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| **FROM:** Controlling DoD Organization. Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310. |

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AWDG-CS 19 November 1969

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SECTION I

OPERATIONS - SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

A. (U) Command. On 12 September Brigadier General Henry J. Muller Jr. departed the division. Effective 16 September Brigadier General James C. Smith assumed duties as assistant division commander (support) and on 26 September Brigadier General John J. Hennessey arrived at Camp Eagle and assumed his duties as assistant division commander (operations).

B. (C) Operations.

1. The division continued its policy of coordination and cooperation with the 1st Division (ARVN) and Thua Thien Province forces in the conduct of all operations. Throughout the period, means were sought to expand both ARVN and province troop participation in division operations. See Inclosure 1, Joint US/GVN Operations Summary.

2. The chronological sequence of combat operations for the period 1 August - 31 October 1969 is as follows:

   a. Operation KENTUCKY JUMPER (1 March - 14 August 1969) — a division-wide operation — continued to conclusion during the reporting period. The primary missions of the operation were: to seek out and destroy VC/NVA forces; to interdict enemy base areas and infiltration routes; to detect, capture or destroy local Viet Cong infrastructure and their sympathizers; disrupt the routes of supply between the rice producing lowlands and population centers, and mountain base camps; and support the Thua Thien Province Accelerated Pacification Program. In addition, the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) in cooperation and coordination with ARVN/GVN forces in the division area of operations continued to conduct combined operations throughout Thua Thien Province, to increase the effectiveness and professionalism of these forces. The following brigade operations were a part of the overall division operation during the reporting period: CAMPBELL STREAMER and MONTGOMERY RENDEZVOUS.

   (1) Operation CAMPBELL STREAMER (13 July - 13 August 1969).

   (a) Task organization:
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2d Brigade Control

2-327 Inf
2-502 Inf
1-327 Inf (27 July - 8 Aug)
2-506 Inf (-) (26 July - 14 Aug)
C/2-17 Cav
1-321 Arty (DS)
B/326 Med
C/316 Engr
5pt Tm, 501 Sig
2d P/2/502 Inf
2-265 BRC
47th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
2/101 MP Co
34 PI Det
TACP 2D TASS
C/101 AHB

TP 2-501 Inf

2-501 Inf
C/3-5 Armored Cav

56th ARVN Regiment

1-54 ARVN Bn
3-54 ARVN Bn
B/12 Arty (ARVN)

Supporting Forces

A & C/2-11 Arty
A/1-40 Arty
A & B/6-33 Arty
2-138 Arty
A & B/2-94 Arty
D/2-130 Arty
C/2-319 Arty

(b) Operation CAMPBELL STREAMER continued to conclusion during the reporting period. Reconnaissance in force and detailed search operations were conducted in the Bach Ma region, southern Phu Loc and northern Hue Duc Districts and the western portion of the Elephant Valley to destroy the 4th NVA Regiment. Light enemy contact was encountered during the reporting period as enemy elements avoided allied operations in the area. Results of the operation were: 58 KIA, 6 POW, 57 individual and 10 crew-served weapons captured. Friendly casualties were: 11 killed and 14 wounded.

(2) Operation MONTGOMERY RENDEZVOUS (8 June - 14 August 1969).

(a) Task organization for reporting period:

1-327 Inf (8-14 Aug)
1-506 Inf (-)

TP 3-5 Armored Cav

Co/3-147 Inf
Plt/C/2-34 Armor

3d ARVN Regiment

1-3 ARVN Bn
2-3 ARVN Bn
3-7 ARVN Cav (APC)
C/12 Arty

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3d ARVN Regiment

Hoc Bao Co

(b) Operation MONTGOMERY Rendezvous, controlled by the 3d Brigade in conjunction with the 3d Regiment, 1st Division (ARVN), continued operations against NVA forces in the high ground to the east of the A Shau Valley (vicinity FB Airborne) and north of the Rao Lao Valley and along Route 547. Sporadic contact was made throughout the reporting period as infantry and armored cavalry units continued reconnaissance in force operations in assigned AO's. 1-8 Cavalry Squadron's night defensive position (Terrain Reference 268392) was engaged by an estimated ten enemy on 4 August. The enemy was engaged with artillery, small arms, 90mm, .50 caliber, and a "Spooky" aircraft. A first light check of the area revealed nine NVA killed, and four individual and two crew-served weapons captured. 1-327 Infantry engaged and killed ten NVA and destroyed a mortar position (vic Terrain Reference 311396) while conducting reconnaissance in force operations west of FB Currahee on 10 August. Results of the operation were: 390 KIA, 10 PW, 185 individual and 43 crew-served weapons captured. Friendly losses were: 56 killed and 179 wounded.

(3) On 14 August, 1st Brigade, with attached units, was released OPCON from the Americal Division and closed at the division base camps. Standdown and refitting operations were conducted by 1-501 and 1-502 Infantry in preparation for future operations with the 2d Brigade.

(4) Cumulative totals for Operation KENTUCKY JUMPER:

(a) Enemy losses:

Total KIA: 1675
Captured: 41
Individual weapons: 1612
Crew-served weapons: 185
Rice: 61.19 tons
Vehicles: 43
SA ammunition: 805,021

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CS ammunition: 32,139

(b) Friendly losses:
US KIA: 391
US WIA: 2103

b. Operation RICHLAND 9'UAR (15 August - 28 September 1969)— a division-wide operation— began and terminated during the reporting period as the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) continued combined airmobile operations to defeat VC/NVA main forces and infrastructure; conducted reconnaissance and surveillance; conducted interdiction of the A Shau Valley; and assisted Government of Vietnam forces to assume a greater responsibility for combat and pacification operations within the division AO. The following brigade operations were a part of the overall division operation during the reporting period: CUMBERLAND THUNDER, CLAIRborne CHUTE, and LOUISIANA LEE.


(a) Task organization:

1-327 Inf
2-327 Inf
2-502 Inf

Supporting Forces

A/2-11 Arty
B/2-138 Arty
A/1-63 Arty
A/4-77 Arty

3d ARVN Regiment

1-1 ARVN Bn
3-3 ARVN Bn

1st Brigade Control

B/2-17 Cav
2-320 Arty (DS)
A/326 Engr (DS)
B/101 AHB (DS)
Spt Tm, 501 Sig
1st FSSE
A/326 Med
B/801 Maint
Plt/826 S& S
4HC 1st Bde
Tm, 101 MT Det
1/265 RRC
L2 Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
TACP 20 TASS

(b) Operation CUMBERLAND THUNDER was initiated as a combined airmobile operation by the 1st Brigade in coordination with the 3d ARVN Regiment to locate and destroy forces, installations, equipment and supplies of the 5th NVA Regiment. Contact during the operation
was light and sporadic, primarily initiated by friendly troops engaging
enemy trail watchers, snipers and rice gathering parties. Enemy initiated
contacts were indirect fire attacks on allied positions, small delaying
actions and sabotage of the Hue-Da Nang Railroad. As allied operations
intensified, the enemy withdrew south out of the 1st Brigade AO and west
into Laos, thus reducing their efforts to gather rice and support from
the populated areas of southern Thua Thien Province. The operation, though
it did not locate or destroy the 5th NVA Regiment, did indicate the lack
of large groups of enemy forces operating in the 1st Brigade area of
operations. Results of the operation were: 83 MIA, 1 POW, 35 individual
and 3 crew-served weapons captured. Friendly losses were one killed
and 25 wounded.


(a) Task organization:

1-501 Inf
1-502 Inf
2-501 Inf
2-506 Inf

2d Brigade Control

1-321 Arty (DS)
3-5 Cav
C/2-17 Cav (DS)
B/326 Med
C/326 Engr (DS)
Spt Tm, 501 Sig
2d FSSE
Tm, 101 MI Det
2/265 HRC
47 Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
34 PI Det
TACP 20 TASS
B/159 AHB

Supporting Forces

A/6-33 Arty
A/2-138 Arty
2-94 Arty
B/1-83 Arty (25 Sep - 28 Sep)
C/183 Arty (25 Sep - 28 Sep)

1st ARVN Regiment

(b) Operation CLAIBORNE CHUTE was targeted against elements of the
5th and 6th NVA Regiment, and elements of the 7th Front which were
believed to be in the rocket belt, and former base areas 114 and 101.
Sporadic contact was made throughout the operation as 2d Brigade elements
conducted several successful ambushes in the lowlands (See Page 9),
reconnaissance in force operations in the rocket belt and canopy, and
responded to intelligence information obtained from Hoi Chans. Information gained from two Hoi Chans on 18 September led elements involved in the operation to a large weapons cache and a mass grave. On 18 September ARP/C/2-17 Cavalry, responding to intelligence information provided by a Hoi Chanh, discovered a weapons cache (vic TB386280) containing 28 individual and 6 crew-served weapons, in addition to 15 cases of AK-47 ammunition. On the following day elements of 1-502 Infantry, while searching out the area of the previous day's contact, discovered the remains of approximately 250 persons missing since TIM 1968. Results of the operation were: 34 KIA, 2 PW, 70 individual and 5 crew-served weapons captured. Friendly losses were 3 killed and 33 wounded.


(a) Task Organization:

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<td>Scty Flt</td>
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<td>A/2-17 Cav (DS)</td>
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<td>TP 2-187 Inf</td>
<td>2-319 Arty (DS)</td>
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<td>3-187 Inf (-)</td>
<td>B (-)/325 Engr (DS)</td>
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<td>C/2-34 Armor (-)</td>
<td>Co/158 AHB (DS)</td>
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<td>TP 3-5 Cav</td>
<td>TACP 20 TASS</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-5 Cav</td>
<td>Spt Tn, 501 Sig</td>
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<td>E/3-187 Inf</td>
<td>3d FSSE</td>
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<td>1/D/3-187 Inf</td>
<td>Tn, 101 MI</td>
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<td>L/C/2-34 Armor</td>
<td>50 Inf Flt (Scout Dog)</td>
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<td>TF 2-7 Cav (ARVN)</td>
<td>3/265 NNC</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-7 Armored Cav</td>
<td>3d ARVN Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/2-3 Inf (ARVN)</td>
<td>C/12 Arty (ARVN)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Operation LOUISIANA LEE was initiated by the 3d Brigade and 3d Regiment, 1st Division (ARVN), which conducted combined airborne and armored reconnaissance in force operations in the A Shau and Da Krong Valleys to destroy enemy forces, interdict enemy lines of communications, locate and destroy enemy caches, deny the enemy
access to these valleys and provide security for Route 547. As the
operation commenced, the enemy assumed a defensive posture and avoided
contact with friendly units. During the course of the operation, the
enemy continued to avoid contact and adopted defensive and evasive
tactics i.e., trail watchers, reconnaissance teams, and small harassing
forces. In addition, the enemy employed indirect fire attacks against
3d Brigade fire bases in the A Shau Valley and a sapper attack against
the 3d Brigade forward CP at FB Berchtesgaden (See Page 10). During
the latter part of the operation, 3-187 Infantry was committed to
the northern A Shau Valley (FB Erskine, FB Cunningham area) to check
the area which had been used by the enemy as a staging and way station
for numerous enemy elements during infiltration into South Vietnam.
Elements were inserted and one company encountered CS type agent
and small arms fire on one LZ. The remainder of the operation yielded
no significant contact but units found numerous signs of recent
activity. Enemy losses during the operation were: 67 KIA, 3 PW,
14 individual and 19 crew-served weapons captured. Friendly losses
were 7 killed and 34 wounded.

(4) Cumulative totals for Operation RICHLAND SQUARE:

(a) Enemy losses:
   KIA: 184
   Captured: 6
   Individual weapons: 150
   Crew-served weapons: 27
   Rice: 2.73 tons
   Vehicles: 9
   SA ammunition: 65,818
   CS ammunition: 4,193

(b) Friendly losses:
   US KIA: 11
   US WIA: 92
c. Operation REPUBLIC SQUARE (29 September - continuing)—a division-wide operation—was initiated at the termination of Operation RICHLAND SQUARE and continued through the reporting period. The primary missions of the operation were: the redeployment of elements into the lowlands to protect and increase security efforts against VC/NVA/VCI; reconnaissance and surveillance operations in the pineda and rocket belt in reaction to hard intelligence information and enemy caches; screening of the redeployment of the 3d Marine Division; and participation in the Thua Thien Province Accelerated Pacification Program. Subordinate brigade and battalion operations are: NORTON FALLS and SATURATE. Cumulative results of Operation REPUBLIC SQUARE as of 31 October were: 126 KIA, 12 PW, 88 individual and 4 crew-served weapons captured. Friendly losses were: 15 US killed and 69 (63 evacuated) wounded.

(1) Operation NORTON FALLS (29 September - continuing).

(a) Task organization:

1-506 Inf
2-506 Inf

2d ARVN Regiment

2-2 ARVN Bn

3d Brigade Control

2-319 Arty (DS)
B (-)/326 Bn (DS)
3d FSGE

Ta, 101 MI Det (DS)
Spt Ta, 301 Sig (DS)
58 Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
TACP 2D TASS
3/265 RMC
C/2-34 Armor (-)

(b) Operation NORTON FALLS (29 September - continuing) was initiated by the 3d Brigade in conjunction with the 2d Regiment, 1st Division (ARVN) in Quang Tri Province to find, fix and destroy enemy forces, base areas, with primary emphasis on screening and quick reaction operations west and northwest of 1st Brigade, 5th Division (Mechanized) area of operations in support of the redeployment of the 3d Marine Division (-). On 2 October 1-506 Infantry and 2-506 Infantry air assaulted into multiple LZ's and established CP's at PB Shrapnel (KD876593) and LZ Scotch (KD911562). Enemy contact throughout the reporting period was sporadic, consisting of indirect and harassing fire attacks on allied positions. On 15 October, the reconnaissance platoon 2-506 Infantry engaged an NVA squad with small arms. A sweep of the area revealed five NVA killed and an equal number of individual weapons captured. Results of Operation NORTON FALLS as of 31 October were: 57 KIA, 1 PW, 19 individual and 1 crew-served weapons captured. Friendly losses were: 5 US killed and 21 US (19...
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Evacuated wounded.

(2) Operation SATURATE (5 October - continuing).

(a) Task organization:

US Forces

1-327 Inf
3 plts, 326 Engr Bn

Sector Forces

142 RF Co
144 RF Co
179 RF Co
955 RF Co
7th RF Co
128 RF Co
155 RF Co

2-56 ARVN Regiment

2-56 ARVN Regiment

Supporting Forces

25th River Assault Group
12th River Assault Group
Union Group Task Force Clearwater
National Police
3d Combined Action Group
Mobile CIC

(b) Operation SATURATE was initiated on 5 October with 1-327 Infantry working in conjunction with ARVN/Thua Thien Sector forces to support cordon and saturation operations in Phu Tho District. The primary missions of the operation are: systematic destruction of all bunkers, caches and enemy elements; construction of security posts and communications routes; and support of Thua Thien Province pacification goals. Due to inclement weather and flooding in the lowlands, the operation was postponed until 5 October. On 6 October, during sweep operations, C/1-327 Infantry observed eight VC sitting on top of a hut (YD867190). The enemy force was engaged with small arms fire, but did not return the fire. A sweep of the area revealed 1 VC KIA, 7 PW, and 7 individual weapons captured. Results as of 31 October were: 7 VC KIA, 7 VC PW, 15 individual weapons captured and no friendly casualties.

3. Other significant activities.

a. Night operations. "The High Price of Rice." This key phrase has been the slogan of the division's night operations. The employment of ambushes extensively throughout the coastal plains and piedmont regions of Thua Thien Province, specifically along suspected enemy lines of communications, has severely hampered the enemy's attempts to gather food from the heavily populated lowlands. The ambushes have exacted...
a heavy toll in enemy killed as they attempted to reach the rice producing lowlands. Noteworthy examples were those conducted by elements of 2-506, 3-187, and 2-327 Infantry Battalions. On 7 September C/2-506 Infantry initiated an ambush five kilometers south of Camp Evans engaging an estimated 25 VC/NVA, killing six and capturing four individual weapons. A sweep the following morning revealed an additional wounded VC/NVA. On 12 October 1/4/2-327 Infantry, five kilometers east of FOB/Tomahawk engaged 6-8 VC with small arms fire killing four and capturing three individual weapons, in addition to 100 pounds of rice. On 14 October 7/8/3-187 Infantry, four kilometers northwest of Camp Evans, engaged 15 NVA moving west to east. The enemy returned small arms and RPG fire and fled. While conducting a sweep of the area, friendly elements received additional RPG rounds from 300 meters to the north. Five NVA were killed and one prisoner of war was captured, in addition to three individual and one crew-served weapons.

b. Sapper attacks on division fire bases. During the early morning of 24 August, FOB Berchtesgaden, location of the 3d Brigade forward CP, was attacked by an unknown size enemy sapper force. The attack was initiated prematurely due to the commencement of a "mad minute" at 0320H, fifteen minutes after a previous mad minute. Immediate contact was made by bunkers located on the southwest side of the perimeter and manned by men of Company B, 1-506 Infantry. Throughout the night intensive artillery, ARA, and USAF "Spooky" gunship fire was brought to bear upon the attacking enemy force. The enemy force employed mortar fire later in the night killing three US. Contact ceased at 1616H. Artillery, ARA, and airstrikes were continuously employed on suspected enemy mortar firing sites and routes of withdrawal. A sweep of the perimeter the following morning revealed 31 enemy killed, 8 RPG launchers, and 6 AK-47's. Friendly losses during the attack were three US killed and eight wounded.

4. Enemy losses during the reporting period:

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<th>KIA</th>
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<th>KBAA</th>
<th>PW</th>
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<td>33</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS 0SPOR-65 (R2) (U)

Ammunition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Demo - Lbs</th>
<th>Doc - Lbs</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>CS</th>
<th>Vehicles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>507.00</td>
<td>29.65</td>
<td>24,045</td>
<td>3,974</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>25.75</td>
<td>293.00</td>
<td>86,510</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>57.25</td>
<td>16.85</td>
<td>6,021</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>590.09</td>
<td>339.50</td>
<td>118,576</td>
<td>5,473</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Friendly losses during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>535</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. G3 air activities for the months of August, September, and October 1969 included:

a. Close air support sorties flown in the division AO during the months of August, September, and October 1969:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>August</th>
<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
<th>Sub-total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preplanned sorties</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>1,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate sorties</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat sky spots</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flareships</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spooky (gunships)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total sorties 2,123

b. Tactical air, dropping 958 tons of bombs and 57 tons of napalm, destroyed 783 bunkers, damaged 79 bunkers, destroyed 191 military structures, damaged 15 military structures, caused 182 secondary explosions,
created 257 secondary fires, and destroyed 2 rocket sites. Enemy transportation was hindered by tactical air when 889 meters of roads were cut, 3 foot bridges, 2 vehicular tunnels, and 1 truck and 2 sampans were destroyed. 32 VC/NVA were killed as a result of tactical air.

c. There were 49 B52 strikes within the division AO during the reporting period.

C. Training.

1. The division air mobility school sponsored by the 101st Aviation Group was conducted twice during the reporting period. Attendance at the class presented on 5-6 September was 57 personnel, including representatives from XXIV Corps, 34 Marine Division, 49th Marine Air Group, and 173d Airborne Brigade. On 17-18 October, personnel attended the school including representatives from 173d Airborne Brigade, 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech), 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, and 1st Battalion, 77th Armor. Because of operational commitments, personnel of the 3d Brigade could not attend the classes on 17-18 October. On 26 October, a special class was presented at the brigade CP for officers of the 3d Brigade.

Designated to familiarize selected personnel with the capabilities and limitations of the division's aviation assets, the school continues to provide general guidance for the proper utilization of aircraft in a combat environment.

2. On 15 September, the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) Sniper School commenced operation. The school is 16 days in length and is capable of training 30 per class. The course provides unit commanders with well trained marksmen capable of engaging targets at extended small arms ranges. To date two classes have been graduated and a third is in progress.

3. During the period of this report a battalion refresher training period was initiated. Under the program all infantry battalions are relieved of operational requirements on a rotating basis for seven days and conduct a minimum of 60 hours of training during that period. Emphasis is placed on tactical training, weapons training, and the conduct of airmobile operations. Additionally during this period, maneuver elements of the battalions become 100% rappel qualified.

4. In addition to conducting replacement training and the combat leaders course, the Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School instituted
a combat commanders course during the reporting period. This three day
course is directed toward providing company grade officers with sufficient
background to successfully lead a platoon or company in combat. Emphasis
in the course is placed on tactical operations and the planning and
utilization of available support. In addition, replacement training was
expanded from five to six days in order to provide more training in
patrolling and ambushes.

5. Reciprocal mobile training was continued in the division with
emphasis placed on training of RF/FP units. In addition to formal
training, combined operations with ARV/F/FP units are conducted
daily. This program has been instrumental in increasing the proficiency of all
participating units.

D. (C) Chemical.

1. General. During August, September, and October, the 101st
Airborne Division (Air-mobile) Chemical Section with operational control
of the 20th Chemical Detachment (CERD) (APN) and the 10th Chemical
Platoon (DS) (Separate) continued its program of chemical combat support.

2. Operations. During the reporting period, the division chemical
section with attached units accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Mission</th>
<th>Number of Missions</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airborne personnel detector</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical CS</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>237 MLRS2, and 498 M7A3 grenades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flame drops</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>492 drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial defoliation</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8115 gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground defoliation</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>850 gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fougasse emplacements</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>641 positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPT inspection/servicing</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>25/17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protective mask inspections</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>6441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops showered</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>775</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Type Mission Number of Missions Amount

Bunker seeding 1 120 grenades

3. The 2oth Chemical Detachment was placed in direct support of the 3d Brigade throughout the month of October. The detachment was tasked with the mission of providing airborne personnel detector support, tactical CS drops and flame drops in support of 3d Brigade combat operations. The detachment was augmented by a flame team and bunker seeding team from the 10th Chemical Platoon. These personnel repaired and serviced flame throwers and seeded caves and bunkers with CS. Placing chemical personnel in direct support of a brigade for a specific operation proved to be a very effective means of integrating chemical support for combat operations.

E. (C) Intelligence.

1. Enemy situation. During the reporting period, the following information was compiled on the enemy situation.

a. At the beginning of the reporting period, the local force companies were moderately active in their respective districts and had the following strengths: C113 and C114 (possibly combined), 110; C115, 80; C116, 20; C117, and C118 (possibly combined), 60; and C119 disbanded. The Phu Loc Armed Battalion had an estimated strength of 250 men. A PW captured 11 July stated that the 5th NVA Regiment had recently received reinforcements. This statement has been corroborated by several PW's during this reporting period. Several intelligence sources indicate that the 5th NVA Regiment base area was SW of Leech Island. The 5th Regiment's strength was about 1800. The 4th NVA Regiment, with a strength of approximately 900 men, continued to operate in its traditional base area in Phu Loc District and continued to evade contact as Operation CAMPBELL STREAM moved into its final phase. The 29th and 803d Regiments, with about 2200 men each, were believed to be located in Base Area 611 west of the A Shau Valley. The 806th Battalion, 6th NVA Regiment, was located in the vicinity of TD3310. Other 6th NVA Regiment forces were unlocated. Elements of the 7th Front continued to operate in the vicinity of former Base Area 101, in Quang Tri Province, with a strength of about 3000 personnel.

b. Enemy activity during the month of August remained at a moderately high level with the enemy increasing the number of rocket attacks on Hue City and major allied installations in the lowlands. On 24 August FB Barchtesgadon received a combination mortar, RPG, SA fire and sapper
attack from a U/I sapper element. The results of this attack were 3 US KIA, 18 US WIA, 31 NVA KIA, 10 IWC, and 8 CSMC. An element of the 6th NVA Regiment was believed responsible for the attack, possibly the K12 Sapper Battalion.

c. The death of Ho Chi Minh (3 September 1969), a three day cease fire (8-10 September), and sporadic monsoon rains produced a decrease in enemy activity as enemy initiated contacts dropped from 203 in August to 61 in September. Allied units continued operations in the rocket belt, the Phu Loc Mountains, the Ruong Ruong Valley, and the A Shau Valley area but the enemy avoided contact. The most significant contact occurred in southern Quang Tri (P) on 25 September, 4km NE of FB Jerome, when the 4th Battalion, 1st ARVN Regiment engaged an unknown size enemy force with small arms fire, which resulted in 19 enemy KIA, 6 IWC, and 4 CSMC.

d. During the month of October, the record rainfall restricted allied operations in the canopy. The 3d Brigade conducted Operation NORTH FALLS in northwestern Quang Tri (P), while acting as a screening force for the 3d Marine Division's withdrawal. 3d Brigade forces engaged enemy forces several times, accounting for over 50 enemy killed. In Thua Thien (P) enemy activity was generally moderate to light. There were two major incidents. On 3 October Camp Evans received 3x122mm rockets resulting in two damaged huts. On 27 October ARVN artillery and ground forces accounted for 28 enemy killed at TD378268, 2km NE of FB O'Reilly. Four 120mm mortars were captured in the contact. Documents indicated the enemy force belonged to the K35 Artillery Battalion, 6th NVA Regiment.

e. On 7 August 1969 at TD223203 ARVN forces captured a notebook which belonged to Lt. General Le Trung Tin, CO of MNNTH. The document contained a description of Tin's visit to Hanoi in April and May 1969 and new instructions for conduct of the war in MNNTH. The notebook revealed that the enemy expects an agreement (possibly a ceasefire) to be signed near the end of this year (1969). General Tin received instructions to enlarge military strengths and political organizations in the lowlands and prepare supplies for an offensive once an agreement is in sight. A recent agent report stated that the enemy has been working at resupplying for the past three months without rest, just as they had done before Tet, 1968. Several recent PW's and Ho Chi Minh have confirmed the fact that the 439th Infiltration Group (400 men) arrived in southern Thu Thien (P) in May 1969 and after 3 to 4 months training, was integrated into the units of the 5th NVA Regiment.

f. By 31 October 1969, the local force companies had reinforced and increased the levels of activity in their respective districts with the
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following strengths: C113, 100 (vic YD6430); C114, 10 (recently reinforced, located vic YD6416); C115, 10; C116, 20 (presently in the canopy, unlocated); Phu Yen Special Action Unit (C117 and C118), 10 (unlocated). The Phu Loc Armed Battalion had a strength of approximately 250 men operating in the Phu Loc Mountains. The 4th NVA Regiment continued to operate in the Phu Loc Mountains (200394). The 5th NVA Regiment was deployed in its traditional fashion with the 810th Infantry Battalion (vic YD6015), 804th Infantry Battalion (vic YD6045), and the K32 Rocket Artillery Battalion (unlocated) forward west of the "rocket belt", and the Chi Thu I and II Sapper Battalions probably located near the regimental QP near the Laotian border. The 29th and 30th Regiments were believed to be in the vicinity of eastern Base Area 611 in Laos (YD2956) west of the A Shau Valley. The 6th NVA Regiment in a significant redeployment moved elements closer to the Phong Dien (D) lowlands (vic YD6525). The 7th Front continued to operate west of former Base Area 101 in southern Quang Tri (P) (vic YD2090).

g. In the B5 (DMZ) Front, at the end of the reporting period, the level of enemy activity remained moderately high with elements of the 246th NVA Regiment deployed south of the DMZ in western Quang Tri (P) (XD9664). The 8th NVA Artillery Battalion remained near the central DMZ. Elements of the 27th NVA Regiment and the 31st NVA Regiment continued to operate south of the DMZ in central and eastern Quang Tri (P). The 9th Regiment, 30th Division was active in the central DMZ area but was believed to have redeployed north of the DMZ during October. The 126th Naval Sapper Training Regiment was located northeast of the Cua Viet River in Quang Binh (P), NVN (vic YD2090).

2. Viet Cong infrastructure activities.

a. August 1969 witnessed a sharp decrease in reported VCI activity and a sharp increase in friendly initiated military operations. Indications are that allied operations in the lowlands kept the VC/NVA off balance and prevented them from massing their forces for large scale offensive operations. Operation CAMPBELL STREAMER pushed the 4th NVA Regiment out of the Phu Loc (D) area deep into the mountains of Thua Thien (P). An operation conducted by the 1st Battalion, 54th ARVN Regiment, RF's, and PF's during 16-24 August 1969, curtailed an enemy buildup in southern Phu Thu (D).

(1) During the month of August, VCI eliminations decreased sharply with 22 eliminations. Five of these eliminations were considered significant by MACV reporting standards. The reason for the decrease appears to be the lack of targeting on the part of the individual DIOCC's,
and the lack of VCI activity in the lowlands.

(2) The following is a table of VCI incidents by district for the month of August 1969:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>FIN/ECON</th>
<th>F&amp;G</th>
<th>Shg</th>
<th>Intal</th>
<th>Kidn</th>
<th>Assas</th>
<th>Terr</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phong Dien</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huong Dien</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quang Dien</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huong Tra</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huong Thuy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Vang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Thu</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Loc</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>Vinh Loc</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nam Hoa</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>31</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) During the month of August there were 101 contacts in the lowlands. Of these contacts 31 were enemy initiated and 70 friendly initiated.

(4) PW's and ralliers disclosed that there was a 28-man platoon of the C2 Company, 804th Battalion, 5th Regiment, operating in central Phu Thu (D). It is believed that this platoon is both advising the Phu Vang Special Action Unit and also operating militarily as a separate unit.

(5) Rice parties of the 800th Infantry Battalion and K35 Artillery Battalion of the 6th NVA Regiment appeared to have moved into northern Phong Dien (D). A PW from the K35 Artillery Battalion captured on 19 August 1969 at YD5916 stated that his unit was suffering from a rice shortage. Another PW stated that the K35 Artillery Battalion and C113
local force company were working together with the mission of collecting rice.

b. During the month of September, VCI related activity increased as the enemy attempted to obtain as much of the fall rice harvest as possible. Contacts in the lowlands also increased sharply as allied forces interdicted enemy rice and infiltration routes. Propaganda stressing US troop withdrawals increased significantly.

(1) During the month of September, there were 145 VCI eliminations with 64 of these being reportable. The increased eliminations were caused by the increase of activity in the lowlands during the fall rice harvest.

(2) The following is a table of VCI incidents by district for the month of September, 1969:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>FIN/ECON</th>
<th>Pmg</th>
<th>Sbtg</th>
<th>Intal</th>
<th>Kidn</th>
<th>Assas</th>
<th>Ter</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phong Dien</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quang Dien</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huong Dien</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huong Tra</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huong Thuy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Vang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Thu</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Loc</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vinh Loc</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hue</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nam Hoa</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 36 15 0 6 0 4 2 63

(3) During September there were 94 contacts in the lowlands. Of these
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contacts, 25 were enemy initiated and 69 friendly initiated.

(4) Rice parties from elements of the 6th NVA Regiment continued to operate in the Phong Dien District lowlands in close conjunction with the 611 local force company. On 6 September, two squads of the C/2-506 Infantry observed 80-120 NVA walking along a trail vicinity YD520262, confirming the presence of major NVA elements in the area.

(5) During September, the fall rice harvest, which began about 20 August 1969, was almost completed. About 85% (10,500 hectares) of the rice had been harvested. In the southern districts, 90-95% of the rice, and in the northern districts of Phong Dien, Huong Dien, and Quang Dien, about 60% of the rice had been harvested. Typhoon Doris caused an estimated 3% damage to the rice crop.

c. VCI activity for the month of October decreased sharply in comparison with September. This was probably caused by allied operations, but it must also be noted that more stringent criteria were employed by XXIV Corps for verification of VCI incidents. Most of the incidents involved rice collection and propaganda; a few intelligence collection and terrorism incidents were noted.

(1) During the month of October 19 new VCI were identified and 8 eliminated. The decrease in eliminations may have been caused by the lack of VCI activity in the lowlands.

(2) The following is a table of VCI incidents by district for the period 1-23 October 1969:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>FIN/ECON</th>
<th>Pend</th>
<th>Stog</th>
<th>Intel</th>
<th>Kidn</th>
<th>Assoc</th>
<th>Terr</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phong Dien</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guang Dien</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huong Dien</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huong Tra</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huong Thuy</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Vang</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Thu</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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3. G2 air.

a. During this quarter the Imagery Interpretation (II) Section, 101st Military Intelligence Detachment completed their move to Phu Bai and have increased the photo reconnaissance capability of the division. They are currently in the process of establishing both an infrared (IR) and SLAR ground data terminal (GDT). These GDT's will enable the division to take quicker action on all SLAR and IR missions.

b. Also during the quarter, the G2 air section was divided to form a new section, G2 ground surveillance. The ground surveillance section assumed responsibility for all ground surveillance activities to include ground surveillance radars, anti-intrusion devices, and unattended ground sensors, with G2 air retaining aerial reconnaissance and surveillance assets.

4. G2 ground surveillance.

a. On 25 September 1969, staff responsibility for ground surveillance radars and sensors was transferred from G2 air to the newly organized G2 ground surveillance section.

b. Sensors.

(1) The division sensor platoon was organized with an assigned strength of three officers and 30 enlisted personnel. In addition, one sensor officer and one enlisted man have been assigned to each brigade. The total assigned strength for sensor personnel in the division is six officers
and 33 enlisted men. All officers and 20 enlisted men are school trained. The remaining 13 non-school trained enlisted personnel were assigned during the reporting period and have received formal instruction at division level and extensive on-the-job training at monitor sites and on sensor implant missions.

(2) With the redeployment of ground troops from the A Shau Valley, monitor sites covering the area were closed. Monitor sites were reestablished in the Thu Thien (P) piedmont area to extend coverage of this area in conjunction with the redeployment of ground troops into the piedmont area. On 25 October 1969 responsibility for monitoring air-readout sensor strings in northwestern Quang Tri (P) was transferred from the 3d Marine Division to the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). On the same date responsibility for operating the monitor site at FB Fuller (YOD159) was transferred from the 3d Marine Division to a combined monitor team from the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) and the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). With the assumption of control of the 3d Marine Division sensor string, the total number of sensor strings controlled by the division increased from twenty-three ground read-out strings to thirty-two ground read-out strings and twenty air read-out strings.

(3) During the reporting period the division program for assisting 1st ARVN Division sensor personnel in training and procurement of sensor equipment under the MACV Tight Jaw Plan was completed. The division sponsored the 3d and 5th ARVN Regiment's (1st ARVN Division) sensor programs under the XXIV Corps Tight Jaw Plan. The 1st ARVN Division has assumed responsibility for operating their own monitor sites and implanting sensors in their AO. As of 20 October 1969, the MATT for 1st ARVN Division assumed responsibility for procurement of sensor equipment. Prior to this date, the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) was responsible for the procurement of this equipment.

(4) Emplacement of USD-W1 line sensors around base camps and fire bases was initiated during the reporting period. Emplacement has been temporarily halted pending receipt of phone line cables and annunciators needed to complete installation. Ninety-four USD-W1 devices are programmed to be employed within the division AO.

(5) On 27 October 1969 responsibility for the monitor site at FB Los Banos (AUB300) was transferred to the 1st Marine Division. With the transfer of this site the number of division monitor sites was reduced to five. Two additional monitor sites will be established to expand sensor coverage of the approaches into the piedmont area.
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(6) The XM-63 claymore firing device and the SARS antenna systems were employed during the reporting period. The SARS antenna system was used to relay sensor activations to distant monitor sites where normal line-of-sight between the monitor sites and the sensor string could not be obtained due to terrain masking. XM-63 firing devices were employed around two sensor strings. When sensor strings were activated the XM-63 devices were fired. Immediate BDA could not be accomplished and results were inconclusive.

c. Ground surveillance radar. Infantry battalions received instruction during the month of September on the operation and maintenance of AN/PPS-5 radars. Reallocation of radar sets is being initiated to provide AN/PPS-4 back-up radars for deadlined AN/PPS-5 radars.

5. Counter Intelligence Section, 101st Military Intelligence Detachment.

a. During the period 1 August to 31 October 1969 the CI section, 101st Military Intelligence, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne) engaged in a variety of activities in support of its primary mission of safeguarding the 101st Airborne Division (Airborne) from enemy sabotage, espionage and subversion. CI inspections of unit’s personnel, document and physical security programs were conducted to detect vulnerable areas subject to enemy exploitation. CI agents monitored the division’s base camp security program to detect enemy agents among the local nationals and third country nationals employed by the division, and conducted frequent liaison with allied intelligence agencies to obtain information pertinent to the division. Personnel security investigations, complaint type investigations, and limited investigations were conducted to increase personnel security within the division.

b. Through the collection effort of a CI agent in Phu Loc (D), four successful ambushes were planned resulting in 18 VC/NVA KIA, 1 VC PW, 16 IWC, and 2 CSWC.

c. Base camp security.

(1) The CI section continued its collection of biographical data of local national and third country national personnel working for the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). The effort to establish casual sources on Camp Eagle to provide information regarding enemy espionage on and out of Camp Eagle was continued. Numerous spot checks were made on local national and third country national personnel to insure
they had appropriate clearances and were not associated with VC
organizations or intelligence organizations.

(2) Close liaison was maintained with the Industrial Relations Division,
Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam, to assist base camp security in identification
and control efforts.

d. The CI section maintained liaison with XXIV Corps Headquarters,
Phu Bai; 525th MI Group Hue/Phu Bai and Quang Tri; the Pacification,
Security and Coordination Headquarters, Hue; Special Police Advisor,
Hue; Province Interrogation Center Advisor, Hue; Static Census Grievance
Advisor, Hue; Phoenix Committee, Hue; Combined Information Coordinating
Element (CICE), Hue; 15th CIT, Dong Ha; the 517th MIB, Quang Tri; and
all DIOCC's.


a. Precipitation data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>23.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>62.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. The month of August was unusual in that it set a record with
the least amount of rainfall recorded in this area. Also significant
during the month of August were the extremely high surface winds, recorded
in excess of 50 knots.

c. The month of September set a record for monthly September rainfall,
which was 4.29 inches more than the average. One typhoon was recorded
in the area.

d. During October, monthly average and monthly maximum rainfall
records were broken. Nearly 15 inches of rain was recorded above the
monthly maximum. The 24-hour maximum rainfall record was broken with
17.21 inches recorded in one 24-hour period. The old record was 11.1
inches.

F. (U) Personnel.
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1. During the reporting period the division experienced a reduction in the number of casualties as compared to the previous reporting period. The lull in enemy activity has caused a decided decrease in casualties and this trend continues at a low level.

2. There has been an increase in the percent of authorized strength in maneuver battalions since the previous reporting period. The division is experiencing the largest DEROS period of the year and strengths are being closely monitored by USAV which is attempting to maintain the division at an operational level commensurate with the mission.

3. Personnel turbulence in the division continued to increase as the division moved closer to its peak DEROS period (November). During the period the division welcomed a new ADC(G), a new G1, G2, G3 and G4.

4. Losses in MOS 11 series stabilized, with a total of 101.6% of authorized strength at the close of the period. MOS 11 series continued to be monitored to insure that maneuver battalions are maintained at operational strength.

5. During the period, twenty new doctors reported for duty. At present, over one-half of the division's physician strength has been with the organization less than three months. At the beginning of this period the division's strength in enlisted medical MOS was adequate, but there was a decline during the period, due to lack of replacement of DEROS losses. There was, however, an increase of enlisted medical personnel in the last two weeks of October.

6. In August, staff supervision of the division aviation safety officer was transferred from ACOFS, G1 to DAO. During the months of August, September and October, there was a notable decrease in aircraft accidents: five during August, nine during September, and eight in October. The result is 21 aircraft accidents below the level of the last period. Aircraft of the division have continued to fly approximately 1000 hours per day, with a slight decrease during the first ten days of October because of poor flying weather. Based on the marked decrease in aircraft accidents for the past three months, and the continuation of approximately 300,000 flying hours per month, strong emphasis placed on standardization and safety appears to be fruitful. A slight problem was encountered within the division during September due to the shortage of field grade officers qualified in the OH-6A helicopter to perform accident investigation duties. A change to division regulation 385-1 now requires the senior member to be a field grade officer and that he be assisted by at least one IP in the type of aircraft involved.
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7. During the reporting period, military police support withdrew concurrently with the movement of supported units from the canopy. Emphasis of military police operations concentrated primarily on post, camp, and station operations, while necessary patrol and escort activities were maintained on CL-1 and routes 5A6, 547, and 551. Division MP's assumed responsibility for all gates in the entire Camp Eagle/Gia Le complex, permitting more effective, centrally coordinated control of personnel movements. Upon relocation of the 1st Brigade to Camp Eagle, its supporting platoon was withdrawn from a direct support role, and retained in general support of the Camp Eagle/Gia Le complex.

8. During the period the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) APO continued to provide postal services at a high rate of efficiency. The following statistics are shown by month.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Money Orders</th>
<th>Number Sold</th>
<th>Number Cashed/Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>$951,705.60</td>
<td>15,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>$1,025,399.35</td>
<td>15,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>$1,060,480.44</td>
<td>15,409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$3,037,585.39</td>
<td>46,213</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dollar Value of Stamps Sold

| August       | $26,239.00  |
| September    | $19,642.00  |
| October      | $26,876.00  |
| Total        | $72,777.00  |

Flow of Mail

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incoming</th>
<th>Outgoing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>380,745 lbs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Incoming</th>
<th>Outgoing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>427,283 lbs</td>
<td>110,927 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>500,264 lbs</td>
<td>141,776 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,308,292 lbs</td>
<td>373,901 lbs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

G. (C) Logistics.

1. General.

   a. Support of the A Shau Valley Task Force dominated logistic operations during the time period August - September. The 3d PSSE was located at FSB Blaze and supervised all combat service support functions. One hundred and fifty-four tons of resupply were required on a daily basis to support the task force. Supplies were built up from a two day level of approximately 400 tons to a five day level by 10 September in preparation for the impending monsoon period. On 13 September, operations at FSB Blaze reached a peak with 1,093 tons of all classes of supplies on-hand to support approximately 3,200 personnel and twenty-four tubes of artillery. The JP-4 storage capacity was increased to 140,000 gallons and the ammunition to 560 tons. Daily resupply was accomplished by 5 ton and 12 ton S&F trucks to FSB Blaze and airlifted forward by CH-47 to Currahee, Berchtesgaden, Eagles Nest, Rendezvous, Destiny, and the 3-5th Cavalry Squadron.

   b. Construction of FSB Rendezvous created a massive task of lifting 1,150 tons of Class IV (tactical lumber and fortification material) to FSB Rendezvous. Route 547 was upgraded and was utilized by 5 ton trucks to transport construction materials from FSB Blaze to FSB Rendezvous. CH-54's were used to lift priority lumber requirements to FSB Rendezvous.

   c. In late September, a plan was developed to close all fire bases in the A Shau Valley. Backhaul of supplies and construction materials began on 24 September. By 2 October 3,000 tons of supplies had been backhauled into FSB Birmingham, which was used as a central point for the collection of all supplies. FSB Bastogne was scheduled to be opened and much of the backhauled material was programmed for the construction of that fire base and the improvement of FSB Birmingham. The remainder was retrograded to the 26th (GS) Group in Phu Bai or used to fill resupply requirements at fire bases located in the southern portion of the division AO.
d. On 2 October the 3d Brigade initiated operations in northern Quang Tri Province at Mai Loc. Daily resupply of approximately 140 tons was moved over highway and by CH-47 from Quang Tri to Mai Loc and to forward battalion fire bases.

(1) Class I resupply was provided by the Marine ration point in Dong Ha and moved by US Army reefer vans to Mai Loc. There, a brigade consolidated mess provided one hot meal daily to personnel at Mai Loc and forward fire bases.

(2) Class III was moved from Quang Tri to Mai Loc by 5,000 gallon tankers. The initial 20,000 gallon JP-4 capacity was increased to 40,000 gallons on 13 October. Daily consumption of JP-4 averaged approximately 19,000 gallons.

(3) Class V was provided by the Quang Tri ASP. Ammunition required at forward fire bases was airlifted from Quang Tri directly to the fire base. Less than pallet loads of ammunition, small arms ammunition, and 2.75 rockets were moved by truck to Mai Loc. A helicopter rearm point was established at Mai Loc to support all division and Delta Force helicopters.

e. A C-130 airdrop program was established in the A Shau Valley to clarify airlift procedures, train unit personnel in proper recovery and request procedures, and to provide an all-weather resupply capability. Two airdrop and one airland resupply missions were accomplished as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Nr Aft</th>
<th>Class Resupply</th>
<th>Cargo (lbs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Shau Airstrip</td>
<td>28 Aug</td>
<td>3 C-130</td>
<td>I, III, V</td>
<td>87,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerber Airfield</td>
<td>1 Sep</td>
<td>8 C-7A</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>43,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rendezvous</td>
<td>15 Sep</td>
<td>2 C130</td>
<td>I, III, V</td>
<td>59,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. Super contact teams, organized and provided by each FSEK, were provided on the average of one every two or three days during the reporting period to troops returning from unit operations or for battalion standdown/refresher training. The number of company-size marshalling operations conducted between 1 August - 31 October were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st Bde</th>
<th>Super Contact Team</th>
<th>Partial Contact Team</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-327</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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2. Transportation.

a. The division movement control monitored the unit movement of
the 1st Brigade from Tam Ky to Tam My Ramp and Phu Bai Airfield. The
lift of the brigade together with supporting elements consisted of
twenty-eight C-130 sorties, six C-123 sorties and five LST's. The
lift was accomplished over a period of five days (10 Aug - 14 Aug 69).
The following number of personnel and equipment were moved on the
dates indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Pax</th>
<th>Equipment (S/T)</th>
<th>Mode</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 Aug</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Aug</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>Sea</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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b. The division movement control monitored the unit movement of 3d Brigade personnel from Camp Evans to Nai Loc. The lift of the brigade consisted of twenty-one C-123 sorties. The lift was accomplished over a period of two days (30 Sep - 1 Oct 1969). The following number of personnel and equipment were moved on dates indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Pax</th>
<th>Equipment (S/T)</th>
<th>Mode</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 Aug</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Aug</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Aug</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Aug</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Aug</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Aug</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>Sea</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. The division received approximately 9,350 short tons of cargo through the Navy facilities at Tam Ky.

d. Aircraft sorties flown in support of the division (CH-47 and C-130).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Pax</th>
<th>Cargo (S/T)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>1,955</td>
<td>9,638</td>
<td>5,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>1,332</td>
<td>8,296</td>
<td>3,755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>931</td>
<td>8,773</td>
<td>2,698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,218</td>
<td>26,707</td>
<td>11,952</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Aircraft maintenance.

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a. Technical supply. On-hand pre-positioned turbine engine stocks, authorized by the aviation material management command (AMMC), for stock at the direct support units (DSU) within the battalion, improved supply effectiveness during the reporting quarter. A single company of the battalion was selected as the controller for the engines with single point consolidation for efficiency and for proximity to the aerial main supply route. As a result of this procedure, engines now account for only 6% of the total non-operational repair supply (NORMS).

b. The 5th Transportation Battalion is now transceiving aircraft repair parts requisitions to the AMMC. Liaison personnel of the battalion receive the transmitted requisitions twice daily. A minimum of 18 hours is saved using this method.

c. Until 1 October 1969, a dedicated C-130 aircraft had been utilized to transport repair parts from Saigon depot to Phu Bai. This service was terminated on 1 October 1969. Using standard aerial transportation procedures a backlog of repair parts awaiting shipment from the Saigon depot developed. Dedicated airlift transportation was resumed on 16 October 1969, and as of the reporting date no backlog exists. During the routine shipment period, the average time from shipment until delivery at Phu Bai was 3-4 days. Dedicated shipment time is one day.

d. Following a prolonged no-fly (weather) period, a large influx of fringe items were requested by supporting units. It has been determined that more thorough, in-depth inspections were conducted during the no-fly period which uncovered previously undetected faults. This type of supply activity can be expected when aircraft are not being flown to the maximum extent.

e. Preventive maintenance periodic (PMP) #12 CH-47B/C. Because of a large number of the division's CH-47's approaching their 1200 hours PMP, plans are in progress to conduct these inspections without jeopardizing the lift capability of the division. The following actions have been taken:

(1) A study was made to determine the "in-house" capability of the division to conduct these inspections.

(2) Coordination was made with higher echelons of maintenance to accomplish inspections or exchange aircraft during those periods where workloads exceeded organic capability.

(3) Special tool requirements, facilities and components changes
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were reviewed to determine weaknesses in organic maintenance and supply operations.

(4) Personnel reviews were conducted to concentrate qualified personnel during peak loads.

(5) Maintenance personnel will be centralized to provide uniformity in quality control, work flow, training and safety.

(6) Continued liaison is being accomplished with the CH-47 units to update information about flying time on aircraft and status of time change components.

f. Communications. A radio teletype net, established during the previous reporting period, linked the battalion with depots A & B (Saigon and Tul Nhon). It has proven its worth in providing updated information on backlogged parts shipments and in expediting requisitions. During the reporting period the battalion installed a radio link at Da Nang for division aircraft backup support.

4. Supply.

a. During the period 1 August 1969 through 31 October 1969, the 426th S&S Battalion (CS) continued to provide supply and transportation support for the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) in operations: KENTUCKY JUMPER, MONTGOMERY RENDEZVOUS, CAMPBELL STREAMER, RICHLAND SQUARE, REPUBLIC SQUARE, and NORTON FALLS.

b. During this quarter, Company B externally sling loaded approximately 3,580 sorties of Class I, II & IV, III and V supplies to the division fire bases. A total of 22 four-hour classes were given to units of the division on techniques of sling loading and care and maintenance of air items. Twenty-five units within the division had their air items inspected by a team from Company B.

c. A 24-man detachment from Company A, Co B, and HC Co supported the 3d Brigade Operation MONTGOMERY RENDEZVOUS in the A Shau Valley utilizing a forward supply point at FSB Blaze. At FSB Blaze a 60,000 gallon JP-4 storage capacity was established for slick refueling and an experimental 50,000 gallon storage bag was emplaced for the refueling of Chinooks and Cranes. An ASP was established at FSB Blaze operated by ammunition specialists from Company A. Class V was primarily trucked in using route 547 and hooked out to units during the A Shau Valley campaign. Also initiated was delivery of ice, ice cream, and A rations to field units. Company A p
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Loaded ice, ice cream, and A rations in conex containers at Corregidor Hook Pad. Chinooks hooked the conexes to Fire Base Blaze where the rations were further distributed to supported units. A 900 cu. ft. refrigeration unit was used to hold perishables until issue was made. Company A also established a material handling team consisting of five men and two 6,000 pound forklifts to speed up receipt and issue of supplies.

d. During the quarter a green tag team was initiated to inspect ammunition backhauls to insure that no unsafe loads were shipped. A total of 51 green tag teams were employed during the reporting period.

e. The 1st Brigade forward supply platoon assisted the 1st Brigade in its move from Tam Ky to Camp Eagle.

f. POL personnel from the 2d Platoon at LZ Sally supported the 2d Brigade in the underbrush burning project in the area surrounding FB Birmingham. Approximately 1600 acres were burned to provide the fighting soldier with better vision of possible enemy approaches.

        g. The evacuation of FB Rendezvous and FSB Blaze saw the establishment of a temporary storage area at FB Birmingham. 3,000 tons of barrier materials were backhauled and transhipped to the new location at FB Bastogne.

h. All fire bases in support of the A Shau Valley operations were closed during this quarter. Relocation of 3d Brigade elements to Mai Loc for operations in conjunction with Marine redeployment increased the supply and transport support requirements of the battalion.

i. In preparation for the cold/wet season, a stockage of appropriate gear was established to provide the individual soldier with his needs during the monsoon season. A “Dry Socks Program” was established and approximately 35,000 pairs of socks were issued in support of this program.

j. Project Edit/Challenge concerning high priority requests and requests for inordinate quantities of nice-to-have items, continued. An average of seven percent of all requests received were rejected as a result of Edit/Challenge procedures.

k. To insure that ice cream reached the combat soldier in the best possible condition, the battalion shipped ice cream packed with dry ice to the field.
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1. The USARV AGI-CMMI was conducted during this quarter. The battalion passed the AGI-CMMI, receiving complimentary remarks regarding billets, maintenance and training.

m. On 28 September 1969, a detachment from Company A was sent to Quang Tri to establish a supply base for the 3d Brigade Operation NORTON FALLS near the DMZ. A forklift driver, FO1 and ammunition specialists were sent to Mai Loc to establish a forward supply point in the brigade trains area. Working closely with 28th General Support Group units, this detachment provided the 3d Brigade with Class I, II and IV, III, and V supplies. A seven point 40,000 gallon capacity slick refuel pad was established at Mai Loc and manned by Company A personnel.

n. A retrograde program was established allowing units to have free turn-in of excess serviceable and unserviceable items of equipment.

o. During the quarter, the Rock Crusher refuel pad (40,000 gallon storage capacity of JP-4) closed operations, the Roy refuel pad (20,000 gallon storage capacity of JP-4) opened operations, and the Birmingham refuel pad (40,000 gallon storage capacity of JP-4) opened operations.

p. The battalion continued its participation in the DISCOM civic action project at the Nuoc Ngot Orphanage in Hue throughout August and September. Wiring was completed at the orphanage as well as screening of windows and doors. Donations of money, clothing, food, soap, and candy were made by members of the battalion.

q. During the reporting period, constant emphasis was placed on perimeter improvement. Trenches were improved and the fighting positions were reinforced. Bunkers were re-sandbagged and covered with a three to five inch layer of concrete. All but three bunkers were concreted during the reporting period. Relaying of tactical wire was accomplished on the perimeter where rain damage had weakened the defense. Sapper classes were conducted by base defense personnel and attended by all battalion members. Sandbagging continued in and around work areas as well as the barracks.

r. Increased emphasis was placed on safety and fire prevention. Wet weather driving and night driving classes were conducted for all drivers. Monthly inspections were conducted to insure that adequate fire prevention controls were established. Weekly fire drills were also conducted at all major refuel pads.

s. The water supply problem continued. Congestion at the Phu Bai water point as well as those located at Camp Eagle necessitated a twenty-
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four hour a day water resupply operation to meet existing water requirements.

5. Ground maintenance.

a. During this quarter, the 801st Maintenance Battalion continued to maintain COMML, armament and automotive equipment below the USARV goal. The battalion has established a goal of a five percent deadline rate for automotive equipment but has not attained that objective this quarter. A recapitulation of support maintenance activity is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>5444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament</td>
<td>4061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>1063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>1564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>1130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13262</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Deadline percentages in major commodity areas were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Begin</th>
<th>End</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armament</td>
<td>0.60%</td>
<td>0.22%</td>
<td>0.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>4.50%</td>
<td>4.10%</td>
<td>3.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>8.20%</td>
<td>5.80%</td>
<td>7.13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Technical supply activities during the quarter experienced fluctuations in work load due to AGI and CMMI inspections. Demand accommodation remained at a steady 80% while demand satisfaction dropped from an average of 60% to 39%. This was due to a significant increase in requisitions being submitted by supported units; the average of 2500 requisitions per week jumped to an average of 4455 during the month of September and dropped to an average of 3024 for the month of October. This unusually large influx of requisitions drove zero balances from a low of 2902 to a high of 3628 during the period. Corresponding percentages increased from 41% to 50%. A detailed zero balance study was initiated as
AVDG-GC

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As a result of this abnormal increase and the zero balance lines were deleted from the ASL. At the end of October this resulted in 6364 ASL lines, down from a high of 7414 lines during the period. Zero balance lines correspondingly dropped from a high of 1628 for the period to 279 after the deletions. Supply transactions during the period were:

- August: 18937
- September: 23182
- October: 18529

(d) Project count inventories and location surveys during the period produced the following agreement percentages:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Inventory</th>
<th>Survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>71.3%</td>
<td>87.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>67.0%</td>
<td>85.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>63.0%</td>
<td>91.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(e) Project Edit II/Priority was implemented by the battalion by authority of message, 73840, AVHCD-SP, HQ USARV, dated July 1969, subject: The Uniform Material Movement and Issue Priority System.

(f) Technical assistance visits.

(1) A new dimension has been added to the support of the division maneuver battalions. While each battalion is conducting its scheduled training standdown, a technical assistance team from the supporting maintenance company conducts a comprehensive technical inspection of all weapons, electronic equipment, generators, and vehicles. This on-the-spot contact has achieved the double benefit of increasing material readiness and identifying organizational maintenance problem areas while they are in a manageable stage.

(2) As in the past, numerous small unit standdowns were conducted in conjunction with super-contact team activities. These contact visits have proved beneficial in upgrading the availability of weapons and equipment in the hands of the individual soldier.
(3) A further expansion in the technical assistance visit field involves personal contact between commanders of the supporting maintenance companies and the material readiness personnel in the supported units. This contact is conducted on a scheduled basis. Immediate results are observable in the continually diminishing organizational deadline rates.

g. Material.

(1) The Joint Logistics Review Board, headed by General Frank S. Besson, Jr., visited the 801st Maintenance Battalion Technical Supply on 15 September 1969. The board was accompanied by the III MAF commanding general, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) commanding general, assistant division commander, and division support command commander. After an introductory briefing by the battalion commander, the group toured the Red Ball section, the yard locations and operations, and the NCR 500 vans where the OIC explained the operating concepts and techniques concerning the NCR 500.

(2) Mr McKay and Mr Pavier of Canadair Limited visited the battalion to discuss the carrier, utility, articulated, XM571. The current deadline rate and the required parts were discussed. Mr Pavier pointed out that a modified clutch had been put in the supply system and should be received soon.

(3) SP5 Wisecup, a FADAC technician from Frankford Arsenal on TDY to I Corps, visited the 801st Maintenance Battalion from 6 September to 10 September 1969. He spent the period in the electronics maintenance platoon presenting new trouble shooting and repair techniques to the FADAC repairmen. His instruction included "bench work" on the FADAC computer, FADAC fault tester, and signal data converter.

(4) Mr Johnson, a Cutler-Hammer factory service representative for AN/PPS-5, worked with the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) from mid-August to the end of September. During the period he toured the 2d and 3d Brigade AO's, teaching operation and organizational maintenance of the AN/PPS-5 radar to organizational personnel. During his instructional periods, he discovered that many of the AN/PPS-5 radars were not fully operational and that, due to the lack of previous training, the operators were not aware that the sets were not fully operational. Mr Johnson's instruction was directed toward solving the problem.

h. Excess property turn-in.

(1) From 1 October to 22 October, the 801st Maintenance Battalion, in
conjunction with other DISCOMM units, organized and executed an excess property turn-in program. The purpose of the program was to reduce the burden on the division's mobility and maintenance capabilities created by the presence of excess property in divisional units. The project allowed each unit in the division to turn-in excess property on a "no questions asked—no paperwork" basis.

(2) As originally conceived, each of the six major commands in the division was allowed two days in which to turn-in all excess property. The remaining division troops were allowed three days. Due to periods of rainy weather during the scheduled turn-in period, the program was extended for an additional week.

(3) The maintenance battalion had the mission of accepting all Class IX supplies and all unserviceable Class II and IV supplies less organizational clothing and aviation related items.

(4) A section was organized as follows to accomplish the mission:

(a) Project office

(b) Administrative section

(c) Classification and identification section

(d) Segregation and storage section

(e) Retrograde section

(5) The value of identified items was $195,398.75. There is an estimated $50,000 of unidentified items.

H. (U) Civil affairs.

1. The same determination and enthusiasm for success which was evident during the previous reporting period has continued and indications are that even more progress will be made in the future. The number of projects underway at the beginning of this reporting period was 52. The figure at the end of the reporting period was 111, an increase of 111% during the reporting period. The contributing factors for this sharp increase in civic action are the receipt of a project priority list from the Thua Thien Province Chief, better management, increased command emphasis, and tactical force locations. The project list was generated by the respective hamlets/villages and submitted through the appropriate district chief to
the province chief. The projects were consolidated, assigned a priority, and the list was then forwarded to the division with a request for assistance. Since receipt of the list, only projects contained thereon have been initiated. In order to keep the list current, provisions have been made to add and delete projects only after approval of the province chief.

2. Refugees. Improvements and repairs to roads and bridges into the resettled areas materially assisted the resettlement process and the resumption of trade and commerce. Approximately 12,000 registered refugees returned to their home hamlets during this period. As the refugee problem has decreased to manageable proportions, neglected social welfare activities have expanded. CARITAS/CRI5, Buddhist Social Welfare, and the World Relief Commission were involved in large scale food programs with surplus commodities, especially in the newly resettled pacification hamlets. UNICEF completed four milk feeding stations which began operation during this reporting period and provide milk daily to more than 4,500 children in 10 refugee camps. Materials for one of these stations in Nam Hoa District were provided by G5. Province plans to build additional milk stations in the future.

3. MEDCAP support. Approximately 30,000 medical patients were treated by US and ARVN/civil medical teams. The G5 and division surgeon worked closely in support of the MEDCAP program. A survey of all districts for MEDCAP locations, facilities, and frequencies was completed by the supporting civil affairs platoon in September. The MEDCAP resources will be applied to the requirements found by the survey. The objective of the MEDCAP program is to emphasize training of Vietnamese in the health care role and to create a sense of identification between the Vietnamese health care workers and the local populace.

4. Coordination with civil officials.

a. PSDF rally. In late August, the division assisted in the support of a three-day People's Self Defense Force rally in Phu Vang District. The rally consisted of approximately 3,000 attendees with competition between various units in militarily oriented events. The division provided 1,500 pieces of PSP, 2,000 pounds of food, 20,000 piasters, and lumber for the rally.

b. English classes. English language classes under the sponsorship of the Hue Cultural Center began in early September. The classes are conducted in various schools in Hue with more than 3,000 students enrolled. Some 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) troopers assisted these classes.
as voluntary instructors during their off-duty hours.

c. Tet Trung Thu. The mid-autumn festival and children's holiday fell on 26 September. The division was requested to specifically sponsor the 3rd ARVN Regiment and the 54th ARVN Regiment. Approximately 3,200 children were reported as dependents. In addition, various orphanages, schools, and the dependent children of the interpreters and Kit Carson Scouts were presented with gifts of candy and toys. A total of 3,500 toys, 1,500 pounds of candy, and 3,000 paper lanterns were purchased for this special occasion. Toys were presented by the commanding general to the children of Colonel Than, the Province Chief and the children of Major General Trung, 1st ARVN Division Commander.

d. October flood. During the first week of October, heavy rains caused severe flooding throughout Thua Thien Province. During this period, the responsible Vietnamese officials demonstrated an excellent ability to handle the flood situation without the assistance of the division. A large number of flood victims were evacuated to high ground and were provided food, clothing, and temporary shelters. CORDS kept the division informed of the situation and requested that the G5 section stand by for possible assistance. After the heavy rains diminished and the flood began to subside, province and the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) pooled resources to furnish relief to the flood victims. Thua Thien Province furnished 42,000 pounds of rice, approximately 8,000 loaves of bread, 20 bales of clothing, and individual rations to feed 31,645 people in 42 hamlets. The division transported these items during 8-10 October with one Chinook for eight sorties and two UH-1H aircraft for 225 sorties.

e. Public sentiment. The discovery in Nam Hoa District of a mass grave of an additional 250 Tet Mau Than victims in late September had significant impact on Vietnamese public sentiment. These bodies, the remains of victims of VC terrorism during the 1968 Tet Offensive, were buried in a large vault and dedicated by the Government of Vietnam as a shrine to the people of Vietnam. The burial ceremony was held 14 October and was attended by President Thieu.

5. Major projects completed during the reporting period.

a. Tinh Lanh Orphanage/School Repair (YD768234) Hue.

b. Nam Hoa Milk Station (YD755173) Nam Hoa.

c. Huong Thuy High School (YD819179) Huong Thuy.
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6. Projects initiated prior to and completed during the period included 13 schools, 6 village headquarters, 1 marketplace, 1 dispensary, and 8 other significant projects for a total of 29 projects.

7. Projects initiated and completed during the period included 13 schools, 2 village headquarters, 3 dispensaries, and 23 other major projects for a total of 51 projects.

8. Current projects. Type of project: schools - 66; administrative buildings - 8; dispensaries - 9; health/sanitation - 47; orphanages - 4; others - 7; total - 141.

9. Commodities issued during the reporting period:

- Tin - 416 Sheets
- Paint - 51 Gallons
- Rebar - 480 Feet
- Cement - 1972 Bags
- School desks - 265 Desks
- School benches - 265 Benches
- Construction lumber - 4725 Board feet
- Scrap lumber - 48,660 Board feet
- Food - 71,702 Pounds
- Clothing - 1305 Pounds
Vocational kits  26 Kits
Soap  1442 Pounds
Ammunition boxes  3405 Boxes
PSP  1966 Pieces
School kits  74900 Kits
Concertina wire  567 Rolls

I. (U) Psychological operations.

1. Statistics. Type and quantity of propaganda media employed.
   a. Leaflets disseminated: 70,045,000
   b. Loudspeaker broadcasts: 1,706 hours
   c. Movies shown: 115:00 hours
   d. TV programs conducted: 13
   e. Quick-reaction leaflets: 1,020,000
   f. PSYOP mobile teams: 23

2. During the past quarter, aerial broadcasts, standard tapes and
   leaflets were utilized to the maximum along with several new themes
   developed by JUSPAO, the 7th PSYOP Battalion and the 101st Airborne
   Division (Airmobile). The major PSYOP effort was targeted against known
   and suspected NVA and VC positions utilizing the theme of "The High
   Price of Rice." This theme was originated by XXIV Corps and disseminated
   throughout the lowlands and piedmont areas. Aerial broadcasts, special
   quick-reaction leaflets and news briefs were utilized to disseminate
   the message to the populace. Leaflets and posters were disseminated and
   ground broadcasts were conducted in Government of Vietnam controlled
   populated areas in an effort to retain and strengthen the population's
   support of the Government of Vietnam, keep a wedge between the populace
   and the enemy, and to inform them of the gains made by the ARVN and
   Government of Vietnam.

3. In compliance with JUSPAO policies, propaganda was developed within
the division to exploit Ho Chi Minh's death and the current rice denial campaign. Themes of VC/NVA military defeats and the growing strength of the RF/PF were also developed. This propaganda was usually in the form of quick-reaction leaflets and live broadcasts.

4. A total of 51 Hoi Chanhs rallied to the Government of Vietnam within the division AO during this reporting period. This figure is more than double the number of ralliers reported during the last reporting period. This gain can be attributed to the increased emphasis placed on PSYOP by the division G5 PSYOP office. Both aerial and ground missions have been increased in frequency, and this parallels the increase in Hoi Chanhs. We feel there is a direct correlation between the number of Hoi Chanhs and the number of broadcasts conducted. This overall pattern indicates a favorable trend throughout the province.

5. During the reporting period, continued support was provided during cordon operations to include ground loudspeaker and movie teams, aerial loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflet drops, armed propaganda teams and cultural drama team performances. Because of the shift towards a stronger pacification program and the redeployment of battalions to lowland and piedmont areas, the cordon operation has begun to play an important role within the division. PSYOP will continue to provide maximum support to this type of operation.

6. The division PSYOP printing capability has continued to be used to the maximum for producing quick-reaction leaflets on Hoi Chanhs and all important exploitable PSYOP situations that arise. The printing capability was also utilized to print VCI leaflets for use during cordon operations and to print standard leaflets when they were needed for an immediate situation and were not available.

a. Rice denial and the "High Price of Rice" leaflets, as mentioned above in paragraph 2, were produced for and directed at the populated areas. The theme was designed to show how the price of rice (VC/NVA lives) continues to rise.

b. Chieu Hoi quick-reaction leaflets were prepared on rallier reports by division PSYOP for exploitation of these ralliers in their former base areas. This was done by interviewing ralliers as soon as possible after they came in. If they could be exploited, a picture was taken and written statements were obtained. These would then be published as leaflets suitable for aerial or ground dissemination in the base area of the rallier's former units. Leaflets of this type
were generally a Chieu Hoi appeal with the Hoi Chanh’s written statement concerning the treatment he was receiving and describing the merits of the Chieu Hoi Program.

c. Pro-GVN and pro-RF/PF leaflets were produced after victories by the ARVN and popular and regional forces. Also mentioned and praised were the national police.

d. NVA hardship (Chieu Hoi) leaflets were prepared and targeted at NVA audiences in support of operations in the A Shau Valley, Ruong Ruong Valley, and other traditional NVA base areas. These leaflets were directed at NVA regular soldiers reminding them of the hardship and suffering they must endure while supporting an immoral cause and failing to achieve any great victories, that they were being driven out of their base areas and destroyed by allied operations, and that their only hope of freedom and safety was to Chieu Hoi.

e. Medical treatment leaflets advertising the medical facilities and capabilities of the allied forces were prepared and disseminated in rural populated areas in an effort to persuade diseased persons and those with any type of physical defect to come in to a medical facility for treatment.

7. The division is conducting an operation aimed at the Montagnard tribesmen in the A Shau Valley and the surrounding areas. The purpose of the operation is to persuade them to Chieu Hoi and resettle to Montagnard villages in GVN controlled areas. Since there is no written language for the Montagnards, picture leaflets were directed at them with a theme encouraging them to Chieu Hoi.

8. All ralliers and PW’s within the division AO have reported that they have been subjected to many allied broadcasts and leaflet drops. Most of them stated that they listened to the broadcasts, read the leaflets and believed what they heard and saw. They also indicated that many of their comrades wished to rally, but could not, as they had no opportunity because they were being closely watched by their cadre and did not have any chance to get into the lowlands.

J. (U) Medical.

1. During the reporting period support company (Eagle Medical Center) continued to provide primary medical care to 101st Airborne Division (Airborne) units at Camp Eagle. Company A was in support of the 1st Brigade, Company B supported the 2d Brigade, and Company C supported the
3rd Brigade. The most significant tactical operation was NORTON FALLS. Elements of the 3rd Brigade moved north toward the DMZ. A forward clearing element from Company C moved forward and located with the brigade TOC. The clearing element consisted of a physician, enlisted medics, and two UH-IH air ambulances for rapid medical evacuations. Prior to leaving the A Shau Valley, the battalion operated a clearing element at FSB Blaze and provided medical back up support to FB Currahee.

2. Two minor outbreaks of disease occurred that might have been preventable. In early August, 29 officers at Bien Hoa Army Base were infected with shigellosis. Interviews showed that these personnel had eaten at the division rear officer's mess. Among deficiencies discovered in inspections of the mess, the following were considered most significant: the dishwashing system did not meet minimum requirements and multiple use, rather than single service dishes were being used. In addition, Vietnamese personnel were being used as food handlers. Corrective measures were implemented and routine medical treatment remedied this situation.

3. Also in August, six members of one line company contracted typhoid fever. Preventive medicine personnel interviewed each of these individuals and found that they had consumed water from streams without using iodine tablets to treat the water. Blood tests were taken from all other members of the company in an effort to locate carriers. However, the tests were negative, indicating that there were no carriers in the company.

4. Very heavy rains in early October resulted in a number of immersion foot cases. Visits were made to various units and pertinent information given to those concerned to help prevent such problems during future periods of heavy rainfall.

5. The following are the medical statistics for 326th Medical Battalion for the period 1 August through 31 October 1969:

Total patients seen at clearing station ......................... 10,030
Total dental patients .............................................. 1,864
Total admissions ................................................... 503
Total transferred ................................................... 551

RECAPITULATION
AVOG-OI
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IRHA .......................................................... 306
NBC .............................................................. 416

MEDICAL DISEASES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disease</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POO's</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diarrhea</td>
<td>838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skin diseases</td>
<td>1,172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/P</td>
<td>671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gastroenteritis</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot problems</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heat injuries</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VD</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med evac missions</td>
<td>730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med cap II total number of persons treated</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Medical supply: 5013 line items shipped at approximate weight of 25,065 pounds.

6. During the reporting period, the following items were accomplished:
   a. 2,600 pairs of spectacles were fabricated by division optometry.
   b. Division medical supply filled 3734 of 3884 requests, for a 96% fill.
   c. Preventive medicine made 111 mess inspections, 9 water point inspections, and 26 barber shop inspections.
   d. The division flight surgeon conducted 271 flight physicals.
The 501st Signal Battalion continued to provide communications support to elements of the division throughout the AO. The battalion supported Operations LAMAR FLAIN, KENTUCKY JUMPER, RICHLAND SQUARE, and REPUBLIC SQUARE. A manned retransmission station in the division command secure net was deployed to Quang Tri to support the 3d Brigade Operation NORTON FALLS. Another manual retransmission station was sent to Hill 859 to support the 3d Brigade during operations in the A Shau Valley. VHF teams deployed to Phu Loc, Phu Thu, Mai Loc, and to FSB's Spear, Nuts, Pistol, Brick, and Nancy. HP radio teams were deployed to Quang Tri, Mai Loc, and FSB's Blaze and Rendezvous. The battalion completed 153 work orders for direct support crypto maintenance, and filled 37 requests for FA support.

L. (U) Engineer.

1. During the reporting period, the 326th Engineer Battalion (Airmobile) provided continuous direct combat support to the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) during operations KENTUCKY JUMPER, RICHLAND SQUARE, and REPUBLIC SQUARE. The significant support was the construction and later the closing out of FSB Rendezvous, on the edge of the A Shau Valley. Numerous fire support bases were reopened and constructed in support of combat operations. A pioneer road was constructed from FSB Barracuda to FSB Rifle, and FSB Rifle was opened. Engineers performed numerous demolition missions, to include direct demolition support of infantry in the attack, destruction of enemy ordnance and supplies, and clearing minefields and boobytrapped areas. Construction of several new landing zones aided normal infantry insertions and downed aircraft recovery. Improvement of existing landing zones under the commanding general's "Project Lifesaver," was initiated as a continuing function of the 326th Engineer Battalion (Airmobile). Additionally, non-divisional engineer elements assisted in the construction of FSB Rendezvous, the maintenance of Route 547, the land clearing operation on the A Shau Valley floor, and land clearing in the Nam Hoa District.

2. The extensive divisional support was accomplished with the three engineer line companies in direct support of the brigades and with the headquarters company in general support of the division. Equipment for the combat support missions was provided by headquarters company. This was augmented, at times, by airmobile bulldozers and backhoes from battalions of the 32d Naval Construction Regiment.

3. At the start of the reporting period, Company A was located at
Tam Ky in support of the 1st Brigade’s participation in Operation LAMAR PLAIN. Company B, located with 3d Brigade in the A Shau Valley, was involved in constructing FSB Rendezvous and improving FSB’s Rendezvous, Blaze and Currahee. Company C was in support of 2d Brigade’s coastal area operations. Along with numerous smaller tasks, Company C relocated FSB Tomahawk and constructed FSB Arsenal.

On 15 August, Company A moved back to Gia Le. As the 1st Brigade reverted to 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) control, Company A reopened FSB Nuts and FSB Spear in support of new operations. Company C improved the defenses of the Song Bo railroad bridge and completed the work at FSB Arsenal.

On 25 August, headquarters company began construction of a pioneer road from FSB Barracuda to FSB Brick. This was a joint US and ARVN operation with security provided by an ARVN mechanized infantry company and an attached tank platoon. Due to continuous enemy harassment and the discovery of an enemy base area, it was decided to construct a new FSB on dominating terrain and to divert the road toward it. The fire base was opened by a normal air move of Company A (engineers) and headquarters (equipment). Four days later, on 10 September, the road connected with a trail started down from the FSB. The fire base, subsequently named Rifle, was completed 10 September.

Concurrently with the road construction from Barracuda to Rifle, Company A reopened FSB Brick and FSB Pistol to support 1st Brigade operations. At the same time, Company B closed out FSB Berchtesgaden and supported the 3d Brigade move to FSB Rendezvous. One squad from Company B remained with 3–5 Cavalry on the A Shau Valley floor.

On 5 September, a joint pathfinder and engineer team started systematically upgrading landing zones throughout the area of operations. This project, called "Project Lifesaver,” was initiated at the direction of the commanding general to both reduce aviation hazards and to provide examples of properly constructed landing zones. Company A provided the initial "Project Lifesaver" squad.

When 3d Brigade began operating in the northern portion of the A Shau Valley on 14 September 1969, Company B reopened FSB Tiger and FSB Erskine. On both fire bases booby traps were detected and destroyed by the engineer elements. Concurrently, Company B also cleaned up FSB’s Zon, Cannon, and Berchtesgaden. On 21 September, on short notice, Company B began disassembling bunkers at FSB Rendezvous in preparation for closing the base. Two days later all elements had departed the fire base.
base and all non-divisional elements were out of the A Shau Valley.

On 24 September, Company A had a unique mission to construct a five float raft to ferry two D-7 bulldozers across the Perfume River. The raft was constructed in one day's time.

On 25 September, Company B dispatched an advance party to Mai Loc to minesweep the area in preparation for the move of 3d Brigade headquarters to that location. Company C reopened FSB Bastogne and continued maintenance and improvement of FSB Arsenal and the Arsenal road. Company A opened FSB Thor for a 1st Brigade artillery raid.

During the first week of October operations were hampered by the heaviest recorded rains in the Hue-Phu Bai area. All companies directed primary efforts toward maintenance of roads and bridges. On 1 October, Company C began preparation for the participation in "Project Lifesaver." At the same time the company coordinated a land clearing operation for Nam Hoa District. Rome plows from the 59th Land Clearing Company accomplished the actual clearing by 17 October.

Company B assisted in reopening FSB Scotch and constructed FSB Victory and Shrapnel for the 3d Brigade. A significant factor in the construction of FSB Victory and Shrapnel was the fact that they were built using only chainsaws, demolitions, and hand labor. Company B continued improvement of the Mai Loc area and started on the Camp Evans sniper range and the combined headquarters of the Phong Dien District-3d Battalion, 187 Infantry.

1st Brigade's Operation SATURATE, in the vicinity of FSB Saber started on 5 October. Company A supported by providing demolition teams and boat operators. With the heavy rains the engineer boats became the only means of logistical resupply. Since helicopters were grounded by adverse weather conditions, the boats also provided tactical mobility. Company A opened OP56 near Camp Eagle on 9 October. Concurrently, Company A directed considerable effort to repair of the severe rain damage on Arsenal road. The road was reopened on 18 October when Company A completed a 70 foot long double-single Bailey bridge.

4. During the reporting period headquarters company provided general support to the three line companies. Total equipment support for both combat support and base development operations during the reporting period is as follows:
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D5A bulldozer</td>
<td>1440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M450 bulldozer</td>
<td>1875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M8S 100 tractor scraper</td>
<td>688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cat 112 grader</td>
<td>1312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front loader</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 ton dump truck</td>
<td>2808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2 ton dump truck</td>
<td>1356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34L4 Backhoe</td>
<td>682</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Providing the above support in the division area of operations required the use of fifty-seven CH-54 "Crane" sorties and thirty-six CH-47 "Chinook" sorties.

M. (C) Army aviation.

1. The mission of the 101st Aviation Group is to provide aviation support to the division and aviation special staff personnel to the division headquarters.

   a. During the 91 day period 1 August through 31 October 1969, the 101st Aviation Group provided continuous support to the combat operations of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). This support was provided for the final stages of Operation KENTUCKY JUMPER which terminated 14 August 1969, for RICHLAND SQUARE from 15 August to 28 September 1969 and for the early phases of the current campaign REPUBLIC SQUARE which began 29 September 1969. Additional support was provided to the 1st Brigade on the final stages of LAMAR PLAIN, while the Brigade was under operational control of the Americal Division in the Chu Lai-Tam Ky area.

   b. Concurrent operations supported throughout the reporting period involved USMC, Special Forces FOB, CCN and the normal five minute standby for dustoff escort and other emergencies.

2. The following statistical data is provided for the reporting period.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Hrs Flown</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Pax</th>
<th>Cargo - Tons</th>
<th>Aircraft Recoveries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>101 AHB</td>
<td>15,890</td>
<td>40,886</td>
<td>60,150</td>
<td>5,645</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>158 AHB</td>
<td>17,589</td>
<td>46,012</td>
<td>70,384</td>
<td>1,568</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>159 ASHB</td>
<td>7,814</td>
<td>22,970</td>
<td>64,584</td>
<td>31,622</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>163 Avn Co</td>
<td>3,960</td>
<td>12,957</td>
<td>7,467</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>45,283</td>
<td>122,825</td>
<td>202,585</td>
<td>38,835</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. The number of aircraft receiving enemy ground fire has decreased since the last reporting period. 21 incidents of ground fire were recorded. Identification of incidents by mission is as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Type</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
<th>AH-1G</th>
<th>CH-47</th>
<th>CH-54</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat assault</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCN</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistical resupply</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (smoke, flare, etc.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Aircraft losses incurred during operations are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-combat</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N. (U) Information.

1. During the reporting period the division information office forwarded 2,153 hometown news releases to the Army Hometown News Center. Seven issues of the division newspaper the "Screaming Eagle" and one
issue of the division magazine Rendezvous with Destiny were published. 10,000 copies of the new History of the 101st Airborne Division, an orientation booklet for newly assigned personnel arrived at the end of October. The division information office distributed 195 news releases and 128 photo releases.

2. Coverage was provided for 29 visiting VIPs including the Secretary of the Army, the Honorable Stanley Resor and support provided to 44 correspondents.
SECTION II

LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

A. Personnel. None.

B. Intelligence.

1. AN/PSR-1 Anti-intrusion device.

   a. Observation: The detection range of the anti-intrusion device, AN/PSR-1, is significantly attenuated when the device is employed in sandy or loosely packed soil.

   b. Evaluation: Employment in sandy soil greatly reduces the detection range of the AN/PSR-1. The loosely packed soil (sand) is a poor conductor of seismic transmissions. As the soil becomes wet, the seismic response of the device increases proportionately. Employment of the device in sandy soil appears to reduce the detection range from 30 meters under favorable conditions to 3-4 meters (ranges approximate).

   c. Recommendation: That when the device is employed in loose soil, the geophones be placed approximately 6-8 meters apart. If not, it must be recognized that the absence of sensor activations does not necessarily indicate an absence of enemy movement.

2. Technique of engaging sensor targets.

   a. Observation: The old technique of engaging sensor targets by using an A and B concentration has not resulted in sufficient tangible results. The 1st Battalion, 321st Artillery has offered a new method of engagement.

   b. Evaluation: The A and B concentrations at each end of the sensor string will still be in effect, but the target areas will be moved down the trail so that the enemy will arrive at the kill zone about five minutes after the notification of a fire mission to the artillery. This five minute period will allow the artillery sufficient time to effectively engage the target, whereas before, a minimum reaction time was available in which to deliver fires.

   c. Recommendation: That through close coordination between artillery and sensor personnel, the sensor activations are rapidly and effectively brought under fire employing these kill zones.
3. Radar (PPS series) and starlight scope.

a. Observation: The effective engagement by indirect fire of targets acquired by radar (PPS series) and crew-served starlight scope is restricted by the inaccuracy of the target's reported location.

b. Evaluation: Precise target location within one meter is possible with both the starlight scope and radar if the instruments are positioned on a surveyed point. This position is then recorded and plotted in supporting indirect fire FDC's. Consequently, operators of the target acquiring devices need relay only target range and direction to the FDC where the exact geographical location is then computed and the target engaged.

c. Recommendation: That units using the two target acquisition instruments mentioned, have the emplacement site surveyed whenever practical and the location plotted in supporting artillery or mortar FDC's.

4. Interrogation of detainees.

a. Observation: On-the-spot evaluation of information obtained from detainees is frequently difficult for interrogators, due to the fact that the interrogator's knowledge of enemy order of battle is very limited in many cases. Reliability of information contained in interrogation reports cannot be judged until such time as the interrogation is terminated and the interrogator submits his report to the order of battle section for evaluation.

b. Evaluation: Information must be evaluated during the actual conduct of the interrogation in order to determine the reliability of the source (detainee) and to maintain continuity and control during questioning. Immediate evaluation also reduces the amount of time required for processing of the information obtained, thus allowing for more timely dissemination of intelligence which results from processing the information.

c. Recommendation: An order of battle specialist participate in all division level interrogations to aid the interrogator in evaluating the information obtained. The OB specialist's first hand knowledge and OB reference material enable him to make pertinent observations and comments as the interrogation progresses, thus making it easier for the interrogator to detect false information, a cover story, or other means of deception which may be employed by the source. An OB briefing is presented to the interrogation section on a weekly basis by members of the order of battle.
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section. This enables interrogators to keep abreast of the enemy situation and enemy activities in the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) AO.

5. Obtaining Chieu Hoi information.

a. Observation: Information from Chieu Hois is not always acquired in the most efficient manner.

b. Evaluation: Chieu Hois often give information concerning the battalion location of enemy units, installions and caches during their interrogation by the brigade IPW team. The normal method used during interrogation is map tracking. Experience has shown that information obtained in this manner is often inaccurate or totally false. Additionally, valuable time is lost during this tedious process of converting a "days march," a stream with a horseshoe bend, etc., onto the map.

c. Recommendation: Once the Chieu Hoi has given information he should be asked if he will lead friendly elements to the locations. If he answers affirmatively, then he should be immediately returned to the location where he surrendered and be oriented on the ground. An alternative method is to fly over the surrender site to see if the Chieu Hoi can readily identify prominent terrain features and then point out the cited locations. A combination of these two methods of terrain association resulted in 2 VC KIA, 1 IW, 1 CSWC, and numerous documents captured within seven hours from the time of surrender.

C. (C) Operations.

1. Cordon and search operations during the monsoon season.

a. Observation: Conditions created during the monsoon season facilitate cordon and search operations.

b. Evaluation: During the monsoon season combat operations in the canopy are significantly curtailed primarily due to the inability to support such operations with air assets. Therefore, the bulk of maneuver elements must be diverted to lowland operations. A lucrative type of operation which can be executed in the lowlands is the cordon and search. Ideally, such operations are combined and include ARVN forces and territorial forces. It may be assumed that, during the monsoon, a significant number of enemy troops will enter the populated areas for numerous reasons. Furthermore, there will be active proselytizing within the populated areas by infrastructure members. Weather conditions will create situations favorable to allied operations; inundated areas will restrict and channelize
enemy movement; high water will deny use of otherwise suitable hiding places for personnel and caches, thereby forcing the enemy to intermingle with the populace and to relocate his equipment and foodstuffs to protected areas. Under these circumstances, cordon and search operations can net favorable results. Such operations must be based upon timely intelligence and characterized by detailed planning and coordination, maximum security, deceptive implementing measures, surprise and extraordinary detail in search techniques. All supporting units and agencies must be used to the optimum (PYSOP teams, MEDCAP teams, combined intelligence centers, etc.). Imaginative employment of all assets, such as air cavalry, boats, and combat tracker teams is essential.

c. Recommendation: Increase the number of cordon operations during the monsoon season.

2. Coordination with GVN forces in combined cordon operations.

a. Observation: The success of a cordon operation depends primarily on the effective coordination between the units involved, especially in the closing of the cordon at a specific time and specific location. Experience indicates that regional forces (RF) and popular forces (PF) can be relied upon to meet the tight time schedule of an effective cordon. However, paramilitary forces such as popular self defense forces (PSDF) and national police field forces (NPFF) are not familiar with military land navigation and therefore are undependable in a combined cordon.

b. Evaluation: The prompt arrival of PSDF and NPFF elements at specific checkpoints is essential to success of a combined cordon.

c. Recommendation: US units conducting the cordon should dispatch liaison personnel to PSDF and NPFF units on the day preceding the operation. US liaison personnel should then guide the PSDF and NPFF to specific checkpoints.

3. Fire base construction.

a. Observation: Fire base sites often include draws and ravines filled with logs and scrap lumber from previous occupants.

b. Evaluation: Debris in draws and ravines must be removed, as it conceals approaching enemy.

c. Recommendation: That artillery units occupying fire bases dispose of waste and/or unserviceable powder charges by igniting them around the
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wood debris in draws and ravines, thus burning them out.

4. Artillery positioning and fire base construction.
   a. Observation: Units are often emplaced on fire bases without regard to the blast and shock resulting from 155mm, 175mm and 8" artillery fire. As a result, tents and hooches are collapsed, and smaller weapons such as mortars become non-aligned in the course of an artillery fire mission.
   b. Evaluation: Excessive blast and shock hinders the effectiveness of the entire fire base and affects fire base morale.
   c. Recommendation: Prior to fire base occupation, infantry and artillery commanders should plan fire base occupation in order to minimize blast and shock effect without hindering artillery effectiveness.

5. Xenon light.
   a. Observation: Use of the Xenon light (aircraft mounted) on night reconnaissance operations.
   b. Evaluation: The light ship should fly between 300 and 600 feet at 60 knots with its position lights on steady dim and anti-collision light off. The first pass of an area should be made with a starlight scope or infrared light beam. With either of these methods, the light ship can fly a ground track fairly close to the area to be observed. This allows the starlight scope operator a closer and better look at the area.

When using the white light, observation passes should be made at a 45° angle to the area. This is necessary because of limited downward movement of the light. The light can either be held steady and moved along the ground at the same speed of the aircraft, or it can be moved right or left scanning the area.

The Cobra will plan his path of flight according to the ground track of the light ship. If the light ship flies a straight ground track, the Cobra should fly behind and 200 to 300 feet above the light ship. "S" turns will usually be needed to maintain his position. If the light ship must fly a zig-zag ground track, the Cobra should fly in orbit around the light ship approximately 200 to 300 feet above it. The Cobra should fly with a complete light blackout.

When a target is engaged, the light ship will exchange places with the
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Cobra and orbit the area over which the Cobra is working.

Surprise of the enemy is the biggest asset. If the target is personnel, their position must be fired on immediately since once the white light is utilized, your position and intentions become apparent. Ideally, the enemy is located with the starlight scope, his position fixed, and then the white light employed.

Observation of the lighted area by the Cobra is difficult due to altitude and position from the light. The best observation can be obtained from the light ship. In orbiting a target while the Cobra is engaging it, the pilot of the light ship must maintain a steep angle to provide as much light on the target as possible. This eliminates shadows that are distracting to the Cobra pilot.

c. Recommendation: Crews must be briefed on the operation so that there is no doubt as to the use of the light and its capability. The light should be installed during the day light hours to insure proper installation and the ship must be fueled to capacity to allow maximum time on station.

6. Use of pink teams (one OH-6A, one AH-1G).

a. Observation: Use of pink teams at night under illumination.

b. Evaluation: The use of pink teams under flares has proved an effective measure in spotting movement and personnel when units are in contact.

c. Recommendation: That units use the pink teams with flare ships in response to night contact missions, weather permitting.

7. ARA (aerial rocket artillery).

a. Observation: Use of ARA when outside of artillery fans.

b. Evaluation: The use of ARA in conjunction with pink teams, when operating out of the artillery fans, has proved effective because they carry more armament and allow gunships to remain on station.

c. Recommendation: Use of ARA with pink teams when they are operating outside of artillery range.

8. Mounted reaction force in cordon operations.

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a. Observation: The operational employment of a vehicle mounted reaction force in a cordon and search mission can greatly influence the effectiveness of the line of encirclement (LOE).

b. Evaluation: When conducting a soft cordon (restricted engagement of infiltrator/exfiltrator), a mounted reaction force provides the mobility and rapid reaction necessary to insure an effective LOE and engagement of suspected or confirmed activity. The terrain will dictate whether a track or wheeled mobile reaction force should be utilized. This force is employed during the day to guard specified avenues into or out of the cordoned area. At night, its mission becomes an immediate reaction force to exploit any situation within the immediate area of the LOE.

c. Recommendation: During daylight hours, the reaction force should be deployed at major roads or routes into the cordon area. The force can monitor and control the traffic and possesses the ability to apprehend anyone attempting to rush through. As darkness approaches, the mobile unit should be dispersed around the LOE and attached to the several command posts. Here they can be employed either to reinforce a sector of the LOE, or massed together as a unit to deploy as directed by the overall mission commander.

9. New McGuire rig.

a. Observation: Less than satisfactory performance of the stabo and standard McGuire rig has been experienced.

b. Evaluation: For emergency extractions, the McGuire rig must be frequently utilized. There are several characteristics of the new McGuire rig which are standard: (1) ease of entry, (2) comfort, (3) safety, and (4) simplicity. The new rig, constructed from the standard army rappel seat, is an improved version of the standard McGuire rig. It meets the above standards, with an additional emphasis on safety. It is ready made, and requires no preparation, except the addition of a rope attaching it to the helicopter.

c. Recommendation: That units utilize the standard rappel seat as a McGuire rig since it offers all the essential characteristics of the standard McGuire rig with improved safety features.


a. Observation: Employment techniques of crew-served starlight scopes
b. Discussion: The crew-served starlight scope is too heavy and bulky to be carried on short range reconnaissance patrols and RIF operations. However, its use during the hours of darkness greatly increases range and the field of vision.

c. Recommendation: Crew-served starlight scopes should be delivered to platoons and squads during the late afternoon and used during night ambushes. They can be picked up by log birds the following morning.

11. Firing too high at night.

a. Observation: There is a tendency on the part of the individual soldier to fire too high at night.

b. Evaluation: Numerous instances have proven that the individual soldier will fire above his targets at night. Additional training and emphasis on firing low has not completely solved this problem.

c. Recommendation: A simple and expedient way of alleviating this situation is to emplace communications or C-ration carton wire horizontally in front of each position, low enough so that when the rifle barrel is raised high enough to touch it, the fire will be approximately at chest level.

12. Command and control aircraft.

a. Observation: UH-1H command and control aircraft have obvious advantages over UH-1C aircraft.

b. Evaluation: Two UH-1C model Hueys have been designed as the command and control aircraft for each air cavalry troop, resulting in four types of aircraft for which supply parts must be carried in each troop. Also, the UH-1C does not have the versatility or power for emergency medevac or other special missions.

c. Recommendation: The two UH-1C Hueys should be replaced with UH-1H models. This would decrease the number of type aircraft to three. Additionally, emergency McGuire extractions, medevac, and other special missions would be possible for the command and control aircraft. These capabilities are essential during operations in deep reconnaissance areas.

D. (U) Organization. None.
E. (U) Training.

Critical shortage of non-commissioned officers.

a. Observation: Critical shortage of non-commissioned officers detracts from small unit action proficiency.

b. Evaluation: A large number of small units (fire team and squad size) are being led by relatively inexperienced enlisted men in the grades PFC (E3) and SP4 (E4). The experience of these soldiers is not always sufficient to cope with the rapid pace of combat operations and the normal leadership responsibilities necessary to instill and maintain proficiency, discipline and welfare. The Sgt (E5) who is a graduate of the non-commissioned officer candidate school is better prepared to accomplish these tasks but still cannot provide the well rounded background normally associated with more senior non-commissioned officers. An interim solution to this problem, practiced by a brigade of the division, is an intensive training program which stresses small unit participation using the existing chain of command. Special emphasis is placed on fire and movement and fire and maneuver. Employment of training exercises in which fire team and squad leaders must control their men develops confidence and experience in the junior leaders, promotes team spirit, coordination, and improves combat effectiveness. The senior non-commissioned officers take an active part in controlling and critiquing these training exercises, using their experience as a training vehicle to increase the responsibility and prestige of the non-commissioned officer corps. An extension of this internal training program is to assign combat experienced officers and senior non-commissioned officers as observers with squad size ambush parties. These observers assume no leadership role during these activities unless absolutely dictated by the tactical situation. Following an ambush, the observers conduct a comprehensive critique of the squad leader, and patrol members with an emphasis on lessons learned.

c. Recommendation: That continued emphasis be placed on this type of training and that non-commissioned officers be provided the opportunity to exercise and demonstrate their capability for leadership by conducting this type of training.

F. (U) Logistics.

1. 50,000 gallon collapsible fuel tank.

a. Observation: The 50,000 gallon experimental collapsible fuel tank
was tested at FB Blaze.

b. Evaluation: The tank provided more capacity, required less room, and held up well under combat conditions.

c. Recommendation: That the 50,000 gallon storage tank be used at large base camps where damage from enemy fire is negligible.

2. Signal repair parts.

a. Observation: Signal repair parts are in short supply.

b. Evaluation: As the rice denial and population security missions increased, additional requirements for communications developed. Radios deadlined averaged 20 days in repair with a substantial portion having to be evacuated beyond DS level with a resultant increase in waiting time for repair parts. Although the supply of parts became more readily available during the second half of this reporting period, a problem still exists.

c. Recommendation: That maximum attention be directed toward expediting the availability of signal repair parts.

3. Expansion of pre-positioned stocks.

a. Observation: Turbine engines account for only 6% of total non-operational repair supply (NORS).

b. Evaluation: Pre-positioned turbine engine stocks, authorized by the ACC for stock at direct support unit level within the battalion, improved supply effectiveness. Several major components such as transmissions and tail booms, because of size and shipping time, have been one of the problems causing high NORS rates.

c. Recommendation: That a study be made on depot stocks, order to ship time, and theater requirements as to feasibility of expanding the pre-positioned stocks at DSU.

4. Reduced shipping time.

a. Observation: A dedicated transport aircraft reduced shipping time on repair parts.

b. Evaluation: Experience with both dedicated air transport
and space required air transport has established that it takes from two to four days shipping time for space required compared to one day for dedicated transport.

c. Recommendation: That air transportation be scheduled for repair parts to high demand areas that do not otherwise have high density cargo flights.

5. Basic load for infantry battalions and the supporting medical company.

a. Observation: During Operation LAMAR PLAIN the infantry battalions that were in combat did not bring medical supplies with them.

b. Evaluation: As a result of the above observation, all medical supplies had to be provided to them for their initial stockage. This depleted the medical company's fifteen day stockage load, resulting in a low level of on-hand medical supplies.

c. Recommendation: Infantry battalions should carry their medical supplies if at all feasible, or the supporting medical company must increase its basic load to insure having on hand a minimum 15 day stockage load of medical supplies.

G. (C) Communications.

1. Long range FM communications.

a. Observation: During operations in Quang Tri Province, distances between stations in the division FM command net exceeded 60km. In an attempt to establish direct communications, two different log periodic antennas were tested.

b. Evaluation: Antenna AS-2169 is in the Army inventory and available to the division. During tests it was found that it could not provide reliable communications over extended distances. Also, its weight and construction preclude its being vertically polarized. (Vertical polarization normally gives greater range). Antenna AS-2236 is a Marine Corps antenna that is not presently available to the division. In tests it provided more reliable communications over long ranges. It can be vertically polarized with little difficulty.


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2. HF radio communications with long range patrols.

   a. Observation: During operations in the piedmont and mountain sectors of the area of operations, long range patrols have been unable to communicate with FM or AM radio.

   b. Evaluation: The terrain in these areas precludes the use without airborne retransmission. HF AM radio, AN/PRC-74, would provide reliable communications via CW if the radio was properly sited, used a properly loaded and cut antenna, and was operated by trained personnel. Communications personnel were instructed on siting the radio and on loading and cutting antennas. After this instruction, long range patrols were able to communicate from their normal areas of operation, but were still hampered by shortages of trained CW operators.

   c. Recommendation: That communications training, to include basic CW, be integrated into the long range patrol training program on a continuing basis. Emphasis must be placed on assigning qualified CW operators, 05B, to ranger units.

3. BA-4386 battery.

   a. Observation: The new "long life" PRC-25 battery, BA-4386, has not demonstrated the life expectancy that was anticipated.

   b. Evaluation: The battery appears to be more susceptible to adverse climatic conditions and deteriorates more rapidly than its predecessor during long periods of storage. Using units have reported batteries freshly unpacked containing insufficient power to operate radios. This situation may be reduced somewhat by storing the batteries for as short a period of time as practical and careful selection of storage areas.

   c. Recommendation: All units using the new PRC-25 battery be continually aware of this problem until it is rectified. An EIR has been submitted through appropriate channels addressing the problem.

H. (U) Material.

   a. Observation: DX wheel cylinders and carburetors which have been repaired have a high rate of failure. When DX parts are replaced with new parts, failure is reduced.
b. Evaluation: DX parts have been rebuilt an excessive number of times.

c. Recommendation: DX items should be replaced with new parts until the older, excessively rebuilt parts are removed from the system.

I. (U) Other.

1. (U) Maintenance.

a. Maintenance time saving.

(1) Observation: Maintenance time can be saved when changing UH-1H main transmissions.

(2) Evaluation: When the main transmission on a UH-1H series aircraft must be changed, with no other components requiring change, maintenance time can be saved by disconnecting the swashplate support from the main transmission and pulling the head stabilizer bar, swashplate and mast as a unit. This unit is readily installed on the new transmission.

(3) Recommendation: That this method be included in maintenance newsletters. The method has been included in unit newsletters and a DA Form 2028 (Recommended changes to DA publications) has been submitted.

b. Maintenance of machetes and chain saws in the field.

(1) Observation: Machetes are essential to infantry operations in the mountainous part of our AO. Chain saws are essential to LZ cutting operations. These tools quickly become dulled with use, and issued whet stones are inadequate for sharpening them.

(2) Evaluation: An adequate method of maintaining these essential tools in the field must be found.

(3) Recommendation: One flat file and one rat-tail file should be issued to each rifle platoon.

2. (U) Engineer.

a. Use of demolitions to assist earthmoving.

(1) Observation: Fire bases often must be constructed on steep-sided, narrow ridges and hilltops. To provide fire pads that are large
enough to accommodate artillery batteries, it has been necessary to lower hills as much as 20 to 25 feet.

(2) Evaluation: Shaped charges and cratering charges have been highly effective in minimizing the amount of bulldozer effort required to lower hilltops. After the trees and undergrowth are roughly cleared by normal demolition and chain saw operations, one or more rows (depending on width of hill) of shaped charges are placed and detonated as shown in figure 1. Cratering charges are then placed in the resultant holes and detonated. Afterwards, it is relatively easy for a light, airmobile bulldozer to push the debris over the side of the hill. This procedure is repeated as many times as necessary to lower the hill to the desired degree. Each successive shot will lower the hill eight to ten feet and will require additional rows of demolitions as the hill gets wider.

(3) Recommendation: Consider the use of shaped and cratering charges to expedite earthwork on fire bases.

b. Use of demolitions to clear underbrush.

(1) Observation: When fire bases or landing zones are constructed in areas with heavy undergrowth, a great amount of effort and time is expended in land clearing to place demolition charges and employ chain saws. Additionally, it is difficult to secure work parties in such areas.

(2) Evaluation: Such undergrowth, including trees up to three inches in diameter, can be quickly and easily cleared using bangalore torpedoes or shaped charges. This greatly reduces the total time required to construct a landing zone in heavily vegetated areas.

(3) Recommendation: When time is a major consideration in the clearing of a double or triple canopy area, consider the expenditure of extra demolitions in the form of bangalore torpedoes or shaped charges to expedite the job.

c. Increasing output from light airmobile bulldozers in heavy undergrowth.

(1) Observation: A D5A airmobile bulldozer was utilized to cut a road through heavy triple canopy jungle. The large trees were generally avoided, or were taken out by demolitions. However, the undergrowth was so thick that progress was less than fifty meters per day when the dozer was unassisted.

(2) Evaluation: The following methods were utilized to simplify the
Placement of initial shaped charges

Cratering charge placed at bottom of holes blown by shaped charges

Cross section

Typical cross section after first cratering charge shot

After second blast

Loosened zones

Final grade

Figure 1. Use of demolitions in earthmoving.

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bulldozer's work. Two bangalore torpedoes were detonated parallel to each other, eight feet apart, along the proposed road trace. The bulldozer could work along the resultant path at a rate approximately four times that through virgin growth. Additionally, at the end of the day a "drum drop" (drum of POL dropped and ignited from a CH-47) was employed along the next day's work trace. This method of clearing compared favorably with utilizing bangalore torpedoes. Bulldozer efficiency was greatly increased.

(3) Recommendation: Clear heavy undergrowth by utilizing demolitions or by burning prior to employing light engineer equipment in jungle terrain. This technique should produce similar results for larger bulldozers such as a D7E.

d. Desirability of electrical blasting caps for LZ and fire base construction.

(1) Observation: On a landing zone or fire base mission, speed and safety are equally important. Absolute control over demolition firing is extremely desirable. When possible, electric caps should be utilized to achieve control.

(2) Evaluation: One of the most significant reasons for using only electric blasting caps concerns helicopters. On a new fire base especially, numerous helicopters frequent the job sites. It is quite possible for an aviator not to establish radio contact with the element on the ground and to fail to notice red smoke, warning of an explosion. Such a situation could easily lead to disaster if it developed in the minute or so after the man-in-charge on the ground had ignited a time fuse. On the other hand, with electrical firing, positive control of the detonation is assured at all times. Additionally, an electrical misfire can be cleared immediately. By contrast, to clear a non-electrical misfire requires a delay of at least one-half hour and even then it is extremely hazardous.

(3) Recommendation: Utilize electric blasting caps whenever possible on landing zone and fire base missions.

3. (C) Chemical.

a. Flame drops.

(1) Observation: In many operations, where the standard 15 barrel flame drop from a CH-47 aircraft is required, such as clearing fields of fire or denying enemy access to terrain, the areas to be burned will
themselves support combustion. In these cases, 25 gallons of napalm (e.g., 15x55 gallon drums), although quite effective in igniting the combustible material can also be excessive.

(2) Evaluation: Flame drops can be conducted using a UH-1H aircraft when the number of drums used is reduced to two. Such "mini-drops" of napalm do not give the large area coverage of the standard flame drop, but when the requirement is merely to ignite combustible terrain, they can be equally effective and much more efficient in terms of fuel expended per unit area and conservation of helicopter "blade time."

(3) Recommendation: In conducting land clearing operations through the use of flame, consideration should be given to the feasibility of using two-barrel drops with UH-1H aircraft.

b. Burning elephant grass.

(1) Observation: Even during the dry season of the year, standing or freshly cut elephant grass is almost impossible to burn.

(2) Evaluation: Standing or freshly cut elephant grass can be burned only with the expenditure of a large amount of fuel such as diesel. However, this method of burning is undesirable because it only partially consumes the grass, leaving the tough stalks standing, and leaving a fine black dust throughout the area. If the grass is cut and allowed to dry for approximately two days it can be readily burned. Burning after drying does not require an external fuel and the stalks are almost entirely consumed.

(3) Recommendation: A successful method of clearing elephant grass is to cut the grass and to burn it after several day's drying time.

c. Burning of underbrush.

(1) Observation: The material and equipment required for effective underbrush burning is not available at the unit level.

(2) Evaluation: The burning of underbrush with diesel fuel was effective, but the logistical requirements strained the unit's supply system. There was not adequate equipment, personnel, or materiel available at the brigade level. Diesel pumps with hoses were obtained from many varied sources and a method of resupply by 500 gallon collapsible drums was provided. This improved the situation but there was considerable difficulty when the equipment was transferred between units. New crews had to be organized and trained and
resupply procedures reestablished.

(3) Recommendation: That a central pool of equipment be provided within the division chemical organization. This equipment would be loaned to units with a technical representative familiar with the equipment operation and a complete understanding of the procedures required for logistical support. In essence, the unit would provide the manpower and division chemical would provide the equipment, technical knowledge and supervision.

4. (U) Psychological operations.

a. Aerial versus ground loudspeaker broadcasts.

(1) Observation: Aerial loudspeakers targeted against a populated area do not seem to be as effective as a groundspeaker team broadcasting from inside the hamlet.

(2) Evaluation: Aerial loudspeaker teams are not as audible and understandable as groundspeaker teams. Groundspeaker teams also offer the advantage of personal contact with the people and can be used in the distribution of leaflet handouts.

(3) Recommendation: That groundspeaker teams be used to a greater extent.

5. (U) Medical.

Fire base sanitation.

(1) Observation: Fire bases attract rats. The wooden "rat box" poison container, effective in rat control in the past, is no longer available.

(2) Evaluation: A field expedient rat trap must be devised.

(3) Recommendation: Use of 81mm mortar illumination canisters with poison in one end as expedient rattans. These canisters accommodate most rats but are too small for larger animals to enter.
AV1-1jIT (19 Nov 69) 1st Ind
SHJ-1jIT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 101st Airborne Division
(AE) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RG5 CSARV-65 (RE)(U)

DA, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Fort Sill 96308

TC: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO SF 90375

1. (U) The Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 101st Airborne Division (AE) has been reviewed at HQ, XXIV Corps and is forwarded in accordance with AR 525-15.

2. (C) Subject to the comments below, this headquarters concurs with the report.

a. Reference item concerning techniques of engaging sensor targets, section II, para B 2, page 52. Concur. Each sensor string should be considered on an individual basis, with kill zones planned according to terrain and availability of artillery. Multiple kill zones should be employed to cover all escape routes and provide for alternate targets in the event of a delay in artillery response.

b. Reference item concerning interrogation of detainees, section II, para B 4, page 53. There is a recognized problem in keeping interrogators appraised of the latest OB holdings. Having OB specialists at interrogation sessions is the least desirable method of interrogation. A training program, planning, and specific EEl should prepare interrogators in conducting interrogations.

c. Reference item AS 2236 Antenna, section II, para G 1, page 62. Concur with the requirement for an antenna with the same characteristics. An ENSURE request has been initiated by HQ, USARV for the Log Periodic Antenna.

d. Reference item concerning maintenance time saving, section II, para I la, page 64. Concur with the commander's comments. However, this procedure has not been approved by DA. The procedure is acceptable, however, close inspection of the stabilizer bar, main rotor head, dampener arms, scissor and sleeve assembly, and swash plate is required to insure all bearings are serviceable.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. D. PECCO
MAJ. AGC
ASST AG

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AVHCO-1st (19 Nov 69) 2a Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, ROD CDPOM-69 (R2) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 95375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GCPF-1ST, APO 90538

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. (C) Reference item concerning "AN/FSR-1 Anti-intrusion device", section II, page 52, paragraph B1; concur. However, dissemination of this information to other headquarters is not considered desirable since the AN/FSR-1 is a non-standard, one time issued item and not available to other units.

   b. (C) Reference item concerning "Radar (PK series) and Starlight Scope", section II, page 53, paragraph B3; concur. This procedure for determining the precise target location is the same procedure for determining target location most normally used by the artillery/mortar forward observer and the fire direction center.

   c. (C) Reference item concerning "Interrogation of Detainees", section II, page 53, paragraph B4; concur. OB specialists can provide invaluable information and assistance during interrogations. This headquarters has successfully utilized the expertise of OB specialists to evaluate the reliability of information obtained during interrogations. The immediate evaluation and processing of the information has resulted in the timely dissemination and effective utilization of intelligence.

   d. (C) Reference item concerning "Cordon Operations During the Monsoon Season", section II, page 54, paragraph C1; concur. During the monsoon season combat operations are difficult to conduct in the mountains and canopy areas, primarily due to the inability to support such operations with air assets. Additionally, during the monsoon season enemy troops are forced to move into the populated areas for shelter and food. Therefore, to restrict the enemy from intermingling with the friendly populace cordon and search operations must be increased during the monsoon season.

   e. (C) Reference item concerning "Coordination with GVN Forces in Combined Cordon Operations", section II, page 55, paragraph C2; concur. Timely execution of combined operations is essential for the success of
AVNOC-ICT (19 Nov 69) 5th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, HHC 09662-6 (R2) (U)

This type operation. Prior to the execution of a Combined Action Operation coordination and exchange of liaison personnel must be made between US and GVN units.

f. (U) Reference item concerning "Crew-served Starlight Scope", section 11, page 53, paragraph C10; concur. The weight, size and configuration of the crew-served starlight scope make it undesirable to be carried by infantrymen during extensive daylight operations. Therefore unit SOPs have been developed for delivery and pickup of the crew-served starlight scope. Special attention has been given to the handling and maintenance of this equipment.

g. (U) Reference item concerning "Command and Control Aircraft", page 59, paragraph C12; concur. USAV Aviation is preparing a message to the 101st Abn Div stating that these UH-1C aircraft can be exchanged for UH-1H aircraft on a one for one basis.

h. (U) Reference item concerning "50,000 gallon collapsible fuel tank", page 60, paragraph F1; nonconcur. Base camps and similar facilities should make maximum use of permanent or semi-permanent installed tanks in lieu of TOE authorized collapsible tankage. Ideal for such use are 250, 500 or 1,000 barrel steel bolted tanks, all of which can be erected by troop labor. Collapsible tanks are designed for use when a fuel storage system must be erected in a short amount of time on a temporary basis. They are designed so that, when a requirement is completed, they can be recovered and moved to a new location. This requirement should not exist at a base camp.

i. (U) Reference item concerning "Signal repair parts are in short supply", section II, page 61, paragraph F2; nonconcur. Information received from 801st Maintenance Battalion, DSO of the 101st Abn Division has revealed that 75% of all radios turned in for repair are either repaired and returned to the user or evacuated to GS level within 5-7 days of receipt of the end item. No significant shortage of Signal repair parts has been or is now being experienced. Some difficulty is being experienced in the prompt repair of RT-841 units for the AN/PRC-77, and RT-505 units for the AN/PRC-25. This headquarters will coordinate with 1st Log Comd/USAECCIM Customer Assistance Office in an effort to resolve the problems encountered.

j. (U) Reference item concerning "Expansion of Pre-positioned Stocks", page 61, paragraph F3; concur. All Aviation intensive managed items (AIMI), excluding engines, are considered for Direct Support Supply Activity (DSSA) stockage. When sufficient assets are not available for DSSA stockage, they are then held at depot level in order to satisfy required delivery dates (RDD) and equipment Deadlined for Parts (EDP) Requisitions.

7.2

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Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFSN-63 (R2) (U)

k. (U) Reference item concerning "Reduced shipping time", page 61, paragraph F3; nonconcurrence. The MACV Common Service Airlift System has insufficient assets to provide units with dedicated airlift on a continued basis. Order and ship time of two to four days is not adequate for a priority of one (1). Accurate demand accounting and timely submission of requests for repair parts should allow most repair parts to be available when needed. In exceptional cases where emergency repair parts are necessary, a Special Mission Airlift Request (SMAR) or Combat Essential (CE) mission may be requested IAW MACV Directive 55-4.

l. (U) Reference item concerning "Basic load for infantry battalions and supporting medical company", section II, page 62, paragraph F5; concurrence. However, the problem should be resolved by the division by prescribing within their Administrative Order adequate supply levels for medical platoons and medical companies. These medical platoons of combat battalions should be directed to carry sufficient medical supplies with them to perform their medical mission. Informal supply procedures are adequate to resupply the medical platoons and the medical companies on a daily basis during combat operations.

m. (U) Reference item concerning "Long range FM communications", section II, page 62, paragraph G1; concurrence. USARV obtained thirty antennas, AS-2236, from redeployed US Marine units and allocated them to XXIV Corps. The 101st Abn Div, under the ENSURE Program has requested 25 of these antennas. DA has not yet approved the ENSURE request. USAFCSM will test seven of the improved version of the AS-2236 in RVN during March 1970.

n. (U) Reference item concerning "DX Parts", page 63, paragraph H; nonconcurrence. The maintenance concept of providing DX support by repairing recoverable or reclaimable and returning them to the supply system has greatly reduced repair parts cost and has proven effective. It is not considered practical of economical to change the existing system due to sporadic difficulties encountered in isolated repair operations. Customer units are responsible for bringing unsuitable supply and maintenance support or service to the immediate attention of their support unit commander. It is the duty of the support unit commander to insure that customer units are constantly provided adequate, reliable, and timely DX support either through the repair and issuance of new recoverable items or the acquisition and issue of new items, as so dictated by his organic capability. Problems of this nature are usually resolved at customer unit-DSSG levels.

o. (U) Reference item concerning "Maintenance Time Saving", page 64, paragraph I1: Concur with the action taken to recommend the change to the proponent agency. However, this method of changing a UH-1H main transmission should not be published until the proposed change is adopted for
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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

publication in the appropriate technical manual.

p. (U) Reference item concerning "Maintenance of machetes and chain saws in the field", section II, page 54, paragraph 11b; concur. Files may be requisitioned as an expendable item.

q. (U) Reference item concerning "Desirability of electrical blasting caps for LZ and fire base construction", section II, page 66, paragraph 2d; concur. Particular caution should be exercised when using electric blasting caps to prevent initiation of the firing chain by radio energy.

r. (U) Reference item concerning "Aerial versus ground loudspeaker broadcasts", section II, page 68, paragraph 14a; concur. Whenever the tactical situation permit, ground mounted speakers should be used. However, when the enemy is in the area in force, ground mounted speakers are vulnerable to small arms fire and its presence presents a vulnerable and easily identifiable target. Guidelines for the use of loudspeakers is contained in existing field manuals and directives.

s. (U) Reference item concerning "Fire base sanitation", section II, page 68, paragraph 15; concur. However, primary rodent control at fire support bases and elsewhere will be by proper disposal of garbage and other organic wastes that serve as attractants for rodents (USARV Regulation 40-32).

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Lt. D. Murray
CPT, ACC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy form:
101st ABN DIV (AM)
XXIV CORPS
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 101st Airborne Division (Air Mobile) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RG 59 CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. Shetk
CPT, AGC
Army AG
1. (C) Significant Operations.

a. During the reporting period, a major portion of the division's assets were placed in support of US/GVN joint operations in order to seek out and destroy VC/NVA forces, to interdict enemy base areas and infiltration routes; to detect, capture or destroy local Viet Cong infrastructure and their sympathizers; disrupt the routes of supply from the rice producing lowlands and population centers to mountain base camps; and support the Thua Thien Province Accelerated Pacification Program. With the advent of the monsoon season and the increased difficulties of resupplying maneuver battalions in the mountainous regions of the division area of operations, a significant redirection of combat operations to joint US/GVN efforts was initiated to create a prevailing atmosphere of security and to permit a maximum effort on environmental improvement programs. Though elements of the division continued to operate in the mountainous regions as part of this plan, increased emphasis has been placed on joint US/GVN operations in the lowlands of Thua Thien Province.

b. Throughout the reporting period the 2d Battalion (Airmobile), 327th Infantry has continued operations in Phu Loc District in conjunction with regional and popular forces, concentrating their efforts in the populated area along QL-1 from Troul River Bridge (YD967063) to the Nuoc Ngot River Bridge (ZD152011). The battalion conducted joint local patrols and area ambushes to interdict enemy efforts to infiltrate and harass the civilian population and continued a training program for regional and popular force units. In addition, the battalion command post, collocated with the Phu Loc District headquarters, forms the nucleus of a joint US/GVN operations center for the area.

c. As a result of the success experienced in the establishment of a joint US/GVN operations center in Phu Loc District, the decision was made to collocate another battalion—3d Battalion (Airmobile), 187th Infantry—at Phong Dien District. This move facilitated increased unity of command and effort, reduced reaction time to enemy initiated activities and resulted in greater mutual understanding and respect among US/GVN forces, and the civilian population.

d. The 3d Battalion (Airmobile), 187th Infantry began operations in the lowlands of southern Phong Dien District on 6 October to deny the enemy access to the district's resources and population. The battalion conducted multiple squad size night ambushes and local patrols in coordination with regional and popular force units astride infiltration routes into the Phong Dien populated areas. In addition to the combined operations, the battalion conducted a deliberate planned training program.
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Inclosure 1 (Joint US/GVN Operations Summary) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, ROY CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

for the district forces.

e. On 5 October, the 1st Battalion (Airmobile), 327th Infantry joined with Thua Thien Sector forces in the initiation of Operation SATIRATE. Working in close conjunction with Thua Thien regional and popular force units, national police field forces, and ARVN (54th Infantry Regiment) forces, the battalion conducted detailed search, local patrol, and ambush operations to neutralize local Viet Cong infrastructure and Viet Cong forces in Phu Thu District. Since then, the 1st Battalion (Airmobile), 327th Infantry has made significant inroads into both the local infrastructure and the "commuter guerrillas" active against the city of Hue. In addition, the battalion with the aid of one platoon of the 326th Engineer Battalion, was tasked to increase security measures (destruction of bunkers and fortifications and the construction of security posts and communications routes) within the district.

2. (C) Combined Campaign Objectives Plan.

a. Following a detailed analysis of the tactical situation in the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) area of operation, planning was initiated for a new combined US/GVN effort to further strengthen the pacification and development program within Thua Thien Province. The Combined Campaign Objectives Plan was formulated to accomplish this task through making the resources and assets of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) available at province and district level in a resourceful and responsive manner in order to intensify and accelerate the total Government of Vietnam effort.

b. The objectives of this plan are to establish a coordinated system of territorial security; increase the level of hamlet security and development; development of a dependable and responsive communications system; denial of resources to the enemy; and assistance in coordination.

c. To establish a coordinated system of territorial security, popular forces, after intensive training with 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) units, will replace regional force elements currently occupying static security positions. Such action will permit regional forces to become more mobile and will take greater advantage of their inherent command and control capabilities, which the popular force platoons do not possess. A training program for people's self defense forces (PSDF) is also being developed for the entire province. The 3d Battalion (Airmobile), 187th Infantry and the 2d Battalion (Airmobile), 327th Infantry have trained several hundred PSDF personnel with excellent results.
d. To increase the level of hamlet security and development it is planned that a company of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) will be committed to the general vicinity of the targeted hamlet. The company CP will be collocated with a regional force group or regional force company to facilitate combined planning and control of the internal defense system and the overall operation. A 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) platoon will be located for combined internal defense operations with the regional forces, national police field forces, popular forces and PSDF as they became available. The company (-) will continue patrol and ambush operations outside the target hamlet in addition to training the GVN forces. US involvement will be gradually reduced as regional forces increase in proficiency and as popular forces and PSDF become available and are trained.

e. To achieve a dependable system of communications from hamlet to village, to district and then to sector a system will be developed, utilizing existing VN communications resources, that provides an effective means for personnel within a hamlet to give sufficient warning to the hamlet or village chief with the radio so that district may be informed timely and can quickly respond. Once district is notified of enemy activity, the district chief has the capability to react with forces available or request forces from sector. Additional troops and assets may be obtained from US forces if required; requests for division assets are facilitated by an established, comprehensive liaison system with a liaison team and dedicated communications at each district headquarters. Continued positive reaction to requests for assistance will foster confidence within the people as well as produce beneficial returns in other areas. Our efforts in regard to a system of communications will be primarily in the area of assistance in the education and indoctrination of the people to utilize their existing resources.

f. To deny resources to the enemy, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) forces will provide direct military assistance in the form of interdiction operations along enemy supply routes into the populated areas, saturation patrols, ambushes, rice harvest security, airmobile operations with sector and police forces, establishment of checkpoints to control movement, enforcement of curfews, and civic action. One significant innovation, now in the planning stage will be the conduct of airmobile roving checkpoints. This concept envisions a combined US/GVN checkpoint/resources denial team aboard helicopters that land in selected areas to intermittently check traffic on waterways, roads and trails and to check harvesters and other field laborers for proper identification.

g. The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) will continue the
Inclosure 1 (Joint US/GVN Operations Summary) to Operational Report – Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, MSG-CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

upgrading of regional and popular forces to perform this task, thereby directly enhancing sector’s long term resources denial capability.

h. Assistance in coordination will be accomplished by the establishment of an informal coordination committee composed of the Commanding Generals, 1st ARVN Division and 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), the Thua Thien Province Chief, and the Senior Advisor, CORDS. The purpose of this committee will be to insure that the efforts and resources of the 1st ARVN Division, Thua Thien Province and the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) are oriented on the same objectives and goals. The area coordination committee will meet periodically and act as the focal point for joint planning and coordination of all available assets in support of pacification and development programs. Under this plan, province will continue to develop and maintain full control over the implementation of the pacification and development plan for Thua Thien Province. The area coordination committee will coordinate and recommend ways and methods to assist in implementing specific portions of the plan, and will insure meaningful assistance by all cooperating parties by establishing priorities written or agreed upon scheme for the allocation of tasks.
Inclosure 2 (Task Organization) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned,
101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 October 1969,

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MEMORANDUM FOR [REDACTED]

CONCERNING DWELLERS
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Inclosure 2 (Task Organization) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS C5FOR-65 (R2) (U)

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Confidential
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 101st Airborne Division

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug 69 to 31 Oct 69.

CC, 101st Airborne Division

19 November 1969

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N/A

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OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

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UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification