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AUTHORITY

AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

AGDA (M) (9 Mar 70) FOR OT UT 694091 17 March 1970

SUBJECT. Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 52d Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

[Signature]

ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, AG
Acting The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 52ND AVIATION BATTALION (COMBAT)
APO San Francisco 96494
"FLYING DRAGONS"

AVBACB-CC

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 52nd Aviation Battalion (Combat), Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

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1. Section 1 - Operations: Significant Activities.
   a. (C) General. This report for the period 1 August through 31 October 1969 is submitted in compliance with AR 525-15, USARPAC Reg 525-15, USARV Reg 525-15 and 17th Aviation Group (Combat) Reg 525-15.

   (1) Headquarters, 52nd Aviation Battalion (Combat), LTC Patrick J. O'Grady, Commanding, remains at Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN. Inclosure 1 reflects the station list of all assigned, attached, and OPCON units, with location and APO, as of 31 October 1969.

   (2) During this quarter, there has been no change of mission. However, the battalion has significantly increased its area of operations within II Corps Tactical Zone. The "Flying Dragons" continue to provide aviation support to the U.S. Fourth Infantry Division, MACV, RVN II Corps Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group, and other Free World Military Assistance Forces in the Central Highlands of Vietnam (see Inclosure 2). All operational and administrative functions and activities of Camp Holloway, Holloway Army Airfield, and Kontum Army Airfield are controlled by the 52nd Aviation Battalion (Combat).

   b. (C) Personnel.

   (1) Awards and Decorations

   FOR OFFUT
   694091

Inclosure

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DOWNGRADED AT 5 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 10 YEARS.
DOB DEC 5300.10
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 52nd Aviation Battalion (Combat), Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star [V]</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star [V]</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal [V]</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>1302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal [V]</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Command and Staff Changes. The following Command or Battalion Staff changes took place on the dates indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>NAME, RANK, SSAN (Incoming)</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BN XO</td>
<td>Talbert, James R., MAJ, 558 16 7966, Fernald, John P., MAJ, 524 40 8974</td>
<td>8 Oct 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bn PIO</td>
<td>Hughes, Barry T., CPT, 454 78 4305, Lopez, Michael S., CW2, 337 36 0474</td>
<td>8 Oct 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC</td>
<td>Burdette, Robert, CPT, 568 54 2610, Kibes, Eugene, CPT, 482 46 5219</td>
<td>24 Sep 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57th Avn CO</td>
<td>Charles, John D., MAJ, 187 26 9138, Kearns, James, MAJ, 392 36 8420</td>
<td>5 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119th Avn CO</td>
<td>Fernald, John P., MAJ, 524 40 8974, Harris, Peter R., MAJ, 544 34 2542</td>
<td>8 Oct 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170th Avn CO</td>
<td>Snell, Douglas, MAJ, 417 40 2119, Hardy, Ramon L., MAJ, 410 56 9486</td>
<td>3 Sep 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179th Avn CO</td>
<td>Pirkle, John, MAJ, 225 64 0956, Jones, Louis R., MAJ, 251 54 2438</td>
<td>5 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189th Avn CO</td>
<td>Ratliff, John, MAJ, 239 50 5936, Lincoln, Richard, MAJ, 092 24 6757</td>
<td>28 Sep 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>361st Avn CO</td>
<td>Deryck, John, MAJ, 277 30 5813, Furney, Robert M., MAJ, 368 30 7486</td>
<td>8 Oct 69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(3) Personnel turnover for the reporting period was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GAINS</td>
<td>LOSSES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUG</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEP</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCT</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) The Battalion Total Strength is 1814, short 42 Enlisted Men, 35 Warrant Officers, and 15 Commissioned Officers as of 31 Oct 69. Unit strengths are shown in Inclosure 3.

(5) Public Information Office activities:

(a) Printed Releases: 17
(b) Pictorial Releases: 3
(c) Hometown Printed Releases: 180
(d) Hometown Pictorial Releases: 15

(e) Civic action projects continue to receive much attention from the battalion. The Fat Smith Hospital in Kontum, the Tu Tam Orphanage in Pleiku, the Pleiku Catholic Parish, and The Church in the Village of Plei Monu have all received financial assistance totaling approximately $2,300.00. Frequent visits are made to the villages, orphanages, churches, and similar organizations within the area by MEDCAPS with food, clothing, and other contributions.

c. (C) Intelligence. The S-2 Section continues to publish a daily intelligence summary of significant activities in the Pleiku-Kontum area. Intelligence information is gathered from II Corps and 4th Infantry Division G-2 offices, other supported units, liaison visits to other S-2 offices and debriefings submitted by aviators and air mission commanders.

(1) Enemy Activity. There were three attacks by fire against 52nd Aviation Battalion (Combat) facilities during the reporting period. The enemy employed 82mm mortars in the first attack. In the second attack, he employed 82mm mortars and RFG-7s. The RFG-7s
were all airbursts. In the last attack, he employed 110mm rockets. All of the attacks occurred at Camp Holloway while the 57th Avn Co at Kontum Airfield didn’t experience any attacks. Significant activities during the period are listed in Inclosure 4.

(2) Movement. The 24th NVA Rgt with the 4th and 6th Battalions moved back into the northern part of Pleiku Province to the North of River Krong. This was substantiated by contacts, captured documents, prisoners and IR missions in their area of operations. There have been reports that the 408th Sapper Battalion has moved into Base Area 202 which is southeast of Pleiku City. The 4th Bn, 95B NVA Rgt is reported to be in the area southwest of Oasis. Their mission has been reported to be that of transporting rice and supplies to the rest of the 95B Rgt.

(3) New Units. There was one new unit confirmed in the Pleiku Province during the last three months. The 966th NVA Bn and K-31 Arty Bn have merged to form the K-631 NVA Bn. It is divided into six companies with a strength of 385 men. Its area of operation is to the northwest of Pleiku City. There have also been reports that a new Artillery Rgt has been formed. It has taken the designation of 40B Artillery Rgt and consists of the K41, K42, K46 and K47 Bns.

(4) Situation. NVA units have come back into Pleiku Province. They have the same mission as before, i.e., to interdict Hwy 14N. They have also conducted attacks by fire on RF/FF units, OPs and poorly defended hamlets. The K-631 Bn has been conducting attacks by fire against Allied and ARVN units and installations. The ground to air fire on helicopters has decreased from the last reporting period.

(5) Capabilities:

(a) Kontum Province. In Kontum Province the enemy forces can conduct standoff attacks or combination standoff/sapper attacks against US/Allied installations anywhere in the province. The enemy can employ mortars up to 120mm, 75mm recoilless rifles and rockets up to 140mm, 85mm/100mm/105mm artillery may be employed against installations near the Cambodian border. He can conduct ground attacks against friendly installations in up to reinforced battalion strength with supporting artillery, primarily in the area of Dak To/ Ben Het and Dak Saang. The enemy also has the capability to interdict QL 14N and Route 512 as well as other lines of communication. Friendly air activity may be restricted with fire from small arms, automatic weapons, 12.7mm, 14.5mm and 37mm anti-aircraft weapons. A limited armor threat still exists in the vicinity of Ben Het.
(b) Pleiku Province. Pleiku Province is also confronted with a variety of enemy capabilities to include: selective attacks on Pleiku City, Plei Doreng, Plei Me, Plei Enang, Than An and Le Trung in multi-battalion strength, supported by mortar, rocket and recoilless rifle fire; attack Pleiku City, US/ARVN bases, CIDG camps, district headquarters and resettlement areas using 62mm mortars, recoilless rifle and 122mm/110mm rocket fire and suppress; set ambushes along QL 19E and QL 1, supported by 75mm recoilless rifle and 60mm/82mm mortar fire; attack lines of communication 509, TL6C, TL7C and LTL 7B with VC elements using anti-tank grenades, recoilless rifle and mortar fire. The possibility of a limited armor and artillery capability exists in the vicinity of Duc Co.

d. (C) Operations.

(1) During this reporting period, the 52nd Aviation Battalion (Combat) supported Combat, Combat Support, Combat Service Support and Pacification Operations throughout the II Corps Tactical Zone. The "Flying Dragons" flew a total of 37,306 hours during this period, including 12,321 hours of combat assault. The majority of this aviation support was given to the U.S. 4th Infantry Division in Kontum, Pleiku, Darlac, Quang Duc and Binh Dinh Provinces. Other units or activities receiving daily aviation support include the Highway 19 Coordinator, CORDS, MACV, 5th Special Forces Group, ARVN 21st Special Tactical Zone, IFFV Artillery, ARVN II Corps Headquarters, and Pleiku, Kontum, Phu Bon, and Binh Dinh Sector Advisors. Six UH-1C and two CH-47 provided support to the Ban Me Thuot area during most of this period in support of the 4th Infantry Division, 23rd ARVN Division, IFFV Artillery and the 5th Special Forces Group. Mission accomplishment has been satisfactory. Some units continue to use unimproved landing or pick up zones for their operations, reducing the capabilities of the supporting aircraft and causing blade strikes and other aircraft damage. Tabulated data of operational results is shown in Inclosure 5.

(2) The following 4th Infantry Division operations were supported during this period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>TERMINATION</th>
<th>START</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hines</td>
<td>Continues</td>
<td>31 January 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wayne Javelin</td>
<td>16 October 1969</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Putnam Tiger</td>
<td>22 September 1969</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greene Orange III</td>
<td>15 August 1969</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Wayne Breaker Continues 19 October 1969
Putnam Wildcat Continues 31 October 1969
Greene Bear Continues 12 October 1969
Greene Bullet Continues 20 October 1969
Hartle Green Continues 14 October 1969
Kramer White Continues 16 October 1969
Hodges Black Continues 21 October 1969

(3) The 57th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter) primarily supported the 24th STZ, Command and Control Center, Kontum Sector, B-21 and the 4th Infantry Division during this period.

(4) The 119th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter) had the primary mission of supporting the 1st Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division. They also provided support to the Capital ROK Division and Binh Dinh Province.

(5) The 170th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter) supported the 2nd Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division. Support was also provided to the 23rd ARVN Division in Quang Duc Province and other Free World Military Assistance Forces within II Corps Tactical Zone.

(6) The 189th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter) provided support to the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, II Corps Headquarters, 23rd ARVN Division, 5th Special Forces Group and other FWMAF within the II Corps Tactical Zone.

(7) Medium helicopter support was provided throughout the II Corps Area of Operation by the 179th Aviation Company (Assault Support Helicopter). The majority of support was to the 4th Infantry Division and lesser support going to II Corps Artillery, II Corps (ARVN), 5th Special Forces Group and the 17th Aviation Group. During this quarter the 179th Avn Co flew 3,121 hours, delivering 16,772 troops and 12,547 tons of cargo in 6,966 sorties. Augmenting the 179th Avn Co is the 1st Platoon, 359th Aviation Company (Heavy Helicopter) which is OFCON to the 52nd ADC.

(8) The 361st Aviation Company (Escort) flew a total of 2,469 hours of which 2,071 hours were in support of combat assault missions. Armed helicopter support was provided for FOB II operations by four AH-1G aircraft daily. Two to four additional aircraft were provided daily for general support of units within the II Corps Tactical Zone.

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(9) During the period from 10 October to 18 October 1969, this battalion participated in an extensive search for two missing O-1 aircraft belonging to the 219th Aviation Company (Utility Aircraft). A total of 42 UH-1H, 4 UH-1C, 17 AHC-1, 3 CH-47 and 1 CH-54 were committed in the search. On 13 October the wreckage of one of the O-1's was found and later recovered. There was no sign of the aircraft occupants. The other O-1 was never sighted and the search continues in conjunction with normal missions.

(10) Pathfinder teams from the 52nd ABDC continue to be extremely valuable in company size lifts. During the search for the two missing O-1 aircraft the Pathfinders were used to the fullest extent possible both in the aerial search and for the initial insertion into the O-1 aircraft wreckage location.

e. (C) Training. All battalion units and headquarters sections continue to use on-the-job (OJT) training due to the tactical and administrative mission requirements. Planned AR 350 series training is conducted as prescribed with makeup classes scheduled as necessary.

(1) During this quarter 35 quotas were requested for the Army Aviation Refresher Training School. 5 officers and 31 Enlisted Men attended and completed this training.

(2) One officer attended the Jungle Environmental Survival Training School.

(3) One officer attended the AH-1G IP course and four officers attended the UH-1 IP course.

(4) During this quarter additional training was given to all personal concerning Drug Abuse and the recent changes to the UCMJ.

f. (C) Logistics.

(1) Class II:

(a) Significant improvements have been noted in the availability of Flight Safety items such as Nomex flight suits and gloves and body armor. Sufficient quantities of these items were received during the past quarter to satisfy initial issue requirements. It is expected that minor existing shortages will be filled in the near future.
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(b) Motor vehicle shortages have been greatly reduced since the last reporting period. A total of 26 vehicles have been received since 1 August 1969. It is particularly noteworthy that two wreckers and three 1250 gallon fuel tankers were among the vehicles received. These were the first new vehicles of this type received within this battalion in a period of one year.

(2) Class III: Total JP-4 dispensed by this battalion during the reporting period was 3,690,000 gallons of which 990,000 gallons were dispensed at Kontum Airfield by the 57th Aviation Company. This is a reduction of 610,000 gallons since the last period which is the result of reduced operations in the Kontum-Dak To areas. In addition to JP-4, 66,000 gallons of Avgas were dispensed at Kontum to transient and tenant aircraft.

(3) Class V: Ammunition expenditures and drawings were increased during the reporting period due to extensive ground support missions flown by battalion gunships and the establishment of an additional forward area arming point at Dak Pek. The minimum stockage level in each arming point at Dak To and Dak Puk is 500 2.75" Rkts, 36,000 7.62mm and 3,744 40mm. Ammunition drawings and expenditures for and by the gunships systems were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nomenclature</th>
<th>Drawn From ASP</th>
<th>Expended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.75&quot; Rkt</td>
<td>10,288</td>
<td>9,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40mm</td>
<td>12,600</td>
<td>13,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62mm (Minigun)</td>
<td>920,000</td>
<td>1,300,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the 9,440 rockets expended, 1,800 were transported to the forward areas making a total of 11,240 rockets required for the battalion. Drawings were delayed in many cases due to insufficient quantities of 2.75" rockets being allocated. This resulted in an ordnance draw down and delayed replenishment of the unit's basic loads. Additional allocations were requested to meet the battalion needs on these critical items.

(1) Aircraft Maintenance.

(1) Maintenance Statistics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Authorized</th>
<th>AH-1G</th>
<th>UH-1C</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
<th>CH-47C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Authorized</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Aircraft Assigned</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Average Aircraft Per Co | 10.9 | 6.5 | 18.5 | 14.6
Availability Rate (%)   | 62.2% | 70.4% | 79.6% | 68.6%
EDM Rate (%)            | 27.2% | 14.7% | 16.4% | 15.4%

(2) Aircraft on-hand status as of 31 October 1969:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>AH-1G Auth/OH</th>
<th>AH-1G Auth/OH</th>
<th>UH-1H Auth/OH</th>
<th>CH-47C Auth/OH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>57th Avn Co</td>
<td>8/7</td>
<td>23/19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119th Avn Co</td>
<td>8/7</td>
<td>23/20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170th Avn Co</td>
<td>8/7</td>
<td>23/20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179th Avn Co</td>
<td>8/7</td>
<td>23/20</td>
<td>16/11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189th Avn Co</td>
<td>8/7</td>
<td>23/18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>361st Avn Co</td>
<td>12/12</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2/2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Aircraft availability by units, and other tabulated maintenance data are shown in Inclosure 6.

h. (U) Accident Prevention.

(1) During the period of this report the 52nd Aviation Battalion (Combat) flew 37,306 hours and experienced six (6) major accidents and no minor accidents. The overall Battalion Accident Rate for this period was 16.2 accidents per 100,000 flying hours; a decrease of 6.9 from the previous quarter. A summary of the accidents which occurred during this period is shown in Inclosure 7.

(2) Units hold monthly safety meetings. In addition, special safety meetings are held at battalion level for specific units and for groups such as Aircraft Commanders when special problem areas are detected.

i. (U) Flight Standardization.

(1) The Battalion Standardization Section flew 267 hours qualifying new instructor pilots, administering 90 day standardization rides, aircraft commander check rides and in-country orientation rides for newly assigned aviators.

(2) Until mid-September the policy in this battalion was to give standardization check rides on missions. This, in most cases, prevents adequate coverage of emergency procedures which decreases the effectiveness of the check rides. Mission type check rides are now discouraged.
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On 25 October 1969 "Charlie Yankee Strip" was completed and opened for use by the IP's of this battalion for practice autorotations. This strip is asphalt covered and measures 70 ft by 500 ft. Since this strip is located within the confines of Camp Holloway, the standardization program will be made more effective as the flight time previously necessary to fly to satisfactory training areas will no longer be required.

 Organisation. The Post Headquarters Section continues to support tenant units of Camp Holloway. Airfield Operations, Base Defense, Post Development, Repair Utility Services, Post Exchange, Special Services and Law and Order activities are coordinated and supervised by the Deputy Post Commander, assisted by a Post Engineer, Special Services Officer, three enlisted assistants and one civilian employee. The average civilian strength during this period has been 109 US and 660 VN, including Direct and Government hires.

Other.

(a) The 52nd Aviation Battalion (Combat) Consolidated Chaplains Fund designated special offerings to the building of a church at Plei Monu, $1,025.50; Pleiku Catholic Parish, $109.20; Christian Service Men's Center in Nha Trang, $97.25; Dr. Patricia Smith's Hospital in Kontum, $290.25; the American Bible Society, $193.65; the Military Ordinariate, $51.15; and for the building of a church at Plei Bregn II, $162.50. Total expenditures, $4,298.30.

(b) As part of civic action work, the Chaplain and eight personnel painted the church of Plei Monu.

(c) Company sponsorship of the Chapel services has continued this quarter. Participation by the men as Lay Readers, Ushers and Greeters has been gratifying. The choir has again been rebuilt due to DEROS of previous members. Attendance at chapel services continued to grow during the quarter.

(d) The Battalion Chaplain has made 46 aircraft flights. He has attended the Group Chaplain's Conference at Nha Trang and the Brigade Chaplain's Conference at Long Binh. He also attended the IPPFV Chaplain's Conference. He has represented the 52nd Avn Bn at the Community Relations Meeting for October at II Corps Headquarters.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 52nd Aviation Battalion (Combat), Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

(2) Surgeon.

(a) Training: There is a continual program of training at the dispensary both in individual OJT situations and those of mass casualties. During the most recent exercise in mass casualties everyone performed their duties in an organized and efficient manner. The 71st Evacuation Hospital has also recently offered this battalion a proficiency training period to be used by our more outstanding medics.

(b) Preventative Medicine: This subject still remains at the top of the priority list for flight surgeons. Units have undertaken measures to decrease the incidence of venereal disease and drug abuse. The active measures taken have been a composite effort of the flight surgeons and Chaplain. Lectures/recommendations have been provided to units. The problems of drug abuse were covered through a mandatory Character Guidance series utilizing visual aids, the C.I.D., the Chaplain, and the flight surgeon. The flight surgeons continue to be available on a regular basis for lectures at safety meetings, discussions about first aid, venereal disease and other pertinent subjects.

(c) Dental Service: The 39th Medical Detachment (KJ) still provides two dentists to provide dental care to personnel at Camp Holloway. CPT's James H Pauloy and James F Houghton are presently assigned.

(d) MEDCAP: A continuing program is in effect, offering the medical services of this battalion to the various Montagnard and Vietnamese Resettlement Villages, the Christian and Missionary Alliance Leprosarium and Dr. Patricia Smith's hospital in Kontum.

(3) Signal: When the 119th Aviation Company moved to An Khe it necessitated removing this company's assets from the Consolidated Aircraft Avionics Shop at Camp Holloway. An officer from the consolidated shop was sent with the 119th Avn Co to set up their avionics shop in An Khe. There were few difficulties involved in the move.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 52nd Aviation Battalion (Combat), Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

2. Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. (C) Personnel.

(1) Critical MOS Shortages.

(a) OBSERVATION: TCE vacancies in such slots as 9L820 (Cook), 62B20 (Mechanic), 63C40 (Motor Sgt), 71H20 (Co Clk), and vital MOS shortages in Avionics sections - 35P (Shop Foreman), 35M (Navigation Specialist) and 35N (Navigation Equipment Repairman), are not filled by school trained personnel.

(b) EVALUATION: Reduced effectiveness of the unit mission and aircraft availability results from a number of unqualified personnel performing these MOS skills in an OJT status.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Place higher priority on CONUS trained replacement personnel, and that trained personnel be programmed for some stateside experience before shipment to Vietnam.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Carefully selected personnel in related MOS fields are used to fill these vacancies. OJT training is conducted in all MOS's where vacancies exist.

(2) Avionics Personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION: Avionics personnel are not knowledgeable in the speed trim and SAS systems for CH-47 aircraft.

(b) EVALUATION: Discussions with avionics personnel indicates they did not receive adequate training on the speed trim and SAS systems. (Avionics personnel are unable to troubleshoot and repair or adjust the speed trim or SAS systems.)

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a study be made of the program of instruction for avionics MOS's presently being conducted at the USATSC, Fort Rastis, Virginia, and more detailed instructions on speed trim and SAS systems be included in the program of instructions.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: An extensive training program is being conducted at unit level to train these personnel.

(3) Experience Level of Senior Helicopter Repairmen.
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AVB-CC-CC (10 Nov 69)

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 52nd Aviation Battalion (Combat), Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

(a) OBSERVATION: Many senior helicopter repairmen (E7U20) are arriving in this unit whose grade exceeds their ability and experience level.

(b) EVALUATION: This unit has received seven Specialists E-5 helicopter repairmen (E7U20) in the last ninety days. These EM were appointed to grade of SF5 upon successful completion of a 5 week leadership course conducted at Fort Rustis, Virginia. They have only a basic knowledge of the aircraft and its systems, and must be closely supervised when working on the aircraft. Successful completion of the helicopter repairman course and the leadership course does not provide an individual the knowledge and experience necessary to perform satisfactorily in a supervisory capacity in the highly technical field of aircraft maintenance.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: To alleviate the low experience level presently existing, additional technical schooling must be provided these individuals.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Close supervision and instruction is given these personnel to develop their experience.

(a) OBSERVATION: No TOE vacancy exists for a Unit Supply Technician. An officer must be assigned the additional duty as Supply Officer and Property Book Officer.

(b) EVALUATION: Aviation units are authorized a large amount of high dollar value equipment and have extensive and complex maintenance and supply activities. Qualified supply officers or warrant officers are urgently needed to ensure timely and efficient supply and property accountability.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Action be taken by higher headquarters to review the need for qualified Unit Supply Technicians at aviation unit level.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Commanders are assigning the most capable officers as FBO and warrant officers as Assistant FBO in an effort to have at least one officer available to supervise supply activities.

(5) Drug Abuse.

(a) OBSERVATION: Several personnel assigned to this battalion are suspected or known to be engaged in some form of drug abuse.
AVBAOB-CG (10 Nov 69)
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 52nd Aviation Battalion
(Combat), Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

(b) EVALUATION: The easy access of marihuana and other more
dangerous drugs in Vietnam is a prime factor relative to this problem.
The problem is further aggravated because of the lack of off duty
facilities for enlisted personnel.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That an intense and widespread crackdown on
the sources of these drugs, through the coordinated efforts of the
Vietnamese and US authorities, together with a more intense information
program for all US troops on drug abuse and its effects be initiated.
This program must be backed up through the administration of swift
severe courts-martial action.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Frequent classes are given on the subject of
drug abuse, addressing the problem from all aspects. These classes
and discussion periods are presented by the commanders, flight surgeon,
JAG personnel, chaplain and CID representatives. In addition, a con-
centrated effort has been made to seek out and minimize the sources,
discover drug hiding places and restrict access to secluded areas
where drugs can be administered or consumed.

b. (U) Intelligence. None.
c. (C) Operations.

(1) Unserserviceable Air-Delivery Equipment and Improperly Rigid
 Loads:

(a) OBSERVATION: The use of unserviceable air-delivery equipment
and improper rigging procedures results in dropped or damaged loads.

(b) EVALUATION: During this quarter units have dropped seven
(7) loads because supported units used unserviceable slinging equipment
or because of improper rigging.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Supported units must carefully inspect all
slinging equipment prior to usage. Class IV loads must be rigid on
pallets.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Reports were filed on all dropped loads.
Supported units were notified each time a load was dropped. Path-
finders have demonstrated proper rigging procedures to supported units
and will continue to do so.

(2) Loads Are Not Always Airlifted From the Closest Source of
Supply to Destination.
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AVBACB-CC (10 Nov 69)
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 52nd Aviation Battalion (Combat), Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

(a) OBSERVATION: This unit is called upon to airlift loads by helicopter long distances when they could have been carried by ground transport or fixed wing aircraft part or all of the way.

(b) EVALUATION: The capabilities of the CH-47 helicopter makes it best suited for carrying loads short distances into areas inaccessible by other means of transport. The high cost of operating the CH-47 makes it imperative that ground transport be utilized unless the tactical situation demands otherwise. Loads which could be ground transported close to the LZ are often carried great distances by helicopter for the convenience of the supported unit. An example is elements of IFFV Artillery effect the resupply of water at Fire Base 6 (near Dak To) by refilling the water trailers at Artillery Hill (near Pleiku) and having them carried to Fire Base 6. This unit has facilities near Dak To that could refill their water trailers and blivets much nearer to destination.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Higher headquarters deny requests for missions which could be performed by ground transportation. All missions should be analysed by the supported units headquarters to insure they are being accomplished in the most efficient manner.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Classes have been given at each of the brigade headquarters of the 4th Infantry Division and other major supported units on CH-47 utilization. Direct coordination with supported units has been in effect so that this unit can make recommendations on improving mission efficiency.

3. Dust Abatement.

(a) OBSERVATION: With the impending onset of the dry season dust becomes a severe problem relative to safe aircraft operation.

(b) EVALUATION: The hazards of dusty Fire Support Eases and LOC's can be anticipated. From previous experience it is known that the dust during the dry season presents one of the greatest hazards to helicopter operation in Vietnam. Helicopter rotor wash can stir up a dust cloud which reduces the pilot's visibility to the extent that visual reference to the ground is not possible. This is an extremely dangerous situation and totally unacceptable as a working environment for sling load operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A dust abatement program must be initiated immediately with peneprime or other suitable substitutes. Helicopter pads should be built, where practical, to accommodate the intense rotor wash associated with the Chinook aircraft. An alternative is to locate loads in grassy areas.
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AVB: CB-CC (10 Nov 69)
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 52nd Aviation Battalion (Combat), Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Liaison has been made with supported units appraising them of this situation and advising them of the requirements necessary for safe operations.

(4) CS Drop Missions.
   (a) OBSERVATION: During this quarter a great deal of CH-47 blade time has been utilized performing CS drop missions.

   (b) EVALUATION: It seems highly probable that there is a more effective and efficient way to perform CS drop missions. Perhaps a C-130 aircraft could be used on these missions. A C-130 could carry three (3) times the pay load, and arrive on station faster.

   (c) RECOMMENDATION: That the feasibility of using C-130 aircraft on CS drop missions be studied.

   (d) COMMAND ACTION: None.

   (e) (U) Organization. None.

   (f) (C) Training. Survival School Quotas.

   (1) OBSERVATION: Very few aviators of this unit are being offered the opportunity to attend formal survival schools.

   (2) EVALUATION: Due to the nature of some of the missions which this unit supports, the possibility of being downed by enemy fire is great and places our personnel in a critical survival situation. Each unit within the battalion conducts its own survival training but this training is a poor substitute for the courses offered by a formal school.

   (3) RECOMMENDATION: That consideration be given to allocating more survival school quotas to this battalion.

   (4) COMMAND ACTION: Each unit conducts extensive survival and escape and evasion orientations and training. Additional school quotas will be requested.

   (f) (U) Logistics. None.

   (g) (C) Communications. CONSEC Logistic Support.

   (1) OBSERVATION: Excessive time is spent turning in and receiving for CONSEC equipment.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 52nd Aviation Battalion (Combat), Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

(2) EVALUATION: CONSEC Secure Voice Equipment is required to be hand-carried under guard when transported to the CONSEC Logistic Support Unit in Qui Nhon for maintenance or turn-in.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That CONSEC logistic support be provided by another unit such as the 4th Inf Div CONSEC Logistic Support Section at Camp Enari.

(4) COMMAND ACTION: Technical assistance in the form of advice and minor repair is now being received from the 4th Division. A formal request is being made to ascertain whether or not more substantial support can be obtained from the 4th Division.

h. (C) Material. Loss of Power in UH-1, T53 Engines.

(1) OBSERVATION: Loss of power in UH-1, T53 engines.

(2) EVALUATION: Failure to properly clean the engine has caused low power problems. The ingestion of oil and dirt into the engine accumulates on the compressor blades which results in a disrupted airflow with a resultant loss of power. In several cases it was necessary to disassemble the compressor section in order to properly clean it.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That at the end of each day's flying, during refueling or prior to shut down, two (2) gallons of clean water be run thru the inlet section of the T53 engine.

(4) COMMAND ACTION: A policy has been implemented within this battalion whereby each unit conforms to the above procedure. Facilities have been made available at the FCL area and in unit revetted areas to accommodate this practice.

i. (C) Other.

(1) Incoming Flight Records.

(a) OBSERVATION: This unit has received numerous aviator flight records which were incomplete and incorrect.

(b) EVALUATION: Flight records which have been previously maintained at CONUS stations (primarily Ft. Rucker and Ft. Stewart) are arriving at this unit incomplete and inaccurate. Several new aviators have arrived at this unit with no record of student pilot time or of transition time. This places an additional burden on the receiving unit. Aviators are allowed to depart Ft. Rucker and Fort Stewart without flight records with the understanding that they will be mailed to them.
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AVBACB-CC (10 Nov 69)
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 52nd Aviation Battalion (Combat), Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

(a) RECOMMENDATION: No aviator be allowed to depart on PCS until he has complete and correct flight records in his possession.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Numerous TWX's and letters have been sent to Fort Rucker requesting missing records.

7 Incl
as
Incls 1, 2 and 3 wd HQ, DA

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - CINCSUSARPAC, ATTN: GROF-DT, APO 96558
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2 - CG, 1st Avn Bde, ATTN: AVBACB-MH, APO 96364
7 - CG, 17th AGC, ATTN: AVBACB-SC, APO 96240
1 - CO, 7/17th ASC, APO 96318
1 - Each Staff Section
5 - S-3, 52nd ASC

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AVRABE-6C (19 Nov 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 52nd Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period Ending 31 Oct 1969, RCS CSPOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 17TH AVIATION GROUP (COMBAT), APO 96240 25 November 1969

TO: Department of the Army (ACSPOR, DA), Washington, D.C. 20310

Commanding General, I Field Forces Vietnam, APO 96350

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the attached report, considers it to be adequate, and concurs with the contents as stated, except as indicated below.

2. (C) The following comments and recommendations are submitted:


   (1) Paragraph 10, Page 3, Intelligence. Data of significant historical value should be written in future reports. PBRIMTRBP's should be omitted and activities of the S2 staff section presented. Information in Enclosure 4 has been reported and documented as processed intelligence. This enclosure should be omitted in future reports.

   (2) Paragraph 1e, Page 7, Training. The total number of days engaged in operations and training is not reflected, reference USARV Regulation 525-15, Para 5b(1)(e).

   (3) Paragraph 1f(1)(b), Page 8, Logistics. Line four should be corrected to read: .... 1200 gallon fuel tankers were among the vehicles received.

   (4) Paragraph 11(2), Page 9, Flight Standardization. Portions of the ninety day proficiency flight should be conducted on operational and training flights to minimize aircraft utilization time. Emergency procedures can be verbally reviewed during the flight and then conducted at the completion of the days mission.

b. Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

   (1) Paragraph 2a(1)(a), Page 12, Critical MOS Shortages. MOS 62820 should be corrected to read 63820.

   (2) Paragraph 2a(1)(a), Page 12, Critical MOS Shortages. Nine 35420 (navigation specialist) on hand versus 11 authorized does not constitute a critical shortage in this MOS. Replacement personnel for the MOS shortages of 35420 and 35820 are arriving at a normal rate. Three personnel with each referenced MOS were received during the months of September and October. Emphasis will continue to be taken to insure that equal distribution of subject MOS's are made within the 17th Avn Grp (Cbt).
AVBAGSC (19 Nov 69) 1st Inf
SUBJET: Operational Report-lessons Learned of 52nd Aviation
Battalion (Combat) for Period Ending 31 Oct 1969,
RDS CINFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(3) Paragraph 2a(2), Page 12, Avionics Personnel. The program of
instruction on the speed trim and SAS is conducted at U.S. Army South-
eastern Signal School and not at USATSC, Fort Eustis. A systems engi-
neering survey is presently being conducted and a request for assistance
has been made through AVEL Support Company. A Course of Instruction on
these systems will be given by this headquarters and AVEL personnel.

(4) Paragraph 2a(4), Page 13, Supply-Officer. This subject has been
covered in correspondence with 1st Aviation Brigade, Ref Letter AVBAGC-P,
Subject: Property Book Officers, TOE/MTOE, 1-077G, 1-157T, 1-259G, and
1-259G dated April 1969. A recent change added the unit supply technician
to MTCE 1-256G, MTCE 1-258G and MTCE 1-259G. No further action has hap-
pened, but this Headquarters considers the addition of a supply technician
to TOE 1-077G to be a necessity.

(5) Paragraph 2c(4), Page 16, CS Drop Missions. Nonconcur. Response
to the immediate needs of the ground commander is a responsibility of an
army mobile force. CS missions, whether on a unplanned basis, or as a tar-
got of opportunity, should be considered a normal requirement. Use of a
CH-47 permits a greater concentration in a shorter time span.

(6) Paragraph 2e, Page 16, (C) Training Survival School Quotas.
Attendance at formal courses of instruction is based on quotas allocated
to the Group. Graduates of these courses are supposed to be appointed as
Escape and Evasion Officers and to conduct training within the units.
Group will request additional quotas to these courses.

(7) Paragraph 2h(c), Page 17, Material. Loss of power in UH-1, 753
Engines. Cleaning process should not take place during refueling opera-
tions due to the potential fire hazard. This cleaning process was recom-
meded to all battalions in July 69.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

MARC L. TUMAS
CPT, ADA
Adjutant

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AVFA-GG-HIST (10 Nov 69) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 52d Aviation Battalion (Combat), Period Ending 31 October 1969
RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350

TO: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96384

(U) This headquarters has evaluated subject ORIL and forwarding indorsement and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

FREDERICK E. HOLLAND

CF:
1 - CO, 17th Avn Grp (Cbt)
1 - CO, 52d Avn Bn (Cbt)
AVRAGC-0 (10 Nov 69) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 52d Aviation
Battalion (Combat), Period Ending 31 October 1969  (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96394  17 DEC 1969

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs with the
contents as indorsed.

2. The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

   a. Paragraph 2a(1), page 12 discusses critical shortages of personnel.

      (1) The 52d Aviation Battalion (Combat) shortage of school-trained
          avionics personnel cannot be resolved at this headquarters. The 17th Avia-
          tion Group (Combat) receives a proportionate share of avionics personnel
          assigned to the 1st Aviation Brigade.

      (2) The 52d Aviation Battalion (Combat) reports a critical shortage of
          71H (Company Clerk) personnel; however, the 17th Aviation Group (Combat)
          possesses 71H personnel in excess of authorisations.

      (3) The shortage of 63040 (Motor Sergeant) and 9410/320 (Cook) per-
          sonnel reported by the 52d Aviation Battalion (Combat) reflects a shortage
          existing throughout the 1st Aviation Brigade. 17th Aviation Group (Combat)
          is allocated an equitable share of brigade assets.

   b. Paragraph 2a(2), page 12 discusses insufficient technical knowledge
      of Stabilisation Augmentation System (SAS) and speed trim repairman. Person-
      nal training in avionics MOS 35W, Stabilisation Equipment Repairman, is con-
      ducted at Fort Gordon, Georgia. These personnel are responsible for the
      repair, alignment and trouble shooting of speed trim and SAS equipment in-
      stalled in CH-47 aircraft. The 1st Aviation Brigade is understrength of
      personnel in this MOS. The Avionics Department, Southeastern Signal School,
      has incorporated this training into their program of instruction; however,
      due to the length of the course and volume of equipment to be taught, only
      a basic knowledge is gained. Experience must be gained through a properly
      supervised OJT program in the unit.

   c. Paragraph 2a(4), page 13 discusses the need for Unit Supply Tech-
      nician 761A at unit level. Concur. This headquarters is aware of the require-
      ment to reestablish TOAE positions of 761A at company level. Further, this
headquarters has requested authorization for 761A’s by letter to USARV, ATTN: AVHGC-FDO, Subject: Unit Supply Technicians, dated 26 May 1969. Department of the Army denied the original request; however, a new request is being prepared at this headquarters. Paragraph 2b(4), 1st Ind, page 20 erroneously quotes authorization for this MOS in aviation units referenced.

d. Paragraph 2c(3), page 15 addresses hazards of dust in helicopter operations. Concur. The use of peneprine as a dust suppressant has been strongly endorsed by this headquarters. On 10 October 1969, a message, Subject: Dust Suppression, was sent to all subordinate commands reiterating the need for a continuing dust suppression program. The message also contained information concerning engineer support for this program.

e. Paragraph 2e(1), page 16 discusses a need for additional survival school quotas. 17th Aviation Group (Combat), the parent unit of the 52d Aviation Battalion (Combat), was allocated 15 survival school quotas during the period covered by this report. These quotas represent an equitable share of allocations given to 1st Aviation Brigade.

f. Paragraph 2g, page 16 discusses Communications Security Logistical Support. Action taken by the 52d Aviation Battalion (Combat) is the only immediate relief possible. There is no Crypto Logistical Support Unit (CLSU) located in Pleiku which serves the 52d Aviation Battalion (Combat). The Crypto Logistical Support Section (CLSS) organic to the 4th Infantry Division, can lend assistance. Investigation is underway to determine if the CLSS can absorb the support mission, what augmentation will be required to do so, or if a new CLSU may be justified.

g. Paragraph 2i(1), page 17 discusses incomplete and incorrect flight records previously maintained at Fort Rucker and Fort Stewart. Coordination with USARV revealed that correspondence was being prepared by the USARV Aviation Operations Plans and Training Branch broaching the problem on a USARV wide basis. As information becomes available, dissemination will be made to subordinate units of this command.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

ARThUR W. LEwIs
CPT AGC
Asst AG.

Copy 3d Ind Furn:
CO, 52d Avn Bn (Cbt)
GPOP-DT (10 Nov 69) 5th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 52nd Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 3 FEB 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

D. A. TUCKER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

011600-1630 Aug: 57th AC gunships in support of 24th STZ fired on a suspected enemy location vicinity of AS 9024 resulting in 1 structure destroyed.

021845-1915 Aug: 361st ACE gunships on a scramble for 17th AEC fired on hootches vicinity of YA 953222 resulting in 1 hootch destroyed. 1900-1929, 361st ACE gunships in support of IPPV Artillery fired on hootches in the vicinity of YA 953327 resulting in 1 hootch being destroyed.

031953-2352 Aug: 189th AC bunker #64, vicinity AR 803475, received a total of 6 rounds of small arms fire. Fire was not returned. Movement was also reported in front of the same bunker and M-79 fire was placed in the area with negative results. There were no friendly casualties and enemy casualties were unknown.

061130-1140 Aug: 361st ACE gunships in support of FOB fired on a suspected enemy location resulting in 1 structure destroyed. 1600-1615, 189th AC gunships in support of 24th STZ fired in the vicinity of AR 9090 resulting in 2 structures damaged and 7 VC KIA (By Air).

073000-1315 Aug: 361st ACE gunships in support of 4th Div fired on a confirmed enemy location vicinity ZA 0417 resulting in one small hootch with a bunker beneath it being destroyed and 2 VC KIA (By Air).

110046 Aug: 189th AC reported possible movement in front of bunker #57. 52nd Scty mortars fired illumination and the bunker employed small arms fire. The fire was not returned. The bunker lost sight of the individuals at 0120. The area was checked using the starlight scope and the Firefly aircraft with negative sightings. A check of the defensive wire found that it had been tampered with in front of bunker #57. The results of the nights activity were negative friendly casualties and unknown enemy casualties.

120135 Aug: 189th AC bunker #57 on Northeast side of perimeter received small arms fire; illumination was employed and M-79 fire was returned with unknown results. 170th AC on west side of the perimeter reported 10 individuals 150 meters to their front; illumination was employed and the individuals turned and ran. 0247, Camp Holloway received 15 82mm mortar rounds. Four rounds landed near the operations building of the 361st ACE and the remainder landed in the 170th AC motor pool and billets area. Gunships and the flareship were launched in support. The results of the attacks were as follows: Friendly - 361st ACE operations building received light damage from shrapnel; 170th AC had 4 US WIA (slight), 1 maintenance tent and 2 maintenance vans received light shrapnel damage, air compressor gas tank received holes in it from shrapnel, and the windshield and canvas of a 3/4 ton truck

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received light damage. A PA&E generator in the area received holes in the generator radiator. Enemy casualties were unknown.

121300 Aug: 119th AC gunships in support of Hawkeye 1D fired when the team made contact with an enemy force in the vicinity of BR 224497 resulting in 10 NVA KIA (By Air) and 3 NVA KIA. 1700, 57th AC gunships in support of 5th SFGA fired on a confirmed enemy location vicinity of AR 4351 resulting in 3 structures destroyed. 2020, 52nd Scty patrol made contact with an unknown size enemy force vicinity of AR 645494.

131400 Aug: 170th AC gunship received intense automatic weapons ground fire causing the ship to crash and burn. Friendly casualties were one ML and 3 WIA.

141700 Aug: 52nd Scty patrol on a search of the area of their contact on 12 August found the following items in the vicinity of AR 645494: 1 NVA belt with red star buckle, 1 first aid kit with bandages, 2 plastic ponchos, 1 khaki uniform, 1 pair of OI drawers, 3 pair of Ho Chi Minh sandals, 5 chemical type fuses (1 damaged) and blood trails leading to northeast.

151150 Aug: 119th AC gunships in support of LRRP 1G team fired when the team made contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of BR 215404 resulting in 5 VC KIA (By Air). 0945-1410, 52nd Scty Det made sweep of the area vicinity AR 846505 to AR 870505 and from AR 854490 to AR 870495. At AR 846495, they found 1 pair of Chinese binoculars, bloody bandages and bloodstains on the ground. 1200 and 1300, 361st ACE gunships in support of 5th SFG fired when friendly troops made contact with enemy forces resulting in 25 enemy KIA (By Air) and 25 WIA. 2240, Camp Holloway bunker #84 on east perimeter received 5 - 6 rounds of small arms fire. Illumination was employed with negative results. No friendly casualties.

160050 Aug: Bunker #13 on the west perimeter of Camp Holloway received 5 - 6 rounds of small arms fire. Illumination was employed with negative results. There were no friendly casualties.

170900-0930 Aug: 119th AC gunships in support of 23rd ARVN Division fired on structure and sampans in the vicinity of BR 2731 resulting in one structure and one sampan being destroyed. 1345-1400, 119th AC gunships in support of 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div fired during LRRP team extraction in the vicinity of BR 146434 resulting in 1 NVA KIA (By Air).

181400 Aug: 57th AC in support of 24th STZ fired on a suspected enemy location vicinity of AR 6620 resulting in 4 structures being destroyed. 1400, 119th AC aircraft working for 5th SFG at Ben Hoi observed what appeared to be a T-26-24 helicopter landing vicinity of YB 8433. The aircraft did not pursue because of its low fuel load.

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191145 Aug: 361st gunships in support of FOE spotted one KIG-21 aircraft. The aircraft circled the helicopters and then left the area.

201100 Aug: 57th AC gunships in support of 4th Inf Div fired on a confirmed enemy location vicinity of ZA 0753 resulting in two structures being damaged. 1115, 57th AC gunships in support of 21st STZ fired on a confirmed enemy location vicinity of ZA 0860 resulting in three structures being damaged. 1125, 170th AC slick, while on a LRRP VR for 4th Div in the vicinity of ZA 0560 received intense automatic weapons fire resulting in 5 hits. The gurner fired on the area resulting in one enemy KIA. 1200-1320, 119th AC gunships supporting 1/4 Inf Div LRRP team in contact with the enemy observed an NVA company in the open and fired on the enemy resulting in 41 NVA KIA. 57th AC gunships in support of 17th AGO fired on a target resulting in one structure destroyed and one enemy KIA. 2132, Camp Holloway bunker #36 (68th PCL area) received 3 bursts of AW fire, illumination and M-79's were employed; 2240, bunker #55 (219th area) received a burst of AW fire, illumination was employed and the area was checked by radar with negative results; 2243, bunker #35 (68th PCL area) received a burst of AW fire, illumination and M-79's employed. There were no friendly casualties or damage when the bunkers received the AW fire.

241345-1430 Aug: 189th AC gunships in support of 4th Div fired when friendly troops made contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of AR 9115 resulting in 9 VC KIA.

251145 Aug: 361st AC gunships in support of the 4th Div fired on a suspected enemy mortar position when friendly troops made contact with enemy forces with results of 10 HM KBK and 5 En WIA (est).

281530-1600 Aug: 119th AC gunships in support of 1/4 fired when friendly troops made contact with enemy forces vicinity AR 5855 resulting in 12 NVA KBK.

290200 Aug: Camp Holloway received 20 rds of 82mm mortar fire and 5 rds of RPG-7. All of the RPG-7 were air bursts. 361st AC and 170th AC gunships fired on the confirmed enemy location vicinity AR 805435. 52nd Sety made a sweep of the area in the morning and found the firing positions. The results of the attack were as follows: Friendly - 1 UH-1H received light damage and 4 US WIA (slight); Enemy - unknown.

301610-1830 Aug: 119th AC gunships fired when LRRP team made contact with an enemy force vicinity of BR 460325 resulting in 10 enemy KIA.

010035 Sep: 361st gunships in support of 230th RF Company and MACV Team #85 in the vicinity of AR 948377 who came under attack from an unknown size enemy force fired with unknown results.
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020625 Sep: Camp Holloway received two 140mm rockets. One landed outside the perimeter near OP #25 and the other landed near the 18th Avn Co located on the east side of the runway. RVN and US artillery fired on the suspected enemy location. There were no friendly casualties or damage done. Enemy casualties or damage is unknown.

020900-1730 Sep: 119th AC gunships supporting 1/4 Div fired three times when friendly troops made contact with unknown size enemy forces in the vicinity of BR 2829, BU 2741, and BU 6855, resulting in 2 NVA KIA (By Air).

041155-1220 Sep: 361st ACE gunships, supporting 6th Div, fired when friendly troops made contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of Za 1966 resulting in 10 enemy KIA.

6 Sep: While on patrol to the east of 57th AC compound at Kontum, members of the 52nd Scry Det found 3 foxholes approximately one day old in the vicinity of AR 79238959. Also found in the area were 3 fibre plugs for 122mm rockets, 1 VC entrenching tool and one bundle of 20 bamboo strips for tying back wire. All items were evacuated to G-2 Kontum Sector. 061615-1645 and 1730-1800, 119th AC gunships supporting 1/4 Div fired on a confirmed enemy location resulting in one structure damaged and one structure destroyed.

06020A Sep: 52nd Scry Det mortar section fired a H&I mission in the vicinity of AR 821502 and received a report of a secondary explosion in the area.

101100-1115 Sep: 119th AC gunships supporting 1/4, fired on a confirmed enemy location when one of the unit slicks on a Snoopy mission received intense small arms and automatic weapons fire from vicinity of BR 240746. Results were one secondary explosion and unknown number of enemy casualties. 1250, 17th AC UH-1N received intense small arms and B-40 rocket fire from the vicinity of Za 060448 resulting in the ship crashing and burning. Casualties were 2 US KIA and 2 US WIA.

111310-1315 Sep: 119th AC slicks supporting 4th Div in the vicinity of BR 3076 received ground fire while landing in an LZ. Fire returned by ships crew resulting in 1 NVA KIA (By Air).

121015-1045 Sep: 119th AC gunships supporting 1/4 Div fired when friendly troops made contact in the vicinity of BR 2031 with an enemy force resulting in 2 NVA KIA (By Air).

131200-1215 Sep: 119th AC slick during extraction of LRRP 1A of 1/4 Div in the vicinity of BR 244183 had the door gunner fire on 2 NVA charging toward the aircraft resulting in 2 NVA KIA. At 1200-1300, 119th gunships fired in the same area for LRRP teams resulting in 10
enemy KB. 1311430-1450, 361st AC gunships supporting 5th SPGA fired on a confirmed enemy location resulting in one .50 caliber machine gun destroyed.

141510 Sep: 119th AC aircraft, on a Snoopy mission for 1/4 Div, observed 24 water buffalo in the vicinity of BR 205945. Gunships fired resulting in 24 water buffalo killed.

161200-1230 Sep: 119th AC gunships supporting 1/4 Div fired when friendly troops made contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of BR 2532 resulting in 10 enemy KB.

181630 Sep: 119th AC gunships and slicks supporting 4th Div fired on a confirmed enemy location in the vicinity of BR 409560 resulting in 3 enemy KIA (By Air).

261415 Sep: 57th AC slick on a Snoopy mission for 24th STZ received moderate automatic weapons fire in the vicinity of ZB 217225 resulting in 7 hits on the aircraft and 1 US WIA. Gunners fired in the area with unknown results.

270810-0930 Sep: 57th AC gunships supporting 24th STZ fired on an acquired enemy location in the vicinity of ZB 0619 resulting in one structure damaged. 1100-1215, 119th AC gunships supporting 1/4 Div fired when friendly troops made contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of BR 2686 resulting in 1 enemy KIA (By Air).

291145-1215 Sep: 189th AC slick received weapons fire and 1 RPG-7 air burst round while going into a pickup zone in the vicinity of YA 866530 resulting in 4 hits on the aircraft and 1 US WIA (alight). Gunners fired in the area with unknown results.

011315-1330 Oct: 57th AC gunships supporting 5th SPGA fired when friendly troops made contact with 20 VC/NVA in the vicinity of YA 861819 resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (By Air).

031100 Oct: 361st AC gunships were scrambled to support 2/3 ARVN Cav unit which was under small arms and B-40 rocket attack in the vicinity of ZA 223745 from an estimated enemy squad while they were on a road security mission. The gunships fired on the confirmed enemy location and the Cav swept the area and found 3 NVA KIA (By Air) and 2 B-40 RL.

041630-1645 Oct: 119th AC gunships supporting 1/4 Div fired on bunker positions in the vicinity of BR resulting in 5 bunkers destroyed.
061240-1245 Oct: 119th AC gunships supporting 1/4 Div fired when friendly troops made contact in the vicinity of BR 290480 with unknown size NVA force resulting in 7 NVA KIA (By Air). The gunships also received intense small arms and automatic weapons fire while attacking the target, but received no hits. 1300-1345; 361st ACE gunships supporting 5th SFGA fired when friendly troops made contact in the vicinity of YB 9269 with an unknown size enemy force resulting in 30 NVA KIA.

101320-1530 Oct: 119th AC gunships supporting 1/4 Div were returning from a LZ preparation and observed 2 individuals in green fatigues running across a field in the vicinity of BR 455551. The gunships fired on the individuals resulting in two NVA KIA (By Air).

131000-1015 Oct: 189th AC slick supporting 17th AGC on an aircraft search mission in the vicinity of YB 850735 received ground fire resulting in one hit on the aircraft. The gunners fired on the area resulting in 5 VC KIA (By Air).

141130 Oct: 119th AC slicks supporting 4th Div observed 3 individuals wearing black pants and carrying packs in the vicinity of BR 223242. The gunships fired resulting in 1 WMD KIA (By Air). They also observed 3 bunkers, cultivated fields and numerous trails in the area. 1445-1800, 119th gunships supporting 1/4 Div fired on enemy structures resulting in 3 structures damaged and one destroyed in the vicinity of BR 3035. 1550-1555, 189th AC gunships supporting 24th STZ fired on a confirmed enemy location in the vicinity of ZA 0750 resulting in 5 VC KIA (By Air).

151130-1230 Oct: 119th AC gunships supporting 4th Div fired on a confirmed enemy location from which one of the unit's slicks had received intense automatic weapons fire. The slick received 6 hits. The results were 15 NVA KIA (By Air). The location of the fire was in the vicinity of BR 692612.

161115-1117 Oct: 189th AC slicks supporting 17th AGC on a search and rescue mission in the vicinity of YB 870746 received intense small arms and automatic weapons fire resulting in 4 hits on the aircraft. The gunners fired on the area resulting in 1 enemy KIA (By Air).

190120 Oct: 170th AC flareship supported 466th RF Co in a sweep in the vicinity of AR 780470 after houses near the 422nd ARVN Engineers received a sapper attack. 191330-1400: 361st ACE gunships supporting 5th SFGA fired on a confirmed enemy location resulting in 10 NVA KIA (By Air).
2017/0-1800 Oct: 361st ACE gunships supporting 4th Div fired when friendly troops in the vicinity of ZC 1073 made contact with an unknown size enemy force resulting in 18 NVA KIA.

202237 Oct: 68th Inf radar picked up movement in the vicinity of AR 820488. 52nd Scty Det mortars fired on the area. The radar checked the area again and movement had ceased. Results of the mortar firing is unknown.

251730 Oct: 119th AC gunships in support of 1/4 Div fired on a confirmed enemy location in the vicinity of BR 3032 when friendly troops made contact with an unknown size enemy force resulting in 10 enemy KIA, 2 bunkers destroyed and one secondary explosion.

260945 Oct: 361st ACE gunships in support of 5th SFGA fired on a confirmed enemy location resulting in 2 NVA KIA.

270750 Oct: 361st ACE gunships supporting 5th SFGA fired on a confirmed enemy location in the vicinity of ZA 205213 when Duc Co CSF troops made contact with 50-60 NVA. Results are unknown. 1620-1630, 119th AC gunships supporting 1/4 Div received intense ground fire from the vicinity of BR 775625 and fired on the same area resulting in 2 en KIA (By Air).

291705-1720 Oct: 361st ACE gunships supporting 11 CTZ fired on enemy bunker positions resulting in 4 bunkers destroyed and one secondary explosion in the vicinity of BR 3026.

301330-1345 Oct: 361st ACE gunships supporting 4th Div fired when troops made contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of YA 9560 resulting in 10 enemy KIA.

310623 Oct: 361st ACE gunships supporting 4th Div troops in contact fired in the vicinity of AR 835560 resulting in 15 KIA. 1215, 361st gunships fired on a suspected enemy location when the trail aircraft received small arms fire resulting in one hit and one US WIA. Fire received from the vicinity of YB 972547. 1230-1240, 361st gunships supporting a Dust-Off aircraft receiving fire while in an LZ fired on a confirmed enemy location in the vicinity of YA 962627 resulting in 7 en KIA (By Air). 1815-1845, 361st gunships supporting 5th SFGA fired on a suspected enemy location in the vicinity of ZB 093205 resulting in 10 bunkers destroyed and 7 enemy KIA.
OPERATIONAL RESULTS AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1969

1. (C) Results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Sorties Flown</th>
<th>Troops Lifted</th>
<th>Cargo Lifted</th>
<th>Enemy KIA</th>
<th>Structures Damaged</th>
<th>Structures DestROYED</th>
<th>Sempans Damaged</th>
<th>Sempans DestROYED</th>
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2. (C) Losses.

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<th>Nr</th>
<th>Aircraft Damaged Type</th>
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Inclosure 5

CONFIDENTIAL
RECAPITULATION OF FLYING HOURS (U): Average number of aircraft is based on those actually on-hand with the following provisions: Aircraft destroyed are dropped from accountability the day following destruction. Replacement aircraft are picked up on accountability on the first day that they become "mission ready" or within 72 hours following receipt, whichever occurs first.

### UH-1C

<table>
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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>AVG NO. HOURS</th>
<th>AVG HOURS</th>
<th>AVAIL-ABILITY</th>
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### UH-1H

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<th>AVG HOURS</th>
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* Percent DA Program on flying hours is based on the following Flying Hour Program per aircraft: UH-1C - 58 Hours, UH-1H - 74 Hours.

Inclosure 6
## AH-1G

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<th>AVG HOURS</th>
<th>AVG ABILITY</th>
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## Recapitulation: Availability, Mission Ready, EDP and EDM percentage
taken from Da Form 1322 and Daily Aircraft Status.

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* Percent of DA Program is based on a DA Flying Hour Program per aircraft as follows: AH-1G - 70 Hours, CH-47 - 60 Hours.
The following is a brief analysis of the accidents which occurred during this period.

1. **110950 Aug 69, UH-1H 68-12775** - Aircraft experienced hydraulic failure in flight. Pilot initiated an autorotation terminating in a hard landing. Aircraft repair cost was estimated at $121,258.

2. **100933 Sep 69, UH-1H 66-17774** - Aircraft experienced material failure. The 90° gear box separated in flight. Pilot made an autorotational landing in trees. The aircraft was a total loss. One crew member received minor injuries and has since returned to duty.

3. **111220 Sep 69, UH-1H 67-17316** - Aircraft crashed and burned, cause unknown. All four crew members suffered fatal impact injuries.

4. **211230 Oct 69, UH-1H 67-17009** - Pilot attempted to hover an over-gross aircraft out of ground effect, lost R.P.M. and crashed. The cost of repair for this aircraft is $214,629.

5. **211144 Oct 69, UH-1H 68-14092** - Aircraft made a rapid descent into a bomb crater L.T., lost R.P.M. and settled resulting in main rotor blade strikes on a 20 foot tree stump. Aircraft came to rest on its right side. One crew member and one passenger suffered fatal impact injuries. Two passengers suffered minor injuries.

6. **281000 Oct 69, UH-1C 66-15122** - Aircraft crashed and burned. Four passengers suffered fatal impact injuries. Two crew members suffered serious burns. Cause of this accident is still under investigation.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 52d Aviation Battalion

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug 69 to 31 Oct 69.

CO, 52d Aviation Battalion

10 November 1969

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