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SUBJECT: Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

ROBERT E. LYON
Colonel, AG
Acting The Adjutant General

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1. (c) Section I. Operations: Significant Activities.
   a. General.
   (1) Missions: The missions assigned to the 5th SF(G) that have a classification of not higher than Confidential are as follows:

   (d) To exercise command and control of subordinate detachments.

   (2) To advise and assist the Vietnamese Special Forces (VSC) and support the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) Program.

   (b) To conduct special operations.

   (c) To conduct the MACV Second School.

   (d) To act as Sector/Task force advisors as directed by MACV.

* - NOTE: Missions with Secret classification are found in MACV Directive 10-11, dtd 1 Nov 69 and Combined Campaign Plan AP III, dtd 30 Sep 68.

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Inclosure

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AV\B\C
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1969 RCS CFGR-65 (2)

(2) Organizational Structure. See organizational chart at Inclosure 1, troop disposition lists at Inclosure 3, and Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) maps at Inclosure 4.

(3) Commanders and Key Personnel. See list at Inclosure 2.

(4) Situation at the Beginning of the Period. The enemy continued his stand-off attacks-by-fire throughout the Republic of Vietnam. Over all the enemy continued to regroup and resupply possibly in preparation for the upcoming "Monsoon Offensive". In I CTZ the enemy was coming to the end of the regrouping period, but failed to launch a comprehensive attack throughout the Corps. The most threatened camps in I CTZ were K'ONG and, with elements of the 90th IFA Regiment moving through its Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAR), and T'A HANG which was surrounded by elements of the 21st INF Regiment. The enemy subjected Camp T'A HANG to increased attacks-by-fire during the quarter, but failed to assault it with ground troops as they had on fire support bases of the AMERICAN DIVISION in the same area. In III CTZ the enemy was also drawing his regrouping phase to an end. By the beginning of the reporting period many camps in III CTZ were being hit with attacks-by-fire. The most threatened camps in III CTZ were T'ET, NET and DUC LAP. Troop concentrations of two to three regiments were reported in the FAM LIR base area west of Camp MAC LAP. In III CTZ the most threatened camps were TAY NH, and LOC NH. The 9th VC Division was moving in the area of TAY NH City, with increasing reports of an upcoming offensive, and the 7th VC Division was in the area of LOC NH with the same reports; neither location was hit however. In IV CTZ the enemy operated extensively from the border areas of Cambodia, remaining in his Cambodian sanctuaries to regroup and resupply. Camp T'A HANG received attacks-by-fire during this time. Throughout the four CTZ's the enemy seemed to be following the same pattern. This period of resupply and regrouping seemed to be coming to a close and another offensive sometime around the Monsoon season is likely.

(5) Operations. The statistical data on operations conducted this quarter are shown in Inclosure 5. CTGR Camp Strike Forces (CTSF) were engaged in squad, platoon and company size operations throughout their TAR's to provide intelligence, hamper enemy movement, and to otherwise conduct offensive operations.

(6) Situation at the End of the Reporting Period. The enemy initiated activity has remained at a low level throughout the Republic of Vietnam. The enemy was engaged mainly in troop redeployment, resupply, reorganization and attacks-by-fire. The anticipated "Monsoon Offensive" has failed to materialize. In I CTZ the enemy conducted repeated attacks-by-fire against Camp T'A HANG during August. In September, the capture of a document 15
kilometers southeast of AN HOA, QUANG NAM Province (as well as other intelligence sources) indicated the reorganization of several NVA/VC units into sapper units. At the end of the reporting period, a low level of enemy activity prevailed throughout the CTZ as enemy units remained deployed in base areas. In II CTZ, enemy initiated activity during the first two months was at a low level. During October, activity increased to a moderate level as enemy troops infiltrated into and through CORD camp TAOR’s. During late October in the area around camp RU PRANG, enemy activity increased significantly with a heavy build up of troops and attacks-by-fire against Fire Support Bases KATE and ANNIE. In III CTZ the enemy has been increasing his troop strength by infiltration from Cambodia. Camp Strike Force operations have made several contacts along the enemy infiltration routes from Cambodia. The enemy has initiated light ground probes against border installations in THUONG and PHU YEN Provinces. Elements of the 34 56th (34 Mobile Strike Force Command) made heavy contact with elements of the 5th VC Division in August and September in Operation BULL THU in an area northwest of Camp PHONG. In October enemy activity indicated that he was engaged in resupply operations, making light attacks-by-fire and limited probes of CTZ camps. In IV CTZ, during August enemy activity was at a low level as the enemy concentrated his efforts on logistical efforts and infiltration of personnel into border areas. In September, enemy activity increased in the Seven Mountains area. In October enemy activity remains at a moderate level with attacks-by-fire and increased troop and supply movement throughout the border areas.

(7) Changes in Organization. The Mobile Strike Force Training Center at AN HAO, BRIG 1175, was deactivated on 23 October 1969. This facility will be replaced by four Camp Strike Force Training Centers, one located in each Corps Tactical Zone. The Mobile Strike Force Training Center is being relocated to the National Training Center at DONO WA THU.
b. Intelligence.

(1) I Corps Tactical Zone.

(a) In early August enemy strength* in I CTZ was approximately 72,000 men, of which 54,000 were combat troops. Contacts and enemy activity remained light, as the enemy probably utilized this period of time to realign, retrain and resupply his units. At the end of October the total enemy strength was estimated to be approximately 67,000 men, of which 57,000 were combat troops. Throughout the period, enemy forces operated with three confirmed divisions, 27 independent regiments, and approximately 89 maneuver battalions.

(b) During August, enemy activity within CIDG camp TAOGS was characterized by unit movements. Although enemy offensive activity was at a moderate level throughout the month, it increased significantly during the period 12-19 August in the vicinity of Camp THA BONG, QUANG NGAI Province. During this time the 21st Regiment, 2nd NVA Division relocated from the southeastern portion of THA BONG's TAOR and attempted to encircle the camp. Continuous attacks-by-fire were conducted by the enemy against the camp, RF/PF outposts, and AMERICAL Division fire support bases in an attempt to draw reaction forces from the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, AMERICAL Division, and CSF operations from THA BONG into ambush sites. However, friendly reaction forces were not committed, and the 21st Regiment withdrew to its base area in the southeastern portion of the camp's TAOR. Other significant movements in I CTZ during August involved the 141st NVA Regiment and the 3rd NVA Division. Elements of the 141st NVA Regiment deployed to the northern portion of THA BONG's TAOR in QUANG NGAI Province, thus significantly increasing the possibility of a major attack against the camp. During the latter part of August, the 3rd NVA Division relocated from the southwestern portion of MINH LAGS's TAOR, QUANG NGAI Province, to an area 12 kilometers west of the camp in the SONG SH Valley. The 1st VC Marine Force Regiment and elements of the 3rd (AKA the 21st) NVA Regiment, 2nd NVA Division, conducted frequent attacks against the AMERICAL and Marine assets in the SONG SH Valley-CSP DUC area of QUANG NGAI Province. Approximately 1,000 VC/NVA were estimated to have been killed during these contacts which rendered the 1st Regiment combat ineffective and forced the regiment to redeploy, in order to resupply and regroup, to

* Includes those units within the DMC and those in FVN and LAGS in close enough proximity to pose a significant tactical threat to I CTZ.
the southern portion of NCOG's TAOR, QUANG NAM Province. During September, the enemy in I CTZ continued to emphasize economy of force tactics while attempting to maintain his personnel strength at a combat effective level. The most significant activity during this period was the capture of a document, 18 kilometers southeast of AN HCA (BT006399), QUANG NAM Province. This document, which was confirmed by agent reports, indicated enemy interest in sapper tactics and reorganization of VC/NVA units. The 31st, 36th, 90th and 141st NVA Infantry Regiments were mentioned as being selected for sapper training. Following this training the units will be redesignated and will operate entirely as sapper units. During future combat missions the document advocates that regardless of disadvantages due to open terrain, subordinate units should make maximum use of divisionary, surprise, and deep thrust tactics to include raids and ambushes. Elsewhere in I CTZ, intelligence sources indicated a regiment-sized force operating in the EA TO TAOR, QUANG NAM Province. The 22nd NVA and 2nd VC Main Force Regiments both of the 3rd NVA Div., and the 9th NVA Sapper Battalion were located east and west of the camp. Although attack indicators were present the enemy initiated no offensive actions against EA TO. During October the enemy continued his low level of activity. Several significant events, however, did occur to include the disbanding of the 368th NVA Artillery Regiment and the enemy build-up along the DMZ and northern QUANG TRI Province. Analysis of FW statements and documents captured 11 kilometers northwest of PHU QUANG DUC (WU2200221) stated that the 368th Regiment had been deactivated and that its three battalions were reorganized to the three commands of Group 44 (AKA 4th Front). The 3rd Battalion was redesignated as the 573rd Rocket Battalion, and the 1st and 2nd Battalions combined to form the 575th Battalion. Other FW reports and captured documents identified several new units in the DMZ and northern QUANG TRI Province, to include the 2nd Battalion, 8th NVA Artillery Regiment; the 9th Regiment, 304th NVA Division; the 45th Battalion of the QUANG BINH NVA Provincial Force; the 226th Regiment, 336th NVA Division and the 33rd NVA Independent Sapper Battalion. The FW LOC Artillery Battalion was also identified in THU COI NAM Province, while the 76th VC Main Force Heavy Weapons Battalion was located in QUANG TRI Province. There was a decline in morale and an increase in dissension among the VC and NVA forces. A FW captured 12 kilometers west of HOI AN (BT002595), QUANG NAM Province, stated that relations between the VC and NVA were sometimes strained to the point that they would fight. Another FW captured on 15 September, 15 kilometers north of AN HCA (BT855587) revealed that a serious food problem existed within the 141st NVA Regiment. The FW stated that during the 30-day period
prior to his capture the unit had not received food for 11 of those days and the situation was becoming worse. In addition, 60% of the 2nd Battalion, 141st Regiment, was suffering from malaria and medical supplies were at a minimum.

(c) At the end of the reporting period, a low level of enemy activity prevailed throughout the CTZ as enemy units remained deployed in base areas. The enemy, however, is capable of employing forces for widespread attacks-by-fire and sapper attacks against isolated outposts, fire support bases, and district towns. A major offensive is not expected at this time; however, the enemy may conduct a coordinated series of attacks-by-fire and sapper attacks following the monsoon season.

(2) II Corps Tactical Zone.

(a) In early August the estimated enemy strength in II CTZ was 56,500 personnel of which 35,000 were combat troops. Enemy-initiated activity during the first two months was at a low level throughout the CTZ, with the enemy engaged mainly in troop redeployment, resupply, and reorganization. After a two-month lull, activity increased during October to a moderate level as enemy troops infiltrated into and through C10G camp TACRS. At the end of October the estimated enemy strength was 54,000 of which 34,500 were combat troops.

(b) During the period August-October, enemy-initiated activity in the B3N HET area was almost non-existent. After the May-June siege of the camp, the 66th and 28th NVA Regiments, supported by the 49th NVA Artillery Regiment, were believed to have withdrawn into Base Area 509 to receive replacements, retrain and resupply. The 66th and 28th NVA Regiments then retrained out of contact and were believed to have moved to southwestern II CTZ near the Cambodian border. The 49th NVA Artillery Regiment also retrained out of contact and, according to documents captured in early October, was believed to have split into two elements, designated 49A and 49B. Elsewhere in the CTZ, enemy activity during the first two months was at a low level, with the enemy deploying some units to new areas of operations. In August, the 5th Battalion, 24th NVA Regiment relocated in northern KNTU Province from the DAK TO-TAN CAND area to Camp PLEI ME, PLEKU Province, and conducted attacks-by-fire against helicopters in the KANG DIX area. During this same period, the 4th Battalion, 93B NVA Regiment redeployed from its normal area of operations west of AN KAE, Binh Dinh Province, to an area east of Camp PLEI ME, PLEKU Province. The battalion is probably
transports rice from Cambodian sanctuaries back to its normal area of operations. In southern PLEIKU Province, PW's and captured documents revealed that the 966th NVA Battalion and the K-31 Battalion, 40th NVA Artillery Regiment had merged to form a K-631 NVA Artillery Battalion. Agent reports and captured documents mentioned that a Fall Offensive was to have been initiated sometime during August. It was believed that the offensive had begun when PLEIKU (PLEIKU Province), KONTUM (KONTUM Province), HAN NOI THUOT (DA LAT Province), AN KHE and CAM RANH Bay and MA TANG (BAH NH Province) received attacks-by-fire and mortar attacks on the 7th, 11th and 12th of August. However, no follow-up attacks-by-fire nor ground assaults against Special Forces assets materialized. During the month of September enemy activity was at a low level. During October the enemy continued to avoid making large scale contacts; however, reports were received that enemy units were infiltrating from Cambodian base areas into South Vietnam with the mission of attacking major allied installations. Agent reports also revealed that a large enemy unit had infiltrated into Camp PLEIKU's TAOD, PLEIKU Province, with the mission of attacking the camp. Although the camp received no attacks-by-fire, joint operations conducted by elements of the 4th US Infantry Division and CSF personnel from the camp made heavy contact with unknown-sized enemy forces north of the camp. Enemy activity in the southern portion of the CTZ also remained light; however, agent and informant reports continued to indicate a large buildup of enemy troops in the HAM LYR Base Area west of Camp DUG LAP, PHU YOC DUC Province. Two ROE CHANS identified the Q251 Locall Force Battalion, as operating in the HAM LYR Base Area. During the first week of October, a PW captured northwest of PLEIKU City identified his unit as the G-2 Transportation Battalion, which had the mission of supplying the 24th NVA Regiment from Cambodian way stations. As the month progressed, enemy-initiated activity began to increase as the enemy continued to infiltrate into PLEIKU and KONTUM Provinces. During late October, KONTUM and PLEIKU Cities received attacks-by-fire. Also CSF elements from Camp PLEIKU MSCG, PLEIKU Province, and US elements in the KONTUM-PLEIKU area made company-sized contacts with elements of the 24th NVA Regiment. A PW captured in one of these contacts stated that the Regiment had the mission of conducting ambushes along Highway 14 between KONTUM and PLEIKU.

(c) Current enemy disposition indicates that the enemy may be positioning units for a possible offensive that could begin in early November. Although intelligence and propaganda reports have stated that CIDG camps in PLEIKU Province as well as PLEIKU and KONTUM.

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OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED OF 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (ABN) FOR THE PERIOD ENDING 31 OCTOBER 1969.

CITIES ARE TARGETS FOR OFFENSIVE ACTIVITIES, THE ENEMY WILL PROBABLY CONDUCT HIS MAJOR DRIVE IN SOUTHWESTERN II CTZ AGAINST CAMPS BU RANG AND DUC LAP. THE ENEMY WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO CONDUCT SPORADIC ATTACKS-BY-FIRE AGAINST THE MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS THROUGHOUT THE CTZ.

(3) III CORPS TACTICAL ZONE.

(a) In early August enemy strength in III Corps was estimated to be between 53,000 and 55,000 personnel, of which 41,000 were combat troops. Contacts and enemy-initiated incidents remained at a moderate level throughout the entire period. Enemy strength increased slightly during September with the addition of approximately 1,000 combat troops. October saw a significant rise in enemy strength, with the total estimated being 58,460 personnel, of which 42,440 were combat troops. Throughout the period enemy forces operated with four confirmed divisions, 12 independent regiments, and 53 independent battalions.

(b) During August, enemy activity was characterized by light attacks-by-fire and ground probes against border installations in TAY NH Notebook PROVINCES and heavy attacks-by-fire in BINHN LONG PROVINCE against CIDG Camp LOC NHIN. In TAY NH Notebook PROVINCES CSF operations made several light contacts during the month with squad to company-sized enemy units. The majority of these contacts in TAY NH Notebook PROVINCES occurred along known enemy infiltration routes from Cambodia. The largest of these contacts occurred on 8 August when a reconnaissance element from KHOC TAY Outpost, Camp BEN SG1, TAY NH Notebook PROVINCES, engaged an estimated VC company, killing 19 enemy. Elements of the 98th NVA Regiment, 9th VC Division, were believed to have been the enemy unit in contact. The enemy also used light attacks-by-fire in TAY NH Notebook and HAU NH Notebook PROVINCES probably to cover infiltration of new troops. Camp DOC HUE, HAU NH Notebook PROVINCE, received 17 rounds of 120mm mortar fire on 12 and 13 August, while Camp KHA TUK, TAY NH Notebook PROVINCE, received 19 rounds of 82mm mortar fire on 1 August. The movement of the 109TH NVA Regiment, 1ST KV Division, was also conducted during the month from III Corps to CHAU DOC PROVINCE in western IV Corps. The regiment was identified in the Seven Mountains Area, IV Corps, on 22 August. The heavy attacks-by-fire in BINHN LONG PROVINCE were targeted against Camp LOC NHIN, which received a total of 253 mixed artillery rounds during the period 12-13 August. The camp also made nine contacts with squad to platoon-sized units believed to be elements of the 209TH NVA Regiment, 7th NVA.
Division, which operated west of the camp during the month. The 165th NVA Regiment, 7th NVA Division, operated in an area northwest of HG.N GUAN, while the 21st NVA Regiment, 7th NVA Division, operated west of HG.N GUAN. The 141st Regiment, along with elements of the D368 Local Force Battalion, was identified in contact on 17 August with operations from CHI BINH west of HG.N GUAN. Also identified as operating in the HG.N GUAN area during August were the 271st and 272nd VC Regiments, 9th VC Division. However, with the relocation of these regiments to the Fishhook area in late August and the beginning of September, enemy activity in BINH LONG Province began to subside. The reported presence of the 5th VC Division in an area northwest of Camp DUC PHONG, PHUOC LONG Province, prompted the initiation of the 3rd MSFC's Operation Bull Run I. The operation was initiated on 16 August, with the first contact on 24 August resulting in 27 enemy killed. Elements of the 3rd MSFC continued to engage the enemy in heavy contacts from 31 August to 3 September, when they were extracted. The 95A NVA Regiment, 5th VC Division, was identified by a HUI GUAN who rallied to the 3rd MSFC on 13 September, and the 174th NVA Regiment, 5th VC Division, was identified in a light ground probe against Camp DUC PHONG on 4 September. The 275th VC Regiment, 5th VC Division, remained relatively inactive in the area southeast of SONG BE, PHUOC LONG Province, until 3 September when it was identified in an attack against Camp BUNARD, PHUOC LONG Province. With the termination of the 3rd MSFC's operation, enemy activity decreased in PHUOC LEXG Province, with the 5th Division probably initiating resupply and regrouping activities. Throughout other areas of the corps, intelligence sources indicated that the enemy was beginning to experience severe logistical problems. Enemy activity throughout III Corps during September was characterized by light attacks-by-fire probably conducted to cover the movement of personnel and supplies, and ground contacts against border outposts in TAY NINH and TAI NGUYEN Provinces and Camp LOC NINH in BINH LONG Province. PHUOC TAI Outpost, Camp BIN SCI, was the center of activity during early September, when it received several light attacks-by-fire and a small ground probe. During the last week of September, there was a slight increase in activity in TAI NINH's TAO, TAY NINH Province, as intelligence sources indicated that the 272nd VC Regiment, 9th VC Division, and the 101st NVA Regiment, 1st NVA Division, were moving into staging areas north of the camp. This movement resulted in one squad, two platoon, and two company-sized contacts with enemy units on 21 and 22 September. In BINH LONG Province, the 209th NVA Regiment, 7th NVA Division, continued to operate west of LOC NINH, while the 165th NVA Regiment, 7th NVA Division, moved to an area southeast of BU DOP, PHUOC LONG Province, and was probably the enemy unit.
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Responsible for the slight increase in activity in the BU DOP area during the first week of September. Intelligence sources also indicated that the 141st NVA Regiment, 7th NVA Division, was moving to Base Area 350, north of LOC MINH, from its former location, west of HON QUAN. The level of activity in October was similar to that in September as intelligence sources continued to indicate the enemy was experiencing severe logistical problems. CIDG camps continued to receive light attacks-by-fire, while ground operations continued to make squad to platoon-sized contacts with enemy personnel engaged in logistical activities. Activity in III Corps during the month of October was centered around the 5th KSF's Operation Homeward Bound in THIEN NGON's TAOR. Elements of the 5th MSF made several contacts with squad to platoon-sized enemy units and discovered four ammunition caches. The enemy unit in contact was identified as the 3rd Battalion, 70th Guard Regiment. The 70th Guard Regiment was incorporated into the 66th Base Security Regiment, CO3VN, in December of 1968. Intelligence sources indicated during October that the 272nd VC and 271st VC Regiments, 9th VC Division, and the 101D NVA Regiment, 1st NVA Division, were redeploying from their former locations in BINH LONG Province into central War Zone C. With the indicated movement of these regiments back into central War Zone C, it appears the enemy will again target its forces against TAY MINH City.

(c) On 5 September, personnel at Camp DUC HUE observed tracked vehicles, believed to have been PT-76 tanks, northwest of the Camp. Shortly after observing the tracked vehicles, the Camp received four separate attacks-by-fire from an unknown type caliber weapon, totaling eight rounds. An examination of recovered shrapnel revealed the rounds to have been either 75mm recoilless rifle or 76mm rounds. PT-76 tanks were sighted by personnel at the camp in April and July of this year.

(d) In mid-to-late October, numerous intelligence sources reported that the enemy may initiate a Winter-Spring Offensive in mid-November. Analysis of available intelligence indicates that the enemy is fully capable of launching such attacks at this time. TAY MINH City has been frequently mentioned as the primary target of the offensive.

(4) IV Corps Tactical Zone.

(a) In early August, enemy strength in IV CTZ was estimated at 25,000 personnel, of which 39,500 were combat troops. Enemy strength
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SUBJ: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1969. RCS CSGOR-65 (R2)

Increased significantly during the reporting period, due to the infiltration of the 18B NVA Regiment, 1st NVA Division, and filler personnel from North Vietnam. At present, the enemy has seven confirmed regiments and 40 confirmed independent battalions with a combined estimated strength of 48,700 troops. Of these, 41,100 are in a combat role.

(b) During August, enemy activity was at a low level, as the enemy concentrated his efforts on logistical movements and infiltration of personnel into border base areas. During this period the 273rd VC Regiment began its relocation from Base Area 400 in CHAU DOC Province to Base 183 in KIEN GIANG Province. Elements of the 18B NVA Regiment then replaced the 273rd Regiment in the Seven Mountains area, CHAU DOC Province. The relocation of the 18B Regiment from III CTZ to IV CTZ increased the enemy's capabilities and combat strength in IV CTZ by approximately 1,300 personnel. In early September, enemy activity increased in the Seven Mountains area, as the 18B NVA Regiment set up permanent bases in the KU GI-LAU CAM area. Reports of large, unconfirmed enemy units infiltrating from III CTZ were received frequently. Incidents of ground probes and attacks-by-fire increased following the infiltration of the 18B NVA Regiment. A sharp increase in enemy-initiated activity occurred during the period 13-26 September, covering the movement of the remaining support and combat service support elements of the 18B Regiment into the mountain base area. During the same period of time, activity increased in the CAI CAM area of northern KIEN GIANG Province; while numerous sightings of large enemy truck convoys were reported in the border regions. Intelligence reports continued to indicate enemy plans to create an equivalent force level with friendly units throughout the CTZ. In October, enemy activity remained at a moderate level and was characterized by attacks-by-fire and increased troop and supply movements throughout the border regions. Intelligence sources continued to report the infiltration of enemy combat units into the CTZ usually from the TAY NAM-HAU NGIA Province areas of III CTZ. Various unit designations were reported, possibly to mask actual unit strengths and intentions. Indications were received of the possible creation of two or three enemy divisions within IV CTZ. The 273rd VC Regiment and the 18B NVA Regiment are believed to be the key units in the divisional formations. Although no divisions have been formed at present, the frequent reporting of elements of the 1st, 5th, 7th and 9th Divisions in the border areas of KIEN TUONG, KIEN PHONG and CHAU DOC Provinces occurred simultaneously with reported infiltration of battalion and regimental-sized units. During the monsoon season, from April to August, the 261B Main Force Battalion, DTI VC Regiment, relocated from its normal operational area of Base Area 470, in western
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DINH TUONG Province, to Cambodia, north of Camp CAI CAI. The 502nd Local Force VC Battalion moved from the CAO LANH City area, KIHN PHONG Province, to Base Area 470 and remained out of contact until after the crest of the flood waters on 26 September. As in the past, many of the battalion and company-sized provincial units conducted minimal combat operations during the rainy season. Most enemy units are believed to have concentrated their attention on political indoctrination and administrative activities during these periods. The end of the rainy season in October also marked an increase in enemy aircraft sightings, and attacks-by-fire, utilizing rockets and 105mm howitzer fire. Six sightings of unidentified aircraft were reported during the period 14 September to 24 October. One of the sightings occurred in the BA XQAI area of CHAU DOC Province, and the others occurred at Camp CAI CAI. Camp CAI CAI also received 107mm and 122mm rockets on several occasions and six rounds of 105mm howitzer fire on 24 October. To date no 122mm rockets have been used by the enemy in the Seven Mountains area or against any interior target within the 44th STZ.

(c) During the next three months the enemy is expected to continue his plan of creating a force equivalent in size to PAVN in IV CTZ. Intelligence sources have indicated that an offensive is to take place when equivalent force levels are established. Infiltration of NVA personnel is expected to continue. The enemy will continue to place emphasis on propaganda activities, and the disruption of friendly pacification programs. No major increase in enemy-initiated attacks is expected until late January or February 1970. Enemy offensive action will consist primarily of attacks-by-fire and ground probes against outposts, RF-PF units, and villages under the influence of pacification programs.
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c. Operations.

(1) I Corps Tactical Zone. (Co C)

During the reporting period, Company C assets conducted a total of 236 company or larger, 1086 platoon, and 1653 squad size operations. A total of 216 contacts were made with the following results: Enemy 307 KIA, 20 captured and 130 weapons captured. Friendly 22 CSF KIA, 9 USASF, 4 WNSF and 120 CSF WIA. One weapon was lost and one CSF is MIA. Camps HA THANH, A-104 and HINH LONG, A-108, also advised district chiefs and RF/PP units in their areas.

During the reporting period, RF/PP units advised by USASF conducted 46 company, 109 platoon and 429 squad size operations and engaged in 41 contacts. Results: 20 enemy KIA; Frd - 4, FF KIA, 5 FF WIA. The following significant contacts occurred during the reporting period.

(a) On 6 Aug, a MSF company operation at HAI THANH, A-50, QUANG NGAI Province, was ambushed by an NVA company 11 km SW of HAI THANH. Results: Frd - one MSF KIA and 18 MSF WIA.

(b) On 7 Aug, a CSF company operation from TIEN PHUC, A-102, QUANG TIN Province, engaged ten VC eight km W of camp. Results: En - four KIA, one female nurse and one SA cptr; 750 kilos of rice and one hut destroyed.

(c) On 11 Aug, a CSF company operation from NONG SON, A-105, QUANG NAM Province, engaged two NVA platoons six km SW of the camp. Results: En - six NVA KIA; one 82mm mortar, one AK-47 and four rounds of 82mm ammo cptr.

(d) On 11 Aug, a CSF company operation from NONG SON, A-105, was ambushed by an NVA/VC platoon five km W of the camp. Results: En - three NVA/VC KIA; two SA, one B-40 rkt launcher and one unk type warhead cptr; Frd - two CSF KIA; one USASF and two CSF WIA.

(e) On 12 Aug, a CSF platoon operation from TRA BONG, A-107, QUANG NGAI Province, initiated contact with an unk number of NVA in bunkers two km W of camp. Results: En - three NVA KIA; two SA, one B-40 rkt launcher, one 60mm mortar and 30 rds of B-40 rkt ammo cptr.

(f) On 13 Aug, a combined CSF company and 100 RF/PP troops from TRA BONG, A-107, received SA and 30 rds of B-40 rkt fire from a village one km S of camp. Results: En - seven NVA KIA; Frd - two CSF KIA; five CSF WIA.

(g) On 14 Aug, a CSF company operation from NONG SON, A-105, initiated contact with an unk size enemy force three km NW of camp. Results: En - five NVA/VC KIA; 20 82mm mortar rds cptr.
(h) On 24 Aug, a CSF company operation from TRA BONG, A-107, engaged an NVA/VC platoon five km W of camp. Results: En - five en KIA and two AK-47's cptr.

(i) On 27 Aug, a Hoi Chanh from district headquarters, lead a CSF Co from TIEN PHUOC, A-102, to a wpns cache three km NE of camp. Results: En - two 60mm mortars, two 82mm mortars, two soviet MG's, 12 AK-47's, two K-50 MG's, one HMG, one carbine and one Thompson SMG cptr.

(j) On 2 Sep, a CSF company opn from TIEN PHUOC, A-102, QUANG TIN Province, engaged an est VC company seven km S of camp. Results: En - 21 KIA; one 60mm mortar, one East German MG, three BAR's, one K-44, two AK-47's, one bipod of 81mm mortar, one HMG, four rucksacks and a medical kit cptr; Frd - one CSF WIA.

(k) On 14 Sep, a four man CSF recon patrol from HA THANH, A-104, QUANG NAM Province, found eight NVA living in a house nine km S of the camp. Results: En - eight NVA KIA; three sten guns, one K-44 and one pound of documents cptr.

(l) On 27 Sep, a CSF company operation from HA THANH, A-104, QUANG NAM Province, engaged an estimated two NVA platoons in a hasty ambush six km SE of the camp. Results: En - 10 NVA KIA; three AK-47's, 10 hand grenades and miscellaneous equipment cptr.

(m) On 3 Oct, a CSF company operation from TIEN PHUOC, A-102, QUANG TIN Province, ambushed an unk size enemy force. Results: En - 30 KIA; one 82mm mortar and documents cptr.

(n) On 7 Oct, a CSF platoon operation from HA THANH, A-104, QUANG NAM Province, engaged an estimated enemy squad. Results: En - six KIA; one B-40 rkt cptr.

(o) On 12 Oct, at 0830 hrs, a company size opn from NONG SON, A-104, QUANG NAM Province, engaged an est two VC squads. Results: En - three VC KIA and two captured.

(p) On 13 Oct at 1940 hrs a CSF company from NONG SON, A-105, QUANG NAM Province, ambushed an unk size enemy force. Results: En - three VC KIA.

(q) On 18 Oct at 0920 hrs a CSF platoon ambushed four VC wearing green uniforms and armed with AK-47's. Results: En - three VC KIA; one female and one AK-47 cptr.

(r) On 24 Oct at 0930 hrs a MSF company operation in BA TO's TAOR made
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contact with an unk size enemy force. Results: En - five VC KIA; two ammo belts, two flares, one grenade, 70 rds SKS ammo, nine rucksacks and nine sacks of rice cptr.

(a) On 25 Oct at 1345 hrs, a MSP company operation in B1 TO's TAGR discovered a cache containing one 82mm mortar, one SKS, 10 B-41 rks, 30 B-41 rks, 30 cases 50 cal ammo, 500 pounds TNT, seven anti-tank mines, 60 82mm rds, 100 ft time fuse, 2D cases AK-47 ammo, 12 bangalore torpedoes, 10 cases SKS ammo, 20 intrenching tools, 15 AK magazines, 300 82mm fuses, 90 B-41 rkt fuses, 70 AK ammo pouches and 10 cooking pots.

(2) II Corps Tactical Zone. (Co B)

During the reporting period, Company B assets conducted a total of 265 company or larger, 1709 platoon, and 4734 squad operations. A total of 177 contacts were made with the following results: Enemy - 194 KIA, 33 VC and 75 weapons captured; Friendly - one USASF and 17 CIDG KIA; one USASF and 61 CIDG WIA. 15 weapons were lost.

(a) On 6 Aug, a CSF platoon operation from DUC LAP, A-239, QUANG DUC Province, engaged an unk size NVA force, 15 km NNW of DUC LAP. Results: En - one VC KIA, one AK-47 cptr; Frd - one CSF KIA, five CSF WIA.

(b) On 7 Aug, an unk size VC force attacked NUI THI outpost, 15 km W of NHA TRANG. Results: En - 14 VC KIA, seven wpns cptr; Frd - one VNSF, 15 CSF KIA, 16 CSF WIA.

(c) On 11 Aug, a CSF platoon operation from MANG BUK, A-245, KON TUM Province, engaged an unk size NVA force eight km NNW of MANG BUK. Results: En - four KIA; one en and four wpns cptr; Frd - three CSF KIA.

(d) On 12 Aug, a CSF company operation from PLATEAU GI, A-111, KON TUM Province, engaged an unk size VC force 15 km S of PLATEAU GI. Results: En 10 VC KIA.

(e) On 19 Aug, a CSF platoon operation from MANG BUK, A-246, KON TUM Province, discovered a mass grave, eight km NW of MANG BUK. The grave was in the 11 August contact area. Results: En - 15 NVA KIA.

(f) On 21 Aug, a CSF platoon operation from PLEI ME, A-255, PLEIKU Province, encountered three VC, two km W of PLEI ME. Results: En - three VC and three wpns cptr.

(g) On 1 Sep, a CSF platoon operation from DAK SEANG, A-245, KON TUM Province, received artillery fire nine km NW of DAK SEANG. Results: Frd two CSF KIA; 11 CSF WIA.
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On 19 Sep, a CSP company operation from LUC CO, A-253, PLEIKU Province, discovered 11 MSF and 12 NVA bodies, 11 km SSW of BEN HTT. Results: En - 12 KIA; Frd - 11 MSF KIA.

On 22 Sep, the 3rd Bn, 2nd MSPC, PLEIKU discovered a cache, 20 km S of BI PRANG. Results: En - 25 boxes of .50 cal ammo, and 57mm RR rounds.

On 26 Sep, a CSP Combat Recon Platoon from DAK PEK, A-212, KONTUM Province, engaged an estimated NVA company, six km NW of DAK PEK. Results: En - five VC KIA, and two wpn traits.

On 26 Sep, a CSP company operation from MANG BUK, A-216, KONTUM Province, engaged a VC squad, 16 km E of MANG BUK. Results: En - one KIA, five VC and four SA traits.

On 27 Sep, two CSP platoon operations from DAK PEK, A-212, KONTUM Province, engaged an estimated NVA company 12 km SSW of DAK PEK. Results: En - 15 VC KIA; two SA traits.

On 27 Sep, a CSP company operation from MANG BUK, A-216, KONTUM Province, engaged an estimated enemy squad 12 km E of MANG BUK. Results: En - eight VC KIA; four SA traits.

On 7 Oct, a company operation from DAK PEK, A-212, KONTUM Province, engaged an estimated two company size VC force three km W of DAK PEK. Results: En - 15 VC KIA; Frd - one USASF KIA.

On 8 Oct, a company operation from DAK SEANG, A-215, KONTUM Province, engaged an enemy squad 11 km N of DAK SEANG. Results: four 122mm rkt projectiles, nine 90mm RR rounds.

On 9 Oct, 2-O-1 aircraft with pilot and one USASF observer from DAK PEK, A-212, KONTUM Province, went down while flying a VR mission in DAK PEK's TACR. Results: Two US KIA, one USASF.

On 10 Oct, a 2-O-1 aircraft with pilot and one US observer went down in DAK SUT district, KONTUM Province, in DAK PEK's TACR. Results: Two US KIA. On the 13th the aircraft was found. Search for missing personnel continues.

On the 13th, the aircraft was found. Search for missing personnel continues.

On 22 Oct, a company operation from DUC LAP, A-239, QUANG DUC Province, engaged an estimated NVA platoon 42 km SE of DUC LAP. Results: En - eight NVA KIA; Frd - three CSP wpn traits.
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(a) On 28 Oct, a platoon operation from BU PRANG, A-236, QUANG DUC Province, initiated contact with an unk size NVA unit. Results: En - two NVA KIA, two AK-47's, one carbine cptr. Frd - one CSF KIA and three CSF WIA.

(b) On 29 Oct, FSB ANNIE, BU PRANG, A-236, QUANG DUC Province, received ten rounds of recoilless rifle fire. Artillery fired on suspected enemy locations. Results: En - unk; Frd - one CSF WIA.

(c) On 29 Oct, FSB KATE, BU PRANG, A-236, QUANG DUC Province, received 10 rounds of recoilless rifle fire. Artillery fired on suspected enemy locations with unknown results.

(d) On 29 Oct, Camp BU PRANG, A-236, QUANG DUC Province, received 14 rounds of 82mm mortar. Results: En - unk; Frd - 10 CSF WIA.

(e) From 29-31 Oct, fire support base KATE, QUANG DUC Province received 12 separate attacks-by-fire and was subjected to five light ground assaults. Attacks around FSB KATE were conducted by unidentified battalion size units. Results: Frd - two US and two CSF KIA; four US and six CSF WIA; En - unk.

(3) III Corps Tactical Zone, (Go A)

During the reporting period, Company A assets conducted a total of 507 company or larger, 1500 platoon, and 4201 squad operations. A total of 317 contacts were made with the following results: En - 334 KIA, 11 enemy and 216 weapons captured; Frd - five USASF, one VNSF and 89 CIDG KIA; 40 USASF, six VNSF, and 554 CIDG WIA; one USASF and 52 CIDG KIA; and 103 wpns lost.

(a) On 8 Aug, a PHUOC TAN outpost recon elem from BEN SOI, A-120, TAY NINH Province, made contact with an est VC company 16 km SW of TAY NINH. Results: En - 19 VC KIA; three SA and two CHICOM radios cptr; Frd - one CSF WIA.

(b) On 12 Aug, a CSF company operation from CHI LINH, A-333, BINH LONG Province, engaged an unk size NVA force in two separate contacts, 14 km NNE of HON QUAN. Results: En - 11 KIA; three SA and one CS wpn cptr; Frd - two CSF KIA; seven CSF WIA.

(c) On 15 Aug, a CSF company operation from CHI LINH, A-333, BINH LONG Province, ambushed an est NVA bn and discovered a large base camp, 15 km E of HON QUAN. Results: En - 16 KIA; a large quantity of ammunition, equipment, and documents cptr.

(d) On 18 and 20 Aug, a CSF company operation from LOC NINH, A-331, BINH LONG Province, made contact with an unk size enemy element 21 km NW of HON QUAN. Results: En - 15 KIA; eight SA and three CS wpns, 20 rifle grenades, eight B-40 rds, and a small amount of equipment and documents cptr.
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(e) On 24 Aug, the 1st Bn, 3rd MSFC, engaged one NVA Bn seven km N of DUC PHONG, BINH LONG Province. Results: En - 27 KIA; two CL wpn cptr; Frd - one USASF and four MSF KIA; 14 MSF WIA.

(f) On 28 Aug, a CSF platoon operation from MINH THANH, A-332, BINH LONG Province, discovered one M-41 tank in excellent condition 29 km SW of HON QUAN. The tank was camouflaged and heavily booby trapped in an underground base camp.

(g) On 5 Sep, the 2nd Bn, 3rd MSFC, PHUCC LONG Province, made contact with an unk size en force 6 km NW of DUC PHONG. Results: En - 28 KIA; four SA and a small amount of ammo and equipment cptr; Frd - two MSF WIA.

(h) On 5 Sep, a CSF company operation from LOC NINH, A-331, BINH LONG Province, made contact with an est two NVA platoons 27 km NW of HON QUAN. Results: En - 12 KIA; four SA and a small amount of equip and documents cptr; Frd - one Sheridan tank damaged and one SA destroyed.

(i) On 6 Sep, a CSF company operation from LOC NINH, A-331, BINH LONG Province, operating with the 11th ACR, made contact with an unk size en force 25 km NW of HON QUAN. Results: En - 15 KIA; 15 SA and misc equip and ammo cptr; Frd - one USASF and three CSF WIA.

(j) On 22 Sep, a CSF company operating from THIEN NGON, A-323, TAY NINH Province made contact three different times with an unk size en force approximately six km N of the camp. Results: En - 35 KIA; Frd - seven CSF KIA; four USASF, three VNSF and six CSF WIA and eight SA lost.

(k) On 5 Oct, a CSF company operation from LOC NINH, A-331, BINH LONG Province, engaged an estimated reinforced enemy company 4 km W of LOC NINH. Results: En - 11 KIA; one VC, one 60mm mortar complete, two B-40 hrs and five SA cptr; Frd - five CSF WIA.

(l) On 16 Oct, the 3rd company, 5th MSFC, operation HOGRARD BOUND, discovered a wpna cache approximately 8 km N of THIEN NGON. Results: 50 SA, two CS wpn, a large quantity of mixed ammo, magazines, assorted small arms parts, ammo drums, assorted sheet metal parts and 50 hoe heads cptr.

(4) IV Corps Tactical Zone. (Co D)

During the reporting period, Company D assets conducted a total of 1,312 company or larger, 5,144 platoon and 4,355 squad operations. A total of 178 contacts were made with the following results: Enemy - 267 KIA, 61 enemy and 154 weapons captured; Friendly - one USASF, one VNSF and 85 CIDG KIA, six VNSF, seven USASF and 239 CIDG WIA, 49 weapons lost.

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(a) On 5 Aug, a CSF from THUONG THOI, A-431, KIEN PHONG Province, was engaged by an est VC company 17 km NE of CHAU DOC. Results: En - three KIA, one AK-47 cptr; Frd - one CSF KIA, eight CSF WIA.

(b) On 12 Aug, a CSF element from TUYEN NHON, A-415, KIEN THUC Province, engaged an est 10 VC 10 km ENE of the camp. Results: En - four KIA, one en cptr.

(c) On 11 Aug, a CSF company from CAI CAI, A-431, KIEN PHONG Province, while on a Blackhawk operation engaged an unk size enemy force 13 km SW of the camp. Results: Six enemy and three SA captured.

(d) On 23 Aug, a CSF platoon operation from THUONG THOI, A-432, KIEN PHONG Province, was engaged by an est VC company five km NW of the camp. Results: two CSF KIA, 10 SA, one PRC-25 and one HT-1 lost.

(e) On 13 Aug, a CSF company operation from MY PHUOC TAY, A-411, BINH TUONG Province, located a cache six km SE of the camp. Results: En - 37 B-40 rks, 38 B-41 rks, 136 booby trap devices, four cratering charges, 16 cases of 12.7 ammo two Ns, four SKS and 14 plastic helmets cptr.

(f) On 13 Aug, a CSF platoon operation from BINH THANH THON, A-413, KIEN TUONG Province, engaged an unk size VC force 23 km SW of MCC HCA. Results: En - three VC KIA; two sampans and one sampan motor cptr.

(g) On 13 Aug, a CSF company operation from TUYEN NHON, A-415, KIEN THUC Province, discovered a cache 12 km ENE of the camp. Results: En - 18 assorted SA cptr.

(h) On 14 Aug, elements of the 2nd En, 4th MSF, KIEN PHONG Province, were engaged by an est two VC squads 13 km NW of THUONG THOI. Results: Frd three MSF KIA; one VC and three MSF WIA.

(i) On 16 Aug, a CSF company operation from BA XOAI, A-421, CHAU DOC Province, engaged an est VC company 23 km S of CHAU DOC. Results: En - five KBA, three AK-77s and five kilos of documents cptr; Frd - eight CSF WIA.

(j) On 18 Aug, a CSF platoon operation from CAI CAI, A-431, KIEN PHONG Province, received an unk number of mortar rounds 11 km SE of camp. Results: Frd - one WIA and six CSF WIA.

(k) On 25 Aug, a CSF company operation from BINH THANH THON, A-413, KIEN TUONG Province, engaged five VC 12 km NW of the camp. Results: En - four KIA; one en cptr.

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(1) On 26 Aug, elements of the 1st Bn, 4th MSFC, CHAU DOC Province were involved in a helicopter crash 25 km SW of CHI LANG. Results: Frd - one MSF KIA; eight MSF and four US crewman WIA. One helicopter destroyed.

(m) On 1 Sep, a CSF company operation from BINH THANH THON, A-113, KIEN THONG Province, engaged an unk size en force 12 km NW of DOC HOA. An additional platoon was inserted by air assets. Results: En - two KIA; one SA cptr; Frd three CSF KIA; one USASF, one VNSF, and three CSF WIA; two SA and one PEC 25 lost.

(n) On 11 Sep, camp CHI LANG, B-13, CHAU DOC Province received 30 to 40 rounds of mixed 82mm mortar and 107mm rockets and a ground probe. Results: En - seven KIA, 12 KBA, four en, two B-40 rocket launchers, two AK-47's and miscellaneous ammunition cptr.

(o) On 13 Sep, one CSF sqd from VINH CIA, A-149, CHAU DOC Province ambushed an unk size enemy force nine km NW of the camp. Results: En - four NVA KIA; two AK-50's and eight B-40 rocket launchers cptr.

(p) On 14 Sep, one CSF platoon from THUONG THOI, A-432, KIEN PHONG Province, in reaction to an intelligence report discovered a cache ten km W of VINH CIA, A-149, consisting of 1,146 rds of 82mm mortar, 200 rds of 75mm Rk, and 3,528 rds of AK-47 ammo.

(q) On 15 Sep, one company from KINH QUAN II, A-416, BINH TUONG Province, operating on NH1 COTO, 17 km S of BA XOA, CHAU Province received 29 rds of 82mm mortar. Results: En - Negative; Frd - one CSF KIA and 15 CSF WIA.

(r) On 17 Sep, the 3rd Bn, 4th NSFC initiated contact with an unk size en force eight km S of CHI LANG, B-43, CHAU DOC Province. Results: En - Unk; Frd - one USASF KIA; one USASF and nine MSF KIA.

(s) On 22 Sep, a CSF company from VINH CIA, A-119, CHAU DOC Province, on a blackhawk operation engaged an unk size enemy force 23 km S of HA TIEN. Results: En - 14 KIA; six SA, 300 kilometers rice and 20 kgs of sugar cptr; 34 sampans destroyed.

(t) On 22 Sep, a CSF company from KY PHUCC TAY, A-111, BINH TUONG Province, on a combined operation with the 4th NSFC, engaged a unit to five km NW of CHI LANG. Results: En - six KIA; 11 SA and four 107mm IR cptr.

(u) On 22 and 23 Sep, FOB located two and one half km NW of CAI CIAI, A-431, KIEN THONG Province, received two attacks by fire totaling 55 rds of mixed 82mm mortar, 57mm Rk and ASA fire. Results: Frd - two VNSF and one CSF WIA.
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(v) On 23 Sep, a CSF squad operation from CAI CAL, A-431, KIEN PHONG Province, engaged an est VC squad three km NE of the camp. Results: Four en KIA; one AK-47 and 1-107mm rkt cptr.

(w) On 2 Oct, two companies of MSF, 2nd Bn, 4th MSFC, KIEN TUONG Province, engaged an unknown size enemy force, 16 km N of BINH THANH THON. Results: Frd - 2 MSF KIA; 1 USASF and 5 MSF WIA; one helicopter gunship shot down.

(x) On 2 Oct, two companies of CSF from CAI CAL, A-431, KIEN PHONG Province, on an operation with one airboat section of the 4th MSFC engaged an estimated VC on six km W of the camp. Results: En - 35 KIA, 7 MG destroyed (not US confirmed); Frd - 3 CIDG KIA, 8 CIDG WIA; 1 SA lost.

(y) On 6 Oct, an airboat section, from the 4th MSFC, KIEN TUONG Province, was engaged by an unknown size enemy force 13 km NW of TUONG THOI. Results: En - nine KIA; one enemy, one wpn and one 30 page document cptr; Frd - one USASF WIA.

(z) On 7 Oct, a CSF platoon operation from MY PHUOC TAY, A-111, DINH TUONG Province initiated contact with an est VC platoon 20 km ESE of the camp. Results: En - eight KIA; seven wpns, 24 rds of 40mm and five cases of 7.62 ammunition cptr.

(aa) On 8 Oct, a CSF company operation from BINH THANH THON, A-413, KIEN TUONG Province engaged an est six VC and discovered a cache. The cpn was then engaged by an est VC company. FAC, airboats, gunships and shab supported. Results: En - 15 KIA; five M1, 25 SA, 200 kilos of documents, 209 rds of 82mm, 184 mortar fuzes, 5,500 rds SKS, 200 AK-47 magazines, 17 grenades, six kilos of TNT and seven sampans cptr; Frd - three CSF WIA.

(bb) On 13 Oct, a CSF squad from BINH THANH THON, A-413, KIEN TUONG Province, on a blackhawk operation engaged an unk size VC force, 15 km NW of MOC HOK. Results: En - one KIA, three KIA, seven SA cptr.

(cc) On 15 Oct, a CSF company operation from MY DINH II, A-416, DINH TUONG Province engaged three VC 10 km SW of the camp. Results: En - three VC KIA; Frd - one CSF WIA.

(dd) On 16 Oct, a CSF company operation from MY PHUOC TAY, A-111, DINH TUONG Province engaged three VC 10 km SW of the camp. Results: En - three VC KIA, one SA cptr.

(ee) On 20 Oct, a CSF company operation from BINH THANH THON, A-413, KIEN TUONG Province engaged 30 VC 21 km SW of the camp. Results: En - four KIA, five weapons and 324 rds of ammunition cptr.
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(ff) On 22 Oct, a CSF platoon operation from TO CHAU, KIEN GIANG Province, was engaged by an est 50 VC eight km NE of HA TIEN. Results: En - three KIA, two en, eight weapons, and assorted ammunition cptr.

(gg) On 23 Oct, an airboat section and two CRF operations from VINH GIA, A-149, CHAU DUC Province, engaged an est 100 VC in sampans four km NW of the camp. Results: En - four KIA; one CS, two SA, 100 grenades, 88 claymore mines, 98 rds 82mm, 100 B-40 rds, 300 lbs of rice, three binoculars, 10 gas masks, 11 NVA uniforms, 20 rds 75mm, 12 rds of 60mm, 16 sampans and four kilos documents cptr.

(hh) On 27 Oct, three CRF's from THUONG THOI, A-432, KIEN PHONG Province, engaged an est VC platoon five km SSE of the camp. Results: En - seven KIA, one VC, one SKS and three sampans cptr.

(ii) On 27 Oct, two CSF companies from BA XOAI, A-421, CHAU DUC Province were engaged by an est VC platoon six km SW of the camp. Results: En - five KIA, 10 KBA, one 60mm mortar, one AK-47 and 20 rds of 60mm ammunition cptr; Frd - one CSF KIA.

(jj) On 28 Oct, two CSF companies from MY DIEN II, A-416, DINH TUONG Province were engaged by an est two VC platoons 22 km NW of MY THO. Results: Frd one NSSF and 12 CSF KIA, four CSF WIA, five weapons and two assault boats with motors lost; En - Unknown.

(5) Special Operations.

(a) 5th MSFC operation SEAFLAT, 2 August through 2 September. One company and one combat recon platoon of the 5th MSFC deployed to NAM CAN, AN XUYEN Province, IV CTZ to provide security for the Navy's Civic Action Program. A total of 24 contacts were made with the following results: En - 30 VC KIA, 69 cnvs cptr, 76 bunkers, 41 sampans and 109 huts destroyed. Friendly five MSF WIA.

(b) PROJECT DELTA operation TROJAN HORSE, 04-27 August and 08 September through 01 October 1969, I CTZ, QUANG TIN Province, OPCON to CG, 3rd Marine Division. A total of 19 Recon Teams, 17 Roadrunner Teams, six Ranger Companies and six USASF Rangers in support operations were conducted. Total results: En - one VC KIA; Frd - 10 KIA, Six Roadrunners and one USASF WIA.
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4. Plans and Organization:

(1) Phasedown in CTDG Strength: Execution of Phasedown was ordered by CONSCAF on 27 Aug 69 after DA had approved the plan and the additional RF spaces. 5th SFDA OP Plan 1-69, dated 5 Oct 69, was published and distributed, directing the reduction of CTDG strength to 26,258 by 30 Jun 70.

(2) CTDG Camp Conversions: The following camps entered the conversion cycle on 1 Oct 69 and C-Day is now scheduled for 31 Jan 70:
   (a) KMTH BUK, II CTZ.
   (b) KMTH PHM, II CTZ (NHA TRANG).
   (c) CTY XM TH, III CTZ.
   (d) CTY MINH, III CTZ.
   (e) KMTH QUAN II, IV CTZ.
   (f) HN DA, IV CTZ.

(3) VMSF-HC Proposed Reorganization: The VMSF-HC proposed to JCS/ACO on 30 Oct to reorganize the VNS to a more compatible organization that coincides with requirements after Phasedown and present organizational requirements. This proposal will not raise the VMSF presently authorized strength of 3,078.

(4) VMSF MTOE Submission: A decision regarding the concept, structure and strength proposals for the new Group MTOE submission is expected in November, with a formal submission planned for January 1970.

(5) Embellishment II: A document was published in October 69 by the Group SF which indicated a PLZ date of 15 Nov 69 to reconfigure all CTDG Strike Force camps that are being retained under Phasedown to the 3, 3, 1 and 1 configuration (3 SF companies, 3 GTFs, 1 POL/AR Team and 1 Heavy Weapons Section). Those CF camps that are to convert to "Special Forces" are authorized to recruit up to their conversion strength.

(6) CTDG Force Developments: No new CTDG TOEs have been developed during the reporting period. Comments and recommendations as a result of the letter from Group SF, dated 28 Sep 69, subject: "Reorganization of Camp Strike and Mobile Strike Forces, have been received from each company and a study is now being conducted to develop the optimum CTDG organization. No reorganization of the CTO or VMSF is expected until after completion of Phasedown.

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(7) CTDG Artillery: At present, 5th SFDA has 60105mm Howitzers with 40 deployed country-wide. The remaining pieces will be distributed after adequate ammunition storage capability is available and crew proficiency tests have been completed. The proposed M70s includes artillery personnel at all levels and repair capability in the Forward Supply Points (FSP).

(8) Current Plans: Table of Allowances 1-68: Action commenced during the reporting period to revise TA 1-68 and the suspense date for the final draft was 31 Oct 69. The expected date of publication for TA 1-69 is 1 Dec 69.

(9) Combined Campaign Plan for CY '71, AR XII (T) was published in October 1969. Companies will be required to provide their implementing plan for AR XII in December.

(10) I CTDG (Company C) Current Plans/Concept:

(a) I CTDG CTDG camps presently have eight 105mm howitzers in position with trained crews. Additional crews have been trained and positions for six more of these guns are being prepared. As of 31 Oct 69, two crews from each camp have completed training. Training for these crews is at Camp THUONG DUC under direction of the AVN Artillery personnel at that location. One AVN IIF and one USAF Artillery CPT have been assigned to monitor all CTDG Artillery training and activities.

(b) As required by current campaign plan, each camp location is continually evaluated with respect to considerations for closure, relocation, transfer to RF/PF, or movement to relocate in respect to the disposition of AVN or MACV. With respect to this requirement, major emphasis has been given to the rehabilitation and hardening of Camp MAT LOC (T 101). Withdrawal of the 3d Marine Division from northern I Corps, and the subsequent redistribution of MACV there, placed MAT LOC in a position of importance. Currently, Project Delta and 3d RCT, 101st Airborne Division are operating from 70B's located adjacent to the camp.

(c) Continued emphasis is placed on recruiting in an attempt to bring each camp up to its authorized strength of 530. At MAT LOC (A-101) it was necessary to introduce a bonus system paid over an extended period to enhance recruiting potential in that area. This proved quite successful as one cct company has been recruited and it is hoped another will be recruited within the next month.

(d) Increased emphasis will be directed toward expanding the existing training program. This will include small arms weapons repair training, vehicle and generator maintenance, basic medical aid and a considerably expanded CTDG training center for basic combat and refresher training.
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(a) Organization/Force Development: On 1 Sep 69, Detachment N-11 became operational and assumed operational control of the five southern camps in I CTZ. These camps are THA BONG (A-107), THAP H (A-101), MINH LONG (A-108), BA TO (A-105) and GIA VUC (VNSF A-103).

(b) Miscellaneous: Camp MAI LOC (A-101) was authorized to maintain operational efficiency of 30% from 12 Sep to date. Camp MON TON (A-103) has been authorized to maintain 30% operational efficiency since 26 Sep. In both camps, weather has caused considerable damage to bunkers, positions, and trenches. Priority has been given to construction and rehabilitation at these camps. However, monsoon rains delayed movement of construction materials and supplies to those locations. Thus, original estimated completion dates for these projects were necessarily extended. Assistance from other W/MAF units has been utilized to the maximum extent, as available.

(11) I V CTZ (Company B), Current Plans/Concept:

(a) Company B is presently conducting a directed phasedown of CTDG forces. Under present phasedown concept, four camps will be converted to RF/PF. Camp PANG RUK is presently finishing the first month of conversion cycle with Camps PIATRAU GI, NHON CO and AN LAC to follow.

(b) All camps will be standardized with a total assigned strength of 530 men, consisting of 3 CSF companies, 3 combat recon platoons, 1 heavy weapons section, and 1 FIDAR team.

(12) III CTZ (Company A) Current Plans/Concept:

(a) To implement the changeover from ARVN Artillery to CTDG Artillery at Camps TPHAND PON and KASHM, an intensified training cycle is underway at Camp TPHAND SUP, the III CTZ CTDG Training Center. Upon completion of the training, the 75 selected CTDG personnel from these two camps will be adequately trained for the artillery transition.

(b) In view of the CTDG Phasedown Program, this headquarters has been directed to place all CTDG camps designated for conversion to Regional Force status in a more favorable Phasedown posture, while at the same time standardizing the strength in all camps retained. Annex F, OPlan 1-69 authorizes the CTDG strengths at all "A" camps to be retained under Phasedown to be a total of 530 personnel assigned per camp.

(13) IV CTZ (Company D) Current Plans/Concept:

(a) On 10 August 69, Company D became OPCON to SA 11th STZ. On the same date, VNSF Detachment C-4 and all CTDG units subordinate to C-4 were placed OPCON to CO, 11th STZ.
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(b) Conversion cycle of camps KI DA and KI TM to Regional Force started on 1 Oct 69. During the month of October inventory of equipment and inspection of camp was conducted by NACT. Conversion of these two camps will completed by 31 Jan 70.

(c) Camps M1 PHOC TAI and M1 DTM TI will enter the conversion cycle on 1 Jan 70.
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e. Training:

(1). General.

(a). The Special Forces Training Center (SFTC) at An Khe was closed on 3 Oct 69. During the period 1 Aug through 3 Oct, seven (7) SF companies and two (2) MSF companies underwent refresher training at An Phu. A proposed CIDG training concept is now being implemented in each CTZ with MSF training to be conducted at Dong Ba Thin. This plan will increase the number of CIDG troops trained annually and improve the caliber of training conducted. Under the centralized system at An Khe, CIDG troops were receiving training once every 23 months. Under the new decentralized system, CIDG troops will undergo training a minimum of one time annually.

(b). The program of instruction for the replacement Combat Orientation Course was evaluated and modified. The course was shortened by four (4) days without a significant loss of training time. The mission of the Combat Orientation Course is to train USASF personnel in the special combat skills required for duty in RVN and to prepare these individuals to deal effectively as counterparts to the Vietnamese Special Forces in the conduct of combat operations and pacification programs. During this reporting period the Combat Orientation Course received 552 students for the eight (8) day course. The following is a breakdown of students for classes 5-70 thru 17-70:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COC Classes</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Comp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5-70</td>
<td>01 Aug - 12 Aug 69</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-70</td>
<td>03 Aug - 19 Aug 69</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-70</td>
<td>15 Aug - 25 Aug 69</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-70</td>
<td>22 Aug - 02 Sep 69</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-70</td>
<td>29 Aug - 09 Sep 69</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-70</td>
<td>05 Sep - 16 Sep 69</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-70</td>
<td>12 Sep - 23 Sep 69</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-70</td>
<td>19 Sep - 30 Sep 69</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-70</td>
<td>26 Sep - 07 Oct 69</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-70</td>
<td>03 Oct - 14 Oct 69</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-70</td>
<td>10 Oct - 21 Oct 69</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-70</td>
<td>17 Oct - 27 Oct 69</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-70</td>
<td>26 Oct - 02 Nov 69</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c). Plans are being finalized to establish a Combat Interpreters School for CIDG personnel at Dong Ba Thin. This course will be eight (8) weeks in duration and will eliminate the necessity of training CIDG personnel for six (6) months at the RVN Language School in Saigon.
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(2). NACV Recondo School.

(a). The mission of the NACV Recondo School is to train selected personnel from US/USARV units in specialized techniques and skills necessary to conduct successful Long Range Reconnaissance Operations in the Republic of Vietnam.

(b). Average assigned and attached strengths of cadre personnel were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>ATCH Off</th>
<th>ATCH EN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUG</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1 ROK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEP</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1 ROK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCT</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1 ROK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c). During this reporting period, the NACV Recondo School received 207 students for the three (3) week course. Classes R-2-70 thru R-5-70 have graduated. Following is a breakdown of students for R-2-70 thru R-5-70 by Corps and Unit area:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recondo Classes</th>
<th>Entr</th>
<th>Dropped</th>
<th>Graduated</th>
<th>Cert. of Attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4th Inf Div</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173rd Abn Div</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROY FV</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75th Inf (Ranger)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Inf Div</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Inf Div</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Inf Div</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Air Cav Div</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Fd, 32nd Abn</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>199th LHB</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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**OGFOR-65 (R2)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recorded Classes</th>
<th>Enrolled</th>
<th>Dropped</th>
<th>Graduated</th>
<th>Cert. of Attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Inf (Ranger)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>224th Corps</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Abn Div</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Inf Div</td>
<td>07</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Marine Div</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Marine Div</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>09</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th SFCA, 1st SF</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>09</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>09</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3). I Corps Tactical Zone:

(a). (C) USASF:

During the reporting period, two USASF Basic Airborne courses were conducted, class numbers 17 and 13 respectively. Four (4) personnel from Co C attended course number 17. Of the two (2) that graduated, one was chosen as the Honor Graduate, one of the initial four failed to pass the physical training test at Dong Ba Thin. For course number 13, four of the five personnel from Co C passed the course, the fifth person failed to meet the physical requirements. There were no problems encountered.

(b). (U) VNSF: Negative

(c). (C) CIDG:

At Dong Ba Thin, in the Combat Reconnaissance Patrol

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Course number 40, is one CRP platoon from Camp Nong Son. One platoon from Camp Tien Phuoc graduated from course number 39, and one platoon from Camp Ba To graduated from course number 38. At An Khe, one CSF Co from Ba To graduated from the Basic Training Refresher Course on 20 August and one CSF Co from Camp Vinh Long graduated from this same course 2h September 1969.

In training at the Armed Forces Language Institute at Saigon are a total of 13 CIDG. Five (5) are attending course number 3-69, four (4) are attending course number 9-69, and four (4) are at course number 10-69.

On 20 September 1969, the first group of recruits began a basic training course at the new I CTZ training center at Ba To Camp (Det A-106) this first group consisted of 54 recruits from Camp Nong Son. Presently training at the same 3 week course are 110 recruits from Nai Loc and from Ba To. They will graduate on or about 6 November 1969.

A maintenance program training program was initiated by Co C on 1 September 1969. The program is set up so that four (4) CIDG from each "A" Detachment will receive sufficient mechanical knowledge to help in the maintenance of vehicles and generators at these locations. Two of the four CIDG are trained as generator operators and repairmen, and two are trained in the repair of light military vehicles. At present, 22 CIDG from different detachments are attending the course and will graduate on or about 20 November 1969.

(a). (U) II Corps Tactical Zone.

(b). CIDG:

The requirement for more intensified training of CSF and MSF elements was illustrated on several occasions during the period. It is apparent that some CSF and MSF elements do not possess the degree of training, discipline or motivation required to effectively combat a well equipped NVA unit.

CSF companies are no longer sent to the MSFTC at An Khe. Preparation to conduct training for CSF will be undertaken by Co B when a suitable site is found.

(b). CIDG Artillery:

Increased emphasis has been placed on training personnel within the camps on all crew served weapons. Company B Artillery
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Officer assisted and will continue to assist in this training. Training programs at Bu Prang have resulted in the 105mm howitzer crews obtaining a satisfactory degree of proficiency.

(5). (C) III Corps Tactical Zone

(a). CIDO Training Center:

The CIDO Training Center at 1st A-301, Tuyen Son, continues to provide basic and refresher training on a Corps wide basis to all CID personnel. As in the two previous reporting periods, the number of newly recruited personnel being trained is still declining. During this period of reduced training activity, a new CI was developed emphasizing weapons familiarization and small unit tactics. In addition to the basic CID infantry course, a ten week artillery course was conducted with the first two classes graduating on 3 November 69. Instructors are furnished by the 23rd Artillery Group (TS) and the classes are administered and controlled by VI-SF. The students were handcuffed from their respective corps for this course. The basis for selection is a physical examination administered by the instructor personnel. Included on this test is the common mathematics used in the computation of an artillery fire mission. Based on their individual scores, personnel were selected for the FDC class. The objective of this course is to develop FDC and firing battery teams capable of performing operational missions. Ultimately, CIDO capabilities will be established eventually enabling all Special Forces organic artillery to be controlled by the detachments and operated by CIDO. Company A presently has four (4) 105mm howitzers earmarked for changeover from Army gun crews to CIDO gun crews. A second ten week course is scheduled to commence on or about 1st November. In addition to CIDO and firing battery classes, a forward observer class is scheduled to be added to the PST. Potential CIDO forward observers will be selected from the new group of students or will be retained from the class that graduated on 8 November.

During the reporting period, the following recruits were trained and assigned to Special Forces Camps as indicated:

| TRAINING CO | GRADUATION DATE | STRENGTH | D A 
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>87th Co</td>
<td>21 Aug 69</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Tong Le Chon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88th Co</td>
<td>8 Nov 69</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Thien Mon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89th Co</td>
<td>8 Nov 69</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Khatum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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(b). 3rd NSFC:

The 3rd "STC at Long Bi,1 continued to devote its stand down time to refresher training programs of four (4) weeks in duration with emphasis being placed on small unit tactics.

(c). "A" Detachment Comments:

Recent after action reports and comments from Detachment Commanders have cited and supported a necessity and need for an "on site" refresher course. The obvious advantage of this program is that large numbers of CID personnel would not be absent from their assigned camps for given periods of time on non-operational type missions, but would at the same time, still maintain a high degree of combat readiness through the efforts of the VSF and USASF personnel at the respective detachments. A proposed POI for a three (3) week course will consist mainly of weapons training and small unit tactics.

(d). CIDC OJT Programs:

The following OJT programs for CIDC troops are either currently being conducted or are planned:

(1). Medical: An OJT course of six (6) weeks duration is now being given at the CIDC hospital in Bien Hoa to train CIDC platoon medics and nurses. It is designed to serve either as a basic course or a refresher course as applicable. Students are presented a certificate with appropriate commendations upon graduation.

(2). Vehicle Maintenance: Vehicle maintenance to include generator maintenance OJT training will be given at detachment level because each detachment area has equipment and problems peculiar to its own area. Detachment Commanders have been requested to develop this training and to furnish this headquarters with a starting date and POI.

(3). Communications: Communications repair is considered to be too technical in nature to teach CIDC on an OJT basis. However, classes in operation and elementary first skeleton maintenance of communication equipment will be given at 0 Detach at level are being planned with a scheduled starting date of 30 November.

In all fields of OJT, maximum utilization of disabled CIDC veterans will be made. This serves the two-fold purpose of training and rehabilitation.

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(6). (C) IV Corps Tactical Zone.

(a). NSF:

During the reporting period one NSF battalion completed three (3) weeks of refresher training at Chi Lang. Seventy-five attended the Basic Airborne Course at Dong Ba Thin Training Center from 13 to 23 September 1969.

(b). CSF:

(1). Mobile Training Team from Cam To Chau conducted refresher training for units at Cam Bien, Thanh Thon, Thanh Tri, and Cam Chai. The MT spent ten (10) days at each location.

(2). Two CHPs attended CHP training at Dong Na Thin.

(c). Status of Training:

(1). The Mobile Training Team from Cam To Chau continued to conduct refresher training at the A Detachment level. At present there is one CHP attending training at Dong Na Thin, 36 CIC attending Leadership Course at Dong Na Thin and 25 CIC are enrolled in the Armed Forces Language Course at Saigon.

(2). In November, the 67th Artillery (ARVN) at Cam Lanh will conduct artillery and fire direction center training for selected CICs. EMAC has provided an Artillery NIT, which will visit CIC camps that have organic 105mm howitzers and give instruction to the gun crews on maintenance and operation of the weapon. A five (5) hour class on mines and booby traps is prepared and will be presented to all CIC units in 36 D during the months of November and December 1969.

(7). (U) Detachment 1-51, Dong Ba Thin (WSP Tng Ctr).

(a). General:

During the last month of this quarter emphasis was placed on the quality of instruction being presented to the students at the training center. This emphasis was placed by means of assigning Non-Commissioned Officers to the various training committees of the training center, i.e; Tactics, Weapons, General Subjects, airborne and when needed or necessary, calling upon other detachment members to assist in the fields in which they specialize, i.e; Communications, Medical,
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and Political Warfare. Each Non-Commissioned Officer is further assigned classes to monitor in relationship to his committee, rendering a written report on the class that was monitored. The report must indicate, but is not limited to, the following:

1. Did the class start on time?
2. Was transportation provided?
3. Were students properly equipped? (Radio, weapons, ammunition, maps, compasses, etc).
4. Were training aids used?
5. In this class, what amount of time was spent on the following:
   - Lecture/Conference _____ Minutes
   - Demonstration _____ Minutes
   - Practical Work _____ Minutes
6. Was the instructor prepared for the class?
7. Was the site appropriate for the class?
8. Did the instructor use his lesson plan?
9. Did the instructor follow a logical sequence?
10. What was the students interest level?
11. Do you consider the instructor outstanding, good, mediocre, or poor?
12. How much ammunition was fired? Type?
13. Was a demonstration team used? If not would one have improved the class?
14. Recommendations or suggestions of the monitor.

At the end of each week a summary is prepared for the Commanders of the Training Center and Detachment F-51, in Vietnamese and English. This summary consists of courses monitored, deficiencies noted, deficiencies reoccurring and recommendations as possible solutions to
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As emphasis was being placed on quality of instruction, emphasis was also placed on the condition of training facilities and the use of training materials, i.e., ammunition, pyrotechnics and grenades.

A long range program is presently underway in upgrading or rewriting POIs and lesson plans at the Training Center.

During the quarter a new course was presented to the Training Center. The VNSF Officers Orientation Course is designed to orientate the newly assigned officer to Special Forces and the role that Special Forces play within the Army of Vietnam. This is a four (4) week course and the second class is now in progress.

The 17th and 18th USASF Basic Airborne Courses were conducted during the period. The lack of motivation experienced in the previous class was not apparent in the last two classes.

(b). Courses Graduated During the Reporting Period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COURSES</th>
<th>GRAD DATE</th>
<th>STUDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16th VNSF OFF/IO Basic</td>
<td>09 Oct 69</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st VNSF GPF Orientation</td>
<td>21 Oct 69</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th VNSF Radio Operator</td>
<td>21 Sep 69</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th VNSF Basic Airborne</td>
<td>02 Aug 69</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th VNSF Basic Airborne</td>
<td>01 Oct 69</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Tae Kwon Do</td>
<td>25 Aug 69</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th US RAC</td>
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<tr>
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<td>38th CRP</td>
<td>06 Sep 69</td>
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<tr>
<td>39th CRP</td>
<td>21 Oct 69</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40th CIDG Ldr</td>
<td>11 Sep 69</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>COURSES</th>
<th>GRAD DATE</th>
<th>STUDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2nd CIDG Radio Operator</td>
<td>04 Aug 69</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th CIDG BAC</td>
<td>29 Aug 69</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th CIDG BAC</td>
<td>23 Oct 69</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c). Courses Currently In Progress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COURSE</th>
<th>START DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17th VN SF OFF/NCO Basic</td>
<td>29 Oct 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd VN SF Officer Orientation</td>
<td>13 Oct 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st VN SF Medical Specialist</td>
<td>18 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Taekwondo</td>
<td>15 Sep 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th CRP</td>
<td>29 Oct 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th CIDG Ldrs</td>
<td>25 Sep 69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Operational Report: Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1969

f. Combat Developments.

1. The Combat Developments Section, 5th SF/DA, is responsible for testing, evaluating, and originating development equipment applicable to the mission of Special Forces. All items are tested by field units to determine their potential and application to Special Forces in Vietnam.

2. The following are projects tasked or under consideration by 5th SF/DA, Combat Developments:

   a) Astrolite Astropak: Astrolite is a liquid explosive developed and supplied by the Explosive Corporation of America through the Munitions Command. To create the explosive, liquid two nonetonable components are mixed to produce liquid Astrolite with a detonating velocity of 26,500 ft per sec or 500 ft per sec faster than C-4. The astropak configuration is a store container that provides saturation of the two components until the explosive is needed. This item was tested by the SF/DA/3RD section with good results. Additional quantities are expected to be received in the near future, at which time the product will be sent to operational detachments for further testing.

   b) SST 201X Miniponnder Transponder: This item is a small, compact lightweight transponder that weighs only 1 3/4 pounds including battery. This transponder will function only with horizontally polarized, X-band Radar which limits its use to the F-102, F-4, T-28, C-130, C-119K, and U-26 aircraft. The item will operate for more than 170 hours on stand-by and 8 hours of interrogation. The Miniponnder was recently tested with the C-119K at Thai Thailand achieving excellent results. Evaluation of the Miniponnder continues with Project Delta.

   c) Illuminated Map Reader: This map reader combines a two power magnifier with an illuminated ring of phosphor which facilitates reading maps at night without disclosing the users position. It also has a night signaling capability. Initial results of testing have achieved excellent results. The evaluation is continuing with Project Delta and "A" Recon School.

   d) XM 61 Linear Antipersonnel Mine: This mine consists of a 25 foot length of waterproof, flexible explosive cord, with coiled fragmentation rings crimped around the cord. It is specifically designed for use where normal mining techniques are ineffective or impractical. 5th Group is awaiting shipment of 100 which have arrived in Vietnam. Planned use will be as an ambush mine and defense of overnight positions. The mines are capable of being together to make an indefinite length. Each mine weighs 5 pounds.
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(e) Improved Position Locator: The locator consists of a backpack, display and control unit, and boot antennas. The operator's step direction is automatically determined by a compass in the backpack and step length automatically measured by the boot antennas. The display and control unit continually displays the operator's present location in 6 digit UTM map coordinates. The locator is being tested by Project Delta.
S. Aviation:

(1) Army Aviation Support. Army aircraft for command support continue to be in short supply with no relief in sight. The OPCON Field Force/Corps HQ are providing only the aircraft directed by COMMAC except in II Corps where R Company has received some assistance from TFVV. The two HH-1s provided in I, III, and IV Corps are not adequate to support the C-Detachment.

(2) Tactical Airlift Support. During this month some difficulty was experienced with a requested unit move of Detachment N-55 (5th NA). A priority SI Special Mission Airlift Request was submitted on 7 October 1969 to provide airlift for this unit move on 11 October 1969. On 10 October 1969 this unit was advised by Traffic Management Agency personnel that the unit move would be delayed 24 hours (an additional delay of 24 hours was necessary on 11 October 1969 due to higher priority missions). In addition, it became apparent that a third 24 hour delay was possible and as the tactical situation required this unit to be in position by 15 October 1969 this headquarters initiated a Coebat Essential Special Mission Airlift Request. This request, initiated at 2300 hours 12 October 1969, required the mission to be completed by 1800 hours 13 October 1969. The unit move was finally completed at approximately 1400 hours, 14 October 1969.

(3) Tactical Air Support. The USAF has attached forward air controllers down to Special Forces company (CTZ) level. Because of the present shortage of attached FACs, CTZ camps normally receive FAC support from OPCOM units, nearby US units, or sector ALCO teams. This dependence on other units for FAC support frequently means that this support is available on a low priority basis when no other commitments exist, and precludes adequate VRs of operational areas, familiarization by both CDD elements and FACs with the other's operational techniques, and routine FAC assistance in such areas as air cover and reconnaissance, radio relay, and navigational guidance for long-range, offensive operations. Despite this problem area, immediate TAC air support for CDD elements in contact has been generally outstanding, effective and highly responsive to tactical requirements. It should be noted that the requirement for CDD units to operate beyond friendly artillery range on offensive operations increases their reliance on TAC air support during enemy contacts. Pre-planned airstrikes and combat taxiops have been flown approximately 99% of the time, with wide variations existing among the corps tactical zones and monthly periods.

(b) I Corps Tactical Zone (Co C)

(a) Tactical Air Support. Tactical air support for the past quarter was the best it has ever been in I Corps. Best, not in the sense of percentage
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of requests flown, but rather the best percent of air requests flown from what tactical air support is available to ARVN to include CIDG forces.

(b) In this last quarter, the procedures in I CTZ for requesting tactical air support for Special Forces and CIDG operations has been revised. Requests for tactical air support from the A-Detachment up to the C-Detachment are submitted by the VNAP only. The USARF at each level does not submit a request, but confirms the NS and USARF clearances only. The AO, Co C, 5th SGT, 1st SF personally briefed all the A-Detachments on the newly revised system of requesting TAC air support. Also seven of the nine A-Detachments have had instruction and practical exercise on the use of the A-6 Peacon transponder with the A-6 Intruder aircraft, which, if necessary, will assist the camps in siege operations.

(c) Skyspot requests have been reduced since the USARF have greatly decreased their overall skyspot bombing in I CTZ and the number of skyspots for ARVN and CIDG forces has been cut to two.

(d) Daily Tactical Fighter Support.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>August</th>
<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Requested</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flown</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) II Corps Tactical Zone (Co B).

(a) Army Aviation Support. Army aviation support continues to be adequate for helicopter airlifts with the exception of those camps OPON to 23rd ARVN Division. In the 2-23 area, air assets must be requested through the 23rd Division, and as of this date, their performance in fulfilling requirements is totally unsatisfactory. At times, exchange of troops on fire support bases took as long as a week, thereby causing morale problems. On one occasion, 60% of the CIDG on FMB KARE deserted due to rotation of companies being delayed day after day. Formed planned combat assaults and daily resupply missions also could not be executed at times because the 23rd ARVN Division would arbitrarily declare a tactical emergency and would not release aircraft.

(b) Tactical Airlift. Tactical airlift support for unit troop moves has been excellent over the past several months. All missions have been flown as scheduled with the exception of unavoidable delays caused by adverse weather conditions.

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(c) Tactical fighter support has been excellent for immediate air-strike requests. All immediate strikes have been timely and accurate. Preplanned air-strike support has been satisfactory for the reporting period.

(6) III Corps Tactical Zone (Co A).

(a) Army Aviation Support.

(1) This headquarters receives the same dedicated air assets as was reported during the last reporting period. These assets remain two HH-1D model helicopters utilized as a work chopper and O-1C ship.

(2) Two daily helicopters are completely inadequate to meet the normal day-to-day command, control and liaison requirements of the company headquarters and three subordinate B-Detachments (Det A-36 is not included since it operates under special circumstances). The normal method of employment is to retain one helicopter for use at the company level, for command liaison visits, staff visits, courier services of an urgent nature, transportation of visitors from higher headquarters (whose interests seldom coincide with unit priorities), transportation of funds, visual reconnaissance of potential operational areas, etc. The second helicopter is used especially for command/staff liaison and control. Detachment B-32 has this helicopter for three days weekly, and Detachments B-33 and B-34 for only two days each week. As a result, in order to adequately supervise subordinate detachments, and to respond to urgent matters that require their presence at A-Detachments, the B-Detachment commanders are reduced to "scrounging" transport from friendly local US Commanders. The cooperation and willing assistance provided is a source of satisfaction, and is also an indicator of the excellent working relationships normally enjoyed, but Lieutenant Colonels commanding Special Forces B-Detachments should not have to beg from their better endowed contemporaries in conventional units.

(b) Tactical Airlift Support. This headquarters receives two C-7A aircraft (C-130 replaced with C-133) two days a week. These aircraft are supplied to Company A from the 82nd Air Division through III CTZ.

(c) Tactical Fighter Support.

(1) During the reporting period, the tactical fighter support has been outstanding in regards to preplanned and immediate air-strikes even with the cutback of air assets in III CTZ. During the reporting period a total of 518 were requested and 452 of these were flown against preplanned targets. A total of 53 combat Skyspots were nominated and 48 of these
requests were flown. Preplanned Combat Skysots are no longer utilized in III CTZ.

(2) Since the last reporting period this headquarters has established an exchange program with the Air Force personnel based at TUY MOA. The 31st Tactical Fighter Wing has the responsibility for providing rapid close air support to Detachments A-314, BMRAD, A-315, DUC PAVNO and A-311, RU DOP. Personnel from these camps are exchanged with personnel from Air Force units to get a close up look at each of the operations and to become knowledgeable of each other's capabilities.

(7) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Co D)

(a) Army Aviation Support. Army aviation has improved but still is inadequate to support the assigned missions.

(b) Tactical Airlift Support.

(1) Tactical airlift support by Army aviation is controlled and allotted by the 4th Special Tactical Zone.

(2) C7A airlift support is provided seven days a week by the 536th Tactical Airlift Squadron at VUNG Tau. The performance of the crews of mission MTS-156 is exemplary. Their desire to get the job done with the least amount of delay has resulted in Company D getting extra sorties delivered to our teams.

(3) C-123 airlift support is provided by the 315th Special Operations Wing at PHAN RAMG, five days a week except Sundays and Thursdays. Support is satisfactory.

(6) II Corps Tactical Zone (3-52) (Project Delta)

(a) Army Aviation Support. Aviation support of Detachment R-52 (PROJECT DELTA) for this period has been furnished by the 281st Assault Helicopter Co. Aircraft commitment from the 281st AHC is six UH-1H and four UH-1C, to be flyable 24 hours per day.

(b) Tactical Air Support. Air Liaison Officers (ALO) and Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) personnel of the 21st TASS are attached to PROJECT DELTA. The ALO-TACP is composed of three officers and four enlisted men, and has been located at the NSR at DONJI HA, and then later at QUANG TRI, during Operation TROJAN HORSE and Operation TROJAN HORSE II.

RCS GSFGG-65 (R2)

h. Logistics.

(1) Supply.

(a) The average number of personnel supported during the period 1 August 69 - 31 October 69 were:

- USASF 2,632
- CSF 35,321
- MAF 8,673

(b) During the reporting period the Logistics Support Center (LSC) of the 5th SFSGA turned over a total of $55,000 in excess medical supplies to the 1st Logistical Command. This turn-in gives the Group much needed storage space and also puts equipment back into supply channels. There is a critical shortage of sandbags within the 5th SFSGA. For the month of August 69, 100,000 bags were allocated by USARV; however, this proved to be an insufficient quantity and an additional 300,000 bags were requested. The 5th SFSGA has placed command emphasis upon improving internal artillery maintenance capabilities. Four artillery contact teams have been organized from within 5th SFSGA resources for this purpose. Savings were made in the FY 70 budget by deferring procurement of major PEMA items. The 5th SFSGA programmed additional repair parts and major assemblies into its budget which greatly increased internal maintenance capabilities.

(c) Local purchases during the 3 month period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice Purchases</td>
<td>$141,550</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$189,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Purchases</td>
<td>$13,700</td>
<td>$5,906</td>
<td>$11,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$155,250</td>
<td>$5,906</td>
<td>$200,908</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Maintenance.

(e) The percentages of nonavailable equipment for the reporting period were:

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RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crew Served Weapons</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forklifts</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Wheel bearings for the 1/2 ton M151 are in critical supply in the 5th SFGA. At present there is a country-wide shortage of this item. Receipt of this repair part would significantly reduce vehicle nonavailabilities for the 5th SFGA.

(c) A country-wide shortage of injector pumps and magnetic amplifiers for generators is a major contributing factor to downtime for generators throughout the 5th SFGA.

(3) Movements

Cargo moved in short tons by the Logistics Support Center during the reporting period was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airlift</td>
<td>1077</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>949</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) I Corps Tactical Zone (CoT)

(a) Supply. The average number of personnel supported during the period 1 Aug 69 - 31 Oct 69 was:

USASF       347
CSF         3631
MSF        829

(b) Supply emphasis has been placed on maintaining adequate...
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Basic loads of all classes of supply for normal camp activities and in preparation for the monsoon season. Heavy recruiting by all camps and by the Mobile Strike Force, plus normal replacement of uniforms and field equipment has caused a temporary shortage of these items. Four 105mm howitzers were received during the reporting period. Construction at B-11 is 90% complete for those projects in the initial contract. The S-4 warehouse, motor pool, generator shed, and the wiring and plumbing contracts are being drawn-up by the Group Engineer. Other major construction efforts were at Mai Loc, Thuong Duc and Nong Son. A Training center at Ba To is presently being planned which will be a major project.

(c) Maintenance.

(1) Nonavailability rate for vehicles remained constant at approximately 5%. The maintenance facility is using the "closed loop" system for exchanging subassemblies with the 1st Logistical Command Direct Support Unit. This has been a tremendous help since evacuating vehicles from the detachments to this location for repair often necessitates a long wait due to transportation problems. The generator nonavailability rate decreased to approximately 10%. However, many generators are approaching the maximum life expectancy, and with the addition of electrical equipment in each detachment, there could be a maintenance problem in the near future. Appliance nonavailability rate remained constant at 10%. Lack of parts, especially compressor motors, is still the problem area in appliance repair.

(d) Cargo Movements. The following tonnages were moved during the reporting period as indicated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airlift</td>
<td>2965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convoy</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3026</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(e) Aircraft availability is adequate during good weather periods but after inclement weather, or a Corps wide increase in tactical operations, all units have large backlogs of supplies and with only one C7A available it is difficult to quickly reduce backlogs. The Forward Supply Point (FSP) is using land transportation to a greater degree and has used ARVN convoys. The airstrips at
Tien Phuoc, Ba To, Tra Bong, Minh Long and Mai Loc have been improved.

(f) Services. The maintenance facility has conducted a school for generator and automotive maintenance operation. Each Detachment trained 2 to 4 personnel in the school which was conducted by the ECCI. Technical representative classes were held each morning on theory and operation, with the afternoons devoted to practical application and maintenance techniques. This should increase the on-site maintenance capability and lower nonavailability rates.

(g) Procedural Changes. There have been no significant procedural changes in logistics during the reporting period.

(h) Facility Improvements. There have been no new significant facility improvements in the S-4 complex during the reporting period.

(i) Adequacy of Logistics Support. This unit receives outstanding support from the Naval Support Activity and 1st Logistical Command located in Da Nang. LSC support is always outstanding, in spite of transportation problems between Nha Trang and Da Nang.

(5) II Corps Tactical Zone (Co B)

(a) Supply: The average number of personnel supported during the period 1 Aug 69 - 31 Oct 69 was:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USASF</td>
<td>447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSF</td>
<td>6431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M5F</td>
<td>2929</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Maintenance: Student quarters have been expanded and classes are being conducted in automotive maintenance, generator maintenance, and driver training. Student capacity is now 40 students per training period. The equipment nonavailability report remains below 10%. An average of fifteen vehicles are completely rebuilt each month and are exchanged with the ones used by A-Detachments. Continual command emphasis is placed on preventive maintenance. Contact teams conducted 64 visits to A-Detachments during this period.

RCS CSPGR-65 (52)

(c) Movements. Weather has been the most significant problem effecting air movement. There is currently no shortage of air items. The following is a monthly total tonnage of cargo moved during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airlift</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convoy</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Services. Logistics support for all categories of supply is provided from the FSP in Pleiku. The maintenance section, with contact teams from 62nd Maintenance Battalion and the Filipino Technical Representatives assigned to Company B, are responsive to all levels requiring maintenance support. Shortages of indigenous patrol rations have caused problems in that Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) personnel are sometimes reluctant to go on operations with rice and mackerel in lieu of Patrol Indigenous Rations (PIR). Construction and barrier materials continue to be in short supply.

(e) Future improvements in the FSP include drainage, relocation of POL Storage, resurfacing of helipad and expansion of the CIDG hospital.

(6) III Corps Tactical Zone (Co A)

(a) Supply: The average number of personnel supported during the period 1 August 69 - 31 Oct 69 was:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USASF</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSF</td>
<td>7500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Due to a shortage of rice in III CTZ the price for a 100 pound bag of rice has increased from 1,350$VN to 2,000$VN. To combat this increase in price the FSP has arranged to have all rice for Company A purchased through the Logistical Support Command (LSC) in Nha Trang.
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(c) Logistics support continues at a high level with one exception. A critical shortage has been reached in the resupply of canned mackerel used to supplement the indigenous diet.

(d) Maintenance.

The vehicular nonavailability rate of Company continues at a very low rate. As of September 1969, the percent of nonavailable vehicles was 1.5% out of a total of 250 on hand. The generator nonavailability rate decreased from 16% for the month to 10% for September. This decrease in deadlined generators can be directly attributed to the Generator Operators school for A Detachment CIDG personnel conducted by Detachments B-32 and B-34. These schools were two weeks in duration and were conducted by the ECCI technical representative located at each B Detachment. Similar schools are planned for Detachments B-33 and B-36.

(e) Movements. The following tonnage was moved during the reporting period:

- Airlift: 26
- Convoy: 65

(f) The enemy situation in the Katum TAOR is such that all fixed wing flights have been classified as combat essential. In a similar situation, all flights into camp Duc Hue now require TOT for TAC cover, and when possible flights into these Camps are scheduled for the first run of the day.

(g) Services: In the past, when items of equipment in A and B detachments were placed on a nonavailability status for 2nd and 3rd echelon maintenance, the item had to be backloaded to the FSP for repair. The FSP now provides the A and B detachments, at their request, qualified maintenance teams to perform 2nd and 3rd echelon repair on site, for generators, refrigerators and vehicles.
(b) Improvements. Because of a large voltage loss between the generator and using items of equipment a new system of power propagation is planned for the C Detachment Company A, 5th SFGA. This system will incorporate step-up and step-down transformers to increase the efficiency of the current power. A centralized air conditioning system was installed in our new communications center.

(7) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Co D)

(a) Supply. During the period D Company supported the following number of personnel.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USASF</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>7,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>1,880</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the month of September the S-4 started preparing the IV Corp interior Camps for turn over to RF/PF. The FSP is now receiving all ammunition support from the 541st Ammunition Company (ARVN) with good results. The occupation of Nui Coto mountain is now being rotated every fifteen days among the various Detachments of the Co D, with all supplies and support being provided through the Supply Point at Detachment B-43.

(b) Maintenance. During this period a prescribed load list (PLL) and an authorized stockage list (ASL) were established for vehicles covering the requirements of the C team, its subordinate B teams, plus the requirements of the A teams within the IV CTZ. PLL listings and Demand Record Cards were produced and were dispatched to all the B teams to properly implement supply procedures and operations. PLL's for other equipment such as generators, forklifts, refrigerators, etc. are also being prepared. Plans for a PLL orientation are being prepared to initiate a refresher course intended for the Technical Representatives. This will enable them to better handle the PLL's at each B team.
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(c) Movements. The following tonnage was moved during the reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airlift</td>
<td>2641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convoy</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Services: The S-4 has a self service supply containing limited expendable office supplies located at the FSP for the Detachments.

(e) Problems: The major difficulty within the FSP continues to be the lack of qualified maintenance personnel.

(f) Planned Improvements:

1. Construction of a fence around the FSP for safeguarding material and equipment.

2. A parking area for civilian workers' motorbikes, is being constructed.
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1. Engineer

(1) Organization: The Commanding Officer of the 31st Engineer Detachment, which is the engineer augmentation to the 5th SFGA, has completed a TO&E revision which when finally approved will bring the detachment under a G series TO&E. In addition, it will specifically include the capability to accomplish those operational (as opposed to advisory) missions which the unit has acquired.

(2) Construction and Rehabilitation:

(a) The following work was completed during the reporting periods:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>PROJECT</th>
<th>CONST UNIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cl Danang</td>
<td>CIDG dayroom, BOQ #4</td>
<td>Contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cl Mai Loc</td>
<td>Tailor/barber shop, 2 latrines, ammunition bunker, rice storage warehouse</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cl Phuoc</td>
<td>Latrine/shower</td>
<td>Contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cl Nong Son</td>
<td>2 latrines, overhead cover POL</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cl Ha Thanh</td>
<td>4 fighting bunkers, latrine</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cl Tra Bong</td>
<td>Country store</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cl Thuong Duc</td>
<td>6 latrines, CIDG canteen, school 5 fighting bunkers</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 Pleiku</td>
<td>Underground POL bladder, 54 building extension, rewire TOC, motor pool office, rewire masts, blast walls for billets, 5 fish pond, hog pens, guard towers, renovation staff BOQ, move POL tanks, latrine, billet &amp; EM messhall</td>
<td>Contract/Self-Help</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C2 Kontum</td>
<td>USASF latrines, USASF BOQ/BEQ</td>
<td>Contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 Ban Me Thuot</td>
<td>Rehabilitate camp</td>
<td>Contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 Dak Seang</td>
<td>Underground bunkers</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 Mang Buk</td>
<td>Living bunker</td>
<td>Contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 An Loc</td>
<td>Dispensary</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 Polei Kleng</td>
<td>Rewire camp, messhall, 2 generator sheds</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 Ben Het</td>
<td>Deep well</td>
<td>31st Engr Det</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 mortar pits</td>
<td>20th Engr Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>58 Living/fighting bunkers</td>
<td>20th Engr Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 recoilless rifle emplacements</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 105 howitzer positions</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 latrines</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 TOC's</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 water storage bunkers</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 ammunition bunkers</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 fighting bunkers</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 Dak Seang</td>
<td>Underground bunker</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 Plei Me</td>
<td>USASF teamhouse, VNSF teamhouse, 2 latrines, 3 dependent houses</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Convalescent center, communications center, well</td>
<td>Contract</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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C3 Trang Sup Latrine and shower Self-Help
C3 Duc Phong Water tower Self-Help
C3 Loc Minh Dispensary Self-Help
C4 Can Tho (MSF) School, 6 machine gun bunkers Self-Help
C4 Thanh Tri Ammunition bunker Self-Help
C4 Cai Uai Market place, teamhouse floor Self-Help
C4 To Chau 12 machine gun bunkers Self-Help
C4 Don Phuc 2 latrines Self-Help
C4 Noc Hoa (MSF) 2 latrines Self-Help
C4 My Dien II POL storage Self-Help
C4 My Da Helipad Self-Help

(b) The following are major projects scheduled to be completed during the next quarter:

New Camp at Plei Me: This new camp will be completed on or about 1 January 1970. Although much of the work is being accomplished by self help, the project is being expedited through the advice and assistance of two Special Forces construction advisory teams. In addition, a U.S. Army engineer platoon will arrive on site in early November to accomplish a portion of the vertical construction.

Rehabilitation of Camp Ben Het: This project is scheduled to be completed by 15 November 1969. The Special Forces construction advisory team was withdrawn upon completion of the assigned tasks. Elements of the 20th Engineer Battalion (Combat) have completed in a most outstanding manner the construction of fifty eight 15'x40' living/fighting bunkers. That unit continues work on road and airfield rehabilitation and should finish on schedule.
New Camp at Chi Lang: This project is being built through the combined efforts of a local Vietnamese labor contractor, a Special Forces construction advisory team, and elements of the 6th Engineer Battalion. It will be complete on or about 9 December 1969. This facility constitutes the first compound built by Special Forces using concrete hollow block in lieu of lumber for the walls.

3) Well Drilling Operations:
   (a) A well has been drilled at Duc Hue utilizing a contractor owned and operated air mobile well rig.
   (b) Wells were also drilled at An Khe and Ben Het by a U.S. Special Forces well team.
   (c) Wells are currently under construction at Duc Co, Duc Lap, and Chi Lang.

(5) Status of CAC 906 Funds:
   (a) Obligated: $286,216.00
   (b) Unobligated: $141,784.00

(6) Public Works and Utilities (PWU):
   (a) The repair and utilities (R&U) section processed 381 work orders during the reporting period.
   (b) The carpenter shop constructed 3,500 pallets and 10,850 concrete hollow blocks.
   (c) The water supply has remained at an acceptable level during the reporting period with an average daily potable water demand of a little over 200,000 gallons. This is in addition to the daily requirement of approximately 300,000 gallons of non-potable water.

(6) Miscellaneous:
   (a) Although shortages of construction materials have been a continuing problem through the reporting period, recent arrivals of some lumber shipments have begun to relieve the pressure.
(b) Emphasis is being placed upon strictly limiting construction to that which is either combat essential or absolutely necessary for the health and welfare of the CIDG soldiers and their families. This policy is oriented toward rehabilitation work rather than new construction.
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J. Political Warfare (POLWAR).

(1) General. During this period the activity of the Group S5 Section consisted of expanding current programs and the initiation of significant new projects.

(2) Plans: (a) Each CTZ has been assigned an S5 Action Officer. This officer will work closely with the AST in his Corps to improve S5 activities.

(b) Budgeted funds for Fiscal Year 70 provide for an expected upsurge in POLWAR spending.

(3) Psychological Operations: Educational and "GVN Image" type leaflets and posters are now being packed with all school kits going to Special Forces Detachments.

(4) Civic Action: (a) All C Detachment S5s have effected close coordination with the Civil Affairs Companies in their respective CTZs. This coordination should increase the capabilities and efficiency of Special Forces CA/PC activities.

(b) Requisition 725-3, reference Civic Action Supply Requisitioning Procedures, was revised to improve efficiency by making the regulation easier to understand.

(c) A Civic Action Survey was initiated which is directed at determining the needs and progress of A camps throughout the country in this area.

(d) A list of agencies supporting S5 activities was prepared and distributed to all Special Forces Detachments. A packet of pictures depicting the civic action kits available was also distributed with the agency list.

(5) I Corps Tactical Zone (Co C)

(a) Psychological Operations: Throughout the reporting period, the largest amount of effort was concentrated toward the development of new Psyops material oriented specifically at the enemy and his various agencies located in the TAoRs of the 5th SFGA in I CTZ. Tape recordings for aerial broadcasts have been made in the RNH Language. Efforts are being made to find interpreters who are capable of making tapes in the languages of the other Montagnard tribes living in I CTZ. Due to translation problems (i.e., many translators speak English and Montagnard but do not speak...
Vietnamese) this program has been coming along slowly. The 7th PSYOPS Bn has given Co C outstanding support in both leaflet printing and tape recording, as well as in printing other material for them. With more emphasis and guidance being placed on the A teams by the B and C teams, a marked increase has been noticed in the amount of PSYOPS material ordered and disseminated by the teams in the field. This upward trend is expected to continue, as new, more effective, material and methods of utilization are developed. Command interest in Co C, as far as PSYOPS is concerned, is probably the largest single contributing factor to the upward trend in PSYOPS in this company.

(b) Social Welfare: CTZ has approximately 9,000 CIDG dependents comprising more than 2,000 CIDG families. Most of these families live in surrounding villages. It is estimated, however, that approximately 600 families are in need of housing. Housing Projects at A-104, A-102, and A-105 are currently under construction or awaiting materials. The biggest problem with this project is the time lag between project approval and the arrival of the building materials. Since 1 January, more than 21,000 health kits have been distributed to CIDG dependents and the local civilian population. Support of refugees is primarily accomplished through distribution of PL 480 food stuffs obtained through the Catholic Relief Service. Since 1 January, approximately 400,000 lbs of cornmeal, rolled oats, rolled wheat, and sunflower oil have been distributed. MEDCAPS are carried out at every camp and are quite effective in improving public health. The frequency of MEDCAPS varies from daily to twice a month. An average of 4000 to 5000 patients are treated monthly. This number includes dependents, refugees and civilians.

(c) Motivation and Indoctrination: POLWAR teams during the months of August, September, and October conducted 216 classes with 17,280 CIDG being in attendance.

(d) Civic Action: Due to a cutback in 5th SFCA construction, the ability of the Staff Engineer to support Civic Action projects has been limited. During a recent S5 conference in Nha Trang, Co C was informed that the only projects assured approval were CIDG dependent housing and cookhouses, neither of which are directly related to assisting the civilian population. The model farms are still in their early formative stages. Seeds and ducks have been sent to all detachments and coordination has been made with CORDS and the 29th Civil Affairs Company to obtain professional agriculture advice.

(e) Miscellaneous: The major problem existing in the POLWAR area of operation is the misuse of the POLWAR team. The members of the team are being utilized as cooks, secretaries, and stock clerks. Many POLWAR operations are cancelled because the additional non-POLWAR duties interfere with the operational plan. Command emphasis would be the solution
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to this problem.

(6) II Corps Tactical Zone (Co B)

(a) POLWAR Training: During this quarter, training was conducted at the St farm in the fields of agriculture, barbering, and blacksmithing. CIDG from B-20 NSFTC, A-251 (Plei Djereng), A-253 (Duc Co), and A-241 (Polei Kleng) attended this training.

(b) Psychological Operations: A leaflet field test questionnaire was sent to all detachments to determine the effectiveness of the standard leaflets provided by Company B, 8th PSYOPS Bn.

(c) Civil Affairs: In the field of agriculture, the primary activity of the quarter was the harvesting of crops at each A-Detachment site. Seeds were sent to B-24 (Kontum) for the next planting. Goats and ducks were shipped to the St farm from SFOS. Goats and ducks were then shipped to A-233 (Trung Phuc), A-251 (Plei Djereng) and A-251 (Tiou Atar). Figs were shipped to A-255 (Plei No), A-233 (Trung Phuc), and A-251 (Plei Djereng). Construction has been completed on two new fish ponds and one pig pen at the St farm. Fruit trees were donated by the Meiku Minority Affairs Chief for A-233 (Duc Co), and A-251 (Plei Djereng).

(7) III Corps Tactical Zone (Co A)

(a) Political Warfare (POLWAR): Significant activities include projects in Civic Action, Social Welfare, Motivation and Indoctrination, and Psychological Operations. These projects are implemented by the POLWAR teams at all Special Forces camps. In addition to the POLWAR teams at A-camps, Company A also has a Cultural/Drama team which circulates to subordinate camps to provide entertainment for the CIDG. The drama team performances are integrated into the motivation and indoctrination programs by working current themes into their skits and traditional songs. Presently, some problems are being experienced at many A-Detachments because of lack of trained POLWAR personnel. The POLWAR teams have not received any formal training for almost one year. Since the POLWAR teams are the backbone of the POLWAR program, the lack of training has had an adverse effect on the entire program.

(b) Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR): During the reporting period, Company A continued with an aggressive PSYWAR campaign against the enemy. The most significant PSYWAR campaign during the period was PSYOPS Campaign Achilles Hoal I (20 Aug 69 – 30 Sep 69). Achilles Hoal I was a three (3) phase PSYOPS in support of the 3d MSF operation Bull Run I. PSYOPS was targeted against subordinate units of the 5th VC Division. The objectives of this campaign were to promote dissatisfaction among
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units of the 5th VC Division, exploit dissatisfaction between VC Cadre and NVA troops, and encourage defection. These objectives were carried out by means of ground leaflet/loudspeaker and aerial leaflet/loudspeaker missions. One PSYOPS aircraft was provided daily for purposes of immediate PSYOPS response to the tactical situation. Minor PSYOPS campaigns were also conducted against the 7th, 9th, and 1st VC Divisions throughout III C7Z.

(c) Social Welfare: Dependent housing continues to be one of the main Social Welfare activities and is progressing as well as can be expected since there is a shortage of building materials. The majority of the subordinate detachments have a school or are helping a nearby school, thus enabling CIDG dependent children the opportunity to obtain an education even though in some cases they are in isolated areas. Garden plots and agricultural projects continue to be a high point in Social Welfare. Since the last reporting period, Social Welfare projects have doubled. In several of the isolated A-Detachments, social welfare projects have been initiated, applying the CIDG and their dependents with hard to get items such as clothing for children, cooking oil, health kits, shower shoes, etc. Such projects are an open demonstration to the CIDG and their dependents of the interest that is being taken in them by GVN. In addition to the Psycholgical gains made, this type program also increases the standards of the dependents' living conditions. A rehabilitation program has been initiated at Company A with the purpose of:

(1) Providing the individual CIDG soldier who has become disabled through his service to his country, the training necessary to seek gainful employment as a civilian.

(2) Training disabled CIDG in specialty areas to fill vacant slots which require qualified technicians.

(3) Offering more security to all soldiers of the CIDG program in that they will know, should they become disabled, that they will not become outcasts with a dim future of unemployment to look forward to.

(a) Providing a "complete" medical program at Company A, i.e., treatment and rehabilitation. Project Assist, the program designed to improve the low morale of the CIDG patients in the Company A Convalescence Center continues to be a success.

Motivation and Indoctrination (M/I): Motivation and Indoctrination has been emphasized as the primary POLWAR activity be-
cause an unmotivated soldier is an incomplete soldier. During this reporting period, Co A has experienced difficulties in Motivation and Indoctrination due to the lack of motivation on the part of the POLWAR team. This problem cannot be resolved until some method is formulated to retrain the POLWAR teams and get rid of the "dead wood" or the teams and replace them with highly trained, motivated individuals. Listed below are Motivation and Indoctrination activities conducted during this reporting period: Wallet cards (six Concepts for CIDG Soldiers) have been developed by Company A S5, printed and disseminated to all CIDG in III CTZ. These cards incorporate the symbols of the GVN and CIDG program and the code of conduct. These cards are to be memorized by all CSF and SFG and are to be carried on their possession at all times. In order to enhance the morale of the CIDG, victory celebrations and sports competition are held, POLWAR bands perform for the troops, movies are shown and in some camps TV sets are available for the CIDG to enjoy during their off duty time. In order for the CIDG to understand more about the GVN, rallies and lectures are given weekly explaining different aspects of the government and its policies. The Soldier-of-the-Month program has had some effect on the troops in improving military discipline and conduct as well as competitive spirit in combat achievement.

(c) Civic Action (CA): The primary Civic Action project continues to be MEDCAPs. All A-Detachments that have a civilian population in their TAOR and all B-Detachments are active in this program. Although MEDCAPs provide the obvious results of improving the health of the civilians, they have proven to be an effective PSYOPS tool for the use of face-to-face communications and intelligence gathering. During a MEDCAP, the POLWAR team provide PSYOPS support by including leaflets and other printed propaganda into the health kits and soap which they distribute. In August, 50 Boy and Girl Scouts were flown from Hon Quan, B-35 area, to Vang Tau for a weekend on the beach. This was the second time that this was done this year, and another trip is being planned for November. The PSYOPS objective is to remove these children from their environment, show them a large part of their country, and let them know what the GVN is doing for the people. After returning home from each trip, it was felt that the PSYOPS objectives had been met and the participants would amount to 50 PSYOPS agents presenting favorable attitude toward the GVN and CIDG for a long time to come. In addition to the above Civic Action projects, the POLWAR teams have assisted the civilian population in constructing and repairing schools, dispensaries, roads, churches, and bridges.
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(a) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Co D):

(a) Psychological Operations (PSYOPS): In support of PSYOPS activities in Co D's area of responsibility, voluntary informant tapes and leaflets produced by 10th PSYOPS Bn and disseminated by air have been utilized to full extent in populated areas. Broadcasts were made utilizing equipment and operators from the Naval Beach Jumper Unit attached from Hinh Thuy Naval Station.

(b) Social Welfare: The biggest social welfare step in IV CTZ has occurred during the reporting period with the establishment of the CIDG FX/Commissary at A-114. The FX/Commissary Program provides fair market prices on goods such as cigarettes, canned tuna and sardines, canned milk, etc., for purchase by CIDG. A rehabilitation program is actively employed at Co D with motor mechanics, barbering, tailoring, etc., being offered as training programs for disabled CIDG prior to their re-entry to civilian life. Hospital visits are conducted weekly under Operation Assist and are a definite morale booster to hospitalized CIDG at an unfamiliar location.

(c) Problems: PSYOPS aircraft support for Co D has been discontinued. Presently this organization has no aircraft for PSYOPS support. High water level still presents a problem in maintaining the agricultural program. Lack of CA/P0 assigned Officers and NCOs continues to hinder S5 activities. The flow of S5 personnel has improved and coordination between the S5 and S1 of Co D has been made in hope of obtaining qualified CA/P0 personnel.
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k. Personnel.

(1) **Strength**: Authorized and assigned strengths at the beginning and at the close of the period were as follows:

   (a) **Beginning of Period**:

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>AGG</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2623</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   (b) **Close of Period**:

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>EM</th>
<th>AGG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2949</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) **Replacements**: Due to an unusual influx of extensions of foreign service tours by enlisted personnel of 5th Special Forces Group during the reporting period, this unit is presently 265 EM above its authorized strength. The attrition rate normally experienced in a combat zone should have off-set these extensions and kept Group strength at its authorized level; however, combat losses during the reporting period were light and requisitioned replacements continued to arrive. Because of the existing overstrength, HQ, USARV has imposed mandatory reassignments of 150 enlisted personnel from 5th Special Forces Group to units within SVN. This headquarters will approve extension of foreign service *ours only in shortage XOS to support HQ, USARV in obtaining an acceptable strength level for 5th SFGA."

(3) **Promotions**: A total of 324 enlisted personnel were promoted during this period.

(4) **Personnel Management (ACR)**: Junior enlisted non-special category personnel are not receiving their assignment on time. Special category personnel reported on the same AOR receive their assignments normally 60-90 days prior to their DEROS date. On the contrary, non-special category personnel do...
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not receive assignments until approximately two weeks prior to return to CONUS. This predicament causes severe impact and hardship to these personnel when shipping hold luggage, applying for concurrent travel, and other personnel actions.

(8) R&R Allocations: The following R&R allocations were received by the 5th SFGA for the months indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>OCT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOKYO</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BANGKOK</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>56</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAIPEI</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>29</td>
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<td>SYDNEY</td>
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<td>50</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SINGAPORE</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5th SFGA has been allocated, on the average, 30 more spaces per month on R&R flights than during the previous reporting period.

(6) Awards and Decorations:

(a) The total number of decorations awarded to 5th SFGA personnel for period ending 31 Oct 1969:
Awards of the Bronze Star and below are approved by 5th SFGA. Silver Stars to Distinguished Service Cross is approved by USARV.

(b) Percentage of each unit's personnel who were decorated for the period ending 31 Oct 1969:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWARD</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>SM-V</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM-V</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM-V</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>70</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM-V</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>47</td>
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<table>
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<th>UNIT</th>
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<td>C</td>
<td>13.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>14.7</td>
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<td>10.2</td>
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<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCN</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) The Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry w/palm has been awarded to the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) and its assigned and attached units per Department of the Army General Order 59, dated 25 Sep 69. The period for which the award was given is 1 Oct 64 through 14 May 69.

(7) Special Services:

(a) General: Special Services is presently expanding by acquiring equipment directly from the A-O Depot. The equipment will be distributed to all units of the 5th SF OA in order to enhance sports at forward operational areas. Interunit volleyball tournaments between the 5th SF OA and LUR culminated in defeat for the 5th SF OA volleyball team. Softball and flag football will be played in the future enhancing unit sportsmanship with group and individual trophies to be given to both winners and losers.

(b) Library: The Green Beret Library will become
AVG C-28

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1969. RCS CSPOR-6S (R2)

A classified library upon completion of an inspection by USARV Librarians. The Green Beret Library reflects the following attendance figures:

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUG</td>
<td>315</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEP</td>
<td>472</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCT</td>
<td>490</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(8) Safety:

(a) Personnel unfamiliar with the local driving habits and rules of the road often encounter difficulty adjusting to non traffic situations in RVN. Common sense and a defensive driving attitude are required in addition to instruction on international traffic signs and local driving habits. Command emphasis has been placed on safe and sane driving habits.

(b) Injury and death by accident:

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUG</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(9) Civilian Personnel:

(a) The 5th Special Forces Group employs civilians throughout the Republic of Vietnam. The number of civilians employed by units during the period ending 31 Oct 1969 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DET</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DET</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Company A</td>
<td>B-51</td>
<td>ULD</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company A</td>
<td>B-53</td>
<td>71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company C</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company D</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(b) Civilian Personnel strength has again decreased for this reporting period. There have been substantial reductions in various detachments, and the civilian spine associated with the Mobile Strike Force. Training Command have been deleted.

(c) Civilian personnel are recruited on a best qualified basis and are placed within a strict TD that fixes the maximum rating (MGR) that the person may attain in that job.

(10) Report:

(a) The following are the 5th SFGA enlistment statistics for the months of Aug, Sep, and Oct.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELIGIBLE</th>
<th>REENLISTED</th>
<th>PERCENTAGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RA AVG RANG</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>RA AVG RANG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 1</td>
<td>233 141 0 1</td>
<td>142 60.7 0 100 63.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) The following are the overall statistics for the months of Aug, Sep, and Oct.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELIGIBLE</th>
<th>REENLISTED</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than four years</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than four years</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Forty-two EM extended their EIS.

(d) Ten EM discharged ONU, accepting USAF commission.

(e) One EM amended his enlistment.

(11) Checkpoint Activities:

Activity Conducted

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**AVUJ-C**

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Services Conducted</th>
<th>222</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attendance</td>
<td>3680</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Group Parish Activities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hospital Visits</th>
<th>33</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Counseling</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>3614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communion Services</td>
<td>1763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communicants</td>
<td>1763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA/Payops Activity</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity Conducted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memorial Services</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendance</td>
<td>1797</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discipline, Law and Order:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bus Violation</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off Limits Violation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curfew Violation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic Violation</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Charges</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AV/P</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AVG-I C

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1969. RCS CSFGR-65 (R2)

(b) Judicial Punishment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Court-Martial</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Court-Martial</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary Court-Martial</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(last quarter)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Court-Martial</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Court-Martial</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary Court-Martial</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Non-Judicial Punishment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Article 15</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(last quarter)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Article 15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Legal Assistance: Legal assistance was rendered to 404 clients, an increase of 282 clients over the past quarter.

(13) CIDG Strength Accounting. Strength accounting
AVG-C
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1969. RCS CSPCAB-65 (R2)

Statistics revealed that there are 36,043 members of CIDG assigned as of the end of 31 Oct 1969.

(14) 1 Corps Tactical Zone (Co Z).

(a) Strength: Strengths at the beginning and end of the reporting period were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENLISTED</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Personnel Management: The flow of replacements during the reporting period was satisfactory. All personnel were well qualified and ready to assume their jobs.

(15) II Corps Tactical Zone (Co Z).

(a) Strength: Strengths at the beginning and end of the reporting period were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>JUL</th>
<th>AUG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENLISTED</th>
<th>JUL</th>
<th>AUG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Personnel Management: As the present time Company B has received 39 officers and 95 new enlisted personnel.
replacement over the reporting period. Personnel gains include a large number who have had no practical experience with the execution of Initial Special Forces Training.

(c) Discipline. Throughout Company B discipline is not a major problem. Non-judicial punishment included four Article 15's and two Special Court Martials. An additional Special Court Martial is still pending.

(16) I I Corps Tactical Zone (Co A).

(a) Strength: Strengths at the beginning and end of the reporting period were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>BEGINNING</th>
<th>END</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Personnel Management: Projected losses will create serious problems in the medical and communication field, if not covered by projected gains.

(c) Disciplinary Action: A total of 3 Article 15's were administered during this reporting period.

(17) I I Corps Tactical Zone (Co B).

(a) Strength: Strengths at the beginning and end of the reporting period were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>BEGINNING</th>
<th>END</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AVGE-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1969. RCS CSPOR-65 (R2)

(b) Personnel Management: 12 officers and 17 enlisted men received promotions during the reporting period.

(c) Disciplinary Actions: No Courts-Martial were held nor Article 15 punishment administered.
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AWOL C
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lassen-Leaded, 88th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(1) Medical.

(1) USAF Medical Care. Malaria rates continue to run much higher than USAV rates. The overall Group rate has continued to fall since the new Group Commander first placed strong emphasis on the responsibilities of unit commanders regarding malaria prevention. Disease accounted for approximately 75% of all USAF hospitalized. 1,270 dental procedures were performed. During the last quarter, 217 USAF were treated on an inpatient basis. There were 2,066 USAF outpatient visits.

(2) CIDG Medical Care: During the quarter, several medical programs were initiated by joint USAF/USA military regulation. The most important of these were an immunization-induction physical examination program and a malaria prophylaxis program. In addition, the Group Camp Preventive Medicine Handbook was translated by the LLUB High Command for distribution to our counterparts. All of these programs have the potential of greatly reducing disease rates among CIDG, which run about three times those of USAF. However, during the past two months, Battle Injury admissions among CIDG have exceeded all disease admissions. 2,671 CIDG were treated as inpatients. There were 106,149 CIDG outpatient visits to USAF medical facilities. Med-evac reaction time was noted to be unusually slow in several instances in IV CID. The Company Medevac officer was asked to make direct coordination with USAV Medevac operations in IV CID.

(3) Veterinary Medicine - Preventive Medicine. Veterinary and PM personnel continued to work together for the prevention of disease at isolated SF detachments. These personnel have been given an objective of 60% of the time in the field by Group Surgeon. Many PM supplies have tended to be in critical supply. Group S-4 is attempting to remedy this, and medical personnel are providing guidance on those items most critical in field units. Extensive livestock and pet immunization programs were conducted in all 4 CID by veterinary personnel. Increased emphasis was placed on rabies prevention.

(4) Medical Supply. There were no critical medical items. Initial fill of medical supply requests reached on all-time average high of 96%. Medical supply drawdowns totaled $278,750. USAV approved a turn to the 22nd Medical Depot of $58,667 worth of medical supplies. A new stockage list was also distributed.

(5) Training Programs. CIDG Camp Sanitation team training
programs were established for the first time by Surgeons at L-43 and Company B. These programs will eventually be established in all 4 CIDG's. The Camp Strike Force Training Center at Detachment L-51 is presently the only USASF/VNSF medical training program recognized by the VN Ministry of Health. Coordination is being made through USAID with the VN Ministry of Health, in an effort to gain more widespread recognition of our country wide medical training programs. At the direction of the Group Surgeon, the Dental, PM and Veterinary sections are attempting to organize training for LLUD and CIDG to correct the present situation wherein USASF personnel perform nearly all Dental, PM and Veterinary work throughout the CIDG program. The Group Veterinary section is presently coordinating with the VNSF High Command for the establishment of an VN veterinary consultant for the LLUD. CIDG medical training has been combined with VNSF medical training at the Camp Strike Forces Training Center. This should result in more highly trained CIDG medics. Dental training programs for CIDG medics were conducted at SFUB, L-43, L-51, B-55, A-502, and at C-4.

(6) \textsc{NINCAPs}, 884 \textsc{NINCAP} operations were conducted. A total of 147,637 VN civilians were treated by USASF medical personnel. Dental personnel conducted 12 \textsc{NINCAPs} throughout SVN.
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AVGB-C
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1969, (RCS CSPFOR-65 (R2))

m. Signal:

(1) OPERATIONS: All means of communications utilized by this command continued to function at a high level of efficiency. The change in the reporting period for INTSRDs and STMRPs reduced the maximum allowable reporting time for subordinate detachments from approximately 17+ hours to 4± hours. Minor difficulties encountered initially have been overcome. A review of the Group pocket SOI revealed that aircraft pilots experienced difficulty associating A camps with their corresponding airfields. Airfield location designators were included in the November pocket SOI to eliminate this problem. The pocket SOI for the month of December will be resubmitted to provide ease of usage and improved readability. In striving to further enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the SOI, each C detachment is currently issued a block of frequencies and call signs to be utilized at C detachment level and below. This action enables the Signal Officer at C detachment level to quickly effect distribution of his monthly SOI to subordinate detachments. Additionally the C detachment reaction time to frequency changes due to compromises or interference is tremendously enhanced. The SFCS cable installation project has been completed and terminal hardware installed. Telepho instruments are currently being connected to the new cable system after which the remaining old cable and field wire will be removed.

(2) TRAINING: The PIO for the 44 hour communication refresher course is being revised. Increased emphasis is currently being placed on thoroughly familiarizing each newly assigned communicator with the single side band and secure voice equipment presently utilized within the 5th SFGA.

(3) NEW CONCEPTS/EQUIPMENT: During this quarter, significant progress was made in expanding the secure voice network within the 5th SFGA. Each deployed C, B and A detachment has a secure voice capability. The inherent radio-line-of-sight limitation of FM equipment was eliminated with a decrease in range due to use of secure voice equipment which includes installation of a secure voice link between each B and C detachment. This equipment has proven to be an extremely valuable asset especially when speed and security of transmission is mandatory.

(4) MISCELLANEOUS: The Vietnamese Special Forces communications course at Dong Ba Thin has been enhanced by installation of modern
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1969. "ACS CPOFR-65 (R2)

high speed code training equipment in the CIDG code training facility. Coordination effected by the Group Signal Officer and his counterpart during a recent visit to the Force Structure Branch of MACV has resulted in the receipt by the Vietnamese Special Forces Signal Company of a limited number of single side band radio sets. The issuance of this equipment through ARVN supply channels was based on a recently submitted TOE. Revitalization of the Vietnamese electronic repair training program is currently being considered by the Group Signal Officer and his counterpart.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

n. Comptroller:

Total expenditures for the 1st quarter of FY 1970 were $19,583 million. Expenditures were appreciably lower than $30,498 million as programmed. Command emphasis placed on effective, coordinated management of all resources is the dominant factor behind the low level of expenditures. Future expenditures should continue at this lower rate as a result of a reduction in stockage levels, elimination of non-essential items, more efficient use of existing resources, and the utilization of experience factors derived from a data base developed during the past twelve months.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1969. RC
OFGR-65 (Rz)

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.


(1) OBSERVATION: A program of documentine the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CDD) has been instituted by the 5th SFMA, as a means of checking graft in connection with the CDD payrolls. The program required that each member of the CDD be issued a serial numbered TD card with photo. A matching serial number pay card would be held by the United States Army Special Forces (USASF) Detachment funds officer. On payday, payment would only be made to those CDD members who possessed an ID card which matched the pay card maintained by the USASF Detachment. In addition to the ID card, each member of the CDD was to have been issued a set of ID tags which would speed admittance to an allied hospital in the event he was wounded or injured.

(2) EVALUATION: Each C-Detachment was issued one Polaroid camera with an attachment for taking multiple ID photographs, a laminating machine for use in laminating ID cards and an embossing machine for the manufacturing of ID tags. The control and distribution of the ID cards was the responsibility of the European Special Forces (EUSF). Until all other aspects of the program were handled by the USASF. Due to a lack of proper coordination many of the ID cards and pay cards were distributed to detachments in different numbered serial blocks. This caused considerable delays in the program as the cards had to be collected and redistributed. The use of a single camera, laminating machine and embossing machine for each Combat Technical Zone (CTZ) proved to be an unrealistic approach to the program. Because of the enormous number of personnel involved (over 11,000 in 11 CTZ alone), the fact that not all the CDD would ever be in a camp at one time, turnover of CDD personnel and the problems in transportation, this approach has taken an unsatisfactory amount of time to complete the program.

(3) SUGGESTION: Future efforts at documenting the CDD should be performed at the Detachment level. Enough equipment should be furnished so that each C-Detachment will be able to handle the documenting the CDD personnel under its control. Any future photographing required could be handled at the C-Detachment level with the use of 35mm Polaroid cameras common to the detachments. Finally, responsibility for the documentation and control of supplies should be placed either solely with the USASF or VASF, not split between the two.

b. Intelligence:

(1) Additional Time for the Planning of Mobile Strike Force (MSF) Operations.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(a) OBSERVATION: The commitment of Mobile Strike Force (MSF) elements to areas of operation where friendly troops have not operated for long periods requires additional time in the planning phase of the operation, in order that adequate reconnaissance may be performed.

(b) EVALUATION: The last three large scale MSF operations have been conducted in areas where increased enemy activity has been reported, but no hard intelligence was available on the true enemy situation in the area. Agent reports are useful for selecting possible areas for future operations, but the level of reliability of most agent reports in South Vietnam is generally not sufficient to use as a basis for operational planning. The problem with recent MSF operations is that the intelligence estimates of enemy strength and disposition within the area of Operation (AO) have not been accurate. The failure of the friendly units to collect information during the conduct of normal operations has contributed to the lack of information concerning trails, fortifications, booby trapped areas, and general enemy activity in the MSF AOs. When such an area is selected for a MSF operation, steps must be taken to obtain all possible information on factors which could affect the conduct of the operation before the operation order is finalized and troops are committed to the AO.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Under no circumstances should the date for a combat operation be firmly established, or the concept of the operation decided, until sufficient reconnaissance has been conducted as to minimize the possibility of the friendly element encountering significant obstacles without prior knowledge of their existence. All types of reconnaissance should be employed where possible, but the most important type, especially in denied areas where friendly troops have not operated frequently, is ground reconnaissance. This type of reconnaissance can produce the most reliable information available on the operational area and should be conducted both prior to, and during the operation. Other types of intelligence assets can prove valuable, e.g., agent nets in the AO, aerial surveillance, and briefings by friendly units in whose area of responsibility the operation is being conducted without prior reconnaissance. The tendency of friendly forces to neglect this essential phase of the operation has seriously affected our combat success.

(2) Exploitation of Prisoners of War (POW), Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI), or Suspects. (CA D)

(a) OBSERVATION: It is a disadvantage for the Intelligence NCO to interrogate a POW, VCI or suspect without having some knowledge of the individual.

(b) EVALUATION: None

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1969. RGS CFFOR-65 (R2)

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When a VI or VC or suspect is brought in for interrogation, he should be questioned first by the WNSP. The information gathered can be quickly compiled and will assist greatly in cross-examination. This procedure will help to put the USASF interrogator in a commanding position and will aid him in finding loopholes in the individual’s story, etc.

(3) VC Mines and Booby Traps. (Co C)

(a) OBSERVATION: The enemy is a battlefield scavenger. Discarded equipment by friendly forces (empty cans, batteries, wire, empty smoke grenades, and even illumination rounds) have cost friendly lives and limbs. The enemy is ingenious in designing simple but lethal weapons. The majority of mines and booby traps are locally manufactured by VC village, district, and provincial munitions workshops. Captured equipment, documents, and VI interrogation indicate the VC have received basic training in how to make use of discarded US Army equipment and how these weapons can be employed. The trains is taught the importance of policing the battlefield. It is also evident that VC/NI commanders at the lowest echelon of line units have the authority to install mines as required.

(b) EVALUATION: During past operations it has been evident that the majority of mines and booby traps found were made from discarded ordnance and materials. The principal source of mine and booby trap materials are 2.36 rounds and 2.40” 0.55” rounds left or discarded. The majority of all encountered booby traps are for their nuisance value and to create casualties, fear, and overcaution. It appears that the VC have changed their method of placing dirt trails and trails, especially the seven Kilometer Area. The enemy have located and developed heavily on or immediately to the right or left of the trail, because friendly troops usually try and stay for fear of mines. While an enemy mine and booby trap are often further back than the trail, it has been confirmed that the majority were locally produced from discarded smoke grenades and surplus items.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The detection of enemy mines and booby traps requires skill and alertness. The word to “Stay alert and stay alive.” The way to avoid casualties is to check everything. Check all places newly filled with soil, covered with leaves, sand, littered with dikes, or always check any suspicious-looking cartons or containers. Be patient and continually check and recheck possible mine locations. Do not fall into the trap of assuming there is no mine in a hole because it was not there yesterday. Running up to assist a wounded comrade must be avoided since the enemy may take advantage of this by employing claymores to hit the rescuer or the curious. Troops should be cautioned against attempting to disarm a mine or booby trap. All such mines and booby traps should be blown in place.

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If a new type of mine or booby trap is discovered, call for an EOD team to disarm and evacuate it. If this is not possible, obtain a sketch of the item and blow it up in place. Most of all, friendly troops should make maximum attempts to police the battlefield and reduce the enemy's capability to police up discarded items, thus limiting their ability to produce local booby traps.

(4) Order of Battle Analytical Technique.

(a) OBSERVATION: A systematic approach was needed to analyze the mass of intelligence information being produced in the enemy buildup in the Seven Mountains Area of GHAR DOO Province.

(b) EVALUATION: By using the methods presented in Pattern Analysis (P), published by Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV), dated 3 February 1969, the enemy's exact location, concentration, and lines of communications were plotted. This method had proven to be a very useful approach in compiling and maintaining data on an enemy unit or activity.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: This technique established a plausible relationship between otherwise unconnected bits of information by plotting data geographically and chronologically.

(5) Agent Production.

(a) OBSERVATION: Coded agent production records maintained at this headquarters indicate that many of the informants have been unproductive for periods in excess of 90 days, and some agent personnel have been unproductive since recruitment.

(b) EVALUATION: The apparent nonproduction of agent personnel is believed to be the result of intelligence personnel not listing specific requirements on the agents for which intelligence reports and possible remuneration could result.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Agent personnel should be briefed with specific requirements for which they could be issued. After a period of 90 days, those agents who prove unproductive should be released. Spotting and assessing potential agents should be continuous to ensure every effort is made to employ productive agent personnel.

(6) Combined Intelligence (CI) and Collection.

(a) OBSERVATION: Personnel newly assigned to Intel WCO positions, particularly at A-Detachments where they must air assume Case Officer
duties for Combined Intelligence and Collection operations, are usually insufficiently prepared and trained to handle these duties.

(b) EVALUATION: To function effectively as a Case Officer requires a thorough knowledge of basic intelligence operation procedures. The Case Officer must be familiar with 5th SFOR regulations pertaining to the operations and proper preparation of OPLANs, fund expenditure reports, and numerous other applicable reports.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all Intel NCOs, particularly those who will also function as Case Officers, receive a comprehensive orientation upon arrival in country, supplemented by several days of briefings, training, and study at the company level prior to going to their places of assignment. The briefing and training would be under the guidance of CI/Collections personnel at the company and would cover in detail all operational and administrative matters relative to CI and Collection operations at the assignment location. In addition, the Intelligence Combat Readiness Team (ICRT) checklist would be covered in detail and explained, as well as general security matters which would apply to the assignment location.

c. Operations

(1) Airboat Operations.

(a) INFORMATION: During the reporting period, several opportunities to make or continue contact were lost when the attached airboats returned to base location because of darkness.

(b) EVALUATION: Airboats are still the only available means of searching large areas during the flood season. Expending their operations to cover both night and day would be a valuable asset.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A study of the possibility of operations with airboats at night using lights or other night vision aids should be made.

(2) Application of Front Target Electrany.

(d) INFORMATION: The current concept of two border control centers controlling all anti-infiltration efforts in the border provinces of IV CTZ is not entirely satisfactory.

(e) EVALUATION: The concept makes the Vietnamese Special Forces commanders of Detachments B-16 and B-20 responsible for combating infiltration in those regions but does not give them sufficient authority to effectively accomplish their mission. This is particularly true in
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(c) RECOMMENDATION: When a PAVN, VC, or suspect is brought in for interrogation, he should be questioned first by the VNSF. The information gathered can be quickly compiled and will assist greatly in cross-examination. This procedure will help to put the USASF interrogator in a commanding position and will aid him in finding loopholes in the individual's story, etc.

(3) VC Mines and Booby Traps.

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(b) EVALUATION: During past operations it has been evident that the majority of mines and booby traps found were made from allied ordnance and material. The principal source of mine and booby trap materials are dud rounds and US/ARVN ammunition left or discarded. The majority of all encountered booby traps were for their nuisance value and to create casualties, fear, and overcautiousness. It appears that the VC have changed their method of mining dirt roads and trails, especially theßen Mountain Area. Most booby traps located and detonated have been on or immediately to the right or left of the trail, because friendly troops usually trail for fear of mining. While mining booby traps adjacent to a certain trail, it was confirmed that the majority were locally produced from discarded smoke grenades and parachute tins.

(e) RECOMMENDATION: The detection of enemy mines and booby traps requires skill and alertness. The motto is "Stay alert and stay alive." The way to avoid casualties is to check everywhere. Check all places newly filled with soil, covered with straw, brush, littered with dung, or always check any suspicious-looking spot. Be patient and continually check and recheck possible mine locations. Do not fall into the trap of assuming there is no mine in a hole because it was not there yesterday. Punching up to assist a wounded comrade must be avoided since the enemy may take advantage of this by employing claymores to hit the rescuers or the curious. Troops should be cautioned against attempting to disarm a mine or booby trap. All such mines and booby traps should be blown in place.
low and slow can find indications of the enemy presence and/or movement such as, trails leading into enemy positions, camouflage positions, camps, and personnel movement. Upon finding enemy positions and/or troops, the guns are used to fix the enemy by fire while the LORs call for the two ships and four slicks to insert the troops that were on strip alert. In opposed to the above operation, the Airmobile operation has generally the same composition, but without the LOHs. The Airmobile operation is hampered by the lack of current intelligence which is provided by the LOHs in an Air Cavalry operation. Therefore the Airmobile operation must either insert the troops "blind" into an area then wait for the troops to search the area, or operate on intelligence reports that are several days old, thereby reducing the possibility of "finding" the enemy.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Every effort must be made to utilize Air Cavalry operations in TV CTZ area. The ability to "find and fix" the enemy prior to committing the troops significantly increases the contact ratio, and at the same time, covers larger areas thereby reducing the enemy's ability to move supplies, equipment, and personnel.

(7) Deployment of CTZ Units.

(a) OBSERVATION: There are too many large operations, company size or larger, when only 15-20% scouting or smaller units are being encountered.

(b) EVALUATION: A company normally moves alone, one route while on an operation and does little to saturate the area of operation. Normally, the area covered will not exceed 15% center or either side of the route traveled. This leaves much of the area of operation not covered. Recent contacts and intelligence reports indicate that the enemy is operating in small groups, consisting of three to eleven men in some areas. A platoon size element can encounter a force of this size with as much success as a company. There is also less ammunition expended per contact due to the CTZ's tendency to lay down an initial heavy burst of fire. A platoon can be moved into an ambush position more quickly and quietly than can a company size force, thereby eliminating much of the possibility of premature detection of the friendly force. Platoons being employed from the camp or patrol base can operate somewhat independent and therefore cover a much larger area. In the past saturation patrolling has been highly successful in finding enemy caches, detecting enemy movement, and in establishing and maintaining contact.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Commanders should take a closer look at methods of employing their forces. In areas where only small enemy forces are being encountered, strong consideration should be given to employing platoon size operations in sufficient numbers to saturate the area of operation.
however, must be exercised to allow for mutual support and/or facilitate
reinforcement. A company or larger size force can be sent into an area
of operation and establish a patrol base secured by one platoon. The
remainder of the platoons can be given areas of operation around the
patrol base with the mission of saturating their respective areas. The
patrol base can be moved as required to insure coverage of the operation area.

(6) Aircraft Control.

(a) OBSERVATION: On numerous occasions aircraft supporting A-Detach-
ments failed to keep the detachment notified of their locations.

(b) EVALUATION: On 9 October 1969 there were two 0-1 (head-
hunters) aircraft flying over the Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAR) of
an A-Detachment in support of a contact. One of the aircraft returned
to the detachment airfield in the belief that the other aircraft was
following. This was an erroneous assumption. After checking with probable
sites where the plane could have landed, the aircraft was declared missing
and a search was started. The search was hampered because there was no
knowledge of the location of the aircraft.

(7) "CONCLUSION": That all aircraft personally report locations
and flight plans to detachments they are supporting.

(8) Command Relationship for Joint Operations. (See 5)

(a) OBSERVATION: On a recent joint operation, shortly after it
began, it became apparent that the 11th unit involved did not fully under-
stand the relationship between VMASF, VPAF, and the USAF. The USAF
control element was proceeding as though the VPAF element was under ocular control
of the USAF. Then the problem was clarified. The VMASF position was
clarified and they were brought into the process.

(b) EVALUATION: Although we felt that the VMASF/VPAF relation-
ship had been clarified during preoperational talks, it was
apparent after the operation that the relationship had not
been understood, and/or needed more emphasis. VMASF still look on
VMASF personnel as having complete command and control over their VPAF
units.

(c) "CONCLUSION": That the 5th SMA, at all levels, continue to
stress to Free World Military Advisory Forces (VMASF) that the SMAF
have the command responsibility within the VMASF program. Increased
emphasis of this during the planning of operations, will enable VMASF
commanders and staffs to understand the relationship of VMASF/VMASF.
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d. Organization: None

e. Training:

(1) Proper Care and Maintenance of CSF Individual Weapons.

(a) OBSERVATION: Many CSF soldiers do not realize the importance of proper care and maintenance of their personal weapons.

(b) EVALUATION: The CSF soldiers at this location were recently issued M-16 rifles to replace the older family of .30 weapons. Although they received eight to twelve hours of instruction on the weapon, it obviously was not enough. A refresher course is necessary to further instill in the CSF an awareness of the necessity of a clean weapon.

(c) PROPOSAL: Mandatory weapon training should be held periodically to improve the state of readiness of the CSF soldier. The M-5, 5th CSF should make posters depicting the consequences of a malfunction in combat due to a dirty weapon and distribute them to all subordinate units. Normal weapons inspection should be conducted daily prior to beginning any combat operation and as part of Meyer's procedures to ensure that all weapons are clean and functioning properly.

(2) Efficiency During Contacts.

(a) OBSERVATION: Many recent contacts initiated by CSF units from a relatively short distance have produced negative results.

(b) EVALUATION: Reports from the A-Detachment indicate that the CSF had only the one shot due to the initial phases of contact. In addition, premature utilization of an weapon does not allow the crew to enter and bring under fire. Thus, most of the friendly fire is concentrated on one soldierindividuals allowing the rest body to escape. The above mentioned faults are a result of lack of proper basic training and/or poor weapon training in regards to weapons and fire discipline.

(c) PROPOSAL: That added emphasis on marksmanship fire control and discipline be stressed at the CSF training center. That the CSF be given intensive training in the emplacement and use of claymore mines, and in the "quick kill" method of firing. This training should be introduced and conducted at the A-Detachment continuing this training for the CSF to overcome the above faults.

(3) Basic Operators (CSF-5).
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(a) OBSERVATION: Communications personnel are not prepared for work at the A-Detachment level.

(b) EVALUATION: The training of operators in STOG (Special Forces Training Group) has not produced personnel sufficiently trained in all aspects of communications. Although operators are competent in receiving and transmitting CI, many of them have not been thoroughly trained in setting up the K22 or FN radios. Land line communication techniques have to be passed on from the old operator to the new operator.

(b) RECOMMENDATION: Special Forces Training Group P01 should be increased to provide more comprehensive training in the installation and use of the K22, FN radios, and land line communications.

(i) Combat Engineer (2P16).

(a) OBSERVATION: Combat engineers have not received sufficient training in electrical circuitry, generator maintenance and construction engineering.

(b) EVALUATION: Construction projects are primarily supervised by the combat engineer who in most cases has received little training in construction engineering and electrical circuitry. As a result, faulty construction, particularly in placement of waterline No. 8, distribution of load weight and faulty wiring, has produced unsafe buildings and bunkers. Because of such errors, bunkers have collapsed. The lack of generator maintenance coupled with extensive use has caused a high rate of generator failures.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Combat Engineer P01 should establish added emphasis on construction, engineering, electrical circuitry and generator maintenance at STOG.

c. Locals:

(1) Radio Contact on Aerial Re-supply Missions.

(a) OBSERVATION: The need for air to ground radio contact on aerial re-supply missions has become apparent.

(b) TRAINING: To facilitate coordination between air and ground crews and to ensure that airfields are secure for landing, there needs to be communications between the pilot and ground.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Proper coordination for air to ground communications
should be established with the pilot being given the call sign and frequency for camps where equipment is to be airlifted or air-dropped before his mission departure. It should also be SOP for the pilot to contact the camp concerned at least 10 minutes prior to ETA to insure the ground crews are prepared for his arrival and security of the areas is established.

(2) Prevention of the Loss of Air Items.

(a) OBSERVATION: There is a need for precautions to be made preventing CID personnel from misappropriating air items after aerial resupply operations.

(b) EVALUATION: CID personnel are particularly attracted to A7A straps, fifteen foot tie-down straps and various other items used for aerial resupply.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Air items are in critical supply and methods should be imposed by camp commanders to retain them for future use. During an airlift all available CID personnel should be employed on the DZ to break down bundles and to remove the air items. These air items should then be removed to a secure location, where they can then be backloaded for future resupply. When the items are broken down and air items removed, then indigenous personnel can be used to help load the camps.


(1) OBSERVATION: Recent and past 186th mobile battalion operations have proved that the continued need for radio teleprinter support of deployed task force headquarters during the past three months of 1967 and up to August 1968 mobile radio teleprinter support was used in the 17th Corps area, primarily with Project Beluga operations. Two were such type radios constructed by Sigma Company in 30 ton trailers. These trailers were mounted on small rubber wheels and could be air lifted into an area and then easily backed into position by three or four personnel. Secure transmission via then provided.

(2) EVALUATION: During the time that a task force is deployed or an operation is under way, the amount of administrative traffic is increased significantly. Reports and requests are of such magnitude that they adversely affect tactical operations by monopolizing frequencies and communication personnel.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That each C-Detachment be provided with two mobile radio teletype rigs to support operations as mentioned above. These could be radios such as the AN/GRC-122 or AN/GRC-142 which are self contained,
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air transportable and capable of transmitting secure traffic using the present secure equipment on hand, or by fabricating such a radio as is mentioned in the "Observation" of this report. The overall effect would be accurate and timely reports from the area of operation, and the ability to respond rapidly to a changing situation.

h. Material: None

i. Engineer:

(1) Cement Capping of Sandbagged Bunkers. (All Companies)

(a) OBSERVATION: It has been observed in all corps areas that sandbags deteriorate and must be replaced after a period of only two to four months.

(b) EVALUATION: The sandbags presently being received through USAV supply channels deteriorate very rapidly. Although expedients are being used, there are still vast requirements for sandbags. Consequently various means of protecting the sandbags in-place were explored. It was determined that cement capping would more than pay for itself in materials alone if one sandbag replacement cycle were avoided.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a cement cap of approximately four inches in thickness be placed with chicken wire reinforcement over the sandbags on those structures which are so protected. The capping will protect the sandbags from exposure to elements until such time as damage occurs.

(2) Cement Block Construction in Lieu of Wood.

(a) OBSERVATION: Wooden structures which have been built in the NW CTZ, where inundation of the terrain causes extended exposure to moisture, have been observed to deteriorate even more rapidly than in other parts of RVN.

(b) EVALUATION: Structures that have been built in similar environments using cement hollow block have proven substantially more durable and less expensive. In the construction of Detachment 7-J at Chi Lang, where cement block has been used exclusively, the cost of a 2x6x2 structure is estimated to cost $220,00 less than a similar wooden structure. Defensive bunkers built at the same location, in addition to the advantages already listed, require no additional sandbag protection. This further eliminates reconstruction and replacement of facilities.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That cement hollow block construction be considered very carefully for more extensive US Army use in RVN.
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(3) PCI on Generator Operation, Maintenance and Power Distribution Systems.

(a) OBSERVATION: In most A-Detachments proper generator operation and
maintenance is at best marginal. Camp wiring has been done in a slip shod
fashion and merely accepted as adequate as long as the light comes on and
different electrical units function. "Proper Power Distribution" is a phrase
that most team members are unfamiliar with, or just do not know what it means
in most cases. These facts are evidenced from reports submitted by the Command
Readiness Team personnel.

(b) EVALUATION: The proper operation and maintenance of generators is a
must in hot, humid climates and especially so where many teams rely on them
as the sole source of power. Replacement parts are expensive and very
difficult to obtain. Improper power distribution and poor wiring systems
increase the maintenance and decrease the usefulness of the generators.
Also it causes damage to electrical equipment such as radios, and decreases
the efficiency of this type equipment. If a light is activated on an already
overloaded circuit, it can cause a drop in power sufficient to make a radio
inoperative, or cause the electrical wires to become so hot that they actually
burn, than a direct short in placed in the circuit causing either damage to
the generator or other equipment in the same circuit, or a fire in the camp
area. This can be costly in equipment and possibly in lives.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a Program of Instruction be prepared on
generator operation and maintenance and presented to selected personnel. A
recommended "Wiring Diagram and Power Distribution Schematic" should be presented
with this instruction explaining why is in necessary to operate power
consumption in order to balance the output of the generators. Only opera-
tors in most areas have the responsibility of operating and maintaining the
generators. This instruction could be given to them in conjunction with the
Readiness Orientation Course (ROC). A small team could go to selected areas and
instruct personnel on it. The overall effect of this program would cut
down on costs of repair, increase the useful life span of generators and
electrical equipment, and in some cases indicate that the team will have
necessary power to communicate more efficiently.


(1) OBSERVATION: Medevac reaction time have exceeded acceptable limits
in many cases, resulting in unnecessary fatalities.

(2) EVALUATION: The medevac system has not always reacted as quickly
as could be desired. However, this has not always been the fault of the
particular Air Ambulance Company involved. Medevac, in a flexible system
that should be adjusted according to the tactical situation. Units in the

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field are responsible for reporting the effectiveness of medevac. Unfortunately, the shortages of medevac usually only become apparent at the expense of actual patients.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: The unit medical operations officer of the unit supported by a particular medevac system, should be delegated the responsibility of medevac coordination. This is most effectively accomplished through coordination with the particular Air Ambulance Company and USAFRV Medical Group controlling all medevac in the given CTZ. This direct coordination should anticipate problems as well as report those already in existence. Only in this way can medevac obtain maximum effectiveness for the benefit of the unit being served.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

F.B. MERICK
LTC, Infantry
Adjutant

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1 - CO 2nd Log Om (ATTN: CTSO) APO 95218
2 - CO, USARV, ATTN: MH, APO 96237
1 - SACEC, OCS, Washington D.C. 20310
AVHGC-DST (14 Nov 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1969, RG 5056R-65 (R2)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, 12 JAN 1970
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces.

2. (U) Comments follow:

a. (U) Reference item concerning "Logistics", page 44, paragraph 1k(2)(b). The bearing kits, FSN 2550-837-1348, referred to in basic letter are in short supply throughout the command. Additional supplies of these bearings are expected to be released in CONUS in late November 1969. The Inventory Control Center, Vietnam is taking action to expedite their delivery from CONUS.

b. (U) Reference item concerning "Personnel Management (AOR)", page 62, paragraph 1k(4). Experience this headquarters indicates that personnel in grades E1-E6, special and non-special category included, who were initially reported on the basic AOR, will normally receive their assignment instructions at least 30-60 days prior to DEROS. Delay in receipt of assignment instructions may occur when individuals are reported as late additions to this headquarters. All assignment instructions that are received by this headquarters are forwarded to major subordinate commands within 48 hours after receipt.

c. (C) Reference item concerning "Agent Production", page 81, paragraph 2b(5); concur. Units and organizations utilizing agents must have a systematic method of evaluation to insure only productive personnel are retained. Unproductive agents are a constant problem to covert operations necessitating continual testing and evaluation.

d. (U) Reference item concerning "Airboat Operations", page 82, paragraph 2c(1); concur. As the primary user of air boats in Vietnam, the 5th SFG should conduct this feasibility study in conjunction with their normal operations.

e. (U) Reference item concerning "Combat Engineer (12645)", page 87, paragraph 2e(4); nonconcur. The RDS description for 12640 does not include a requirement for the Combat Engineer to be qualified in electrical wiring and circuitry or in generator maintenance. If such additional qualifications are required, training should be provided within the Special Forces training program provided under ATP 33-300 at the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
AVNOC-DST (14 Nov 69) 1st Ind
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f. (U) Reference item concerning "Mobile radio teletype support", page 88, paragraph 2g. Radio sets AN/GRC-122 or AN/GRC-142 will be included in HTOE presently being prepared by the 5th Special Forces.

g. (U) Reference item concerning "Cement Capping of Sandbagged Bunkers", page 89, paragraph 2i(1); nonconcur. Application of a cement covering over sandbags is not recommended. The strike of a projectile on the cemented surface will cause spalling which may present additional hazards to the bunker occupants. In addition, the cemented surface will tend to conceal any structural failure or void caused by sandbag deterioration or by water intrusion.

h. (U) Reference item concerning "Cement Block Construction in Lieu of Wood", page 89, paragraph 2i(2); concur. USARV is procuring two concrete block plants to provide concrete blocks for use in future construction.

i. (U) Reference item concerning "POI on Generator Operation, Maintenance and Power Distribution System", page 90, paragraph 2i(3); concur. Implementation of the recommendation is within the capability of the 31st Engineer Detachment, 5th Special Forces Group.

j. (U) Reference item concerning "Medevac Reaction Time", page 90, paragraph 2j; concur. Direct coordination between supported unit and supporting air ambulance unit is standard procedure in the aeromedical evacuation system. Through this coordination the air ambulance unit commander is able to make maximum utilization of available aircraft and provide the widest possible coverage from assets under his command. No action is deemed necessary at this time as the aeromedical system provides for the recommended coordination however, it will be included on the agenda of the next USARV Surgeon's semi-annual conference.

3. Items concerning aviation and operations on pages 40, 41, 82 and 83 will be forwarded to KACV J3-07 for consideration.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

D. MURRAY
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
5th SPG
KACV

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 29 JAN 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. L. SHORT
CPT, AGC
Army AO
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* - VNSF Camps
# TROOP DISPOSITION LIST - IV CTZ (CONT)

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**LEGEND:**
- **CSF** - Camp Strike Force
- **RP** - Regional Force
- **PF** - Popular Force
- **MSF** - Mobile Strike Force
- **BS** - Border Surveillance
- **S/SS** - Sector/Sub-sector
- **RF** - Radio Relay

*VN* - Vietnamese
*CAMB* - Cambodian
*MONT* - Montagnard
*CHI* - Chinese
*Laos* - Laotian
*MCIT* - Command and Control
*TC* - Training Center
### STATISTICAL DATA

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Incl 5 to 5th 3FGA ORL for Quarterly Period Ending 3 October 1969.
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#### STATISTICAL DATA (CONT)

(d) Quarterly comparison of USAF casualties country-wide:

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<th>May - Jul 69</th>
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### STATISTICAL DATA (CONT)

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105
AVGB-CP 27 August 1969

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned - Camp Conversions (II)

See Distribution

1. (U) GENERAL: The purpose of this letter is to provide information and guidance to subordinate detachments in the conversion of CIDG to Regional Forces Status.

2. (U) BACKGROUND: Since May 1963 several attempts have been made to convert CIDG troops to RF. These attempts have experienced varying degrees of success. In late 1965 a joint planning conference established general procedures governing subsequent and future conversions. As a result of this conference, MACV-INFO Combined Effects CP/67 was written which was to be the guide for all elements to follow in CIDG camp conversions. Since the first CIDG camp converted in Aug 66 utilizing these procedures, conversions have been successful without serious failure. The ideal cycle for conversion of a sector (province) includes several phases. During Phase One of the CIDG effort, USASF-attached CIDG units are established to establish security, with the help of advisors to the VNSF and in some cases, advisors to the subsector commanders (district chief) to geographically remote areas of Vietnam. A USASF-attached contact to a detachment will serve as the focal point for coordination of the overall effort to establish security. When security has been established, CIDG, apparatus energized, and the CIDG effectively trained and supported, then CIDG are gradually converted to Regional Forces with minimal loss of effectiveness. During this phase, the USASF and the VNSF are progressively withdrawn from the camp. Once conversion has been successfully accomplished, the VNSF team can be redeployed to another area to begin a similar cycle of pacification. The conversion from CIDG to RF is only one step in the local pacification process and due to the criticality of this step, 5th SFGA endeavors to constantly seek methods of internal improvements in the camp conversion cycle.

3. (C) SIGNIFICANT LESSONS LEARNED:

   a. Utilization of Conversion Checklists/Guides.

      (1) OBSERVATION: During the period 1 Jan - 30 June 69, six CIDG camps

Incl 7 to 5th SFGA CALL for the Period Ending 30 October 1969.

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SUBJECT: Lessons Learned - Camp Conversic'~s

were in the 90 day conversion cycle. Although all six camps were successful, several problems were encountered that had been experienced in past conversions and were documented in Corrected Copy of the CIDG Conversion Procedure Checklist/Guide, dated 3 March 1969.

(2) EVALUATION: The CIDG Conversion Procedures Checklist/Guide was developed from MACV/JCS Directive 004/67 to provide information and guidance to personnel involved in the conversion process. This document provides detailed guidelines encompassing the entire scope of the conversion process and assists in the orderly transition from CIDG to RF status. Utilization of the Checklist/Guide will eliminate the majority of problems associated with conversion.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Each individual concerned with the conversion process become intimately familiar with the CIDG Conversion Checklist/Guide. Conversion project officers designated by the C and F-Detachment commander involved, should be appointed upon receipt of the conversion order to monitor the conversion effort. These officers should not be changed until C-Day is completed and should be of sufficient rank to successfully establish an effective rapport with other agencies.

b. Attitude of USAF Toward Conversion.

(1) OBSERVATION: Some USAF personnel have acquired a negative attitude towards conversion, thus hampering the conversion effort and causing undue hardships in accomplishing the mission.

(2) EVALUATION: A positive, enthusiastic and a professional "Special Forces" attitude tends to motivate all personnel involved in the conversion process. A professional approach by professional soldiers will always accomplish the mission with outstanding results. In reality, conversion from CIDG to RF is a clear indication that Special Forces has accomplished its mission in a given sector by establishing an acceptable degree of security and pacification and by assisting the Government of Vietnam in expanding its influence to previously denied areas.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Command emphasis should be placed on the importance of camp conversion efforts. The Company Commanders deliver the conversion Letter of Instruction to each affected B and A-Detachment to insure that each individual concerned is properly briefed on Special Forces past accomplishments and the task that is presently at hand.

c. Attitude of VNSF Toward Conversion.

(1) OBSERVATION: It has been evident that some VNSF personnel have had less than a desirable attitude toward converting from CIDG to RF and as a result have added additional burdens to the conversion effort.
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SUBJECT: Lesson Learned - Camp Conversions (2)

(2) EVALUATION: The VNASF must be completely informed in regards to the conversion cycle. When the VNASF are unaware of their future assignments and do not know the mechanics of conversion, they tend to possess a negative attitude toward the conversion program.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Each VNASF individual concerned with conversion must do his share to properly insure that his counterpart is thoroughly familiar with the mechanics of conversion and that he is cognizant of the overall mission in pacification.

d. Property Inventory.

(1) OBSERVATION: Delayed property inventories have held up requisitions of TOS shortages from the appropriate ALC and submission of proposed camp TA's.

(2) EVALUATION: Timely camp property inventories will ensure that this portion of the conversion process is completed. This inventory must be accomplished during the C-120 to C-110 time frame, prior to requisitions being submitted for TOS shortages and the submission of proposed TA's.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: The conversion procedures as established in Section I of the Conversion Checklist/Guide be followed to accomplish required logistical actions.

e. Civilian Personnel.

(1) OBSERVATION: Civilian personnel, unsure of their employment after conversion, have tried to spoil the conversion effort.

(2) EVALUATION: Civilian employees; interpreters, translators, medics, mechanics, etc., are extremely important in the conversion effort. They can greatly assist the "FAST" in motivating the VNASF and displaying the "sense of urgency and purpose" attitude.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: The VNASF should do all out to motivate the civilian employees and assist them in securing employment after the conversion cycle.

f. Administrative Documentation.

(2) OBSERVATION: Documentation for CTO personnel converting to RP status has, in some cases, not been completed prior to C-Day. The TD cards for the troops have posed no problems, but TD cards, birth certificates and marriage certificates for dependents have been difficult to complete on time. Documentation is particularly difficult when the majority of CTO's are Montagnards, since more Montagnards do not possess personal or family documentation.

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SUBJECT: Lessons Learned - Camp Conversions (1)

(2) EVALUATION: Proper documentation for CIDO troops and dependents is probably the single most important motivation factor to the individual soldier in the conversion cycle. This is the first indication of ARVN's capability to take care of the converter. The concept of citizenship and responsibility to a local government may be alien to these soldiers.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That a briefing be given immediately after the Conversion Order is received informing the CIDO what documentation will be required of the individual and dependents, that the sector commander is responsible for documentation, and what will occur during the conversion cycle. The VNAP and USAP should make every attempt to coordinate a continuous effort on documentation at district and province levels. Documentation should be completed NLT C-20.

g. Rank Assimilation.

(1) OBSERVATION: Rank assimilation, in some camps, has been a unilateral effort.

(2) EVALUATION: Rank assimilation, if developed by a joint VNAP/USAP/CIDO commanders conference, tends to improve the CIDO morale and indicate that each man is receiving fair consideration.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: A conference be called at the VNAP A-Detachment for the purpose of developing the rank assimilation roster for submission. The assimilation should be agreed upon by the VNAP, the USAP and each CIDO unit commander. Past experience has proven that the rank assimilations are returned as submitted. Rank assimilations should be submitted as soon as possible after the conversion order is received to allow sufficient time for processing. Regardless of the situation, rank assimilation lists must be submitted prior to C-75.

h. Camp Conversion Classes.

(1) OBSERVATION: Occasionally, CIDO are arbitrarily selected by VNAP to give classes on Camp Conversion. Classes include the reasons for conversion to RF, the advantages of RF, RF pay scales, benefits, etc.

(2) EVALUATION: Selection of unmotivated and unknowledgeable CIDO to give classes on Camp Conversion, just to fill a requirement, results in a loss of interest and enthusiasm for the program.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: CIDO not give classes on Camp Conversion unless they are properly motivated. Good men should be selected to give these classes.

i. Deception Involving Enlistment Statements.

(1) OBSERVATION: In one camp, CIDO personnel were deceived into signing
an enlistment statement by being led to believe that the statement was a "laundry statement".

(2) EVALUATION: Deception of this nature causes contempt and works counter to the overall objectives of the conversion program. The CIDG soldier will accept RF status if he receives the proper motivation preparation and psychological indoctrination.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: CIDG personnel should be given a complete orientation on the RF, the benefits derived from being an RF soldier, and the importance of RF to GVN. A major effort should be directed towards winning the support of the leaders in the existing CIDG structure.

j. Conversion Status Reporting.

(1) OBSERVATION: Conflicting conversion status reports have been received by CONMACT from the various elements involved in the conversion process. Information concerning the percentage of personnel recruited, ID Cards, Dependent ID Cards, Birth Certificates, Marriage Certificates and Medical Examinations completed, have often varied according to the element submitting the report.

(2) EVALUATION: Correct status reports, forwarded through channels to reflect the actual status, is one of the keys to conversion success and will serve to keep all elements involved in the conversion procedure informed. Correct information enables higher headquarters to properly evaluate their support efforts and points out weaknesses in the system and where further support is required.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Prior to submitting a report, coordinate with respective counterparts to insure no discrepancies exist and all reports reflect the accurate status of conversion. Each HU A-Detachment will submit a weekly conversion status report through channels to CO, 5th SFDA, ATTN: AVGC CP Thursday of each week using the following format:

(a) Training - What training other than PSYOPS and WILP is being conducted to prepare the CIDG for RF status?

(b) Recruiting - How many CIDG soldiers have enlisted from the total assigned? Recruiting goal is

(c) Personnel: Nr of CIDG ID Cards processed.
Nr of CIDG Dependents ID Cards processed.
Nr of CIDG Birth Certificates processed.
Nr of CIDG Dependent Birth Certificates processed.
Nr of CIDG Marriage Licenses processed.
Nr of CIDG Medical Examination processed.
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(d) Property and Equipment Inventory and Turnover:
   Status of initial inventory.
   Status of equipment turnover to ARVN.
   Status of equipment turnover to MACV.

(e) Backloading of Equipment: Current status and planned backloading.

(f) Intelligence Data and Net Transfer: Current status.

(g) Psychological Preparation, Motivation and Indoctrination: PSYOPS and \textit{VIZI} training conducted during week.

(h) Rank Assimilation: "Q" submitted and current status.

(i) MACV & ARVN Team: Nr of MACV advisory team officers authorized and PDY.
   Nr of MACV advisory team EN authorized and PDY.
   Nr of ARVN officers authorized and PDY.
   Nr of ARVN EN authorized and PDY.

(j) Problem areas within capabilities of camp personnel: Self explanatory.

(k) Problem area requiring assistance from higher headquarters: Self explanatory.

k. Leadership and Technical Skill Training.

(2) OBSERVATION: Obvious areas of training are not being given sufficient consideration and tend to leave a leadership and technical skill vacuum after conversion.

(2) EVALUATION: Before conversion can take place, certain leadership and technical skill training must be accomplished. The function under "P" differs from that of CBN units. These differences must be determined and provisions made for the training required. This is a MACV team responsibility but the \textit{MACP} A-Detachment commander may find it necessary to remind the MACV team chief of his responsibility and assist him as necessary.

(3) PRODUCTION: Technical training for radio operators, clerks, armorers, and administrative and maintenance personnel should be integrated with the conversion process to the maximum extent possible. Training should be planned to extend into the period immediately following the conversion.

1. MACV Advisory Team Transition.
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SUBJECT: Lessons Learned - Camp Conversions (U)

(1) OBSERVATION: The MACV advisory team is not being properly transitioned into the conversion effort and generally assumes no responsibility until C-Day.

(2) EVALUATION: The MACV advisory team is programmed to be on site C-60 so that a unified, determined and knowledgeable effort can be made to affect a successful conversion. It is imperative that the new advisors be permitted and encouraged to participate in all phases of camp functions prior to C-Day.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: USASF A-Detachment personnel must provide the MACV advisory team with a complete working orientation and assist at every opportunity in allowing the MACV team to assume the advisory effort as rapidly as possible. Particular emphasis should be placed on MACV personnel accompanying USASF personnel on combat operations to become familiar with the camp "AOR and the soldiers with whom they will be working after C-Day.

m. Backloading of Equipment.

(1) OBSERVATION: Backloading of Special Forces equipment has been a recurring problem due to numerous difficulties with MACV and ATN getting the TA's approval, obtaining TOE shortages and the arrival of the MACV subsector kit.

(2) EVALUATION: Backloading of Special Forces equipment must be accomplished prior to C-Day or a temporary loan arrangement made of equipment that is to be left behind. Experience has shown that the USASF backloading must be flexible. Coordination at all levels must be effected to eliminate excessive turbulence.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Once backloading is begun, C and E-Detachment CO's must provide close supervision and monitoring of the backloading. Reports through parallel channels, to higher headquarters, expeditiously submitted are required and will serve as the key to successful backloading.

n. Conversion Ceremonies.

(1) OBSERVATION: USASF have become involved in arranging portions of past camp ceremonies.

(2) EVALUATION: The ceremonies are not a USASF function and USASF personnel should not become involved in any way unless requested to assist in some particular aspect of the ceremony. The conversion ceremony is primarily an ATN/MACV affair.
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AWOS-CP

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned - Camp Conversions (v)

(3) PROVISION: USASF should not become involved in coordinating or arranging for the camp conversion ceremonies unless requested to do so by Army CAG.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/Clifford R. Kuhl
/s/CLIFFORD R. KUHL
CPT, Infantry
Asst Adj

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