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SUBJECT: Operational Reports - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery

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1. (C) SECTION 1. OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES.

   a. ADMINISTRATIVE/PERSONNEL.

      (1) During this period there were five significant personnel changes in II FFORCSV Artillery. Brigadier General L.D. Kinnard assumed command on 21 May 1969. Colonel Joseph N. Hearin, Jr. assumed the position of Deputy Commander, Colonel John E. Baker assumed the position of Executive Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Donald K. Locke assumed the position of S3, and Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Lemanski assumed the position of S4.

      (2) Personnel rotation has been normal for the period covered by this report, and replacements have been received in adequate numbers in the majority of MOS positions. However, MOS shortages continue in 05B (Radio Operator), 05C (Radio Teletype Operator), 63C (General Vehicle Repairman), 71T (Maintenance Data Specialist), 72B (Communications Center Specialist), 76Y (Unit Supply Specialist), and 94B (Cook).

      (3) The following awards were presented to assigned and attached personnel:

         (a) LEGION OF MERIT - 5.

         (b) SILVER STAR - 7.

         (c) BRONZE STAR - 65.

         (d) AIR MEDAL - 8.

         (e) ARMY COMMENDATION MEDAL - 71.

         (f) PURPLE HEART - 35.

      (4) On 22 July 1969, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, II Field For

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Artillery for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, ROJ 000,000

Force Vietnam Artillery achieved a satisfactory rating on the II FFORCEN ART. (1)

(5) There were no administrative or tactical moves by this head-
quarters during the reporting period.

(6) Current organizational structure of II FFORCEN Artillery is at
Inclosure 1.

b. OPERATIONS.

(1) GENERAL. This reporting period was characterized by numerous
and rapid repositionings of II FFORCEN Artillery units to counter specific
enemy threats that occurred throughout the period, resulting in maximum fire
power being brought to bear on the enemy. The reporting period was also
characterized by the frequent use of heavy artillery to conduct artillery
raids and to provide an assault fire capability in support of both US and
allied operations. Continuing emphasis is being placed on the improvement and
modernization of ARVN Artillery. The period was highlighted by the deploy-
ment of two new ARVN 105MM battalions and the organization of an ARVN mobile
battery.

(2) TACTICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND MISSIONS OF II FFORCEN ARTILLERY UNITS.

Current deployments of II FFORCEN Artillery units are listed in Inclosure 2.
Heavy artillery coverage for III CTZ is portrayed graphically in Inclosure 3.
The current tactical missions of force artillery units are outlined in
Inclosure 4. Inclosure 5 lists the coordinates of fire support bases and
other geographical locations cited in this report.

(a) Heavy artillery coverage changed during the reporting period
with the movement of one 8" section and one 175MM section to FSB Elaine (KT 559
047) on 26 May 69. The movement provided heavy artillery support to the 25th
ARVN Division and provided coverage along the Angels Wing and Parrots Rock
areas on the Cambodian Border. On 21 July, the one 8" section was changed to
a 175MM section, thus placing two 175MM sections at FSB Elaine. On 15 dif-
ferent occasions, one 8" of Battery B, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery moved from
Tay Ninh (XT 168 520) to firing positions located on all sides of Nui Ba Den
(XT 280 580) to destroy enemy infiltration routes into the mountain stronghold.
On 26 June, the 8" platoon of C/7/8 moved from Xuan Loc (YV 464 082) to Black-
horse (YS 465 982) to provide heavy artillery coverage for a three day LIB
operation northeast of Blackhorse. On 25 July the 8" platoon of C/7/8
moved from FSB Echo (YT 023 155) to FSB Horseshoe (YS 424 620). For two days,
the platoon moved to FSB Thrust (YS 494 540) in the morning, fired direct fire
missions into the Long Hai Mountains and returned to Horseshoe in the evening.

(b) Due to the increased enemy activity in the Xuan Loc area in

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June, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division deployed from northern II CTZ to counter the threat. To provide medium artillery support, two Platoons of Battery A, 5th Battalion, 42d Artillery were repositioned from FSB Magen (YT 090 093) to LZ Rock (YT 489 354). The unit provided support from 10-22 June and returned to FSB Magen.

(c) To provide artillery support to Navy and Special Forces operations along the Van Go Dong River and Kien Cay Canal, a two gun platoon of Battery A, 5th Battalion, 42d Artillery was moved to Tra Cu (XS 476 984) on 8 June.

(d) On 3 June a three gun platoon of Battery B, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery moved from Xuan Loc (YT 464 083) to Gia Ray (YT 636 134) to support an 18th ARVN Division operation north of Gia Ray. The platoon remained at Gia Ray until 9 June when it was replaced by a three gun platoon of Battery C, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery from Xuan Loc. The platoon remained at Gia Ray until 23 June when it moved to FSB Concord (YT 034 174) to join the remainder of the battery with the mission of GS II FFV POF BHTAC.

(e) At the close of the last reporting period, Battery D, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery (Provisional) was at FSB Dottie (YT 200 537) supporting Special Forces Mobile Strike Force operations in War Zone D. The battery moved from FSB Dottie to FSB Terry (YT 081 424) on 16 May and continued to support the operations until 28 May. On 7 June Battery D was reconstituted and deployed to FSB Ann (YT 507 258) to continue support of the 3d Mobile Strike Force in the heart of War Zone D until 15 July. On 16 July the operation terminated and Battery D returned to Phu Loi (XT 850 172).

(f) On 15 May Special Forces and CIDG elements became engaged in heavy contact just outside of ARVN 105MM range at Bu Dop (XU 974 389). Within four hours after notification, a two gun platoon of Battery F, 16th Artillery was airlifted into Bu Dop. The platoon began firing immediately and contact was broken. The platoon remained in Bu Dop supporting Special Forces/CIDG operations until 30 May and then returned to Quan Loi (XT 811 903).

(g) As the enemy continued his build-up along the Cambodian Border area northwest of Tay Ninh, Battery C, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery was moved to FSB Washington (XT 146 568) to provide medium support for the area. On the night of 6 June the battery was instrumental in the defense of the 25th Infantry Division's FSB Crook (XT 055 595). During the attack by the 88th NVA Regiment, the battery fired over 1000 rounds in support of base defense and was credited with 34 NVA KIA. Total results of the attack on FSB Crook were 323 NVA killed, 10 POW's and two US wounded. From FSB Washington, the battery has conducted six artillery raids moving to Mo Cong (XT 140 615) and returning to FSB Washington the same day.

(h) With the redeployment of two brigades of the 9th Infantry
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Division, Battery A, 1st Battalion, 64th Artillery was moved to Dong Tam (XS 410 430) to make preparations for redeployment. The withdrawal of the battery from Long An Province left a gap in medium artillery coverage for the Division's 3d Brigade. To compensate for this gap, a three gun platoon of Battery B, 5th Battalion, 42d Artillery was moved from Can Gio (XS 829 724) to Tan Tru (XS 655 623).

(3) EMPLOYMENT OF IMPROVED CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS:

(a) The expenditure rate of Improved Conventional Munitions increased considerably since the last reporting period with 14,801 rounds being expended in the II FFORCEV Area of Operations during this period as compared to 2,600 rounds for the previous three months. This increase can be attributed to the change in the Rules of Engagement, which occurred in March, permitting the use of ICM against unobserved targets.

(b) The area authorized for expenditure of Improved Conventional Munitions was increased during the reporting period with the addition of the Citadel Area (XT 570 250) in Hau Nghia Province. The Citadel, a hard core enemy area, is generally flat and open, broken only by hedgerows and destroyed or deserted villages making the area well suited for employment of ICM.

(4) ARVN AND CIDG ARTILLERY

(a) ARVN Artillery assets were increased during the reporting period by the deployment of the 53d and 253d Artillery Battalions in the 32d and 31st Divisional Tactical Areas respectively. Other significant improvements made by ARVN include the organization, training and deployment of mobile batteries by each of the ARVN divisions operating in the III CTZ. In May, the platoons of Battery C, 181st Artillery Battalion, 18th ARVN Division were released from their territorial missions and organized into a mobile battery at Xuan Loc (YT 464 083). Where necessary, US artillery deployed in the 18th ARVN Division's area of operations assumed responsibility for the artillery coverage previously provided by these platoons. After participating in battery and airmobile training for approximately four weeks, Battery C, 181st Artillery was airlifted into a position in the southeastern portion of Phuoc Tuy Province to support regimental operations. Battery A, 51st Artillery Battalion, 5th ARVN Division was organized into a mobile battery in July and participated in battery and airmobile training which was sponsored by the 2d Battalion, 33d Artillery, 1st Infantry Division. After completing its training, Battery A was airlifted into a position southeast of the Michelin Plantation where it supported a combined US and ARVN operation.

(b) During this reporting period, the first phase of a combined ARVN, II FFORCEV Artillery, and Special Forces program began to provide the initial deployment of CIDG Artillery in III CTZ. The program was begun with the deployment of two 105mm howitzer platoons, one at the Special Forces Camp.
at Katum (XT 327 904) and the other at the Special Forces Camp at Thien Ngon (XT 082 813). The howitzers, provided by the 5th Special Forces Group, are presently being manned by artillerymen from the ARVN 25th Infantry Division. The ARVN 25th Infantry Division has agreed to provide personnel at both camps until CIDG personnel are fully trained and ready to assume the mission of providing their own direct artillery support. With the deployment of the first of the two platoons at Katum, a phased withdrawal began and the two US platoons that had been providing support at Katum and Thien Ngon were redeployed. In both camps, a liaison team remained to offer assistance and advice to ARVN. The second phase of the program will be that of training two platoons of CIDG artillerymen fully capable of providing their own direct artillery support. A ten week training program will begin on 1 September and will be conducted at the Special Forces CIDG Training Camp at Trang Sup (XT 166 554). CIDG personnel at Katum and Thien Ngon will be carefully screened and 70 of the most qualified will be selected to attend the training. M101A1 howitzers will be used for training the CIDG personnel and will be obtained from USARV on a 180 day loan. The instructor team, provided by the 23d Artillery Group, will form on 15 August and receive an orientation by Company A, 5th Special Forces Group on the ethnic background and special problems involved when training minority elements such as the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups. The organization established for conducting the training will include US and Vietnamese officers and NCO's for command and control, interpreters, and sufficient instructors to present the training to small group or at section level. This is the first time in III CTZ that ARVN has actually participated in a program to enhance the CIDG fighting capability. Through this program, a nucleus of trained personnel will be established upon which the Special Forces and the CIDG can expand and provide their own direct artillery support throughout the III CTZ.

(c) Throughout this reporting period, close liaison was maintained with Headquarters, III ARVN Corps Artillery, and the Headquarters of the ARVN Division Artillery, in order to identify areas where US assistance could be used.

(5) AVIATION SUPPORT. At the end of the last reporting period, the aviation assets available to this headquarters and its assigned, attached and OPCON units included 13 OH-6A and five OH-23G helicopters. Through a retrofit program developed by USARV aviation section, this headquarters was scheduled to receive one OH-6A and nine OH-23G helicopters during the reporting period. However, a loss of seven OH-6A helicopters was experienced instead of a gain of one as scheduled. Additionally, only six OH-23G helicopters were received, three less than the scheduled assignment. The loss of seven OH-6A helicopters during this period was attributed to one by accident, transfer by hand receipt of one OH-6A to the 25th Aviation Company, and the reassignment of five OH-6A helicopters to the 1st Cavalry, 4th Infantry and 9th Infantry Divisions. While the total loss of aircraft during the period was only one, the replacement of seven OH-6A helicopters with six less desirable
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OH-23G helicopters adversely affected the operations of this headquarters.
II Field Force Vietnam Artillery also lost the support of two daily mission
O-1 Birddog fixed wing aircraft during the reporting period. This headquarters
currently receives the daily mission aircraft support of two OH-6A helicopters
and five O-1 fixed wing aircraft. In an attempt to alleviate the aircraft
shortage which developed during this period, this headquarters requested addi-
tional aviation support from headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam and assign-
ment of additional OH-6A helicopters by USARV. In reply to these requests,
aviation support was received on a mission basis from the Ist Cav., 1st Infan-
try and 25th Infantry Divisions. In addition, USARV has programmed the assign-
ment of four OH-23G helicopters, one of which was received prior to the close of
this reporting period.

(6) ARTILLERY ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS. Accidents and incidents
continue to be a source of friendly casualties and as such, a matter of grave
concern for all artillerymen. The most outstanding causal areas of accidents
and incidents during the reporting period were liaison/clearance errors and
firing battery errors.

   (a) Liaison/Clearance Errors. There has been a significant
increase in liaison/clearance errors during this period as compared to previous
periods. Primarily, these errors have been caused by the misunderstanding of
target identification systems between clearance agencies, failure to perform
required double checks on overlays and target lists, failure to make complete
coordination and failure to obtain sufficient clearances. The rapid turnover
of personnel and the high degree of control which must be exercised over fire
support has necessitated that all personnel become thoroughly familiar with
the prescribed rules of engagement and the procedures for clearing targets.

   (b) Firing Battery Errors. During the period, firing battery
errors were caused by negligence and violation of sound firing techniques. As
a result, attention to detail and sound, established firing battery techniques
have received increased command emphasis.

(7) IMPROVEMENT OF METRO COVERAGE. With the redeployment of two
brigades of the 9th Infantry Division, the metro station at FSB Khau II
(KS 617 274) relocated to Nha Be (KS 921 814) on 26 Jun 69. Tests conducted
by the II FFORCEV Artillery Metro Quality Control Team indicated that data
received from the Bien Hoa metro station was not always valid in the area
south and west of Saigon due to the difference in altitude and changes in
atmospheric conditions between the two areas. With the move to Nha Be, rick-
ety and accurate metro data is now available to all artillery units in III CTZ.

(8) METAR ACTIONS. During the reporting period, METAR's were processed
for the Machine Gun Battery (D/71st Art) attached to the 5th Battalion, 2d
Artillery and for Headquarters and Headquarters Battery of the Field Artillery
Groups. Primary changes requested for the machine gun battery included the
addition of vehicle maintenance personnel to support the unit which is de-
ployed throughout III CTZ and the replacement of 2 1/2 ton trucks with 5 ton
trucks as a prime mover for the weapons system. The weight of the gun mount
plus the armor plating that is added to the vehicle have significantly
contributed to the unit's maintenance problems as the weight limitations for
the 2 1/2 ton trucks are severely exceeded. The primary changes requested for
the artillery group headquarters battery include the addition of a bulldozer
to speed up preparation of fire support bases and the upgrading of key person-
nel in the operations section to align the grade structure with that of a
division artillery operations section.

(9) COMBINED US/ARVN ARTILLERY SUPPORT. During the past quarter
considerable command emphasis has been placed on US utilization of improved
ARVN artillery fire support assets. Artillery commanders have been enjoined
to insure that the positions of ARVN artillery within support distance of
their base camps and areas of operations are plotted and that these assets
be included in fire planning.

(10) COMPUTERIZATION OF THE COMBAT READINESS EVALUATION (CRE) PROGRAM.
The CRE is a detailed inspection of artillery firing batteries conducted by
battalion and group headquart. The inspections are conducted along guide-
lines established by this headquarters which include FDC organization and
general procedures/operations, metro operations, FADAC operations, firing
battery operations/procedures and fire missions, and ammunition storage,
administration and fire protection. Each inspection (6 inspections per battery
per year) results in a formal report which details to a high degree all short-
comings. Six months experience with the CRE program has resulted in a mass-
ive amount of data which defied analysis. The computerization of the CRE
results is designed to provide a meaningful mechanical analysis and summary.
Three computer printout reports are planned; CRE results by unit, CRE results
by inspection area and an inspection schedule. These reports will be publish-
ed monthly and distributed to commanders for their use in analyzing unit
strengths, weaknesses and combat effectiveness. The first printout will be
made in September 1969.

c. INTELLIGENCE.

(1) AN/MPC-4A COUNTERMORTAR RADAR EFFECTIVENESS.

(a) An evaluation and analysis of the effectiveness of all
AN/MPC-4A countermortar radars (CMR) employed within III CTZ was conducted for
the period January 1969 through June 1969 to determine if there was any in-
creasing or decreasing trend developing in the overall effectiveness of the
radar. To depict this in graphic form the number of sightings acquired during
draw attacks by fire, which were within range of a CMR in III CTZ, was deter-
mined for each five day period. The percent of sightings acquired was deter-
mined from this data and reflected an overall effectiveness figure disregarding the fact that the set may have been shut down for normal non-operating hours, periodic downtime due to mechanical difficulties or the fact that the radar was searching a sector of scan other than the direction of the incoming rounds.

(b) Out of 1,759 attacks by fire over the six month period, the overall effectiveness average was 19.44% with 342 confirmed launch locations determined. There was a slight but not significant decrease in effectiveness over the six month period.

(c) A comprehensive analysis was made for the two months of May and June 1969 to resolve the factors most frequently affecting the capability of the set. The fact that the set is only able to scan a 44° sector at any time is the most recurring reason for non-sightings. Out of 537 attacks by fire in these two months, 253 occurred out of sector, 56 occurred during normal off-time of the crews, 20 occurred while the set was down for mechanical failure leaving 208 attacks in which sightings by operators were possible. Out of these 208 attacks, 89 sightings were made reflecting an overall operator efficiency of 42.8. The above analysis is reflected by Division in Inclosure 7. An analysis such as this can be conducted at unit level and should provide a good indication of weak areas in the operations. This analysis may be used to improve CMR effectiveness.

(d) Even though the set has many limitations, it is possible to increase its effectiveness. Using units should insure that:

1. Intelligence information available is being examined and analyzed carefully to determine the most effective sector of search.

2. Provisions are made to insure that the set is operational during the most likely periods of attack.

3. Maintenance procedures are carefully evaluated to determine if technical assistance or additional training is needed.

4. Operators are performing at an acceptable level of proficiency and if not, provide the training required.

(2) TRAINING ARVN ON THE AN/TPS-25A GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADAR (GSR). During July 1969, a two week orientation course for ARVN personnel was conducted by the 2d Arty Sect Det (RDR), 8th TAB, 25th Arty. Sixteen ARVN signal personnel completed the training which consisted of radar theory, radar operations, target plotting, maintenance, replacement of parts, and generator operations. The personnel were divided into two groups with one group receiving instruction on radar operations while the other group received instruction on maintenance operations. The groups rotated at the completion of the first weeks training. Each student was familiarized with the basic fundamentals of
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the radar set. The instruction was enthusiastically received and all personnel showed considerable progress during the course.

(3) EFFECTS OF ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS.

(a) On 1 July 1969 a statistical study was initiated by II
FORCEV Arty for the purpose of analyzing anti-aircraft activities within III CTZ. The study presented an analysis of those activities in terms of the number of aircraft engaged, altitude of engagement, type of weapons used and geographic areas of activity. The statistics analyzed were on a daily basis for May and June 1969 and on a weekly basis from January 1968 through June 1969.

(b) It was found that for the period analyzed:

1. The enemy was able to hit 32% and down 12% of those
aircraft fired on (715 aircraft in May and June 1969).

2. Most aircraft (56%) received fire at low altitudes
(0-499 ft).

3. Aircraft received the majority of fire (55%) from small
arms fire and the largest percent of aircraft (37%) were downed by small arms.

4. Automatic weapons and heavy machine guns, although
utilized to a lesser degree, seemed to be more effective than small arms.

5. Although some high points of anti-aircraft attacks did
coincide with high points of attacks by fire (rockets and mortars on allied
installations), no trend could be determined.

6. Enemy anti-aircraft activity increased with the increase
in aircraft assets in III CTZ.

7. Specific geographic areas of III CTZ were identified
as high density anti-aircraft activity areas and generally correspond with the
disposition of enemy forces. A map depicting high density anti-aircraft
activity areas is attached as Inclosure 8.

8. Heavier anti-aircraft weapons were used more frequently
in border areas.

9. Some anti-aircraft attacks were repeatedly initiated
from the same specific terrain locations.

(a) This analysis was made to portray the total anti-aircraft
activities in III CTZ. The analysis is being continued to obtain individual
unit statistics and to determine what action is being taken to counter the
enemy anti-aircraft threat.

d. LOGISTICS.

AIRLIFT OPERATIONS. II Field Force Vietnam Artillery made extensive use of aircraft capabilities during the reporting period to support fire support bases throughout III CTZ. Air Force and Army aircraft flew a total of 2,079 sorties, airlifting a total of 23,458,796 pounds. II Field Force Vietnam Artillery was credited with 95.34% aircraft utilization during the period. The breakdown by type of mission is as follows:

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<tr>
<td>Emergency Resupply</td>
<td>9 Sorties</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combat Essential</td>
<td>69 Sorties</td>
<td>80 Sorties</td>
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<tr>
<td>Priority I</td>
<td>555 Sorties</td>
<td>1,251 Sorties</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>648 Sorties</td>
<td>1,431 Sorties</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL WEIGHT</td>
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2. (C) SECTION 2. LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. PERSONNEL. None.

b. OPERATIONS.

OBSERVATION: Distribution of artillery ammunition allocated to II Field Force Vietnam Artillery should be based on the potential demand for ammunition of each command as determined by analysis of those factors which most influence expenditures.

EVALUATION: An analysis was performed of five principal factors which were determined to best represent each major command's potential for ammunition requirements. The factors considered are; that proportion of the total area
in III CTZ which falls under the range of the US artillery with III FECOM/ which is covered by the weapons of a given artillery command, short artillery area coverage; that portion of total maneuver unit contacts supported by artillery which were supported by the weapons of a given command; and the proportions of all preparations, counterbattery missions and acquired targets engaged which were fired or engaged by the weapons of a given command. Each unit's factor shares for each caliber of weapon employed are weighted by a factor representative of the degree of relative importance of each of the five factors to determine the unit's share of the total potential demand for ammunition. This share is normalized by averaging with the unit's percentage share of the total number of tubes in each caliber. The resultant percentage figure represents that unit's share of the ammunition allocation for each caliber. This system is more equitable than simply distributing ammunition based on each unit's performance during the previous allocation period since it measures potentials for demand and evaluates the relative needs of each unit by a single standard which considers both the past expenditure experience of each unit and those factors which represent potential requirements for future expenditures.

RECOMMENDATION: That this system of distributing ammunition be considered for employment by other commands as a means of increasing expenditure efficiency.

c. TRAINING. None.

d. INTELLIGENCE.

(1) DISPLACEMENT PROCEDURES IN THE OFFENSIVE EMPLOYMENT OF AN/TPS-25A GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADARS (GSR).

OBSERVATION: The AN/TPS-25A GSR is an effective target acquisition and intelligence information gathering device when employed offensively in suspected areas of enemy movement. However, this type of employment requires continuous repositioning which can be detrimental to continuous operation of the set.

EVALUATION: Due to the sensitivity of the set, it is extremely important that the equipment be carefully handled, properly packed and secured prior to movement. The radar should always be stowed in the radar shelter while in transit.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(a) That AN/TPS-25A crews be given additional training in handling, packing and displacement procedures.

(b) That, when possible, a qualified technician be available at the new location to check the set for proper adjustments and provide assistance.
(2) DEFENSE AGAINST ROCKET AND MORTAR ATTACKS.

OBSERVATION: The enemy rocket capability has been primarily used to maintain pressure and inflict maximum damage and casualties with a minimum expenditure of resources.

EVALUATION: Prompt reaction to rocket attacks by locating enemy firing positions is essential. One technique in countering attacks by fire is placing maneuver forces in the suspected firing sites as soon as practical following the attack. Through reconnaissance, terrain analysis and intelligence information, a list of enemy launch positions can be compiled. Comparing this list with the visual and electronic sightings acquired during the attack, maneuver forces can be directed into suspect areas with an increased probability of success in locating enemy forces. The location of enemy personnel, equipment and ammunition caches is the primary objective, but the confirmation of the suspected position as an actual firing site will help improve the effectiveness of the defense against rocket and mortar attacks (DARMA) program.

RECOMMENDATION: That the technique described above be employed whenever possible.

(3) AN/MPQ-4A COUNTERMORTAR RADAR (CMR) EFFECTIVENESS.

OBSERVATION: An evaluation conducted for the period January 1969 through June 1969 on the use of the AN/MPQ-4A CMR showed a slight decrease in effectiveness during the reporting period. (REF: Para 16(1))

EVALUATION: Due to the enemy's capability to launch attacks by fire from 6,000M, the small sector of scan of the AN/MPQ-4A CMR was the largest single factor reducing its overall effectiveness. Other contributing factors were operating hours, mechanical failure, and operator efficiency. Operators showed a higher level of proficiency during high points of enemy activity.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(a) That suspected launch positions and directions and times of attacks by fire be recorded and analyzed on a continuous basis to determine the most likely sectors of search and optimum operating hours.

(b) That during low points in enemy activity, additional operator training be provided by use of artillery registration or the AN/TPA-7 simulator to insure a high level of operator proficiency at all times.

LOGISTICS.
INCREASING EFFICIENCY OF AIRLIFT OPERATIONS.

OBSERVATION: Recent airlift operations have shown that units not experienced in air movement have caused inefficient use of aircraft when called upon to move by air or receive aerial resupply.

EVALUATION: This condition is due mainly to a lack of training and an established SOP for airlift operations. Aircraft hovering over pick-up or landing zones are delayed because the loads are incorrectly rigged or contacts on the ground do not know proper contact procedures. Sound SOP's and preparatory unit training in airlift operations will result in more efficient utilization of aircraft for battery moves and resupply missions.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(a) That all prospective battery commanders receive an orientation on air movement and resupply operations upon assignment to a battalion.

(b) That unit SOP's be reviewed and revised if necessary and that all personnel involved in airlift operations become thoroughly familiar with the SOP.

(c) That periodic training in airlift operations be scheduled especially when there is a turnover of key personnel within the battery.

f. ORGANIZATION. None.

g. OTHER. None.

8 Incl
1. Organization of II FFORCEV Artillery
2. Positioning of II FFORCEV Artillery
3. Heavy Artillery Coverage as of 31 July 1969
4. Missions of II FFORCEV Artillery Units
5. Alphabetical Listing of Sites
6. Metro Coverage
7. CBR Effectiveness Study
8. Anti-aircraft Activities Study

Incls 5 and 6 wd HQ, DA

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - USARPAC
3 - USARV
3 - II FFORCEV

CONFIDENTIAL

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery for the period ending 31 July 1969.

FOR THIS COMMANDER:

[Signature]

B.G. MacDonalh
ILT, AG
Asst. AG
AVHGU-UST (29 Aug 69) 2d Ind

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APC San Francisco 96375 OCT 1969

TU: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APC 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery.

2. Reference item concerning "OPERATIONS", section II, page 10, paragraph 2b; concur. USARV allocates munitions to major subordinate commands which reallocate to their subordinate commands. The method employed in making the reallocation is the prerogative of the major subordinate commander. The study conducted by II FFV Artillery has merit and that headquarters has been tasked to furnish additional information. Subsequent to receipt of this information, an analysis will be made to determine if other elements of the Command can employ this method.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON

1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy tern:
II FFV Arty
Rt: II FFV

15
GPOP-DT (29 Aug 69) 3d Ind (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 16 OCT 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

CPT, AGC

16 OCT 69
1. The following unit is assigned to II FFORCEV Artillery: Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 6th Target Acquisition Battalion, 25th Artillery.

   a. The following units are assigned to HEB, 8th TAB, 25th Artillery and attached or placed OPCON as indicated:

   (1) 6th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar) OPCON CHAC
   (2) 9th " " " OPCON EHTAC
   (3) 76th " " " OPCON EHTAC
   (4) 79th " " " OPCON CHAC
   (5) 231st " " " OPCON CHAC
   (6) 234th " " " ATTACHED 23d GP
   (7) 246th " " " OPCON EHTAC
   (8) 247th " " " OPCON CHAC
   (9) 248th " " " OPCON EHTAC
   (10) 249th " " " OPCON CHAC
   (11) 257th " " " OPCON RTAVF
   (12) 258th " " " ATTACHED 25th Inf Div
   (13) 259th " " " OPCON CHAC
   (14) 260th " " " ATTACHED 23d GP
   (15) 267th " " " OPCON EHTAC

2. Headquarters, II FFORCEV Artillery has one attached automatic weapons battalion, 5th Battalion (AW)(SP), 2d Artillery. This battalion has two additional batteries attached as indicated below.

   Battery D (NG), 71st Artillery
   Battery I (SLT), 21st Artillery

Inclosure 1

Organization
3. Headquarters, II FFORCEN Artillery has operational control of two artillery groups. The artillery battalions listed below are assigned to the artillery groups as indicated and are under operational control of II FFORCEN Artillery.

a. 23d Artillery Group

(1) 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery (105T)
(2) 6th Battalion, 15th Artillery (105T)
(3) Battery F, 16th Artillery (155T)
(4) 3d Battalion, 197th Artillery (155T)
(5) 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery (155SP)
(6) 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (8/175SP)
(7) 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery (8/175SP)

b. 54th Artillery Group

(1) 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery (105T)
(2) 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery (155SP)
(3) 5th Battalion, 42d Artillery (155T)
(4) 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery (8/175SP)
**CONFIDENTIAL**

LOCATION OF II FFORCEn ARTILLERY UNITS AT 2400, 31 JULY 1969

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MISSIONS OF II FFORCEV ARTILLERY UNITS

1. 23D Artillery Group - General Support II FFORCEV.
   a. 2d Bn, 13th Arty - General Support II FFORCEV.
      (1) Btry A - GS-Reinf 1st Infantry Division Artillery
      (2) Btry B - GS-Reinf 1st Cavalry Division Artillery
      (3) Btry C - GS-Reinf 1st Cavalry Division Artillery
   b. Btry F, 16th Arty - GS-Reinf 1st Cavalry Division
   c. 1st Bn 27th Arty - General Support II FFORCEV
      (1) Btry A - General Support II FFORCEV
      (2) Btry B - GS-Reinf 25th Infantry Division Artillery
      (3) Btry C - GS-Reinf 25th Infantry Division Artillery
   d. 6th Bn 27th Arty - General Support II FFORCEV
      (1) Btry A - General Support II FFORCEV
      (2) Btry B - General Support II FFORCEV
      (3) Btry C - General Support II FFORCEV
   e. 2d Bn 32d Arty - General Support II FFORCEV
      (1) Btry A - General Support II FFORCEV
      (2) Btry B - General Support II FFORCEV
      (3) Btry C - General Support II FFORCEV
   f. 6th Bn 15th Arty - General Support II FFORCEV
      (1) Btry A - GS-Reinf 25th Infantry Division Artillery
      (2) Btry B - GS-Reinf 25th Infantry Division Artillery
      (3) Btry C - General Support II FFORCEV
   g. 3d Bn, 197th Arty - General Support II FFORCEV
      (1) Btry A - GS-Reinf 1st Cavalry Division Artillery
      (2) Btry B - GS-Reinf 1st Infantry Division Artillery
      (3) Btry C - General Support II FFORCEV

Inclosure 4
2. 54th Artillery Group - General Support II FFORCEV.

a. 7th Bn 9th Arty - General Support II FFORCEV
   (1) Btry A - General Support II FFORCEV POF BHTAC
   (2) Btry B - General Support II FFORCEV
   (3) Btry C - GS-Reinf 18th ARVN Division Artillery

b. 7th 8th Arty - General Support II FFORCEV
   (1) Btry A - General Support II FFORCEV
   (2) Btry B - General Support II FFORCEV POF BHTAC
   (3) Btry C - General Support II FFORCEV

c. 2d Bn 35th Arty - General Support II FFORCEV
   (1) Btry A - General Support II FFORCEV POF BHTAC
   (2) Btry B - GS-Reinf 1st Field Regiment Royal Australian Artillery
   (3) Btry C - 3 tubes GS-Reinf 2d Bn 40th Artillery
      3 tubes General Support II FFORCEV

d. 5th Bn 42d Arty - General Support II FFORCEV
   (1) Btry A - General Support II FFORCEV
   (2) Btry B - GS-Reinf 2d Bn 4th Artillery
   (3) Btry C - GS-Reinf 2d Bn 4th Artillery
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THE ATTACHED MAP.

1. VICINITY OF AN LOC.
2. VICINITY OF QUAN LOC.
3. CAMBODIAN BORDERS SOUTH OF THE DOG FENCE.
4. VICINITY OF PHN LOC.
5. NORTH OF NUI BE, DEN.
6. SOUTHWEST OF TAY NINH.
7. WEST AND NORTH OF THE MICHELIN PLANTATION.
8. VICINITY OF THE FILHOL PLANTATION AND THE IRON TRIANGLE.
9. SOUTHEAST OF PUEK LOC AND NORTHEAST OF NUI BA DE.
10. SOUTH OF THE PUSHOOK.

INCLUSION 8
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CONCENTRATED AREAS OF
ANTI-AIRCRAFT ACTIVITIES
(MAY AND JUNE 1969)

CONFIDENTIAL

CAMBODIA

PREK LOC

NUI BA DEN

TAY NINH CITY

MICHELIN PLANTATION

DAN TIENG

CAMBODIA
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May 69 to 31 July 69.

CG, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery

29 August 1969

N/A

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310
END

DATE FILMED

12-69