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VIETNAMIZATION

LESSONS LEARNED NO. 76

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS EXCEPT RVNAF AND
FMWAF. BY AUTHORITY OF
COMUSMACV.
DATE: 22 NOV 1969

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GROUP 4 - DOWNGRADED
AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
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12 YEARS.
SUBJECT: Vietnam Lessons Learned No. 76: Vietnamization

1. Attached for your information is a Lessons Learned from recent operations aimed at Vietnamization, i.e., gradual assumption of an increased combat role by the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.

2. The information contained in this Lessons Learned may be of value for direct application in future Vietnamization, in future redeployments, in training, or in reinforcing or revising existing doctrine.

3. This Lessons Learned is not intended to be directive in nature. Neither is it believed applicable to every Vietnamization situation; some lessons may apply, others may not. Some of the items included cannot be considered as true "Lessons Learned" but are merely considered validations of current teaching.

4. Comments or questions concerning this document, or requests for changes or additions in the distribution of Lessons Learned, should be addressed to this headquarters, ATTN: MACJ3-053. Lessons Learned published prior to 1968 may be obtained from the Defense Documentation Center.
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1. **BACKGROUND.**

   a. One of our basic policies in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) - one which the Government of the Republic of Vietnam (GVN) shares with us - has come to be known as "Vietnamization". This policy includes all the factors - political, military, economic, social, and psychological - which would make it possible for the GVN to assume responsibility for the defense and security of the country, maintain a stable government, and develop a viable economy. An important and high priority aspect of this process is the transference of more tactical responsibility to the RVN Armed Forces (RVNAF) as rapidly as they are able to assume it. It is this aspect of Vietnamization that is dealt with below.

   b. A principal ingredient of Vietnamization is the transfer of responsibility for missions, areas, or installations. These transfers of responsibility usually involve redeployment of US forces, which may be within the RVN, to the continental United States, or elsewhere.

   c. Several transfers of responsibility have already taken place, two of which are considered major and will serve as highlights for the material that is to follow.

   (1) One was the transfer of responsibility for northern Kontum Province, followed by the Ben Het-Dak To campaign (Operation DAN QUYEN) during the period April - July 1969. This involved redeployment of US forces within the RVN. The lessons learned during that period have been exhaustively reported in other US and Vietnamese publications and will not be dwelled upon here in detail. (See MACV Lessons Learned "Operation DAN QUYEN - The Ben Het-Dak To Campaign", 24 August 1969.) Two of the four broad conclusions reached in that Lessons Learned are appropriate here.

   (a) "ARVN forces have demonstrated considerable professional effectiveness: They must prepare to face greater demands."

   (b) "The ARVN experience...has underscored the continuing requirement for US advice, training and assistance."

   (2) Another major transfer of responsibility resulted from the redeployment of about 25,000 US troops from RVN during July and August 1969 - Operation KEYSTONE EAGLE. The major units involved in this redeployment were the 9th US Infantry Division, which was based at Dong Tam in Dinh Tuong Province in the Upper Delta, and the 9th Regimental Landing Team of the 3rd US Marine Division, which was based in Quang Tri Province near the Demilitarized Zone.
d. RVNAF improvement and modernization has progressed to a point so that Operation KEYSTONE CARDINAL (U), an additional redeployment of 40,500 personnel spaces, has been announced for completion by 15 December 1969. Lessons learned from past Vietnamization efforts can be applied profitably.

e. Certainly the most unique aspect of the Vietnamization process is that it involves the disengagement and replacement of fighting forces in an environment of continuing combat.
Vietnamese express gratitude and sorrow at Ta Son Nhut air base departure ceremony.
2. (FOUO) RESPONSIBILITY OF HIGHER HEADQUARTERS.

a. In KEYSTONE EAGLE, the central theme in most problem areas reported by redeploying units was lack of firm and timely guidance. In some areas, e.g., personnel management, criteria were changed several times during the planning and preparation stages, thus largely wasting much previous planning and work. Changing criteria cut into the already short reaction time for redeploying units. The result was a serious blow to efficiency and morale.

b. In this case there were understandable reasons for some lack of exact information. In similar cases, warning orders and tentative guidance must be given, with the clear understanding of its tentative nature. Every effort must be made at each level to establish firm guidance as early as possible.

c. This is not a "lessons learned" in the true sense, but it emphasizes that, as in other military activity, the guidance must be firm and timely. In future redeployments, guidance to the affected units must be a major concern of higher headquarters.
Vietnamese present gifts at Tan Son Nhat air base departure ceremony
3. (C) PERSONNEL AND INFORMATION.

a. Personnel Administration and Management.

(1) Personnel administration and management proved to be a major problem area for the Army of the RVN (ARVN) during Operation DAN QUYEN.

(a) Two of the major lessons learned there were that the ARVN replacement system could not provide timely replacements for sudden and heavy combat losses and that the system was not adequate to counteract heavy losses over prolonged periods.

(b) ARVN staff functioning also showed the need for improvement. While recognizing that the development of a well-rounded staff capability is a long-term effort, US advisors and the RVNAF Joint General Staff must constantly strive to train qualified ARVN staff officers; they are essential to the success of future independent ARVN operations. Also, after KEYSTONE EAGLE, the 9th US Division cited personnel administration as the major problem that continued throughout the redeployment.

(2) The need for firm and timely guidance to redeploying units is well illustrated by personnel selection criteria for KEYSTONE EAGLE. The criteria for deploying or retaining individuals in the RVN were changed several times during the 30 days following the original announcement; much initial unit planning was invalidated with each change. Partially as a result of the changing criteria, there was not enough lead time to complete detailed planning, coordination, and determination of requirements. The result, magnified successively at subordinate units, was doubt and confusion as to the status of smaller units and of individuals. Too many personnel decisions were made in response to short deadlines. Efficiency and morale suffered.

(3) During the early stages of KEYSTONE EAGLE it was thought that the 25,000 man reduction applied to personnel spaces. This proved to be a wrong assumption and, with the later interpretation that it applied to actual strength, it complicated the overall strength figure. This new interpretation required the redeployment of about 10,000 more personnel than originally planned. The chargeable strength ceiling to be imposed at the end of any redeployment should be determined at the outset of future redeployments; the space ceiling should also be determined.

(4) Whenever possible, redeploying units should be informed of their new-station missions, for guidance on which to base personnel, equipment, organization, and training actions. The use of previously planned personnel ceilings to determine the numerical strengths of certain Marine Corps units during KEYSTONE EAGLE posed problems. The reconciliation of program ceilings to manning level billets and T/O functional elements within units was especially difficult. Having a mission assigned in advance to redeploying units and elements would greatly assist in planning
for and determination of personnel requirements by grade and MOS/MCS for assignment to each unit and element. In any event an assigned mission or function probably would better determine the strength of the elements of a redeploying unit rather than an arbitrary personnel slice.

(5) At the time the redeployment of the 9th US Division was announced, all ARVN divisions in IV Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) were understrength. This was the result of the activation of 104 Regional Force companies (12,792 personnel) during Jan-Mar 69. After IV Corps learned of the redeployment of the 9th US Division, it was faced with the requirement to activate 427 new Popular Force (PF) platoons (14,954 personnel). The assumption of the mission of the 9th US Division by the understrength 7th ARVN Division, and the later requirement to activate additional PF platoons further complicated an already critical problem. IV Corps was unable to provide an immediately effective personnel priority for the 7th ARVN Division to be filled from Corps assets because of similar problems in other ARVN divisions. This underscores again the need for early dissemination of redeployment information to all units which will be affected. Two other lessons can also be derived from this situation:

(a) Higher headquarters (in this case the RVNAF Joint General Staff (JGS)) must insure that the strengths of units scheduled to assume the missions of redeploying units are maintained at an effective level.

(b) The JGS should be consulted on, or asked to recommend, US units for replacement by RVNAF units.

(6) During KEYSTONE EAGLE the 9th US Division had to continue tactical operations, as well as its own logistical and administrative support; it was also reorganizing during this period. Replacements were not being received, although normal attrition continued. Each unit contained all categories of redeploying personnel, some of whom had to be released before their unit's redeployment. Some units had to release personnel prior to their unit's own redeployment in order to fill units with earlier redeployment dates. It soon became apparent that critical personnel could not be released. The result was a withholding of personnel from units which redeployed relatively early; this distorted transportation estimates and created a late "ballooning" of reassignments and unprogrammed returnees. One possible solution to ease this problem could be unit rather than individual redeployment, although there could be overriding considerations of equity in individual cases.

(7) To receive credit for a completed tour in the RVN, Army personnel, under present policy, must complete at least ten months there. The minimum time set by the Navy is nine months; for the Air Force and Marine Corps it is six months. The majority of personnel, particularly career personnel, will not want to leave the RVN without credit for a completed tour. During the redeployment from the Dominican Republic in 1966-67 a precedent was established to give tour credit for six months spent there. In its Redeployment After Action Report, the 9th US Division endorsed the six months criterion as a means of reducing personnel turbulence.
Personnel required to redeploy with their units after spending six months in the RVN should be given credit for a completed foreign service tour.

(8) Configuring units for redeployment to another overseas area is difficult for many reasons; among these reasons is the reluctance of personnel to redeploy to another overseas area without tour completion credit in the RVN. Army personnel assigned to redeploying units who have tour completion credit (ten months in the RVN) cannot redeploy to another overseas area unless they volunteer to begin a new tour at the new station. DA and USARPAC letters of instruction allow personnel to volunteer to remain in the RVN to receive tour credit or to qualify for the extended early release program. Some one-sixth of a unit's personnel (those in the 10-12 month bracket) have tour completion credit when a redeployment date is announced. Others complete ten months in-country before the unit redeploys. This total of some one-third of a unit's personnel are not normally eligible for redeployment to another overseas area. Filling the 9th Division's units for redeployment to Hawaii required that personnel be assigned involuntarily to meet the directed redeployment strength. To have assigned personnel from other US Army, Vietnam (USARV) units would have increased personnel instability and disrupted units performing missions in a combat environment.

(a) Units should redeploy from the RVN as configured on the date of announcement, less the personnel who do not meet the redeployment criteria. Units remaining in the world-wide force structure outside the RVN would be filled to the authorized manning level after their arrival at the new duty station.

(b) US Army Reserve and National Guard units would be exempt from this policy. These units would redeploy with all currently assigned USAR and NG personnel.

(9) Redeploying units find it difficult to obtain detailed guidance from reference materials. There are no references and publications which list procedures, methods, reports, and other administrative matters in the preparation for and the actual movement of a unit. Many units will not have all the required publications immediately available; even units which have up-to-date and complete files will find it difficult to review quickly all the pertinent references. To help ease this burden for US Army units, USARV has prepared a redeployment guide containing check lists and references covering personnel, administration, logistics, and facilities, plus selected lessons learned from KEYSTONE EAGLE. These lists summarize the required actions and will reduce the research time needed at the smaller units and lessen the impact of redeployment on short notice. Other MACV components and echelons should prepare appropriately detailed check lists for the purposes stated above.

(10) At best, the personnel situation in most redeploying units will be unstable. Any means to stabilize the situation should be considered. A cut-off date for in-country extensions is desirable to help
preclude continuous readjustments within redeploying units and units staying behind. Such a cut-off date would do much to stabilize the strength of a redeploying unit.

(11) In almost all cases of redeployment, some personnel will not be present for duty, e.g., those on TAD/TDY, hospitalized, etc. Timely instructions should be issued regarding their disposition and that of their personal effects. Such guidance is desirable as another means to stabilize the fluid personnel situation.

(12) Commanders and key staff officers who will redeploy with units are best selected early in the planning phase so that plans, policies, and decisions affecting the unit after redeployment are made by those who are expected to accompany the unit when redeployed. Likewise, the assignment of special duty personnel, e.g., customs inspection teams, should be done well in advance as considerable training and familiarization with the duties will be required.

(13) Small units often do not have administrative personnel skilled or experienced enough to develop correct unit diary/morning report entries in a redeployment situation. The administrative problems of these small units, and ultimately those of higher headquarters, would be reduced by the publication of suitable standardized entries, or at least the format for such entries.

(14) For purposes of individual personal planning, US Army Reserve (USAR) and National Guard (NG) units should be advised as early as possible of their release date from active duty. Ideally, this date should be included in the initial redeployment instructions.

(15) Redeploying troops might discard serviceable personal property without thought to its value to charitable institutions or civic action projects. This property may include such things as clothing, radios, books, writing materials, and musical instruments. Such items are needed for charitable institutions, schools, and civic action projects. A system to collect, sort and distribute these discarded items will provide valuable assistance to charitable agencies and help leave a good image of the redeploying unit and of the US.

b. Customs.

(1) Customs clearances and procedures deserve special and detailed coverage in this lessons learned publication because of -

(a) their importance,

(b) the lack of prior experience with redeployments of this magnitude, and

(c) the excellent procedures developed and carried out by the 9th US Division.
(2) Existing customs facilities and procedures at ports in Hawaii and the continental US (CONUS) are organized to process only the normal flow of returning personnel. A redeployment of the magnitude of KEYSTONE EAGLE requires that customs inspections be conducted in the RVN. US customs officials came to RVN to verify that customs procedures to be followed conformed to the... standards. These procedures were designed to prevent the intentional or accidental entry of prohibited items, especially narcotics and munitions.

(3) Because of prior commitment of its limited customs assets, USARV was able to provide only technical advice and assistance to the 9th US Division and charged the 9th Division with the responsibility of conducting customs inspections. Relying chiefly on the Division Military Police (MP) Company, the 9th Division did a commendable job of training inspectors, establishing procedures, and carrying out the inspections.

(a) Since customs clearance was not a normal MP function, a separate customs section was set up under the Provost Marshal and a concentrated training program was conducted. The customs section, containing seven experienced MPs, was charged with supervision of the customs program and furnishing technical advice to commanders on customs matters. The section was later divided into two groups—one group of four for personnel inspection supervision and a group of three for equipment inspection supervision.

(b) In addition to the customs section, about 20 MPs were selected to conduct personal baggage inspections. This group was given intensive customs training before actual inspections began. The group became very proficient and the same personnel were used throughout the redeployment.

(4) Personnel processing was centralized at the 9th Division's Reliable Academy. Centralized processing was determined the best way to insure that the multitude of required actions progressed in an orderly and efficient manner. Initial processing included a briefing on customs regulations, emphasizing prohibited items and procedures for shipping privately owned weapons and war trophies. After the briefing, each soldier was permitted access to an "amnesty box" where he could deposit any contraband with no questions asked. Later, during this same initial processing, but at a different station, individual hold baggage was turned in for inspection and packing. The inspection of hold baggage (only) was done by the 1st Logistical Command. Each person had access to a second amnesty box before submitting his hold baggage for inspection.

(5) Two days before a unit's departure each person turned in his accompanying baggage. Each piece was inspected by division MP customs inspectors, tagged, and secured in a van. The van was then locked and moved to the departure airfield where the baggage was palletized by the Air Force and loaded into the aircraft. Once inspected, the baggage was not returned to its owner until he arrived at his destination. War trophy weapons were
also turned in during this phase; each weapon was checked for proper documentation and then boxed for security and ease of transportation. The weapons were moved in the same manner as the accompanying baggage. Experience showed that eight customs points could process about 70 individuals in an hour.

(6) On the day of departure each individual was processed through a customs inspection where he and any hand-carried baggage were searched. A customs point manned by two MPs required an average of one minute for each man. Once inspected, the men were isolated until departure. A third amnesty box in this inspection area was provided and proved beneficial.

(7) Customs inspection and clearance of equipment posed different problems from that of individuals and their baggage. Because of the magnitude of processing, packing, and transporting unit equipment, the MPs could do little more than act as technical advisors in customs matters and spot check equipment as it was being packed. Each company-size unit appointed an officer and an NCO on orders as a customs control team. The MPs conducted special training for these teams. The teams were responsible that no prohibited items were included with unit property, and the officer executed a certificate to effect for each container. Each unit provided a copy of its packing schedule to a central control office which, in turn, informed the Provost Marshal which units were packing and the dates and times involved. The Provost Marshal sent teams to spot check units on their equipment inspection procedures. Customs teams also spot checked vehicles before they were moved to the port.

(8) While not purely a customs matter, stringent vehicle and equipment inspection and certification standards and procedures must be established and practiced to insure removal of all explosive ordnance. Even though the criteria existed during KEYSTONE EAGLE, on several occasions explosives, ammunition, grenades, and other explosive ordnance were found in vehicles and equipment at POEs prior to loading. Unit certifications will not be honored if a most careful inspection is not done at the unit processing location.

c. **Kit Carson Scouts.** Experience has shown that Kit Carson Scouts may not readily accept employment with another unit in the event that their parent unit is redeployed. This reluctance probably stems from unwillingness to move out of the local area and away from their homes. Each unit desiring Kit Carson Scouts should develop a positive recruiting campaign aimed at retaining the scouts now in the program. A liberal leave policy, to include transportation, should be developed to help overcome their reluctance to leave a local area and work with another unit.

d. **Labor.**

(1) When units redeploy, the requirements for local labor procurement will change. The 1st Logistical Command elements collocated with redeploying units experienced an increased workload during KEYSTONE EAGLE.
Daily hire labor was increased to assist in the cleaning and preservation of equipment; this is not usually considered a proper use for daily hire labor, but allowances were made because of urgency. Immediately after the redeployment there was a reduction of labor requirements, which dictated a reduction of the work force. At the same time, the retention of skilled employees needed by the remaining units had to be assured. These types of situations must be handled carefully to prevent misunderstandings with the labor force and to insure adequate support for the remaining units.

(2) Upon redeployment notification, a review of labor requirements of all units in the affected area should be conducted to determine the temporary increase in labor required, the labor requirements for the units to remain, and the requirements for daily hire labor.

(3) The following discussion will illustrate how the local labor market and economy can be affected by redeployment.

(a) Before KEYSTONE EAGLE, the US Army, US Navy, and US contractors employed about 1500 Vietnamese and third-country nationals in and around Dong Tam. Of this number, about 300 became unemployed after redeployment of the 9th US Division; about 1200 are still employed at Dong Tam or were transferred elsewhere, chiefly to Tan An.

(b) Redeployment will also have an impact beyond the labor market; this impact will be both real and psychological. The real impact will be most heavily felt in areas of US troop concentration, where Americans have been a major consumer of goods and services. Some unemployment, and probably deflation, will result. This may be partially offset by the use of former US facilities by private local investors. Some of the unemployed may return to their home villages, which will tend to strengthen those villages with new skills and insights. Most of the unemployed will probably want to remain in the urban areas in the hope of retaining their present standard of mode of living. If these hopes fail to materialize, the unemployed will become a potential source of political unrest which the enemy can be counted upon to exploit.

e. Public Information.

(1) Because of the political/public information aspects of Vietnamization, an extremely large number of correspondents can be expected to visit major redeploying units. Judicious handling will be required to insure good press relations yet preclude delays caused by large numbers of visitors. At the same time, press emphasis on spot occurrences must not be allowed to distort perspective. The Vietnamization process is aimed at elimination of aggression together with a carefully calculated redeployment of US combat forces.

(2) Public Information Aspects of KEYSTONE EAGLE.
(a) The initial KEYSTONE EAGLE redeployment announcement was ambiguous because it specified a 25,000 space reduction but was not specific as to the base figure from which the 25,000 spaces were to be taken. This caused problems in answering press questions. News media questioned whether strength levels were actually being reduced at the same rate that personnel were reported to be leaving the RVN. There were open implications that the military was circumventing the Presidential order. The initial announcement should have been based on concrete figures that would have been more readily explainable to the public; all agencies then could have used this figure as a common denominator to help avoid press skepticism.

(b) The weekly fluctuations of in-country strength added to the difficulty of explaining the redeployment and further compounded press skepticism. Many correspondents misunderstood or disregarded explanations that the replacement flow was based on a long-range projection which had been made before the redeployment announcement. A reduction in replacement flow to coincide with the redeployment would have helped from an information standpoint. Fluctuations in strength during redeployment are difficult to explain and are likely to result in controversial news stories.

(c) The overall publicity value which accrued to the ceremonial activities of the 3/60 Infantry, i.e., the departure ceremony in the RVN and the parade in Seattle, is questionable. Stories and broadcasts asserting that the men were required to practice and stand for long hours in the hot sun nullified most of the favorable publicity. Negative stories exploited the fact that many men of the composite battalion were assigned only for the move and did not relate to its achievements. The media gave much coverage to the anti-war demonstrators who marred the Seattle parade, comparing their current attitude with World War II homecoming receptions. Nevertheless, the ceremonial unit was a worthwhile symbol upon which the press could concentrate, because it focused attention on the fact that the US was attempting to deescalate. Little positive publicity can be expected from similar ceremonial units in future redeployments.

(d) The effort to demonstrate the redeployment of specific combat units by filling redeploying units with those due to rotate from other units was not successful from an information standpoint. Composite units redeploying under the colors of selected units do not attract enough press interest to justify this practice for information purposes. An extensive information program was needed to explain these procedures, as the system was often inaccurately reported by the press. The communists charged that the system was a ploy to give a false impression that troops were being withdrawn. Press speculation could be reduced and better reporting expected if numbers of redeploying personnel are emphasized, as opposed to numbers and types of units; and if it were explained that, because of attrition, units will not redeploy at full strength. Additionally, stress must be placed on the attempts being made to redeploy individuals based on their time in-country, not their luck in finding themselves in a redeploying unit. The end result of redeployment, i.e., reduction of number of US combat spaces, needs the prime coverage in information media.
A salute to departing troops at
Tan Son Nhut air base
4. (C) INTELLIGENCE.

a. Intelligence Assets and Procedures.

(1) It can be expected that the full spectrum of intelligence assets available to the enemy will be targeted against redeploying forces.

(2) Agreements between agent handlers and sources may not include termination conditions. Agreements should be made which will permit either party to terminate at his discretion. Termination pay should be clearly defined and money set aside to permit rapid cancellation of the contract. Since redeployment may come with little notice, attempts should be made to find new employment for agents terminated as a direct result of redeployment.

(3) Base and camp areas should be thoroughly searched for classified material, or any materiel useful to the enemy, immediately after a unit departs.

b. Enlarged Reconnaissance Areas. Redeployment of combat units, where there is no corresponding reduction of the tactical area of operational responsibility (TAOR), results in an increased reconnaissance requirement. Additional reconnaissance efforts must be expended to maintain surveillance and an acceptable degree of security in the TAOR. Plans must be made early to replace the security formerly provided by the departing troops with surveillance and reconnaissance as redeployment progresses. Close coordination must be maintained among all those concerned with the expanded intelligence efforts, including RVNAF and Regional and Popular Forces. Also in this connection, any DUFFLE BAG coverage must be given early consideration; liaison with the relieving unit or a small stay-behind element from the redeploying unit will insure continued or expanded coverage of the TAOR.

c. Intelligence Activities in Operation DAN QUyen. Based on this operation, ARVN intelligence planning and execution requires improvement. In the operation, intelligence planning was minimal; intelligence assets were not properly used nor were all intelligence sources exploited; long-range reconnaissance was not conducted; and bomb damage assessment following air strikes was not adequately performed. In addition, US advisors went beyond their advisory roles and participated directly in the intelligence effort, a tendency which must be avoided.
Soldiers board Military Airlift Command's C-141s for the flight home
5. **(C) OPERATIONS.**

   a. Operational Plans and Operations.

   (1) Unit redeployment schedules were required for KEYSTONE EAGLE before complete information was available concerning the units to be redeployed or their destinations. This created an almost intolerable planning situation at all levels and precluded sequential determination of redeployment schedules and transportation arrangements based on redeployment strengths, tonnages, tactical constraints, and other factors. One method of coping with this situation in the subordinate units was distribution of draft plans and orders, with close liaison and concurrent planning among the counterpart staffs or higher and subordinate headquarters concerned. This further illustrates the need for firm, timely, and complete information and guidance from higher headquarters, as discussed in paragraph 2.

   (2) Redeployment planning groups (RPG), set up at various echelons, performed a valuable function during KEYSTONE EAGLE. While these ad hoc groups can, and did, serve a useful purpose, they should not automatically be set up without due consideration of the need for them and their functions, composition, and authority. (See also paragraph 5c(1) for a discussion of liaison and assistance groups.)

   a. The 9th US Division RPG is fairly representative of these groups. It was not intended as an action agency but was formed to isolate and identify problems or obtain decisions and turn them over to the appropriate division staff section or action agency. The RPG prepared all redeployment plans, closely monitored all division redeployment activities in coordination with the general and special staff, and kept the Commanding General informed of the redeployment status through daily briefings.

   b. An observation within the division was that subordinate units which also set up RPGs performed redeployment operations markedly better than those which did not.

   (3) KEYSTONE EAGLE demonstrated the need for centralized control and coordination of redeployment effort and planning and the periodic evaluation of progress. For headquarters such as USMACV and USARV and for major redeploying units, a redeployment operations and statistics center proved to be of value. Such centers should be equipped with suitable status charts and boards where projections can be shown and progress compared against them. The center can be used for command and staff briefings and conferences and to orient and brief liaison personnel and other visitors.

   (4) As units redeploy, a larger percentage of each remaining unit will be needed for interior security of fixed installations, bases, and lines of communication. Effective maneuver strengths will be reduced by
both the strength of the redeploying units and the personnel from remaining units needed for this security. This reduction in maneuver strength must be recognized in planning. Consideration must be given to unit relocations and reductions in both size and number of fixed areas to be defended.

(5) Covering forces must be planned and provided early in the redeployment process. Stand-down and preparation for redeployment eventually prohibit the redeploying unit from manning a covering force to secure the staging area; still, the threat of attack continues or even increases. These covering forces should have a high degree of mobility and firepower as their TAOR is likely to be quite large.

(a) To illustrate this covering force, the 9th US Division formed Task Force Carlson consisting of an infantry battalion, an assault helicopter company, an air cavalry troop, one light and one medium artillery battalion, two ranger teams, and small supporting elements (e.g., engineer and signal). This concept worked well and provided protection during stand-down. As the last elements of the division prepared for redeployment, the division could no longer protect itself against attack and the relieving ARVN unit furnished this protection.

(b) In summary, a highly-mobile task force should be constituted to protect a redeploying unit which is disengaging from active combat. Whenever possible, this task force should be composed of non-redeploying units.

(6) Concurrent redistribution of remaining forces is necessary to fill gaps left by redeploying forces. Because of the nature of operations conducted in the IV Corps Tactical Zone (IV CTZ) before KEYSTONE EAGLE, RVNAF were in a position to take over area responsibility, even if on a reduced basis. In I CTZ, RVNAF and US operations were not combined to the high degree as were operations in IV CTZ. Upon redeployment of the 9th US Marine Corps Regimental Landing Team (RLT-9), an apparent void was created in area coverage. Redistribution of forces should be planned and executed prior to or concurrent with redeployment to avoid creating a vacuum in area coverage.

(7) The stand-down period for all RLT-9 embarkation increments was 21 days. This proved to be more than enough for preparation of both personnel and equipment for embarkation. Stand-down periods should be kept as short as possible so as to cause the minimum amount of wasted time. Based on RLT-9 experience, the optimum stand-down time should be 10-15 days, the exact time depending on tactical considerations, space availability, air/sea lift schedules, and the ultimate destination and mission of the unit.

(8) Relocation and support (including logistical support) of non-redeploying units require early and detailed planning and coordination. This is illustrated by experience with more than 40 non-divisional units at Dong Tam which were attached to or supporting the 9th US Division. These units belonged to various USARV major subordinate commands.
relocation dates and future support provided to these non-divisional units depended on the stand-down or redeployment dates of various 9th Division elements. Additionally, an increase in non-divisional unit strengths was required when the Division Support Command's logistics and signal elements began stand-down. Facilities for these non-divisional units were lacking in some cases at their proposed relocation sites. Identification of and accounting for small detachments was a problem in itself in some cases. Planning for the relocation and future support of non-redeploying units must begin as soon as the redeployment of a major unit is announced.

b. Reorganization and Force Development.

(1) The reorganization in the RVN of units redeploying outside the RVN is not practical. The 9th Division was required to redeploy in three directions. One brigade remained in RVN and one brigade each was to redeploy to Hawaii and CONUS. USARPAC initially desired that the brigade to redeploy to Hawaii be reorganized in the RVN, which would have been highly impractical as MOSs, personnel spaces, individuals, and materiel were a... involved. (The requirement to reorganize was later cancelled.) Units should redeploy in their MTOE configuration; any reorganization that is necessary, for other than combat missions in the RVN, should be done at the new station under the direction and supervision of the gaining headquarters.

(2) Fragmenting a unit, particularly a combat unit, during redeployment is undesirable. When this happens, such as the 9th US Division leaving one brigade in the RVN, the sub-elements must be augmented with combat support and combat service support capabilities. Reorganization coupled with redeployment creates additional problems and personnel instability and temporarily lowers combat efficiency. Unit integrity should be maintained during redeployment and any reorganization should be done as a separate action.

(3) The KEYSTONE EAGLE redeployment raised two substantial problems related to force development. The first was the procedure to be used to delete the redeploying units from the force structure. Normal procedure is for the component to submit a force structure change through joint and service channels to remove a unit from the structure. The second related problem was the manner in which force structure change requests previously submitted, which contained units later identified for redeployment, were to be amended or rescinded. In this type case, normal procedure is for the component which submitted the request to take action to amend or cancel it.

(a) At the CINCPAC Redeployment Planning Conference held in June 1969, it was agreed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) would issue a single Deployment Adjustment Notification (DAN) to reflect the deletion from the structure of the redeploying units, with no action required by other headquarters.

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(b) With regard to force structure changes already submitted, the JCS declared a suspension of six weeks on the processing of force structure change requests to give USARV time to submit amended requests.

(c) On 3 July 1969, DAN JS-69-633 was issued reflecting the reduction of 25,000 spaces and adjusting the component strength/space ceilings accordingly, effective 31 August 1969. By 10 August 1969, USARV had submitted the necessary amended force structure changes and DAN action was complete.

(d) These methods proved efficient and should be used in future redeployments.

c. Command and Control Relationships.

(1) Liaison and assistance groups provided excellent support to both redeploying units and to higher headquarters during KEYSTONE EAGLE. The USARV Planning and Operating Group (UPOG), which functioned with the 9th US Division at Dong Tam, is a good example. The UPOG was delegated decision-making authority, within limits, and had direct access to the USARV Chief of Staff for decisions outside its authority. The UPOG helped the 9th US Division in redeployment planning and in the transfer of responsibility to ARVN for its base camp at Dong Tam. In addition, the UPOG arranged for outside technical assistance; this assistance was plentiful and required a great deal of coordination. Technical representatives often arrived on short notice.

(a) Based on the success of the UPOG, USARV sent roving contact teams to help the smaller, isolated units. They provided the units with redeployment packets, which included detailed and graphic guidance documents.

(b) Finally, the 9th US Division assigned a liaison officer to USARV. He proved valuable in keeping USARV informed of the redeployment status within the division.

(c) The UPOG, the roving teams, and the liaison officer did much to eliminate extensive correspondence and burdensome reporting.

(d) Four recommendations concerning liaison and assistance are included for consideration:

   1. A group similar to UPOG should be collocated with major redeploying units which have significant installation responsibilities.

   2. The major redeploying unit should provide a liaison officer to its next higher headquarters.

   3. Roving assistance teams should be used to help small, isolated units.
4. Outside technical assistance requirements should be determined early and timely assistance provided. Ideally, this assistance should be scheduled, properly phased, and consolidated. (See also paragraph 5a(2) for a discussion of redeployment planning groups.)

(2) The transfer of areas of responsibility should be undertaken only after thorough and comprehensive development of a memorandum of agreement. The most efficient transition will be based on an agreement which includes the interests of both parties.

(a) This was one of the prime lessons learned and recommendations resulting from Operation DAN QUYEN (the Ben Het - Dak To campaign). The actual memorandum of agreement developed in II CTZ is reproduced at Appendix A as an example of the type of document that can be used.

(b) Transfer of responsibility for Dong Tam base was also formalized in a letter of understanding. The transfer was not smooth (see paragraph 5c(2)) and the letter was not signed until about 60 days after it was known that the base would be transferred to ARVN. Had the letter of understanding been prepared earlier, and had a firm US turnover plan been made before negotiations began, the transfer might have been smoother and more satisfactory to both parties. This letter is reproduced at Appendix B.

(3) Some confusion existed during KEYSTONE EAGLE as to the time that operational control was to pass from tactical to component commanders. In most cases it passed at stand-down. Confusion also existed as to the passing of operational control from component commanders in RVN to the PACOM component commanders. Both cases of confusion disappeared with the publication of more explicit orders or changes to orders.

d. Fire Support and Combat Support.

(1) The redeployment of the 9th US Division caused an immediate reduction of artillery support in the Upper Delta. The loss of artillery amounted to three battalions. When the 7th ARVN Division, which assumed the mission of the 9th US Division, has all its authorized artillery operational there will still be a net loss of two battalions. There will be an artillery deficit in the Upper Delta at least until early 1970. While IV Corps will have two more battalions operational by December 1969, one of these is to be Corps artillery and the other is to be assigned to the 9th ARVN Division. Artillery strength could be restored to the Upper Delta by December 1969 if all available artillery becoming operational were to be assigned to the 7th ARVN Division; this could be only at the expense of artillery support elsewhere in the Delta. Higher headquarters, to include ARVN Corps and RVNAF JCS, must have plans to reinforce artillery support quickly in areas from which US artillery may be redeployed.

(2) Redeployment of artillery has greater or lesser effects, depending on missions being performed by the artillery. There was no force
Reduced combat strengths may mean increased requirements for combat support, such as this 175mm gun firing in support of a Civilian Irregular Defense Group camp.
artillery in IV CTZ, therefore the 9th US Division Artillery had provided considerable general support area coverage as well as direct support. In I CTZ, force artillery was available which was not redeployed; therefore, some area support remained after redeployment. There must be careful prior study and consideration given to shifting artillery, depending on the anticipated effect of the redeployment.

(3) Artillery units may be kept "on line" until 10 - 14 days before redeployment. RLT-9 artillery units were placed in stand-down about three weeks prior to redeployment. Later experience showed that no more than two weeks was needed to redeploy these units.

(4) Reduced combat strengths, with no reduction in the TAO, tend to increase combat support requirements. This is caused by gaps in combat strength which must be filled by other means, e.g., by artillery. Artillery fire support requirements may increase, even though some of the artillery tubes may be redeployed. Requirements for air and naval gunfire support may also increase as a result of redeployment.

(5) A detailed review of minefield records should be made and all minefields removed or records transferred to a relieving unit upon redeployment.

(6) Operation DAN QUYEN indicated that RVNAF must be given every opportunity to acquire US expertise in fire support coordination.

(7) Vietnamization must include an increased RVNAF combat support capability, particularly helicopter support. While the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) improvement program will ultimately provide an improved capability for close air and helicopter support, major reliance on US resources will be necessary for some time to come. This fact is illustrated by examples taken from operations during the second quarter of 1969. During that period, the VNAF provided about 9% of the total helicopter lift, 6% of the helicopter medical evacuation, and 14% of the air strikes required by the RVNAF. During the same period, the US flew over 4600 helicopter gunship sorties for the RVNAF. The VNAF will have no helicopter gunship capability until the first quarter of 1970.

e. Psychological Operations (PSYOP).

(1) Vietnamization must be supported by a maximum PSYOP program, as redeployments can generate apprehension and feelings of insecurity among both the military and civilian populations of the RVN and other Free World nations. They may view redeployment as a capitulation to the enemy.

(2) Using varied means of dissemination, the enemy is capable of mounting a broadly-based and intensive campaign to exploit Vietnamization. Without doubt, he will exploit the situation to the fullest by portraying redeployment as a "sell out" or withdrawal by the "defeated aggressor." A concentrated, sustained campaign, with appropriate themes, must be aimed
at all significant audiences. The acceptance or rejection of the basic premise for Vietnамization, i.e., the growing strength of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam (GVN) depends on how the various audiences perceive Vietnамization and will ultimately reflect the effectiveness of the PSYOP program.

(3) No redeployment PSYOP guidance was received for KEYSTONE EAGLE by the 9th US Division until after redeployment orders were issued. This delayed the start of any PSYOP campaign in the Upper Delta until five days after the enemy began his PSYOP exploitation of the redeployment. Neither had the GVN issued guidance in this area, so a coordination of US/GVN efforts was impossible. As a result, the friendly redeployment PSYOP efforts in the Upper Delta had little or no impact.

(4) Based on the KEYSTONE EAGLE PSYOP experience, the following lessons are apparent:

(a) A well-coordinated PSYOP campaign in effect before public announcement of Vietnамization/redeployment should achieve significant goals. Timeliness is essential at all levels. A high priority must be given for exploitation messages sent to the field.

(b) Early and clear guidance is essential, even if it is only broad and general. Redeploying units should be authorized to respond within established broad guidance, pending receipt of specific guidance. It is imperative that field personnel are aware of and fully comprehend the scope and intent of the early guidance provided.

(c) Vietnamese operators should be used in all phases of the campaign. Americanization of the effort will reinforce enemy claims that the US is actually in charge in the RVN.

(d) Subordinate units should also do preliminary planning in anticipation of future occurrences, as specific guidance for all situations cannot be conceived by higher headquarters.

(e) PSYOP should stress established guidance, rather than attempt to counter specific enemy themes.

(f) PSYOP, using all available media, should concentrate on Vietnамization in the geographical areas directly affected.

(g) Political warfare assets of RVNAF must be fully used to disseminate information to their own forces and to the Vietnamese people.

(h) PSYOP should continue to stress territorial security, as surveys indicate that security is the primary public concern.

(i) In all possible cases, RVNAF units should physically replace US units being redeployed, following a public announcement to this effect made in advance. A public ceremony transferring responsibility to RVNAF units is also desirable.
MG Harris W. Hollis, CG of the 9th US Infantry Division, prepares to receive the division's decorations at Dong Tam
6. (c) LOGISTICS.

a. Combat Service Support and Supply.

(1) The following determinations must be made early, and timely guidance passed to the affected units:

(a) Any reorganization to be required.

(b) Equipment to accompany redeploying units.

(c) Disposition of equipment not to accompany units, with no requirement for lateral transfers. Redistribution should be made by depot.

(d) Disposition of special allowance and temporary loan equipment and items procured under the US Army's program for expedited non-standard urgent requirements for equipment (ENSURE).

(2) Requirements placed on support units may increase, even though the overall strength of combat units is decreased. Increased dispersion of the remaining combat units, plus their tactical repositioning, will tend to increase the requirements placed on support units. This is likely to be particularly true during stand-down and actual redeployment, and may be expected to continue even with reduced numbers of tactical units. Aviation support required by the 9th US Division during its redeployment illustrates this situation. Stand-down of the division's organic aviation assets required additional aviation support from other units. Aircraft not being redeployed were transferred laterally to non-divisional aviation units and 9th Division aircraft crew members, who did not meet redeployment eligibility criteria, were used to man the transferred aircraft. Maintenance of the aircraft was done by the gaining non-divisional unit and its back-up direct support maintenance unit.

(3) A non-organic support element may be required to assume maintenance, supply, medical, transportation, and administrative functions as supporting units stand-down so that redeploying units can prepare for movement. The arrival of this support element must be timed and phased to ensure maximum assistance to the redeploying unit and minimum facility crowding, loss of unit effort, and expenditure of support resources. However, the presence of this support element does not relieve the redeploying unit of the responsibility of preparing equipment and supplies for redeployment, using organic means to the maximum. In this connection, the maintenance element of a redeploying unit should be among the last to stand-down.

(4) Due to the large number of critical items of supply and the deactivation of one brigade of the 9th US Division during KEYSTONE EAGLE, large quantities of material were turned into depots or transferred laterally between units. Future redeployments may exceed KEYSTONE EAGLE in magnitude. It is doubtful whether logistical units, such as the 1st
Logistical Command, could support larger redeployments if they included deactivation of units. In such a case, a rear detachment from the redeploying unit could assist the logistical rollup unit. This rear detachment would remain in the RVN to police any residue left by the redeploying unit and only after this cleanup would it redeploy or otherwise disperse. It is also apparent that as more units redeploy, the number and quantity of items left in-country must be reduced and the materiel also redeployed. Future lists of critical items to remain in the RVN must be reduced to absolute essentials and all other materiel redeployed with units.

(5) After the KEYSTONE EAGLE announcement, both the RVNAF Joint General Staff (JGS) and MACV attempted to accelerate activation of RVNAF units and start training or deployment of new units, based on the assumption that equipment would become available from redeploying units of a like type. MACV (ACoS for Military Assistance) and the JGS identified two ARVN artillery battalions for acceleration. It was realized that acceleration hinged on the availability of equipment from redeploying units, the availability of personnel, and the ability of the training base to support the accelerations.

(a) When priorities were established for distribution of equipment from redeploying units, RVNAF received third priority, behind both USARV and US advisor elements. It also developed that personnel to fill the accelerated units would have to be drawn from existing units.

(b) In the future, if RVNAF units are to be accelerated, RVNAF must be given priority high enough to insure availability of equipment. In addition, personnel to fill the new units must be made available from the training base, with no extensive draw-down of existing units, which in most cases are already short of personnel.

(6) If a unit is to be reconstituted at another location, the personnel and equipment requisitioning goals and procedures should be prescribed as early as possible.

(7) Requirements for Class IV items tend to increase as additional company-size patrol bases are developed and as installation configurations change. Items particularly involved are barbed wire, concertina, engineer stakes, and sand bags.

(8) In many cases supply records of redeploying units will not adequately reflect actual on-hand status. If units are inactivated, the property books must be zeroed and a complete physical inventory will be necessary. Zeroing a property book for a standard light infantry battalion was found to take at least 15 days.

(9) There may be many accountable officers who are not familiar with zeroing a property book or accounting for all property. It may be necessary to set up mobile teams of supply experts to insure that proper procedures are followed.
(10) Every effort must be made to turn in or transfer all Class V supplies not consumed, including safe disposal of unserviceable items. Transfer, within existing regulations, to RVNAF is recommended. Procedures should be simple to prevent ammunition being abandoned.

(11) Rigorous technical inspection may not be possible at unit processing sites due to lack of time and trained personnel. To prevent unwarranted costs from shipping uneconomically repairable equipment, technical assistance teams may be required to conduct inspections, such as those which would be conducted under the Simplified Criteria for Retrograde of Army Materiel (SFCRAM) procedures established by the US Army Materiel Command. Equipment should be redeployed with units if it is in a combat serviceable, economically repairable condition.

(12) A complete physical inventory of post, camp, and station property should be made and all equipment not essential to sustain the unit should be turned in as early as possible.

(13) Property excesses may be found. To promote supply economy and speed unit processing, the turn in of excesses should be as convenient as possible and on a "no-questions-asked" basis. Units should be encouraged to turn in excesses as soon as possible after notification of redeployment, to include authorization for streamlined turn in procedures. Guards should be posted at likely disposal areas, e.g., sanitary fills, to prevent wasteful disposal of excesses.

(14) Last-minute arrangements for turn in of property will result in confusion, inefficiency, and unresolved accountability. Planned phasing out of property accounts and station type activities must be done to avoid these last-minute arrangements. For example:

(a) If a large unit operates several messes, early consolidation and phased closures permit orderly turn in of equipment.

(b) Supply accounts can be reduced by centralizing the support of smaller units.

(c) Austere facilities in the later stages of redeployment can reduce post, camp, and station property. (See (12) above.)

(d) Phasing down Class V stocks will help eliminate shifting of basic loads and the resulting cross haul and back haul of these supplies. (See (10) above.)

Although some last-minute property transactions cannot be avoided, proper planning and phasing can do much to make them more satisfactory for all concerned.

(15) US inter-Service support within the RVN must be reviewed in light of Vietnamization. Redeployment of forces, even internally within
b. Movements.

(1) The movement schedule for the 9th US Division redeployment was established at a mid-June conference in Hawaii. The 9th Division was not represented. Through a misunderstanding, the resulting movement schedule did not correspond to the planned movement schedule of the division. This misunderstanding was later corrected at considerable effort and expense, but it might have been avoided had the 9th Division been represented at the original conference. When a redeployment involves a major unit, that unit should be represented at any redeployment movements planning conference. A MACV Movement Planning Conference should be held prior to any Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) Movement Planning Conference.

(2) The CINCPAC KEYSTONE EAGLE movements program (which resulted from the conference referred to in the paragraph above) addressed transportation with respect to troops and units to be redeployed. While equating to the redeployment of 25,000 troops, it did not necessarily relate to in-country on-hand strengths at any given time, nor could it be considered a prime document with respect to space reduction. Clear guidance stating actual numbers of people to be redeployed, spaces to be reduced, and their relation to in-country strength must be made known early.

(3) Space may be a critical constraint on staging through base camps. As an example, the 9th US Division was operating in the Delta where high ground, therefore suitable staging space, was at a premium. The population density of the Dong Tam base camp was already high and was increased by the influx necessary to support the division's redeployment. Sufficient space was not available for maneuver units as they vacated their fire support bases and space had to be arranged for elsewhere. Careful scheduling may be required to stage maneuver units through base camps for onward movement to POEs.

(4) One or more austere staging areas, with suitable minimum facilities, should be located at or near the APOEs where personnel/equipment can be kept for a few hours if necessary, in the event of aircraft delays due to weather or mechanical problems.

(5) MAC support of KEYSTONE EAGLE was exceptional in response to the requirements and in the sense of urgency displayed. To allow for additional flexibility and more efficient use of aircraft, both MAC-owned and common-user/civilian contract aircraft should be considered for use in future redeployments.

(6) Consistent with the tactical situation and with the magnitude of future redeployments, consideration should be given to airlifting
redeploying units on a 24-hour basis, as opposed to during daylight hours only. This would take advantage of the MAC 24-hour airlift capability, promote a more efficient use of aircraft, insure a more even flow of passengers and cargo, help avoid peaks and valleys in airlift requirements, and add insurance against delays due to weather or mechanical problems.

(7) A unit "on-load contact" must be provided to the US Air Force. This is an individual appointed by the redeploying unit to act as liaison at the APOE to provide information on manifesting and equipment. He should be appointed early and remain available at the APOE during the entire time that his unit is staging through the APOE.

(8) Personnel movement from unit locations to APOEs will often be by helicopter, then by C-141s to the next destination. The C-141 lift may require several aircraft and the arrival sequence of these aircraft will not necessarily be the departure sequence from the APOE. The use of the reverse planning technique is recommended in manifesting to avoid confusion and congestion at the APOE and to insure that personnel arrive at destinations in the sequence desired. On occasion, MAC may substitute a 707 aircraft for a C-141, which will provide 71 additional seats per flight. Redeploying units must be as flexible as possible to accommodate to these changes to make more efficient use of aircraft. Manifesting should be complete as to identification and destination of passengers, and an officer-in-charge should be appointed on each flight who can identify those passengers debarking at other than the principal port of debarkation.

(9) Movements should be programmed to be completed several days before the publicly-announced completion date. This will allow a cushion against unexpected weather and operational or other problems.

(10) Before KEYSTONE EAGLE, tariff rates for hold baggage to Hawaii did not exist and had to be established hastily. Tariff rates should be established for shipment of hold baggage to all areas of the world where US units may be redeployed.

(11) At least two security guards should be provided to travel aboard each ship carrying a unit's equipment. They may be scheduled aboard ship by a letter addressed to Military Sea Transportation Service, Vietnam. The guards should carry the following papers:

(a) Unit movement orders and orders assigning them to the moving unit.

(b) A letter of instructions assigning duties, responsibilities, and actions to be taken and which lists names and telephone numbers of points of contact at ports of embarkation and debarkation.

c. Facilities and Construction.

(1) Because of many initial uncertainties connected with KEYSTONE EAGLE, base closure and transfer planning was unstable. Real property
inventory and condition information was inadequate. Initially there was an absence of policy and guidance with regard to types, kinds, and condition of real and related installation property that should be recovered, relocated, or transferred to RVNAF; nor did RVNAF have the capability to operate some of the facilities at a US base. All of these difficulties were overcome, but with losses of effort and time. There is a need for a policy and guidance paper for the transfer of real and related property.

(2) The orderly transfer of the Dong Tam use to ARVN was hampered by the lack of appropriate ARVN and JGS representation and lack of well-coordinated US policy. MACV tasked the Delta Military Assistance Command (DMAC) to develop a plan for disposition of facilities at Dong Tam. MACV, DMAC, and USARV provided specific guidance regarding the disposition of facilities, e.g., prefabricated buildings, wooden buildings, air conditioners, electric power, ice and water plants, refrigerators, and installed equipment. DMAC’s mission was undertaken, and eventually completed, by a committee which included representation from DMAC, USARV, 9th US Division, 4th ARVN Area Logistics Command, and 7th ARVN Division. The USARV representative was chairman.

(a) The committee had considerable difficulty in following the command guidance in many cases, and felt that some of the guidance was not consistent with sound engineering principles and economics. The committee made certain recommendations in this area which were later approved, e.g., to leave a high-voltage power plant and an intact water system.

(b) During the committee meetings and deliberations regarding items to be removed from Dong Tam, MACV guidance was changed to reflect greater concern for aiding the RVNAF improvement and modernization program.

(c) During the development of future plans for the transfer or other disposition of facilities, RVNAF representation should include JGS as well as subordinate unit representatives; however, a US plan must be prepared and approved in advance. A basic policy should be established pertaining to the disposal of facilities which takes into consideration -

1. Actual RVNAF requirements and capabilities,
2. The need to improve and modernize RVNAF, and
3. US requirements. (See also paragraph 5c(2) regarding memoranda of agreement and letters of understanding.)

(3) RVNAF personnel may lack the necessary skills to operate and maintain some of the complex facilities and equipment which may be transferred to them. This was the case at Dong Tam and formal training and extensive on-the-job training (OJT) was required. Plans for the transfer of complex facilities or equipment to RVNAF must consider the training time required when determining the effective date of transfer. The plans must also include provisions for the formal training and OJT required.
The question of RVNAF capability or desire to maintain US type installations must be addressed RVN-wide at a high level, perhaps the GVN level, rather than by individual installation.

(4) Vietnamization may generate new construction requirements. This was the case when Dong Tam was transferred to RVNAF; additional facilities for supporting units of the 9th US Division which were remaining in the RVN had to be built in other locations. Land had to be quickly obtained, projects had to be funded by reprogramming, and engineering effort had to be diverted to this new construction. New construction must be foreseen and planning must begin early to insure orderly and efficient relocation. Early determination is also required as to which construction already underway should be terminated or reduced in scope.

(5) MACV Directive 735-3 was prepared as the policy and guidance paper needed for the transfer of real and related property. It was published on 3 November 1969.

(6) Close attention from several sources, such as the US General Accounting Office and the press, can be expected to be focused on the transfer of accountability for installations and equipment. It is highly important that all concerned avoid any action before, during, or after a transfer which might be construed by anyone as misuse or misappropriation of government property.

d. Preservation, Packaging, and Packing.

(1) Some personnel in KEYSTONE EAGLE units were not familiar with documentation, classification, preservation, and packing requirements for the overseas shipment of supplies and equipment. A key element in successful large-scale redeployment is the proper documentation, marking, and handling of supplies and equipment. US Army military standard transportation and movement procedures (MILSTAMP) are complex and not easily used by untrained personnel. Supervisory technical assistance may be available but the unit must have the general knowledge and fundamental skills for this type of operation. Prior to redeployment, technical contact teams from a suitable source, e.g., 1st US Logistical Command or US Army Materiel Command, should visit each redeploying unit to present instruction, printed guides, and other assistance to key personnel who supervise the processing of materiel for overseas shipment.

(2) An adequate preservation, packaging, and packing area must be established for units being redeployed. Hard-surface roads, hardstands, overhead rain cover, and wash racks are highly desirable, recognizing that all desirable facilities may not be possible because of construction limitations. Comprehensive and timely expert advice must be available concerning organization of the area, the detailed requirements of customs processing, and all agricultural and entomological requirements. For example, the undercarriages of vehicles cleaned only with high-pressure water hoses and insect-infested wooden components of equipment will not meet US Department of Agriculture standards for entry into the US.
(3) Redeployment requires the use of pallets, shipping crates, and various other materials and tools not readily available to most units. Redeployment planning should address these requirements early and in detail and verify them on a periodic basis, otherwise considerable time may be lost when the need for them materializes.

(4) Materials handling equipment, e.g., forklifts, is in great demand during certain periods of redeployment. Centralized control and scheduling of this equipment should be considered to help insure more continuous and efficient use of it.
River craft of the Mobile Riverine Force pass in review before the flagship USS BENIMAH at Dong Tam. GEN W.B. Rosson, DSCOMUSMACV, is on reviewing stand.
7. (c) Communications-Electronics.

a. Communications.

(1) Enemy forces have the capability to intercept communications traffic to gain information and to intercept spurious traffic for deception purposes. They are expected to use several forms of harassment to their advantage, to include overrunning communications sites as protective forces are reduced or redeployed.

(2) Dedicated voice and secure teletype circuits between the deploying unit's base, its higher headquarters, and its ports of embarkation proved essential to KEYSTONE EAGLE movements. No requirements for secure point-to-point voice communications were reported.

(3) The following determinations must be made early, and timely guidance passed to the affected units as to the disposition of installed communications items:

(a) Equipment to be laterally transferred in place to a relieving US or RVNAF unit.

(b) Equipment to accompany the redeploying unit.

(c) Disposition of equipment not to accompany the unit, with no requirement for lateral transfers. This category of equipment should be reported to higher headquarters for disposition instructions.

(4) Telephone service for the 3rd Surgical Hospital at Dong Tam was abruptly cut off on 25 August 1969, although the target completion date for redeployment was 31 August 1969. This created many problems, inconveniences, and inefficiencies for the hospital for the remainder of the redeployment period. Communications must remain intact until completion of redeployment.

b. Communications Planning.

(1) At any major redeployment site, there will probably be a conglomerate of US signal units, as was the case at Dong Tam. To prevent unnecessary confusion which could result, one signal coordinator should be designated for the site/installation. There is a constant need for higher headquarters to enter the planning at an early stage and to resolve problems which cannot be resolved at a lower level.

(2) Communications requirements may increase during redeployment. This makes it impractical and often impossible to terminate communications services and deactivate communications systems until late in the redeployment. If the site is being abandoned or the perimeter changed, some signal units may not be afforded proper physical security. Arrangements should be made with an appropriate tactical element to provide this security until communications services and systems can be rerouted and the equipment removed.
(3) The complexity of the US chain of command creates unusual signal problems which must be resolved before future redeployments. Planning must be both vertical and horizontal. This can be illustrated by the problems encountered at Dong Tam where there were three US signal elements (Company B of the 52nd Signal Battalion, the 9th Signal Battalion, and a detachment of the 1st Signal Brigade Regional Communications Group). These three elements did not have a common command chain below USARV. Planning had to be done within USARV, 1st Signal Brigade, Defense Communications Agency-Southeast Asia Mainland (DCA-SAM), and RVNAF, in coordination with MACV.

(a) Consideration should be given to the preparation of a combined communications plan, in coordination with RVNAF, in the same manner as the Combined Campaign Plan. A general plan outlining actions necessary for a coordinated redeployment with a concurrent or later movement of RVNAF into the site/facility appears to be essential. This plan need not address specific installations, but should apply to any situation. Having done this planning, problems similar to those faced at Dong Tam would be much alleviated.

(b) RVNAF needs time to get into the installation scheduled for transfer to analyze requirements, formulate plans, and properly staff the plan within JGS and with MACV. US security constraints on redeployment information must be removed early to provide this time.

(c) Meetings among MACV, US components, DCA-SAM, the installation coordinator, and RVNAF must be held. Proceedings of these meetings should be recorded, documented, and exchanged among all concerned.

(4) Redeployment of USN, USAF, and USMC units has a potential impact on communications support required from the Army. This is particularly applicable where communications facilities are vacated but still required for rollup or residual forces. MACV planning policy is that the USN and USAF must provide a shortfall force for communications facilities until permanent reassignment of responsibility can be arranged. Indications are that the Army will be assigned ultimate responsibility for these facilities. MACV planners must provide timely information to USARV on communications facilities for which the Army will be assigned responsibility upon redeployment of units of the other Services.

(5) Signal units usually have an area type mission and provide communications support to varied units and activities in a given geographical area. When a major unit redeployes, the units remaining in the area will still require signal support. It is impractical, and almost impossible, to withdraw integral signal units or a part of the signal slice during redeployment. It is more feasible and practical to withdraw a suitable number of spaces from a signal unit as representing those which supported specific redeploying units. Administrative procedures should be set up to approve quickly the withdrawing of spaces from signal units and for rapid processing of TOE/TD changes.

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(6) During the redeployment of the 9th US Infantry Division, the USS BENEWAH was operating on the Mekong River in the vicinity of Dong Tam as the flagship for the Mobile Riverine Force. In this capacity it was necessary for the BENEWAH to have access to the overall in-country communication system. This was accomplished through the installation of two AN/TRC-24 radio sets, one on the BENEWAH and one at Dong Tam. Equipment and personnel were provided by the 9th Division's Signal Battalion. During the redeployment there was a degree of confusion and concern on the part of the Navy command group aboard the BENEWAH as to who would replace the existing communication link, when, and under what authority; this was resolved only in the closing phase of the redeployment. This further illustrates the need for continuous, detailed coordination and planning at all echelons of command.
A farewell salute from Mobile Riverine Force crew members at Dong Tam
8. **CIVIL OPERATIONS AND REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT (CORDS).**

Provision for the assumption of all pacification and development tasks and security functions being performed must be coordinated with the relieving unit. Where military civic action programs (MILCAP) and medical civic action programs (MEDCAP) exist, the local people become accustomed to visits from these teams. The redeploying unit should do its utmost to insure continuation of these programs. Where the relieving unit is an RVNAF unit, it should be strongly urged to continue meaningful MILCAP and MEDCAP. Projects which are underway should not be abandoned as there is likely to be an unfavorable psychological and material impact. Projects not yet underway may be terminated, except certain extraordinary projects or those which can be completed before the unit leaves. Any interruptions in the programs provide an opportunity for dissatisfaction. This dissatisfaction on the part of the people is likely to be quickly exploited by the enemy. Redeployment plans at all echelons should include a CORDS annex listing programs, their status, and points of contact with leaders of the civilian community. Public meetings, orientation tours, and personal introductions of local leaders should be scheduled for units assuming responsibility for the program. Using the same gathering for both "introductions" and "farewells" is appropriate and can save time.
At dockside ceremonies at Da Nang, an RVNAF representative presents gifts to departing Marines
9. (U) REPORTS.

a. Requirements for reports should be analyzed and confirmed as early as possible. Every effort should be made to relieve redeploying units of non-essential reporting requirements. Full reports, such as those prescribed in US Army Regulation 220-10, are not always realistic when applied to a unit redeploying from a combat situation.

b. Terms peculiar to redeployment or terms used in other than their commonly-understood sense should be kept to a minimum and carefully defined.
After dockside ceremonies at Da Nang, the first Marines board the USS PAUL REVERE for Okinawa.
10. (U) SUMMARY AND FINAL OBSERVATION.

   a. This document has been an attempt to bring together from more than 35 different sources the various lessons learned, observations, evaluations, and recommendations regarding Vietnamization. Undoubtedly, situations will arise which have not been covered here and for which there is no specific guidance or recent precedent. It is hoped that the material presented here will prove helpful in the continuing process of Vietnamization.

   b. One last observation is in order, regarding documentation for historical purposes.

   (1) In planning the redeployment of the 9th Signal Battalion of the 9th US Division, the Photographic Section was scheduled for movement ahead of the remainder of the signal battalion and a large number of other divisional units. This early redeployment deprived the 9th Division of its major photographic capability during an important period of unit history. When this situation was recognized, the USARV 1st Signal Brigade was tasked to provide photographic support for the duration of the redeployment.

   (2) The photographic capability of a redeploying unit should be retained to the latest possible time to assist in the collection of historical material.
11. (c) LOOKING AHEAD.

a. As the final phase of the war, Vietnamization, gains momentum, the need for detailed long-range planning aimed at sustaining the RVNAF capability which has been built up through combined efforts over the years becomes more pressing.

b. Progress and professional effectiveness of the RVNAF were cited in paragraph 10c(1). On the other hand, several areas were cited throughout this publication where improvements are needed; e.g., personnel systems and training in paragraph 3a(1), intelligence activities in paragraph 4c, fire support coordination and helicopters in paragraphs 5d(6) and (7), and operating and maintaining complex installations and facilities in paragraph 6c(3). Efforts are now underway to bring about improvements in these areas.

c. However, US and other Free World support to RVNAF must include detailed planning for the future. The equipment and techniques contributing to military success in the RVN thus far must be closely examined with a view toward RVNAF needs and ability to maintain the equipment. Examples are the helicopter, tactical aircraft, the B-52s, and RF4C reconnaissance aircraft which have contributed so significantly to success in the special environment of the RVN. At least some of these US items (helicopters, especially) must become part of the RVNAF inventory, as RVNAF meets expanded responsibilities for prosecuting the war and maintaining security against possible future aggression. Continued RVNAF participation in long-range planning will insure accommodation of equipment to RVNAF desires and support capabilities. For example, capabilities of the RVNAF training base to produce helicopter mechanics and pilots, and capabilities of the RVNAF logistics system and the RVN economy to provide helicopter repair parts and services must be considered in any plans to increase the number of helicopters. Perhaps civilian contractor maintenance support is an answer to some of the logistical problems.

d. Long-range planning assistance must include the RVNAF personnel accounting system, communications system, force development, and training. Until a fully self-sufficient RVNAF research and development (R&D) capability is established, a sizeable US R&D effort will be needed. R&D must be geared to provision of items to sustain the RVNAF mission. Some of the most useful items developed thus far have been simply the modification and return to service of obsolescent but reliable, sturdy, and relatively uncomplicated items such as the B-26, C-47, and C-119 aircraft, and the Navy "Monitor" for riverine operations. R&D may be able to reduce training requirements through introduction of simpler items which are easier to maintain. Additionally, R&D may help make the most of limited manpower resources by providing increased mobility, firepower, and communications.

e. Finally, the war in the RVN has required considerable amplification of US tactical doctrine. There is a continuing need for the exchange of information stemming from combat experience in this environment.

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MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
ON
Responsibilities of ARVN and US Forces in The
KONTUM PROVINCE and along QL 14 North of Pleiku City
24 April 1969

1. (U) Purpose: The purpose of this Memorandum is to record agreements in effect between II Corps and I FFORCEV units in Kontum Province and along QL 14 North of Pleiku City. The agreement is effective 201400 April 1969.

2. (c) Responsibilities:
   a. Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division will:
      (1) Assume area responsibility for that portion of Kontum Province as indicated on the inclosed map and the security of QL 14 North of Pleiku City.
      (2) Be prepared to reinforce 24th Special Tactical Zone upon request of Commander, 24th Special Tactical Zone. Size of reinforcement will depend upon the nature of the threat and the forces available.
      (3) Maintain liaison with Commander, 24th Special Tactical Zone regarding mutual tactical or support problems and the exchange of information and plans.
      (4) Provide the same effective artillery coverage along QL 14 as is now provided by two ARVN 105mm howitzers at fire base 17 (ZA 204715).
      (5) Require Commander, 2d Brigade to maintain liaison with Commander, Kontum Sector and Commander, Pleiku Sector concerning security of highway 14 and populated areas along the highway.
   b. Commanding General, I FFORCEV Artillery will:
      (1) Provide general support artillery as required.
      (2) Support operations within 24th Special Tactical Zone with a minimum of two light or medium artillery batteries.
      (3) Maintain automatic weapons support in the Dak To-Ben Het area.
c. Commander, 24th Special Tactical Zone will:

(1) Assume area responsibility for that portion of Kontum Province as indicated on the inclosed map.

(2) Furnish security for US combat support elements in the 24th Special Tactical Zone area of operation or which support ARVN forces. Designation of those elements presently in the area follows (Commander, 24th Special Tactical Zone will be notified in advance when these units are to be withdrawn or replaced):

**Field Artillery**

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<th>Battery/Platoon</th>
<th>Unit</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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**Army Aviation:**

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<td>57th Assault Helicopter Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>321st Aviation Service Detachment</td>
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**Engineers:**

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<td>D Company, 299th Engineer Battalion</td>
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**Signal:**

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<td>Detachment 2, C Company, 43d Signal Battalion</td>
<td>Tan Canh</td>
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<td>Detachment 3, 54th Signal Battalion</td>
<td>Fire Base 1</td>
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(3) Maintain liaison with Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division regarding mutual tactical and support problems.
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(4) Maintain a representative in the 52d Artillery Group FSCC at Fire Base 1.

(5) Provide ARVN artillery support as required.

d. Commander, 17th Combat Aviation Group will:

Continue to support 24th Special Tactical Zone on a mission request basis.

3. (U) Review: This Memorandum of Agreement will be reviewed in one year or whenever requested by either signatory.

/s/
LU MONG LAN
Major General
Commanding II Corps

/s/
CHARLES A. CORCORAN
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding I FFORCEV
MCCZ-IV-EN

SUBJECT: Letter of Understanding for Occupation of Dong Tam US/ARVN

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

1. CONCEPT: The 7th Inf Div (ARVN) occupies, controls, and is responsible for the security of the Dong Tam Base as of 311700 Aug 69. Within the perimeter of the base the following U.S. elements remain as independent tenants for an undefined period of time within boundaries agreed upon in Tab C: U.S. Naval Support Activity; 93rd Engr Bn (Constr); RMK; 238th Mtn Co (IM); B Co, 52nd Sig Bn; and a team from Transportation Movement Agency. The 4th ALC (ARVN) will also occupy the portion as shown in Tab C. The U.S. 164th Avn Gp (CBT) will operate a rearm/refuel point and provide helicopter fuel and aircraft ammo to U.S. and VNAF Aviation units. Pathfinders will be provided, on request, to assist RVN units for airmobile operations staged from Dong Tam.

2. OPERATION:

   a. Security - The 7th Inf Div (ARVN) is fully responsible for perimeter security as of 311700 Aug 1969. U.S. elements will not provide perimeter security forces except by mutual agreement, but will provide their own internal security. Security element will consist of no less than one Inf Bn, one Cav Trp and one Arty Btry.

   b. Utilities - ARVN operators will be provided by ARVN sources.

      (1) Power:

         a. USARV will provide technical training for ARVN operators and will operate generators until ARVN operators are trained for independent operation.

         b. U.S. Navy & RMK will provide independent power to satisfy their own needs except for Reliable Academy area and VNN area which will continue to be serviced from central power system.

         c. Other U.S. elements remaining will continue to draw power from central power plant until their departure.
MACCZ-IV-EN
SUBJECT: Letter of Understanding for Occupation of Dong Tam US/ARVN

(2) Water - USARV will provide on-the-job training to ARVN water purification equipment operators. When USARV (i.e., PA&E) determines that operators have reached adequate proficiency, ARVN will be required to operate water purification units. U.S. elements will remain on central water distribution system until their departure. U.S. Navy will have access to one deep well within Dong Tam Base. ARVN will provide operation of well systems.

(3) Ice Plant - USARV will provide assistance in training ARVN operators. However, ARVN will take over operation of the plant at a time to be determined by USARV (i.e., PA&E). ARVN will provide ice to requesting U.S. elements remaining at Dong Tam.

(4) POL Facilities - The 164th Avn Gp (CBT) will operate JP-4 fuel system for helicopters until 4th ALC is trained to operate system independently. The 4th ALC will operate remaining bulk POL systems. The 7th Inf Div (ARVN) will operate remaining retail fuel systems. The 164th Avn Gp (CBT) will provide refueling to U.S. and VNAF helicopters until 164th ceases operation at Dong Tam. The 4th ALC as bulk distributor and 7th Inf Div (ARVN) as retail distributor will continue to provide MOGAS and Diesel to U.S. Army vehicles and civilian contract vehicles organic to Dong Tam until their departure.

(5) The 4th ALC will operate the Dong Tam ASP subject to safety limitations established by agreement with Naval Support Activity. Storage capacity is limited to 1000 tons total weight excluding Class I and II. The 4th ALC will provide ammunition to U.S. elements remaining at Dong Tam and will provide storage space at the ASP for aircraft peculiar ammunition belonging to the 164th Avn Gp (CBT).

(6) U.S. elements will have access to rock off-loading site and 4th ALC port.

(7) PX Service - Installation Coordinator will operate a small PX. Naval Support Activity will operate a PX and required concessionaire services for U.S. personnel.

(8) Medical Service - Installation Coordinator will provide aid station for U.S. personnel and request augmentation as necessary to meet civilian commitments for FMK and PA&E. Navy provides medical service to Navy personnel. Hospitalization procedures for U.S. personnel to be determined by Installation Coordinator.

(9) Chaplain Services - Installation Coordinator arranges for Chaplain services for U.S. personnel.
MACCZ-IV-EN
SUBJECT: Letter of Understanding for Occupation of Dong Tam US/ARVN

3. Matters of mutual concern to both U.S. and ARVN will be resolved by coordination of the CG, 7th ARVN Div, and U.S. Installation Coordinator. U.S. Installation Coordinator at this time is the CO, 93rd Engr Bn (Constr) effective 26 July 69. Matters unresolved by the above coordination will be passed to CG, IV CTZ, and CG, DMAC for further coordination and resolution.

/s/
R. WETHERILL
MG, USA
Commanding General, DMAC

/s/
NGUYEN VIET TRANH
MG, ARVN
Commanding General, IV Corps & IV CTZ

B-3
Recommended Additional Reading

1. (U) MACV Vietnam Combat Experiences "Pacification of Quang Dien District: An Integrated Campaign", 1 March 1969 (U). This is a review of a classic Vietnamization campaign conducted from May through October of 1968 which succeeded in virtually eliminating Viet Cong influence from Quang Dien District, northwest of Hue in Thua Thien Province. It illustrates an integrated effort between a US airborne battalion and district territorial forces in creating a secure condition for resettlement and development of the district. Although airborne forces were available if needed, security throughout the district was provided by the territorial forces, who the people knew would remain permanently and not be redeployed to another area.

2. (C) MACV Lessons Learned "Operation DAN QUYEN - The Ben Het-Dak To Campaign", 24 August 1969 (S). This is a case study of the events which took place from late April into July of 1969 in northern Kontum Province, the Ben Het-Dak To Campaign. Not only did ARVN forces acquit themselves well in this campaign in extremely heavy contact, they also conducted prolonged operations holding sole tactical responsibility in a sizeable area.
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<td>Heliborne Operation Cai Nhay, An Xuyen Province</td>
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<td>11 Apr 62</td>
<td>Operation JUNGLE JIM</td>
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<td>Ranger Task Force Operation in Vinh Binh Sector</td>
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<td>Multi-Battalion Operation in Northern Tay Ninh Province</td>
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<td>11 Apr 62</td>
<td>Operations in Phuoc Thanh Sector to Relocate Civilians</td>
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<td>18 Apr 62</td>
<td>Operation DAN TIEN VIII</td>
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<td>VC Ambush-Trung Lap, Binh Duong Province</td>
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<td>Review of Lessons Learned 1 - 15</td>
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<td>Techniques Dealing with Airmobile Assaults</td>
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<td>Tips and Combat Experiences</td>
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