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6 October 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces, Period Ending 30 April 1969 (U)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to AGSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO San Francisco 96240

AVOB-C

15 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHOIC-1ST, APO San Francisco 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army, Pacific
ATTN: GPO-UT, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) Section I. Operations: Significant Activities.
   a. General.
      (1) MISSION. The missions assigned to the 5th SF Group are as follows:
      (a) To exercise command and control of subordinate detachments.
      (b) To advise and assist the VNSF and support the CIDG Program.
      (c) To act as Sector/Subsector advisors as directed by COMUSMACV.
      (d) To provide intelligence to COMUSMACV.
      (e) To conduct special operations.
      (f) To conduct the MACV Recondo School.
AVOB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RG5 CSFGR-65 (RI)

(2) Organizational Structure. See organizational chart at Inclosure 1, troop disposition lists at Inclosure 3, and CTZ maps at Inclosure 4.

(3) Commanders and Key Personnel. See list at Inclosure 2.

(4) Situation at the Beginning of the Reporting Period. At the end of the last quarter, enemy activity had dropped off considerably. Aggressive friendly operations coupled with wide-ranging airstrikes seem to have checked a long heralded "Winter-Spring Offensive." In I CTZ large enemy units had once again renewed the threat to the DMZ and QUANG-TRI Province. Intelligence sources in II CTZ reported large enemy buildups west of KONTUM near Camp BEN HIT (A-244). SAIGON still remained the Communist's main target but Allied forces were organized in depth and any major enemy troop movement toward the city was almost certain to be discovered. Border camps, such as BEN SOI (VNSF A-136) and KATUM (A-322), were subject to constant attacks by fire. In the Delta the 4th Mobile Strike Force Command was still bogged down in the NUI COTO mountain area. Several attacks on TUK CHUP Knoll, the main enemy redoubt, had not been successful. Throughout IV Corps, however, an increasing Chieu Hoi rate indicated that local VC forces were having considerable difficulty holding their units together. There were intelligence reports that NVA units were being introduced into the Delta. Throughout Vietnam the enemy seemed to be preparing for a major offensive. If for no other reason than memorandum of last year's TET Offensive the Communists probably felt forced to launch another this year, either during the Holidays or immediately thereafter. Yet this very expectation insured that ARVN as well as other Allied units would be ready to counter any enemy attack.

(5) Operations. The statistical data on operations conducted during this quarter are shown at Inclosure 5. The TET holidays passed uneventfully, but immediately thereafter on the night of 22-23 February attacks-by-fire were launched across the country against Allied bases and outposts as well as Vietnamese cities. Yet very few of these were followed up by ground attacks. Nowhere was there the suicidal fanaticism of last year's TET battles. The enemy's purpose was to gain the greatest publicity, especially in the United States, at a minimum cost in men and equipment. But this very strategy may indicate a weakening in both the enemy's resources as well as their morale. The so-called "Winter-Spring" offensive would sputter on and off throughout the next two months. The most threatened camp in I CTZ was TIN PHUC (A-102) where the enemy overran one outpost and attempted to besiege the camp itself. Mobile Strike Force units assisted by AMERICAN Division elements conducted operations in the camp's TAOR and relieved enemy pressure. Throughout late February in II CTZ Camps BEN HIT (A-244) and DUC CO (A-253) received attacks-by-fire and the enemy appeared to be massing for drives against PHUOC and KONTUM Cities. These never materialized. On 3 March the Communists, for the first time in II CTZ,
employed tanks in an unsuccessful attack against BEN HET. A minefield, planted by camp forces, blew up two of the PT-76 tanks and the rest retreated. In III CTZ the enemy as part of the offensive assaulted the BIN HOA-LONG BINH complex but they were fairly easily repulsed. Camps BEN SOI, KATUM, and DUC HU (A-325) were harassed continuously by hostile rocket and mortar barrages. The most significant CIDO battle in III CTZ occurred in War Zone D when the 3rd MFC Operation CENTURIAN VI made contact with elements of the 275th VC regiment, 5th VC Division. Over 300 enemy were killed in the engagement. In IV CTZ the 4th and 5th Mobile Strike Forces, teaming up in a brilliant month-long battle, routed the Communists from TUK CHUP Knoll and drove them out of the NUI COTO mountain area.

(6) Situation at the End of the Period. The Enemy's "Winter-Spring" Offensive, which had consisted almost exclusively of stand-off attacks-by-fire, died out about the middle of April. A new offensive was rumored in intelligence reports, supposedly to begin in late May or early June. In I CTZ major enemy units had withdrawn to base areas in order to resupply and retrain. The Communists were expected to increase their rocket and mortar attacks and even launch limited ground probes in an effort to draw attention away from their rice-gathering activities. BEN HET (A-244) remained the most threatened camp in II CTZ since a significant number of enemy units were still concentrated in or near its TAOR. Any friendly operations in that area could expect to encounter heavy NVA opposition. In III CTZ hostile pressure continued against Camps BEN SOI (VNSF A-136) and KATUM (A-322). Allied operations and massive air strikes seemed to have thwarted any Communist plans for larger-scale ground assaults toward SAIGON. The problem in IV CTZ was what to do with the NUI COTO area now that it had been taken. The danger was that half-hearted pacification and RF/TF operations would allow the enemy to seep back in. Nine months of bloody fighting by two Mobile Strike Force Commands would then have been in vain. There were also intelligence reports that a regular NVA division was moving down along the IV Corps border with Cambodia for possible infiltration into the Delta. While this might mean a step-up in the fighting tempo, it would also signify that local VC efforts were failing and needed an infusion of fresh outside forces. Country-wide Communist efforts were characterized by indecision and uncertainty. This could be the result of the Paris Peace Talks or successful ARVN and other Allied operations or a combination of both factors. Enemy strategy will probably seek to inflict maximum casualties, especially on American troops, at a minimum cost. This will gain much publicity while preserving enemy strength for the post-war struggle in the Republic of Vietnam.

(7) Changes in Organization.

(a) Camps CUNG SON (A-221), HA TAY (A-227), and TAN RAI (A-232), all II CTZ camps, were converted to the RF status on 31 March 1969.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVOB-C
15 May 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(b) Camps DONG TRU (A-222), BUON HAI CH (A-238), and VINH THANH (A-120), the latter a VNSF camp, are undergoing the conversion cycle at this time and are scheduled to convert to RF on 30 June 1969.

(c) Effective 25 April the four interior camps in TV CTZ, MY DA (A-43), MY DIN TIT (A 116), MY PHUOC TAY (A 466), and KOT (A 114) came under the direct control of Company D. Formerly Camp MY DA was under Detachment B-43 at CAO LANH while the other three were controlled by Detachment B-41 at MOC HOA.

(8) A list of VIPs who visited this headquarters during the reporting period is found at Inclosure 6.

(9) Inclosure 7 contains the General Order for the award of the Congressional Medal of Honor on 17 April to SFC 87 Fred W. Oehlertosky.

b. Intelligence.

(1) I Corps Tactical Zone.

(a) In early February the total enemy strength was approximately 105,000 personnel of whom 38,000 were combat troops. Contacts and enemy activity remained generally light as the enemy suffered the loss of many of their major caches. The enemy sustained heavy losses when they attempted to initiate a series of coordinated attacks following the Tet Holidays. At the end of April the enemy was estimated to have approximately 85,000 personnel of whom 32,000 were combat troops. These losses were attributed to aggressive friendly sweep operations and the loss of large medical and food caches resulting in a large number of desertions and deaths due to insufficient food and medical attention. Throughout this period enemy forces operated with two confirmed NVA divisions, 17 to 19 independent regiments, and approximately 75 to 80 maneuver battalions.

(b) During the first half of February enemy activity within Special Forces TAOR's remained at a low level. Enemy activity was characterized by infiltration of personnel and equipment while units retrained and refitted for planned offensive activities. There were numerous agent reports indicating infiltration through the DMZ of multi-battalion and regimental size enemy units, which were probably the 27th and 216th NVA Regiments. Sporadic ground contacts with squad and platoon-size enemy forces were observed during the Tet Holidays. On 22 February the enemy launched widespread attacks-by-fire and ground probes against population centers and military installations including MAI LOC(A-101), HA THANH(A-104), and T Nhuoc(A-102). T Nhuoc was the most threatened camp with both the camp and its outposts receiving attacks-by-fire and ground probes. During this siege the camp received 250 rounds of mixed mortar and rocket fire while an additional 250 to 300 rounds impacted outside the camp's perimeter. Camp operations from T Nhuoc met stubborn resistance from fortified positions occupied by VC Local Force units supported by elements of the 31st NVA Regiment, 2nd NVA Division, and the 78th VC Local Force Artillery Battalion. Marine Operation DEUNY CANYON severely limited the enemy's capability to sustain offensive activities in the SHAU Valley. Hostile activity during the first week of March increased sharply as the enemy launched widespread, coordinated attacks-by-fire against population centers, province and district towns, military installations and outposts throughout I CTZ. Intelligence reports from MAI LOC continued to indicate the enemy was infiltrating men and material through the northern portion of the TAOR. A Special Forces agent report stated unidentified NVA units of multi-battalion-size were located on the plateau southeast of THUONG DUC. The 21st Regiment of the 2nd NVA Division had been carried in this area since the October attack on the camp. The threat to T Nhuoc...
appeared to have been relieved by reinforcements of the camp Mobile Strike Force and AMERICAL Division elements. A total of 653 NVA/VC were confirmed killed by all sources. During the first weeks of March usually reliable sources had indicated significant enemy buildups along the eastern fringes of the HA THAMN, MINH LONG (A-108) and BA TO(A-1/6) TAOR's. There were indications that these forces were moving in order to attack QUANG MNAI City and DUC PHO. Although these attacks never materialized, the movement of the 3rd NVA Division posed a serious threat to CIDG camps in QUANG NOAI Province. Interrogation of the executive officer of the lst NVA Regiment revealed that an enemy armored personnel carrier regiment equipped with Soviet BTR-50 armored personnel carriers and an artillery regiment equipped with Soviet 122mm field artillery pieces were located 35 kilometers west of THUONG DUC. Because of the enemy's capability of armor and artillery in the KHE SANH area and the A SHAU Valley, it is possible that the enemy has this capability in the western regions of QUANG NAM Province. Interrogation of a POW captured 12 kilometers northeast of MAI LOC revealed he was a member of a transportation battalion subordinate to the 325C NVA Division. The unit had infiltrated through the DMZ early this year and was to prepare a base camp for further elements of the 325C Division which were then located just north of the DMZ. It is believed elements of the 325C Division were responsible for the sharp increase in attacks-by-fire against friendly installations during mid-March in QUANG TRI Province. A 15 March camp operation from MAI LOC discovered segments of a Russian manufactured SA-2 surface-to-air guided missile seven kilometers southwest of the camp. Friendly sweep operations continued to discover vast caches Russian and CHICOM manufactured equipment in western QUANG TRI Province and the northern portion of the A SHAU Valley. During April enemy activity dropped to an all time low level within Special Forces TAOR's as the enemy's last-TET Offensive was believed to have ended in I CTZ. All enemy units returned to safe areas in order to retrain and refit for renewed offensive activities. The date of this new offensive has often been mentioned as HO CHI MINH's birthday on May 19. Throughout the reporting period the enemy continued improving his lines of communication. The enemy began construction of HAYNS Road which runs from Laos through southwestern QUANG NAM Province and, if the previous speed of construction continues, will reach KHAM DUC at the end of May. Route 548 through A SHAU Valley continued to be well used and maintained, probably by elements of the 83rd NVA Engineer and 9th NVA Infantry Regiments. Due to the loss of major cache sites throughout I CTZ enemy morale fell to a low level although cadre continued to promise their troops a major victory and American de-escalation of the war.

The rumored use of new weapons and equipment was not confirmed in I CTZ although reports indicated the enemy intends to introduce several weapons. The continued accuracy of the RPG-2 and RPG-7 against friendly installations in the CUA VIENT River Valley indicates the possibility of an
infrared capability. There have been recent reports of the enemy along the CUA VIT River possessing an 81mm shoulder-held recoilless rifle. It is possible this weapon is the equivalent of the Soviet R56-10. The capture of 12 Soviet 122mm field artillery pieces during Operation HUNTER CANYON emphasized the enemy's attempt to increase their artillery capability in I CTZ. During the reporting period the enemy substantially decreased their use of artillery fire from within the DMZ against friendly installations. Reports of helicopters and "airborne lights" continued to be received along the DMZ. Readouts of aerial photography continue to identify Soviet tanks, scout cars, and armored personnel carriers in Laos and North Vietnam. The Soviet PT-76 Light Amphibious Tank has not been confirmed in I CTZ since LANG VI Special Forces Camp was attacked and overrun in February 1968. The use of armor in future enemy attacks, however, cannot be overlooked.

(d) At the end of the reporting period major enemy units had withdrawn to base areas and were conducting resupply and retraining activities. Even though major enemy forces are not in attack positions the enemy is still capable of rapidly deploying his forces in an offensive posture and conducting widespread attacks-by-fire and ground attacks against friendly fire support bases, outposts, district towns and population centers. MAI LOC and other friendly installations in QUANG TRI Province are vulnerable to attack by the 27th, 246th and 270th NVA Regiments and the 31st Group. These forces could be reinforced by enemy units north of the DMZ including the 308th, 320th and 325C NVA Divisions. In QUANG N.M Province the enemy is capable of attacking THUONG DUC and NGOC SON (A-105) with the 31st and 111st Regiments and the 1st VC and 21st NVA Regiments, 2nd NVA Division. These forces can be supported by the 365B NVA Artillery Regiment and elements of the 62B NVA Artillery Regiment. TINH RUOC and other outposts in QUANG TIN province are vulnerable to attack by the 31st Regiment of the 2nd NVA Division, supported by 5 VC battalions. CIDG camps and friendly installations in QUANG NAM Province are subject to attack by elements of the 3rd NVA Division, the 38th, 48th, and 81st Local Force VC Battalions, and the 401st Sapper Regiment. Friendly forces in I CTZ can expect an increase in attacks-by-fire and ground probes during early May as the enemy attempts to draw attention away from their rice gathering activities. Major enemy offensive activity in the northern three provinces will be limited due to aggressive friendly operations which have captured numerous enemy caches and have hampered enemy infiltration into South Vietnam from Laos.
CONFIDENTIAL
15 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS CSPOR-65 (RI)

(a) 403d SOD Activities. Personnel of the 403d completed their operations building and are currently presenting daily briefings to the CO and S-2 Officer of Company C. On 5 February 403d SOD personnel, as representatives of Company C, presented a formal briefing to the III MAF ground reconnaissance conference. The following areas were discussed during the briefings: the responsibility to report wire sightings immediately and accurately, the channels for reporting these and requesting assistance in wire tap operations, and the different types of equipment usually deployed on wire tap operations. Recently the unit received additional wire tap equipment and is now capable of supporting several concurrent operations. A briefing on wire tap operations to include enemy landline communications, types of wire tap equipment, and methods of deployment has been prepared for Special Forces personnel. (Company C)

(f) District Intelligence and Operation Coordinating Centers (DIOCC). DIOCCs have been established in or adjacent to all Special Forces A detachments in the I CTZ. The mission of the DIOCC coordinator who is subordinate to the District Senior Advisor, is to coordinate intelligence activities at the district level. He is primarily concerned with identifying and neutralizing Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) in his area of operations. As a result of the close professional association between Special Forces intelligence sergeants and these coordinators information concerning enemy units and VCI is furnished on a timely basis. Recently an intelligence collection agent employed by TRA BONG District gathered information concerning a meeting of a large number of VC in that area. This information was initially reported to the GVN District Chief, then passed to the DIOCC coordinator who in turn notified the intelligence sergeant at Detachment A-107. Based on this the Detachment Commander coordinated an operation with the commander of an American artillery unit in the area. R/E fire was placed on the meeting site. No body count was obtained from this; however, a large secondary explosion was observed. (Company C)

(2) II Corps Tactical Zone.

(a) In early February the estimated enemy strength in II CTZ was 60,000 personnel of whom 36,000 were combat troops. Enemy activity continued at a light level for the first three weeks but rose sharply in the final week of February due to the enemy's initiation of the Winter-Spring Offensive. During this offensive the enemy suffered moderate losses due to friendly operations. At the end of April the estimated enemy strength in II CTZ was 54,000 of whom 34,500 were combat troops. Though the enemy suffered moderate losses they began to replace these by infiltrating combat troops in small numbers into II CTZ along the Cambodian border from base camps located in Cambodia.

(b) After a lull during the prior three months, enemy initiated activity increased greatly with the initiation of the Winter-Spring Offensive on the night of 22-23 February. BEN HET (A-244) was the hardest hit of all Special
Forces camps in II CTZ. Fragments picked up from the heavy attack-by-fire revealed they were from an 85mm field gun. A FAC later confirmed three of these positions located along the Cambodian border. Also during February a major relocation of enemy units was noted in II CTZ. The 95th, 18B and 101D NVA Regiments, which were previously located in II CTZ, were identified in III CTZ. During the month increased road activities were noted in the Tri-border area. Documents captured during this time identified the K25A and K25B Engineer Battalions. The documents revealed these units had the mission of repairing roads in the Tri-Border area. Elements of the 66th and 24th NVA Regiments moved from Cambodian base areas to positions threatening Special Forces Camps POI KIENG (A-231) and POI KIENG (A-113). Operation BINH DAI 48, an ARVN-US operation conducted in western Kontum and Pleiku Provinces, resulted in heavy enemy casualties. During the last week of February and the first week of March the enemy continued to shell Special Forces Camp BEN HET with artillery and mortar fire. On 3 March the enemy conducted an unsuccessful armor attack on the camp in which the enemy lost two PT-76 tanks. Documents taken from one of the destroyed tanks revealed that it was from the 202nd Armor Regiment. It is doubtful, however, that the whole armor regiment is located in the area. Throughout March enemy activity was centered in the Western Highlands while the remainder of the corps experienced a low level of activity. POI KIENG reported receiving 105mm howitzer fire on 7 March, indicating that the road in the B-3 Front area had been completed and was being used to transport artillery and troops towards POI KIENG. Enemy activity was reported at a low level during early April in northwestern II CTZ, while enemy activity increased in the II-23 area. Analysis of documents captured during late March and early April by Special Forces Camp DUC LAP (A-239), Camp AM LAC (A-231) and 3rd MDF Battalion identified the TRUNG SON Transportation Regiment. This is composed of the 251st and 252nd Battalions. The 251st Battalion picks up equipment from the NAM LTR base area and delivers it to the 252nd Battalion which has the mission of delivering the equipment to enemy units in PHUOC LONG Province. Documents captured east of TIKU ATAR (A-231) from 19 to 23 April and a FN captured by elements of the 17th Cav on 23 April identified the E-12 and E-19 NVA Regiments. The mission of these units was to infiltrate to PHU KH and KHANH XA Provinces. It is expected that the enemy activities will continue to be moderate as enemy troops step up infiltration from the north to base areas located in Cambodia and then into RVN.

On 23 February Special Forces Camp BEN HET received heavy barrages of artillery fire which was later identified as 85mm howitzer fire. This was the first time 85mm artillery was used in II CTZ. With the enemy road network in the Tri-Border area, the enemy could transport artillery pieces much more easily. During March II CTZ also experienced 105mm howitzer fire for the first time. Analysis of shell fragments from DUC CO (A-253) and POI KIENG plus the capture of CHICOM 105mm howitzer ammunition...
confirmed its use. Though the enemy has used armor in I CTZ, the use of armor was experienced for the first time in II CTZ. On 3 March Soviet PT-76 amphibious tanks were used during the attack on BEN HHT. Two helicopters were identified in northern II CTZ near Special Forces Camp PEMIX (A-255). The first identification was on 10 April when the Hawk radar system at LZ Oasis detected an unidentified aircraft. Chase aircraft were then dispatched and pursued the intruder, which was later identified as a Soviet MI-6 HOOK, a helicopter having a maximum cargo capacity of 13 tons. On 20 April the second identification was made when a chase aircraft pursued and identified a Soviet MI-4 HOUND cargo helicopter. Though there has been no confirmed evidence of the use made of these aircraft, it is believed that they are employed to transport equipment and troops into II CTZ from Cambodia.

(d) Current enemy dispositions indicate enemy units are in the process of relocating and reorganizing for possible offensive activities which intelligence sources indicate will take place in May. Primary targets during the offensive will possibly be BEN HHT as indicated by the relocation of the 66th NVA Regiment and the 10th NVA Artillery Regiment out of the CHU PA Mountains towards BEN HHT. Major population and US installation centers such as PLEIKU, KONTUM, QUI Nhon, AN KHE, and NHA TRANG can expect increased enemy activity in the coming months. Special Forces camps along Cambodian such as DUC CO (A-253) and DUC LAP remain threatened by enemy elements operating in base areas along the Cambodian border. It is probable the enemy will utilize tanks and artillery in future offensives against Special Forces Camps.

(e) Counterintelligence Screening Operations. Two counterintelligence screening operations were conducted unilaterally by USASF CI/COLL personnel from Company B at Camp DUC CO (A-253) during this period. The first on 10 February 1969 utilized an ex-VC turned informant who was familiar with the area. He volunteered to go to A-253 and discreetly observe the CIDG within the camp. During the operation eight VC, VCI suspects were apprehended, interrogated, and turned over to the Pleiku National Police for further disposition. The second operation was conducted on 28 April 1969 in a similar manner. No further suspects were identified or apprehended. The informant was extracted. This later operation indicated there has apparently been no enemy penetration attempt into the camp area during a period of accelerated hostile activity within A-253's TAOR.

(f) Polygraph Examinations. During this period approximately 105 polygraph examinations were conducted throughout Company B TAOR's. Nine examinations proved to be positive. By comparing the examinations with detailed interrogation reports, numerous VC suspects were identified and neutralized. These were both male and female as well as CIDG and civilian. They represented all echelons of Company B and the Mobile Strike Force units. The subjects who had positive results from their examinations were...
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AVGB-C
15 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS. CSFOR-65 (RI)

interrogated by CI/COLL personnel and subsequently released to the custody of national police agencies for further exploitation. (Co B)

(g) Cost Code 912 Fund Reports. Numerous administrative discrepancies were noted on the VNSF and USASF monthly Cost Code 912 Fund Reports. In order to eliminate the mechanical and procedural errors of reporting, Company B has prepared a bilingual Cost Code 912 Fund Report guidelines sheet which was distributed to all subordinate detachments within Company B. These guidelines should help to improve the validity of the monthly reports. (Company B)

(a) Advisory Activities. Significant progress in counterpart associations was noted between VNSF and USASF S-2 personnel. The strengths and weaknesses of the S-2 CI/COLL operations and administration were freely discussed and analyzed. As a result the VNSF have scheduled an intelligence school to be conducted at Company B during May 1969 for all VNSF intelligence NCO's. VNSF and USASF S-2 and CI/COLL personnel at Company B are currently coordinating blocks of instruction, teaching aids, and materials to be utilized for the intelligence school. The goal is to insure that VNSF and USASF intelligence personnel are operating and administering with equal proficiency. (Company B)
III Corps Tactical Zone.

(a) In early February enemy strength in I I Corps was between 60,000 and 65,000 personnel of whom 15,000 were combat troops. Contacts and incidents increased significantly during the latter part of February as the enemy initiated the long expected Winter-Spring Offensive. Throughout the period enemy forces operated with four confirmed divisions, seven to eight independent regiments, and 80 to 85 maneuver battalions.

(b) The enemy terminated a month of moderate activity by launching the Winter-Spring Offensive on the night of 22-23 February. Very few of the numerous attacks-by-fire were followed by ground attacks, indicating that the first phase of the new offensive was in preparation of the battle field. During the corps-wide attacks-by-fire no major enemy redeployment was noticed with the exception of the 7th NVA Division. Three regiments of this division began moving south out of the Fishhook (XY5891) after remaining stationary for the prior three to four months. The most significant activity recorded during the month of February was the attack on the BIEN HOA-LONG BINH complex. This action, coupled with other nearby contacts, resulted in the identification of the 17th NVA, 33rd NVA, 95th NVA, 275th VC, and 277th VC Regiments and also revealed their tentative locations in the vicinity of BIEN HOA. During March Camps KATUM (A-322) and BEN SOI(A-136) reported heavy enemy activity with the most serious attacks being directed against BEN SOI's PHUOC TAM Outpost. A heavy enemy build-up to the northeast, north, northeast, and east of TAY NINH City was also noted throughout the month. Elements of the 1st and 7th NVA Divisions were involved suggesting the provincial capital was to be a major target for the second phase of the offensive. During the second week of March enemy activity shifted to the border areas of HAU NGHIA and TAY NINH Provinces. A series of attacks were directed against KATUM, DUC HUE(A-325) and BEN SOI. The heaviest ground attack was against BEN SOI where camp forces made contact with elements of the 271st and 273rd VC Regiments, 9th VC Division. The 95C NVA Regiment, 1st NVA Division was identified in attacks directed against LZ Grant (XY188904) on 8 and 11 March which further indicated the enemy's threat to TAY NINH Province. In war zone D the 3rd MSFC Operation Centurian IV made contact with elements of the 275th VC Regiment, 5th VC Division. After two days of fighting, enemy losses were 190 killed by body count. It is felt that the heavy resistance displayed by the 275th VC Regiment was a diversionsary tactic to allow other elements of the 5th VC Division to move past allied sweeping operations without being detected. Although a decrease in the number of enemy initiated incidents was noted for the latter part of March, the intensity of attacks-by-fire showed a sharp increase. Serious attacks-by-fire reported on 25 and 27 March were directed against the ARVN Airborne Command Post located in the vicinity of XT192S05.
which received 185 rounds of rocket and mortar fire and PHUOC TAM Outpost which received 108 rounds. During April enemy activity consisted primarily of attacks by fire in an attempt to cover the withdrawal of the 7th NVA Regiment from the Michelin Plantation and the replacement of units in the border area.

(c) On 12 April US Special Forces personnel observed two tracked vehicles in the vicinity of XT2711 and XT2914. The presence of armored vehicles, coupled with the enemy antiaircraft capability in close proximity to the camp, poses a serious threat to Camp DUC HUE.

(d) At the present time divisional-size enemy forces are deployed in the western and northern portions of the corps as well as in War Zone D. In TAY NINH Province the enemy has in excess of 11,000 troops, composed of the 9th VC and 1st NVA Divisions. Special Forces Camps KATUM and BEN SOI have received the brunt of enemy initiated activity during the past three months and all indications are that it will continue. In HAU NGHIA Province DUC HUE and TRA CU(A.396) are threatened by elements of the 9th VC Division and Sub-Region 2. These two camps lie along a major infiltration route which runs from the Cambodian Border to SAIGON. They will receive heavy enemy activity should the enemy attempt to move on the Capital Military District. It is concluded that the enemy is at a stage of indecision and uncertainty as allied forces continue to thwart their plans. An inability to complete scheduled offensive activities and the continued erosion of manpower and resources may have caused a re-evaluation and reassessment of their present strategy. It is estimated that the enemy is likely to continue the present series of uncoordinated, localized attacks while evaluating developments on the battlefield and at the conference table before making decisive efforts towards withdrawal or towards coordinated, large-scale offensive activity.

(e) During the reporting period, the polygraph examiner attached to Company A has traveled extensively within the III Corps Tactical Zone and was able to enhance liaison between the USASF and the VNSF as well as with the NSS and the National Police. He was also directly responsible for identifying 101 members of the Viet Cong Infrastructure of whom 44 were neutralized. From 2 to 11 April 1969, an officer assigned to the 82 section, Company A attended a Phoenix Program orientation course. He will be used to further this unit's active participation in the program.

IV Corps Tactical Zone.

(a) In early February enemy strength was approximately 11,000 personnel of whom 35,000 were combat troops. Enemy strength remained stable with a possible slight increase during February and the first half of March.
The 962nd Main Force Battalion, D1 Main Force Regiment, CU LONG Regiment, and the 6th Artillery Company were confirmed operating in or near Special Forces areas of interest. At present the enemy has five confirmed regiments and 3 confirmed independent battalions. Total estimated strength is 15,000 troops with 10,000 in a combat role.

(b) Most of the major enemy units remained within their normal areas of operation: the 510th and 512th Battalions in southern CHAU DOC Province; the 569th and 295th Battalions in northern CHAU DOC Province; the 62nd Battalion in northern KMN PHG Province; the 502nd Battalion near CAO LAM City, the 504th Battalion and possibly the 257B Battalion in the Crow's nest area, elements of the DTD Regiment in northern Base Area 704; and elements of the DTD Regiment in northern central DINH TUONG Province. Immediately following the Tet Holidays the enemy units around CAN Tho city relocated to their traditional base areas further south and have remained there. FW's, Ho Chams and captured documents indicated that several battalions suffered severe casualties during B-52 airstrikes, thus prompting this movement. In early March enemy units began to relocate toward CAI LAY, CAI BE and MY THO Cities. The enemy was apparently preparing for major attacks in DINH TUONG Province. Although indirect fire attacks increased, there were no major ground attacks against these cities. Intensified friendly operations conducted in late March and throughout April forced the enemy to withdraw from their objectives due to heavy losses. The enemy's degree of resistance plus the tactical value of the NUI COTO complex prompted the execution of a major operation to pacify the mountain. On 5 March the 4th and 5th ... Strike Force Commands began the operation which terminated successfully on 7 April. This is expected to have an immense psychological effect on the enemy due to the loss of their once invulnerable headquarters. During late March and early April Military Region II reportedly experienced a major reorganization. New battalion-size units were to be formed, some as conventional units and others as specialized sapper units. On 24 April indications appeared that two sapper battalions had been formed in DINH TUONG Province. Although FW's claimed to be from the 313A Sapper Battalion and captured documents made reference to the 313A and 313B Sapper Battalions, neither unit has been confirmed in contact. Enemy activity increased notably in Base Area 704. Large enemy units as well as a highly complex military installation were reported. Just prior to the turning point of the NUI COTO Operation, major enemy units in CHAU DOC Province deployed for a large offensive directed against the provincial capital. This attack was preempted by friendly operations resulting in a substantial decrease in the combat effectiveness and morale of enemy troops in the province.

(c) On 12 February Special Forces Camp TUTU NHON (A-1015) located near the III CTZ-IV CTZ border reported an unidentified aircraft flying north to-
wards Cambodia. This was the first such incident reported to the headquarters in IV CTZ. On 19 February Viet Cong elements on NUI COTO employed a chemical agent to force friendly units to break contact. This was the only reported use of chemical agents against Special Forces units in IV CTZ during the period. Although the enemy's 107mm rocket capability in the 60th STZ was confirmed in January and several rounds have been captured since then, the weapon was not employed during this period.

(d) Current enemy disposition indicates that they will continue to avoid decisive contacts while recruiting, training and resupplying troops. Extensive propaganda campaigns can be expected especially in those areas where the enemy has suffered the heaviest losses. Friendly installations can anticipate sporadic attacks-by-fire used as harassment and to screen troop movements. The enemy will probably continue to avoid Special Forces camps and operations whenever possible and instead concentrate their activities on major population centers where the maximum number of civilians will be affected or lightly defended installations where they can be assured of victory.

(e) During this quarter emphasis shifted somewhat from recruiting counterintelligence and collection agents, although considerable recruiting continued as total agent strength approached established goals, to systematically weeding out unproductive and unreliable agents. The VCI program continued to produce excellent results, although some detachments were weak in this area and the number of neutralizations as compared with identifications were not as high as anticipated. A large part of the difficulty in increasing neutralizations stemmed from the general lack of interest and support of the PHOENIX program by GVN authorities in Kien Tuong Province. The VIP program was emphasized with an increase of volunteer informants being noted. However, problems were experienced in obtaining production of special leaflets and posters due to a large backlog of orders for local agencies. The average cost of IR's fluctuated slightly but overall remained at an acceptably low figure. Considerable difficulty was experienced at Camp MY DA(A-433) from obtaining production of special leaflets and posters due to a large backlog of orders for local agencies. The average cost of IR's fluctuated slightly but overall remained at an acceptably low figure. Considerable difficulty was experienced at Camp MY DA(A-433) with regard to IR production. Finally, at the end of February 1969, all nets were submitted for termination.

By the end of the reporting period, recruiting of new agents at this camp was progressing satisfactorily under stringent control measures designed to prevent a recurrence of the problem previously encountered. (Co D)

(f) The company S-2 Section actively engaged in support of Operation NUI COTO. A collection net was established in the operational area which provided considerable information. Aggressive liaison was established with the local DIOCC which produced invaluable information and also resulted in the loan of eight Kit Carson Scouts to support the operation. A polygraph
examiner was utilized with considerable success. However, a six-man CMIC team produced marginal results, partially due to the inexperience of the interrogators. The S2 section maintained a minimum of one officer and one analyst at the operation CP throughout most of the operation and occasionally augmented these with an additional officer and NCO. This arrangement was extremely effective. However, it greatly taxed the S2 personnel resources at Company Headquarters, thereby making it advisable in the future to have augmentation from higher headquarters for any similar undertakings.

(g) A quarterly intelligence conference was held at the company headquarters during February. The first day of the conference was devoted to an interrogation training class conducted by a three-man CMIC team. Major topics presented and discussed on the second day included the VCI program, the VIP program, and reporting procedures. The conference also afforded an opportunity for those attending to discuss problem areas.

(h) Counterpart relations at the C-detachment level remained good although Operation NUI COTO also taxed VNSF intelligence personnel assets making it difficult to coordinate on other substantive matters.

(i) Increased emphasis was placed on analyzing and developing the intelligence role and concepts in the new border surveillance/interdiction program. Considerable coordination was effected with MACV personnel in this regard. One of the official problems facing implementation of the program is the scarcity of intelligence personnel assets, especially CB analysts.

(j) As the reporting period closed two problem areas became apparent. The first of these was the loss through reassignment of one attached visual reconnaissance pilot and aircraft which decreased the amount of support immediately available to the Company. The second problem was the DEROS loss of CB and analyst personnel which was partially alleviated by several voluntary extensions of tours. Adequate replacements are not expected. Fortunately, as a result of extensions by CI personnel and the arrival of area specialist replacement personnel, the personnel situation in those fields has improved greatly.
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15 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS GSPFR-65 (RI)

O. Operations.

(a) I Corps Tactical Zone (Company C)

During the reporting period, Company C assets conducted a total of 373 company or larger, 124 platoon, and 2,820 squad operations. A total of 2,02 contacts were made with the following results- Enemy- 228 KIA, 97 captured and 94 weapons captured; Friendly- 2 USASF, 9 CIDO, 6 RF, PF KIA, 35 USASF, 7 VNSF, 250 CIDO and 1 RF/PF WIA, 17 CIDO and 1 RF/PF WIA. 58 weapons lost. The following significant contacts occurred during the reporting period:

(a) On 23 February, Camp TIN PHUOC (A-102), QUANG TIN Province, sustained 35 rounds of mixed 82mm mortar and 122mm rocket fire, followed by a ground attack on the camp's southwest outpost. The enemy, part of the 31st NVA Regiment, 2nd NVA Division, succeeded in overrunning the OP, but a CSF counterattack later that morning succeeded in recapturing the position. Results: Enemy- 10 KIA; Friendly- 42 CSF KIA, 1 USASF, 1 VNSF, and 10 CSF WIA, 4 CSF MIA, 85 reinforcements and CSF operations conducted clearing operations in that TA through 21 March, engaging in ten significant contacts with elements of the same enemy unit. Total results were: Enemy 81 KIA, 27 weapons captured; Friendly 1 USASF and 20 CIDO KIA, 1 USASF and 75 CIDO WIA, one CIDO MIA. In addition, elements of the American Division, operating three km north of TIN PHUOC, discovered 12 graves containing 152 NVA bodies on 16 March. The enemy KIA were believed to be the result of an artillery zone sweep called by Camp TIN PHUOC, although the KIA figures were not included in KIA statistics.

(b) On 21 March, a CSF company operation from TRA BONG (A-107), QUANG TIN Province, was ambushed by an unidentified VC local force unit, eight kilometers southwest of TRA BONG. Results: Enemy 19 KIA; Friendly- three CSF KIA; 2 USASF and one interpreter WIA.

(c) On 2 April, a CSF Company operation from BA TO (A-106), QUANG NAM Province, raided two VC way stations of the C-29 LF Company, seven kilometers southeast of BA TO. Results: Enemy 8 KIA, two enemy and two weapons captured.

(d) On 9-10 April, two companies of the 1st MSF operating near THUONG DUC (A-105), QUANG NAM Province, engaged probable elements of the 11st or 21st NVA Regiments, five kilometers east of THUONG DUC. Total results of two separate contacts and a cache recovery were- Enemy- 4 KIA, three enemy 16 SA and CS weapons, and miscellaneous equipment captured; Friendly- 1 MSF KIA, 2 MSF WIA.

(e) On 15 April, a CRP operation from BA TO (A-106), ambushed the
CONFIDENTIAL

A2OR-C  15 May 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for
the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

Lead element of possibly the C-29 local force company, five kilo-
meters southeast of BA TO. Results: Enemy - 7 KIA, 1 small arms
captured; Friendly - 7 CSF KIA, four small arms lost.

(f) On 27 April, a CSF company operation from HONG SON, (A-105),
QUANG NAM Province, was ambushed by two NVA companies, believed to
be from the 90th NVA Regiment. Results: Friendly - 1 USASF and 2
MSF KIA; 2 MSF KIA, 6 weapons and one AM/FRC-25 radio lost.
During the reporting period, Company B assets conducted a total of 531 company or larger, 2278 platoon and 8075 squad operations. A total of 1,65 contacts were made with the following results: Enemy- 738 KIA; 53 enemy and 250 weapons captured; Friendly- 6 USASF and 89 CIDG KIA; 19 USASF, 4 VNSF and 330 CIDG WIA; 1 CIDG MIA; 25 weapons lost.

(a) On 1 February, a CSF Company operation from PLEI MRONG (A-113), PLEIKU Province, engaged an unidentified IF VC platoon three kilometers north of their camp. Results: Enemy- 8 KIA, three small arms captured.

(b) On 21 February, a CSF company operation from BUCK BLCH (A-238), DARLAC Province, engaged an unidentified NVA battalion infiltrating into central II CTZ, 20 kilometers northeast of BAN ME THUOT. Results: Enemy- 33 KIA, three small arms captured; Friendly, 3 CSF WIA.

(e) During the period 23 February through 6 March, Camp BEN HIT, (A-244), KUM Province, received over 900 enemy artillery, mortar, and rocket rounds from the 40th NVA artillery Regiment. Increased contacts with enemy ground elements near this camp also occurred during this period. On 3 March, the camp was attacked by an estimated battalion from the 66th NVA Regiment, supported by ten tanks from the 2D2nd Armor Regiment. Two of the tanks were immobilized by a CIDG minefield on Highway 512 west of camp and subsequently destroyed, while the remainder of the enemy force was repelled. Results of the action were: Enemy- 15 KIA, 2 HT-76 tanks destroyed; 2 CS weapons captured. Friendly- 2 CSF WIA.

(f) On 26 March, a combined CSF two-company operation from DUC LAP, (A-239), QUANG DUC Province, and THAMU PHUC, (A-233), QUANG DUC Province, initiated contact with a reinforced NVA company newly infiltrated in Cambodia. The contact occurred 15 kilometers southeast of DUC LAP.
continued sporadically for several days. Results were: Enemy 33 KIA, 11 small arms captured; Friendly- 1 CSF KIA, 6 CSF WIA.

(g) On 7 April, a CSF company operation from AN LAC, (A-234), QUANG 'OC Province, engaged a company of the 252nd Bn, NVA TRUNG SON Transportation Regiment 21 kilometers northeast of AN LAC. Results: Enemy- 25 KIA, 7 small arms and miscellaneous documents captured; friendly- 1 CSF KIA, 5 CSF WIA.

(h) On 15 April, a CSF company operation from TIKU ATAR, (A-231), DARIAC Province, initiated contact with a company of the newly infiltrated K-19 NVA Regiment 19 kilometers southeast of TIKU ATAR. The contact was the first of a series of nine contacts between helicopter CSF companies and the enemy unit, continuing over a five-day period. Total results were: Enemy- 111 KIA, 35 small arms and crew served weapons captured; friendly- 6 CSF WIA.

(i) On 19 April, a CSF company operation from BU PRANG, (A-236), QUANG DUC Province, engaged an NVA Bn of the SONG BE Regiment of 36th Recon Service Group, 17 kilometers south southwest of BU PRANG. Results: Enemy- 27 KIA; 1 small arms captured; Friendly- 2 CSF KIA, 1 USASF and 1 CSF WIA. Another CSF company from BU PRANG and the 1st Bn, 2nd MSFC, were inserted into the contact area to continue recon-in-force operations. On early 25 April, a MSF company was attacked in their night positions by an estimated NVA Bn. The MSF unit was forced to withdraw, but recaptured its position in a TAC AIR-supported counterattack. The 2nd Bn 5th MSF and the 5th Bn 2nd MSF were then inserted into the AO and TF WOOD was formed to direct the operations. Results since 19 April were: Enemy- 81 KIA, miscellaneous small arms and documents captured; Friendly- 1 USASF and 6 CSF KIA, 1 USASF, 1 VMSF and 34 CIDG WIA.
(3) III Corps Tactical Zone, (USASF Company A and VMSF Det C-3)

During the reporting period, Company A assets conducted a total of 900 company or larger, 2029 platoon, and 3757 squad operations. A total of 62 contacts were made with the following results: Enemy- 855 KIA, nine enemy and 578 weapons captured. Friendly- 6 USASF, 3 VNSF and 118 CIDG KIA, 52 USASF, 2 VMSF and 613 CIDG WIA; 27 CIDG MIA; 26 weapons lost.

(a) On 8 February, a CSF company operation from LOC MINH (A-331), BINH LONG Province, engaged an unidentified NVA platoon, 13 kilometers east of LOC MINH. Results: Enemy- 8 KIA; two small arms captured.

(b) On 24 February, a CSF company operation from TRA CU (A-326), HAU KOHLA Province, operating with USM PBR elements, engaged an enemy platoon from the 267th VC Bn, 15 kilometers northwest of DUC HOA. Results: Enemy- 8 KIA; one small arms captured.

(c) On 8 March, CSF local security elements from BINH SOI (A-136), TAY MINH Province, engaged the 273rd VC Bn, 12 kilometers southwest of TAY MINH. The enemy unit had entered BINH SOI village, but was forced out by a reaction force from camp. Reinforcements from CSF camps and ARVN units continued the contact against entrenched enemy forces for two days. Final results were: Enemy- 19 KIA; 1 enemy and nine small arms captured; Friendly- 5 USASF and 19 CSF KIA.

(d) On 10 March, a CSF company operation from MINH THANH (A-338), BINH LONG Province, engaged elements of the 320th NVA Regiment, 30 kilometers southwest of HOW QUAN. Results- Enemy- 8 KIA, 1 weapon captured; Friendly- 1 USASF and 1 CSF KIA.

(e) On 19 March, a CSF company operation from MINH THANH (A-338), BINH LONG Province, positioned as a blocking force on the east side of the Michelin Rubber Plantation, again made contact with a unit of the 320th NVA Regiment. The operation was part of a joint operation with US units, "ATLAS WEDGE" and the contact occurred 30 kilometers south of HOW QUAN. Results: Enemy- 15 KIA, 1 enemy and two small arms captured.

(f) On 22 March, a CSF platoon from CHI LINH (A-333), Binh Long Province, ambushed a company of the D368 local force battalion 25 kilometers southeast of AN LOC. The outnumbered CSF elements retained its tactical superiority despite aggressive and orderly reaction to the ambush by the enemy forces. Results: Enemy- 15 KIA; three small arms captured; Friendly- 1 USASF KIA, 2 CSF KIA.

(g) On 26 March, a CSF company operation from DUC HUE (A-325), HAU KOHLA Province, engaged a battalion of the 272nd NP VC Regiment.
35 kilometers south southeast of TAY NINH. The CSF units had been inserted by helicopter and occupied three ambush positions at the time of the contact. Results: Enemy-9 KIA, 10 weapons captured; Friendly- 1 VNSF and 6 CSF KIA, 2 USASF, 1 VNSF and 28 CSF WIA.

(h) On 4 April, a CSF company operation from CHI LINH (A-333), ambushed a VC platoon from the D368 Local Force Battalion, 25 kilometers southeast of AN LOC. Results: Enemy-9 KIA, 2 weapons and 9 documents captured.

(i) On 9 April, a CSF Company operation from BUMBARD (A-334), PHUOC LONG Province, engaged an estimated VC company from the D168 MP battalion, 70 kilometers south southeast of SONR BE. Results: Enemy-7 KIA, Friendly-1 CSF WIA.

(j) On 10 April, a CSF company operation from RAP GU (A-335), engaged a company from the 26th VC En, 15 kilometers west of DUNG HA. Results: Enemy-9 KIA, 2 weapons and miscellaneous equipment captured.

(k) On 11 April, a CSF company operation from MIH THANH (A-337) engaged a company from the 320th NVA Regiment 25 kilometers southwest of HOM QUAN. Results: Enemy-12 KIA, three small arms and miscellaneous ammo and documents captured.

(l) On 21 April, a CSF company operation from KATUM (A-322), TAY NINH Province, conducted a heliborne operation into a base area of the 95th NVA Regiment, engaging two enemy companies, 5 kilometers northeast of the camp. Results: Enemy-7 KIA, four weapons captured; Friendly- 8 CSF WIA. On the next day this same operation was ambushed by an estimated enemy company. Results: Enemy- 8 KIA; Friendly-2 CSF KIA, one USASF and 5 CSF WIA.
IV Corps Tactical Zone (USASF Company D and VNSF Det C-4).

During the reporting period, Company D assets conducted a total of 1289 company or larger, 6193 platoon, and 8073 squad operations. A total of 309 contacts were made with the following results: Enemy - 176 KIA, 57 enemy and 637 weapons captured; Friendly - 2 USASF, 1 VNSF and 39 CIDG KIA, 16 USASF, 6 VNSF and 22 CIDG WIA; 55 weapons lost.

(a) On 2 February, a combined CSF operation involving camps under control of B-41, MOI HCM, KHE THONG Province, initiated contact with various unidentified VC elements, approximately 15 kilometers northwest of BINH THANH THON. Results: Enemy - 8 KIA; Friendly - 1 CSF KIA; 3 CSF WIA.

(b) On 1 March, a CSF company operation from MY PHUOC TAJ, (A-411), BINH THONG Province engaged two platoons of the 261A PF BN, 30 kilometers south southeast of MOI HCM. Results: Enemy - 11 KIA, two KIA and 1 small arm captured; Friendly - 1 CSF KIA; 5 CSF WIA.

(c) On 2 March, a two company, CSF BLACKHAWK operation from MY DA (A-411), KHE THONG Province, supported by US and PRU ground elements, engaged two platoons of the 261B PF battalion, 32 kilometers south of MOI HCM. Results: Enemy - 13 KIA, five enemy and 7 small arms captured; Friendly - 1 CSF WIA.

(d) On 19 April, a CSF company operation from BINH THANH THON (A-411), KHE THONG Province, ambushed an estimated VC platoon, 30 kilometers northwest of MOI HCM. Results: Enemy - 19 KIA; 1 enemy 2 small arms and miscellaneous arms and documents captured; Friendly - 1 CSF WIA.
(a) On 21 April, a CSF company operation from KIMH QUAN II, (A-11h), KIEM TUOMO Province, engaged an estimated VC platoon, seven kilometers northwest of MOC HCM. Results: Enemy - 8 KIA, 2 small arms captured; Friendly - 2 CSF WIA.

(b) On 23 April, a CSF company operation from KIMH QUAN II, (A-11h), engaged a VC platoon, possibly from the 261th MF Bn, 20 kilometers southwest of MOC HCM. Results: Enemy - 6 KIA, 2 small arms captured; Friendly - 1 CSF KIA.

(c) On 26 April, a CSF company operation from VINH QIA, (A-11h9), CHAU DOC Province, on a BLACKHAWK Operation, engaged a local district company, 23 kilometers east of HA TIEM. Results: Enemy - 8 KIA, 5 small arms captured; Friendly - 6 CSF KIA; one USAF and 5 CSF WIA; 3 small arms lost.

(d) On 28 April, a CSF company operation from THUOM THOI, (A-132), KIEM PHOM Province, engaged a VC platoon from the 509th or 295th MF Bn, 63 kilometers northwest of CAO LAMH. Results: Enemy - 5 KIA, 5 KIA, 3 small arms captured; Friendly - 1 CSF WIA.
(5) Special Operations.

(a) 3rd MSFC Operation CENTURION IV, 16 January through 17 February. Three battalions and a recon company were committed to War Zone D in III CTZ, with standard augmentation of artillery, FAC's, aerial relay and Army aviation units. On 4 February, the 3rd Bn, 3rd MSFC discovered an enemy base camp and engaged a security force. Results: Enemy-10 KIA, 3 small arms captured and miscellaneous equipment, ammo and documents captured; Friendly- 1 MSF KIA, 2 MSF WIA. On 5 and 6 February the 2nd Bn discovered two caches, one of which contained a large amount of ammo, explosives and equipment, and the second of which contained 14 weapons. On 11 February, the 3rd Bn engaged an enemy force entrenched in an extensive communications center. Results: Enemy-6 KIA, numerous radio parts and ammo captured; Friendly-1 USASF and 1 MSF KIA, 2 MSF WIA. Total enemy losses for the operation included 76 KIA and 69 weapons captured.

(b) 3rd MSFC Operation CENTURIAN IV, 1 March through 7 April. Deployed with a similar task force organization as CINTURIAN V, the 3rd MSFC participated in one of its most successful operations on record in War Zone "D". On 1 March, the 3rd Bn engaged an unknown size enemy force and found themselves in an enemy base camp, surrounded by enemy units. Results: after breaking out of the area, enemy 37 KIA, friendly 2 MSF WIA. On 22 March, a MSF recon team discovered a cache site, and captured an estimated 771 rounds of 82mm, 110 rounds 60mm and 8 rounds of 120mm mortar, 532 grenades, 99 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle ammo, and numerous other items, explosives and ammo. The zone was airlifted into the former 151st LRRP AO in reaction to intelligence, and made contact with elements of the 17th and 275th NVA Regiment, 5th VC Division, on 24 March. Reinforced by the 1st Bn and supported by TAC AIR and artillery, the unit succeeded in repelling enemy attacks and destroying a large base area complex. Results of the hard fought two-day contact were 190 enemy KIA, 103 KIA and 80 weapons captured, while 2 USASF and 25 MSF were KIA. Total results of the operation which terminated on 7 April were: enemy-235 KIA, 103 KIA, 85 weapons captured; friendly-3 USASF and 28 MSF KIA, 13 USASF and 111 MSF WIA; 3 MSF WIA.

(c) 3rd MSFC Operation CENTURIAN VII, 17 April through the end of the reporting period. Organized with standard organic and attached units, the FOB at RANG RANG received 30 mortar rounds during the first two days of its establishment. Results: friendly-2 US (Non USASF) KIA, 7 USASF, 2 US (Non USASF) and 6 CSF WIA. On 30 April, the 1st Bn engaged two VC companies and discovered an enemy cache. Results: enemy-1 KIA, 162 small arms and 82 crew served weapons captured; friendly-1 USASF and 10 MSF WIA.

(d) Project DELTA Operation CASS PARK I, 29 March through 25 April, I CTZ. During the first two months of the reporting period, following operation ARMS in III CTZ, PROJECT DELTA confined its operations to recon...
missions in the NHA TRANG area while the 81st Ranger Bn participated in Operation PAUCI near NUI BA DHN in III CTZ, OPCOM to the ARVN Airborne Division operation. CASA PARK I commenced on 29 March in I CTZ, OPCOM to the 101st Airborne Division. A total of nine recon teams, 6 roadrunner teams, 8 ranger companies, three BDA Platoons, and one recon platoon were deployed during this operation. Total results were: Enemy-36 KIA, 1 enemy, 2 small arms, 11 crew served weapons and miscellaneous ammo captured; Friendly- 5 KIA, 33 WIA, 11 KIA, 19 weapons, 10 radios, 1 camera and other equipment lost.

(a) 5th MSFC Operation ROOSTER II, 21 January through 13 February. Two companies and a GRP of the 5th MSFC conducted a search and clear operation with USN elements in the RUNO SAT Secret Zone of III CTZ. These elements made 12 contacts during the three-week period, and temporarily disrupted enemy attacks on shipping in the Capital Area. Results: Enemy-2 KIA, 8 weapons captured; Friendly-1 MSF KIA, 3 USASF and 1 MSF WIA.

(f) Operation NUI COTO, 1st MSFC, 5th MSFC and augmentation from CSF and RF/PF elements in IV CTZ, 5 March to 7 April. During continued operations by the 4th MSFC on NUI COTO in the Seven Mountains area of IV CTZ since 12 July 1968, VC elements of the 513th VC Bn led by CHAU KHM continued to hold caves and bunker complexes on that mountain. The long, arduous and difficult struggle against the entrenched enemy forces had taken a heavy toll of friendly personnel, since the rugged terrain and extensive boulder and cave complexes presented formidable defenses for enemy snipers and defending troops. In order to secure the mountain complex and pacify the area, the 5th SFGA submitted a three-phase plan to IV CTZ SA on 28 February. This plan was approved by that headquarters, and assurances were given of adequate TAC AIR and Army aviation support, with a detailed pacification plan to be implemented using regional popular forces. Phase I, the cordon and search of villages, was executed on 5 March, although numerous guerrilla and auxiliary personnel escaped due to untimely and insufficient aviation assets. Phase II, the cordon and assault of TUK CHUP KNOLL, proceeded slowly but steadily, and lasted from 12 through 25 March. Phase III, the assault on the main mountain complex by three battalions of the 1st and 5th MSFCs, was completed on 7 April with the raising of the SVN flag on that former enemy position. The most significant aspect of the operation was the successful, courageous and determined effort of the CIDG units participating in the attack, which after regular ARVN units referred to attack the mountain complex, resumed the mission until it was accomplished. A new innovation, the use of volunteer USASF personnel, hastily organized in NHA TRANG, trained in the 106 HR, .50 Cal MG (mounted on jeeps), and flamethrowers, and committed as Platoons, proved highly successful. Total results of the operation were: Enemy- 53 KIA, 544 weapons captured; Friendly- 3 USASF, 3 USMF and 33 CIDG KIA.
The transfer of Camp GIA VUC (A-103) on 31 January 1969 gave I CTZ its first camp under complete control of VNSF, thus giving each CTZ a minimum of one VNSF camp. The transfer of GIA VUC means that the 5th SFGA now supports seven VNSF camps countrywide which have no USASF advisory element. The areas of administration, logistics, supply economy, and honest funds management will continue to be problem areas in camp transfers. Recent emphasis in these areas has resulted in improvement in the pre-transfer training given the VNSF. The Camp Commander's Course (CCC) at B 51 should continue to enhance the ability of VNSF officers to assume complete control of CIDG camps. Increased emphasis during FY 70 will be placed on transferring camps to VNSF.

(b) Camps CUONG SOM (A-221), HA TAY (A-227) and TAM RAI (A-232), all II CTZ camps, were converted to RF status 31 March 1969. The conversion of these camps was considerably smoother than past conversions; however, 5th SFGA still must carry much of the burden of conversion that should be born by ARVN and MACV personnel. The recruiting effort was particularly successful in that all medically qualified CIDG volunteered for RF. This amounted to 92% of the recruiting goal.

(c) Camps DOONG TRH (A-222), BUCH BIECH (A-238) and VINH THI AnH (A-120), VNSF Camp, are undergoing the conversion cycle at this time and are scheduled to convert to RF 30 June. Thus far the conversion procedure is proceeding smoothly and from reports and staff visits these conversions should be the most successful to date.

(d) In order to assist the USASF and VNSF in the conversion process the 5th SFGA Conversion Checklist/Guide was updated. All sections of the Checklist/Guide were revised and the following sections added: S2, Controller, S5, and Medical. These documents were issued to II CTZ elements who are presently involved in conversion but who have not been issued to other CTZ elements. As conversions are ordered in other CTZ's, a combined MACV/5th SFGA camp conversion conference will be conducted at the appropriate company headquarters at which time the revised Checklist/Guide will be issued.

2. Phasedown in CIDG Strength.

(a) During the latter portion of the second quarter it was evident that a phasedown in CIDG strength would be ordered by MACV/JGS. Planning for the phasedown commenced and on 23 February 1969 a joint conference was held with JGS. Represented at the meeting were JGS, MACV, VNSF, and USASF. A bi-lateral
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15 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RGS CSFGR-65 (RI)

Plan was agreed upon 26 February 1969 with a proposed implementation date of 1 July 1969. A CIDG strength of 26,000 is the phasedown goal which will amount to a reduction through camp closures and conversions of approximately one-half of the present CIDG authorization. As a result of this a phasedown of USASF personnel became imminent during March. Work commenced on authorization documents for 5th SFGR to correspond to the reduction in CIDG strength. It is anticipated that these documents will be submitted on 1 June to USAFRV in the form of MT0E's in the new "0" series and TDA for MACSOF. Group strength will be reduced from 2726 to approximately 2275. Although the CIDG strength reduction is almost one-half present authorization, there will not be a similar sharp decrease in USASF due to continuing administrative needs, the logistical burden, and the requirement to maintain special pro acts and operations.

(b) The new MT0E's will encompass elements formerly authorized under TDA's. Under the phasedown there will be 38 border oriented camps, 11 command and control camps and one training center. The following is the breakout of detachments by CTZ:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CTZ</th>
<th>A detachments</th>
<th>B or C detachments</th>
<th>MSFC companies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I CTZ</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II CTZ</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III CTZ</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV CTZ</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B-51, B-52, B-55, and B-57 will be retained with B-55 authorized three MEF Battalions. Each border camp will be authorized 530 men composed of three CSW companies of 132 men each (CS-1), three CRP's of 32 men each (CS-2), a 16-man heavy weapons section (CS-3), and a 16-man POLWAR team (CS-4).

(b) Budgets.

(a) Thus far in FY69 the local programs managed by the S3 have achieved an $8 million savings.

(b) During March 1969, the 5th SFGR Comptroller and Budget Program Manager met and formulated the budget for FY70. It is significant to note that the program for which the S3 is manager decreased from $39 million FY69 to $17 million FY70. The decrease was primarily due to the reduction in the CIDG force levels under the projected phasedown.


(a) On 18 March, CO, Company C, received a message from CQ III MAF,
subject: Camp Relocation data, requesting the input for the proposed plan to relocate A-Camp. to support border surveillance missions and interdiction of enemy infiltration routes and base areas. An analysis of present camp locations was conducted and the reply sent to CO III MAF with an information copy to CO, 5th SFGA.

(b) On 8 April 69, CO, Americal Division forwarded a letter to CO, III MAF, Subject: Relocation of SF/CIDO Camp TIEN PHUOC (A-102). The CO, Americal Division proposed relocating the camp to the PHUOC CHAU Valley. On 19 April 69, CO, 5th SFGA forwarded a memorandum to CO, III MAF, Subject: Group's position Concerning the Relocation of Camp TIEN PHUOC. This concurred with the relocation of TIEN PHUOC to the PHUOC CHAU Valley with the specific location to be jointly determined by CO, III MAF, CO, Americal Division and CO, 5th SFGA.

(c) On 12 April 69, CO, Company C, provided input to CO, 5th SFGA, concerning the closing of Camp MAI LOC (A-101). Reference message, 181, CO, Company C, 5th SFGA, dtg 120100Z April 69, Subject: Closing of Special Forces Camp A-101 (MAI LOC). It was recommended that this camp be closed. The VNSF and the CO, I CTZ can be expected to non-concur in this proposal.

(d) A planning group under the direction of DG Bennett, III MAF Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans), which includes the Commander of Company C and selected staff members, have initiated a study to determine the feasibility of relocating CIDG Camps to the XE SANH/LANG VAI, A SHAU, and MAC DONG/ROUNG ROUNG areas. The Commander VNSF has indicated their position will be to relocate along the population border areas.

(e) Current plans call for continued recruiting of CIDG personnel for replacements. A recruiting team has been organised in QUANG MAI and has proved quite effective. Additional recruiting teams are being programmed for the QUANG TRI/DONG HA area.

(5) II Corps Tactical Zone (Company B).

(a) On 1 April 69 all Mobile Strike Force elements within Company B were consolidated under the centralized command and control of Detachment B-2C, HQ's 2nd MSF Command, eliminating the responsibilities of Detachment B-23 and B-21 in maintaining one battalion each. The consolidation should result in a more equitable distribution of personnel and equipment as well as a standardized level of performance and discipline throughout the MSF Command.

(b) Three CIDG camps, Camp CUNG SON (A-221), HA TAY (A-227) and TAN RAI (A-232) were converted to the RF/FF role on 31 March. Planning...
continues for the conversion of three more camps on 30 June: Camps
DONG TRE (A-222) VDNH THANH (A-120) and BUON BLECH (A-238).

6) III Corps Tactical Zone (Company A).

(a) Current Plans and Concepts. All Special Forces/CIDG camps
continue to utilize saturation patrolling techniques and aggressive
small unit operations within assigned Tactical Areas of Responsibility
(TAOR's), to seek out and destroy the enemy. Emphasis is being plac
ed on rapid reaction to intelligence, the expanded use of heliborne
combat assaults, and joint and complimentary operations with US and
ARVN forces operating in, or adjacent to, Special Forces TAOR's. The
use of both B-52 strikes and pre-planned tactical air strikes has proven
to be a valuable extension of available fire power for the combat oper-
ations of both the 3rd Mobile Strike Force Command and Camp Strike Force
elements. During March alone, 151 B-52 strikes were conducted within
Special Forces TAOR's or in support of Special Forces operations. Ad-
ditionally, 276 preplanned tactical airstrike were executed in support
of CIDG units. This expenditure of air assets represents approximately
one half of all preplanned airstrike flown in support of Allied Forces
operating within this Corps.

(b) Long Range Plans/Concepts. This headquarters remains prepared
to accomplish those missions assigned for implementation in the
Combined Campaign Plan 1969, AB 144(U). As of this date special instruc-
tions have not been received pending joint General Staff and MACV levels
of command.

(c) Organization/Force Development. The organization of Company A
has been changed during this reporting period by the augmentation of one
7 man special A Detachment to Ben Soi. This augmentation was approved
by Hqs 5th SFGR and has been designated Det A-321, BEN SOI. Increasing
NVA pressure on the camp and its substest at PHUOC TAN plus communications
problems in requesting combat support necessitated this change. Composi-
tion of this team is as indicated:

| Detachment Commander | 0-2 |
| CA/PO               | 0-2 |
| Operations Sgt      | E-8 |
| Intell Sgt          | E-7 |
| Medical Spec        | E-7 |
| Radio Oper Supv     | E-7 |
| Chief radio Op      | E-5 |
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(7) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Company D).

(a) Current Plans. Plans are now being made for joint US Navy PBR and Airboat Operations. These will include cordon and search, integrated patrols, and possibly Airboat/PBR night waterborne ambushes. Operations are scheduled to commence as soon as the Corps water level rises to an acceptable height.

(b) Organisation. Effective 25 April the four interior camps, MY DA (A-133), MY Dihn II (A-116), MY Phuoc Tay (A-111) and Kinh Quan II (A-144), came under the direct control of Company D. Each B-Detachment under the new border surveillance plan has four subordinate detachments. B-1 and B-3 designated as Border Command and Control Camps (BCC) remain under the operational control of 5th Special Tactical Zone.
e. Training.

(1) General. (S3 Training.)

(a) The Mobile Strike Force Training Center (MSFTC), established at AN KHE, began training its first company from the 5th Mobile Strike Force Command on 3 February 1969. The MSFTC is currently capable of training two cycles of three companies each during a given month and can billet a total of six companies. The MSFTC has also trained three Camp Strike Force and four Mobile Strike Force companies as of 30 April 1969 in the three week refresher program. During May a letter of instruction will be sent to the field from this Headquarters listing requirements for units that will undergo training at AN KHE.

(b) The program of instruction for the Combat Orientation Course has been expanded to twelve days. The POI has been changed a total of four times as new requirements are identified from the field. On 7 October 1968 the school moved to HON TRE ISLAND where all training is conducted except for staff briefings and a few other classes that are held at the SFCH before the students leave for HON TRE. Because of the expanded POI and increased emphasis placed on the school, the course has become more effective in preparing new personnel for assignments to Special Forces operational detachments.

(c) Input has increased substantially at all training centers in Vietnam. The quality of instruction has improved with the updating and revision of POI's as well as the addition of qualified instructor-interpretor personnel. Part of the difficulty at the training centers has been a failure to understand the mission and a lack of ability to identify problem areas. These difficulties are slowly but surely being overcome.

(2) I Corps Tactical Zone (Company C).

(a) USAF. The lack of heavy weapons NCO's at the A-detachments and inadequate cross training among other team members necessitated initiating a program of instruction covering heavy weapons. This POI has been disseminated to all A-detachments and training is now in progress. Instruction on the A-6A Radar Beacon has been completed at all A-detachments. The beacon has been effectively employed at Camps TINH PHUC (A-102), HA THANH (A-104), MONG SON (A-105), and THUC NGU DUC (A-109).

(b) C2O. Currently one Combat Reconnaissance Platoon is in training at DONG BA THIN and one Camp Strike Force company is at AN KHE. Future training allocations are considered inadequate at this time. Twenty more company allocations are required for FY 70.
addition twenty-two CRP allocations for DONG BA THIN are needed for FY70 because of an increase in CRP under Phase II Plan. M16A1 training is progressing satisfactorily at all detachments with approximately 85% of all CIDG now trained.

(3) II Corps Tactical Zone (Company B).

(a) CIDG. CIDG and MSF training has shown increased improvement since the last reporting period. The overall training outlook has broadened due to the recent addition of the MSF Training Center located in AN NTM. This center is now fully operational, conducting three-week refresher classes for all MSF units within RVN and for CSF units from I CTZ and II CTZ. To this date Company B has had 6 CSF companies and one MSF battalion complete training at the center. Current plans are to send an additional MSF battalion and at least 12 more MSF companies there by the end of this year.

(b) M16 Training. During this period a total of 6,704 M-16's were issued to CSF and MSF personnel. A training program was conducted prior to the weapons being issued to the troops. The familiarisation classes were taught by USAF and VNSF advisors. The minimum program of instruction included two hours of assembly and disassembly, one hour of care and maintenance, and three hours of practical exercise on the firing range.

(c) Miscellaneous. Three Combat Reconnaissance Platoons are attending the CRP school at DONG BA THIN. Fifty CSF and MSF personnel have been sent to the CIDG Leadership School at DONG BA THIN. Finally, 21 interpreters are being trained at the VN English Language School in SAIGON and the Combat Interpreters School in NHA TRANG.

(4) III Corps Tactical Zone (Company A).

(a) Basic and Refresher Training. The III CTZ CIDG Training Center at TRANG SUP (A-301) continues to provide basic and refresher training on a Corps-wide basis to all CIDG personnel. During this reporting period the number of newly-recruited CIDG personnel has sharply declined. This period of reduced training responsibility, however, was profitably utilised by Detachment A-301. New training facilities were constructed and old ones renovated. A 100-meter standard KD range was extended to 200 meters. An infiltration course and "pep up target" firing lanes were added. Since the camp also has the responsibility of maintaining 50% of the present for duty strength on operations as well as insuring a hardened camp defense posture, Camp TRANG SUP was able to conduct extensive offensive operations, primarily in support of Detachment BEN SOI (A-321), and to bring their defenses up to the highest standards. During April an influx of new recruits and CIDG personnel for refresher training reaped
the benefits of the extensive improvements made by the CIDG training center during March 1969. During this quarter the following recruits were trained and assigned to Special Forces camps as indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>GRADUATION</th>
<th>TRAINING CO</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>GAINING UNIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23 Dec 68</td>
<td>10 Feb 69</td>
<td>80th Co</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>Det A-341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Jan 69</td>
<td>22 Feb 69</td>
<td>81st Co</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>Det E-36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Apr 69</td>
<td>30 Apr 69</td>
<td>82nd Co</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>Det F-322</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) **IV Corps Tactical Zone (Company D).**

(a) **MSF.** Two companies are in training at the Co D training Center at TO CHAU (A-142). One hundred and eighty-eight MSF troops have completed airborne training at the DONG BA THIN Training Center. One MSF battalion is in training at the AN KHE MSF Training Center. One MSF platoon completed CRP training at the DONG BA THIN Training Center. Refresher training is being conducted at DON PHUC (A-101). Out of twelve companies that should be airborne qualified only two actually are. The next Company D allocations for airborne training are 100 in November and 200 in December.

(b) **CSF.** Four companies have completed basic training at the TO CHAU Training Center, while two companies completed refresher training. Three platoons have received CRP training at DONG BA THIN. A total of 72 CIDG graduates from the CIDG leadership course and another 36 are in training. Of the 50 CSF companies in IV CTZ only 16 have received such training. The company's allocation for CRP training is one platoon per month; this and additional quotas are being continuously filled. Considerable progress has been made but the lack of allocations and facilities preclude attaining the desired level of training. To improve CIDG combat skills a Mobile Training Team is being formed. It will go from camp to camp and conduct instruction as needed.

(6) **MACV Recondo School.** The school trains selected US/TFN/USAF personnel in the techniques and skills needed for long range reconnaissance operations in the Republic of South Vietnam.

(a) **Cadre Strengths.** Average assigned and attached strengths were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>RM</th>
<th>ATCH OFF</th>
<th>ATCH RM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>1 AUST, 1 ROK</td>
<td>2 ROK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1 AUST, 1 ROK</td>
<td>2 ROK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>1 AUST, 1 ROK</td>
<td>2 ROK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RG 378 CSFOR-65 (RI)

(b) Results of MACV Reccondo School. During this period the MACV Reccondo School received 287 students for the three week Reccondo Course. Classes R-15-69 thru R-18-69 have graduated. The following is a breakdown of students for R-15-69 to R-18-69 Reccondo classes by Corps and Unit areas:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reccondo Classes</th>
<th>Entr</th>
<th>Drpt</th>
<th>Grad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4th Inf Div</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173rd Abn Bde</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co C (Ranger) 75th Inf</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROMV</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFFY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Inf Div</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Inf Div</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Inf Div</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Cav Div</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>199th LIB</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTAVF</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co D (Ranger) 151st Inf</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Bde, 82nd Abn Div</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXIV CORPS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st Abn Div (AM)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde, 5th Inf Div</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americal Div</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III MAF</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th SFGA</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMY RTC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(e) The mission of the Combat Orientation Course is to train selected United States Army Special Forces personnel in the special combat skills required for duty in the Republic of Vietnam and to prepare these individuals to deal effectively as counterparts with the Vietnamese Special Forces in their conduct of stability operations and pacification programs.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for
the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

15 May 1969

(a) During this quarter the MACV Recondo School received 1693
students for the nine-day Combat Orientation Course. The following is
a breakdown of students for classes 31-69 thru 43-69:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coc Classes</th>
<th>Entr</th>
<th>Comp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 - 69</td>
<td>24 Jan - 01 Feb 69</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 - 69</td>
<td>31 Jan - 11 Feb 69</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 - 69</td>
<td>07 Feb - 18 Feb 69</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 - 59</td>
<td>14 Feb - 25 Feb 69</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 - 59</td>
<td>21 Feb - 01 Mar 69</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 - 69</td>
<td>28 Feb - 11 Mar 69</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37 - 69</td>
<td>13 Mar - 25 Mar 69</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38 - 59</td>
<td>21 Mar - 01 Apr 69</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39 - 69</td>
<td>28 Mar - 06 Apr 69</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 - 69</td>
<td>06 Apr - 15 Apr 69</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 - 69</td>
<td>11 Apr - 22 Apr 69</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42 - 69</td>
<td>18 Apr - 29 Apr 69</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43 - 69</td>
<td>25 Apr - 06 May 69</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) General. During the reporting period this detachment success-
fully accomplished its mission of providing advice and assistance to
the VNSF Training Center in training VNSF and CIDG personnel and also
in its mission of providing advice and support to the assigned Camp
Strike Force in combat operations and local security. Considerable
gains were made in improving training support and facilities for
USASF and CIDG personnel. On 3 April 1969 a demonstration of Training
Center capabilities was presented for the delegates to the Southeast
Asia Special Forces Conference.

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completed the 35th CRP Course along with 4 CIDG CRP platoons. The performance of this platoon was highly satisfactory. The assistant S3, Lt Harper, has been assigned the mission of monitoring the CIDG Leadership Course and determining what action must be taken to improve it. He will attend all classes and report his findings to the detachment commander on a weekly basis.

(c) Courses Graduated or in Progress During the Reporting Period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COURSES</th>
<th>GRAD DATE</th>
<th>STUDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36th CIDG LDRS</td>
<td>11 Feb 69</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37th CIDG LDRS</td>
<td>7 Apr 69</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34th CRP</td>
<td>15 Feb 69</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35th CRP</td>
<td>7 Apr 69</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th TEAKWON DO</td>
<td>3 Feb 69</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th CCC</td>
<td>1 Feb 69</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th CCC</td>
<td>31 Mar 69</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th VNSF RTO</td>
<td>15 Feb 69</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th VNSF OFF &amp; NCO</td>
<td>13 Feb 69</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th CIDG BAC</td>
<td>13 Feb 69</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th CIDG BAC</td>
<td>22 Apr 69</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th VNSF BAC</td>
<td>4 Apr 69</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th USAF BAC</td>
<td>19 Apr 69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Courses currently in progress:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COURSES</th>
<th>STARTING DATE</th>
<th>STUDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>38th CIDG LDRS</td>
<td>21 Apr 69</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36th CRP</td>
<td>21 Apr 69</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th TEAKWON DO</td>
<td>10 Mar 69</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd CIDG RTO</td>
<td>7 Apr 69</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st VNSF MED SPEC</td>
<td>10 Mar 69</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th VNSF OFF &amp; NCO</td>
<td>15 Mar 69</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th VNSF RTO</td>
<td>7 Apr 69</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th CCC</td>
<td>7 Apr 69</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
f. Combat Developments.

1. The Combat Development Section, 5th SFSA, is responsible for testing and evaluating equipment applicable to the missions of Special Forces. CD's inventory ranges from duplicating machines to demolitions. All are tested by 5th SFSA field units to determine their potential usefulness.

2. The following are projects tasked or under consideration by Combat Developments:

   a. Starlight Scope Protective Covers: On 26 March 1969, MACV Science Advisory introduced a starlight scope protective cover and requested that combat developments evaluate the item. Ten of these semi-transparent plastic covers have been requested for field evaluation by selected A-teams.

   b. In-Flight Film Processing: MACV Science Advisory provided all necessary components for this portable film processing unit now being evaluated by Sf of B-52. This small 2"X1" black box can process 35mm black and white film in a matter of minutes using a jelly like substance which operates in a manner similar to the polaroid principle.

   c. Claymore Flash Attachment: A small camera type flash bulb has been developed which, when attached to a claymore mine, will flash if the mine is moved. This type of attachment will enable the using element to determine which claymore to detonate. B-52 is evaluating twenty-five of these items provided by MACV Science Advisory.

   d. Retro-Reflective Spray and Powder: Both the spray and powder work on the infrared principle and are now being tested by B-52. When supporting aircraft with IR capabilities are used, the items can be employed to locate friendly elements and mark positions. Generally, the employment of both items is limited only by the user's imagination.

   e. Mortar Elevation Indicator for Hand-Held 81mm Mortar: This item is a small attachment which indicates the angle of elevation of the 81mm mortar and allows the mortar to be hand-held for firing without the use of bipod or sight. The device is designed for quick employment of the 81mm mortar when carried on field operations. This expedient item is being forwarded from USARY to the 5th SFSA for evaluation.

   f. Parrying Precision Aerial Delivery System (PPADS): Combat developments section recently completed a field evaluation on the PPADS. This controlled airdrop cargo system has been developed to permit accurate airdrops of cargo to small drop zones. The system,
which employs an all flexible parawing as the lifting canopy, will
silently glide under electronic guidance to an accurate landing and
can be used to deliver supplies to troops in remote or hostile areas,
day or night, and under all types of weather and terrain conditions.
The PPADS has a 500 pound payload capability and can be deployed from
six miles up and fifteen miles out from the ground-based transmitter,
Yet it will land within 200 feet of the transmitter with about the
same force of impact as a conventional parachute. The evaluation
was concluded as successful.

(3) USARV Army Concept Team Vietnam is considering 5th SFQA as
an evaluating unit for future projects such as fragmacord, which is an
explosive similar to Det Cord; night vision goggles, similar to the
starlight scope; and camp sentinel foliage penetration radar. The Navy's
research and development unit is now projecting future items for the
5th SFQA to evaluate.
g. Aviation:

(1) Army Aviation Support. Operations of Project Delta, B-52 and the 3rd BRF, B-36 have continued to receive the required amount of aviation support under their operational control. Because of the amount of the support provided and the command relationship enjoyed, excellent results have been achieved. The amount of Army Aviation support provided for command and liaison to the Group has not changed except in IV Corps where Company D is now receiving two UH-1 helicopters daily as authorized by COMUSMACV.

(2) Tactical Airlift Support. This has been excellent.

(3) Tactical Fighter Support. Increased command emphasis has been placed on requesting pre-planned TAC AIR. Data for the past three months is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>February REQUESTED/FLOWN</th>
<th>March REQUESTED/FLOWN</th>
<th>April REQUESTED/FLOWN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I CTZ (Co C)</td>
<td>132/132</td>
<td>131/131</td>
<td>76/76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II CTZ (Co B)</td>
<td>102/105</td>
<td>37/37</td>
<td>13/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III CTZ (Co A)</td>
<td>234/224</td>
<td>237/235</td>
<td>205/211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV CTZ (Co D)</td>
<td>95/91</td>
<td>91/91</td>
<td>71/71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>563/562</td>
<td>476/479</td>
<td>396/394</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) I Corps Tactical Zone.

(a) Tactical Air Support for the past quarter was generally outstanding. However, during the February/March siege of Camp TIEN PHUOC (A-102) a lack of coordination among the units operating in the TACR created problems in clearing grids for air strikes. A joint FSCC was established in an attempt to alleviate these problems. However, there was no one in the FSCC with the authority to grant political clearances. Also, the FSCC was not the final clearing authority for air strikes in the TACR. The requirement to clear grids with intermediate commands after having obtained FSCC clearance created undue delays in obtaining air support.

(b) The C Detachment now has an M-108 radio control jeep available for relocation to camp sites under siege. The jeep has a UHF radio capability that makes it ideal for use in conjunction with the A-6A Radar Beacon. It has been tested at Camp TIEN PHUOC and found to be highly effective.

(c) A recurring problem is the lack of organic helicopter support for the

CONFIDENTIAL
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15 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

Mobile Strike Force. Many delays have been encountered in moving MSF troops. These delays reduce the combat effectiveness and the morale of the MSF.

(d) **Tactical Air Support**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Requests</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>flown</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) **III Corps Tactical Zone.**

(a) **Army Aviation Support.** This has been exemplary considering the number of aircraft available and their numerous commitments in III Corps Tactical Zone. There is a definite shortage of aircraft and no hope for resolution in the near future. The CIDG and MSF have reached a degree of sophistication as evidenced by their use of available aircraft where the augmentation of aircraft to this detachment could be justified. Moreover many of the CIDG camps have large TAOR's which are difficult to cover thoroughly without such aid.

(b) **Tactical Air Lift Support.** This continued to be outstanding.

(c) **Tactical Fighter Support.** On an immediate basis this was excellent with all tactical air requests being granted except when adverse weather conditions prohibit support. Preplanned tactical air support has improved greatly in the past two months, but is still marginal. This is because few tactical aircraft are available to Special Forces for the purpose of Preplanned airstrikes.

(6) **IV Corps Tactical Zone.**

(a) **Army Aviation Support.** This headquarters received the same dedicated air assets as was reported during the last period. A request was submitted to C3, III FFV asking for more work choppers and one additional LOH for Command and Control. This request was denied by III FFV because of the non-availability of aircraft.

(b) **Tactical Airlift Support.** This headquarters receives two C7A aircraft daily and one C-123 aircraft 5 days a week. These are supplied by the 8314th Air Division through III Field Force Vietnam. The majority of troops moved by Company A throughout the IV CTZ are assigned to the 3rd Mobile Strike Force Command. During the reporting period a total of 16,128 passengers were moved in 2,070 sorties.

(c) **Tactical Fighter Support.** Tactical fighter support has been outstanding in regards to preplanned and immediate airstrikes. A total of 730
flights were requested and 623 flights were flown against preplanned targets. A total of 123 Skyspot were nominated and 10 flown. The non-availability of aircraft still hinders the Skyspot program throughout this Corps. Four new aircraft have been added to the tactical support inventory. These aircraft are AC-1190 gunships which are commonly called Shadow. Each is armed with four mini-guns utilizing 7.62mm ammunition. One mini-gun has a sustained rate of fire of 3,000 to 6,000 rounds per minute. These aircraft fly only during the hours of darkness and are used in support of Special Forces elements.

(7) IV Corps Tactical Zone. (Company D)

(A) Army Aviation Support. This has not been completely adequate due to the lack of rotary wing aircraft.

(b) Tactical Airlift Support. Army Aviation Tactical airlift support is controlled and allocated by the 14th Special Tactical Zone. C7A Airlift support is provided seven days a week by the 536th Tactical Airlift Squadron in VUNG TAU. The crews of the C7A do a tremendous job. Their enthusiasm and desire to get the job done is outstanding. Maintenance delays and crew duty time are the only problems. The crews are limited by regulation on the number of hours they can fly. If the 536th could return to the procedure they followed seven months ago of having the crews spend the night at Company D, both productive hours flown and sorties could be increased while maintenance problems on the C7A could be reduced considerably. C-123 Aircraft support is provided by the 515th Special Operations Wing out of PHAN RANG, 5 days a week, excluding Sundays and Thursdays. Such support is adequate at this time.

(e) Tactical Fighter Support. This support provided by the USAF Tactical Fighter Wings based at Binh Hoa Air Base is excellent.
Logistics,

(1) Supply.

a. The average number of personnel supported during the period 1 February to 30 April 1969 were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>U.S.A.F.</th>
<th>C.S.F.</th>
<th>M.S.F.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Feb</td>
<td>2,576</td>
<td>34,471</td>
<td>8,773</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. During March the MUI COTO operation in IV CTZ received direct support from the LSC Supply and Maintenance facilities. This included 106.5 round, Cal .50 machine gun and small arms ammunition, collapsible water containers, clothing, rations, load-bearing equipment, armored vests, protective masks, flame throwers, and 106mm RR and Cal .50 machine guns mounted on M151A1 4-ton trucks. All shipments to Company D were top priority or "Red Ball" mission. The mounting of the 106mm and Cal .50 machine guns on the jeeps took the maintenance facility less than 24 hours to complete.

c. Local purchases during the 3 month period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>214,229</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>127,991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Purchase</td>
<td>29,265</td>
<td>9,526</td>
<td>7,495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>243,494</td>
<td>9,526</td>
<td>135,486</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Maintenance.

a. The percentages of deadline equipment for the reporting period were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEMS</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crew Served Wpns</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFGR-69 (RI)

Artillery 0% 0% 0%
Forlifts 9% 9% 8%
Vehicles 4% 5% 4%

The increase for vehicles during March was due to the shortage of tires and "closed loop" type repair parts. However, during April, 250 ¾ ton truck tires were received from CISO and CAM RANH RAY. This filled all existing due outs. It should be noted that the 5% deadline status is still well below the USARV deadline rate of 10%.

b. There has been a recurring problem with repair parts for the M51A1 ¾ ton truck. When the M51A1 was developed it was programmed to last 5 years and thus repair parts were programmed on a 5-year-cycle closed loop system. Parts within this system are available only on a direct exchange basis. An attempt is being made to order these items through the 2nd Logistical Command in Okinawa where all ordinary 5th SFGA requisitions are placed. Group, due to its funding, has not been able to enter the closed loop system. With the signing of the ISSA, however, this should change. Increased maintenance support has been received from 1st Log Cmd due to the recently signed ISSA with USARV.

(3) Movements.

Cargo moved in short tons during the reporting period was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MODE</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C7A/C223</td>
<td>355.1</td>
<td>587.4</td>
<td>525.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C130</td>
<td>1102.7</td>
<td>703.7</td>
<td>797.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air America</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IST</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>799.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convey</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>107.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The "O" figure reflected for movements by Air America during March is normal since they do not usually have unobligated aircraft to haul supplies for outside agencies.

(4) As of 31 May the FSP (Forward Supply Point) at B-23 RAN ME THUOT will cease FSP functions and on 30 June, the B-23 FSP will terminate.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS CSFU-65 (RI)

The A-detachments previously supported by the FSP at B-23 will be supported by either MHA TRANG or the Company B FSP at PLEIKU. Presently preparations are being made both at the ISC and B-23 FSB for the support changes.

(5) The Staff Engineers have begun construction of an extension to Warehouse #6 at the SFOB. The extension is needed to house four new and two expanding sub-sections of the ISC Maintenance Facility. An extension to the rigger ramp was completed during March. It will provide faster and more efficient service for loading and unloading of cargo.

(6) The lst Logistical Command and Naval Supply Activity continue to provide about 65% of the maintenance and supply support for 5th SGAF. This percentage will increase slightly when the maintenance ISSA is fully implemented.

(7) I Corps Tactical Zone, (Company C).

(a) Supply. This FSP supports 31st CSF, 783 MSF, and 289 US for a total of 4,315 troops. Emphasis has been placed on maintaining basic loads in all supply classes at each camp and backloading excess items. M-16 rifles were received in March and distributed to the A-detachments and MSF. Shortages of M-16 ammunition have caused temporary problems in building up an adequate basic load and has also slowed delay in backloading carbines. Tactical operations increased significantly in the latter part of February and March with the siege of Camp THUOC PHUOC (A-102) as the most critical area. A newly developed low altitude parachute extraction system (LAPES) was utilized for an emergency ammo resupply at this camp. The ammo was rigged by the 109th QM Aerial Delivery Company in CAM RANH BAY and an Air Force control team directed the delivery. This was an extremely successful operation due to excellent cooperation between the 109th QM company, the Air Force, and the C Company Air Movements Section. Utilizing the newest techniques it was the second operation of its kind in Vietnam. The first was at Camp THUOC PHUOC (A-109) for a resupply of construction material. Local purchase decreased, with fresh food for the CIDG still being the largest item. Other purchases include sand and gravel, parts for commercial equipment, and R&U supplies.

(b) Deadline date for vehicles dropped during the period to approximately 10%. One problem has been evacuating vehicles back to the maintenance facility for repairs which cannot be accomplished on site. The generator deadline rate was reduced significantly to approximately 15%. A number of factors accounted for this. A field fix was designated by ECCI technical representatives at the maintenance facility, consisting of an added fuel filter to combat the fuel contamination problem. Another fix was the addition of a replenisher pump so
as to combine two 55 gallon drums in a continuous fueling operation. The final primary factor for the lower generator rate was the capability acquired during this period to repair fuel injector pumps. The rate for refrigerators, freezers, and air conditioners remained fairly constant at 10%. Lack of repair parts, especially compressor motors, is the main reason for this. Overall a lack of expeditious transportation for contact teams and repair parts is the major problem in providing maintenance support to the A detachments.

(c) Cargo Movements.

The following tonnages were moved:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Land</td>
<td>2121.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Drop</td>
<td>52.5 (LAPES)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convey</td>
<td>87.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sealift</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2270.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Non-availability of aircraft is the most serious problem in this Corps. Air Land tonnage dropped 162 tons from the previous reporting period. The Camp TDEN PHUOC airfield was upgraded to C-123 capability. The airstrip at TRA BONG (A-107) was closed; but a joint USAF and Americal Division effort has regraded and repaved the field so that it is now open to C-7A aircraft. Camps GIA VUC (A-10) and THUCNG DUC (A-109) will have their airfields upgraded to C-123 capability during the next quarter.

(d) Services. Effective 1 February 1969, fresh food is being supplied by a NHA TRAMG contractor. The quality of food has dropped, with some spoilage due to the added transportation time, but the increase in quantity has more than offset the decrease in quality.

(e) Facility Improvements. With the completion of the Class I warehouse and the backloading of most excess items to LSC, over 200 conex containers previously used for storage have been turned in. The berms for the same storage area was completed in February 1969 and all loose ammo has been palletised. An NECI ammunitions technical representative made a liaison visit in February and assisted in reorganizing ammo storage to meet compatibility requirements. All bulk outside storage items, such as, diesel, mogas, sand bags, concertina, pickets, barbed wire, are now being palletised immediately upon receipt in the FSP. This has increased efficiency in the outside storage yard and proved invaluable in quick reaction to emergency requests.
AVGB-C  
CONFIDENTIAL  15 May 1969  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(f) Adequacy of Logistical Support. This unit has received outstanding support from the Naval Support Activity and First Logistical Command, both located in DA NANG. LSC support is always outstanding; however, since there is a constant problem of transportation between DA NANG and NHA TRANG, it is more feasible for this unit to increase support requirements from local agencies.

(g) Problem Areas. Air support for this FSP is not adequate. This affects both supply and maintenance. M-16 ammo has been in short supply. All six air riggers have less than 120 days until DODOS and three are 45 day losses. Finally the maintenance facility needs more mechanics for contact team repairs.

(b) II Corps Tactical Zone (Company B).

(a) Supply. During the reporting period, Company B supported approximately 12,000 NSF, 2,100 HSF, and 600 USASF personnel. This was accomplished by utilizing the two forward supply points located at PLEKIU and BAN ME THUOT. The single line requisitioning system continues to be the most efficient method devised to support operations. Local procurement averaged $0.07 per man during the past three months. Items purchased were primarily plumbing fixtures, electrical supplies, and repair items that were not available in the supply system. Quality was generally below American standards.

(b) Maintenance. Bilingual checksheets on operational maintenance are in use at all levels. The generator-automotive mechanics school is fully operational and has produced outstanding results. Company B currently has a deadline rate of less than 10% at the A-detachment level because of the practice of sending technical representatives to the camps to make the required repairs.

(c) Movements. The only problem that exists in the movements section is the shortage of cargo nets and C7A aircraft. The following is a breakdown of cargo moved by various modes of transportation. All figures are in pounds.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEBRUARY</th>
<th>MARCH</th>
<th>APRIL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airland</td>
<td>2,595,783</td>
<td>2,758,159</td>
<td>2,322,392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airdrop</td>
<td>17,679</td>
<td>27,621</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>209,935</td>
<td>907,324</td>
<td>175,516</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Stockage Levels. Recently stockage levels have been analyzed and appropriate adjustments were made because of sufficient demand data. The former system of a direct exchange for unserviceable repair parts, weapons, and generators has been eliminated. All items are requested on a DA Form 2765-1 and processed as required.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(a) Adequacy of Logistical Support. Support from the lst Log has been adequate. The biggest handicap has been a lack of transportation to pick up supplies. MSC support has been excellent except for lumber, plumbing, and electrical items.

(b) II Corps Tactical Zone (Company A).

(a) Supply. The FSP at Company A supports 7,500 CSF, 2,500 M511, and 75 Special Forces personnel. Special Support has been rendered to the 2nd M511, Detachment B-36, which has been deployed continually this year in War Zone "D4". Helicopter support for B-36 is provided by the 117th Assault Helicopter Company, 12th Combat Aviation Group. This also includes one and occasionally two light fire teams. Because of the remote area of operations, the closest Army Aviation Element fuel point is approximately 15 minutes flight time from the AO. Total turn around time exceeds 30 minutes. This is considered an excessive period of time for a combat unit to be without helicopter support when engaged in enemy contact. A solution was provided by establishing an emergency fuel point at the FOB. Portable 500 gallon fuel bladders were drawn from the 64th QM Battalion, transported to Company A, and shipped to the FOB via CH-47 helicopters. A pump was provided by the supporting unit, 117th Assault Helicopter Company. During the period a total of 12,789, 371 SVN ($188,384) was spent on local purchase of cost codes 902, 905, and 910. Rice purchases account for over 90% of this sum. 358,643 5M (5,039) was spent on cost code 905. This high expenditure can be explained by the emergency requirement for water pumps, each costing 18,000 VN. These Briggs and Stratton pumps are of good quality. The deadline rate is high, however, because of the heavy work load placed on these units. The other large expenditure during this quarter was the purchase of pallets. These cannot be obtained through normal supply channels at present. If the FSP were to draw lumber from the lst Log Command, pallets could be made at a cost of $2.35 each. This would not include the expense for labor and nails. To cut this high cost the FSP locally purchased these items at an average price of 44 each. Other items purchased include rubber stamps, non-standard lighting and plumbing fixtures, and silver and copper welding rods. The latter is used in the repair of refrigerators and air conditioners.

(b) Maintenance. The new tire and paint shops were completed. The old shops will be used for the installation of the engine air boat rebuild and electric motor rewind facilities. All 24-ton and 5 ton trucks which do not have drivers assigned are being put into float. It is felt that these vehicles cannot be maintained properly without assigned drivers. The percentage of deadlined generators has been high, close to 21%. This is due to the non-availability of parts, especially injector pumps for 100 kw Libby generators. The deadline percent of vehicles has been low at 7%. Most parts are available, but due to the shortage of Vietnamese mechanics, many vehicles are awaiting shop. This detachment needs more qualified mechanics to keep up with the flow of repairs at the FSP.

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RGCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(c) Air Movements. A total of 23,878,830 lbs of cargo and 16,428 pax were transported by the Air Movements Section of Company A FSP. 12,240,311 lbs of cargo were transported via convoy. 11,738,519 lbs were shipped by air in the following categories: 905,500 lbs by special mission aircraft, usually O-130's, 2,210,196 lbs by C-130's, 3,294,619 lbs by dedicated C7A's and 5,328,184 lbs by rotary wing aircraft, mostly CH-47 helicopters. One tactical emergency and five combat essential missions were flown in support of Special Forces operations in III CTZ.

(d) Services. The FSP at Company A provides maintenance contact teams to all subordinate detachments. The team normally consists of a Philippine technical representative and one or two Vietnamese civilians skilled in the same fields. When a subordinate detachment needs maintenance beyond their own capabilities and the situation demands work be done on the site, a maintenance team is quickly deployed there. On occasion, USAF personnel are included on this team. These contact teams have a record of quick deployment and high job performance. The status of the 10KW (Libby; generator, model 148002-1-) in Company A FSP has reached a critical state. All A-4 detachments are authorized two 10KW generators for camp power supply, one in use and the other as a backup. This company has 16 Libby generators on hand, of which 16 are deadlined because of a lack of fuel injector pumps. For the last six months the Company A FSP has experienced difficulty obtaining construction materials, especially lumber, from available supply sources. This has curtailed numerous approved projects at various locations. The shortage is anticipated to last indefinitely. Sandbags and barbed tape, however, are readily available at present. There has been some difficulty in drawing both 81mm WP ammunition, which has been suspended, and M18A1 Claymore mines with accessories (KII143). All other types of ammunition have been received in sufficient quantities.

(10) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Company D).

(a) Supply. During the period the Sh Section supported the following number of personnel: USAF: 390; CSF's 7,000; MSF: 2,000. The NTH COTO Operation terminated on 6 April 1969 and the FSP at CHI LANG was turned over to Detachment B-43. Although one Battalion of MSF will remain on the mountain, the resupply problem is minimal with B-43 handling it every third day. The air assets for this are obtained from IV Corps. 23 March IV Corps informed Co D that B-43 would move from CAO LANH to CHI LANG and be operational by 7 April. This was accomplished without the promised help of IV Corps, either in supplies or personnel. Without the air support from IV Corps the move would not have been completed as soon as it was. B-43 is now in the process of reorganizing itself and preparing to move out of a temporary location as soon as the Engineer section complete the new site. Local procurement of items is now handled differently than before.
CONFIDENTIAL

APB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS OSPOR-65 (R1)

When an item is required by a section, the support calls either LSC or the Maintenance facility, gets approval for the purchase, and records the individual's name who gave the approval. This eliminates the possibility of making a local purchase when supply channels can adequately handle the request.

(b) Maintenance. A Generator Operator Maintenance Course was conducted which has proven a great success in reducing breakdowns in this area. Due to the lack of a Property Disposal Officer in the CAM THO area, numerous pieces of junk equipment are accumulating in the Maintenance Facility. Deadlines have increased this quarter due to the full support given the NUI COTO Operation. A contact team was dispatched to the FSP for on the spot repairs which aided in returning equipment to operational status in reduced time. Many electrical motor breakdowns have been repaired locally. At present plans are being drawn up to improve and expand the Maintenance Facility and construct a Motor Pool building for second echelon maintenance. Currently this facility is short of both ECCI and VN personnel. The former are being transferred without replacements.
1. **Engineers**

1.1 **Construction and Rehabilitation.**

(a) The following construction was completed during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>PROJECT</th>
<th>CONSTRUCTION UNIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C1 Danang</td>
<td>Security fence, steam bath, generator shed</td>
<td>Contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1 Danang</td>
<td>MSF water distribution system</td>
<td>Contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1 La Th</td>
<td>CIDG water distribution system</td>
<td>Contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1 Plei</td>
<td>CIDG water distribution system</td>
<td>Contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1 Trai</td>
<td>AMM UNITAN bunker, generator shed</td>
<td>Contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1 Plei</td>
<td>CIDG medical billets, generator</td>
<td>Contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1 Plei</td>
<td>MSF guard house</td>
<td>Contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1 Ben Me Thuet</td>
<td>BOQ, CIDG billets, CIDG shower and latrine</td>
<td>Contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1 Plei</td>
<td>Three MSF billets</td>
<td>Contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1 Plei</td>
<td>50 bunkers, rice warehouse</td>
<td>KB-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1 Ben Het</td>
<td>Rice warehouse, runway repair, emergency medical bunker</td>
<td>KB-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1 Plei</td>
<td>Dispensary, water tower, ammo bunker</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 Han Quan</td>
<td>US billets</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 Thien Ngon</td>
<td>PIR storage shed</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 Lec Minh</td>
<td>Deep well, 15 Gallons per minute</td>
<td>Contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 Tong Le Chon</td>
<td>Deep well, 15 (GPM)</td>
<td>Contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 Bu Dap</td>
<td>Deep well, 15 (GPM)</td>
<td>Contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 Duc Hue</td>
<td>Teamhouse, dispensary, emergency medical bunker and camp rehabilitation</td>
<td>KB-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Generator Shed</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 Song Be</td>
<td>Dispensary</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 Can The</td>
<td>Interrogation/Retention center, TOC, air movement office, paving of road</td>
<td>Contract/Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4 Thuong Toi</td>
<td>Supply building extension</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4 My Da</td>
<td>Ammunition bunker</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4 Thanh Tri</td>
<td>Barber shop</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4 Tuyen, Xhon</td>
<td>Camp rewiring</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| C4 To Chau    | Administration building                           | Self-Help               

**CONFIDENTIAL**
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RSC GSFG-65 (RI)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>PROJECT</th>
<th>LOCION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MSPTC, An Khe</td>
<td>Construction of Training Center</td>
<td>Contract/Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trung Dung</td>
<td>Teambase, commo bunker, 7 latrines</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOB Nha Trang</td>
<td>MSF emergency medical bunker</td>
<td>Contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOB Nha Trang</td>
<td>Field Grade BOQ</td>
<td>Contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOB Nha Trang</td>
<td>HQ Company dayroom</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) The following major construction should be completed during the next quarter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>PROJECT</th>
<th>LOCION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C1 Danang</td>
<td>BOQ</td>
<td>15 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1 Danang</td>
<td>Renovation of sewage system</td>
<td>1 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1 Danang</td>
<td>Three MSF billets</td>
<td>31 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 Plei Ke</td>
<td>New Camp</td>
<td>31 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 Ban Hat</td>
<td>Camp reconstruction</td>
<td>1 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 Ban Me Thuot</td>
<td>Camp renovation</td>
<td>25 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 Pleiku</td>
<td>Hospital renovation</td>
<td>31 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Storm drain system, interrogation</td>
<td>15 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>center</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Hospital</td>
<td>1 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Convalescent center</td>
<td>25 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bu Dop</td>
<td>Dependent housing</td>
<td>15 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tay Vinh</td>
<td>Communications bunker</td>
<td>30 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tong Le Chon</td>
<td>Camp rehabilitation</td>
<td>31 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch Can Tho</td>
<td>Aircraft loading ramp</td>
<td>31 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch Muc Hoa</td>
<td>Tactical Operations center</td>
<td>31 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch Thuong Thoi</td>
<td>Dispensary</td>
<td>30 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOB Nha Trang</td>
<td>Dispensary</td>
<td>25 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOB Nha Trang</td>
<td>2Z/63 building</td>
<td>30 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOB Nha Trang</td>
<td>BOQ #3</td>
<td>31 July</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) **Well Drilling Operations**

(a) Wells have been successfully drilled at RU DOP, TONG LE CHON and LOC VINH utilizing an airmobile well rig, owned and operated by the contractor. These wells are each producing approximately 15 gallons per minute.

(b) The well rig previously used in KOMTUM Province has been returned to the province chief at the request of CORDS.

(c) One deep well has been drilled in the SFOB and a second is nearing completion. The well rig is scheduled to be moved to AN KHE upon completion of this well.
(d) The well rig which has worked in III CTZ for the past year is presently in the SFOB undergoing maintenance overhaul. It is then scheduled to drill wells in the B-23 area.

(3) Budgeting and Funding.

Status of CAC 926 Funds.

Obligated: $917,528.00

Unobligated: $2,082,472.00

(4) Public Works and Utilities.

The repair and utilization (R&U) section processed 1414 work orders during the reporting period. The carpenter shop constructed 8,800 pallets and 17,500 concrete blocks. The water supply reached a critical level during the month of April and water rationing was instituted. With the addition of a new well as well as conservation practices the water storage rose to an acceptable level by the end of the reporting period. Renovation of the sewer system in the SFOB and at Detachno t B-55 was completed. Renovation of the SFOB water system is in progress.

(5) Problem Areas. Lack of critical construction materials still constitutes the major problem area. Premature cancellation of an order resulted in a shortage of one inch and two inch lumber. Electrical wiring also is in short supply. Transportation of sand and gravel to camps where these items are not locally available has also been a problem. The heavy haul capability of the group is extremely limited. Support from outside sources has been non-existent. A third area of difficulty is the continuing pilferage of both construction materials and engineer repair parts during shipment to job sites. This has been especially noticeable on critical electrical supplies.
J. Political Warfare (POLWAR)

(1) General. During this period, the activity of the Group S5 Section consisted of expanding current programs and the initiation of significant new projects.

(2) Plans.

(a) The S5 evaluation system for the detachment was redeveloped. The new system is based on enemy and civilians in the TACRs rather than in the total CTZ. Similarly, Civic Action is now tabulated per civilians in the CTZ. Motivation and Indoctrination activities are still computed per CIDG soldier in each company. The figures were recomputed back through September 1968 to give a lead into the present quarter. A spot check of the previous charts shows no major distortion from the prior method employed.

(b) In addition to the quantitative evaluation the S5 Section is now rating companies on how they stand each month in each of the three categories of PSYOPS, Motivation and Indoctrination, and Civic Action as well as how they stand overall. For first place in an output type activity, such as leaflets disseminated by air, a company is awarded five points. Three points are awarded for second, two for third, and one for fourth. For result type activities, such as Hoi Chanks and lowest desertion rates, double points are given in each standing.

(3) Motivation and Indoctrination.

(a) A dependent housing priority list has been established for the CIDG. This is a compilation in a priority order of dependent housing projects throughout the four Corps to include projected construction in the future. All such projects are monitored by the S5.

(b) A joint VNSF and USASF Soldiers of the Month program for the CIDG troops was devised, written, and implemented in all camps during this period. This program will effect some 40,000 CIDG soldiers throughout Vietnam.

(c) ARVN PX/Commissary regulations were translated, edited, and prepared for publication. These regulations should enable B and C-De- tachment S5's to better understand and monitor the development of the PX/Commissary system in the CIDG program.

(d) A POLWAR equipment shortage report was compiled and shortages were submitted for requisition. Receipt of this equipment will provide the POLWAR teams in the field with their full TONE issues and enhance...
their performance.

(4) Civic Action.

(a) Candy bids from candy companies in the United States were examined and tabulated, and samples compared. Two types and brands of candy were selected to be purchased for use in the Group CA program. This candy is of much better quality and considerably less expensive than the type previously bought on the local market.

(b) The first class of 20 students was sent through the CORDS IR8 Rice School in MOC HQA, IV CTZ. This is a two-week course and it will be conducted monthly. Agricultural Cadre have been formed in almost all of the A-Detachments. These cadre will instruct CIDG and local personnel as well as build and maintain demonstration plots. IR8 rice is the main product currently being emphasized. A crop calendar and agricultural manual was published and distributed to all A-detachments. Agricultural policy guidance has been given to all Company 35's and priority projects designated.

(c) Twenty-two earth block making machines were procured from CARE for the A-detachments. This will make the involved A-detachments less dependent on aerial resupply for bulk building materials.

(5) Psychological Operations.

(a) It was recommended to DA and the Psychological Operations Department at SWS that SF officers targeted as CA/PO officers in the 5th SFQA be sent to the newly created POLWAR Advisors Course. This course would be more suitable for duty in RVN and would also provide a basic language capability.

(b) The POLWAR portion of the Combat Orientation Course was expanded to two hours. New lesson plans, training aids, and charts were devised and used in the weekly POLWAR presentation.

(c) To insure continuity in CA/PO programs a POLWAR Operations Plan has been designed. In establishing an operation plan the individual CA/PO officer will be required to project six months ahead what priority programs he considers necessary in his TAOR in the categories of Civic Action, Psychological Operations, and Motivation and Indoctrination. Such a plan can then be utilized by his replacement with little or no loss of momentum.
I Corps Tactical Zone (Company C)

(a) Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). During the reporting period the POLWAR teams directed their efforts at the two major targets in the TAOS: the local populace and the CIDG. Face to face communication and the dissemination of leaflets, newspapers, and magazines were some of the media used. Face to face communication was backed up with loudspeaker broadcasts and radios. "Support your local government" and attacks on the VCI were the main themes used.

(b) Psychological Warfare. Approximately thirty-five million leaflets were dropped in I CTZ. The majority were on the Chieu Hoi theme and directed at VC/NVA. Targeting has continued against enemy base areas, infiltration routes, and trails. Leaflets were also targeted on the local populace within the TAOR's using various themes with the primary stress on the GVN image. The development of media directed at the Montagnard is progressing, but rather slowly. Currently interpreters are being used to make general appeal Chieu Hoi tapes for use within each of the camp TAOR's. There are such variations in language that it is impossible to have only one standard tape. Numerous live aerial broadcasts were also made by Hoi Chans throughout I CTZ using the C/C helicopter with a 1000 watt speaker. This quick reaction capability has had some effect on the Montagnard in enemy controlled areas, whereas the current leaflets have little or no meaning to them. Leaflets with a visual message such as those used in II CTZ are currently being developed and printed by the 7th Psyops BN for Montagnard areas.

(c) Social Welfare. The refugee population again decreased in this period. Only 9000 refugees are now supported by the camps. A lack of transportation and Civic Action commodities from CRS has hampered the assistance program. Dependent housing has been requested for Camps CONG SON (A-105), THIUNG DUC (A-109) and Detachment B-16.

(d) Motivation and Indoctrination. During this quarter, the Polwar teams from THI LOC (A-101), THIUNG DUC (A-109) and Detachment B-16 were trained by ARVN I Corps. Due to enemy action, some teams have lost personnel and replacements will be trained at the next POLWAR school in May. The "soldier of the month" program is proving to be an excellent motivation factor. The drama team continued to perform very effectively and has been moving from camp to camp, normally staying at each for two or three days. It has also performed on DA NAING radio and TV.

(e) Civic Action. A country store is now being built at Camp TRA BONG (A-107), Camps HA TIENH (A-104) and BA TO (A-106) have established CIDG canteens. The agricultural program is still improving. The CA/PO's at
BA TO and MINH LONG (A-161) and the Camp Commander at Camp GIA IVN have been helping Mr. Jose Palada, a Phillipino agricultural expert working in I CTZ, make this project a success.

(f) Miscellaneous A new project has been initiated involving the raising of ducks, chickens, and pigs by the camps. This will help improve the quality of meat eaten by the CIDG and their dependents.

(g) II Corps Tactical Zone (Company B)

(a) POLWAR Training: At present thirteen of the twenty-one CIDG POLWAR teams in Company B are trained. Seven of these graduated from the POLWAR School at II Corps Headquarters on 7 April 1969. The remaining untrained teams are presently in PLEIKU and will also attend the II Corps POLWAR School. The class will begin on 5 May with graduation scheduled for 26 May 1969. Two CIDG POLWAR teams from Camps DUC GO (A-253) and PLEIKU (A-213) graduated from the Company B POLWAR Refresher Course on 26 March 1969. This is a three week course taught by officers, NCO's, and interpreters from both the USAF and VNAF sections. The course terminates with a 4 day practical exercise conducted in a local PLEIKU hamlet. The next class, with CIDG teams from Camps DUC LAP (A-239) and TIZU ATAR (A-231) will begin on 10 May 1969.

(b) Agricultural Projects. The S-5 farm, located on the northwestern corner of the Company B compound, is being used as a classroom as well as a source of food. Two 6 day classes conducted at the farm have taught 9 CIDG and civilian personnel improved methods of agriculture and animal husbandry. These classes will continue, beginning on the 1st and 3rd Monday of each month. The animal stock consists of Landrace Hogs, chickens, ducks, fish and sheep. Also crops such as corn, hemp, peanuts, and gourds are grown. Three Landrace Hogs have been shipped to both camps DUC LAP and TIZU ATAR. Three are to be shipped to MANING BUK (A-246) in the near future.

(c) Psychological Operations. During January 1969, approximately 3.5 million leaflets were dropped in support of Special Forces operations within II CTZ. This figure was doubled in both February and March, and was tripled in April. The number of air loudspeaker hours has made a similar increase. The most significant results occurred in February when 83 people turned themselves in to a MSF unit operating southwest of BAN ME THUOT. Forty-one of these individuals were later classified as Hoi Chanhs by the Vietnamese Chieu Hoi Agency in BAN ME THUOT. During April Company B received a total of seven Hoi Chanhs.
SECRET

AVORD C

18 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1/6th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969, RGS (AVORD 69-7/1R)

(a) III Corps Tactical Zone (Company A)

(a) General. Significant POLWAR activities included projects in Civic Action, Social Welfare, Motivation and Indoctrination, and PSYOPS. Company A's Mobile Training Team, split into two smaller teams plus advisors, visited the A-detachments to give additional on-the-job training to the POLWAR teams. Primary emphasis has been placed on implementing a Motivation and Indoctrination program for the CIDG troops. The Mobile Training Team gave additional instruction and supervision to the POLWAR teams on how to show movies, give lectures, organize rallies and award programs, and establish an overall Motivation and Indoctrination program. The Team also provided instruction for the POLWAR training course at TRANG SUP (A-331), the III CTZ Training Center. In addition to the POLWAR teams at all A-detachments, Company A also has Culture-Drama teams at three B-detachments. These visit the A-detachments on a continuing basis and also perform POLWAR functions at the B-detachments. The drama team performances were integrated into the Motivation and Indoctrination programs by working current themes into their skits and traditional songs. The teams provided entertainment during the numerous camp celebrations and Vietnamese-Cambodian-Montagnard holidays. Furthermore they performed for the patients at Company A's convalescent ward.

(b) Psychological Operations (Psyops). This is an integral part of the CIDG program. All social welfare projects, culture-drama team performances, and civic action projects must be exploited by PSYOPS. No matter how much time or expense has been invested in a project it is of little value if it has failed to influence people's attitudes and/or behavior. The POLWAR team is one of the best assets in this area because face-to-face communications are the most effective means of reaching people. An example of an integrated PSYOPS program took place in April when a CIDG combat operation in the LCC KINH (A-331) TAOR entered a particular village. Noticing that some of the villagers needed medical attention and lacked adequate clothing, the A-331 S-3 called the B-33 S-3 and requested medical supplies and clothing. A U-10 was dispatched by Company A to B-33 where the S-5 had prepared air droppable bundles of the needed commodities. The supplies were dropped and a MEDCAP was conducted while the PSYOPS aircraft circled overhead and played tapes that "OVN supports you" mixed with patriotic music. At the same time the POLWAR team mingled with the villagers and conducted face-to-face persuasion. As a result of this, considerable intelligence was gained about VC activities in the area.

(c) Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR). During the reporting period, Company A continued with an aggressive PSYWAR campaign against the enemy. The last phase of the 3-phase Tet campaign ended 21 March. A total of 32,170,000 leaflets has been disseminated in support of this campaign. Themes emphasized were "Family appeal", "It's spring, why stay in the jungle", "Tet Chieu Hoi"
and "Return home for Tet". Although Company A's leaflet dissemination and loudspeaker broadcasts continue to steadily increase, the number of Hoi Chans rallying in Special Forces TACRs remains low. Many Hoi Chans during interviews have indicated they are afraid to rally to isolated camps. This may be a major contributing factor to Company A's low Hoi Chanh rate. It should be noted though that III CTZ during February 1969 had a total of 272 Hoi Chans and Company A contributed 33% of all aerial leaflets disseminated in the Corps. In March there was a total of 493 Hoi Chans and Company A contributed 49.5% of all leaflets dropped. To improve the Hoi Chanh rate, a series of leaflets have been printed which encourage potential ralliers to proceed to Special Forces camps. These explain the benefits of the Chieu Hoi program, list rewards for turned in weapons, and provide a map to the nearest CIDG camp. These leaflets will be disseminated extensively during May. In addition to this, posters are being made explaining the value of the Chieu Hoi program to the CIDG soldiers.

(d) Social Welfare. The primary activity to improve the living conditions of the CIDG are construction projects. Dependent housing is being built in all camps desiring it. A priority list has been established for this. Four-fifths of all A-detachments have schools and all B-detachments have one or are supporting the one that dependent children attend. Reading rooms are also being built in the camps. Plans have been made with the Staff Engineers for a standard BOK to be used when camps submit a project for this type of construction. The majority of the camps have their own barber shops and tailor shops. Several camps, mainly those located in isolated areas, have established PX/Commissaries. Agriculture and animal husbandry projects are now being demonstrated in various camps. These projects are not only beneficial since they provide food for the CIDG, but they also teach the CIDG to be self-sufficient since they are 100% self-help. Fish ponds have been constructed and stocked in three of the camps in III CTZ. A medical and a sanitation program are two continuing projects. All detachments have a daily sick call program for the CIDG and their dependents. It provides immunization as well as treatment, and has been an effective deterrent in controlling dangerous diseases. Nurses are given on-the-job training at Company A. After training, they are sent to the A-detachments to provide assistance. The camp sanitation program is also continuing on a daily basis. The POLWAR teams have been instrumental in improving camp sanitation by supervising police call, making trash containers and latrines, and giving lectures and showing movies on health. "Project Assist" continues to be successful. This was designed to improve the low morale of the CIDG patients in the Company A Convalescent Center. The low morale was due to the loneliness caused by the separation from their families and friends, the boredom of just lying around, and a feeling that nobody cared for them, although they had fought valiantly.

59

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The program includes the timely presentation of Vietnamese awards, the hazardous service award, and an individual CARE gift. Also various items such as cigarettes and toilet articles are given to patients hospitalized for more than one week. As a follow-up to Project Assist, Company A coordinated with the National Rehabilitation Center in Saigon who agreed to train handicapped CIDG in civilian occupations. Presently three former CIDG are enrolled in this program. During this period, gifts for children were distributed to all detachments for celebrations during the Tet holidays. On 15 February USASF and VNSF S-5's and members of Company A toured 9 A-detachments distributing Tet gifts to the CIDG. The remainder of the detachments received their gifts from the B-detachment S-5's.

(e) Motivation and Indoctrination (M/I). This is the primary mission of the POLWAR teams. The program at most camps includes sports competition (volleyball and ping pong), entertainment (movies and culture drama team performances), and camp celebrations. Rallies and lectures are also held to educate the CIDG about the SVN. Company A publishes a monthly magazine which is sent out to all camps. Stationary has been designed and produced for the use of the CIDG. It incorporates the CIDG crest and slogan, "Honor, and Responsibility". A poster was developed to promote esprit-de-corps among all CIDG troops. It incorporates the CSF and HSF insignia, VN flag and six concepts for conduct. A project has been established to furnish 3rd HSF's troops with coke and cigarettes when they come in for standdown. Fresh food is also brought out to them. This program has definitely improved the morale of the troops. Also during this quarter a debating competition was held at Company A with the winner getting a photo album and the runner-up a cigarette lighter. One particularly effective motivational project was the Soldier-of-the-Month program. Candidates are elected by the troops from squad through company level. Then they are presented to a board while the company commander of each candidate relates the latter's achievements. After the Soldier-of-the-Month is selected, he is honored at a battalion formation. At the same time he is presented a letter of commendation, a three day pass, and a VN$2,000 watch. This program has resulted in a noticeable improvement in military courtesy and willingness to work by the CIDG.

(f) Civic Action (C/A). The primary projects performed by the POLWAR teams to improve the living conditions of the civilian population has been in the field of health and sanitation. All detachments with a civilian populace have been conducting MEDCAPS. Over 57% of the A-detachments and 100% of the B-detachments are active in this area. The POLWAR teams continue to provide PSYOPS support by distributing leaflets and other printed material in the health kits and soap. All medicines are wrapped in leaflets bearing a PSYOPS message. The most important element is to have the CSF and VNSF medics provide the actual treatment under the supervision of a USASF medic.
This not only improves the indigenous medical proficiency but also creates a favorable attitude toward the CIDG and GVN. In addition to MEDCAPS, the POLWAR teams have assisted the civilian population in constructing or repairing schools, dispensaries, roads, churches, and bridges. Efforts have been made to establish all civic action projects as self-help with the people providing at least 50% of the labor. Two particularly exploitable civic action projects occurred during this quarter. In March VC entered THU BON village and burned 50 Montagnard huts at random to emphasize the point that the VC did not want them to live there. A MEDCAP was conducted in which over 300 villagers were treated, and rice and commodities were distributed. Coordination was made by B-33 with the CA platoon from AN LOC District for materials to help the people rebuild the village. The District donated tin sheets and cement. Psychological Operations to exploit the situation were conducted by JUSPAO, the Vietnamese Information Service, and the POLWAR team from Province. In April at LOC NHIN in the new pagoda services were conducted for the Buddhist New Year. This very impressive ceremony was attended by many villagers from the district. The pagoda is 85% completed. The whole event was exploited by the POLWAR team personnel from LOC NHIN District. When completed, the pagoda will be one of the most beautiful structures in the whole district.

(9) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Company D).

(a) PSYWAR (Psychological Warfare). Cord/Psyops and the 17th Psychological Operations Battalion continue to furnish sufficient tapes, leaflets, and posters to enable Company D to accomplish its mission. The following themes were utilized: standard Chieu Hoi, standard government appeal, weapons rewards, and Ho Chi Minh letters. In addition, the Volunteer Informant Program (VIP) was emphasized as the S2 and S5 coordinated their efforts. Two standard leaflets on the program were available to detachments, and one special poster is being produced. The VIP will continue to receive emphasis in the future.

(b) Social Welfare. As part of the social welfare program in IV Corps, numerous MEDCAPS were conducted. A health program has been initiated that will benefit CIDG soldiers and their dependents as well as civilians. The VNSF Social Welfare NCO from C-4, accompanied by a USASF S5 representative, visits local hospitals on a weekly basis giving cigarettes, soap, candy, and milk to convalescing CIDG soldiers.

(c) Motivation and Indoctrination. Timely rallies, lectures, and propaganda missions were conducted to keep the CIDG soldiers, their dependents, and civilians informed of local and national events. Successful combat operations have been celebrated at victory parties held for
the CIDO soldiers. Numerous award ceremonies were held for the CSF and MSF to draw attention to specific acts of bravery. Through an increasingly active sports program, competitive spirit has been generated.

(d) Civic Action. A large number of schools, hospitals, churches, roads, market places, and bridges have either been built or repaired with labor, materials, or funds furnished through Company D. An aggressive agricultural program designed to enable the CSF and local population to learn new farming techniques, has been implemented in IV Corps. An agricultural school is now available at MOC HOA for personnel selected from each detachment.

( ) Psychological Operations. While participating in tactical operations, members of the PHWAR teams made loudspeaker broadcasts, passed out leaflets, and put up posters. Numerous rallies and lectures, as well as political indoctrination classes were organised, all directed at the CIDO troops. Aerial loudspeaker missions, flown by C-47 and U-10 aircraft, continued to play an important role in the PSYOPS program.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (AI)

k. Personnel.

(1) Strength: Authorized and assigned strengths at the beginning and at the close of the period were as follows:

(a) Beginning of Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>MN</th>
<th>AGO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2765</td>
<td>3480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2185</td>
<td>3232</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Close of Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>MN</th>
<th>AGO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2765</td>
<td>3480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2650</td>
<td>3387</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Replacements: During this period, a total of 137 officers and 74 enlisted replacements were assigned, while the losses totaled 117 officers and 577 enlisted personnel.

(3) Promotions: A total of 405 enlisted personnel were promoted during this period.

(4) Personnel Management:

(a) Critical MOS Shortages: MOS 11F continues to be the most critical shortage in the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne); however, some relief was experienced as one hundred and twenty-four B-4's reported to this command during the reporting period. Headquarters, USARV has queried Department of the Army regarding this shortage. As a result, 12B's are being applied against 11F requisitions after these personnel have completed an intelligence course at Fort Halstead, Maryland. This course, though not fully qualifying individuals for positions of intelligence sergeants, qualifies them for positions in Command and Control Detachments, thus freeing fully qualified 11F personnel for assignments to Special Forces A-detachments.

(b) Strength Reduction: During the reporting period Headquarters, USARV, directed this headquarters to allow all officers not serving on extensions to depart Vietnam 12 days prior to their normal DEROS effective 12 February 1969 through 12 April 1969. This action was accomplished in conjunction with instructions from Department of the Army to reduce the officer strength level within USARV.
(e) Promotions: During the month of February 1969 Headquarters USARV, authorized this command to promote all individuals in grade E5 through E7 who had attained promotion list status prior to 1 August 1968. Two restrictions placed on promotable personnel were that they had to be carried on the Group's current selection list for promotion and that a bar to promotion had not been incurred. As a result of this directive ten enlisted men were promoted to grade E7 and one enlisted man was promoted to grade E6. These promotions were made without regard to Department of the Army quotas, requisition actions, command pay grade vacancies, or local positions vacancy criteria.

(d) Miscellaneous: During the reporting period, Headquarters, USARV, directed this headquarters to have an Enlisted Efficiency Report (DA Form 2166) prepared on all E7's and E8's who had not been tested in their PMOS during the Calendar years 68 and 69. These enlisted efficiency reports were prepared and forwarded to Headquarters, Department of the Army for use by the Army Promotion Board.

(5) R&R Allocations: The following R&R allocations were received by the 5th SFTA for the months indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Utilization Ratio: 97.7% 106.5% 118.1%
During this period the average number of allocations per month dropped to 261 as compared to 320 last period. The drop was due to a general cut back throughout Vietnam by MACV. Our utilization ratio has improved from 92 percent the previous period to 108 percent for this period. This improvement will allow the 5th SFGA to receive more seat allocations in the future.

(6) Awards and Decorations:

(a) The total number of decorations awarded to 5th SFGA personnel for period ending 30 April 1969:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWARD</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CMH</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LM</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS-V</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM-V</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACM-V</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACM</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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65

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Awards of the Bronze Star and below are approved by 5th SFQA, Silver Star to Distinguished Service Cross are approved by USAVE.

(b) Percentage of each unit's personnel who were decorated for the period ending 30 April 1969:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRC</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEN</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) The recommendation for the Meritorious Unit Commendation for the period 31 January 1968 to 31 December 1968 is presently at Headquarters, USAVE, for processing and subsequent submission to Headquarters, Department of the Army. The recommendation for the Presidential Unit Citation for the period 1 November 1966 to 31 December 1968 has been forwarded to Headquarters, Department of the Army for approval.

(7) Special Services:

(a) GENERAL: During the past three months Special Services has made great strides towards improving its facilities and activities to enhance the morale, comfort and physical fitness of the members of the 5th SFQA. During this period 5th SFQA entered a basketball team in the tournament play conducted by the 5th General Support Group. Initial drafting has been completed for the construction of an air-conditioned Special Services facility which will include a dark room, game room and exercise room.
Final approval of these plans are expected in the near future.

(b) Library: The Green Beret Library continues to offer a fine selection of books and magazines. Life magazine has placed the facility on its complimentary mailing list effective 1 July 1969. The 5th STOA Chaplain continues to distribute books and magazines to Special Forces detachments in the field. The Green Beret Library reflects the following attendance figures for the period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>6713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>7134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>6574</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(8) Safety: On 15 March 1969 the 5th STOA Safety Council held its meeting to discuss accident reports, motor vehicle accident prevention, firearms safety, and the advantages of using safety checklists. After careful evaluation of written recommendations, the Council awarded MSG John T. Ream, RA 13h29388, Company C, 5th STOA, the United States Army Safety Award and recommended Company B for the United States Certificate of Merit for Safety. Both awards are for calendar year 1968. The 5th STOA Safety Newsletter has proven to be an important asset of the Safety Program. Suggestions and comments received as requested by the newsletter have been most helpful in gearing articles to the prime safety problem areas. USARY statistics for the 3rd Quarter FY 69 are not available at this time. The number of accidents by type during this period are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MOD Violations</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons Violations</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falls</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(9) Civilian Personnel:

(a) The 5th Special Forces Group employs civilians throughout the Republic of Vietnam. The number of permanent civilians employed by units during the period ending 30 April 1969 were as follows: (Next Page)
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AVOR-C
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS OSFGR-65 (RI)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Company A</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company B</td>
<td>970</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>?7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company C</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>268</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company D</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det B-51</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det B-52</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det B-55</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSFTC</td>
<td></td>
<td>98</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det A-502</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLD</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3457</td>
<td>3038</td>
<td>3040</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) The large reduction of civilian personnel during March was the result of a study conducted in February to determine the minimum number needed to accomplish the mission. This reduction will result in more realistic utilization and better management as well as reduced labor costs of approximately $56,000 per month.

(a) The Commanding Officer 5th SFOD has withdrawn from subordinate commanders the authority to employ temporary laborers. This action is in conjunction with the CPO's task of aligning employment practices with efficient personnel management techniques.

(d) The civilian personnel technicians and interpreter/translators employed by 5th SFOD are new paid on a monthly salary basis which precludes excessive payment for overtime and other fringe benefits.

(e) A language differential test was written and administered to all civilian employees of the 5th SFOD that qualified IAW 5th SFOD Reg 690-1 to receive the language differential pay. Approximately 70% of those taking the test qualified to receive the extra pay.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969, RG2 CSFOR-65 (RI)

15 May 1969

(10) Reenlistments:

(a) The following is the 5th SFGL, 1st SF, reenlistment statistics for the period ending 30 April 1969.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELIGIBLE</th>
<th>REENLISTED</th>
<th>PERCENTAGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RA</td>
<td>AUS</td>
<td>RESIGN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) The following are the Regular Army statistics for the same period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELIGIBLE</th>
<th>REENLISTED</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than four(4) years</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than four(4) years</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) One EM amended his NET. One bar to reenlistment was initiated and approved. Nineteen EM extended their NET.

(11) Chaplains' Activities.

**ACTIVITY CONDUCTED**

Religious Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERVICES CONDUCTED</th>
<th>ATTENDANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>261</td>
<td>1100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GROUP Parish Activities

Hospital

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERVICES</th>
<th>VISITS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Counsel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERVICES</th>
<th>INTERVIEWS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>548</td>
<td>1278</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMUNION SERVICES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SERVICES 163</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Communicants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CH/Payees Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SERVICES 1601</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

ACTIVITY CONDUCTED

Memorial Services 28
Attendance 1498

Invocation/Benedictions
Conducted 16
Attendance 786

Staff Meetings 101
Camp Visits 255
Camps Visited 194

MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS: During the three months 28,358 separate items of religious literature, devotional books, magazines, paperback books, SF prayer cards, calendars, religious medals, and gift packages of items received from supporters in the USA were sent out to all detachments of the 5th SFOD.

(12) Discipline, Law and Order:

(a) Discipline Reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pass Violation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off Limits Violation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curfew Violation</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic Violation</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Charges</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWOL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

LAST QUARTER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violation</th>
<th>November</th>
<th>December</th>
<th>January</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pass Violation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off Limits Violation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curfew Violation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic Violation</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Charges</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWOL</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL                      | 55       | 29       | 36      | 120   |

(b) Judicial Punishments:

THIS QUARTER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violation</th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Court-Martial</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Court-Martial</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary Court-Martial</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LAST QUARTER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violation</th>
<th>November</th>
<th>December</th>
<th>January</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Court-Martial</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Court-Martial</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary Court-Martial</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(e) Non-Judicial Punishment

THIS QUARTER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article 15</th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Article 15</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

LAST QUARTER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article 15</th>
<th>November</th>
<th>December</th>
<th>January</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Legal Assistance: Legal assistance was rendered to 238 clients, a decrease of two over the past quarter.

(13) CIDG Strength Accounting. On 25 April 1969, the second command-wide CIDG Autor: Roll Call was conducted for the purpose of validating the legitimacy of CIDG whose names appear on camp pay rolls and assessing the combat capability of each camp in terms of CIDG actually assigned and present for duty. The new CIDG Identification Cards have been distributed by the VISF and are being held at the C-detachment level awaiting further distribution to subordinate detachments. The Strike Force Pay Cards have been completed and are also ready for distribution. A basic data card is being prepared to record the same information as recorded on the ID card. The former will be centrally filed at this headquarters for convenience in comparing fund reports to CIDG payrolls. Identification tags will also be issued to the CIDG. Cards for the purpose of taking CIDG ID photos have been distributed to the C-detachments.

(14) I Corps Tactical Zone (Company C)

(a) Strength: Strengths at the beginning and end of the reporting period were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>61</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENLISTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Replacements: The flow of replacements was satisfactory. All personnel were well qualified and ready to assume their jobs. The shortage of 11C's and 11B's within this unit still presents a critical problem.

(c) Discipline: Three Article 15 punishments were imposed during the reporting period.

CONFIDENTIAL
Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969, RG2 CSFGR-65 (RI)

(d) Morale and Personnel Services: There were a total of 52 R&R's and eight leaves. These were processed rapidly and in most cases corresponded with requested dates and locations.

(e) Personnel Management: The 05B's are still receiving approximately 14 days training. This serves as both a refresher and practice period. Emphasis has been placed on reducing the headquarters strength and correcting improper assignments.

(f) Civilian Personnel Office: Company C presently employs 175 civilians in order to provide centralized civilian services in the fields of logistics, medicine and administration.

(15) II Corps Tactical Zone (Company B)

(a) Strengths: The authorized strength for the reporting period decreased with the closing out of three A-detachments. Currently the assigned strength is 171 officers, 1 WO, and 312 EM as compared to 162 officers, 1 WO, and 385 EM on 1 February 1969.

(b) Replacements: There have been no problems experienced in obtaining sufficient officer personnel to fill all the required positions throughout Company B. Although many new officers lack experience, they are generally able to accomplish their missions. The critical problem lies with the procurement of enlisted men. There continues to be shortages in MOS's 11B, 11C, 05B, 913, and 11F for the operational A-detachments and of the 11F, 05B, 91B, 76 and 71 MOS's within the B and C detachments.

(16) III Corps Tactical Zone (Company C)

(a) General: During the reporting period further coordination was effected with III Field Force in the maintaining of maximum strength of augmented LRRP personnel to the Mobile Strike Force Command. A command message was initiated by Brigadier General Charles Cantrell, Chief of Staff, III FFV, on 18 March 1969, to all the supporting LRRP Detachment Units reemphasizing the importance of maintaining 100% strength of their personnel to Company A at all times. Also in this period, the CO, Company A initiated a program encouraging each staff section to make frequent visits to the subordinate detachment sites in order to obtain first hand knowledge of frequent problem areas. This has enabled many administrative difficulties to be corrected on the spot, thus eliminating an appreciable amount of message traffic over the single side band.
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(b) STRENGTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KM</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>296</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Distribution. The number of Article 15's administered to Company personnel were as follow:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KM</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFF</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of Military Police Reports received on Company A personnel were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>APR</th>
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<tr>
<td>KM</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Morale and Personnel Services. Recreational equipment was provided for all subordinate detachments as well as Company headquarters. This included footballs, basketballs, baseballs, baseball gloves, ping pong sets, tennis balls, and horse shoe games. The use of this special equipment enhanced the morale of the troops immensely. Two USO shows were presented during this period.

(e) Annual General Inspection. Company A took part in the Annual General Inspection on 7 February 1969. The entire Company received a satisfactory rating with only a few noted minor deficiencies which were corrected on the spot or are in the process of being corrected.

(f) Civilian Personnel Office. There are a total of 501 civilian personnel assigned to Company A: 197 at the C-detachment, 148 at the four B-detachments, and 161 at the fourteen A-detachments. During April 1969 all civilian employees were reviewed with attention to grade and step. This revealed an excess of personnel at the higher levels and during that month corrections were made to all positions with the table of distribution dated 10 March 1969. The adjusted.
AVOB-C 15 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

became effective 1 May 1969 and should show a marked decrease in cost per individual.

A change in the TD of the 3rd MSFC (B-36) to accommodate their needs for more combat interpreter slots due to their split composition was approved by Group Headquarters and adopted on 7 April 1969. A request for additional slots to accommodate the convalescent center at LONG HAI was also approved, adding 11 needed positions. Temporary laborers can only be hired after approval by Group Headquarters. Presently 49 temporary laborers are approved; 32 at the C Detachment, 2 at Detachment B-32, 10 at Detachment A-322, and 5 at Det B-34.

17) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Company D).

(a) Strength.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>AUTO</th>
<th>ASSO</th>
<th>AGG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>75</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Replacements. Among officers there is a great shortage of XO and CAPO replacements. The critical enlisted MOS's are 11F, 11C, and 91B.

(c) Discipline. Company D has not had any problems concerning discipline or law and order. The following is a summary of judicial actions.

Article 15: 5
Summary Courts-Martial: 0
Special Courts-Martial: 0
CONFIDENTIAL

15 May 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

1. Medical

(a) USASF Medical Care. The health of USASF personnel has remained excellent throughout the reporting period. There has been a substantial reduction in the incidence of malaria with the introduction of daily quinine pills to the chemoprophylaxis malaria control program in late January 1969. Hospital admissions for battle injuries have increased considerably during this reporting period due to increased contact with enemy forces. The hepatitis rate continues to be a minor problem.

The health of USASF personnel is constantly exposed to the environment in the food and liquids they consume. Due to the unique nature of the USASF personnel their exposure to contagious diseases is normally higher than any other unit in Vietnam. Although there have been no epidemics among indigenous in areas where USASF have been operating, USASF casualties have been kept low by a strictly enforced immunization program.

(b) CIDG Medical Care. A schedule of disability payments for the CIDG was published. CIDG and civilian employees who are permanently disabled in the line of duty will be paid an allowance. A percentage of disability is determined by the C-Detachment Surgeon in accordance with the schedule. The total allowance is computed by multiplying three months’ base pay times the percentage of disability. Due to recurring incidences of epidemics of common diseases among the CIDG population, an immunization program for CIDG has been instituted by each USASF company. The basic series of immunizations will include smallpox, cholera, plague, and the time/or PPD skin test. Any additional immunization requirements deemed necessary by the company surgeon will be utilized at his discretion. A record of these immunizations will be kept as part of the individual pay record and will be transferred with the individual to each of his duty stations. The following recommendations have been made for addition to the proposed CIDG identification tag: "US of ARVN." This will inform US medical authorities that these persons are authorized treatment in their facilities and hopefully preclude their transfer to CIDG or ARVN facilities. Additional information to be included on these permits will be "5th SFGA." This will keep an up-to-date account of hospital admissions of CIDG throughout the Republic will be maintained.

(c) Preventive Medicine and Veterinary Activities. The Group Veterinary Center conducts the rabies control program in IV CTZ. A total of 1159 animals were vaccinated in and around ten camp areas. Preventive Medicine leaflets for troop commanders have been published and distributed to the field. All of these publications are in the process of being translated into tribal form. Routine mess and club sanitation inspections have been
conducted and a general improvement noted. As previously stated, malaria discipline within the 5th SFDA has been satisfactory. An effective immunization program continues to be conducted among USASF personnel and a program for immunization of CIDG is being implemented.

(4) Medical Supplies. Supply economy has been more effective during this reporting period than at any previous time. Complete inventories of all medical supply items within the command were conducted and all excess backloaded to the LSC. To date a saving of over $30,000 has been realized. A new medical supply stockage list has been published. Developed by the Group Medical Supply Officer and Group Surgeon, it was based on supply utilization figures and recommendations from the component surgeons. Employing this stockage list and previous usage factors new requisition objectives (RO's) will be established. Emphasis has been placed on the correct utilization of the Red Ball resupply system. Medical supply usages have been planned in a manner that precludes Red Ball resupply except for operational emergencies. There have been no critical medical items during the reporting period.

(5) Training. It was pointed out during the second VNSF/USASF Surgeons' Conference, held 19 and 20 April 1969, that USASF personnel appear to be doing too much in the CIDG hospital program and often completely override the VNSF. The eventual goal is to turn over the CIDG hospital program to the VNSF and they in turn will answer to the ARVN Surgeon General. Until the final transfer VNSF doctors will assume more and more responsibilities in the program and USASF medical personnel will revert to an advisory effort. This process will be pursued keeping in mind at all times, however, the necessity for providing the best possible care for patients.

(6) I Corps Tactical Zone (Company C).

(a) USASF Medical Care. Long range planning in the area of camp hygiene has been neglected at C and B team compounds where unanticipated growth and use of available facilities has overburdened waste disposal systems. It is readily apparent that problems of septic tank overflow are much harder to correct once present than to prevent by building facilities with a generous allowance for future growth. Septic tank overflow complicates mosquito control, interferes with potable water supply, and is aesthetically intolerable. The ideal solution is the future development of an economical self-contained waste disposal system. However, until such time, allowances for future growth must be taken into consideration from the very start of construction. Another health problem has been caused by the inadequate washing of fresh vegetables purchased from the local economy which has lead to multiple cases of shigellosis and other transient
CONFIDENTIAL

15 May 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

Special Forces Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 10 April 1969. PPS CSFOR-65 (RI)

The term "vegetables" often are a necessary part of a diet but all vegetables have high, their food economy should be considered as

"favorable". Therefore, it is important to make them in water with a thirty
gallon, and followed by washing in five ppm chlorine-

water. The rate of disease should be properly recorded.

(b) In general, the safety of personnel involved in nude war

cannot be protected by the construction of protective holding

tents or bunkers alone. Generally, those areas must have distan-
ties from areas where ordnance is used and during nude operations when

personnel and patients are exposed to a considerable time in accomplish-
ing the mission, a large holding bunker on the headquarter would have pre-
vented this problem in the past and those it may prevent justify construction.

(c) Pre-All-Out Physical Examinations. The deployment of two

personnel to the theater of operations with active tuberculous

syndromes was indicated by the completion of postoperative physical exami-

nations. Those personnel involved were sent to Vietnam via Inter-

theater transport, which indicates these personnel need closer exami-

nations. The postoperative examination of personnel coming from COMUS

to the theater currently is working well as no active disease has

been reported in this group.

5) II Corps Tactical Zone (Company B).

(a) USASF Medical Cadre. Four new buildings have been added to

the hospital plant. These include housing for USASF and VH SF medical

personnel, housing for civilian employees, a medical supply storage

facility, and a 50-man bunker. These buildings increase the hospital

capacity to 45 beds, permit more complete care and quicker reaction
to medical evacuation, and provide better security for hospital medical

supplies. In addition, housing the VH SF medical personnel at the hos-

pital will permit almost complete integration of them into all activities.
The third copy of the Company B medical newsletter has been issued. This

newsletter, printed every three months, contains both medical articles
and guidance on medical administrative procedures and is disseminated
to all Company B medicals.

(b) VI Corps Medical Care. A total of 3,339 patients were cared for
during the period including 166 as inpatients. A plague immunization

program for B-20 PDP and the C-2 security force as well as their depen-
dents was initiated in cooperation with Detachment B-20 in response to

a plague episode. A total of 233 individuals were vaccinated by the

Khe Sanh detachment. In addition, an active preventive medicine program us-

ing rat poison, traps, and dusting is still in progress in the dependent

without.
(c) Medical Supply. Extra efforts have been made during this period to improve medical supply efficiency and economy. The thorough examination of medical expendable and equipment requisitions prior to their submission to the FSP has been a definite plus factor. In addition the individual medical specialists have become more aware of the dollar value of each particular medical item they request. Medical supplies used for HEDCAP purposes have received closer scrutiny by A and B detachments medics. A survey was conducted to ascertain the existence of excess medical expendables at A and B detachments. Subsequent backloads have resulted in the proper allocation of these supplies. During this period medical supplies have been misrouted on several occasions. The problem has been traced to the air movement ready line and the Air Force personnel responsible for loading and unloading supplies at the aerial port, but it still has not been fully resolved.

(d) Training Program. The OJT program for medics at the hospital is still in effect and a total of 23 students have been enrolled with 5 satisfactorily completing training. The primary purpose of this program is to train civilian personnel for the hospital. A CIDG medic training program lasting six weeks was started 23 April 1969 consisting of lectures, demonstrations and supervised OJT. Subjects taught include medicine, surgery, laboratory procedures, physical rehabilitation, and preventive medicine. Twenty-nine students from A detachments, MSF, and Polwar teams are currently enrolled.

(e) Medcaps. Three patrols were conducted with 327 patients treated. The patrols were limited to the PLEIKU area and included the MSF village of PLEI YUT.

(f) Miscellaneous. The presently organised CIDG medic training program is experimental and will probably have to be modified. All Company B medics have been encouraged to provide constructive criticism of the courses as soon as the trained CIDG medics return to their units. This criticism will be the basis for any changes in the course. In an effort to correct errors in the MOPSUM a monthly letter is being sent to each A detachment medic analyzing his Annex G and informing him of the efforts being made by the Company B staff to assist in solving problems. The VNAF Surgeon and one of his medics will soon move to the new quarters constructed on the hospital compound. All aspects of hospital activity will then be jointly controlled. The training program presently conducted is a joint operation with both USASF and VNAF cooperating closely in classroom instruction and supervision of the OJT phase. A request for approval of a physical therapy unit containing hydro-therapy and exercise sections has been submitted. Activation of this unit should enhance patient care in the hospital and lower the permanent disability rate. A continuing problem at the C-2 compound is the unsatisfactory emergency water supply. After heavy rains, the well serving as the water...
source is contaminated with sewage. With rainy weather fast approaching, an increase of water borne diseases such as hepatitis and dysentery can be expected unless satisfactory means can be found for chlorination of the water.

(3) III Corps Tactical Zone (Company A)

(a) USASF Medical Care. The CIDG Hospital continues to function as a company-level medical facility for USASF personnel. Medical and dental records are maintained at the Company. The hospital conducts routine daily sick call for members of the C-team and all immunizations. While all emergency cases from A and B teams are medevaced directly to Evacuation or Surgical Hospitals, the CIDG Hospital screens all patients requiring more sophisticated medical care not offered on site. This includes X-rays, laboratory procedures, casting, and appraisal by the Company Surgeon. All dental work is referred to the 199th Dental Detachment in BIEN HOA.

(b) CIDG Medical Care. The hospital capacity has been increased from 79 to 93 beds. During the reporting period, the hospital had a mass casualty situation, receiving 75 wounded MSF in a period of three hours. The gymnasium at Company A was turned into an additional ward to handle the casualties. This enabled the hospital staff to treat the wounded MSF with optimum efficiency. The renovation of the CIDG Hospital is well under way, and is expected to be completed within the next month. Relocation of the Convalescent Center to Company A is still in the planning stages.

(c) Preventive Medicine. There have been no epidemics of any significance in III CTZ during the reporting period. There were, however, a few isolated cases of plague. Team members were immunized and the camps dusted, with no further cases reported. The lack of preventive medicine personnel continued to be a major problem since the only PM specialist assigned to Company A is currently on a reenlistment leave.

(9) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Company D).

(a) CIDG Medical Care. The clearing station at CHI LANG was closed 7 April. A total of 379 patients were treated there since 5 March.

(b) Preventive Medicine. Several plague cases were reported near MY PHUOC TAY. (A-II) Capt Paul D. Hoffmann, Company D Surgeon, visited the camp and advised on precautionary measures. No cases were reported at the camp itself. There was a diarrhea outbreak among the dependents at MY PHUOC TAY. Some 25 individuals, mostly children, were involved although one USASF had to be evacuated. The company surgeon visited the camp and found all water sources polluted. Evidently the CIDG Medic, in the absence of the USASF who was on operation, was not chlorinating the water, which has since been corrected.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C 15 May 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

m. Signal.

(1) Operations. All means of communications utilised by the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) continued to operate at an exceptionally high level of efficiency. No significant difficulties were encountered during the entire reporting period. In striving for even more effective communications, careful analysis of message precedence assignment on all teletype traffic handled by the SFCO Commcenter revealed an inordinately high percentage of Immediate messages. Specific guidance to all levels of this command brought about significant improvement. Detailed instructions followed by critical message precedence analysis to pinpoint specific violators resulted in a decrease in the use of Immediate precedence from over 50% to 30%. The resulting distribution of messages throughout the Immediate, Priority, and Routine categories has insured efficient handling of all Commcenter traffic.

(2) Training. The 44 hour communications refresher course continues to provide excellent instruction to newly assigned signal personnel. Radio operators are now reporting to their field assignments with adequate proficiency in CW operations and the necessary familiarisation with communications equipment being utilised within the 5th Special Forces Group.

(3) New Concepts/Equipment. Good progress has been made in the development of the secure voice program throughout Vietnam. All detachments in I Corps, 70% of those in II Corps, 76% in III Corps, and 65% in IV Corps now have secure voice capabilities. This equipment has proven to be an extremely valuable asset particularly in the "Hot" camps where speed and security of transmission is essential. Efforts will continue to obtain critically needed X-mode cables and adapter cards for the installation of additional high powered VRC-12/KT-8 secure voice system.

(4) Miscellaneous. A definite communications problem has been experienced in camps turned over to the VNSF due to their lack of training on new equipment and limited familiarisation with communications concepts unique to Special Forces operations. Subordinate commands are implementing a vigorous training program to insure that all VNSF radio operators are able to assume the responsibility for all camp communications support. In addition to lack of qualified personnel, there is also a lack of qualified VNSF electronics repairmen. The VNSF could not at the present time provide electronic maintenance support in the event of troop reduction or complete US withdrawal. It has been recommended that VNSF repairmen be given on-the-job training at all echelons of repair. The ultimate goal of this program would be for the VNSF technicians to take over and more of the electronic repair responsibility until such a time as they could assume all the maintenance support.

CONFIDENTIAL
Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(5) I Corps Tactical Zone (Company C).

(a) Operations. Secure teletype remains the primary means of communications with higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters. One teletype circuit (SF5D) and two landline circuits (III MAF G-3 and DA NANG South Minor Relay) are currently in operation. The DA NANG South circuit is programmed for deactivation prior to 1 June 1969, and a new terminal will be activated as programmed into Defense Communications (DCS) facilities. Message handling times will greatly improve through the use of this new system. Radio set WWMKA (single sideband) continues to provide an exceptionally high degree of reliability in support of signal operations. Propagation for short and intermediate transmission paths (HF) have been well within acceptable standards. Normal propagation difficulties have been experienced for the reporting period. Operational efficiency, however, has not been adversely affected by regular or irregular variations.

(b) Training. Company C continues to provide familiarisation training to newly assigned radio operators. It has been noted that replacements in SFCB6 who have recently graduated from the Special Forces Training Course are not as well trained as replacements received during the previous reporting period. An intensive familiarisation program has been initiated to provide maximum operational experience to personnel in this category. An exchange training program has been initiated with the Marine Amphibious Force Teletypewriter Course. This program of instruction is specifically oriented to the repair and maintenance of teletypewriter AN/FGC-58X (100WPM). An additional benefit is derived from the continuous exchange of repairmen from Company C (Signal) to attend the course of instruction.

(c) New Concepts/Equipment. Radio set WWMKA has been issued to the Vietnamese Special Forces Signal Augmentation Team. Vietnamese operational detachments will conduct signal operations on a net closely paralleling the United States Special Forces Command Net, using radio set AN/PRC-74. Operation of this net is scheduled to commence on or about 15 May 1969. The transition of a camp to VNSF control is easier when equipment used in support of signal operations has been integrated prior to the transfer. Two nets have been added to Special Forces signal operations within I CTZ. A Direct Air Request Net provides expeditious handling of preplanned air-strike requests and operates independently from the command net. This net terminates directly with the S3 Air Officer. Preplanned missions are requested by a particular detachment on a daily basis at specific times. This net may also be activated on a continuous basis to support tactical operations at the discretion of the detachment commander. Experience has shown that this method is superior since valuable time is saved by direct coordination between detachment commander and the Air Force Liaison/S3 AOI. In addition...
a CW net operates on a continuous basis between the base station and the subordinate detachments. By contrast, from a guard frequency camp in I CTZ, therefore, have as many as three nets on separate frequencies which can pass operational traffic. The advantages of this concept are readily apparent in that three detachments may transmit simultaneously to the base station at the discretion of the operator on duty. Message processing and handling times have been reduced considerably through the use of this concept. Also all detachments currently possess a secure voice capability.

(d) Problems. The only major difficulty is that the shortage of X-Mode cables and cards currently preclude corps wide distribution of secure voice equipment (KY-8).

(e) Miscellaneous. The new communications center facility was completed in February 1969 on schedule. Introduction and use of one hundred word per minute teletypewriter equipment, as well as incorporation of the radio section within the communications center, has produced exceptional results in security, speed, and reliability of service to the command. The Vietnamese communications section has relocated and is operational within a joint (non-integrated) VNSF/USASF signal section. Future Vietnamese plans provide for termination of VNSF communications center landline circuitry within the signal section. The results of operating a joint signal section have been very worthwhile. An exceptionally high degree of rapport between the VNSF and USASF has been established. Future projects include integration of VNSF radio repairmen into an on-the-job training program in the company signal maintenance facility to increase familiarization with US signal equipment and supply demand data procedures and systems.

(f) II Corps Tactical Zone (Company B)

(a) New Equipment/Concepts. During this reporting period secure voice communications equipment was installed, linking Company B command detachments with subordinate detachments. Company B Headquarters now has secure voice with one B-detachment B-24, and with one A-detachment PLEI DJAHING (A-51). Detachment B-24 has secure voice capability with four subordinate A detachments, PLEI KLENG (A-241), DAK PEK (A-242), BEN HET (A-243), and DAK SENG (A-244). Detachment B-23 has secure voice with one subordinate detachment, DUC LAP (A-239). The installation of this equipment enables the commander to coordinate more rapidly and securely the activities of subordinate detachments.

(b) Training Program. All newly assigned radio operators are given a period of OJT to familiarize them with radio procedures and equipment used in Company B.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS COFR-65 (RI)

(7) III Corps Tactical Zone (Company A).

(a) Operations. The SSB Radio AN/PRC-93 is a primary means of communications for passing administrative traffic between C and B Detachments. At present the importance of utilizing the SSB for passing extended administrative traffic between A and B detachments is being stressed. This will clear the air on FM and preclude administrative traffic from interfering with operational traffic. FM communications continue to be very reliable in III Corps. This reliability is enhanced through the use of NUI BA DNN as a radio relay site. Frequency jamming is a major problem in areas with large troop concentrations. This problem has been discussed with II FFV and they are looking into the possibilities of issuing more discrete frequencies in these areas. Presently there are VHF circuits to three B detachments and RTT to the other (B-36) as the primary teletype system. RTT is a backup for these. Recently the VHF circuits have proven unreliable, so RTT has been utilized. The problem has been traced to wiring in and around the patch panel at Central in BIEN HOA. The same problem has occurred in tropo communications with NHA TRANG. At present Company D is in the process of trying to work out a backup circuit to NHA TRANG via VHF.

(b) Training. Cross training programs continue at C and B Detachment levels in order to insure maximum utilization of communication personnel.

(c) New Concepts/Equipment. Secure voice systems continue to improve communications in the III CTZ. The reliability of the equipment has been excellent and maintenance problems few.

(8) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Company D)

(a) Training. A training program was initiated during February on the KWM-2A. It was aimed at new American operators and the LLDB radio operators. The instruction was conducted in the maintenance shop and included installation, proper loading procedures, operation, and preventive maintenance. Throughout this quarter the radio NCOIC conducted on the job training with all incoming operators. When new operators are assigned, their ability is evaluated based on their experience and on personal observation by the NCOIC. The operators are kept at the C-Team where they are trained and observed by their respective NCO's until their skill level meets the necessary standards at which time they are sent to subordinate detachments.

(b) New Concepts. During February and March Tech Reps from the signal maintenance facility went to many of the A-Camps. Much equipment was repaired on site.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for
the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

r. Controller.

(1) CIDG Fund Regulation. Due to the many improvements made
in the financial administration of CIDG funds, 5th SFGA Reg 37-1
dated July 1968 was determined to be outdated. Since this reg-
ulation is the sole source of 5th SFGA current policy and procedures
concerning the financial administration of CIDG funds, a rewrite
and update was undertaken. The revised edition of 5th SFGA Reg
37-1 was distributed to the field on 25 March 1969. Shortly there-
after a copy was provided to the VNSF for translation. Upon comple-
tion of this translation, sufficient copies will be produced to
insure that VNSF commanders at all levels have a copy. In this way
it is felt that VNSF counterparts will acquire a greater appreciation
of the complexities and controls associated with CIDG financial ad-
ministration, and thus be able to understand the USASF Agent/Fund Officers'
duties and responsibilities. This should result in a more harmonious
working relationship between VNSF and USASF personnel. The revised
edition of 5th SFGA Reg 37-1 was reviewed by the MACV IG in conjunction
with the development of a MACV/JGS directive designed to curb irregular-
ities associated with the payment of CIDG Forces.

(2) CIDG Subsistence Rates. On 1 February 1969 a proposal was
submitted to the CC VNSF HC recommending that the VNSF assigned to
USASF detachments throughout Vietnam be subsisted on a reimbursable
basis with food purchased from CIDG funds. The purpose of this proposal
was threefold. First, it sought recoupment for the food which is
intended only for the CIDG but is sometimes diverted to the VNSF.
Secondly, it would provide adequate subsistence to the VNSF
assigned to camps located in the remote areas of Vietnam.
Previsouy, USASF Detachments commanders had reported receiving
complaints from their counterparts about a lack of food. Thirdly,
it was anticipated that the VNSF, who in some cases negotiate directly
with food contractors for subsistence contracts, would maximize their
efforts to acquire the highest quality of food available. On 20 Febru-
ary, a reply to the recommendation was received from the CC VNSF HC.
The VNSF HC concurred with the implementation of this proposal in I
and II CTZ's. Those VNSF assigned there have the option of subsisting
from food provided for the CIDG with a reimbursement rate of $3 VN per
day or acquiring subsistence for themselves on a personal basis. In
III and IV CTZ's the VNSF provide their own food. This system became
effective on 1 March and to date no problems have been encountered.

(3) PIR Rations. In conjunction with the above mentioned proc-
dures, the CC VNSF HC was advised of the fact that reports had been re-
cieved at HQ 5th SFGA that VNSF in the field were consuming patrol rat-
tions provided for the CIDG. Investigation into RVNAF regulations revealed

CONFIDENTIAL
the fact that Vietnamese patrol rations were available to the
VNSF upon request. The CG VNSF HC stated that instructions
had been issued by his command to the VNSF personnel stating
they are not authorized to consume the operational rations
provided for the CIDG.
2. (C) Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel.

(1) Need for Reassignment Instructions for Medically Evacuated Personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION. This headquarters is receiving requests for Military Personnel Records and personal effects belonging to individuals who have been medically evacuated from this command. It is felt that this situation is caused by non-receipt of reassignment instructions from HQ, USARV.

(b) EVALUATION. Since the new medical evacuee reassignment system was established on 15 February 1969, this headquarters has experienced difficulties with the receipt of reassignment messages for medical evacuees due to non-receipt of electrical transmission or other administrative problems. This in itself has caused delay in the forwarding of records and personal property of medical evacuees to the proper medical facility. The situation is further compounded by the hardship caused to the individual when he does not receive his monthly pay and allowances.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Casualty Section, HQ USARV should review the internal procedures concerning the transmission of reassignment instructions of medically evacuated personnel with a view towards establishing a requirement that subordinate units receiving reassignment instructions from USARV be required to acknowledge receipt telephonically NLT forty-eight hours after receipt. This system would insure a suspense check from USARV to subordinate units in case of non-receipt of reassignment instructions.

(2) Reassignment and Promotion of Officers.

(a) OBSERVATION. CONUS commanders are not complying with the provisions of paragraph 29c, AR 624-100 which state in part that "recommendations for or against promotion may be prepared by immediate commanders up to four months before the eligibility date for those officers who are being reassigned when reassignment will result in a change of promotion authority. Recommendations will be forwarded by the losing promotion authority to the gaining commander by Air Mail and a copy filed in the officer's Military Personnel Records Jacket, US Army (DA Form 201)." Additionally, losing commanders are not adhering to the provisions of paragraph 29c, AR 624-100 which requires that "the losing promotion authority will promote qualified, recommended officers who have been reassigned when eligibility occurs prior to the EKDA." On several occasions this headquarters has been unable to promote officers on their eligibility date upon arrival in the...
command due to non-receipt of DA Form 78 from the losing promotion authority. Requests for DA Form 78 must be submitted to this headquarters by the losing commander before any action can be taken to promote an officer. Upon receipt of DA Form 78, orders are published by this headquarters.

(b) EVALUATION. This situation creates a severe financial hardship to the officer being promoted. In many cases an officer loses between three weeks to one and a half months pay due to the time lost prior to receipt of DA Form 78 at this headquarters.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. HQ, USARV should contact Department of the Army to enlighten CONUS commands of the existing and recurring problem concerning non-compliance with paragraph 29b and c, AR 624-100.
b. Operations.
(1) Search Procedures. (A-121)
   (a) OBSERVATION. On recent BLACK Yuk operations this
detachment has discovered many sampans both new and used in good
condition, resting at the bottom of water-filled bomb craters in the
vicinity of base and safe areas as well as near ravine stations along
water routes now arid because of the dry season.
   (b) EVALUATION. Bomb craters seem to be the favorite location
for hiding these sampans which are used during the wet season to trans-
port supplies. This is possibly due to the fact that the bomb craters
are filled with undisturbed water that scums over and prevents
the sampans from being seen from the air. This could be a countrywide
practice as the wood in the sampans will shrink and the caulking fall
out if the sampans are not kept moist.
   (c) RECOMMENDATION. Bomb craters located in or near treelines
and waterways should be investigated periodically.
(2) Utilisation of CRP's (A-121)
   (a) OBSERVATION. When this detachment conducts company size
operations, that normally last three to five days, it has been noticed
that upon initiating contact with the enemy the company is tired, unable
to develop the situation, difficult to control, and incapable of pursuit.
   (b) EVALUATION. Some means must be devised to preserve the inherent
strength and firepower of a company size unit so that they are
required to influence the situation they have the necessary capability.
   (c) RECOMMENDATION. This detachment has experimented with the
employment of a company and a CRP jointly. The company sets up a safe
area near the AO and stands by for quick reaction. The CRP conduct patrols
with the missions of relaying fresh intelligence to the company, fixing
the enemy, or establishing contact. The company is then employed to react
to the intelligence, initiate contact, or develop the situation favorably.
The results of this procedure have been quite effective.
(3) Resupply and Medevacs after Contacts.
   (a) OBSERVATION. After a contact during which friendly casualties
are suffered and significant amounts of ammunition are expended, the
GSF are reluctant to maintain contact or sweep the battle area until the
wounded have been evacuated and they have been resupplied.

(b) EVALUATION. Failure to maintain contact reduces the opportunity both to inflict additional casualties on the enemy and to make an accurate assessment of enemy losses.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. A small force, platoon or squad size, should be left at the contact area, with 1 USASF and 1 radio to supervise the preparation and execution of the MEDVACs as well as to insure supplies are brought in. The remaining forces can pursue the contact.

(h) Rest Over Night Positions (RON).

(a) OBSERVATIONS. When preparing to rest over night, the CIDG tend to stop early and group closely together.

(b) EVALUATION. This makes it much easier for the enemy to inflict many casualties at once. Establishing a RON position early gives the enemy the advantage of surveillance and planning.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Operations should move until there is just enough light remaining to set up a good defense and disperse as much as possible. Advance elements can be sent into the planned RON location early to check for booby traps and provide security.
AVOB-C
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(5) Failure of CIDG Troops to Assist in Evacuation of Their own Casualties. (Co A)

(a) OBSERVATIONS. CIDG soldiers do not know how to assist in the medical evacuation of their own KIA and WIA while on operations.

(b) EVALUATION. This delays the operation as well as endangering the lives of those who need medical assistance quickly. Lack of training and team motivation is very evident in this respect.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Prior to combat operations a short period of training should be conducted on life saving steps and the importance of medical evacuation techniques.

(6) Development of Water Resupply System. (Co A)

(a) OBSERVATION. During the dry season in certain operational areas such as "War Zone "D", water shortage becomes critical to a point where it severely undermines the morale and fighting spirit of the CIDG soldiers.

(b) EVALUATION. An extensive and conclusive study should be made at the S-4 level to obtain sufficient and adequate water containers which would alleviate unnecessary water waste during resupply.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Discardable plastic 81MM cannisters or metal 105 and 8" howitzer cannisters can be filled with water at the camp or MSS, and heli-lifted or airdropped into the operational location.

(7) Troop Morale and The Need for Fresh Food. (Co A)

(a) OBSERVATION. In February 1969, after consuming PR's for nearly 60 days, approximately 250 members of the Mobile Strike Force deserted during a resupply mission while on Operation Centurian IV.

(b) EVALUATION. Subsequent debriefings revealed that one significant contributing factor was the continuous consumption of PR's. Company A then initiated a policy of issuing fresh food every fifth day to maneuver battalions during field operations. This greatly improved CIDG morale.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

CONFIDENTIAL
(8) Programmed Deployment of the 3rd MSF.

(a) OBSERVATION. Prior to Mobile Strike Force Operation Centurian V, CTGC personnel were unaware of the duration of field operations and had no fixed standdown period.

(b) EVALUATION. This was considered one of the major contributing factors along with the lack of fresh food that resulted in the desertion of 250 ISF members during Operation Centurian V. Company A developed and gained III HV's approval to plan MSF operations on a definite schedule. Each battalion operates 20 days in the field and has a ten day standdown time. This schedule is known to every ISF member and, coupled with the fresh food supply, has proven extremely effective in maintaining high morale among the troops.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Provision must be made in planning operations for adequate standdown time.

(9) Night Time Preplanned Airstrikes.

(a) OBSERVATION. During the hours of darkness the enemy can travel with relative ease. The majority of the Forward Air Controllers fly only during the daylight hours leaving the enemy free access at night to the rail and road networks for movement of supplies and troops.

(b) EVALUATION. The use of night-time preplanned airstrikes on specified targets would disrupt the enemy's ease of movement. These should have no set pattern so that the enemy would have to be on guard constantly.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. A trial of such airstrikes should be instituted for a period of 30 days, utilizing night-time FAC's and available air assets. At the end of the trial period, agent reports could be screened in conjunction with bDA's to ascertain if movement has decreased.

(10) Notification of Preplanned Airstrike to Subordinate Detachments and Forward Air Controllers.

(a) OBSERVATION. On many occasions, tactical fighters have been on station for requested preplanned airstrikes, but the Forward Air Controller was not available. The fighters were then diverted to other targets or to a jetwash area to drop their ordnance, causing a waste of manpower and material. Upon investigating the situation, it was uncovered that the FAC did not receive confirmation of the requested airstrikes from the Special Forces "B" Detachments in sufficient time to respond.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

15 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(b) EVALUATION. The use of the radio to pass the required information to the subordinate detachments would enable the FAC to schedule his commitments the night prior to flying. This will insure that the FAC is on station as required.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. The Single Side Band radio should be used from the C detachment to the subordinate B detachments to pass the aircraft callsigns. Time-Over-Target immediately upon confirmation. This should be followed by an unclassified message over the RTT system as a back up. The B detachment would, upon receipt of the SSB message, call the FAC by telephone and pass the information pertaining to the next day’s flights. If this procedure is followed, all personnel concerned will be informed in sufficient time.

(11) Command Coordination Between FWG and CIDG Units (Co C)

(a) OBSERVATION. Recent events at a CIDG camp under siege identified certain problem areas that resulted from a lack of initial command coordination between FWG and CIDG units. Artillery and tactical air clearance were extremely difficult to obtain because there was no joint/combined tactical operations center. No arrangements had been made to provide adjacent units with information on planned operations. Because there were elements from different commands operating within a confined area, timely combat support could not be rendered to units in contact.

(b) EVALUATION. Whenever FWG are deployed in a CIDG camp’s TACR, it is essential that close coordination be effected prior to conducting any operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Whenever FWG conduct operations within a CIDG camp’s TACR, a joint TOC should be established. Since most camps already have a hardened bunker this could be utilized. An integral part of the TOC would be an FSCC with the authority to clear all artillery fires and tactical air support within the TACR. All units involved would have representation (IMO) in the TOC. A central command or OPCON authority should be designated to control operations and direct maneuver elements.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS CSPOR-65 (RI)

(12) Use of CBU 12 and 22 Bomblets as an Incendiary. (Co D)

(a) OBSERVATION. During March 1969 Detachment B-43 received an operations order from the 44th STZ with the mission to search selected areas of the "Tram Forest" for enemy cache sites and defoliate the entire area by burning. The terrain in the "Tram Forest" is typical of the Delta Region. There is little or no farming done in the region because of the acidity of the soil. The area is uninhabited except by the enemy who use it as a sanctuary for infiltration, rest zones, and staging areas. Much of it consists of grassy plains intermingled with dense woods. During the rainy season the majority of the "Tram" is underwater while at the height of the dry season it can support armor operations. By first searching selected areas and then defoliating them with fire, the enemy would be denied use of their sanctuary for a period up to a year. Searching presented no problem. However, defoliation did since only a minimum of assets were available.

(b) EVALUATION. Logical and sound choices in such a situation are few. The initial plan was to use a CH 47, rigged with the necessary apparatus for dropping drums of CS, to distribute 55 gallon drums filled with napalm over the area. This was not feasible because of the time and equipment that such a plan required. Conventional napalm dropped by high speed aircraft was considered. But since it would only cover a small area, this idea was dropped. After much thought and consultations with the Air Force CBU 12 and 22 incendiary bomblets were selected.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. The use of CBU 12 and 22 bomblets was effective in starting large grass fires in the areas of operations. The bomblets can be dropped from heights of 150 feet or lower and cover four times the area of a conventional napalm drop. (Also the bomblets if released from heights of 350 feet can provide an effective curtain of smoke. CBU 12 and 22 bomblets, however, are not effective in hilly or mountainous areas since they must be dropped at fairly low altitudes.)

(13) Enemy use of Abandoned Positions. (Co B)

(a) OBSERVATION. During two separate Mobile Strike Force operations in this reporting period, enemy forces were encountered using abandoned US fire support bases as defensive positions.

(b) EVALUATION. The total abandonment of intact fire support bases coupled with the discarding of relatively large amounts of usable military material by US units has proven extremely costly to friendly
units conducting offensive operations in the area at a later date. The enemy has made maximum use of foxholes, bunkers with overhead cover, defensive wire, and US ammunition and equipment which was left behind by the departing units. Examples of US equipment found after driving the enemy from such positions include cases of hand grenades (fragmentation, white phosphorous and smoke), large quantities of 5.56\(\text{mm}\) ball ammunition and M-79 ammunition, HE and WP 105\(\text{mm}\) rounds and extra fuses, steel helmets and protective masks. It is of the utmost importance that units leaving fire support bases be impressed with the disastrous results of leaving usable positions and/or material which is of value to the enemy.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Conventional units which prepare defense positions suitable for extended utilization and are subsequently redeployed elsewhere, should be directed to destroy abandoned positions to the greatest possible extent. In the event a fire support base is programmed for future use and it is not feasible to secure it, reconstruction of the position is considered more desirable than waiting to drive a firmly entrenched enemy out of it. (This recommendation has been relayed to the Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division).

(14) Effect of IFFV Aviation Policy on Air Movements. (Co B)

(a) OBSERVATION. The current IFFV policy that only a fixed wing aircraft may be used to transport passengers or cargo between two locations if both locations have a fixed wing airfield has resulted in undue delays and inefficiency in air movements.

(b) EVALUATION. Due to rotary wing assets being more limited than fixed wing assets in II CTZ, it has recently been directed that moves originating and terminating at locations that have fixed wing airfields must be accomplished by a fixed wing aircraft. This has resulted in inefficient air movements on several occasions. In a move of one CSF company from Camp EBN HST (A-24h) to Camp LANG BUK (A-24h), there was a one week delay due to insufficient ceilings for fixed wing flight into LANG BUK. If helicopters had been available for the move, contour flying along the DAX NORE River Valley could have accomplished the move as scheduled, thus avoiding the unnecessary loss of approximately 972 man-days. In a move of a Mobile Strike Force companies from Camp DAK BEK (A-2h2) to KSTTN, C-7A aircraft had to be used rather than the requested CHH7 helicopters. Due to the short runway at Camp DAK BEK, the C-7A could take off with a maximum of only 18 passengers, as opposed to the 40 passenger capability of the CHH7. The move took three days to complete, rather than one day which would have been sufficient for the same move by Chinook. This inefficiency resulted in the loss of approximately 266 man-days.
(c) RECOMMENDATION. Each air movement request should be considered on its own merits rather than under blanket policy which can result in obviously inefficient use of air assets.

(15) Delayed Munitions by Order US Forces.  (B-32)

(a) OBSERVATION. During the reporting period an area known as "AO Keep Out" was established in the TACR of one of this detachment's subordinate "A" camp. A request came to this detachment for clearance to employ delayed munitions drop in the area specified. After discussion with the VNNF camp commander and the senior USASF advisor, clearance was denied. A message was then received stating that this munitions drop was a directed action that it would take place, and that the subordinate A-Camp should be advised accordingly.

(b) EVALUATION. This strike, by its delayed action nature, has denied the camp access to its most lucrative operational area. Consequently its effectiveness as well as the morale and discipline of its CIDG soldiers has declined considerably.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Steps should be taken at whatever level necessary so that the advice of those on the ground is heeded in such areas as will adversely affect their present or future operations.

(16) Counter Mortar Patrolling.  (B-32)

(a) OBSERVATION. It has been noted that the use of three platoon sized (30 men) elements, operating under one command, have more success in countering enemy mortaring than one company sized element.

(b) EVALUATION. During the reporting period the three element system of counter mortar patrolling was used exclusively at Camp KATUM (A-322). The three elements were committed separately but under one central command. When mortar fire was detected, the command element maneuvered the other two elements in such a manner as to close off escape routes and to allow the best chance of making contact with the enemy. It was noticed that when these tactics were used mortar and rocket attacks lessened. When they were not used, mortar and rocket attacks increased.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. The multi-element or saturation method of counter mortar patrolling should be used by camps subjected to heavy
mortar attacks to alleviate the situation.

(17) Marking of Targets for CIDG.  

(a) OBSERVATION. During contact it is often difficult to control the fire of the CIDG soldiers, particularly the M-79 grenade and automatic weapons.

(b) EVALUATION. During recent operations from Camp TRA CU (A-326) USASF advisors carried magazines loaded with ball and tracer ammunition in order to point out targets. This has resulted in better coordinated, more accurate, and more effective fires.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Special Forces Advisors in the field should carry magazines loaded with ball and tracer ammunition. When the enemy is engaged, they should utilize this to designate targets. This tracer ammunition can also be used to point out targets to FACs and SPOOKY pilots.

(18) Enemy Counter Ambush Tactics.

(a) OBSERVATION. A Combat Recon Platoon from Camp CHI LHON (A-333) ambushed three VC, two riding bicycles and one walking, along the Serse Jungle Highway. It was assumed that the three VC were killed by the initial volume of fire. Part of the ambush force, including one USASF advisor, immediately went to the bodies to begin a search. The USASF was fatally wounded by one of the so called "dead" VC. At the same time an NVA company that had been using the three VC as a point element, counterambushed the CRP causing two more friendly casualties. A similar maneuver was recently attempted against an operation from Camp MINH THANH (A-322).

(b) EVALUATION. None

(c) RECOMMENDATION. After an ambush has been executed, insure that the search party and ambush force remain alert and prepared for an enemy counterambush. Do not casually move in to search "dead" VC who may only be pretending.

(19) VC Use of Oil Fires as Camouflage.  

(a) OBSERVATION. On a number of occasions after the CIDG had made contact with the enemy, the VC have set oil fires which caused heavy smoke.
(b) EVALUATION. This camouflages enemy movement besides hampering friendly use of gunships and TAC air.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Since the VC usually withdraw under the cover of the smoke, contact can be reestablished by positioning friendly assets along likely withdrawal routes.

(20) Use of the 105 "Super Quick" fuse in marshy areas. (A-133)

(a) OBSERVATION. A large number of 105MM duds were discovered in a marshy area after a fire support mission.

(b) EVALUATION. The artillery had been employing the point detonating fuse. When a change was made to the "Super Quick" fuse duds were almost non-existent in these areas.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. "Super Quick" fuzes should be used on marshy ground.

(21) Need for Parallel Messages through VNSF and USASF Channels.

(a) OBSERVATION. VNSF fail to respond to troop requirements for BLACKHAWK operations, school quotas, etc., when the message originates only in US channels.

(b) EVALUATION. It still takes a considerable length of time before parallel messages come down through VNSF channels. Not only does this cause time to be wasted, but it also results in hard feelings between counterparts even before the operation gets underway.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. USASF Headquarters all the way down the line where messages must be retransmitted should put pressure on their counterparts to insure that parallel messages are sent out in an expeditious manner.

(22) Use of Aerial Patrol Routes Along Border

(a) OBSERVATION. Border operations utilizing air assets in areas where the border is not outlined by terrain features call for continuous pilot orientation flights to avoid international incidents. This is particularly true when such operations take place at night.

(b) EVALUATION. Instead of designating an area for search in night operations, aerial patrol routes based on recognizable checkpoints should be used. These routes should be carefully planned and reconnoitered.
at last light, to include preparation of azimuths and flight times between checkpoints as a double check on visual navigation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

(23) Recognition of Achievement for Indigenous Personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION. There is no formal recognition for indigenous personnel receiving prolonged training at the A Team level or higher.

(b) EVALUATION. Company D has a certificate with several blank lines that can be filled in for whatever type training the individual has undergone. Besides being a morale builder, this also helps identify those CIDG who terminate service at one camp and enter service later at another. They can present this certificate as evidence of the training they have already received. This will assist the personnel at the new camp in deciding how to best utilize them.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Each A team as well as TO CHAU and DONO BA THIN should be issued blank certificates to be utilized for the purpose discussed above.

99

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

15 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

C. Training.

(1) Inexperienced Radio Operators.

(a) OBSERVATION. Many radio operators are reaching the field with little or no practical experience. These personnel often hinder the efforts of the detachment. Among discrepancies noted are failure to pass or receive traffic, damage to communication equipment, and communications security violations. There have been cases in which a piece of equipment has been returned to maintenance when all it needed was a tune.

(b) EVALUATION. Since there are only a limited number of fully qualified operators available, the inexperienced personnel must be utilized in operational tasks.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Since a lack of experience is the major problem, these personnel usually can become fairly qualified within a month after arriving for duty. It is recommended that newly arriving personnel be given an opportunity to function in a communications center for a period of four weeks before assignment to the field. Thus they would be able to acquire a working knowledge of their duties under the control of an experienced supervisor. Also, if properly proceeding, these personnel could be given instruction in such areas as radio maintenance, SSI/301, CW, generators and generator maintenance, and electrical wiring.

(2) Training of CIDG Personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION. Most CIDG commands are experiencing difficulties in maintaining an adequate level of proficiency among their personnel. In some instances, trained personnel within CIDG companies are nonexistent.

(b) EVALUATION. The facilities at the CIDG training centers are not capable of handling an influx of trainers sufficient to satisfy the needs of all CIDG commands. Allocations to these centers cannot be increased.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Each command should be authorized a well-trained cadre who could process newly acquired personnel. These cadre would instruct trainees on the basic skills. This would allow a unit to be at least partially operational until more formal training could be conducted at a later period. Also upon the completion of each 90 operational days the command should be authorized to conduct a stand down of 5 to 7 days retraining in needed areas.

100
Utilisation of Subordinate Leaders.

(a) OBSERVATION. Often the CSF do not properly utilise squad and platoon leaders in training or on operations. Company Commanders tend to control the company without delegating authority to their subordinates.

(b) EVALUATION. A chain of command is essential not only for insuring that orders are obeyed but also to develop the leadership abilities in subordinates so that they can assume greater responsibilities when necessary.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. USASF Advisors must convince VNSF and CSF of the importance of developing leaders at squad and platoon levels. CSF commanders have to be shown that delegation of authority does not lower their position. USASF Advisors must work with platoon and squad leaders during training to develop their initiative and confidence.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RT)

d. Intelligence.

(1) Personnel Cross Training

(a) OBSERVATION. Occasional personnel shortages in the Co A OB Section due to leaves, R&R, guard and CQ duties caused difficulties in the day-to-day production of the Intelligence Summaries. Since the OB personnel specialize in given areas, no adequate back up personnel were available.

(b) EVALUATION. Extensive cross-training was effected by a gradual change-over of areas of responsibility for each area analyst. The cross-training, rather than slowing the analysis effort, actually had a booster effect. Personnel who had spent several months engrossed in a given area were confronted with a new situation, a learning situation. They found their backgrounds in specialized areas of the Corps could be generally applied. New ideas and patterns became apparent. The total effect was one of increased communications and coordination within the OB Section and widening of the scope and depth of knowledge of each area analyst.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Cross training should be conducted as much as possible.

(2) Commander's Daily Intelligence Briefing/Intelligence Wrap-Up.

(a) OBSERVATION. The Commander's Daily Intelligence Briefing is transmitted by messages to companies and separate detachments of the Group as well as to five MACV addressees. This daily intelligence "wrap-up" also gives all elements of the Group the benefit of analyses made by the Commander's Order of Battle and Analysis Section.

(b) EVALUATION. The daily intelligence wrap-up has made it possible to forward a continuous flow of timely, accurate information presented in a highly readable form. As a result of not sending daily INTSERVs to adjacent Corps, the total number of messages handled by the Special Forces Operational Base Communications Center dropped almost 7 percent. This is significant in that it means an overall decrease of between 170 and 200 messages monthly. Since this traffic was all operational immediate the new procedure has especially improved the handling of immediate messages. In conclusion, intelligence information is being disseminated at a faster rate than before and immediate messages of a tactical, urgent nature are being handled more efficiently.
CONFIDENTIAL

15 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RT)

(c) RECOMMENDATION. This daily intelligence document should continue to be disseminated to the line companies and the MACV addresses.

(3) The 5th Special Forces Group Recognition Manual.

(a) OBSERVATION. The 5th Special Forces Group Recognition Manual, published at the direction of the Commander, 5th SFGA, was distributed to approximately 1,500 personnel within Special Forces Vietnam.

(b) EVALUATION. The recognition manual equips all operational detachments with a ready reference for identification of Communist Bloc aircraft, armor, and anti-aircraft weapons. It is bi-lingual to facilitate counterpart use. On numerous occasions, as a direct result of this manual, it has been possible to submit highly accurate spot reports in a timely manner to adjacent and higher headquarters.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. This manual should be periodically updated since the enemy continually makes improvements in arms and equipment.

(b) Volunteer Informant Program.

(a) OBSERVATION. The Volunteer Informant Program (VIP) has not produced the desired results that were anticipated throughout Company B during the reporting period.

(b) EVALUATION. The program has been relatively ineffective because of technical difficulties in disseminating the VIP information to the populace, the numerous dialects of the predominantly Montagnard population throughout the TAOR's, poor preparation of leaflets and propaganda, and the almost total lack of literacy among the indigenous.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Greater care should be exercised in studying the motivational factors and culture of the Montagnards if effective implementation of the Volunteer Informant Program is to be achieved. Also, more face to face contact by MEDCAP units, PODFAR teams, and PSYOPS personnel with the Montagnard population could be used to spread information about the program.

(5) Use of Polygraph Teams.

(a) OBSERVATION. Several civilian employees and CSF soldiers at Camp DUC PHONG (A-343) have relatives who are Viet Cong.

(b) EVALUATION. If a Polygraph team were made available to the various A-detachments upon request, such people could be questioned at their location. A tremendous amount of usable information could
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

be obtained.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. The "C" team should be augmented with a mobile polygraph team capable of moving to any location for the purpose of interrogating personnel.

(6) Polygraph Operators.

(a) OBSERVATION. At the present time, there are four polygraph operators assigned to the Group. Within two months, two of these individuals are scheduled to DER'S. Two examiners cannot be expected to provide polygraph support for screening civilian indigenous employees, interpreters, and CIDG personnel as well as furnishing direct support to CIDG combat operations throughout the Republic of Vietnam.

(b) EVALUATION. For the past year, the polygraph program has proved to be extremely valuable not only in examining civilian employees but also in directly supporting combat operations. It provides the most timely method of verifying information from prisoners of war, ralliers, and detainees. Since October 1968, 1,201 VC, VC, and NVA have been identified through such examinations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Since polygraph facilities have been established in all C-detachments, the strength of the polygraph branch should be maintained at five examiners. One examiner should be assigned to each C-detachment and one at Headquarters, 5th SFG. This will provide country-wide polygraph support.

(7) Bilateral Net Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION. The control of bilateral net operations has presented problems in the past. Quite often the VNSF Case Officer would take the attitude that the operation was under his sole control and that the USASF Case Officer was to provide only logistical and financial support. As a result, the VNSF Case Officer would proceed to manage the operation without the advice or guidance of the USASF Case Officer.

(b) EVALUATION. Bilateral operations are begun with the ultimate purpose of advising and training VNSF intelligence personnel so that they can operate the net successfully on their own. If, however, the VNSF Case Officer assumes sole control prematurely, the result is usually a breakdown in operational security.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. The USASF Case Officer should regulate both financial and logistical support in order to stimulate joint control of the operations. USASF Case Officers should know who the principal agents and action agents are and their capabilities and limitations.
CONFIDENTIAL

15 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS CSTOR-65 (RI)

(8) Exploitation of Hoi Chanh.

(a) OBSERVATION. The time lapse between when Hoi Chanh come under friendly control and when they are used as guides to exploit their knowledge is often excessive. This allows the enemy to relocate units and caches.

(b) EVALUATION. This situation is caused by the emphasis placed on the speedy processing of the Hoi Chanh to centers located at unit headquarters and the failure of the ground commander to ascertain the full tactical knowledge of the Hoi Chanh during initial interrogation. Often times even if the information is obtained initially, it is not acted upon immediately because of doubt, lack of assets, or because the action needed is inconsistent with the present mission of the unit.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Ground commanders must continue to insure that all possible information of immediate tactical value is extracted from the Hoi Chanh before he is forwarded to higher headquarters. This will prevent the delay incurred by processing the Hoi Chanh, finding out information at a higher level, and then disseminating it back down through channels. Once the information is learned in the field, the unit should be able to keep the Hoi Chanh until he is fully exploited at that level and then forward him through channels. A reaction force with assets should be available and utilized immediately to check out what has been learned. If possible, this should be done the same day by a unit such as BLACKHAWK. Such immediate action will prevent the enemy from neutralizing the valuable information available from Hoi Chanh.

(9) Visual Reconnaissance Program.

(a) OBSERVATION. Visual reconnaissance flights have recently proven most productive immediately after dawn, immediately before sunset, and in the early afternoon.

(b) EVALUATION. The enemy is quick to discover patterns in our visual reconnaissance. In the past very few VR missions were flown at these times, and the VC took advantage of this lack of coverage to move supplies and accomplish other tasks.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. The VR program should be carefully planned to prevent the establishment of patterns either in the area covered or in the scheduling of missions.
Timely Dissemination of Intelligence.

(a) OBSERVATION. On 23 March 1969 a source belonging to an agency other than Special Forces reported that he had observed an unidentified VC battalion in the vicinity of Cambodia, XT227155. They were carrying a sign which read "Victory Minh Thanh and Phuoc Luu". This report did not reach B-32 until 26 March 1969. On the night of 25 March 1969 (2330H) an operation from A-325, Camp Duc Huu made contact with an estimated VC battalion in the vicinity of Binh Thanh, VT364721H. If this report had reached B-32 twenty-four hours earlier the element from A-325 would have been better prepared to meet a large enemy force and may possibly have reduced their own casualties while inflicting heavier casualties on the enemy.

(b) EVALUATION. Intelligence is often available about the area in which a unit is operating, but it is not in the hands of the unit which is or will be on the ground.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Whenever possible Special Forces intelligence agencies should coordinate laterally as well as within their own organization to effect greater, more rapid dissemination of intelligence.

Timely Intelligence Reporting.

(a) OBSERVATION. In the past it has been noted that due to extended operations and limitations of distance, the information gained by intelligence agents often is not timely. Instances of enemy troop movements cannot be transmitted for quick reaction. In other cases the lack of communications accounts for the failure to pinpoint enemy bases and caches. When the information is received by the case officer, the location is usually a general vicinity instead of an exact coordinate.

(b) EVALUATION. Timeliness in intelligence reporting has always been a major problem especially in the gathering of agent reports. This has basically been a communications problem. The ability to make enemy concentrations visible to the aerial observer could effectively result in the interdiction of enemy movement and the destruction of enemy personnel and logistics.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. A solution at least to the base area problem would be to mark it. The most effective way to do this is with a flare parachute. By placing the chute in a tree or otherwise in close proximity to a base area, the agent can make it readily identifiable from the air but not from the ground. It has been found that airstrikes can be placed right on the target with the FAC using the white parachute as a reference point.
Subject: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS CSFM-65 (RY)

(12) Operations Based on Current Intelligence.

(a) OBSERVATION. During the reporting period, Camp DONO TZE (A-222) maintained a high kill ratio. Most of the combat operations were based on aggressive intelligence produced and collected by organic assets.

(b) EVALUATION. The intelligence NCO actively and steadily pursued basic intelligence principles with initiative, imagination, and determination to obtain useful information. His results were accepted and utilized in planning successful operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Command emphasis should be placed on meaningful and productive intelligence gathering and reaction to knowledge gained from such efforts.

(13) Neutralization of VC Infrastructure.

(a) OBSERVATION. Camp PLEI DJERENG (A-251) effectively identified and neutralized Viet Cong suspects throughout their TAOR during the reporting period.

(b) EVALUATION. A-251 concentrated the majority of the population within its TAOR in a resettlement village close to their camp. By efficiently utilizing existing black lists in cordon and search operations, they systematically identified and neutralized VC and VCI in their TAOR.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. In conjunction with District and Province, camps should strive to consolidate their scattered population in their TAOR's into an easily controlled resettlement area. Current and meaningful black, grey and white lists should be maintained and integrated with cordon and search, medcap, and psychological operations.

(14) Agent Ruses.

(a) OBSERVATION. The VC units in the vicinity of Camp BA XOAI (A-421) have tightened their security so effectively that it has proved next to impossible to penetrate their base camps and safe areas with agents utilizing conventional methods.

(b) EVALUATION. A new arrangement was thus necessary in order to penetrate effectively enemy base camps and safe areas to gather intelligence.
CONFIDENTIAL

15 May 1969

OPERATIONAL REPORT OF 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (ABN) FOR THE PERIOD ENDING 30 APRIL 1969

RECOMMENDATION. This detachment has utilized agents disguised as wood cutters to effectively penetrate these locations. In this TAOR wood cutters are so common that little suspicion is attached to them. Occupations in prominence in other locations could be similarly utilized.

Agent Reporting.

(a) OBSERVATION. The time lapse between an agent sighting and the receipt of the information is prohibitive. By the time the report is received the intelligence is anywhere from 12 hours to three days old and its value decreases in proportion.

(b) EVALUATION. The entire operational commitment is based on accurate and timely intelligence, yet no means of rapid collection is in effect.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. The use of outmoded electronics systems would adequately suffice. If PRC 10 radios and batteries could be made readily available, this would be a solution. Other possible solutions consist of an outmoded system similar to the "Angry Nine" or a vehicle to support a rapid dead drop technique.

Collection Efforts and Unnecessary Payments of Agents.

(a) OBSERVATION. While planning and operating the intelligence collection effort, it was learned that agents' reports have been the most unreliable type of information received. It was also noted that the primary motive of all agents was money. Villagers and/or one time informants have rendered more reliable information than coded agents.

(b) EVALUATION. During the past seven months agents have rendered unreliable information. Very little has been confirmed. Another agency, also having agents operating in the TAOR, reported that their agent reports could not be confirmed either; and were unreliable. These reports create an administrative burden. They necessitate wasteful combat reconnaissance and air surveillance operations and cause confusion in the collection effort.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Agents and/or prospective agents whose sole concern is monetary rewards should be closely monitored to determine the validity of their reports. If the unreliability of their reports is confirmed, they should be terminated.
The personnel data on these individuals should be disseminated to all other agencies in an effort to safeguard friendly intelligence agencies from rehiring the individual. In addition, all Special Forces A-Detachments should be encouraged to make more use of casual informants.

(17) Cover for Clandestine Collection Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION. The use of civilian cover in clandestine collection operations in a combat environment is not as advantageous as a shallow military cover. Civilian cover is more difficult to establish and does not offer as great a degree of physical security as military cover. Captured documents indicate that a large portion of the US civilian population in Vietnam is suspected by the enemy of operating in some type intelligence capacity.

(b) EVALUATION. The purpose of cover for US Military Intelligence personnel working as Case Officers is to enhance the physical security of the Case Officer Team and to provide plausible denial of clandestine operations being conducted against the target area. When effectively developed, military cover not only affords denial of clandestine intelligence operations, but provides for easier and more rapid logistical support, freedom of movement, and backstopping cover arrangements than does civilian cover.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Shallow military cover should be used when conducting clandestine collection operations in a combat environment.

(18) Clandestine Photography Missions.

(a) OBSERVATION. The use of indigenous agents in clandestine photography missions presents certain problems. The agent selected for such a mission must be intelligent, courageous and willing to use a camera in spite of the obstacles. Many agents lack confidence in using a camera. Usually they do not have the necessary training. Moreover, concealment of the camera is a problem.

(b) EVALUATION. The purpose of a clandestine photography mission is to give visual proof of the information reported and also provide a more factual presentation of the item or area on which the agent is reporting. When effectively utilized, such a mission can provide valuable information which often cannot be obtained through other means. It is also a means of testing the agent's reliability.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. To build the agent's confidence a number of training missions must be run followed by thorough debriefings and critique of the photography. In addition, a system of bonuses should be initiated to provide further incentive to the agent for obtaining clear pictures of...
intelligence value. Simple concealment devices for carrying the camera can be constructed from items such as carrying baskets, sap buckets, etc., depending on the agent's cover or occupation. Training of the agent can be conducted by the case officer or principal agent who is in turn trained by a photography specialist.


(a) OBSERVATION. Due to communication backlog and downtime, as well as processing procedures for end product ARDF reporting, Mobile Strike Force (MSF) operations in the field were denied ARDF locations of enemy units within their AO on a real time basis. This resulted in an incomplete intelligence picture of enemy activity.

(b) EVALUATION. The 403d SOD in recognition of the problem deployed mobile ARDF two man teams utilizing manpack ARDF monitor positions consisting of an AN/PRC-77 with KY-38 speech security device in direct support of MSF operations in the field. These teams, located at the AOR or with the maneuver elements, pass ARDF locations to the supported commander and make recommendations as to employment of artillery, TAC AIR, ground reconnaissance teams or reaction forces based upon the radius and timeliness of the reports. By augmenting MSF operations with these teams, the delay in passing information from the B or C-detachment to the field has been effectively eliminated. Additionally, this information combined with other reports provides the supported tactical commander with a more timely, valid and completely integrated intelligence picture. This support has been highly successful and is one of the primary reasons for the outstanding results of recent MSF operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. MSF operations should continue to be augmented by ARDF teams in order that information can be exploited expeditiously.
e. Logistics.

(1) Fuel Filter Modification for Libby 10 kW Generator. (Co C)

(a) OBSERVATION. One of the primary causes for "down time" for the 10 kW Libby generator is fuel contamination resulting in injector pump failure.

(b) EVALUATION. As there is no feasible way to improve fuel quality, a method must be devised to filter fuel before it enters the generator fuel system.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. ECCI Technicians at this unit have developed a field modification to eliminate fuel contamination problems. Initial application of this field-fix at three selected A detachments has shown that the "dead line" rate has been drastically reduced. Further tests are being conducted and final results will be forwarded to the Group Maintenance Officer for possible command-wide application.

(2) Expedient Battery Box for 2½ ton truck. (Co B)

(a) OBSERVATION. The battery boxes on 2½ ton trucks rust out and deteriorate in some cases before the truck is one year old.

(b) EVALUATION. The location of the battery box under the right side of the truck body where it is exposed to road dirt and mud is the cause of this problem. When the box becomes unserviceable, it can be replaced with a simple frame type box locally fabricated from scrap angle iron and relocated under the assistant driver's seat inside the cab. In addition this protects the batteries from the road dirt and mud, and makes them easily accessible for the daily operator's check.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. The maintenance shop should consider fabricating these battery boxes for use in cases where the original box has become unserviceable.

(3) M51A1 Starter Switch. (Co B)

(a) OBSERVATION. The starter switch on the ¾ ton M51A1 becomes unserviceable at approximately 4,000 to 6,000 miles. This is due to faulty design and improper location of the floor board.

(b) EVALUATION. The starter switch for the 2½ ton truck is suitable for the ¾ ton M51A1 and can be easily installed on the vehicle dash near the ignition switch.
CONFIDENTIAL

15 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS OSF-65 (RI)

(c) RECOMMENDATION. An EIR has been submitted to the Tank Automotive Center, Warren, Michigan on DA Form 2404, control number T91194, recommending relocation of the starter switch on M551A1 vehicles.

(h) Generator/Radiator

(a) OBSERVATION. Several 10 kW Taiyo TD 10 generator sets were deadlined due to faulty radiator. Replacement radiators are no longer being purchased from Japan.

(b) EVALUATION. It was learned through experiment that the radiator for the M35 2½ ton truck could be modified and installed on the Taiyo generator. Several of these generators have been in operation for over three months with modified radiators.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. No Taiyo TD generators should be sent to salvage due to nonavailability of Taiyo radiators since the M35 2½ ton truck radiators can be modified and utilized as replacements.

(5) Use of M-1 Trigger Housing in the M-2 Carbine. (SH SFOB)

(a) OBSERVATION. The rebuild program for the M-2 carbine was almost stopped because M-2 carbine trigger housings were not available.

(b) EVALUATION. The shortage of M-2 trigger housings was due to the large number of M-2 carbines being rebuilt and the nonavailability of repair parts for these obsolete weapons in the supply system.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. To alleviate this problem, a modification was developed for the M-1 trigger housing. Two minor alterations were made. An insert was made to accommodate the selector spring. Also a mortise was provided off the housing to allow the M-1 housing to be inserted into the M-2 lower receiver. These modifications should only be done by the LSC Maintenance Facility.

(g) Need to Review Dual-Units. (SH SFOB)

(a) OBSERVATION. Requests for certain repair parts were overlapping, thus creating extra demands and raising the RD and RPs at the LSC Technical Supply.

(b) EVALUATION. Instead of sending in follow-ups on previously submitted requisitions, units were submitting new requisitions for the same item. This resulted in creating due outs in excess of actual requirements.

CONFIDENTIAL
(c) RECOMMENDATION. Units should utilize the due out reconciliation published by the LSC. Technical Supply sections of each unit should purify their due outs by cancelling no longer required items that are in excess of their present demands. The end result will be a cost saving to the Group because excessive quantities on order will be cut to meet actual requirements.

(7) Need for Increased Maintenance on the Water Pump of the M37B1 3/4 ton Truck. (SI SFOR)

(a) OBSERVATION. The water pump for the M37B1 3/4 ton truck has had an abnormally short life.

(b) EVALUATION. The lack of proper preventative maintenance on the water pump is causing it to wear out due to the lack of lubrication.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Command emphasis should be placed on insuring that motor stables and scheduled maintenance are conducted properly. The grease cup on the water pump should be tightened two turns at least twice a week to lubricate the bearing and the cup should be checked to insure that it is full of grease.

(8) Control of Livestock During Shipment.

(a) OBSERVATION. Since the establishment of the Centralized Feed Procurement Program, livestock and poultry have arrived sometimes at A-depots locations either injured or having broken free from their ties or other restraints. Hogs have shown a tendency to die of fright during air movements.

(b) EVALUATION. Livestock which is to be used as a fresh meat supply for CIDO camps should arrive in good health and under control at their destination.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Tranquilisers should be utilized to avoid death or injury to livestock while they are being transported. This would also prevent their breaking loose of restraints.

(9) Backload Items.

(a) OBSERVATION. Many times aircraft arrive on short notice at an "A" site. If the men responsible for "backload items" are not available, there is a hectic rush to decide "what is backloaded where".
(b) EVALUATION. There are many means of setting up a simple backload system.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. At one location a room was set aside in the supply building. Backloaded items were placed there and each was individually tagged with its destination. Thus any member of the team could tell at a moments notice what had to be backloaded and where it was going.

(10) Self Service Supply Center System.

(a) OBSERVATION. The FSP Stock Control Section was needlessly bogged down as a result of processing single line requisitions for office expendables.

(b) EVALUATION. A SSSC (Self Service Supply Center) was established at the FSP and units now draw what they need by filling out a multilined issue sheet at the time of issue. The multilined issue sheet is then assigned a FSP document number and the issued supplies dropped from the stock record cards. This system has proved to be extremely efficient in both responsiveness to user needs and in minimizing office paperwork.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. All FSPs should adopt this system as being the most responsive means of distributing office expendables to all detachments.

(11) Ammunition Stockage Level.

(a) OBSERVATION. As a result of changes in camp strengths, in density of weapons, and in the enemy situation, on hand stocks of ammunition has become excessive in some detachments and deficient in others.

(b) EVALUATION. In order to balance ammunition stockage levels at all detachments and reduce ammunition expenditures, a continual logistical analysis must be made.

(12) RECOMMENDATION. The forward supply point at Company "A", 5th SF(A), Ist SF, has taken the following steps with favorable results. All detachments are required to submit a weekly status report of ammunition, listing all ammunition by type and quantity. These reports as well as all requests for ammunition are reviewed by the SL. Ammunition is then allocated based upon camp strength, the status of weapons on hand, storage capabilities and the tactical situation. In several instances it has been possible to redistribute.
ammunition throughout the Corps area, rather than drawing more
ammunition from the Ist Log Ammunition Supply Point. The results
have been a balanced ammunition status at all subordinate det-
achments and a sharp reduction in ammunition expenditures.

(12) Helicopter Refueling Points. (Co A)

(a) OBSERVATION. Detachment B-36, the 3rd Mobile Strike Force
Command, was deployed into War Zone "D" for extended combat operations.
Helicopter support consisted of an attached light fire team from the
117th Assault Helicopter Company, 12th CAG. Because of the remote
area of operations, the nearest Army Aviation Element (AAE) refueling
point was approximately 15 minutes away, with a total turn-around time
in excess of thirty minutes.

(b) EVALUATION. The turn-around time period needed to refuel
helicopters was far in excess of an allowable period for an infantry
unit to be without helicopter support when in contact with the enemy.
An emergency refueling point was needed at the Forward Operational Base
(FOB). Portable fuel bladders (drum, fabric, collapsible, liquid fuel)
were transported to the FOB via CH-47 helicopters from the Company "A"
Forward Supply Point. This fuel supply was used only when the 3rd MSF
was in contact. When not in contact, fuel was obtained as usual from
an AAE fuel point.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.
CONFIDENTIAL

AMPH-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. ROG OSPOR-65 (RI)

1. Policing Warfare.

1.1 Air Loudspeaker Missions.

(a) CIRCUMCISION. Loudspeaker aircraft tend to fly at too high an altitude that the message cannot be heard on the ground.

(b) CAUTION. Such a loudspeaker mission is worthless.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Tapes should be played from the aircraft over a "hot spot" area for a short time. Through contact with ground crews it can be determined if the tape is clearly audible.

1.2 Task Oriented Action Programs.

(a) CAUTION. In many cases, American-made tools will not be used by Vietnamese. These are designed for American or Europeans and may be too heavy and unwieldy for people of small stature. A second problem is that the tools may be unfamiliar to the indigenous.

(b) CAUTION. If these tools are distributed without prior testing and identification they are disposed of or allowed to sit in a corner. If and when concerned returns to his less efficient, but more familiar implements.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Tools should be purchased in Asian countries when possible. Tools purchased in places such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Japan are often more suitable for Vietnamese as well as more economical.

2. Fund for Maps and Instructions for Hoi Chanh.

(a) CAUTION. There continue to be frequent reports from Hoi Chanh. FOs and agents that individuals or groups want to surrender under the Chinese Hoi program but do not know how or where.

(b) EVALUATION. More specific information must be disseminated to every personnel who might want to become Hoi Chanh.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. A special leaflet should be designed giving instructions and a map for each detachment area.
(a) OBSERVATIONS. The current system for leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcasts in III CTZ is ineffective and entirely unsatisfactory. These missions are flown by the 6th PSYOPS Battalion out of Bien Hoa as requested through the S-5 at Company A, 5th STUA. Requests for these missions must be submitted at least six days in advance, thereby making it impossible to react to current intelligence.

(b) EVALUATION. In most cases the pilots are totally unaware of the local friendly-enemy situation. They are merely told to play a specified tape and drop a certain leaflet over the requested grid square. Often the target audience has left the area. This means the mission is virtually useless.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. If the aircraft could stop at the detachment requesting the mission long enough for the pilot to obtain a short briefing on the local situation, missions would be considerably more effective. Naturally this would decrease the number of missions but those flown would have a chance to produce results instead of being wasted on some uninhabited area.

(5) More Stress on Loudspeaker Broadcasts. (Co A)

(a) OBSERVATION. While interviewing personnel returning from operations throughout III CTZ, it has been found that leaflets are scattered almost everywhere.

(b) EVALUATION. Since leaflets have been dropped in almost all localities and are obtainable if wanted, loudspeaker operations should now be stressed with leaflet operations as support. Most enemy units have strict disciplinary measures against reading leaflets. It is difficult, however, to keep a man from listening to a loudspeaker, and even more difficult to make him forget what he hears.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Each detachment should be equipped with a VIH-5 or ULH-6 loudspeaker system which could be used either on the ground or from the air.

(6) Need For Full Facts in S-5 Assistance to Indigenous. (Co A)

(a) OBSERVATION. As a result of airstrikes on the TAN PHUOC village in III CTZ during February, many dependents lost their homes and personal belongings. Assistance to CIDG dependents was requested by the VNSF S-5 section.
(b) EVALUATION. All plans and requisitions for assistance were made based on the premise that these refugees were CIDG. Not until after everything was approved was it learned that the refugees were in fact dependents of the VNSF who are not authorized assistance under the S-5 Polfar Program but must seek aid from the RVN military dependent refugee program.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Whenever dealing with indigenous personnel, it is essential that all facts and details are obtained before making any commitments. Also it is important to monitor the distribution of commodities to ensure that they are given to the intended recipient.

(7) Self-Help Projects Still the Fact. (Co A)

(a) OBSERVATION. Because of an increasing interest in learning English by the CIDG at Company A, a program was proposed to provide a beginners’ English course. Desks and benches were not available, so a self-help project was initiated. Scrap lumber was obtained and given to some of the more eager students to build the needed desks. They were told that classes would not start until the desks and benches were constructed. The following week the English class began with a seating capacity of eighty.

(b) EVALUATION. None

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Before beginning any project that will incur much time and expense for completion, first determine if there truly is a demand for that project. The best means to determine this is to make the ones who are to benefit contribute their time and labor toward the project.

(d) Refresher Training for POLVAR Teams. (Co A)

(a) OBSERVATION. POLVAR teams if not given refresher training have a tendency to grow stale. Their output decreases and their motivation declines.

(b) EVALUATION. During the month of April Company A’s S-5 section sent CIDG POLVAR specialists to visit POLVAR teams at four A Detachments. It has been noted since receiving this additional training there has been a marked increase in POLVAR activities at these locations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. All A-Detachment POLVAR teams should receive refresher training periodically.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCB CSFOR-65 (RT)

(9) POLWAR Program and Defined Goals.

(a) OBSERVATION. Although there is now much more coordination with 5-5 counterparts at each detachment level and with the SFAB than in the past, there are still no specific written or listed objectives which are to be attained by the POLWAR program.

(b) EVALUATION. Even though it is not possible to "measure" the minds of the Vietnamese and Montagnard peoples, there are still areas especially in civil affairs, where certain goals and objectives could be established such as the installation of CVN certified teachers at all schools supported or assisted by the 5th SFSA. These objectives or goals could be the subject of a joint letter signed by the CT, VNSF, and CO, 5th SFSA. By using a joint letter unified objectives will be established, thereby bringing the VNSF and USSF POLWAR programs into much closer alignment.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. A joint letter should be prepared outlining defined goals for the POLWAR program.

(10) Requirement for Trained and Motivated 5-5 Personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION. In order to effectively advise and assist the VNSF in the conduct of their POLWAR program, it is essential that properly qualified and motivated personnel be assigned to 5-5 positions at all levels. While the quality of these personnel has markedly increased within the past three months, there is still much room for improvement. Of the twenty-three 5-5 related positions in B Company, only nine of these positions are filled by school trained personnel.

(b) EVALUATION. In order to continue improving the POLWAR program, more trained and highly motivated personnel are required. This is especially necessary at B and C-Detachments in order that the maximum number of A-Detachment POLWAR officers receive proper assistance and guidance in the conduct of their programs.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. USAV should be strongly advised of the great need to assign officers either school trained and/or experienced in POLWAR to the 5th SFSA.

(11) Misuse of POLWAR Teams at Some Camps.

(a) OBSERVATION. When the CA/PO leaves the A detachment, the CT/VO POLWAR team often degenerates into the camp detail squad. The team will then spend their time completing minor tasks given to them by the LLDB leader.
(a) EVALUATION. Important S-5 projects are put aside and the team does not perform their scheduled duties. This explains why some of the teams are not effective because they are not being used as POL'AR teams, but rather as detail personnel.

(b) REPORTING. The CA/PO officer should keep a record of the projects that he and the LLDB POL'AR leader have agreed upon. A completion date should be set for projects along with the approximate number of hours needed to finish each one. This information should be given to the team supervisor who can watch to ensure that team members are not pulled aside for other activities. Whenever the CA/PO has to leave the camp, upon his return he should check the POL'AR team's progress. He should record this. The LLDB leader in charge of the team should be shown these records as well as the regular monthly reports submitted to 5th SFMA headquarters. This will act as a further check to ensure that the team is not misused.

120
CONFIDENTIAL

2. Organization.

Need for CRP and POLWAR Team in RF.

(a) OBSERVATION. Regional Force units assuming responsibility for converted CIDG camps are not authorized Combat Reconnaissance Platoons (CRP) or Political Warfare teams.

(b) EVALUATION. CIDG operations have proven the value of the Combat Reconnaissance Platoons in gathering useful information and locating valuable targets for camp strike force combat operations.

Political Warfare Team, when trained and utilized properly, is invaluable in motivating and indoctrinating friendly units, managing MAPO programs, and conducting counterintelligence missions.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Consideration should be given by ARVN to authorizing RF units similar to CIDG Combat Reconnaissance Platoons and Political Warfare Teams for assignment to converted CIDG camps.
h. Other

AVIATION

(1) Need for OPCON Air Support at Nui Coto Operation. (SFOB Avn)

(a) OBSERVATION. On Operation NUI COTO, the required Army Aviation was in direct support of Company D for only a specific time frame each day, then returned to home station.

(b) EVALUATION. This arrangement was advantageous to the supporting aviation unit because it allowed aircraft and crews to return to their home station for maintenance and rest. On the other hand, new crews arrived each day from various aviation units. SOPs of each unit differed and a thorough briefing on frequencies, call signs, and troop locations had to be given to the new crews each morning. The aircraft also reported individually with no one designated as mission commander. As a result much time was lost in briefings and the supported unit had to assume the task of organizing aviation support for the mission as well as handling flight following and other tasks normally provided by supporting aviation units.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Aviation assets should be placed OPCON to the supported unit for the duration of an operation. Tactical integrity of these assets should be maintained. Whenever possible, it should support from the field location.

(2) Air Support for 1st Mobile Strike Force Command. (1st MSFC)

(a) OBSERVATION. All but three operations conducted by the 1st Mobile Strike Force Command during this reporting period have been initiated by tactical covert assault. Air support for these missions was coordinated through III MAF or one of its subordinate units. This air support is rated from unsatisfactory to fair. Delays incurred in moving elements into operational areas ranged from 24 to 72 hours. Only one operation was conducted on schedule as opposed to six that were not. The time period for this evaluation is from 1 February through 6 April 1969 and does not reflect delays for extraction of units from operational areas. Other requirements that necessitate dedicated helicopter and air support are as follows: Command and Control, visual reconnaissance, medevac, extraction of refugees/detainees, resupply, and extraction of maneuver elements.

(b) EVALUATION. The ratings given in the above paragraph were arrived at after analysis of missions requested through III MAF. These delays severely hamper the effectiveness of the 1st Mobile Strike Force Command because its operations are normally initiated against a known enemy or are based on hard intelligence about a specific area. If this
command had OPCON of its own lift capability, the delays could be eliminated. Responsive aircraft are a necessity to the type of operations conducted by the 1st MSFC. This detachment is unable to provide adequate air support based on the limitations of only two UH-1D helicopters to cover nine operational detachments in the I CTZ. It is recognized that subordinate air elements of III MAF have difficulty meeting I CTZ operational requirements due to shortage of aircraft, operational losses, and maintenance. It is further recognized that other MAF in the I CTZ must also obtain air assets from III MAF for operational and logistical aerial support.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Detachment C-I should have OPCON of four UH-1D lift/cargo ships and two UH-1B gunships. These ships would alleviate many inherent deficiencies that stem from MAF in I CTZ not being familiar with nor oriented toward MSF/CSF type operations.

COMMUNICATIONS

(a) OBSERVATION. It is evident from the exceptionally high percentage of immediate messages being transmitted that individuals do not know the importance of proper precedence assignment and are therefore channeling message flow into one precedence category only, namely Immediate.

(b) EVALUATION. Flagrant disregard for precedence assignment by using Immediate to insure timely receipt makes it literally impossible to expeditiously handle messages of extreme tactical urgency.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. An extensive education program must be established at all levels of the command. Detailed instructions followed by careful message precedence analysis to pinpoint specific violators will bring about significant improvement. Although it is not likely that the USARV standard of 2% Flash, 6% Immediate, 12% Priority and 50% Routine will be attained, the resulting even distribution of messages throughout the Immediate, Priority, and Routine precedence categories will insure more efficient, effective handling of all command center traffic.
(4) **FM Power Output Improvement.**

(a) **OBSERVATION.** Experience has shown that secure equipment reduces the output of FM Radio equipment by approximately 20%.

(b) **EVALUATION.** Due to this reduced power output as well as the extreme distances involved, it is literally impossible for isolated detachments to communicate directly by secure-voice with higher headquarters.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION.** If the tactical situation warrants it, a 3CL-1 (Linear Amplifier for the KWM-2) should be adapted to FM secure-voice radio system. See diagram below.

The top frequency of the 3CL-1 is 30 MHZ. The bottom frequency of the AN/PRC-25/524 is 30 MHZ. The 3CL-1 can be raised in frequency by adding capacitors in series with final capacitors. This should be done by maintenance personnel only. This system will boost the power output of the PRC 77/KY-38 from 2 to over 60 watts and the VRC-46/KY-8 output from 35 to over 120 watts. The resulting increased power output could provide
even the most distant detachment direct FM secure-voice communications with its higher headquarters.

ENGINEER

(5) Inspection of Wooden Structures. (Co D)

(a) OBSERVATION. In the Dak area, wooden structures are subject to accelerated deterioration which may not be readily visible to the casual observer.

(b) EVALUATION. During a recent inspection of a 30 foot observation/50 caliber machinegun tower, several 2X4 cross braces were found to be partially rotted at the juncture with the main supports. Upon closer inspection, several cracks and weak points in the main support posts became apparent. Dismantling the tower, the 6X6 main support posts were found to have a rotted or hollow core, some running the entire length of the posts, leaving only a shell of good wood. The diameter of the bad area averaged 3.5 inches. The tower was erected 25 years ago. Wood preservative or paint was not used. The main supports rested on 18 inch concrete bases; however, during one rainy season the lower 3 feet of the main supports were under water for a period of 4 months.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. All wooden structures should be thoroughly inspected periodically. One method of determining internal deterioration is the tapping of the tested wood with a heavy instrument and listening to the sound produced.

(6) Expedient Welding Rod. (Co D)

(a) OBSERVATION. The supply system has been unable to supply welding rods (gas welding) to the engineer and maintenance sections.

(b) EVALUATION. It was discovered that barbed wire which is plentiful throughout Vietnam could be used as an expedient for the rods.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. The use of barbed wire as an expedient replacement for regular welding rods should be further evaluated and tested to determine desirability and effectiveness.

(7) Construction of Concrete Bunkers for Ordnance Storage. (Co D)

(a) OBSERVATION. Concrete ammunition bunkers offer several distinct advantages such as greater protection from enemy fire as well as cover from wind, rain and dust.
(b) EVALUATION. These advantages can be negated, however, by the presence of excess moisture in the bunkers. Increasing air circulation will prevent moisture from building up.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. When constructing these bunkers, provisions should be made for increased movement of air. By making two screened and baffled air ports in the upper walls it is possible to allow for this circulation without weakening the structure. Keeping the doors open for a short period during the daytime will also help circulation.

MEDICAL

(8) Septic Tanks.

(a) OBSERVATION. Long range planning to support camp hygiene has been neglected, especially at C and B Detachment compounds, where unanticipated growth and the increasing use of facilities has overburdened waste disposal systems.

(b) EVALUATION. It is readily apparent that problems of septic tank overflow are much harder to correct once present than to prevent by building facilities with a generous allowance for future growth. The overflow from septic tanks complicates mosquito control and interferes with potable water supply. It is also aesthetically intolerable.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. The ideal solution would be the development of an economical, self contained waste disposal system. Meanwhile, however, thought should be given to the construction of "oversized" septic tanks during the initial planning of an installation.

(9) I.V. Infusion Set Needles Becoming Dislodged During Movement.

(a) OBSERVATION. When moving a patient who has an IV infusion set needle inserted, it is often necessary to cross sand bags, ditches, wire, and other obstacles. This many times results in the needle becoming dislodged thereby causing vascular damage.

(b) EVALUATION. None

(c) RECOMMENDATION. An intracath should be used in place of the needle on the infusion set. This would allow any type of movement of the patient without the needle becoming dislodged.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS CSFOR-35 (RI)

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Incls 2, 6, 7 and 8 wd Hq, DA

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2 - CG, USARV, ATTN: NH, APO 96237
1 - SAGSA, OJCS, Washington D.C. 20301

127
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHCG-DST (15 May 1969) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969, CSC CSPOR-69 (M1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 1 AUG

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CSOP-LT, APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (U) Reference item concerning "Need for Reassignment Instructions for Medically Evacuated Personnel," section II, page 87, paragraph 2a(1); nonconcur. Reassignment instructions for medically evacuated personnel are transmitted in sequentially numbered telegraphic message orders to each major subordinate command concerned. Commanders have been instructed to notify this headquarters if a message order is received out of sequence. Action will then be taken to retransmit the missing order(s). A message outlining the above policy has been retransmitted to the unit. No action by USARPAV or DA is required.

b. (U) Reference item concerning "Reassignment and Promotion of Officers," section II, page 87, paragraph 2a(2); concur. CONUS commanders are not complying with the provisions of paragraph 29b, AR 624-100. This headquarters contacted the Department of the Army in August 1968 and June 1969, recommending army wide reiteration of the contents of paragraph 29b, AR 624-100. On 28 October 1968 and 17 February 1969 the Department of the Army dispatched messages to the Army Commanders explaining the problem of non-receipt of DA Form 78 by gaining promotion authorities. This headquarters will continue to monitor the program and place emphasis when and where it is needed.

c. (C) Reference item concerning "Use of Polygraph Teams," section II, page 103, paragraph d(5) and "Polygraph Operators," section II, page 104, paragraph d(6); concur. A MTQE action is now being processed at this headquarters which increases the authorization for both polygraph equipment and polygraph operators. When final comments have been received from the 5th Special Forces Group, the MTQE action will be forwarded to higher headquarters for final approval.
AVIKO-615 (15 May 6017) 1st Ind

(Confidential: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn.) for the Period ending 30 April 1969, HQS CoR08-65 (A1))

d. (C) Reference item concerning "More Stress on Loudspeaker Broadcasts," section II, page 117, paragraph f(5); concur. Since the report was written, the 5th Special Forces Group has obtained a sufficient number of loudspeakers to meet their requirement. No further action is required.

e. (U) Reference item concerning "Requirements for Trained and Motivated S-5 Personnel," section II, page 117, paragraph f(10); concur. This headquarters is aware of the need. All requisitions for such personnel are annotated to request graduates of the Political Warfare course at the JFK Special Warfare Center. These personnel are not diverted to other units. The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) has a very aggressive Foreign Service Extension program. Whenever untrained Political officers are allowed to extenduja, they apply as fill against a requisition. Greater selectivity to preclude unqualified officers from extending against their specialized positions would assist by increasing the number of trained officers placed on orders by the Department of the Army.

f. (U) Reference items concerning "Aviation," section II, page 121; paragraph 2a(1); paragraph 2b(1), page 122 and paragraph 2b(2), page 122; concur. The evaluations and observations indicate that shortcomings have been experienced in the coordination of aviation support for the 5th Special Forces Group. To be effective, aviation units must remain in close contact with the ground commander and work as a team with the supported unit. These operational problems will be brought to the attention of headquarters, USAV.

g. (U) Reference item concerning "Message Precedence Assignment," section II, page 123, paragraph h(3); concur. The problem of message precedence assignment abuse has been recognized at all levels up to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Command Message Review boards have been established as directed by USARV Regulation 105-10. These boards, established at all commands possessing a communication center or prime users of a communication center, scrutinize two days of message traffic per month and initiate appropriate action to correct violators. This program is monitored by this headquarters and is considered to be successful. No further action is required by higher headquarters.

h. (C) Reference item concerning "FX Power Output Improvement," section II, page 124, paragraph h(4); concur. This matter has been previously recognized by USARV. A number of interconnecting cables have been locally fabricated and distributed to units. Three-hundred cables are currently being fabricated by USAOCO and will be shipped to USARV for distribution at a rate of 100 per month commencing in September 1969. No further action is required by higher headquarters.

CONFIDENTIAL

1.29
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Air) for the Period ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFW-05 (HL)

1. (U) Reference item concerning "Septic Tanks," section II, page 12b, paragraph h(8); concur. A self-contained waste disposal system (LVL Task 05-6-08) is being evaluated in RVN. The camp in question was constructed by a Vietnamese contractor who was contracted for by the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne). Informal coordination between this headquarters and the 5th Special Forces Group indicated disclosed that the problem has been resolved. No further action is required.

For the CO's Action:

C. D. Wilson
C. D. WILSON
Lt. AG
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy Fort:
5th SFG
MACV
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for Period Ending 30 April 1969,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 19 SEP 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

2. Reference paragraph 1m(3), page 81. As of 15 August 1969, all of USARV's stated requirement for 840X Mode cables and 515 adapter cards for the KY-8/VRC-12 Configuration were delivered in-country; 230 of KY-8 installation Kit #1 were delivered with remaining 747 kits to be shipped prior to CY-70; and 121 of the KY-8 installation Kit #2 were delivered in-country with remaining 312 kits to be shipped prior to CY-70.

3. Reference paragraph 2h(4)(c), page 124. Frequencies assigned for FM type operations are normally restricted in power output to minimize interference in adjacent areas. Recommend that consideration be given to authorizing 150 watts on selected FM frequencies only for use by US Army 5th Special Forces Group (Abn).

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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TROOP DISPOSITION LIST - II CTZ

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<td>Bu Dop</td>
<td>YU97152909</td>
<td>Nov 63</td>
<td>560</td>
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<td>VN/MONT/CAMC</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Dong Xoai</td>
<td>TT07645797</td>
<td>Jun 65</td>
<td>132</td>
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<td>Apr 66</td>
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<p>| IV CTZ |
|--------|----------|--------|-----|-----|----|-----|-----|---------------------------------|---------------|
| C-4   | Can Tho  | WS81301160 | Jan 63 | 207 |    |    |     | C&amp;C                             | VN/CAMC/CHI   |
| B-10  | Can Tho  | WS8431160  | Mar 68 | 2087|    |    |     | C&amp;C                             | VN/CAMC/CHI   |
| B-111 | Noc Hoa  | KS03659091 | Feb 65 | 51  |    |    |     | C&amp;C/SS                          | VN/CAMB       |
| A-1111| My Phuoc Tay | KS200065984 | Feb 67 | 623 |    |    |     | CSF                              | VN/CAMB       |</p>
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<th>DREW</th>
<th>CSF</th>
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<th>PF</th>
<th>MSF</th>
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<td>Binh Thanh</td>
<td>WS86180331</td>
<td>May 65</td>
<td>540</td>
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<tr>
<td>A-142</td>
<td>Thanh Tri</td>
<td>WS05759553</td>
<td>Mar 65</td>
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<td>A-142</td>
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<td>WS3656050</td>
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<td>A-142</td>
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<td>WS76226990</td>
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<td>A-143</td>
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<td>Thong Thoi</td>
<td>WS3109505</td>
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<td>A-143</td>
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<td>WS5605552</td>
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<td>219</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>VN/CAMB/CHI</td>
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</table>

**TOTALS:**

| 7168 | 2087 |

**LEGEND:**

- **CSF** - Camp Strike Force
- **RF** - Regional Force
- **PF** - Popular Force
- **MSF** - Mobile Strike Force
- **BS** - Border Surveillance
- **S/SS** - Sector/Sub-Sector
- **RR** - Radio Relay

**ETHNIC:**

- **VN** - Vietnamese
- **CAMB** - Cambodian
- **MONT** - Montagnard
- **CHI** - Chinese
- **C&C** - Command and Control
- **TO** - Training Center
### Statistical Data

1. **(C) Missions:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Squad</th>
<th>Platoon</th>
<th>Company or larger</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CTZ</td>
<td>CTZ</td>
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<tr>
<td>2820</td>
<td>1343</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8075</td>
<td>2278</td>
<td>531</td>
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<tr>
<td>3757</td>
<td>2029</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8035</td>
<td>6193</td>
<td>1289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1177</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>109</td>
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<tr>
<td>921</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>41</td>
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</table>

   **TOTAL:** 24,785

2. **(C) Contacts:**

   a. Friendly initiated contacts
   b. VC initiated contacts
   c. Incidents

3. **(C) Confirmed enemy losses:**

   a. KIA
   b. Captured

4. **Quarterly Comparison of Confirmed Enemy Losses Country-Wide:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>CPTR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May - July 68</td>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug - Oct 68</td>
<td>2172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov - Jan 69</td>
<td>1142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb - Apr 69</td>
<td>2095</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. **(C) USAF Losses:**

   a. KIA
   b. WIA
   c. MIA

### Confidential

Incl 5 to 5th FOA GRILL for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969.

140

**CONFIDENTIAL**
## (a) Quarterly comparison of USASF casualties country-wide:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May - Jul 68</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug - Oct 68</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>154</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov - Jan 69</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>67</td>
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<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb - Apr 69</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>163</td>
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</table>

5. (C) VNSF Losses:

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>CTZ</th>
<th>CTZ</th>
<th>CTZ</th>
<th>CTZ</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. WIA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. MIA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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d. Quarterly comparison of VNSF casualties country-wide:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May - Jul 68</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug - Oct 68</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov - Jan 69</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb - Apr 69</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>125</td>
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6. (C) CIDG Losses:

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<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>CTZ</th>
<th>CTZ</th>
<th>CTZ</th>
<th>CTZ</th>
<th>SD</th>
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<tr>
<td>a. KIA</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>146</td>
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<td>383</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. WIA</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>201</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>1618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. MIA</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
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d. Quarterly comparison of CIDG casualties country-wide:

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>518</td>
<td>1668</td>
<td>58</td>
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<td>Aug - Oct 68</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>1109</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1899</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov - Jan 69</td>
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<td>894</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1195</td>
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<td>1618</td>
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7. (C) RF/PP Losses:

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<td>c. MIA</td>
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d. Quarterly comparison of RF/PP casualties country-wide:

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<th>Month</th>
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<td>Aug - Oct 68</td>
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<td>Feb - Apr 69</td>
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8. (C) Weapons:

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<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>CTZ</th>
<th>CTZ</th>
<th>CTZ</th>
<th>CTZ</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>RF/PP</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>168</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Enemy Wns Capt</td>
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<td>250</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>546</td>
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<td>2116</td>
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 5th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb 69 to 30 Apr 69.

CO, 5th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces

15 May 1969

692358

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310