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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

FOR 0T UT 69B026
15 July 1969

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: BG Darrie H. Richards, CG,
Qui Nhon Support Command, Period 9 May 1968 to 8 June 1969 (U)

1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) dated
4 November 1966.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of BG Darrie H. Richards, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 1-26, as a result of subject report should be provided ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

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Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96375

AVHQC-DST

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report

3 JUL 1969

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20301

1. Attached are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by BG Darrie H. Richards. BG Richards served as CG, Qui Nhon Support Command during the period 9 May 1968 to 8 June 1969.

2. BG Richards is recommended as a candidate guest speaker at appropriate service schools.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
2 cy wd Hq, DA

1 Incl

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AVCA QN-CG (18 Apr 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Program

HQ, United States Army Support Command, Qui Nhon APO 96238 18 April 1969

TO: Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375

Inclosed herewith is my debriefing report (RCS-CSFOR-74).

3 Incl
Added 1 Incl
3. Debrief Rpt (5 cys)
Incl 1 and 2 wd Hq, USARV

DARRIE H. RICHARDS
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS. UNITED STATES ARMUY VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96375

AVHAG-PO

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Program

BG Darrie H. Richards
Commanding General
Qui Nhon Support Command
APO San Francisco 96238

1. In accordance with paragraph 2, AR 1-26 and paragraph 5a, USARV Regulation 1-3, request that you prepare a debriefing report (RCS-OSFOR-74) in five copies as prescribed in paragraph 6, AR 1-26.

2. The objective of the report is to record and utilize the experience, knowledge, and insight gained by you in your position of responsibility for the purpose of doctrinal development, training modernization and improvement, case studies, evaluation of the effectiveness of United States defense policies and programs, improvement of military programs and procedures, and research and development. It will also be utilized in the U.S. Army school system and by other services if applicable. Prescribed format is contained in Appendix II, USARV Regulation 1-3.

3. The report and the attached regulations will be forwarded to this headquarters, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, prior to your departure. It will be classified at least Confidential.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

ED V. HENDRICKS, JR.
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

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DEBRIEFING REPORT (RCS-CSFOR-74)

Country: Vietnam

Debrief Report by: Brigadier General Darrie H. Richards

Duty Assignment: Commanding General, USA Support Command, Qui Nhon

Inclusive Dates: 9 May 1968 - 8 June 1969

Date of Report: 9 June 1969

1. GENERAL: Much of the material which I might cover already has been discussed at great length and many times with personnel representing the DA commands concerned who have visited the US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon during the past 13 months. Further, significant subject matter reflecting my personal observations has been covered in some detail in the quarterly Operations Report, Lessons Learned (ORLL). There are, however, several points which demand emphasis which I shall cover at this time.

2. LESSONS LEARNED:

   a. Areas in need of increased emphasis:

      (1) Area security of logistic bases: Considerable losses of supplies and equipment were experienced as a result of enemy action in USASUPCOM Qui Nhon during my tenure of command. One of the principal contributing causes was the absence of clear-cut lines of authority and responsibility for security of the area around Qui Nhon in which many logistic facilities such as depots, tank farms and pipelines are being operated by both the US and Vietnamese Armed Forces. The "Qui Nhon Self Defense Area" which surrounds many major logistic facilities has been divorced from the TAOR of all nearby tactical units. Every unit commander within the area, of course, is responsible for the security of his own installations and a short distance outside the perimeter. The US Installation Defense Coordinator oversees these activities for the US units. However, since the surrounding area is in no one's TAOR, the Province Chief and District
Chiefs involved have the responsibility for area security with their Regional and Popular Forces. They plead lack of resources and, with some justification, a higher priority mission to defend the villages and hamlets. The result has been totally inadequate area security coverage in the vicinity of US facilities. Many attempts have been made by higher headquarters to resolve the problem but no satisfactory solution had been found prior to my departure. The situation is particularly difficult because of the international aspects involving US, Korean and Vietnamese Armed Forces, each with its own separate and parallel chain of command. The lesson learned is that logistic bases should be included in the TAOR of a major tactical command until such time as the capability of the local authorities to secure the area has been proven beyond doubt.

(2) Losses from petroleum pipelines: The Support Command sustained high losses in POL as a result of the vulnerability of its tactical pipelines to sabotage and pilferage. The magnitude of these losses from the flexible, coupled lines which run above ground indicate that the ability to secure the line should be a major consideration when alternative means of delivery are explored. Further, even if pipeline delivery is selected because of operational factors, provision should be made for continuously upgrading the line from a physical security viewpoint. The principal means found for reducing combat and pilferage losses has been to convert to a buried line. Much of the pilferage loss could have been eliminated by adequate enforcement measures by local authorities. Realistically, I don't think we can ever count on this in economically underdeveloped areas or for that matter in developed areas such as Western Europe when the peacetime distribution system has broken down. The lesson learned is that tactical pipelines are difficult to secure in an environment of insurgency and absence of adequate enforcement by local authorities.

(3) Too many supplies too far forward: I have spent the past year in the Support Command stripping units down to what they need to perform their mission. This seems to be a lesson we must relearn in every war. The units were clogged almost to the point of unresponsiveness. They didn't know what they had in many cases, didn't know where it was and couldn't ship expeditiously that which have been identified as available. In one maintenance unit the direct support supply activity (DSSA) was carrying over 17,000 items on the books. Their supply performance against requirements placed on them by the units supported was very poor. That same unit now has less than 7,000 items for stockage and

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supply performance is much improved. They can keep track better of the reduced stocks. They can find what they have more easily. They can ship it faster because the shipping and receiving section is not glutted with materiel. The lesson here again is to resist the impulse to load up the forward units with a lot of "might need" items.

b. Recommendations:

(1) Have all base areas assigned to a specific tactical unit's TAOR even after civil authorities appear to have adequate control. The tactical unit commander then has the continuing responsibility to monitor the situation and to preempt the civil authorities when the situation dictates.

(2) Study the requirements for tactical pipeline security in relation to Army Doctrine. As a matter of urgency, study the immediate implications of our current experience on the logistic support of a war of movement and high POL consumption such as would be fought in Western Europe.

(3) Put positive and immediate controls at the highest level on the length of time "push" shipments should be used in developing a logistic support capability for an expanding force.
**Senior Officer Debriefing Report: BG Darrie H. Richards**

**Senior Officer Debriefing Report, 9 May 1968 to 8 June 1969.**

**BG Darrie H. Richards**

**Report Date**: 9 June 1969

**Contract or Grant No.**: N/A

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**Abstract**

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