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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

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AVGB-C

15 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for Period Ending 31 October 1968. RCS GSFOR-65 (R) (U)

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AMHOC-DST, APO San Francisco 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army, Pacific
ATTN: GPOF-DT, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

2. (C) Section II: Operations: Significant Activities.

a. General.

(2) Mission. The missions assigned to the 5th SFGA are as follows:

(a) To exercise command and control of subordinate detachments.
(b) To advise and assist the VNSF.
(c) To act as Sector, Subsector advisors as directed by CCMUSMACV.
(d) To provide intelligence to CCMUSMACV.
(e) To conduct special operations.
(f) To conduct the MACV Records School.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for Period Ending
31 October 1968. RCS CSFGR-65 (R1) (U)

(2) Organizational Structure. See organizational chart at inclosure 1, troop disposition lists at inclosure 3, and CTZ maps at inclosure 1.

(3) Commanders and Key Personnel. See list at inclosure 2.

(4) Situation at the Beginning of the Reporting Period. At the end of the last quarter, intelligence indicated that the enemy was probably preparing for another country-wide offensive. Enemy forces in all four Corps Tactical Zones appeared to be avoiding major contacts in an effort to retrain and resupply after the failure of the second general offensive in May and early June. In I CTZ THUONG DUC (A-109) continued to be threatened by the 31st and 11st NVA Independent Regiments and the 21st Regiment of the 2nd NVA Division. Having overrun the outer line of Camps, a SHAU (A-102), LANG (A-101), and KHAM DUC (A-101), the enemy now seemed intent on trying to smash the inner line. In II CTZ enemy forces were building up west of BAN ME THONG along the Cambodian Border. In III CTZ enemy forces were a constant menace to Camps along the border. VC local force battalions were the main threat in IV Corps.

(5) Operations. The statistical data on operations conducted during the reporting period are shown at inclosure 5. The long anticipated Third Offensive began on 18 August in TAY NINH Province, then spread slowly to the other Corps. The most significant action for Special Forces occurred in II CTZ at Camp KMC between 15 and 27 August. Three NVA regiments, the 56th, the 326th, and the 90th, and the 326th, and the 90th, continued to overrun both the CIDG Camp and the near-by GVN District Headquarters. With the help of the 2nd and 5th MSFC the Camp repelled the enemy who suffered more than 800 casualties in the entire battle. Seven other Special Forces Camps received major ground attacks during this period: HA THANH (A-101) and THUONG DUC (A-109) in I CTZ; KATUM (A-322), LOC NINH (A-331), THIEN NGoc (A-323) in III CTZ. In each attack the enemy was repulsed, often suffering excessive casualties when compared to allied losses. In IV CTZ several large weapon caches were discovered. Also in IV Corps the Chieu Hoi rate climbed to one of its highest points in two years. (See Inclosure 9 and 10 for After Action Reports on HA THANH (A-104) and THUONG DUC (A-109). Reports on the other major battles are being published separately.)

(6) Situation at the End of the Period. Except for the rather feeble Third Offensive in late August, the enemy generally avoided contact throughout this period. Intelligence indicated that large numbers of enemy troops had moved into base areas along the borders of SOUTH VIETNAM. Such units as the 308th and 326th NVA divisions were believed to have returned to NORTH VIETNAM. One interpretation was that enemy units were regrouping and resupplying for another attempt at a country-wide offensive, possibly in late November or early December. If this is correct constant pressure by Allied Forces might spell such plans just as such pressure probably aborted the enemy's Third Offensive. Another view was that the enemy beaten military would take one step back in order to take two forward on the political front. A decline in military activity coupled with a cease-fire negotiated at Paris might generate pressure both at home and abroad for the United States to withdraw.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for Period Ending 31 October 1968. RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

from VIETNAM. The NLF/VQG, even without direct North Vietnamese aid, would then be free to return to their subversive-terrorist activities of the pre-1965 period. If this is the enemy strategy, then Allied Forces must begin planning now to win the political phase of the war. Such a task promises to be even more difficult than was the military phase.

(7) Changes in Organization.

(a) A concept paper was prepared on 21 September 1968 by MACJ321 in coordination with 5th SFGA on the role the CIDG program would play in a post-military phase.

(b) New Camp Strike Force (CSF) TOEs were published on 30 September. (See Inclosure II)

(c) In II CTZ Detachment B-20 was reorganized into the 2nd MSFC with its headquarters at PIRINHU. Detachment B-55 at NHA TRANG became the 5th MSFC. In III CTZ the 36th MSFC was redesignated the 3rd MSFC.

(d) In III CTZ Det B-35 HAU NGHIA, was closed and its "A" detachments, A-351 and A-352, were placed under B-32 at TAY NINH.

(e) In IV CTZ Detachment B-42 was deactivated and its mission was assumed by MACV Advisory Team 64.

(8) A list of VIPs who visited this headquarters during the reporting period is found at Inclosure 6.

(9) A sketch of the new S2 building at Company C is located at Inclosure 7.

(10) Inclosure 8 is an interrogation report on a Cambodian agent who penetrated Camp KATUM (A-323).

(11) The I Corps Tactical Zone Current Plan/Concepts, marked SECRET, is contained in Inclosure 12.

(12) Increased air support to 5th SFGA has been requested from USARV. (See Inclosure 13 for significant portions of the study made to justify this request.)

(13) An After Action Report on Satchel Charges is found at Inclosure 15.

(14) The August, September and October issues of the Green Beret Magazine are attached as Inclosure 16.
b. Intelligence.

(1) 1 Corps Tactical Zone.

(a) In early August the total enemy strength was approximately 125,000 enemy personnel of whom 56,000 were combat troops. Contacts and enemy activity remained generally light. The enemy sustained heavy losses when they attempted to initiate a corps-wide offensive on 18 August. Increased enemy infiltration, utilizing improved transportation methods and road construction, enabled the enemy to maintain their strength. At the end of October, the enemy was estimated at approximately 127,000 enemy personnel of whom 59,000 were combat troops. Throughout the reporting period enemy forces operated with three confirmed NVA divisions, 20 to 22 independent regiments, and approximately 115 maneuver battalions. (S2 SFGA)

(b) Throughout the reporting period enemy forces were generally deployed for offensive activities. Previously enemy tactical units had been ordered to pull back in order to make preparations for the "Fall Offensive". The majority of Special Forces camps in I CTZ were not seriously threatened by enemy build-ups in their TAORs. During August Special Forces camps HA THANH (A-10h) and THUONG DUC (A-109) were heavily threatened. HA THANH was endangered by the 22nd Regiment of the 3rd NVA Division, the 107th NVA Artillery Battalion of the 401st Main Force Regiment and the 328th Local Force Regiment. The attack on HA THANH came as a complete surprise since the enemy appeared to be focusing his attention on THUONG DUC. The latter was receiving constant attacks by fire and ground probes from elements of the 31st and 113th NVA Independent Regiments and the 21st Regiment of the 2nd NVA Division. These units were supported by elements of the 193rd Artillery Regiment. A final attack on THUONG DUC appeared to be imminent at the time but resulted in the enemy using THUONG DUC as a diversion for their main attack on HA THANH. HA THANH was besieged with constant 122mm rocket and 82mm mortar fire. Substantial damage was inflicted on the camp and its personnel. But this threat was relieved by Operation CHAMPAIGN GROVE, an AMERICAL Division operation which encircled the camp's TAOR. In late September the enemy again focused his offensive attentions on Camp THUONG DUC. Intense attacks by fire struck the camp utilizing 122mm rockets, 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles, and 60mm and 82mm mortars. Aircraft attempted to resupply the camp despite intense .50 caliber, 47mm, and 12.7 mm antiaircraft fire. A large number of American aircraft, resupply helicopters, gunships, FAC's, and even fighter jets were shot down. The enemy controlled the plateau south of the camp which is the most strategic position in the THUONG DUC area. Friendly personnel and equipment suffered heavy losses and once more a final ground assault appeared imminent. The enemy, again the 31st, 113th, and 21st NVA Regiments supported by elements of the 193rd Artillery Regiment, waited too long to initiate their final ground attack which might have resulted in an enemy victory. The threat to THUONG DUC was relieved by a joint US Marine and ARVN multi-battalion operation entitled MAUI PEAK. During this period all contact with the 308th and 320th NVA divisions was lost. The 320th was last reported deployed along the DMZ area in northern QUANG TRI Province. Both units are believed to have returned to NORTH VIETNAM in order to regroup and resupply. These units were partially replaced by the following units: The 216th and 138th Regiments of the 338th NVA Division, the 27th Independent NVA Regiment, and the 201st
NVA Artillery Regiment. The enemy did initiate a corps-wide offensive on 18 August. This "Fall Offensive" was aimed at the people of South Vietnam, and the enemy was hoping to sway the people toward the National Liberation Front. On 18 August the enemy launched attacks by fire on DANANG, QUANG TRI, QUANG NGOAI, TAM KY, DONG HA, CHU LAI, and other large population centers. The intensity of these attacks rapidly as allied forces swept the surrounding countryside and dealt the enemy substantial losses. The North Vietnamese probably thought a victory in these cities would give them more bargaining power at the PEACE TALKS and have a psychological effect on the presidential elections in the UNITED STATES. A severe SVN defeat and heavy friendly losses might have influenced the voting toward a peace candidate who would favor ending the VIETNAM conflict by pulling out. But a final ground assault against these cities never materialized. Throughout the period the enemy continued to improve lines of communication. The old French road, Route #53b, from KHAM DUC to HUEP DUC was improved. The old Special Forces camp at KHAM DUC is now a major enemy supply and trucking depot. Route #53b through the A SHAU VALLEY is being well-maintained, probably by elements of the 93rd NVA Engineer Regiment. The majority of all regular combat troops during this time were well trained, politically indoctrinated, and well-equipped. Morale remained high as cadres continued to promise their troops a major NVA victory resulting in the liberation and freedom of the "oppressed" South Vietnamese. Local force units throughout the corps are now mostly NVA regulars. The National Liberation Front seems to be phasing out local force and main force VC from its units. (S1, 5th SFGA)

(c) The rumored use of new weapons and equipment was not confirmed in I CTZ. Though reports had indicated that the enemy intends to introduce several new "duds", the enemy continues successful with their interdiction of the CUA VIET RIVER. The improved accuracy of the RPO-2 and the RPO-2 against friendly ships on the CUA VIET RIVER indicates the possibility of an infrared capability. During the reporting period the enemy continued their usage of 130mm and 95mm artillery. The majority of this was utilized in the DMZ area. The enemy did, however, may use 105mm howitzers in the future offensive activities in northern QUANG TRI Province, along the DMZ. Reports of helicopters and "airborne lights" continue to be received. The enemy probably has an "air strike" capability. In early October an unknown size enemy force initiated a gas attack on an ARVN unit in northern QUANG NGOAI Province. Four ARVN soldiers suffered vomiting, nausea, and unconsciousness for periods of up to 5 hours. The type and composition of this gas have not been determined. Photo readouts continue to identify Soviet tanks in LAOS and NORTH VIETNAM. The Soviet PT-76 Light Amphibious Tank, however, has not been confirmed in I CTZ since LANG BLE was attacked and overrun in February. The PT-76 was believed to have been at the siege of HA THANH although they were never used. No significant reports were received on new construction or defense of enemy fortifications. (S1, 5th SFGA)
(d) At the end of the reporting period major enemy tactical units remain deployed for offensive activities. Although the threat in the DMZ area has been reduced, the enemy is still capable of initiating an offensive in QUANG NGOAI and QUANG NAM Provinces. Probable targets would be CIDG camps and major population centers, such as DANANG, QUANG NGOAI, QUANG TRI and TAM KY Cities. Preliminary construction has been completed at Special Forces camps MAI LOC (A-101) and NONG SON (A-105). Further construction is required to ensure these camps are not vulnerable to ground attacks by regimental size units. The 27th NVA Regiment, the 161st NVA Artillery Regiments, and one unidentified NVA battalion are presently located within or near MAI LOC's TACOR. So far these units have only interdicted the roads leading to and from the camp. NONG SON and THUONG DUC can be attacked by the 21st Regiment of the 2nd NVA Division, the 111st and 115th NVA Regiments supported by the 36th Artillery Regiment, and the T.00 Sapper Battalion. The equivalent of these enemy regiments are in the DANANG vicinity: The 36th NVA Independent Regiment; the T4, the D.7, the R.20 Local Force Infantry and the 3rd Main Force Sapper Battalions which comprise the 36th NVA Regiment; the 1st Battalion of the 68th Artillery Regiment; and three companies of the NVA Special Action Sappers. QUANG NGOAI and TAM KY Cities and CIDG camp HA THANH can be attacked by elements of the 3rd NVA Division, the 32nd, Local Force Regiment and the 101st Sapper Regiment. Since elements of major enemy tactical units are deployed near both population centers and CIDG camps in I CTZ, CIDG and FWMAF operations will probably experience increased contact. No threat is seen to any Special Forces camp in I CTZ at this time. A general corps-wide offensive will probably take place during the month of November. If the reported Fourth Offensive does take place, the enemy will try both to win the support of the people and to gain a badly-needed psychological victory such as the over-running of a Special Forces CIDG camp. (S2, 5th SFGA)

(e) Joint Intelligence Conference. During the reporting period, Company C conducted a joint US/VN intelligence conference to clarify command relationships and procedure in the areas of Order of Battle, Collectors, and counterintelligence. All AF detachment intelligence sergeants and their Vietnamese counterparts attended. Periodic conferences of this type are recommended to insure uniformity of effort and interchange of successful techniques. (Co C, 5th SFGA)
(f) Collection and Counterintelligence Plans. Between 1 July and 30 September 1968, S2 undertook the task of establishing a more effective intelligence effort. The first project was the creation of new operation plans at each "A" detachment outlining the bilateral collection and counterintelligence operation. These plans were prepared by the intelligence sergeants and their respective Vietnamese counterparts at each "A" camp. Assisting in the task were representatives from the S2 of Company C. The two main objectives in writing these plans were that they be both workable and continuous in nature. Due to the changeover of intelligence personnel at the detachments, the operational plans had to be written so that each newly assigned intelligence sergeant would have ready access and could quickly become fully familiar with the counterintelligence and collection operations at his camp. Sound intelligence principles were adhered to especially in the area of security during the writing period. By the end of September all of these plans had been submitted for approval to S2, 5th SFGA. Implementation of these plans has begun. Each camp has undertaken the recruiting of individuals as agents to fulfill the requirements stated in the plans. Personnel at Company C have assisted the detachment intelligence sergeants in getting their sources coded through Group S2. Presently the USASF and their VNSF counterparts are striving to accomplish the objectives in the operational plans. (Co C, 5th SFGA)

(g) Completion of S2 Building. The new S2 building at Company C (See Sketch - 40L 1) has greatly assisted in improving cooperation and interchange of information between USASF and VNSF personnel. This combined facility has helped in fostering counterpart relationships. A particularly interesting section of the building is the interrogation/polygraph room. The special features of this room include: Sound absorbing tile on the ceiling and walls; incandescent lights to prevent interference with the polygraph; a partition dividing the room in two which enables various interrogation techniques to be employed; and an outside entrance which allows FW's to be brought in without compromising the security of the building. Future plans for the interrogation room include a one-way mirror and an air conditioning unit.

With the expanded facility, each section has their own working area. While each is separated, they are nevertheless close enough for coordination and planning purposes. The new Analysis and Production room provides adequate space for maps and files. A combined map/supply room provides a centralized storage facility. The compact placement of map cabinets has been a factor in a more accurate inventory system and fosters rapid dissemination of maps to requesting units. The one drawback of the S2 building is its separation from the other staff sections of the company. However, through daily coordination, this problem has been overcome. (Co C, 5th SFGA)
Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for Period Ending 31 October 1968

(1) **Efforts Made in Organizing District Intelligence and Operation Coordinating Centers (DIOCC).** The first efforts in attempting to organize DIOCC's in the four southern camps of BA TO, MINH LONG, HA THANH and TRA BONG began during the Joint Intelligence Conference held at Company C on 27 July 1968. At this time both the Phoenix program and the benefits to be derived from the DIOCC's were presented to the intelligence sergeants. The I Corps Phoenix representative was not present at the conference. Close coordination, however, had been made with him and the program was thoroughly discussed. After the conference meetings were held by the Company C Counterintelligence Officer and the I Corps Phoenix representative to get the program started in those camps not having a DIOCC. These meetings did not bear fruit since there were problems in getting the equipment and personnel necessary to set up the DIOCC's.

On 7 September 1968 a visit was made to QUANG NGAI City the province capital for QUANG NGAI Province. At this meeting the problem of the DIOCC's was brought to the attention of the Province Senior Advisor, Mr. Burke, and the Province Phoenix Advisor, Naval Lieutenant Tom Sartin. The Province Phoenix Advisor stated he did not have the personnel to act as advisors to the DIOCC's in the mountain districts at this time and none were programmed for the immediate future. Company C personnel at this meeting were LTC Williams, Deputy Commanding Officer, and Captain Kennedy, the S2. It was brought out that in lieu of trained Phoenix Advisors, the intelligence sergeants at the camps could act in this capacity if a mobile training team from Phoenix would go to the camps involved and assist the intelligence sergeants in beginning the DIOCC's. Lieutenant Sartin did visit the camps in September but met with limited success since the visits were not coordinated, they usually lasted less than one hour, and the team leaders were not fully cognizant of the total ramifications of their role as sub-sector advisors.

Throughout September and October liaison was made between the I Corps Phoenix representative and the Company C S2. We agreed to ship the equipment for the DIOCC's on our aircraft. Up to the present, however, no equipment has been received for shipment. The personnel of the Phoenix MIT have gone to the I land DIOCC's and none are available to assist the highland districts. The I Corps Commander has issued an order to initiate DIOCC's in all the districts of I Corps, but none are activated at the present. Currently, Company C is attempting to meet this order. (Co C)

(2) **Intelligence Summary of HA THANH Area After Action Report.** An attack against HA THANH was initiated by the enemy to secure his lines of communication within the TAOR and to allow free movement of his units. The enemy unit involved in this action was the 22 REG 3 NHA Div. The 3 NHA Div. moved into southern I Corps near the SONG HE Valley during late July. At first it was believed that the division had moved north in order to retrain within a secure base area. The division headquarters remained in the SONG HE Valley through June. During July, forward elements of the 3 NHA Div. began moving along the corridor between Camp HA THANH and Camp MINH LONG.
Intelligence reports during July indicated that the enemy was moving men and supplies along the southern edge of the HA THANH TAOR. On 19 July 1968, a camp operation captured four 120mm mortars during a contact vicinity BS 299600. Camp operations continued to make contact with NVA elements in the southeastern part of the TAOR vicinity BS 4361. Documents and uniform insignia captured by one operation suggested that a division command post had recently been in the area. Document readouts indicated that the 2 Regt, 3 NVA DIV had been there.

In order to secure supply lines into base area 121 and a route of withdrawal if necessary, the enemy gave the 22 Regt, 3 NVA DIV, the mission of containing camp operations. The enemy employed attacks by fire against the camp, utilizing mortars and rockets, and ground attacks against the OPs surrounding the camp. Through continuous air support and ARC LIGHTS the camp was able to maintain its defensive posture. The enemy continued to harass the camp with mortar fire until the middle of September. At this time there was a general withdrawal of major enemy units throughout I Corps.

It is believed that the primary mission of the 3 NVA DIV was to attack QUANG NOAI City. The 22 Regt was required to secure supply lines through the HA THANH TAOR. When this regiment failed, the enemy was unable to mass enough troops to carry out the main mission. Isolated outposts in western QUANG NOAI Province, including HA THANH were probably the secondary objective of the 3 NVA DIV.

In order to relieve the pressure on HA THANH, the 11th LEB launched Operation Champaign Grove, a combined operation with elements of the 2 ARVN DIV. The mission of the operation was to make sweeps through Base Area 121 and in the vicinity of the camp. Enemy resistance was light to moderate, and friendly forces are credited with 150 enemy KIA. As a result of this operation the enemy withdrew from positions near the camp and moved southwest, probably to GI LANG (Coordinates BS 2763). A Mobile Strike Force unit while on a sweep operation in the vicinity of BS 3466, uncovered a model of HA THANH in a battalion size base camp. The base camp contained well-used trails and a defensive bunker system. The manner in which the enemy had constructed defenses in all of these discovered locations indicated that a full scale siege was planned for the camp.

The situation that existed at HA THANH is in some ways similar to that of LANG VEI, KHAM DUC, and THUONG DUC. HA THANH is located on a highway which offers the enemy an avenue of approach into QUANG NOAI City. The location of the camp was a threat to the enemy's supply lines and withdrawal routes. The enemy also attempted to occupy the OP's, from where fire could be directed on the camp. Like THUONG DUC, HA THANH had no indications of an impending attack from railers or PW's. Elements of the 3 NVA DIV are still located to the east of the
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There is no indication of a threat at this time, but the enemy could launch an attack against the camp as a secondary objective to an assault against QUANG NGAI CITY. (Cc C)

Intelligence Summary for THUONG DUC A109 After Action Report. Camp THUONG DUC's strategic location along enemy infiltration - supply routes has made it a constant "thorn" in the enemy's side. The camp also occupies a key position in the DA NANG barrier. If the camp was taken by the enemy, it would offer him an excellent avenue of approach into the city. THUONG DUC has been under heavy enemy pressure several times in the past. It is believed that these attacks were of a diversionary nature in order to distract attention from enemy activity elsewhere. However, on 280230 September the enemy launched an attack against OP #2 and #5. At first it was believed that the attacks against OP #2 and #5 were the preliminary move for a direct assault against the camp. A combined effort between tactical aircraft and ground units prevented the enemy from taking this objective, and forced them to lose the element of surprise. It is the purpose of this summary to describe the enemy situation prior to the attack, enemy units involved, and the friendly action taken based on intelligence reports.

THUONG DUC is located Southwest of DA NANG at the junction of the SONG VU GIA and the SONG CON (coordinates ZC 145534). The high ground to the west offers the enemy the best direction of attack against the camp. The terrain immediately north and east is flat and lacks concealment. However, the mountainous terrain further north provides excellent cover for mortar positions. To the south, across the river, there is extremely rugged rising terrain covered with dense undergrowth. The top of this mountainous area, known as the "plateau", is an enemy base area. The lip of the plateau offers excellent weapons positions for firing on the camp and aircraft, while the northern slope offers concealed mortar positions for attack on the camp.

For approximately one month before the attack on the OP's, the camp was under increasing enemy pressure. The enemy used attacks by fire against the camp in conjunction with the launching of the Third Offensive in late August. The purpose of these attacks was probably to draw troops away from major installations. During the early part of September, the enemy continued to attack the camp by fire. He possessed the capability of attacking in regimental size force, supported by rocket fire. It is believed that the enemy was using these attacks either as a diversion for activity elsewhere or as a softening up process in preparation for a ground assault. Camp operations continued to make contact, especially in the vicinity of Hill 200 (coordinates ZC 155565). This hill contained several tunnel entrances and is believed to be a base area for the 31 NVA Regiment. The enemy offered unusually hard resistance in defending it. The enemy continued to attack the camp by fire in preparation for the planned assault. After the enemy failed to take the OP's, the intensity of the attacks by fire increased as if the enemy intended to destroy the camp.
by this means alone. Both the attacks by fire and the resistance that camp operations had met were early indications of the impending attack. (Co C)

(2) II Corps Tactical Zone.

(a) In early August total enemy strength was estimated at 74,865 of whom 50,990 were combat troops. Enemy troop strength continued to build during the first three weeks of August. After the sieges at Special Forces Camps DAK SEANG and DUC LAP, enemy strength gradually decreased despite renewed emphasis on infiltration and resupply. Enemy attempts to recruit the local populace met with practically no success. By the end of October there were approximately 60,775 enemy soldiers in II Corps of whom 39,595 were combat troops. Thus, the period showed an overall decline of 14,000 troops. Throughout the period the enemy operated with elements of three divisions, four independent regiments, 11 Main Force and 8 to 10 Local Force battalions. (S2, 5th SFGA)

(b) During late July and early August it became evident the enemy was moving a large number of troops and supplies south along the Laotian-Cambodian borders. The largest buildups occurred north and south of BAN ME THOUT and west of Special Forces Camps DAK SEANG and DUC LAP. These two camps experienced sizeable enemy attacks on 18 and 23 August respectively. The siege at DUC LAP was an extremely significant contact since it was the first time the enemy had committed a multi-regimental force to battle since DAK TO nearly a year ago. Both attacks proved costly to the enemy not only in manpower but also in morale. At DAK SEANG the 101D NVA Regiment's troops seemed to be poorly trained and inexperienced as allied personnel rather easily repulsed a large enemy assault against that camp. The siege at DUC LAP between 23 and 26 August was on a much larger scale as elements of three NVA Regiments, the 66th, 320th and 95C, took part in a coordinated attack on the CIDG camp and GVN District Headquarters. Although the enemy occupied the camp's north hill for a short time, they were unable to over-run the main compound and gain a badly needed victory. In excess of 800 enemy were killed during the five day battle. Two other significant ground activities occurred during this period in BINH DINH and KHANH HOA Provinces. In BINH DINH Province during late September the 18th NVA Regiment suffered about 90 killed when elements were caught in the open by allied operations. In late October, elements of the 30th ROK Regiment, 9th White Horse Division, conducted an operation in the DONG DO, KHANH HOA Province, which resulted in 350 enemy killed and the virtual annihilation of the 5th Battalion, 18B NVA Regiment. There were several significant enemy movements during the three month period. A PW captured during the attack at DAK SEANG revealed that the headquarters element of the 35C NVA Division, which had previously been located in the Tri-Border area...
throughout early summer, had returned to North Vietnam to form a new division. Other PWs and agents reported that the 95th and 18B NVA Regiments, less the 6th and 7th Battalions, which remained in their old operational areas, left PHU YEN and KHANH HOA Provinces for KONTUM Province where they received political training, replacements, and supplies. In early September these units proceeded to the NAM LYR Base Area where they remained throughout the rest of the period. In early October the 101D NVA Regiment moved south from the Tri-Border area to a location southwest of DUC CO in Base Area 701. At approximately the same time, the 66th NVA Regiment left the area north of BAN ME THOT and moved northwest toward the Cambodian border. (S2, 5th SFGA)

(c) Several new weapons, techniques, and tactics were noted during the period. In early August there were reports of a new metallic "air pressure" detonated anti-helicopter mine which was being used by the enemy in known and likely allied helicopter landing zones. These mines, however, were not used to any appreciable extent. There were a number of incidents during September and October when unidentified enemy aircraft — probably helicopters — crossed the Cambodian-Vietnamese border near DUC CO. On one occasion a US FAC circled one helicopter as it proceeded east back into Cambodia, but the helicopter could not be identified. Flying-mines, CS gas, and flame-throwers were used slightly more than in the past. For the first time the enemy began emplacing antitank and anti-vehicular mines directly in the asphalt of hard surfaced roads. They also started wearing civilian clothing in order to approach friendly troops before springing ambushes. (S2, 5th SFGA)

(d) Presently the heaviest enemy concentrations are located west of Special Forces Camps DAK SEANG, BEN HET, DUC CO and DUC LAP. Nowhere else in the corps does the enemy have the capability of launching multi-regimental ground attacks with any conceivable chance of success since the remainder of his units lack the necessary manpower and materiel. In the B-22 area small scale attacks by fire and terrorist activities will probably be conducted against selected allied installations. The continued absence of the 2d, 22d, 95th, and 18B NVA Regiments in BINH DINH, PHU YEN and KHANH HOA Provinces denies the enemy the capability of launching any sizeable attacks in those areas. Enemy units in the southern portion of the corps will probably conduct small scale indirect fire attacks, mining, sapper and proselyting activities. Activity in the B-23 and B-24 areas is largely dependent on the political mood. Until such time as the enemy desires to initiate a large scale offensive they will probably continue attacks by fire, ground probes, highway interdiction, propaganda and terrorist activities while placing the majority of their effort on resupplying, retraining and positioning troops. (S2, 5th SFGA)

(e) Accountability of PW's, Detainees, and Captured documents. Difficulty had been experienced in the past in maintaining continuous control of these. When they are picked up in the field it is sometimes several days before they can be evacuated to company headquarters due to adverse weather or shortage of aircraft.
One NCS in the Company B S2 Section has been assigned the primary duty of coordinating the handling and processing of PW's, detainees and documents. From the time they are captured in the field until they are evacuated out of channels, an exact accounting is kept of them. A specific number is assigned each PW. Hoi Chanh, detainee and group of documents. This number, along with the current location and the message number on readout, is entered in a log. This system facilitates the handling and disposition of PW's and documents and provides ready answers to questions posed by other headquarters concerning their status. (Co B, 5th SFSG)

(6) Counterintelligence. From 2 Oct to 29 Oct, 100 polygraph examinations were conducted on key employees, interpreters and suspects at Company B. As a result of these polygraph examinations and selective interrogations, 23 VC were identified within the compound. Fourteen of these individuals went AWOL before they could be apprehended. Nineteen were seized and turned over to the National Police for further interrogation and detention. As a result of interrogations of the VC within the company, 149 VC sympathizers from FLEI YON PRONG village were identified. This village is located in the northeastern part of the FLEI MB TACR. On 29 Oct 1968, a cordon and search operation was conducted on this village. As a result of the operation, 19 personnel on the blacklist were apprehended. From interrogations of two Montagnards, members of the 2d MSFC, 214 VC and VC sympathizers were identified. These individuals live in several villages located northeast of BAN MB SANG. Some of these villages are within AO Green wire on the MSF AC in the BAN ME TAWU area. Plans are being formulated to conduct cordon and search operations in this area possibly utilizing MSF recce. (Co B, 5th SFSG)

The 223rd Aerial Surveillance Company is being sent Company B's SOT and TACO camp locations. It is hoped that timely inflight Red Haze and STAR mission readouts can be utilized at camp as the mission is flown over the TACO... H & I fire and offensive operations can then be immediately initiated against lucratative targets. (Co B, 5th SFSG)
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(3) III Corps Tactical Zone

(a) In early August enemy strength in III Corps was between 43,000 and 48,000 of whom 32,000 were combat troops. Despite heavy losses in scattered contacts, increased infiltration kept enemy strength relatively high. At the end of October the enemy was estimated to have 55,315 men, of whom 42,120 were combat troops. Throughout the period enemy forces operated with three confined divisions, seven to eight independent regiments, and about eighty-five maneuverable battalions, (SO 5th SFSG)

(b) When the period began, enemy forces were generally dispersed along the border areas of TAY NINH, BINH LONG, and HAU NORD Provinces. Special Forces camps were constantly threatened by enemy build-ups in their FSB's. Detachments in TAY NINH Province made increased contact as enemy units moved eastward from Cambodian base areas toward the city of TAY NINH. On 18 August enemy forces opened the third offensive in TAY NINH Province. The VC launched large scale attacks on KATUM, (A-32) with the 1st Battalion, 66th VC Base Security Regiment, and on Fire Support Base Buell, (Coordinates of XTz31567), with the 3rd Battalion, 27th VC Regiment. Smaller attacks were made during the week against NUI BA DEN, the CHIEF HOI Center at TAY NINH City, and Regional Force outposts throughout the province. The enemy also launched attacks by fire, employing 82mm mortars, 107mm rockets, against TAY NINH base camp. Detachment B-32, KATUM, TRANG SUP, Fire Support Base Buell, Fire Support Base Buell, Barbour (Coordinates of XTz315668), and an ARVN Training Center, (Coordinates XTz315634), against KATUM alone, the VC employed over 500 rounds of 82mm mortar and 12 rounds of 122mm rocket fire. Meanwhile other regions of the Corps were fairly quiet. By renewing ground activity in TAY NINH Province the enemy hoped to achieve a psychological victory which would influence the Paris Peace Talks. In every major confrontation, however, enemy forces either withdrew or were annihilated by better prepared and equipped ARVN units. Their strategy to draw allied reinforcements to TAY NINH did not succeed, and their personnel losses were excessive. The initial phase of the VC third offensive in III Corps called for a three pronged attack using eight battalions to seize TAY NINH City. At the height of this offensive activity, the 9th VC Division moved south, possibly to the BA THU area, and the 5th VC Division moved into the BOI LOI woods. Agents reported the 7th NVA Division was located somewhere in central BINH LONG Province. While its exact location was unknown, the Division was believed to have moved from vicinity XU062 to southeast of LOC NINH (A-331). Contacts continued into September with scattered enemy units who were unable to break through the allied ring protecting the Capital Military District. The ensuing low morale resulted in the rallying of numerous high level cadre. Enemy-armed plans to stage massive rocket attacks on installations and population centers in the Saigon area were never realized. FMs indicated that severe logistical problems, especially within the Dong Nai Regiment, forced the enemy to terminate operations in the city. Airborne Personnel Detector missions, as well as agent reports, indicated large enemy vehicular movement and major build-ups around LOC NINH (A-331) and along the TAY NINH Province Cambodian border. Heavy vehicular traffic was noted near Special Forces camps KATUM (A-327) and LOC NINH (A-331). During October, the
enemy continued to refit and resupply his troops. With the exception of War Zone C, there were few enemy initiated incidents. Numerous agent reports indicated, however, a substantial build-up of troops. Although not confirmed, at least three new divisions were said to have infiltrated into III Corps. The latest report has stated that there are presently 30,000 enemy troops in the BA THU base area, while 10,000 troops have already infiltrated into western III Corps. These figures may be somewhat exaggerated, but visual reconnaissance and Airborne Personnel Detector missions have noted heavy enemy movement in the area. Also Camp DUC HUE (A-325) was heavily mortared on 27 October. Often this indicates enemy movement past a camp. (S2, 5th SFGA)

(c) Between 25 and 29 August, MACV J2 received four large caliber rockets which were captured in III Corps. These rockets were unusual since they had large caliber homemade warheads fitted over the nose of a standard 107 mm or 122 mm rocket. Large caliber stabilizing fins were attached over the rocket motor. Specimens received to date consist of a 200 mm warhead with 30 pounds of explosives for the 107 mm rocket and fragments of a 122 mm rocket with a 270 mm diameter stabilizing fin. The warhead for this latter 122 mm rocket is also probably 270 mm in diameter and would carry approximately 75 pounds of TNT. These large caliber rockets are thought to have a range of 1,500 to 3,000 meters and could be used effectively against barricades and field positions. Against populated areas they would exercise a great psychological influence. The 25th Infantry Division reported the existence of a new Russian rocket in III Corps. It supposedly has the destructive power of a 260 kilogram bomb or twelve 122 mm rockets. Each rocket is packed in a crate approximately 50 centimeters square by 1.6 meters in length. Weight is about 250 kilograms. The crates, which are marked in Russian and Chinese, are accompanied by blue-green cotton which are as thick as a man's wrist. These are possibly conductor wires. (S2, 5th SFGA)

(d) Currently divisional size enemy forces have redeployed to the western and northern regions of the Corps. Plans for a November 1 country-wide offensive, as reported by FWs and agents, failed to materialize. It is now believed these were rumors circulated by VC cadre. At the close of this period in northern BINH Dinh Province the enemy had approximately 5000 combat troops of the 7th NVA Division. Agents indicate TAY NINH City in TAY NINH Province as a likely target of ground assaults should the enemy's major thrust against SAIGON fail. The enemy has over 11,000 combat troops dispersed throughout TAY NINH Province where they threaten Special Forces compounds. When enemy forces now dispersed along the Cambodian border of HAU NOHTA Province receive word to move on the capital, Special Forces operations are likely to note increased engagements with larger enemy units. Because of recent political developments at the Paris Peace Talks, a major corps-wide offensive is doubtful. The enemy, however, is in the final stages of resupplying and regrouping. Although a corps-wide offensive is unlikely, the enemy does have the capability to launch such an attack and attempt to end the VIETNAM conflict. (S2, 5th SFGA)
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(c) Collection. There are 14 SF camps in III CTZ capable of supporting an intelligence effort. On 1 Aug, 12 of these camps had operational collection systems, and 11 had approved net OPLANS. On 31 Oct 68, the situation had improved substantially. All of the camps had operational systems and approved OPLANS. During this period III CTZ SF intelligence collection systems acquired and submitted approximately 1,050 agent reports to this and higher headquarters. These were obtained at an average cost of $4.15. There are currently 130 coded and casual collection agents, an increase of 30 since 1 Aug 68. A collection system was also established at the 3D MSF base camp at LONG HAI. Previously, due to lack of personnel, no net had operated in this area. This new asset, working with the new OP facility at that location, should considerably improve results of the CSF operations from the base camp. (Co A, 5th SFGA)

(cf) Counterintelligence. One of the most significant CI events of the reporting period was the identification and capture of a Cambodian government penetration agent at Camp KATUM. A copy of the interrogation report of this prisoner is attached as inclusion 8. During September, this headquarters had the services of a polygraph operator from 5th SFGA. The operator tested 67 VN civilians employed by this headquarters. Of the 67, 54 had no enemy connections. Five are still under surveillance as possible undesirables. One undesirable employee was discharged. The interrogation report of a Cambodian penetration agent was confirmed. One ARVN deserter was identified and turned over to MSS. The remaining five revealed backgrounds of possible VC activity. Further investigation cleared one man. Three were confirmed while one was in doubt. All four of these were handed over to the MSS. The polygraph is turning out to be an excellent tool for the OB, collection, and CI officers in establishing necessary personal data and reliability factors on agents, employees, and CIDG, as well as providing valuable verification of interrogatory reports. It is anticipated that this headquarters will have another operator attached about 1 Oct 68. Plans are underway to establish a polygraph program encompassing all SF detachments in III CTZ.

There are 26 SF camps in III CTZ capable of supporting a CI intelligence system. Of these, 19 camps have operational systems receiving intelligence reports. The last camp is recruiting agents at this time. There are a total of 56 coded CI and casual agents reporting to SF case officers in III CTZ, an increase of 31 since 1 Aug 68. All camps have approved net OPLANS. A total of 42 CI intelligence reports were received during the period. (Co A, 5th SFGA)

(g) S-2 Air Program. During the period, this program was expanded. There was increased use of preplanned TAC Air including night fighter strikes, Combat Sky Spots, Airborne Personnel Detectors (APD) missions, Red Haze missions, SLAK and aerial photography. In addition, a system was established
to provide for immediate readout of visual reconnaissance (VR) flights, and immediate air drop of aerial photos requested by camps from aircraft conducting aerial surveillance in SF TAOR's. During the reporting period, the following combat air support was received:

- **B-52 Strikes:** 161
- **Combat Sky Spots:** 58
- **TAC Air Sorties:** Over 2500

Data on APD's, Red Haze, and SLAR are not available. Statistics will be maintained starting 1 Nov and will be available for the next quarterly report. Increased use of aerial surveillance assets has assisted the OB and collection officers in evaluating the large volume of agent reports received by this headquarters. In September, SF camps in III CTZ were contacted by OV-1 Mohawk aircraft 160 times reporting immediate readout. In addition, on 16 occasions, OV-1 aircraft upon SF request dropped air photos of areas during surveillance missions in the TAOR. The S2 section continues to provide intelligence target data to the Spectre AC-130 crew for flights in III CTZ. It is felt that the relationship established through this association was instrumental in the recent defense of Camps KATUM, LEMON GONG and BEN SOI. The Spectre aircraft has been targeted primarily against vehicular and sampan infiltration into this CTZ. Results of this activity include: 28 trucks destroyed; 12 trucks damaged; 20 sampans destroyed; 7 sampans damaged; 2 large boats destroyed; 2 storage structures destroyed; 12 attacks on enemy troop concentrations; and 25 secondary explosions. (Co A, 5th SFGA)

11. **IV Corps Tactical Zone.**

(a) In early August enemy strength was approximately 38,000 of which 30,000 were combat troops. The enemy had previously suffered many casualties, but infiltration and recruitment had kept the strength fairly stable. Late in the reporting period enemy strength increased to 42,000 of which 36,000 were combat troops. There were continued reports of new units in the CTZ although none have been confirmed to date. At present the enemy has two confirmed regiments, and 25 confirmed independent battalions. Unconfirmed yet are reports of one NVA regiment and two to four battalions. (S2, 5th SFGA)

(b) At the beginning of August enemy units appeared to be in their normal areas of operation. The 510th Local Force Battalion was in northern CHAU DOC Province and the 512th Local Force Battalion was in the south. In KIEN PHONG the 295th Main Force Battalion was along the northern border area and the 502 Local Force Battalion was east of CAO LANH City. The 504th and the 267B Battalions were located along the northern border area of KIEN TUONG Province. In northern DINH TUONG Province the 231A, 511A, and 263 Battalions were near Special Forces Camps KY DA, MY PHUC TAY, and MY DINH II. In PHONG DINH Province the DONG TAP II Regiment, 307th Main Force, 309th Main Force, 312th Main
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Force, TAY DO Local Force and 198th Main Force Artillery Battalions were on the South and west sides of MY THO City. These units had been in offensive positions, but during the first week of August they appeared to be moving away from the city. Cadre of these units were probably attending training sessions and possibly picking up large rockets. In mid-August enemy activity showed an increase in attacks by fire and small scale ground probes. These were probably staged to test the effectiveness and extent of friendly defenses for a reported third offensive to be conducted in late August. This offensive failed to materialize because friendly operations seriously damaged the enemy's supply and personnel strength. Enemy units returned to safe base areas and continued to avoid contact with friendly sweep operations. Terrorism and sabotage incidents, however, increased in an effort to slow down the operations and cause ill feeling among the Vietnamese civilians towards US and ARVN Forces. This low level of activity lasted for several weeks. In early September the enemy attempted to resurrect his offensive plans but lack of preparation, strength and coordination made these attacks weak and ineffective. Enemy units then seemed to concentrate in Base Area 470. In early October friendly forces conducted air strikes, and then sweep operations in this area. The operations rendered the 511th, 261B and 263 Battalions only marginally combat effective. Agents reported that the commander of the 261B Battalion, because it suffered extremely high casualties, collected weapons from the survivors and disbanded the unit. After these operations, agent reports, PWS and a very high NOI CHANN rate suggested enemy morale was deteriorating. During October the NOI CHANN rate reached one of its highest points in two years. In portions of the corps, however, enemy activity seemed to rise. In the Seven Mountains area increased enemy movement indicated the infiltration of new enemy battalion size units. Presently a regimental plus enemy force is believed to be operating in the BA XOB area. The majority of the troops appear to be waiting further orders on the Cambodian side of the border. A new offensive was planned for early November with political as well as military objectives. This activity was to be initiated in the Seven Mountains Area and then shifted to the CAN THO City area. The primary goal was to interdict Highway #1 and thus isolate the major rice producing area of the Delta from SAIGON. Attacks by fire became more frequent during October, although there appeared to be no direct connection between these actions and the start of a general offensive. These attacks appeared to be tactical maneuvers to divert friendly attention from the infiltration of supplies and personnel. Evidence of a large enemy troop build-up in the Seven Mountains area, however, indicates that the enemy has not abandoned plans to harass friendly troops, influence US elections by propaganda, and cause dissension between US and ARVN advisors. At the end of October enemy activity indicated a capability of accomplishing these goals. Terrorism and forced indoctrination of civilians continued. Increased impressment of Vietnamese civilians into Viet Cong units and attempts to cause desertion of ARVN's Camp Strike Force and Mobile Strike Force Soldiers by threatening their families may indicate the enemy's lack of personnel. To solve this problem NVA and Montagnard units are thought to have been infiltrated into the northeastern and northwestern portions of the corps.

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(c) During the reporting period there were increased reports about the enemy's capability of 107mm and 122mm rocket launchers and 105mm howitzers. Although the rocket launchers have been reported for several months, the enemy so far has not employed them against any large military establishment. The 105mm howitzers have been reported several times in the B6 XGI area, but not confirmed.

(d) Current enemy disposition, excepting the Seven Mountains Area, does not indicate offensive activity. Although CAN THO City is the primary target, the deployment of enemy units does not pose an immediate threat to friendly installations in the area. The enemy is expected to initiate an offensive in early November from the Seven Mountains area. The early stages will concentrate on military targets while later stages will shift toward emphasizing propaganda and attempting to isolate friendly units along the corridor to III Corps.

(e) Collection and Counterintelligence. During this period, considerable progress was made in the fields of collection and counterintelligence. OPLANS for all detachments were completed. Although some of these had to be scrapped and others modified, a solid basis has been established on which to expand and improve operations in these fields. Recruitment of agents remained at a generally high level throughout the period, with CI recruiting lagging at the beginning and collection recruiting tapering off at the end. Overall, there was an increase of 400 percent in the number of agents. Also CI and collection augmentation personnel conducted an increasing number of field trips to subordinate detachments for the purposes of training and supervising intelligence personnel. During October, CI augmentation personnel were attached to B-43 and B-40 to aid those detachments and their subordinate elements. (Co D, 5th SFGR)

(f) Administration and Coordination. During the period, the S-2 administration subsector concentrated on improving reporting procedures. The S-2 of Company D also cooperated extensively with the newly established IV Corps Joint Intelligence Center, especially in regard to OB and the assessment of enemy intentions and capabilities. (Co D, 5th SFGR)

(g) Counterpart Relations. These generally remained good although difficulties were experienced at some detachments. Increased emphasis was placed on integrating and training counterparts in all facets of intelligence operations. (Co D, 5th SFGR)
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Operations.

I. Corps Tactical Zone (Company C)

During the reporting period, Company C assets conducted a total of 32 company size or larger operations, 2660 platoon size and 3969 squad size operations. A total of 118 contacts were made with the following results: Enemy - 156 KIA, 20 capt; Friendly - 59 USASF, 19 CIDG and 29 RF/PF KIA; 103 USASF, 79 CIDG and 162 RF/PF WIA. The following significant activities occurred during the quarter:

(a) TIEN HUC (A-102): During August and September the camp had received sporadic mortar attacks and operations from the camp continually made contact. Total results from these contacts were: Enemy - 77 KIA and seven capt; Friendly - 11 KIA.

(b) HA THANH (A-104): At 0215 hours on 23 August, an estimated enemy battalion attacked five OPs of the camp with 54, 82, and 82mm mortars. The results of these attacks were: Enemy - 23 KIA; Friendly - one RF/PF killed and eight WIA. Until the 30th of August the camp continued to receive 82mm and 120mm mortar fire. Local security and MSF operations conducted near the camp made continuous contact with platoon, company and battalion size units. 40 enemy were killed and friendly losses were 17 CIDG KIA during this period. Although HA THANH was mortared and rocketed until 28 September, 30 August marked the end of the threat to the camp itself. On 2 September, the 11th Brigade sent two battalions to clear the AO and the pressure was relieved. (See Inc 9)

(c) THUONG DUC (A-109): The long-awaited attack on the camp finally came on the 28th of September. Possible elements of the 11th NVA Regiment were in position along the plateau and in the mountains to the north. The 308th Artillery Regiment held locations to the north. Four battalions of the 21st Regiment occupied the mountains west of camp. On the 28th at 0230, OPs Alpha and Bravo were overrun by possibly a company size force of the 21st Regiment. Upon taking its objectives, the enemy left one platoon to hold these locations. This platoon was virtually destroyed in counter-attack operations later that day. Also on the night of 28 September, a battalion of the 11st secured the market place in HA TAN, but withdrew leaving a platoon size occupation force. This force was also totally destroyed by counter-attack operations. An unidentified battalion, possibly from the 308th Division, occupied HQA HU to the south of the camp across the river taking heavy casualties. Radio transmissions monitored on a captured Chinese Communist radio indicated that all units were taking heavy casualties due to air and artillery. They had lost many top cadre and were calling for reinforcements and medical supplies. A resupply unit was caught in the open northwest of the camp on the 2nd of October and possibly suffered as many as 100 casualties. Probes against all friendly positions and attacks by fire continued through 6 October 1968. However by then, it was evident that the enemy had abandoned any thoughts of attacking THUONG DUC due to the high casualties taken. Also on this day (6 October) a multi-battalion relief force operation, MAUI PEAK, designed to relieve enemy pressure.
on the camp kicked off. Seven battalions deployed - 5 USMC and 2 ARVN: 2nd Battalion of the 7th in the vicinity of ZC14527; 2nd Battalion of the 5th Marines, vicinity ZC200561; 3rd Battalion of the 5th, vicinity ZC178514; 2nd Battalion of the 51st ARVN, vicinity of ZC150579; 1st Battalion of the 51st ARVN, vicinity of ZC136565. Both ARVN Battalions made heavy contact with a Regimental size unit and the units of the USMC sweeping west from Hl.11 52 made sporadic contacts.

Listed is the casualty count for the period 28 September to 19 October:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USAF</th>
<th>CIDG</th>
<th>RP/FR</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>WIA-9</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA-0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Captured equipment: 4 RFD MGs, 25 AK-47s, 2 B40 RLs, 11 B40 RDs, 1 12-7mm MG, 2 SKS CARBs, 1 60mm mortar, 2 chicom radios, 1 US bar, and 1 US M1 rifle.

Operation MAUI PEAK:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRIENDLY</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WIA-79</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA-34</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA-N/A</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Weapons captured in action: 26

Note: Enemy casualty figures are confirmed.

MAUI PEAK did relieve the pressure on the camp and the enemy apparently retreated to safer areas, possibly as far away as HAPI VALLEY to the north, the southern edge of the plateau (approx 6-7 kilometers south), and the mountains to the west (approx 4-5 kilometers). (See Incl 10)
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\(2\) II Corps Tactical Zone (Company B)

During the quarter, Company B assets conducted 478 company or larger size operations, 1930 platoon size and 5499 squad size operations, which resulted in 438 contacts with the enemy. Results of these contacts were: Enemy - 781 KIA; 64 cptr; 397 wpns seized; Friendly - 10 USASF, two VNSF and 104 CIDG KIA; 14 USASF, 15 VNSF and 142 CIDG WIA. The most significant contact during the quarter occurred during the period 23-27 August when DUC LAP, A-239, was attacked by a force of up to three regiments (see (a) below). During the reporting period, Camps BEN HET, A-244 and DAK SEANG, A-242 were under the CP of the 4th Infantry Division. Significant contacts were as follows:

(a) DUC LAP (A-239): On 23 August, the camp received a ground probe supported by mortar and rocket fire. The outer perimeter was penetrated and later occupied by an estimated two enemy companies. Three MSF companies from PLEIKU and two from NHA TRANG were inserted as a reaction force. On 26 August two MSF companies were successful in driving the enemy from the camp and restoring the perimeter. Total results were: Enemy - 239 NVA KIA; 92 cptr; 92 SA and 44 CS wpns cptr; Friendly - six USASF, one VNSF and 37 CIDG KIA; 13 USASF, seven VNSF and 80 CIDG WIA.

(b) TRUNG DUNG (A-502): On 3 August, three Montagnards, who had been enslaved by the VC, surrendered at MY LOG, an OP of A-502, with CHIEU HOI passes in hand. Reacting to the CHIEU HOI report of more families who wished to surrender, a live broadcast by one CHIEU HOI made from an O-2 B, encouraging 58 refugees to move to a prepared LZ to be picked up. On 5 August, a CHIEU HOI made another live loudspeaker appeal. An additional eight VC surrendered and were lifted out. Additional broadcasts and leaflets encouraged the surrender of three more VC and 43 refugees on 10 August. Coordinating throughout the week long operation were the 281st Helicopter Assault Company, VNSF, USASF, 8th PSYOPS Battalion and the NHA TRANG Airbase FACs. All personnel were located in an area 31 Km W of NHA TRANG.

(c) DAK SEANG (A-242): On 18 August, the camp received a ground probe in battalion strength supported by mortar and rocket fire. TAC Air, gunships and Spooky supported the camp and the attack was repulsed. Results: Enemy - 36 KIA; 11 cptr; 55 SA and 14 CS wpns cptr.
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III Corps Tactical Zone (Company A). During the reporting period assets of Company A conducted 560 company size or larger operations, 2332 platoon size, and 4903 squad size operations which resulted in a total of 516 contacts. Results of these contacts were: Enemy 85 KIA; 37 cptr and 273 weapons seized; Friendly four USASF, seven VNSF, 210 CIDG and two RF/PF KIA; 34 USASF, 10 VNSF, 531 CIDG and one RF/PF WIA. The most significant contact during the quarter was the attack on THIEN NGO. (See (g) below)

(a) KATUM (A-322). At DTG 130110 August, KATUM was attacked by an estimated VC battalion, armed with AK-47, B-40 rockets, RPG-2 rockets, 82mm mortars, 107mm rockets, CS-agent and small arms. The VC were dressed in black shorts, camouflaged jackets and were carrying rucksacks. The VC initiated contact and friendly forces fired camp assets, artillery and TAC Air. The VC penetrated into the camp's outer berm. But they were forced to withdraw by friendly fire power and support. Regrouping, however, they attacked again. The contact was finally broken at DTG 181000 with the VC withdrawing to the northwest. Friendly forces reorganized and were reinforced with one company from TRANG SUP. Results: Friendly - 15 CSF KIA; 30 CSF WIA; 15 dependents KIA; 27 dependents WIA; and three USASF WIA. Enemy losses were: 56 VC KIA and 15 VC WIA. From DTG 192210 to DTG 192220 August, KATUM received 150 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Spooky, Spectre and FAC were on station. Results: Friendly - 1 CSF WIA. From DTG 202150 to DTG 202157 August, KATUM received 52 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Three VC were spotted and artillery was called in on the enemy. The results were negative friendly casualties and unknown VC casualties. At DTG 251210 August, the 1st Battalion of the 11th MSFG operating out of KATUM, made contact with an estimated VC company. When additional enemy troops were thrown into the battle, one company from KATUM reinforced the 1st Battalion. TAC Air, artillery, and light fire teams supported friendly elements and contact was broken with the VC withdrawing to the south. Results: Friendly - one USASF KIA; three USASF WIA; three MSF KIA; 21 MSF WIA. Equipment lost: Three US carbines and three HT-1 radios. Enemy casualties unknown. At DTG 260000 to 261300 August, KATUM received two rockets larger than 122mm and 65 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Friendlies countered the enemy fire with 195 rounds of 175mm artillery fire and airstrikes.

(b) LOC NINH (A-331). At DTG 180115 August, LOC NINH came under heavy attack by an estimated VC battalion. The VC initiated contact from 200 meters with 57mm RRL's, 122mm rockets, 60mm mortar, small arms and B-40 rockets. Enemy broke contact at DTG 185630. At DTG 180710 August, a company operation swept the area around the camp and made contact with an estimated VC company. A fire fight ensued with the VC breaking contact at DTG 181230. A further sweep of the area disclosed 16 VC KIA; 30 platter charges, 15 bangalore torpedoes, 3 AK-47's, one US carbine, two BAR's, two RPG-7 rockets, one SNS, one 60mm mortar, eight grenades and assorted web gear left behind by the fleeing enemy troops. Friendly casualties were three CSF KIA; 11 CSF WIA; one VNSF WIA; one US (not USASF) WIA; one 3/4 ton truck, two 10 KW generators, one 2 1/2 ton truck, one water truck and the dispensary damaged; two UPG-12 generators, one M-79, 23 drums of diesel fuel and one 45 caliber Thompson submachine gun destroyed. One ammo bunker and five
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Confex containers partially destroyed. From DTG 190105 to DTG 190250 August, LOC NINH received approximately 90 rounds of mixed fire accompanied with sporadic small arms fire from a distance of approximately 200 meters. The camp was also fired at by B-40 and 75mm WM fire. Results: two USAF WIA, one US Engineer WIA, two CSF WIA, three ARVN WIA, one PRC-25, one water trailer, one 120 Hp water pump, one 120 Hp generator, one 60mm mortar and one 4.2" mortar damaged.

(c) BEN SON (A-136) (VNSF). At DTG 221315 August, operation G-127 made contact with an estimated VC battalion, vic XTl2833. The VC broke contact at DTG 221645 and withdrew to the west. The VC were in black pajamas, yellow scarfs and blue hats. Results: 11 CSF KIA; nine CSF WIA; eight CSF MIA; one VNSF WIA. Equipment lost: one M-79, four M-2 carbines, two M-1 rifles, one HT-1 radio. Enemy losses: 29 VC KIA (VNSF BC); five AK-47's, one M-16, one M-79, one pistol, .25 caliber, 30 rounds of AK-47 ammo, three Chicom grenades captured and six VC boats destroyed.

(d) TRANG SUP (A-301). At DTG 231420 August, XT166555, a security force while on patrol Round 53 VC bodies. The VC were believed to have been killed during the counter-mortar fire of 21 August, which was fired during an attack against TRANG SUP.

(e) THIEN NGON (A-323). THIEN NGON came under mortar and rocket fire at DTG 010010 hours September and received a total of sixty 82mm mortar rounds, eight 107mm rockets and 20 120mm mortar rounds during the attack. The camp fired counter-mortar fire with camp mortars, 105mm howitzers, 175mm howitzers, (TAT NINH fire support base firing DEFCONS) and Spooky. The results of this attack were one USAF KIA, one VNSF KIA; three CSF KIA and one dependent KIA. VC casualties are unknown.

(f) KATUM (A-322). At DTG 050255 September, camp KATUM came under heavy mortar and rocket attack. There were approximately one-hundred and ten RPG's fired at the camp. The VC began a determined ground attack by an estimated battalion plus at 0330 hours and the north-west star point was breached at 0345. The VC then began using throwers and matchel charges on bunkers. The camp fired 105mm Howitzer and mortars into the star point and counter-attacked driving the VC out. The camp employed flare ships, Spooky, TAC, artillery and camp weapons to defeat the enemy. All firing ceased at 0515. The enemy losses were 111 VC KIA and nine VC captured. Four flame throwers, 35 AK-47's, two radios, six RPG, two machineguns, 10 bangalore torpedoes, 1,000 lbs demolitions and 1,000 80mm rockets were captured.

(g) THIEN NGON (A-323). At DTG 262215 hours THIEN NGON came under mortar, rocket and RPG attack and received approximately 100 rounds. The camp employed the camp weapons, DEFCONS and Super Spooky was on station throughout the attack. The results were: 157 VC KIA; two captured; 30 AK-47's, one 60mm mortar, two LMG's, 40 RPG launchers, one 57mm RR and one radio captured.

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(iv) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Company D)

During the reporting period, Company D assets conducted 188 company size or larger operations, 630 platoon size, and 17,328 squad size operations. A total of 335 contacts were made with the following results: Enemy - 381 KIA, 112 cptr and 226 WIA seized; Friendly - two USASF, 14 CIDG and 37 RP/FF KIA, 19 USASF, seven VNCF, 191 CIDG and 102 RP/FF WIA. The following significant contacts occurred:

(a) BA XCAI (A-421): On 6 August, one platoon from BA XCAI, A-421, CHAU DOC Province was air inserted on a BLACKHAWK mission and located a VC cache and munitions factory 33 km East of HA TIEN. Results: En - 17 carbines, four TASD, one shotgun, four 40mm flare pistols, two SA (ty unk), 12 rifle stocks, 50 AK-47 magazines, 57 mines, three cases of 60mm mortar rounds, four cases HOs, 1700 lbs explosives, one powder scale, one drill, seven diamond tipped drill bits, two 25 lb forges, two 75 lb forges, one 500 lb forge, 25 forge molds, 500 grenade molds, one 616 trailer with wheels, 60 tractor engine blocks, 26 truck engine blocks, nine tractor drive shafts, two tank drive shafts, one truck engine complete with drive shaft, 1,000 three foot steel rods, one case of orders, photos and documents cptr. Destroyed were one furnace, three bunkers, five sampans. Left behind were 35-40 tons of scrap iron.

(b) MY DA (A-433): On 13 August, two CSF companies from MY DA, A-433, KIEN PHONG Province air inserted on a BLACKHAWK mission, 17 km North of VINH LONG. After a brief fire fight with an unknown number of VC, the VC broke contact and withdrew. Results: En - two VC KIA; one SA cptr; 10 sampans, one structure, 50 lbs of rice destroyed. On 14 August, one CSF company from MY DA air-inserted on a BLACKHAWK mission, 20 km Northeast of CAO LANH. A 15 minute fire fight with an unknown number of VC ensued, and a munitions factory complex was located. Results: En - the following items destroyed: 500 M-26 grenades, 2,300 home made grenades, 2,000 potato masher type grenades, 400 grenade molds, 15 mines, 1,000 pressure fuzes, 1,000 springs, 50 8x1 ft. metal sheets, 30 24 ft. steel rods, 200 steel stakes, one forge, one melting stove, 6 gallons of crystalized powder, two barrels of an unknown type acid, one barrel of potassium chloride, one barrel of black powder, 40 lbs of M-1 propellant, 15 cans of cosmoline, 80 blasting caps, 1,000 lbs of rice, 10 structures, eight sampans; Prd - two USASF, six CSF WIA.

(c) VINH GIA (A-149): On 17 August, one CSF platoon from VINH GIA, A-149, CHAU DOC Province, initiated contact with one VC plat, 27 km Northeast of HA TIEN. A 20 minute fire fight ensued terminating with VC breaking contact and withdrawing North. Results: En - 15 VC KIA; one VC WIA; seven SA, one B-40 RL cptr.

(d) 4th MSFG: On 16 August, elements of the 4th MSFG located a cache in a cave on NOT COTC, 6 km South of TRI TON, CHAU DOC Province. Results: En - the following items captured or destroyed, three SA, 18 B-40 RL, 20 B-40

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rockets, two four kilo cratering charges, 19 eight kilo cratering charges, two 105 How rounds, 25 60mm mortar rds., 69 82mm mortar rds., two claymore mines, three cans of 82mm mortar fuzes, one 57mm RR rd., one 75mm RR rd., 93 grenades, two grenade launchers for an M-1 rifle, assorted SA ammo, 23 blasting caps, half mile of blasting wire, two VC flags, 24 arm bands and two kilos of documents. Frd - one MSF KIA, one MSF WIA (by booby-trap).

(e) BA XOAI (A-421): On 7 September, one CRP from BA XOAI, A-421, CHAU DOC Province, air-inserted on a BLACKHAWK mission, 40 Km East Southeast of HA TIEN, KIEN GIANG Province. Contact was established with two VC squads, followed by a one hour fire fight, terminating with the VC breaking contact and withdrawing Northeast. Results: En - five VC KIA; one cptr; 14 SA and 337 pages of documents cptr; eight bunkers destroyed.

(f) TUYEN NHON (A-415): On 8 September, one CSF platoon from TUYEN NHON, A-415, KIEN TUONG Province, air inserted on a BLACKHAWK mission, 36 Km South-East of MOC HOA. Contact was established with two VC squads which fled North after a 30 minute fire fight. Results: En - nine VC KIA; five KIA; one cptr; six SA, one RPG-2, 2,000 rds SA ammo, 20 SA magazines, six sets of individual equipment, six bottles of penicillin, half kilo of documents cptr; two SA, 10,000 rds SA ammo, four sampans, 200 kilos of rice destroyed.

(g) MY DA (A-433): On 11 September, one CSF company from MY DA, A-433, KIEN PHONG Province air-inserted on a BLACKHAWK mission, 16 Km Northeast of CAO LANH. Contact was established with one VC company. After a 90 minute fire fight the VC broke contact and withdrew South. Results: En - one VCS detained; 18 ARVN FMs liberated; one sampan, 1,000 kilos of rice destroyed; Frd - one USASF, two CSF KIA; one CSF WIA.

(h) KINH QUAN II (A-412): On 12 September, one CRP from KINH QUAN II, A-412, KIEN TUONG Province, initiated contact with two VC platoons, 22 Km Southwest of MOC HOA. After a brief fire fight the VC broke contact and withdrew South. Results: En - 13 VC killed; five VC cptr; two SA, four sampan motors, 203 pages of documents cptr; 15 sampans, 20 chicom 60mm mortar rds destroyed; Frd - three CSF WIA.

(i) CAI CAI (A-431): On 16, 17 and 18 October, the camp received 90 - 100 rounds of 32mm and 105mm howitzer fire from enemy units positioned in Cambodia. Counter battery fire and Spooky supported the camp. Results: Enemy - unknown; Friendly - three CSF wounded.

(j) BINH THAN THON (A-413): On 22 October, a CSF company operation from BINH THAN THON, A-413, KIEN TUONG Province, initiated contact with 15 VC in sampans, 35 Km West Northwest of MOC HOA. Results: En - nine VC KIA; 31 SA, 11 3.5 telescopes, 15 grenade launchers, 267 rifle grenades, 79 82mm mortar rounds, 106 60mm mortar rounds, 1147 B-40 rockets, 36,720 rounds of SA ammo and

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three bayonets cptr; Friendly destroyed five sampans with motors and a VC mobile ration unit; two CSF WIA.

(5) Special Operations.

(a) OPERATION ALAMO (Det B-52, PROJECT DELTA): Operation ALAMO was conducted in the III CTZ during the period 30 August 68 through 30 September 68, in the southeastern portion of BINH LANG and the southwestern portion of PHOUC LANG Provinces. The detachment was under the OPCON of C5, 5th Inf Div, ARVN, PHU LOI. During this period PROJECT DELTA employed the following elements:

RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS: 13
CIDG ROADRUNNER TEAMS: 14
CIDG NUNG BDA PLATOONS: 2
RANGER COMPANIES: 4

Elements of PROJECT DELTA located and captured a large enemy munitions cache containing 306 rounds of RPG-7 ammo, 2,436 rounds of B-40 rockets, 1,128 rounds of 60mm mortar ammo, 574,560 rounds of AK-47 ammo, 573 rounds of 82mm mortar ammo, 4,575 200 gram blocks of TNT (Chicom), and 336 HT-50 anti-tank grenades. This cache was one of the largest found in the REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. The total friendly losses for this operation consisted of two KIA and 14 WIA. The total number of enemy losses during the operation were 15 KIA, and four captured.

(b) OPERATION CHINA BOY III (3d MSFC): Operation CHINA BOY III was conducted in the III CTZ during the period 27 July 68 through 9 August 68 in camp BU DOP’s TAOR to conduct reconnaissance in force and interdiction operations. During this period the 3d MSFC conducted seven company, six-six man recon and five 12 man ambush teams and one 22 man special action patrol. The total friendly losses for this operation consisted of one MSF KIA, one MSF WIA and four US MIA (crew of gunship lost due to weather). Enemy losses during the operation were six KIA and one captured.

(c) OPERATION CHINA BOY IV (3d MSFC): Operation CHINA BOY IV was conducted in the III CTZ during the period 11 August 68 through 16 August 68 in camp TONG LE CHON’s TAOR to conduct reconnaissance in force, interdict lines of communication and to capture prisoners. The operation was planned to last for about 10 to 12 days, but on 16 August 68 approximately 200 MSF soldiers deserted and headed back to TONG LE CHON. They refused to continue the mission. The mission was cancelled, and the rest of the battalion returned to TONG LE CHON. Total results of the operation were: Friendly -- six MSF KIA and 20 MSF WIA. Enemy losses were -- five VC/NVA KIA; one AK-47, one 1-40 and three B-40 rockets captured.

(d) OPERATION CHINA BOY VI (3d MSFC): Operation CHINA BOY VI was conducted in the III CTZ during the period 24 September 68 through 13 October 68. The
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operation was conducted southwest of camp THIEN NOON and in the northwestern portion of TAY NIN Province. The operation consisted of six MSF companies, with reaction companies at camp THIEN NOON. 030638 September 68 at coord WT 975755, the enemy attacked the 1st Bn in their NDP with an estimated two battalions. The enemy launched his initial attack from the west with Chicom mines, 3-40 rockets, AV's and 82mm mortars and then attacked from the north. Ammo resupply mission was requested and flown. The enemy maintained continued pressure on the west and north sides of the perimeter during the resupply. After most of the ammo was dropped from a HULB helicopter, it was shot down approximately 20 meters from the fighting position. A reaction force from the 2nd MSF Bn operating on a parallel axis to the east was called in to reinforce the 1st MSF Bn. Once the reaction force arrived the enemy broke contact rapidly. The total results of this operation are: friendly losses - 19 MSF KIA; 40 MSF WIA and two MSF MIA; Enemy losses - 162 C KIA and 60 VC KIA.
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d. Plans and Organization.

(1) Long-range Plans/Concepts. (S3 - 5th SFGA)

(a) On 21 September 1968 a concept paper was prepared by MACJ321 in coordination with 5th SFGA and submitted to MACMA. The purpose of this paper was to outline the general posture that the CIDG program would assume under Phase II Force Structure for RVNAF Modernization and Improvement. The concept was based upon a post-hostilities environment and called for significant reduction in forces and realignment of CIDG units and camps. Upon completion, this concept was incorporated into a comprehensive document covering all RVNAF units.

(b) 5th SFGA completed a manpower survey on 8 October 1968. This survey was directed toward identifying manpower sources within 5th SFGA not being efficiently utilized as presently deployed. Based on this survey an MOE will be submitted to USARV for realignment authorized spaces.

(2) Current Plans/Concepts. (S3 - 5th SFGA)

This headquarters submitted to MACV a concept of operations outlining how 5th SFGA could be used to achieve overall objectives through CY 69. Based on this, Annex K to Combined Campaign Plan AB 114 was prepared and submitted to the field on 30 September 1968. While generally extending actions programmed for CY 68, this plan also deals specifically with the concept of employment of the Camp Strike Force and Mobile Strike Force units. Detailed coordination and command relationship requirements are included to facilitate more productive and harmonious relations when operating in conjunction with ARVN or FWMAF units. Annex K, AB 114, is general in scope, allowing for flexibility in implementing programs. Current plans are underway for the conversion of six camps along the coastal areas of II CTZ with the first camp scheduled for early February. Initial coordination has been made for these conversions and preparations continue to progress as scheduled.

(3) General 5th SFGA Plans for CY 69. (S3 - 5th SFGA)

(a) Open six (6) new camps.

(b) Open three (3) Mission Support Sites (MSS).

(c) Close or convert nine (9) camps to RF/PF.

(d) Transfer three (3) camps to VNSF control.

(e) These plans include the conversions mentioned in the prior section. All plans are based on the current situation and are subject to change.

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(u) CIDG Force Structure. (S3 = 5th SFGA)

(a) The Mobile Strike Force Commands (MSFC) have progressed through the initial stages of organization and have proven their value to the CIDG program. The successful defense of DU LAF in II CTZ was effected through prompt and efficient employment of the 2d MSFC in II CTZ and the subsequent commitment of elements from the country-wide reserve, 5th MSFC in Nha Trang. Other actions at THUONG DUC in I CTZ and KATUM and THUEN KHOC in III CTZ further substantiated the value of this concept.

(b) On 16 October 1968 a study on increases in MSF strengths was completed. In submitting input for this study, units requested increases ranging from one company to two additional MSF battalions. Our desire to expand the MSF is limited by our current personnel (VNSF/USASF) and logistics capabilities. Due to the extensive employment of the countrywide reserve, an additional MSF battalion has been authorized the 5th MSFC bringing its total authorized strength to 1,982. Additional expansion for the CTZ MSFC will be programmed for CY 69 commensurate with air capability to support them.

(c) New Camp Strike Forces (CSF) TOEs were published on 30 September and distributed to the field. These reflect authorization for the modern family of weapons, i.e., M-16, M-79; however, the availability of these weapons for CSF units will depend on priorities established by COMUSMACV for the CIDG program. The TOE also adds two new elements: the 81mm Mortar Section and 1.2 inch Mortar Section. These will be used exclusively by the "A" camps to man indirect fire weapons. Attached as Inclosure 11 are the Camp Strike Force TOEs CS-1 through CS-8.

(5) VNSF Force Structure. (S3 = 5th SFGA)

No change in the VNSF force structure has been noted since last reporting period. The MTCE that was submitted to JGS in June was approved. The VNSF "B" detachment at Chau Doc has been closed out and moved to Can Tho as the counterpart of USASF Detachment B-10 in the Mobile Strike Force Command. One camp, KHN III in IV CTZ, has been programmed for transfer to VNSF control during or immediately following this reporting period. Progress in preparation for the transfer has been encouraging and many problems encountered in previous transfers have been eliminated. This will be the fifth CIDG camp under complete control of the VNSF.

(6) USASF Force Structure. (S3 = 5th SFGA)

The new MTCE discussed in Para (1) (b) above is in the initial stages of preparation. The MTCE concept letter outlining the new changes will be submitted to COMUSMACV for approval on 30 October 1968. In this MTCE there is a reduction of 5th SFGA strength by 100 Special Forces Personnel. In addition,
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34th Special Forces Group (Air) (5th SFGA) will be redesignated to provide for the following special projects: Forward Supply Points (FSP), CIDG Hospitals, S5 Section, Combat Orientation Course, Mobile Strike Force Training Center, Command Readiness Team/ID Section, Command Liaison Detachment, Food Service Section, and an Airborne Ranger Advisory Detachment. Through this planned realignment of personnel, 5th SFGA will realize a greater degree of efficiency in performance of assigned missions.

(7) I Corps Tactical Zone (Company C). See Inclosure 12

(8) II Corps Tactical Zone (Company B).

(a) Current Plans. The increase in enemy activity has dictated the use of company-size RF missions. Contacts indicate movements of company-size and larger enemy forces. Extensive small unit patrolling also continues.

(b) Long-Range Plans. Long range plans are directed toward denial of base areas and infiltration routes to the enemy to prevent or spoil enemy offensives such as occurred during TET and in August.

(c) Organization/Force Development. Within the CIDG force structure, Detachment B-60 was redesignated into the 3rd MSFC during this period. Presently one Hqs and Service Co., one Reconnaissance Company, and three Battalions (1st, 2nd, and 3rd) are stationed in Pleiku and under the control of Hqs 2d MSFC. Three companies (5th BN) are at BMT and under the CO 2d BN. Two companies (6th BN) are in Kontum and under the CO 2d BN. One company (7th BN) is in Quang Ngai and under the CO 2d BN.

(9) III Corps Tactical Zone (Company A).

(a) Current Plans/Concepts. During this reporting period, the plan for utilization of CIDG forces in III CTZ centered around saturation patrolling to locate and identify enemy infiltration units. The 36th MSFC was redesignated in line with the country-wide organization of the CIDG. The 36th MSFC under the CO 2d FFV, directed several 3rd MSFC operations primarily in TX Ninh Province. The Recon Company was to identify units while the Mobile Strike Force battalions took pressure off the CIDG camps. The "A" detachments continued gathering intelligence which required the great majority of B-52 strikes to hit within Special Forces TACR's. Plans had been made to use Super Spooky against large ground attacks on III CTZ camps. During the enemy multi-company assault on THIEN NOON, Super Spooky proved without a doubt that it was the fastest and most accurate support available to reinforce camps under attack.

(b) Long-Range Plans/Concepts. Several camps are to be closed during CT 69 and an equal number opened. The concept of closing inactive sites, although a definite part of the CIDG program, has not been accepted by CO 2d FFV. It is envisioned that the inner-chain of camps will be either converted to RF/FF.
turned over to VNSF, or closed to establish additional border ones. There are plans to increase A-301 TRANG SUP, III CTZ Training Center, to a full strength TOE "A" detachment. Also 5th SF Group has been requested to add another MSF battalion to the TOE organization of the 3rd MSFC. This would allow 2 battalions to be on operation at all times according to the II FFV concept while the remaining 2 battalions trained and refitted for their next mission.

(c) Organization/Force Development. The organization of Co A changed slightly during this reporting period. Dat B-35, DUC HOA was closed, leaving a Mission Support Site in its place. The A detachments, A-301 and A-302, were placed under command and control of B-42, TAY NINH. To align the unit designations of TRA CU A-352 and DUC HUE A-351 with the B-32 designations, Tra Cu was changed to A-325 and Duc Hue to A-325. The mission support site was designated the B-32 MSS.

(16) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Company D). On 31 August 1968, Detachment B-4.2 was inactivated. Responsibility for their mission has been assumed by MACV Advisory Team 64. No major problems were encountered during the conversion. The subordinate A detachments CP CON under Detachment B-4.2 are now under direct control of Company D.
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Training.

(1) General.

(a) Input has increased substantially at all training centers in Vietnam, especially at Dong Ba Thin. The important subjects for the CIDG program such as CRP and CIDG leadership have increased 63% over the previous reporting period. The quality of instruction should also improve with the hiring of Montagnard instructors. Part of the difficulty at the centers has been the failure to understand the mission and the lack of ability to identify problem areas. This office has identified many of the latter and recommended solutions to correct them. The greatest single problem is the lack of imaginative qualified instruction.

(b) The USASF/VNSF concept of a Mobile Training Team, approved during the joint S3 briefings on 24 and 25 July 1968, has been dropped. The plan now is for all MSF companies to be given basic and refresher training at a Mobile Strike Force Training Center to be established at AN KHE. When this is completed, it will be capable of training 11 companies in a 6 week basic training program and/or 3 week refresher training course. The program of instruction for this course has been approved and published in Vietnamese and English. The MSFTC was activated on 1 September 1968 when A-502 turned over responsibility for its operations and upkeep to Det B-51. Target data for the first class is 1 January 1969.

(c) The combat Orientation Course program of instruction has been expanded to 10 days. On 7 October the school moved to Hon Tre Island where all training is conducted except for staff briefings and a few other classes that are held at the SFOB before the students leave for Hon Tre. Because of the expanded POT and the increased emphasis placed on the school, the percentage of students flunking has been reduced from an average of 26% for the last period to 9% for this one.

(2) I Corps Tactical Zone (Company C).

(a) USASF. Personnel received by the detachments are willing, intelligent, inexperienced and untried. The establishment of the COC Course at SFOB has proven to be effective for new personnel. All personnel are trained G3 due to our shortage of personnel and mission requirements. The mandatory classes required by regulations are presented by each detachment to its members.

(b) VNSF. A continued improvement is observed in many of our counterparts. The VNSF have begun to function adequately in I CTZ in training their own personnel. The major problem, however, is still in the NCO and company grade officer leadership. The VNSF NCO does not have the authority delegated to American NCO's, and the VNSF captain or lieutenant still has problems understanding
that he is responsible not only for combat operations but for the welfare of his CIDG troops.

(c) CIDG. Due to the closing of the KHAM DUC training site in May 1968, and the HA THANH training site after its second cycle in June 1968, centralized training came to a halt. Training is currently being conducted at individual camp sites for those recruits needing training. The program is not satisfactory. Currently, plans are being surveyed to establish a new training center in the old CIDG camp at AN KHE. The existing camp site still has bunkers, wire, and trenches. With a minimum of renovation, it could become an adequate training center within a short time. Based on the approval of the AN KHE Center, the following plans have been made. All new recruits in both the camps and MSFC will receive training there. New companies will be trained for camps that are understrength according to the TOE. Refresher courses will be given to CSF companies that are selected by VNSF/USASF camp commanders.

(d) Cadre. Currently VNSF provide all cadre for the training center. The VNSF have a complete POI for their program. They are well qualified as proven from the caliber of personnel turned out of the KHAM DUC center. USASF personnel monitor training and furnish support as required. Upon approval and opening of AN KHE Center, two USASF personnel will be assigned to assist there.

(3) II Corps Tactical Zone (Company B).

(a) Status of Personnel Training. During the period operational demands greatly hampered training. As a result, plans were initiated for the establishment of a II CTZ training center. Due to the monsoons suitable sites could not be inspected, however, the following was decided upon jointly with the VNSF. The new training center will be located in the AN KHE area which is relatively pacified and whose population can be used for recruitment. The Center will have the capacity to house and train simultaneously six recruit companies. Facilities will also be constructed for the establishment of a POLWAR center by the C-Det S5 and for specialized training in generator and vehicular maintenance by the Company Maintenance Officer.

(b) During the period, "Quick Kill" was included within the 2nd MSFC training program on a permanent basis. Experience has shown that "Quick Kill" experience is a valuable aid in the event of sudden encounters with enemy forces.

(4) III CTZ Training (Company A).

Training in III CTZ remains a key area of command emphasis. The III CTZ Training
Center has been operating at peak load throughout the period. The 6-week basic training course was completely reviewed and additional emphasis has been placed on small unit tactics. This was required by the introduction of saturation patrolling at all Special Forces camps. This new tactic requires the CIDG to operate in small 5 to 12 man groups from a central control base. Their primary mission is to gather intelligence rather than engage the enemy. Efforts continue to train the VNSF, with marked improvement being noted throughout the Corps. As VNSF leadership and tactical knowledge have improved, the CIDG have been more willing to follow the VNSF. This is a key factor if the latter are to take over CIDG camps.

(5) III Corps Tactical Zone (Company D).

(a) CIDG Force Structure. The training center at TO CHAU has been conducting refresher courses on crew-served weapons during the past quarter. CSF Companies attend there as a unit accompanied by their A-detachment USASF/VNSF advisers. At least a year will be needed before all CSF companies have received this training.

(b) VNSF Force Structure. This company constantly stresses the need for USASF and VNSF personnel to work together and give each other the benefit of their training. One method of insuring this would be to have VNSF NCO's and USASF NCO's attend the MACV Recondo School together under a "Buddy System."


(a) Cadre Strengths. Average assigned and attached strengths were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>EN</th>
<th>ATCH OFF</th>
<th>ATCH EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1 ROK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1 ROK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 ROK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Results of MACV Recondo School. During this reporting period, the MACV Recondo School trained 432 students for the three week Recondo Course. Classes R-2-69 thru R-8-69 have graduated and class R-9-69 will graduate on 16 Nov 68. The following is a breakdown of students for R-2-69 to R-8-69 Recondo classes by unit and Corps area:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>3rd Mar Div</th>
<th>Americal Div</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Entr</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drpt</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grad</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comp</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RECONDO CLASSES

II Corps

1st Cav Div
4th Inf Div
73rd Abn Bde
ROK Forces V
Thai Forces
Co F, 51st Inf

III Corps

11th Div
11th Arm Cav Regt
25th Inf Div
101st Abn Div
199th Or Inf Bde
Co "C", 20th Inf

IV Corps

9th Inf Div

USARV

U.S.A.S.F.
U.S.A.F.

Combat Orientation Course. This course trains newly arrived USASF personnel in needed combat skills and prepares them for their role of advising Vietnamese counterparts. During this reporting period 905 students finished the course. Only 183 or 20% of them received failing grades. The rate of failure has been steadily decreasing due to improved teaching. Sixty eight classes were inspected. Nine were superior, 45 were good and 14 were satisfactory. There were no unsatisfactory classes taught. The highlight of the reporting period was the moving of the FTX to Hon Tre Island. All cadre and students agreed this was very beneficial and a great improvement in the training. Plans were then made to conduct the entire course on the Island. On 7 October this move was completed with no problems encountered.

VNSF Training Center (Detachment B-51). During the reporting period this detachment successfully accomplished its mission of providing advice and assistance to the VNSF Training Center in training VNSF and CIDG personnel.

Programs and Results. The following is a list of classes graduated or in

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progress during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COURSE No.</th>
<th>GRAD DATE</th>
<th>STUDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32nd CIDG Ldrs</td>
<td>20 Aug 68</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33rd DO</td>
<td>23 Sep 68</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31st CRP</td>
<td>13 Sep 68</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32nd DO</td>
<td>28 Oct 68</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th VNSF Off and EM</td>
<td>31 Oct 68</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th VNSF BAC</td>
<td>8 Sep 68</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th DO</td>
<td>26 Oct 68</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th NSP BAC</td>
<td>29 Sep 68</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Med Spec</td>
<td>12 Oct 68</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th USASF BAC</td>
<td>20 Sep 68</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Courses currently in progress:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COURSE No.</th>
<th>COMMENCED</th>
<th>STUDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4th TAE KWON DO</td>
<td>16 Aug 68</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th VNSF RTO</td>
<td>26 Aug 68</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Camp Commander</td>
<td>30th Sep 68</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34th CIDG Ldrs</td>
<td>7 Oct 68</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th USASF BAC</td>
<td>28 Oct 68</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A total of 1643 students either graduated or were attending the school during this time. This is 100 students more than during the entire first 6 months of 1968. It is significant that the VNSF, CIDG Leadership and Combat Reconnaissance Platoon courses had increased student enrollments.

(b) Improvements in Training Program. During this quarter both training facilities and the quality of instruction continued to improve. A special 48 pop-up target apparatus was constructed for the Quick Kill Reaction Range. The range itself, consisting of six lanes (150 by 7 meters) each with eight pop-up targets and numerous stationary ones, will be completed by 9 November 1968. An area beautification program was started. Projects include a new asphalt entrance to the Center and a new helipad. Work continues in clearing and leveling the eastern side of the compound. The Camp Commander Course has been revived and will be scheduled on a regular basis during the next three months. Up to 20 students can be enrolled in this course. It was last given in 1966. The most significant improvement in training was the hiring of six Montagnards as instructors. All fluent in Vietnamese, together they can also speak nine ethnic languages. This should greatly improve the quality of instruction for troops who are members of minority groups.
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(c) Problem. Ten training inspections were conducted of 50 classes. Twenty-nine of these were rated unsatisfactory. There were a number of reasons for this. Incorrect material was being taught. Instructors were sometimes ignorant about their subject. Often they had poor teaching habits. Lastly, students were indifferent. The next reporting period should show improvement. Emphasis is being placed on the quality of instruction and the Vietnamese have willingly accepted criticism and advice.

f. Combat Developments.

(1) Project Sonjia. The 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) infiltration Route Interdiction Program can now be employed country-wide. The lessons learned from the pilot project in II CTZ were disseminated throughout the Corps Tactical Zones.

(2) Four new items were evaluated during the quarter.

(a) Wrist Compass. This item, although not a substitute for a lensatic compass, was rated satisfactory by all who were issued one. The only complaint was that the luminous markings chipped off when subjected to field conditions.

(b) Two quart collapsible canteen. This was tested and found to be a great improvement over the canteen now carried.

(c) Demolition Knife. It combines the best features of the crimpers found in the standard demo chest and the currently issued demo knife. It has crimpers, fuse cutter, wire stripper, punch, screw driver and a knife blade built into the body of the knife. The only thing lacking is a can opener.

(d) Astrolite. In the field of demolitions astrolite is the newest explosive since C-4. For safe transportation, the explosive comes packaged in two separate components; a liquid and a powder. Separated they are harmless chemicals. But once the powder is dissolved into the liquid, it becomes an explosive just as powerful if not more so than C-4. After the liquid is poured on the ground and soaks in, it cannot be detected by sight, smell or mechanical means. Once in place it will retain its explosive capabilities for up to four days. Astrolite is presently being used in Project Sonjia.
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**g. Aviation**

(1) **Army Aviation Support.** The 5th Special Forces Group (Abn), because it has no organic aviation support, must depend on General Support Aviation provided by the OPCON Corps/Field Forces. COMUSMACV has directed these Corps/Field Forces to provide two UH-1 helicopters for each company and the Group Headquarters to fulfill administrative and command and control requirements. The only tactical aviation support that must be provided is that needed by the MACV Recondo School and Project Delta when on COMUSMACV directed operations. MACV directed support has not been sufficient to meet the needs of the Special Forces units. Very few airborne operations are being conducted by CIDG forces except in II Corps. B detachment commanders, who advise a regimental size force, get helicopters for command and liaison requirements only every three or four days. Replacements, mail, inspection teams, etc., are frequently delayed due to a lack of air transportation. Because of a countrywide shortage of aviation and the low priority given to Special Forces and CIDG requirements by the OPCON Corps, little support is received in addition to that directed by MACV. Much of this reporting period has been devoted to a study of what are the minimum aviation requirements of Special Forces. The study resulted in a request for additional support sent to COMUSMACV in accordance with the provisions of MACV Directive 95-3 on 10 October 1968. (See Enclosure 13 for the significant portions of the study.)

(2) **Tactical Airlift Support.** Major Leo Fortschneider, the 5th SFGA TALO, departed for Minot AFB, North Dakota, on 1 October 1968. He was replaced by Major Harvey C. Biegert who previously served as the TALO for Company A at BFP HOA.

(3) **Airfields.** Special Forces units are located near 61 separate airfields throughout Vietnam. Most of these are used principally by Special Forces advised CIDG camps. A program has been undertaken to inform the "A" detachment commanders of their responsibilities concerning routine maintenance, police, and control of their airfields. Coordination has been effected with Aviation Plans and Facilities Branch at USBARV in an attempt to clearly define these responsibilities.

(4) **I Corps Tactical Zone (Company C).**

(a) **Army Aviation Support.** Detachment C-1 has two assigned UH-IH aircraft. This is not enough to effectively satisfy daily requirements. Because of the dispersed locations of the A camps and the necessity for frequently visiting them, more aircraft are essential. This C detachment also has the responsibility of aviation support for the B detachment of 1st MSFC. Whenever MSF troops are deployed, for example, it is necessary to provide them with a Command and Control ship. This leaves only one helicopter to support the C detachment and nine A detachments. There is also a problem with transportation from DANANG to NHA TRANG. The Air Force no longer flies to NHA TRANG on a regularly scheduled
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basis. The Otter supposedly scheduled Monday, Wednesday and Friday seldom flies that often. This precipitates problems not only for priority staff and personnel visits, but also for safe hands traffic.

(b) Tactical Airlift Support: The 5th section of Detachment C-1 has had excellent success obtaining tactical or logistical airlift support. Although only one C7A is assigned to this unit, there has been no real difficulty getting additional ones. The biggest problem is that several camps do not have airfields that are open to C7A traffic. This necessitates airlifting supplies via helicopter. It has already been requested that one CH-46 be permanently assigned for that purpose. Some camps have a C123 capability. These aircraft are briefed 48 hours in advance and there have been no problems in this area. The runway at camp HL THANH has been closed since early August and the majority of resupply missions have been air drops. On 31 October 1968 a Low Level Parachute Extraction was completed and this delivery system will be used in the future.

(c) Tactical Fighter Support: Support has been excellent and there are no real problems in this area. However, experience has verified that a Forward Air Controller who is highly familiar with Special Forces camps and operations can do the best job, especially during periods of limited visibility. C-1 is assigned only 2 FAC's and one C-1 aircraft. Even though each camp receives excellent support, the effectiveness of air support would be greatly enhanced by adding 6 FAC's and 1 aircraft. This has been proposed and is presently being considered through Air Force channels. The Beacon-controlled bombing unit has been tested at camps A-10 and A-12 and found to be very effective. This unit provides an all-weather, accurate, close air support capability essential for A Detachments. It is easy to operate and should be deployed on sites more often. Hopefully, in the future, there will be enough so that an A Team can be provided with one whenever the situation dictates.

(d) Pattern Analysis Techniques Applied to Target Acquisition: The increased emphasis placed on the interdiction of enemy LOC's and base areas requires that targets be selected according to the latest available intelligence. Most units would simply task their S2 Air with this responsibility, but the Special Forces "C" Team does not have a TOE slot for one. However, the Order of Battle Section is well suited for the job of target acquisition. In order to develop trends and make accurate estimates of the enemy situation, it is necessary for the OB section to use pattern analysis techniques. This is simply an organized process of recording, posting, and analyzing intelligence reports. In C Company an enemy situation map (1:50,000) is maintained for each camp. Each map is equipped with three overlays. Intelligence reports from various sources can be organized and plotted on these overlays. Agent reports are posted on one overlay, information from aerial reconnaissance and surveillance on another, and intelligence from the various electronic sensing devices on a third. Separately, each overlay provides only a part of the situation. When all are placed on the map, the entire enemy situation becomes more apparent. Once a trend in enemy activity has been determined, the process
of target acquisition can begin. For example, an analysis of enemy activity indicates that supplies are being moved along a certain route and stored in a base area. Targets are plotted for the interdiction of these routes and for the destruction of base areas. A target list, including descriptions and evaluations, is submitted to the S3 for execution. The S3 then employs aerial or artillery assets against the targets. These are plotted and dated to show what coverage has been made, and to aid in the selection of new ones.

(5) II Corps Tactical Zone (Company B).

(a) Army Aviation Support. The two (2) UH-1 (Slicks), and one (1) U-1A (Chui) provided to support Company H falls short of command and liaison requirements. The Company has three (3) "B" detachments and 20 "A" detachments deployed throughout II CTZ which is the largest CTZ in Vietnam. The lack of aircraft to perform command (support) liaison activities continues to limit Special Forces efforts in II CTZ.

(b) Tactical Airlift Support. Excellent.

(c) Tactical Fighter Support. Excellent.

(6) III Corps Tactical Zone (Company A).

(a) Army Aviation Support. Company A must support the "C" detachment and three (3) "B" detachments with two (2) UH-1 helicopters for command and liaison provided by II FFV. This arrangement gives the "B" detachment commander a means of visiting his subordinate units only once every three days which is totally inadequate.

(b) Tactical Airlift Support. Excellent.

(c) Tactical Fighter Support. Excellent.

(7) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Company D).

(a) Army Aviation Support. Although authorized two (2) UH-1 "Slicks" for command and liaison support, Company D is receiving only one UH-1 per day to support the "C" detachment and two (2) "B" detachments. The CORDS helicopter provided to B-14 and B-13 are used primarily for MACV missions. As a result it is extremely difficult for the detachment commanders to exercise adequate supervision over subordinate units because of a lack of transportation.

(b) Tactical Airlift Support. Of 17 locations occupied by Special Forces personnel in IV Corps, 1 cannot be resupplied by air landed fixed wing aircraft. The CH-47, capable of handling 7,000 lbs, is needed to augment the C-12A support provided by the USAF on a regular basis. Company D is allocated one (1) C-12A daily, but also to a change in crew scheduling by the Air Force the number of sorties available to haul cargo daily has been reduced by two or three. This increases the demand for CH-47 support by 10,000 to 15,000 lbs more cargo to be hauled daily. CH-47 support provided by IV Corps falls about 10 sorties per week short of the airlift needed by Company D.

(c) Tactical Fighter Support. Excellent
h. Logistics.

(1) General. The average number of personnel supported during the period Aug 68 to 31 Oct 68 by type was:

USASF - 2165
CSF - 34,870
MSF - 7,643

(2) Supply.

(a) During the period 23-27 August 68, A-239 located at Duc Lap came under attack and received direct logistical support from the ISC to supplement the support received from the Forward Supply Points at Ban Me Thout and Pleiku. This support consisted mainly of air drops to the camp of critical items. Two medical kits, 72 rounds of 81mm Illumination rounds, and 23,000 rounds of .30 Caliber Carbine were dropped in the first day. Additional supplies during the remaining periods consisted of 400 gallons of water, 20 M-79's, 800 fragmentation grenades, 200 - 105mm HE rounds and 1,000 rounds of 100mm M-79 rounds.

(b) The costs of local purchase of supplies during the three month reporting period was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Expenditure</td>
<td>$241,207</td>
<td>$22,649</td>
<td>$214,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice Purchase</td>
<td>$220,087</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$208,105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Items purchased locally included electrical fixtures, administrative supplies, repair and utility items, and vehicle repair parts. Their quality varied from good to excellent since many items were U.S. made. The only ones of poor quality were electrical fixtures, particularly light bulbs, which are locally made.

(i) Maintenance:

(a) The percentage of deadlined equipment for the reporting period was:
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEMS</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crew Served</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generators</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forklifts</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office Machines</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recoilless Rifles</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most of the deadline figures remain fairly constant or vary only in tenths of a percent which are not reported. The deadline figures for generators and forklifts went down due to increased maintenance emphasis.

(b) Lesson plans were recently received from the Ordnance Center at
Aberdeen Proving Grounds and plans are being formulated to conduct a series of organizational maintenance classes for four to five days duration at each B and C Detachment.

(c) During the period 24-26 Oct 68, a class on prescribed load lists was given to ten selected Vietnamese personnel at the LSC. All training materials utilized were received from the Mobility Equipment Command in St. Louis, Missouri. The classes were designed to acquaint the students with the methods of establishing and maintaining prescribed load lists of repair parts.

(d) Movements:

Cargo in short tons moved during the reporting period was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MODE</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C7A/C123</td>
<td>627.9</td>
<td>708.7</td>
<td>511.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C130</td>
<td>1574.4</td>
<td>1199.7</td>
<td>852.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MODE</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air America</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST</td>
<td>307.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>604.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convoy</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>94.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The "O" figure reflected for movement by Air America during August and September is normal since usually they do not have unobligated aircraft to haul supplies for outside agencies. The greatest problem area is the lack of helicopter support for the Forward Supply Point at CAN THO. Seven camps there do not have airfields at all and others are under water during the monsoon seasons. The only way they can be supplied is by helicopter or airdrops. However the shortage of air items preclude extensive air drops and helicopters are needed to retrieve the air items for reuse. Requests for additional helicopter support from both the Forward Supply Point at CAN THO and the 5th SFGA Headquarters have been forwarded to higher headquarters and some improvement has been noted in recent weeks.

(5) Support:

(a) During the period 24 Sep to 24 Oct, the 5th SFGA received ammunition support from 1st Log Cmd based on a weapons density basis. The amounts received were adequate and were a marked improvement over the previously authorized amounts which were based on a monthly bulk basis. However, DA on 20 Oct withdrew the authority to provide the 5th SFGA ammunition on a weapons density basis and directed a return to the old bulk allocation system. Based on past experience, there will be many problems of ammunition shortages and steps are being taken to increase the bulk monthly allocations to acceptable standards.

(b) At the present, 5th SFGA is receiving about 10% fill of requisitions from 1st Log Command. However, due to new interservice support agreements signed recently, the percentage should rise considerably after the 1st Log Cmd facilities adjust their requisitioning procedures to meet our demands. The percentage of fills from the Counterinsurgency Support Office cannot be adequately determined, but the support has generally been commendable and the order ship time is averaging about 100 days.

(6) I Corps Tactical Zone (Company C). During the period 1 August 1968 to 31 October 1968 the Forward Supply Point for I Corps experienced a rapid increase in its support mission. This was caused by the construction of two new CIDG camps at MAI LCC and NONG SON, the siege of HA THANH and THOUNG DUC, and the expansion of the Mobile Strike Force Command.
(a) Supply. The Forward Supply Point presently supports 3220 CSF, 910 MSF, and 268 USASF, for a total of 4398 troops. With the completion of a new S-4 warehouse, a rigged ready shed, and a new hard-surfaced outside storage area, the Forward Supply Point now has adequate facilities to support the Special Forces mission in 1 Corps. On 24 August 1968 construction began on the two new CIDG camps located at R9I LOC and NONG SON. By prestocking a majority of the construction material and equipment no significant delay was experienced in the construction phase. The major problem was transportation, but outstanding support by the 15th Aerial Port at DANANG Air Base helped solve this. Two major tactical operations were supported this quarter. One was at camp RA THANH and the other at Camp THUONG DUC. The three-week stockage of food, ammunition, and equipment on site was invaluable because of the problems encountered trying to resupply the camps while they were under siege.

(b) Maintenance. A spot check team will be organized at the main gate of the C-1 compound to inspect, at random, vehicles coming and going. All vehicles that cannot be repaired on the spot will be sent to the maintenance officer for necessary action. The daily deadline percentage is approximately 17 percent. Most of this is due to lack of parts and transportation to and from the "A" sites. There is also a shortage of personnel at this facility. A requisitioning account has been established with the 85th Maintenance Battalion and they are able to fill most of the fast moving critical requisitions. The deadline status has improved greatly since the establishment of this account. Requisitioning from LSC has been cut by approximately 50% on all standard parts. To date very few refrigeration parts have been received from LSC thereby causing the deadline of a great number of air conditioners and refrigerators.

(c) Movements.

The Forward Supply Point shipped the following tonnage to the "A" Teams during the quarter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Lands</td>
<td>175,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Drop</td>
<td>17,099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convoy</td>
<td>1,432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea Lift</td>
<td>1,509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>196,130 tons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Closer coordination was established at the C7A Caribou ramp. Each night C7A Operations is given a list of supplies to be moved and in what sequence. This has almost eliminated loads being delivered to the wrong camp.

1) Services. A permanent contact team had been established to rotate between the "A" Teams. The team repaired vehicles and instructed team members on preventive maintenance. It was quite effective until a shortage of US personnel with maintenance MOS's required it to be called back to the FSP.
(e) Improvements. At present the stock record cards are being reorganized at the FSP. When this is completed, Due-Outs and Due-Ins will be maintained by item on them. A change is also being made from the Multi-Line requisitioning procedure to the single line DA Form 2765.

(f) Adequacy of Support. The support received by Company C is generally good because the FSP requisitions from three sources: The Naval Support Activity, Logistical Command Danang Support Command, and the Logistical Support Center NHA THANG.

(g) VNSF-USASF Counterpart Relationships. Joint inspection visits to "A" camps of this command will be conducted to assess the value of present support and to determine unique or special requirements. Through joint direct contact Company C will be able to settle existing logistical difficulties and determine the usefulness of control and maintenance procedures at each camp.

(h) II Corps Tactical Zone (Company B).

(a) Supply. Company B logistical operations in II Corps support approximately 2,800 Mobile Strike Force soldiers, 12,000 Camp Strike Force soldiers, and 600 USASF. Two special tactical operations were supported during the reporting period that warrant comment. On 18 August 1968, Camp DAK SEANG located in northern II Corps came under heavy attack. From 23 to 26 August, Camp DUC LAP in southern II Corps was under siege by the NVA. 120,000 pounds of supplies were air dropped into DAK SEANG on 19 August using C7A aircraft and G13 parachutes. The drops were made from 300 feet at the entrance to DAK SEANG. Some problems were encountered during this support operation. Class IV and V supplies were not pre-rigged. Two to three hours were lost rigging the initial loads. At the present time C7A loads are pre-rigged at the FSP and are held in reserve. Also, items needed, priorities, and quantities could not be determined at the camp because of the tactical situation. All supplies air-dropped had to be selected by the C Detachment Staff. DUC LAP was resupplied by air drop utilizing C7A aircraft and G13 and T7A parachutes from an altitude of 300-500 feet. During the period of the heaviest fighting, medical supplies were dropped at night. Due to the heavy ground fire and the extremely small area of the camp still held by friendly forces, the night drops were unsuccessful. After the fighting tapered off, CH-47 and CH-54 helicopters were used to resupply the camp until the airstrip could be made operational. Local purchase has been reduced to an average of $500 per month at the C Detachment. Items generally purchased are VN light bulbs, stencils, and R&U items. The quality of these items varies with some below the standards of US-made equipment.

(b) Maintenance. During the past three months, Company B has greatly improved the material readiness posture of all equipment. The following are some of the steps taken. Equipment densities have been reduced within Company B. US maintenance personnel and the assigned Filipino Tech Representatives at
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Each B detachment have helped organize and operate maintenance programs. Maintenance Contact teams have been furnished by 1st Logistical Command units. During the past 5C days, 1st Log teams have worked in 90% of Company B's detachments. A school for indigenous mechanics working on "A" site is planned. When the additional ECOI automotive instructors are assigned to each B detachment, they will travel to each camp and conduct the training. Since CH-54 helicopters have been available, there has been no difficulty evacuating excess or unserviceable equipment. The percentage of deadlined equipment is decreasing at the present and this is expected to continue.

(c) Movements. The movements section at Company B moved the following tonnage during the past 3 months:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>July</th>
<th>August</th>
<th>September</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airland</td>
<td>2,698,000 pounds</td>
<td>2,645,580 pounds</td>
<td>1,636,199 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airdrop</td>
<td>100,000 pounds</td>
<td>39,648 pounds</td>
<td>175 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle Convoy</td>
<td>218,000 pounds</td>
<td>186,882 pounds</td>
<td>259,623 pounds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A critical shortage of air items existed for a short time but was resolved by increasing assets and putting command emphasis on the backloading of air items.

(d) Services. Visits to the individual detachments by the Company B S4 and NCOIC alleviated many logistics problems and have helped improve the logistical support to the units. By implementing a due-out system during July and August, the responsiveness of Company B's support system has increased tremendously. Streamlining the stock control section and conducting numerous inventories have enabled the FSP to process requisitions more quickly. The most serious problem at present is the shortage of US personnel to supervise. B-20 is without a supply sergeant and B-28 had no supply sergeant during October. The FSP at Pleiku is short a supply supervisor while B-23 FSP is short B. Company B has been getting cargo airlift support from II Corps helicopters. CH-54 support has been outstanding over the past 30 days. 1st Logistical support has been good in both maintenance and general supply. This could be improved if personnel were assigned to Company B's FSP to permit a liaison with QUI NHON and PLEIKU 1st Log units. ISC support has been outstanding. A new building program has been submitted to the Staff Engineer that will provide the physical facilities needed for the planned expansion of the CIDG support operation in II Corps. The existing facilities are grossly inadequate and limit efficiency.
(b) III Corps Tactical Zone (Company A).

(a) Supply. Within the III CTZ Tactical Zone there are approximately ten thousand troops that depend on the FSP for their logistical support. Supplies for this support are obtained from the 506th Depot at Long Binh, the Engineer Construction Yard at VUNG TAU, and the Logistical Support Center in Nha Trang. Support has to be obtained from CAM RANH BAY when heavy drops are necessary. Although the supplies are available in this area, the essential LAPES platforms can only be obtained from support units located at CAM RANH BAY.

(b) Maintenance. The utilization of 1st Log subordinate units has increased the procurement of spare parts, and reduced the deadline rate. At present within the command 11% of the vehicles and 15% of the generators are deadlined. The majority of these generators are 10 KW Libby with defective injector pumps. The FSP has established a mobile contact team to assist subordinate detachments in their maintenance program. Additional facilities have been added to the motor pool to improve the maintenance support. Grease racks and self-filling wash racks have been constructed and a new tire shop and welding shop are programmed.

(c) Movement. On 10 August the 3rd MSFC FOB was moved from SONG BE to LONG HAI by 17 sorties of C-123 aircraft carrying a total of 200 pax and 137,300 lbs of cargo. Also, 133,730 lbs of supplies were airdropped into Katum during August. Total tonnage moved by air increased sharply in September because supplies were needed to rebuild KATUM (A-322) and THIEN NGO (A-323). A total of 369,688 lbs of supplies were airdropped (LAPES) into these two camps. October was highlighted by the large unit move of Delta Project. Thirteen sorties of C-130 aircraft lifted 295,760 lbs of cargo from QUAN LOI to AN HOA. The move started on 13 October, but, due to inclement weather, was not completed until 17 October. There were 155,200 lbs of supplies airdropped (LAPES) into THIEN NGO and KATUM this month. Totals for the quarter were 631 sorties, 251,62 tons, and 5,819 pax. Over 8,918 tons of supplies were shipped by truck convoy.

(d) The counterparts are being encouraged to become active in the logistical operation. Each afternoon a list of receipts and issues are presented to them so that they are aware of the availability of equipment and supplies. They have obtained certain critical items from their channels and distributed these to the subordinate detachments. A VNSF is stationed at the shipping ramp to insure the correct delivery of the issued item to the teams.

(e) Problems. Enemy rocket and mortar fire closed the runways at both KATUM and THIEN NGO to fixed wing aircraft. Since 23 August 1968 over 1.5 million pounds of cargo have been airdropped (LAPES) into these two camps. Although the LAPES were successful, they did cause some minor problems. On 28 August a LAPES platform was dropped too high and dug a hole in the runway at KATUM. This took several weeks to repair. Occasionally, a pallet broke up, scattering the load and damaging cargo. Engineer teams were brought into both
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KATUM is now open to C-7A and C-123 but THIEN NGON is open only to C-7A. The Air Force does send one C-7A Special Mission per day into THIEN NGON which eliminated the necessity for airdrops there.

(b) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Company D).

(a) Supply. During the reporting period, the S-4 Section supported 799 USASF, 2,775 CSF, and 4495 MSF. The NUI COTO Special operation received ammunition and rations by airdrop twice weekly. An MSS was established at TRAM CHIM to support airboat operations at A-40, A-431, and A-432. The change in group policy permitting a thousand dollars per month for local purchases with no single item over twenty dollars proved helpful. Some 35 outboard motors were removed from deadline by the local purchase of spark plugs which were not available in supply channels.

(b) Movement. The Air Force has cut the number of sorties per day on the C7A from 7 or 8 down to 4 or 5. This was due to a lack of trained crews to fly the aircraft as well as numerous maintenance problems. A work chopper is also needed since the Company's one was lost several months ago. Overall during this period Company D FSP handled 1,658,666 pounds of supplies. 8,636,796 pounds were received from ISC at KHA TRANG. 4,313,760 pounds were shipped to subordinate detachments. Of this 1,831,972 lbs went airlift, 7,277,271 airdrop, 8,200 lolex and LAPES, and 1,629,918 slingload.

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i. Engineers

(ii) Construction and Rehabilitation.

(a) Following construction was completed or under construction during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>CONST UNIT</th>
<th>% COMPLETE</th>
<th>EDC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CL Mai Loc New camp</td>
<td>14 EBC</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>21 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL Mai Loc Airfield</td>
<td>MCB-3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL Nong Son New camp</td>
<td>Staff Engr</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15 Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL Tra Bong New TOC</td>
<td>35 EBC</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL Ha Thanh New Bunkers</td>
<td>35 EBC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL Ha Thanh Hosp, TOC</td>
<td>35 EBC</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL SK Building</td>
<td>Contract</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL Sh Warehouse</td>
<td>Contract</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 Ben Het Rehab</td>
<td>KB4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 Phu Tu: Airfield</td>
<td>20 EBC</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 Cung Son Rehab</td>
<td>Self help</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 An Loc Airfield</td>
<td>70 EBC</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 Tieu Atar Camp completion</td>
<td>Self help</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 Duc Go Warehouse</td>
<td>Contract</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 MSF Billets</td>
<td>Contract</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 B-23 FSP Rehab</td>
<td>Self help/70 EBC</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 B-23 MSF facility</td>
<td>Contract</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 Maint</td>
<td>Contract</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 Warehouse</td>
<td>299 EBC</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 Ton Le Chon Rehab</td>
<td>KB2</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 Katum Airfield, Rehab</td>
<td>168 EBC</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 Tra Cu Airfield</td>
<td>168 EBC</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 Trang Sup Rehab</td>
<td>Self help</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 Thien Ngon Airfield, Bunker</td>
<td>168 EBC</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 Hon Quan Billet - TOC</td>
<td>Self help</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 Chi Linh Rehab</td>
<td>EB3/Self help</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 Bu Dop 15 CSF Billets</td>
<td>Self help</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 Long Hai Rehab</td>
<td>36 EBC/Self help</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 Bien Hoa TOC</td>
<td>Contract</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 Bien Hoa CSF Billets</td>
<td>Self help</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 Bien Hoa Hq Rehab</td>
<td>Self help</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 Bien Hoa Ration breakdown</td>
<td>Contract</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 2 BEQ</td>
<td>Contract</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 Long Hai Convalescent Ctr</td>
<td>Contract</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 Hospital remodel</td>
<td>Contract</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1 Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 Bunkers</td>
<td>Self help</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 R&amp;U Bldg</td>
<td>Self help</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 Tay Minh Rehab</td>
<td>Self help</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>CONST UNIT</th>
<th>% COMPLETE</th>
<th>EDC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cu To Chau Re-hab</td>
<td>KBI</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cu My Dien II New Const</td>
<td>Self help</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL Personnel Bunkers</td>
<td>Contract</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cu Ba Koa</td>
<td>Self help</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cu CIDG Billets</td>
<td>Self help</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cu TOC</td>
<td>Self help</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cu Whse storage bins</td>
<td>Self help</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cu Tuyen Nhan New Const</td>
<td>Self help</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cu, Thanh Tri Camp Const</td>
<td>KBI</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-50 New</td>
<td>KB3/Contract</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3 Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOB BOQ #1</td>
<td>Contract</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOB Sig BEQ</td>
<td>Contract</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>15 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOB Mess Assoc Warehouse</td>
<td>Contract</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>15 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOB Handball court</td>
<td>Self help</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOB Air Movement blog</td>
<td>Self help</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOB LSC Test fire pit</td>
<td>Self help</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>15 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOB Mortar pits</td>
<td>Self help</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>15 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOB Officer Club Renovation</td>
<td>Contract</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>27 Nov</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Following construction is planned for next quarter:

SFOB 81st Ranger CIDG Billet | Contract | 3 Nov |
SFOB Conference Room | Self help | 4 Nov |
SFOB BEQ #3 | Contract | 1 Dec |
SFOB BEQ #4 | Contract | 20 Jan |
SFOB BOQ Field Grade | Contract | 1 Dec |
SFOB S2 Hawhill Facility | Contract | 25 Nov |
SFOB Diapensary | Contract | 15 Nov |
SFOB Two wells | Self help | Unk |
SFOB Dong Ba Thin 2 Wells | Self help | Unk |
SFOB Sauk Dau | Contract | Unk |
Camp Goodman Rehab | Contract | Unk |
I CTZ Training Center | Contract | Unk |
Ben Het Renovation | Self help | Unk |
Ple5 Me Relocation | Self help | Unk |
Trang Phu drainage and rehab | Self help | Unk |
C3 Bien Hoc Generator shed | Self help | Unk |
C2 B-41 | Contract | Unk |
SFOB B-52 FOB Construction | Contract | Unk |

2. Well Drilling Operations.

(a) This unit has the responsibility to provide wells for all detachments of the 5th SFGA. At present, however, the 31st Engineer Detachment, 5th SFGA, has no organic drilling capability. It does have one well drilling rig which is not air mobile. To meet the requirements set by 5th SFGA, the Detachment should have a minimum of two air mobile well drilling rigs, each operated by a team of 3 individuals with MOS's of 62020.

(b) A well rig borrowed from the Kontum Province Chief has been used to drill four wells in Kontum Province. This rig can be recalled by the Province.
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Chief without notice.

(c) The rig in III Corps put in a well rated at 100 GPM at TRANQ SUP,
a well rated at 50 GPM at TAY NINH, a well rated at 25 GPM at KON QUAN and
currently is drilling the first of three wells in LONG HAI. The team is having
difficulties at LONG HAI because of overnight sand seepage, but this will be
eliminated by use of pea gravel as packing material. After the completion of the
three wells at LONG HAI, the team will be moved to DUC IAP.

3. Budgeting and Funding.
Funds obligated: $2,161,743.33
Funds unobligated: $ 746,839.77

(a) R&U Section: completed 595 work orders during reporting period.
(b) Carpenter Shop: constructed 13,500 pallets and 10,470 concrete blocks.

(c) During the month of August the water shortage reserve dwindled to
a low of 15,000 gallons resulting in water rationing at the SFQ. By sink-
ing several new wells and continual maintenance of the old wells, the reserve
was maintained near its maximum of 100,000 gallons during September and October.
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j. Political Warfare (POLWAR).

(i) General.

(a) During this period the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) set up three objectives for the POLWAR program:

(1) Establish and maintain a high degree of loyalty, discipline and morale within the CIDG.

(2) Gain the support of the civilian population by improving the civilian military relationships.

(3) Combat the VC/NVA through effective use of Psychological Warfare.

(b) Seven specific areas were outlined in which these objectives were to be implemented. These included improving counterpart relations, training of US CA/PO personnel, proper utilization of school trained CA/PO personnel, integrating the POLWAR effort with the operational and intelligence gathering effort, improving the quality, quantity, and reaction time of psychological operations, increasing the coordination both within the 5th Special Forces, the 4th PSYOPS battalion and MNCCORDS, and improving the effectiveness of our reporting and evaluation system.

(c) With this program as a basis, the S5 Section has revamped, revitalized and expanded the POLWAR Program of the 5th SFGA. In addition to increasing the individual productivity of CA/PO personnel at all levels, new programs and procedures were developed which changed the scope and enhanced the effectiveness of the POLWAR program. Among these new programs were the improved motivation and indoctrination program, the centralized quick-reaction PSYOPS exploitation program, the resource management program and the quantitative evaluation system. When the USASF S5 adopted the VNSF POLWAR concept earlier this year, the keystone of that concept was the motivation and indoctrination of the CIDG soldier. The welfare, loyalty, and education of the CIDG became the number one priority of the USASF, replacing the civilian population as our first concern. These efforts were brought together under the motivation and indoctrination program. Housing for dependents of the CIDG has proved to be an excellent morale builder with the CIDG troops, both reducing the AWOL rate and boosting the enlistment rate. Under the motivation and indoctrination program a survey was conducted to determine the living standards of the CIDG throughout the RVN. As a result of this survey, priorities for CIDG dependent housing were established. Construction of 118 units of housing at MY DIEN II and the Mobile Strike Force Training Command were approved in September. A large effort was initiated to complete construction of all previously approved projects. By the end of Calendar Year 1968, it is planned to have the necessary
dependent housing approved for all locations in Special Forces TAOR's throughout the RVN. Another step in the motivation and indoctrination program was the creation of a coordinated countrywide CIDG Soldier of the Month and Camp of the Month program. These programs should be implemented in the near future. Training and utilization of the 16 man POLWAR Teams, the crux of the MI program, continued. In A Company, for instance, all the teams have been trained and are fully operational. The traditional motivation and indoctrination activities, now incorporated in this broad program, have continued to expand and show corresponding results. Using May as the base figure, the distribution of magazines to the CIDG increased an average of 43 percent in each of the last four months. Newspaper distribution increased an average of 14.8 percent a month. The number of movies shown and the attendance at these movies increased 35 and 51 percent respectively for the last four months. At the same time the AVOL rate dropped from 1.16 percent to .99 percent during the same period.

(d) The second major innovation in the POLWAR program was a revitalization of the PSYOPS program. First came the centralized PSYOPS quick-reaction exploitation program. All daily intelligence summaries and situation reports were filed through the S5 officer. These were immediately studied to look for opportunities for PSYOPS exploitation. Companies were immediately called to ask if these opportunities had been exploited yet. This process stimulated efforts of C, B, and A Detachments, greatly increased the speed of PSYOPS exploitation and substantially expanded the number of opportunities which were actually exploited. Over 150 queries were sent out in the first three months that this new program was operational, most of which resulted in successful PSYOPS exploitation. Second came the increased speed of leaflet dissemination. Through close coordination with the 4th PSYOPS Group the time required to react to intelligence and disseminate a standard leaflet was cut from days to 2 hours. The development and dissemination of specific quick reaction leaflets was cut to 24 hours. On one occasion these specific leaflets were out of the aircraft only four hours after PSYOPS intelligence was received in the field. Third was the increased effort to provide PSYOPS support for combat operations. A PSYOPS EBI annex was added to the 5th SFOD Collection Plan, and a POLWAR Annex is required on all operations orders. Using May as the base figure, again, the number of leaflets disseminated by air has increased an average of 62 percent a month for the last four months. Leaflets disseminated on the ground have increased an average of 165 percent for each of the last four months. Hours of air loudspeaker broadcasts have similarly increased 103 percent each month, and hours of ground loudspeaker broadcasts have risen by an average of 43 percent each month. These increases have paid off in an average monthly increase in Ho Chi Minhs of 2.95%.

(e) The POLWAR resource management program undertaken in the last months is a many faceted program which includes a new MTO&E to adapt to the expanded POLWAR program, a budget and cost accounting system to provide effective

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approval in excess of the monthly limits set for detachments. The piaster limits on the 907 funds detachments could spend each month without Group S5 approval were lowered by 50%. All construction projects were required to have approval of the staff engineer and the Group Commander. The use of 907 funds to purchase supplies normally available through S4 channels was prohibited. The second of this series of measures was revision of the S5 supply and logistics regulations which established a new centralized purchasing procedure and a faster distribution system. Requests for supplies were required to be consolidated at the B and then the C Detachment level to permit bulk, and therefore much cheaper, purchasing. To speed the response to supply requests and to prevent any slowdown in the distribution of supplies which the new consolidated purchasing might cause, C and B Detachment were required to keep on hand a one month’s supply of materials required by subordinate detachments. The third in the series of resource control tightening measures was in the area of manpower planning. To prevent the constant turnover of S5 personnel and the resulting loss of individual experience and program consistency, measures were initiated to stabilize S5 personnel in S5 assignments. The Group Commander sent a letter to all Detachment Commanders requiring that the latter remain in those S5 positions for the duration of their tour in Vietnam. To reinforce this new policy, S5 began examining records of incoming personnel for S5 training or experience. Those with such training and experience are now targeted by the Group S1 for S5 positions at the detachments to which they are sent.

(f) In addition, during the months of August and September the Group S5, with support from the 4th PSYOPS Group, conducted two Civic Action/PSYOPS officer courses and one Civic Action/PSYOPS NCO course. These courses consisted of 24 hours of instruction on motivation and indoctrination, civic action project planning, PSYOPS intelligence, PSYOPS development and counter-part relations, counter-intelligence, and men attended these courses.

(g) Another item in the revitalization of the S5 program was the creation of a quantitative evaluation system to measure the S5 results of the four line companies. This system enables the S5 officer and Group Commander to effectively analyze each company’s output and results over a given period of time. It also enables them to compare the four diverse companies with each other. Finally, it enables them to correlate where effort is achieving results and where it is not. The final result of the evaluation system is 75 charts with accompanying analysis which not only show effort and results, but which also highlight problem areas throughout the S5 program.

(h) The final area in which the S5 program has been revitalized is that of relations with the VNSF and CARE and 4th PSYOPS Group. Counterpart relations were greatly strengthened particularly at the Group level. All major POLWAR directives are now bi-lingual. The S5 annex to the MOPSUM will soon be a joint bilingual report completed by each CA/PC officer and his VNSF counterpart working together. The same report will be forwarded through both USASF and VNSF channels.
analysis of past resources, reconceived estimates of future resource needs, and a series of measures to impose tighter control on both material and manpower resources.

(1) The new TOE for the S5 section has done two things. First it officially recognized the S5 section as the S5 section, with a LTC as S5 and a Major as Asst S5. The section was previously authorized as two independent sections PSYWAR and Civil Affairs, with two majors as the staff officers. This reorganization created one S5 section and officially authorized the POLWAR concept as the theory and organization by which the S5 section would operate. The second thing the new TOE did was to provide the headquarters the structure and necessary manpower with which to effectively carry out the POLWAR activities under the POLWAR concept. The jobs of the previously authorized personnel were redesignated and 1 officer and six EM were added to the headquarters staff. The new TOE includes the S5, Asst S5, a new POLWAR officer who, among other things, supervises the Motivation and Indoctrination officer, the Civic Action and the PSYOPS officer, a Plans officer, an operations sergeant, an assistant operations sergeant, an area specialist sergeant for each CTZ, a senior NCO for POLWAR, Motivation and Indoctrination, Civic Action and PSYOPS, a psychological intelligence analyst, and a three man administration section. In addition to providing minimum manpower required to carry out the expanded S5 programs the new TOE provided the capability of either an officer or NCO in each function to be in the field at all times. It provided the capability for tailored trouble shooting teams from the headquarters to move into problem areas quickly. It also provided capability for manning and operating the S5 briefing room and S5 OB maps and action reports.

(2) The second measure in the resource management program was the creation of a detailed budget for all S5 funds and the concomitant creation of a cost accounting system. The cost accounting system is a big departure from the Comptroller’s funds expenditure system which records funds by who spent them, not who used the resources for which the money was spent. The cost accounting system will allocate cost to the companies or detachments who used goods whether purchased by the individual detachments, the central purchasing center in SAIGON or obtained free from international Voluntary agencies in SAIGON. The budget and cost accounting system enabled the S5 section to determine who spent how much for what. It therefore helped to predict needs in detail for the coming year, to argue effectively for the funds required to meet those needs, and to monitor how closely the actual expenditure of funds came to the predicted expenditure.

(3) The third and last aspect of the resource management program was a series of measures to tighten the control of S5 resources. The first of this series was a revision of POLWAR, Civic Action, and PSYOPS regulations to require more detailed justification for the approval of construction projects and for
the POLWAR Team's primary responsibility should be face-to-face communications. On the first few visits the POLWAR members should distribute commodities and find out the population's attitude towards the GVN. Once rapport has been established the conversation can turn to discussion about the VC/NVA. Here is where intelligence is gathered. Another essential element in a successful medcap is to have the CIDG and VNSF medics provide the actual treatment under the supervision of a USAF medic. This method not only improves the indigenous medics' proficiency, but also creates a favorable attitude towards GVN soldiers. In addition to health and sanitation projects, the POLWAR Teams have assisted the civilian population in constructing or repairing schools, dispensaries, churches, roads, and bridges. During the reporting period efforts have been made to establish all civic action projects on a self-help basis with the people providing at least 50% of the labor. In one project, (repairing a pagoda), the people provided 50% of the labor and the POLWAR Team provided 50%. While some team members worked on the project, the remainder went house-to-house explaining the project and how the government was willing to help the people to help themselves. Additionally, the POLWAR Team used the same techniques mentioned on medcaps to gather intelligence. The net result of this project was two subsequent self-help projects done by the people and more intelligence gathered from them. Two particularly exploitable civic action projects occurred during this period. In August, MINH THANH, Detachment A-36, reported an outbreak of disease in the local water buffalo. A Veterinarian from the 1st Infantry Division diagnosed the disease as hemorrhagic septicemia which is passed by contact between the animals. After further investigation and reports of similar animal deaths in AN DO, the outbreak was classified as an epidemic which would threaten all water buffalo and cattle in III CTZ if uncontrolled. Vaccine was ordered through USAID and delivered from SAIGON. The 5th Special Forces Group Veterinarian arrived at MINH THANH to assist. The POLWAR Team constructed a corral and chute for immunizing the animals and was instrumental in alerting the populace to bring in their animals for treatment or immunization. The reaction of the people to the project was very impressive. They did most of the work rounding up the cattle and buffalo. The Animal Husbandry Team from BINH LONG Province did the immunizing while the 5th SFPA veterinarian provided technical assistance. Psychological operations to exploit the situation were conducted by JUSPAO, Vietnamese Information Service, and the POLWAR Team. This project resulted in the immunization of over 70% of the livestock in BINH LONG Province, stemmed the spread of the epidemic, and gained the appreciation and confidence of the people. In October, a joint civic action project was conducted between two of our "B" Detachments. The project was a FSTOPS field trip for fifty (50) boy scouts. They were flown from HON QUAN, B-33 area, to LONG HAI Detachment B-36. At LONG HAI the POLWAR Team took charge of the boys and gave them lectures on the GVN, showed them Vietnamese movies, had a beach party, and entertained them. The FSTOPS objectives were to remove the boys from their environment, show them a large part of their country, and let them know what the GVN is doing for the people.
(2) I Corps Tactical Zone (Company C).

(a) Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). Friendly audiences included CIDG, their dependents, refugees, and other inhabitants of the safe areas. The media used were face to face communication, hand dissemination of leaflets, and loudspeaker broadcasts by the POLWAR teams. During the period approximately 1,100,000 leaflets were disseminated. Face to face communication was conducted on patrols and medcapes. At Camp HA THANH during the month of September and at THUONG DUC during October the POLWAR teams were successfully used. The target audiences in both cases were the friendly, safe area population. The main themes were "Support the GVN" and "Deny the VC." At THUONG DUC, in particular, PSYOPS activities enabled GVN to maintain more effective control over the people. The POLWAR team made 500 hours of loudspeaker broadcasts.

(b) Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR). During the period approximately 25,000,000 leaflets were dropped by aircraft on hostile troops and populations. A small number of leaflets were left along trails and in night locations by friendly patrols. The themes used were "Rally to the GVN" and "Your leaders have lied," as well as some exploiting the high enemy casualties and poor medical treatment for wounded. Approximately 100 hours of aerial loudspeaker broadcasts were used. Constant coordination was maintained between this headquarters and adjacent and higher headquarters in order to increase our quick reaction capability. The 7th PSYOPS Bn. provided all printed propaganda materials and coordination for aerial propaganda broadcasts. Support by this unit was outstanding. The PSYOPS Officer is coordinating the temporary assignment of representative Montagnards to the 7th PSYOPS Bn. These individuals will be from the Cua, Bru, Hre and Katu tribes and will be used to develop themes directed toward Communist members of these tribes.

(c) Social Welfare. Our refugee population for camps HA THANH and THUONG DUC almost doubled during this period, with approximately 21,000 refugees being aided. Assistance to these refugees as well as to the CIDG is complicated by the tactical situation and the fact that both airstrips are closed. Approximately 700,000 lbs of commodities were transported to all the camps with the lion's share going to HA THANH and THUONG DUC. Supplies consisted of food stuffs, clothing, health items, kits, and various building materials. A survey of dependent housing needs of the detachments was completed and at THUONG DUC temporary housing was provided.

(d) Motivation and Indoctrination. At the present time, all camps except MAI LOC have a POLWAR team. These teams are used to show movies to the CIDG and to give troop information lectures. The second quarterly sports competition is planned for the near future. As a result of the extremely heavy contact at camps HA THANH and THUONG DUC victory celebrations were held at both locations. These celebrations proved effective and at THUONG DUC especially produced a measurable increase in morale. A Vietnamese Culture-Drama team has performed
with great effectiveness in every camp and at the C Detachment. The shows are a combination of drama, comedy, and music, with a mild propaganda appeal. The team is hard working and visits each camp for three days at a time. At the "A" camps, performances are given to both civilians and CIDG. At the C Detachment, the Mobile Strike Force, the wounded in the hospital, and laborers have been entertained.

(e) Civil Action. Sanitation projects have been started at Camp BA TC with bridge construction and repair planned for the future. The agriculture program at Camp Gia Vui has been greatly expanded and is proving very successful. Plots have been started at BA TC. The program has been enlarged to include Camp MINH LONG and will include Camp HA THANH as soon as the tactical situation permits. A dispensary for the Bru Montagnards has been completed. A fish pond has been build and stocked at Camp MINH LONG.

(f) Miscellaneous. This headquarters is collecting data on the Kata Montagnards in preparation for operations to reestablish contact with this hostile tribe. Although it has long been under Communist control, there are indications that friendly relations can be established between it and the SVN. A Kata Chief Hoi has been located and will be used to garner additional information. Representatives of the Summer Institute of Linguistics have proved invaluable in their work with 64 Kata tribesmen located at camp THUONG Duc. They are attempting to construct a written language for the Kata and become familiar with their attitudes, recent history, and traditions. This headquarters had provided transportation for a Vietnamese speaking Kata from Camp THUONG Duc to DANANG to work with the representatives of the summer institute.

Close coordination has been achieved between the VNSF and the USAF by means of daily visits between the two headquarters. Relationship between counterparts is excellent with a ready exchange of ideas and opinions. Overall efficiency will improve when current plans for co-location are implemented. As soon as the S-H Section completes its new office facilities, the VNSF S-H and USAF S-H will jointly occupy the old S-H offices.

The major problem encountered was the lack of trained personnel. All camps have a CA/PO Officer but none are CONUS school trained. This lack of training is partially offset by their enthusiasm and initiative of all personnel. Under these circumstances continuity of effort is difficult to maintain. Steps are being taken to acquire school trained personnel and to stabilize CA/PO assignments.

(3) II Corps Tactical Zone (Company B).

(a) During the reporting period the POLWAR teams really began functioning as effective units. Equipment was distributed and the teams started programs in the villages around the "A" camp locations. The camp at FOI KLUNG recently
set up a dispensary in one of its villages. Sick calls are conducted every day. Active promotion of the volunteer informant program is conducted via leaflets and posters. As yet there is no feedback on this.

(b) During this period the headquarters disseminated approximately three million leaflets. One third of these were especially developed in response to specific situations, printed in small quantities, and dropped selectively. We logged 59 hours of live broadcast time, the majority of it in conjunction with leaflet drops. It has been found that the live broadcast is superior to the tape broadcast. Outstanding support has been received from B Co, 8th PSYOP Bn. for PSYOPS efforts.

(c) In the field of social welfare tremendous efforts are being made to upgrade the standard of dependent housing for the CSF. An agriculture program has been initiated with the aim of making the CSF less dependent on vegetable resupply. In most locations: there is no reason why they cannot grow their own vegetables.

(d) The POLWAR teams are active in the CSF M and I program. With the new POLWAR team equipment, they have the capability of conducting interesting indoctrination courses on a recurring basis.

(e) During the reporting period about $300,000 VN was spent on more than 100 projects. These ranged from bridges and improved highways to schools and dispensaries. More and more, the POLWAR teams are being closely associated with the civic action effort. The end result is more awareness in the minds of the people that the SVN does care for them and is spending money on their welfare.

(h) III Corps Tactical Zone (Company A). Significant POLWAR activities include projects in Civic Action, Social Welfare, Motivation and Indocrrination, and PSYOPS. The training of POLWAR Teams at Co A has entered its second phase. The first phase of training was completed in July when all teams attended a four (4) week basic course on the fundamentals of POLWAR activities at the III Corps Training Center, Detachment A-501, TRANG 301. The second phase of training is conducted by a Mobile Training Team organized from the POLWAR Instructors with USASF and VNSF supervision. The Mobile Training Team, split into two smaller teams, visits the "A" Detachments to give additional on-the-job instruction to the POLWAR Teams. Primary emphasis has been placed on implementing a Motivation and Indoctrination program for the CIDG troops. Having completed one circuit of the "A" Detachments, the Mobile Training Team is presently beginning a second circuit, paying particular attention to camps which have a high AWOL rate or new POLWAR Team members. The third phase of training, the total implementation of the POLWAR program, will begin during the next reporting period. During this phase the POLWAR Teams will be responsible for actively planning and executing projects on their own initiative. Supervision and additional on-the-job training will be provided by "A" and "B" Detachment S-5 (USASF and VNSF) personnel.
In addition to the POLWAR Teams at all "A" Detachments, Company A also has Culture-Drama Teams at three "B" Detachments. The Culture-Drama Teams visit the "A" Detachments on a continuing basis, besides performing POLWAR functions at the "B" detachment. They integrate current Motivation and Indoctrination themes into their skits and traditional songs. In addition, they provide entertainment during the various camp celebrations and Vietnamese-Cambodian-Montagnard holidays. The Teams have been used in Civic Action projects at neighboring villages and hamlets. During medcaps, their performances have created interest in the project and they have been an effective media for the dissemination of PSYOPS. The average size of the Culture-Drama Team is five to nine members with one-third female and two-thirds male.

(a) Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). Psychological Operations are an integral part of the S-5 program. All too often PSYOPS is viewed merely as dropping leaflets and loudspeaker broadcasts. Although these are important tools in the PSYOPS effort, it must be realized that no other phase of POLWAR, whether Civic Action, Social Welfare, or Motivation and Indoctrination, can be effective without PSYOPS exploitation. All other POLWAR activities are simply vehicles for the dissemination of PSYOPS. One particularly effective project during the reporting period illustrated a totally integrated PSYOPS program. In late August, local VC attacked MINH HOA village near Detachment A 33. To counter the VC propaganda and restore the villagers' confidence in the GVN a village festival was held. During the festival the Deputy Provost Chief and the District Chief talked to the people. The POLWAR Team distributed civic action commodities, entertained the people by singing traditional songs, and distributed leaflets and newspapers. A medcap was held by the CIDG medical under the supervision of the USASF medic. The Vietnamese Information Service provided loudspeaker support. The PSYOPS objectives were to present an image of cooperation between GVN agencies, demonstrate that the GVN was interested in the people's welfare, and counter VC propaganda. The village festival project illustrated what is undoubtly the most effective PSYOPS media, namely, face-to-face communications. This method is also used by the POLWAR Teams during medcaps, civic action projects, and motivation and indoctrination training.

(b) Psychological Warfare (PSTWAR). During this reporting period, Co A carried out an aggressive PSTWAR program against the enemy. In order to exploit enemy vulnerabilities more effectively, Co A has divided its PSTWAR program into two parts, pre-planned and quick reaction. Equal emphasis must be placed on both methods in order to maintain continuity in the program. Pre-planned missions are determined every Wednesday for the following Sunday through Saturday. The main objective is to expose the individual enemy soldier continuously to timely and effective PSYOPS. This calls for a coordinated effort with the S-2 section and other PSYOPS agencies.

(i) Three special pre-planned mission campaigns have been implemented during this reporting period. The following is a summation of these. In August a new
border leaflet campaign was implemented. The objective was to saturate all infiltration routes and Special Forces TACR's which border Cambodia with at least two leaflets per square meter. Standard leaflets are employed and each area is saturated bimonthly. The leaflet density must be great enough to prevent any practical type of police-call by the enemy. It is felt this will effectively expose enemy soldiers during infiltration and exfiltration along the border to our PSYWAR themes. The theme stressed was the Chieu Hoi program. In September a second Chieu Hoi leaflet map campaign was implemented with development of map leaflets for B-32, TAY MINH, and B-33, NON QUA. The leaflets were developed after receiving POW agent and Hoi Chanh reports that more VC, NVA would surrender but they didn't know how or where. The campaign is designed to provide information for potential ralliers on where to surrender. The following is a translation of the text of the leaflet developed for B-23:

"FRONT: Caption: This is the direction for you to rally. BACK: Attention Soldiers of the NLF. The RF/PF, CIDG and ARVN forces, and the GVN officials are prepared to receive you under the Chieu Hoi program. Return to the GVN and build a better life for you and your family. You will be well received by the GVN at any of the following locations: 10C PHU, AN LUC, HON QIAN, TOI LE CHON, CHI LINH, and MINH THANH."

Instructions: "Come in during the daylight hours to any of the locations shown on the map. Hide your weapons before you come in. You will be given a chance to go back and get it and you will be rewarded for turning in your weapon. If you have a leaflet, bring it with you, but you do not need a leaflet in order to come in.""The GVN officials and ARVN, RF/PF, and CIDG soldiers in the area shown above on the map are expecting you. You will be well received."

Leaflets will be developed for each subordinate "B" Detachment. Maps are also being prepared for each subordinate "A" Detachment area. In October the increased number of offensive attacks against Special Forces camps led to the development of a third leaflet for pre-planned drop while camps are under attack. The objective of the leaflet is to undermine the morale of the attacking enemy soldiers. The leaflets have been stockpiled at Company level and will be disseminated on a quick reaction basis. The text is reinforced with a picture of dead soldiers on the front. The following is an English translation:

"FRONT: Caption: Do not allow this to happen to you. BACK: Attention Members of the NLF and NVA! Your leaders lead you to attack the Special Forces camps, insuring your death! Do not be led to your own death! You can avoid this useless suffering and death. You can help to bring peace to yourself and to your country by rallying to the GVN. You will be received warmly and treated well. This way you will escape certain death."

Quick reaction leaflets, the second part of PSYWAR, were also used during this
period. In September, BEN S.O.I. Detachment A-136, came under a number of attacks by enemy units. Reaction leaflets and tapes were developed within twenty hours exploiting enemy casualties. The following is the leaflet translation:

FRONT: Chieu Hoi Symbol

BACK: To VC and NVA soldiers who tried to overrun the Ben Soi Special Forces camp.

Soldier: Three times now you have tried to overrun the Ben Soi Special Forces camp and, of course, three times you have failed. Your leaders have told you that the camp could easily be taken, but the camp has not fallen. Your leaders have recklessly and needlessly sent you against the superior firepower of the camp. Why must you continue to die for a losing cause? Death still awaits you at the Ben Soi camp. Do not let your body hang in the barbed wire there. Refuse to throw your life away in another useless attack. Rally now! You will be welcomed and well treated by the GVN."

During this period, over 100 Hoi Chanhs were received. Our average usually is two to five ralliers a month. In August Detachment B-33, HON QUAK, received 95 KKK and 3 NVA ralliers for a total of 98. The majority of Hoi Chanhs rally to ARVN units, rather than to Special Forces. However it is possible that our PSYOPS effort has caused some of these ralliers to ARVN.

(c) Social Welfare. The main activity performed by the POLWAR Teams to improve CIDG living conditions has been construction programs. Several camps have initiated dependent housing, PX/Commissaries, club, barber shop, theater, reading room, or dependent school building projects. The POLWAR Teams have been instrumental in encouraging the CIDG to provide self-help labor to complete these. Fish ponds which will provide a ready source of food for the troops and dependents were constructed and stocked at three camps by the Teams. Additionally, the latter have given the troops assistance in beginning their own garden plots. Two additional social welfare projects which continue on a daily basis are the medical and the sanitation program. All Detachments have a daily sick call for the CIDG and their dependents. This provides immunization as well as treatment and has been effective in controlling contagious diseases. Some Detachments have begun a "Mother's Day" program where one or two mornings a week the dependent women bring their children for examination. While they are waiting, some POLWAR Team members entertain the children and treat them to candy. Other members distribute health kits and demonstrate to the mother such practices as how to wash a child and use a toothbrush. This instruction is particularly effective with Cambodian and Montagnard mothers who are not accustomed to the luxuries of soap and a toothbrush. "A" Detachments are also providing valuable medical instruction for village and hamlet nurses. At present fifty (50) nurses are being given on-the-job training. Those Detachments near a civilian populace allow the latter to participate in the sick call program. This enables the Detachment to monitor various diseases
and illnesses prevalent in the area, as well as allowing them to venture further from camp with their medcaps. The camp sanitation program is also conducted on a daily basis. The POLWAR Teams have improved sanitation by supervising police-call, making trash containers and latrines, and giving lectures and showing movies on it. One Team member is assigned to each company and dependent housing area and closely monitors daily police-call.

(d) Motivation and Indoctrination. The motivation program conducted by the POLWAR Teams at the camps includes sports (volley ball, soccer), entertainment (movies, Culture-Drama Team performances), and camp celebrations. The most effective projects have proven to be those which stimulate competition between the troops, such as Sports contests or marksmanship contests. These engender an esprit-de-corps and desire for recognition. The Soldier of the Month Program has turned out to be particularly effective. The pilot project was initiated at one of the "B" Detachments and proved so successful that it has been put into effect throughout Company A. Candidates are elected by the troops from squad through company level. Then the candidates appear before an impartially selected board. The company commander of each candidate lists the man's achievements. After the Soldier of the Month is selected, he is given a presentation at a battalion formation. This includes a letter of commendation, a three day pass, and a $10.00 gift. The program has already resulted in a noticeable improvement in military courtesy and willingness to work by the CIDG. POLWAR Teams also handle the distribution of printed matter (magazines, newspapers, and pamphlets), lectures, rallies, bulletin boards, and Vietnamese PSYOPS movies. The printing of the newsletter within the individual "B" Detachment has proven beneficial. Locally produced newsletters are more effective since they can single out outstanding individuals and units to give them the recognition they deserve. In addition, a company wide newspaper is printed monthly by the 6th PSYOPS Battalion at BAN HOA and distributed to the CIDG. Until PX/Commissaries can be established at all camps, an interim measure has been undertaken which will provide dependents at remote camps with adequate food and other sundries as well as controlling inflation. Dependents are being transported weekly into the "B" detachments where they can make their purchases.

(e) Civic Action. During the reporting period all Detachments with a civilian populace conducted medcaps, resulting in 66% of the "A" Detachments and 100% of the "B" Detachments being active in this area. Besides improving the health of civilians, medcaps have also proven an effective PSYOPS media for the use of face-to-face communications and intelligence gathering. All prescriptions and medicines are inclosed in leaflets bearing a PSYOPS message. Certain techniques of running medcaps have proven successful. One key element is to return to a hamlet or village on a regular basis. This allows the medics to provide follow-up treatment on their patients, as well as eventually weeding out the curious who do not really require treatment. From a PSYOPS standpoint, regular visits create confidence and a favorable attitude in the people. During treatment
Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for Period Ending 31 October 1968

RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(5) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Company D).

(a) General. Emphasis for this reporting period has been on Indoctrination and Political education. Programs have also been directed toward cultural matters. Assisting in these efforts has been the CAN THO Radio Broadcasts. On 1 September 1968, Major Thu, Deputy Chief of Staff for POLWAR visited Company D and three "A" Detachments. On 20 September 1968, a two day USAF POLWAR conference was held at Company D. Available POLWAR equipment was issued to each detachment.

(b) PSIOPS. PSIOP Speaker and Leaflet missions continue to be flown by Company D. These missions are directed at known or suspected VC positions, based on current Intelligence reports.

(c) Social Welfare. Command emphasis has been placed on dependent housing throughout IV CTZ. When transportation is available, supplies are sent out to various detachments. Health and sanitation programs are encouraged to assist the dependents in improving their living conditions.

(d) Motivation and Indoctrination. The POLWAR Team visited A-433 MY DA on 5 August 1968. It provided entertainment and political classes for the soldiers. Musical instruments were procured from VN at Corps and forwarded to A-421 SA XOC. A-416 TO CHAU A-433 MY DA and A-443 MY DlEN II. Guitars and harmonicas were part of the packet. Classes were conducted during this reporting period on the following themes:

- The good fighting cause of our troops/people;
- The plot the VC use to get supporters;
- The determination of the South to destroy the VC; and
- The GVN shall conquer.

(e) Civic Action. On 20 Aug 68, a Medcap was conducted at AN HUNG hamlet, THIUAN DUC village, CHAU THIEN district. 300 persons received medical and dental care. 300 VN (flag color) T-shirts, 100 shower shoes, 100 school kits, and 100 health kits were distributed. CARE IV Corps and CARE Saigon representatives attended a rice distribution for refugees at A-411 MY PHUC TAY on 15 Aug 68. On 15 Aug 68, a CORDS Agricultural representative spent 3 days at A-443 MY DlEN II, for the purpose of taking soil samples. The canal system around the camp was checked out to determine how fresh water could be obtained. Seeds were given to the Cambodians who are experienced farmers. They are giving instructions to others in the camp. The visits to Can Tho hospital continue. 200 wounded CIDG soldiers received gifts during this period.
k. Personnel,

(1) Strength. Authorized and assigned strength at the beginning and at the close of the reporting period were as follows:

(a) Beginning of Period:

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(2) Replacements. During this period a total of 210 Officers and 752 Enlisted replacements were received. During the same period losses totaled 185 Officers and 622 Enlisted.

(3) Promotions. A total of 289 Enlisted personnel were promoted during this period.

(l) Personnel Management

(a) Strength Reduction. During this period the 5th SFGA was directed by HQ USARV to reduce the assigned strength to authorized levels. This was accomplished by reassigning SF personnel to other units in RVN. By 30 September 68 the 5th SFG was at 99% strength.

(b) Miscellaneous. Department of the Army assigned 5 B8 11055's for duty as 11F55. Also, DA assigned 12 personnel PMOS 12B3S for duty in MOS 96B2S. These personnel will attend the Intelligence Analyst Course prior to departing CONUS. When these personnel arrive in country to the 5th SFGA they will still be carried in PMOS 12B3S, thus creating an imbalance in 12B strength.

(5) R&R Allocations. The following are the number of seats utilized by SF personnel for the months indicated (REF: RCS MACJ-1-09):
AVG-B-C

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15 November 1968

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<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BANGKOK</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAIPEI</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUALA LUMPUR</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PENANG</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANILA</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAWAII</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>81</td>
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<tr>
<td>HONG KONG</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SINGAPORE</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There has been a consistent increase in R&R allocations for 5th Group, particularly in the areas where there were marked shortages, specifically Sydney, Bangkok, Hawaii, and Hong Kong. Personnel are now able to go to these sites mid-tour, whereas six months ago, ten months or more in country was required for these more popular areas. Also, personnel with minimal time in country are now able to go to the less popular sites. During the period May to October 1968, 5th Group has achieved an overall gain of 38.1% in R&R allocations from USARV. This improvement was made as a direct result of this unit's demonstrated ability to utilize these additional allocations. In addition, steps are being taken to encourage the consideration and approval by USARV of Okinawa and Brisbane, Australia as future R&R sites. A survey will soon be conducted of personnel in the 5th Group to show USARV the number of personnel desiring these sites.

(6) Awards and Decorations

(a) Decorations Awarded:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DSC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFC</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

67
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for Period Ending 31 October 1968. RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUG</th>
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<th>OCT</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5S</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LM</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS<strong>TV</strong></td>
<td>60</td>
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<td>75</td>
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<td>96</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACM<strong>TV</strong></td>
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<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACM</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>353</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>194</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMB</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PH</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>17</td>
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</table>

*Browse Stars for Valor and below are awarded by Group. Soldiers Medals and above are awarded by USAFV. The Purple Heart figures represents only those awarded by Group and not those authorized by in-country hospitals.

(b) Valor/Service Award Percentages by unit.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>AUG %</th>
<th>SEP %</th>
<th>OCT %</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>AUG %</th>
<th>SEP %</th>
<th>OCT %</th>
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<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>5.8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>B-52</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-5</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>3.5</td>
<td>C-5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>HHC</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G&amp;C</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>G&amp;C</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
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</table>
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Aba) for Period Ending 31 October 1968. RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(c) Valor/Service Awards by Grade.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>2/4</td>
<td>0/3</td>
<td>4/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>1/29</td>
<td>3/13</td>
<td>3/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>13/43</td>
<td>2/30</td>
<td>12/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>7/28</td>
<td>6/23</td>
<td>26/33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2LT</td>
<td>1/3</td>
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<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO's</td>
<td>0/4</td>
<td>0/1</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-9</td>
<td>0/6</td>
<td>1/4</td>
<td>2/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-8</td>
<td>7/12</td>
<td>4/13</td>
<td>4/16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-7</td>
<td>15/60</td>
<td>15/53</td>
<td>30/149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-6</td>
<td>11/53</td>
<td>18/13</td>
<td>17/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-5</td>
<td>27/73</td>
<td>24/56</td>
<td>31/17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-4</td>
<td>6/25</td>
<td>3/15</td>
<td>23/9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-3</td>
<td>0/1</td>
<td>3/1</td>
<td>2/11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Meritorious Unit Citation. The 5th Special Forces Group was awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation Medal by Hq, USARV General Order 3427, dated 17 July 1968. A copy of that order is attached as Inclosure II.

(7) Special Services.

(a) Film Accounts. Additional motion picture film accounts have been established by all B detachments. It was found that the C and B detachments were showing films intended only for showing by the A detachments.

(b) Reading Material. All Special Forces units are on a Special Services library mailing list for the receipt of weekly magazines and the Army Times. Monthly magazines and paperback kits are also mailed to each Special Forces Unit.

(c) Special Service Libraries. Eight Special Service Libraries each consisting of 2,000 paperbacks have been secured for the following units.
Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for Period Ending 31 October 1968.

C&C (N) Co C FOB #2, B-24, C&C (S) B-23, Co A, and Co D. Improvements in film accounts, reading material, and libraries have been accomplished through the efforts of the Chaplain’s Office, 5th Special Forces Group.

(d) SFOB Field Library. The appearance of this facility has been improved by the installation of tile flooring, new lounge chairs, and magazine racks. A new 2000 book kit has increased the amount of reading material available. Library attendance was as follows for the past quarter:

August = 500 (estimated)
September = 500 (actual)
October = 1053

(e) SFOB Athletic Facilities. An additional handball court is under construction to allow greater participation in this popular sport. Weekly use of SFOB handball, basketball, volleyball, weight-lifting, and Karate facilities averages 200 persons.

(f) SFOB Green Beret Theater Attendance:

August = 6926
September = 7145
October = 7352

8) Safety.

(a) General. During the past quarter, the command has taken positive steps to improve its safety program. The 5th Group Safety Regulation has been revised to reflect the appointment of Safety Officers at C and B detachment levels, required monthly safety inspections, safety procedures at forward landing fields, the formation of a 5th SFGA Safety Council, and the establishment of a Group safety awards program.

(b) Safety Data. During this last quarter, the 5th SFGA had a total of 7 accidents, 5 injuries, and 1 death. None of these accidents involved motor vehicles. As compared to the USARV military injury rate of 11.1 injuries per 1,000,000 man days of exposure, the 5th SFGA military injury rate for this past quarter was 20.4 injuries per 1,000,000 man days of exposure.

(9) Civilian Personnel.

(a) Civilian Strength. Civilians employed by units of 5th Special Forces are classified into three different categories: permanent employees (903 f ad),
temporary employees (hired for specific projects only), and non-appropriated fund employees. The following chart shows companies and separate detachments in above mentioned categories and their current strengths.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Permanent</th>
<th>Temporary</th>
<th>Non Appropriated Fund</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Company A</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company B</td>
<td>1028</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company C</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company D</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det B-51</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det B-52</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>incl with SFOB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det B-55</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>incl with SFOB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det B-57</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det A-502</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOB</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>386</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Civilian Recruitment. Civilians are recruited generally in the vicinity of Detachments throughout the Republic of Vietnam when position vacancies are anticipated and funds/position authorizations are available. Local recruitment requires the detachment to locate applicants who appear to possess necessary qualifications for a particular vacancy and to submit their "CS" forms necessary to obtain the appropriate security clearance from the local military security service detachments. Preference in selection will be given to:

(1) Current employees who are qualified and are subject to reduction in force,

(2) Disabled CIDG Veterans and widows of deceased CIDG Veterans if qualified,

(3) Former employees who have applied for reemployment after release from military service with honorable discharges. The period between separation from military service and application for a position, however, should not exceed one month. Exceptions to this policy may be made by the employing detachment.
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15 November 1968

(4) Former employees who have been separated by reduction in force.

(5) Former employees applying for reemployment.

(6) New applicants.

(c) Civilian Pay. Civilians are organized and paid in accordance with job
and salary classifications found in the US Forces Classification Manual, Viet Nam.
The funds for civilian salaries are provided through the CIDG funding program.

(10) Recruiting.

(a) Reenlistment Percentages. Reenlistment percentages for the quarterly
ORL Report for the period I Aug 68 through 31 Oct 68:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>ELIGIBLE</th>
<th>REENLISTED</th>
<th>PERCENTAGES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RA First Term</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>40.98</td>
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<td>RA Career</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>94.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADS</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>00.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NG &amp; RES</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Extensions. Totals of personnel by category who extended their ETS
during the reporting period:

a. Thirty Eight (38) RA personnel extended their ETS.

b. Four (4) ADS personnel accepted recall to active duty in USAR.

c. Two (2) National Guards Enlisted.

d. No USAR personnel extended during this period.

(11) Chaplain's Activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED</th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious Services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services Conducted</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendance</td>
<td>1389</td>
<td>2147</td>
<td>1727</td>
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AVGB-C
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for Period Ending 31 October 1968. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

15 November 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED</th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group Parish Activities</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hospital Visits</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counseling Sessions</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>2233</td>
<td>2324</td>
<td>2662</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communion Services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services Conducted</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communicants</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>1029</td>
<td>752</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA/PSYOPS Activities</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Literature</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Items Distributed</td>
<td>5711</td>
<td>12486</td>
<td>12221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invocations/Benedictions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conducted</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendance</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Meetings</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Visits</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camps Visited</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12) Discipline, Law and Order.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(a) Discipline Report:</td>
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THIS QUARTER

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
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<td>Pass Violation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off Limit Violation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
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AVGB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Atn) for Period Ending 31 October 1968. RCS CSFOR-55 (R1) (U)

15 November 1968

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<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Curfew Violation</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic Violation</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Charges</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWOL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>58</td>
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**LAST QUARTER**

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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic Violation</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Charges</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>AWOL</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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<td>42</td>
<td>23</td>
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</table>

(b) Judicial Punishment.

**THIS QUARTER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>August</th>
<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Court-Martial</td>
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AVOB-C

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15 November 1968

LAST QUARTER

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(c) Nonjudicial Punishment.

THIS QUARTER

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LAST QUARTER

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</table>

(d) Legal Assistance. Legal assistance was rendered to 237 clients, an increase of 138 over the past quarter.

(13) I Corps Tactical Zone (Company C).

(a) Strengths: Strengths at the beginning and at the end of the reporting period were:

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
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<td>59 Officers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>64 Officers</td>
<td>68 Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted men</td>
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(b) Replacements: Replacements for the most part have been qualified personnel ready to assume their jobs. Commo personnel have been an exception. The company has had to retrain radio operators.

(c) Discipline: There have been very few occasions that warranted punishment by the Commander. Article 15 jurisdiction was imposed one time during the period.
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(d) Morale and Personal Services: Morale within this command is evaluated as very high. Indications of this are:

- No serious incidents;
- No USASF Veneral Diseased cases;
- Very low DR rate, a total of only ten during period;
- No AWOL's; and
- Only one Article-15 and no trials by Court Martial.

A number of factors have contributed to this results:

- Leaves and R&R's are processed rapidly and, in most cases, correspond with requested dates and locations.
- Special services recreational equipment, parcels and supplies have been increasingly available.
- Mail has been delivered regularly to all "A" sites, weather permitting.
- There have been regular and frequent visits by the Group Chaplains.
- Food and service in the mess hall has been excellent.
- Staff sections have made frequent helpful visits to each "A" site.

During the reporting period a 2000 volume library was received. Books are currently being cataloged and will be housed in a library constructed in the Unit Day Room. These books will be made available to the "A" sites on a temporary loan basis. Four new 16mm Movie projectors were received. These were used as replacements or as initial issue to sites without this facility. All sites are now supplied. Due to previous mismanagement of the Saigon film account, this unit was required to turn back all outstanding films during the month of September. The status of overdue films was clarified and handling procedures corrected. By 15 October the circuit had been reestablished. Due to difficulty of transportation, rotating the movies is a large problem. Films have been moving slowly through the chain of camps. To help alleviate this a special courier has been dispatched twice weekly to speed up the flow. Counterpart relationships have definitely improved during the reporting period. Counterparts were visited more often by USASF which resulted in greater familiarity and better mutual understanding. The S3 office is collocated with VNSF S3 as are the CO and DCO's offices. Part of S2 is collocated and plans have been completed to bring together the VNSF and USASF S5 section. Problem areas of the company include CIDG strength accountability, processing of CIDG pay cards, difficulty of hiring interpreters, and lack of sufficient allocations for CIDG support platoon.
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(e) Personnel Management: The shortage of 118 MOS has made it necessary to train 118 MOS in lieu of 116.

(f) CPC: Company C presently employs 126 civilians in order to provide centralized civilian services in the fields of logistics, medicine, and administration to the "C", "B" and "A" detachments.

(1b) II Corps Tactical Zone (Company B).

(a) Strength: The unit's authorized strength was 465 at both the beginning and the end of the period. Officer authorized strength decreased from 126 to 116. Assigned EM strength for the month of August was 392 and rose to 420 by the end of the period. Assigned officers strength also increased from 116 to 156.

(b) Replacements: Difficulties have been experienced in filling operational MOS requisitions. Otherwise the credits and qualifications of incoming personnel have been well above average.

(c) Discipline: No usual disciplinary problems have been encountered.

(d) Morale and personnel services: Morale of the unit is excellent. The increase in R&R allocations has helped considerably. Postal service is excellent with mail being delivered approximately three times per week to the A sites and daily to the B and C detachments. Special services are adequate, although no library exists in the unit at present. Finally, Protestant and Catholic religious services are held once a week at the C detachment and at least once a month at each B and A detachment.

(e) Personnel Management: In the next 60 days 35 EM will be lost. Over 1/3 of these personnel will be in operations MOS's and 15 will be in Radio/RTT MOS's.

(f) Civilian Employees: SFOD C utilizes 260 appropriated fund employees. Detachment B-20 employs 88 civilians. Two of the B detachments have about 85 each while B-23 employs 107. Each of the 32 "B" detachments has 20 civilians. Employees are utilized by all staff sections as interpreters, skilled laborers, technicians, and administrative personnel. Approximately 90 non-appropriated fund employees are utilized by SFOD C, 25 per B detachment, and 10 per A detachment. These are waitresses, maids, and cooks. All of Company B's employees are hired through local civilian personnel offices. A special attempt is made to hire dependents of deceased CIDG or disabled CIDG. All employees are organized and managed under the unit funds office.

(15) III Corps Tactical Zone (Company A).
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(a) General. During the reporting period Company A underwent several changes of command. LTC Roeholt formerly CO at SNO BE Base, assumed command of Company A on 10 August 1968. Then on 13 September 1968 LTC Robert M. Campbell took over. LTC Roeholt was reassigned to Detachment B-34. On 21 October 1968 LTC Finlay, DCO for Company A, completed his tour in Vietnam. Presently this position is vacant.

(b) Strength.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aug 68</th>
<th>Oct 68</th>
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<tr>
<td>AUTH</td>
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<td>OFF</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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(c) Discipline. There were no Article 15's administered during the period. Four MPR's were received, all during August for minor traffic violations.

(d) Morale and Personnel Services. Company A received approximately 1000 paperback books from Chaplain (LTC) Combs, 5th Special Forces Group, during September. These were distributed to subordinate B-3 and B-5 detachments. Also $2,000 worth of athletic and recreational equipment was obtained from Special services in Saigon. This was equally divided up among the B Detachments for their individual A & R programs. A volleyball court has been built which has greatly enhanced morale. Also completed at Company A was an exercise room with sets of barbells and weights. One of the most significant changes at Company A has been the addition of a golf and tailor shop. Items that can be purchased there include sweat suits, shoes, money and watches. Plans are being made for the building of a steam bath. The film circuit has been revised so that each A Detachment is shown one movie per day for five days. The films are so selected that an old set of films is overlapped with a new set. Five new film projectors have been delivered to Company A to replace existing projectors from the field. These now permit a DX Filmster System to be established so that when a projector is sent in for repair, another one can be immediately sent out, enabling the subordinate detachments to continue showing movies. During the reporting period Chaplain (LTC) Combs and MAJ Chavarria, 5th Special Forces Group Chaplains, made numerous visits to A and B Detachments in III Corps and conducted services. These visits have greatly improved the morale of the personnel in the field. During this period Company A has received an
average of seven Red Cross inquiries per month. The most significant of these concern the health and welfare status of individuals who have not been writing home. Second are messages concerning a "newly serviced" member of the family. Once the message is received at Company A headquarters it is immediately transmitted by Single Sideband to the individual at the "B" or "A" Detachment level. In cases when there has been a death in the family the individual is notified and brought to Company A as quickly as possible. Emergency leave orders are requested from Group Headquarters and are picked up by the service member at the Command Liaison Detachment in Saigon where he will be booked on a flight to CONUS.

(e) Personnel Management. LRRP personnel attached to this headquarters are no longer required to transfer their individual finance and personnel records. Past experience has shown there is less confusion when these records are maintained by the parent unit because there is no need to forward them back and forth. The finance sections for the parent units excluding the 199th Infantry Brigade, now pay the attached LRRP's by check. Prior to this, Company A was required to have a Class "A" agent pick up the individual's money and deliver it to him personally. With the check system the individual can receive his monthly pay via SAFEHANDS.

(f) Civilian Employees. Civilian personnel are hired, utilized, paid, managed and recruited in accordance with 5th SFOR Regulation 690-1 and policies. There are 182 workers employed at Company A headquarters performing administrative and logistical services and 930 assigned to A and B sites. All are required by the Company CPO from BEN HOA and SAIGON areas. Applicants for employment must undergo a series of tests administered by the CPO to ascertain job proficiency qualifications. If the applicant is qualified, he fills out two application forms, personnel questionnaires and a Sponsor statement. He is then brought before a VNSF Security Officer for processing. The employees start working only upon completion of their security investigation. They are assigned to sections or detachments according to the authorized civilian table of distribution.

(16) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Company D).

(a) General. On 11 September 1968 LTC Herbert G. Parker assumed command of Company D while LTC Carl J. Nagle became the DCO.

(b) Strength.

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<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCT</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Discipline. Company D did not have any serious discipline problems during the period. The following is a summary of judicial actions:
Summary Courts-Martial: 1
Special Courts-Martial: 0

(d) Morale and Personnel Service. Morale within Company D is excellent. A number of factors have helped maintain this high level. Mail goes to each detachment a minimum of four to five times a week. Increased R&R allocations permit all personnel to take advantage of this program. Personnel can utilize the USO in Can Tho, as well as the tennis court and swimming pool located at the MACV compound. Ten to fifteen movies are sent to each detachment monthly.

(e) Personnel Management. The problem of late receipt of orders for personnel departing RVN still presents a problem although considerable progress has been made. Failure to receive adequate notification of personnel assigned to Co D has hindered the programming of new replacements.

(f) Civilian Employee. During this period, TD increases have allowed C-4 to recruit 10% personnel, an increase of 19. In all cases, these are skilled individuals. Procurement of interpreters continues to be a problem especially of those with Cambodian and Chinese linguistic skills.
1. Medical

(1) USASF Medical Care. Another dentist has been authorized and assigned to Special Forces in Vietnam. This greatly expands dental care for USASF personnel in the field.

(2) CIDG Medical Care. A recommendation has been forwarded to S-3 Plans to incorporate four CIDG hospital staff sections into the NME. Each section would have 13 persons. In the past, the CIDG hospitals have been supported by SF company personnel. This has decreased the operational capabilities of the company. CIDG dependents between the age of one and eighteen years may be referred by USASF personnel to the Children's Medical Relief Institute in Saigon for reconstruction and plastic surgery. This program is outlined in a letter from the Group Surgeon to all Company Surgeons dated 21 October.

(3) Veterinary Medicine. In August 1968 an additional Veterinarian was assigned to the 5th SF Group. This greatly increases the ability to cope with veterinary and preventive medicine problem areas. A nutrition and sanitary survey was conducted during the month of October. Selected "A" sites from each corps area were inspected by the Group Veterinarians. The results are being tabulated for forwarding to the commanders concerned. The survey indicated the need for all commanders to place more emphasis on camp sanitation. Sanitation guidelines are being added to the Camp Commander's Handbook and a complete checklist is being forwarded to the CRT.

(4) Medical Supplies. Presently 5th SF Group draws medical supplies from the 32nd Medical Depot on an emergency basis only. In the near future, however, this group will draw all expendable medical supplies from the 32nd. Requests for supplies will be submitted to the depot by the companies, B-23, S-4, and the LSC CIDG Supply Office.

(5) Training. During the first quarter of FY 69 Special Forces trained a total of 128 CIDG medical aidmen and 57 indigenous nurses. The goal in this area is to train as many of the CIDG and indigenous personnel as possible in rudimentary medical science. Hopefully, when and if U.S. assistance is withdrawn, there will be sufficient number of trained personnel who will be able to carry on a training program as well as care for the sick and wounded at a village level.

(6) Medcaps. In Vietnam SF conducted 816 MEDCAPS during the quarter, treating 135,582 patients. The overall command and control of MEDCAP missions in Vietnam is now under the surveillance of the USARV Surgeon's Office.

(7) I Corps Tactical Zone (Company C).

(8) USASF Medical Care. USASF personnel receive outpatient care at "A" sites or the C Team CIDG hospital. If hospital care is required, it is received at
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(g) Miscellaneous. Clear guidelines are lacking for discharge of disabled CIDG patients from service. This has caused confusion between camp commanders, VNSF, and USASF personnel. This is a problem which centralization of USASF and VNSF medical facilities could help solve. Of special concern is the classification of CIDG who are able to do local security and camp work but who cannot go on operational patrols. Various camp commanders have different policies on this. Standardization is needed. The advisory effort to VNSF medical personnel has been a total failure because the VNSF doctor and staff have not cooperated in a joint CIDG medical care program. VNSF A-Team medics follow the precedent set by their doctor and, with the exception of two “A” sites, completely avoid joint programs and efforts. This situation has existed in I Corps for the past 19 months and no improvement is expected.

(8) II Corps Tactical Zone (Company B).

(a) USASF Medical Care. The medical and dental records of USASF personnel in Company B are kept at the CIDG Hospital. Dental care, as well as any serious medical condition, is handled by the 71st Evacuation Hospital or referred elsewhere by them.

(b) CIDG Medical Care. During the last quarter, 3281 patients were examined by the CIDG Hospital. Of these, 583 were hospitalized. There were 62 medevacs called in. 156 immunizations were given. Clothing for CIDG patients and dependents was provided by both S5 and donations. The SFOR and Company B preventive medicine specialists visited and assisted the CIDG Hospital and all subordinate detachments in II CTZ.

(c) Veterinary Medicine. The immunization of animals for rabies has been carried out at five detachments. Approximately 120 animals were vaccinated. A program is now underway to provide rabies vaccination to all other camps not covered in the last two quarters. No epidemics have been reported.

(d) Medical Supply. Medical supply, which was a serious problem, has improved. This is due to both USC receiving more supplies and sending them out, and to company B’s changeover from a “fill or kill” to a “due cut” system. A new medical supply list has been made up and distributed to all “A” and “B” detachments.

(e) Training Program. Programs are now being prepared for the next basic medic course. Construction of a new billet for the student medics has been requested and is awaiting approval. One of the primary problems of previous programs was the lack of adequate housing for the students. At the present time two indigenous student nurses are being trained on an OJT basis. Several nurses from the 71st Evacuation Hospital have volunteered their free time to work with and train indigenous medics and nurses. Present progress indicates that sufficient Vietnamese medical personnel should be available within 2 years.
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(f) Medcap's. Thirteen MEDCAP's have been conducted jointly by 5th and USASF Medical personnel during the past quarter. Approximately 1300 persons were treated. Experience has shown that, except for the civic action and propaganda value, MEDCAP's are a waste of supplies and manpower from a medical standpoint. Patients cannot be properly evaluated or helped with a "once in a while" treatment. The villages covered by MEDCAP's this past quarter included Plei Blang Dung 1, 2 & 3, Plei Blang Yam, Plei Blang 1, 2 & 3, Dang Roia, Plei Chi Tir, and Plei Kian.

(g) Miscellaneous. One chronic problem that has always plagued medical support in III CTZ is an inadequate number of USASF medics. Currently, however, this situation has been improving.

(9) III Corps Tactical Zone (Company A).

(a) USASF Medical Care. Routine medical care for USASF personnel is provided at the CIDG Hospital. Sick call and immunizations for G-3 personnel are handled by the CIDG Hospital; USASF personnel from all of III Corps come to the Hospital to get X-Rays taken, physicals, cast work, etc. Minor wounds are handled by the Detachment medics. Cases that require hospitalization or examination by specialists are sent to the two nearby American hospitals in LONG BÌNH, 25th Evacuation and 24th Evacuation Hospitals. Recently, Company A has acquired additional assistance in the area of dental care. Personnel that need dental care are now sent to the 199th Dental Detachment located at the 101st Airborne (Rear Support) in BIEN HOA.

(b) CIDG Medical Care. The III Corps CIDG Hospital, located in BIEN HÒA, is composed of two four-bed wards with an additional area to erect a 50-bed tent to hold approximately 20 more patients. Facilities include two operating rooms for major surgery (both with surgical table, anesthesia machine, etc.), a treatment room with 3 tables (for minor surgical procedures), a laboratory, an X-Ray, a mess hall, and supporting activities. The hospital handles emergency, medical, and surgical patients. For the past quarter the daily hospital census has averaged above 50 patients, this is an increase of between ten and fifteen patients above the daily census of the previous quarter. Approximately 90% of the CIDG Hospital patients need surgical care. The end of the patient's stay results in either a return to active duty (with perhaps a short period of limited duty) or a CIDG discharge with compensation. Patients with a non-service-connected disability are discharged without compensation. Patients with a chronic disease, e.g. tuberculosis, are discharged and treatment is given at government sanatoriums at the rate of $60/week per person not to exceed one year. Patients requiring prosthetic devices are referred to the National Rehabilitation Hospital in SÀI GÒN for necessary brace prosthetic work for discharge. In the 15 months that the III Corps CIDG Hospital has had the capability for major surgery, the amount and type performed has altered drastically. Originally a non emergency casualty, Currently, although approximately the same number of patients requiring minor surgery for wounds are received, many of the seriously wounded.
are taken by helicopter pilots directly to regular US Army hospitals. Then, after the emergency casualty surgery is performed, the hospitals send the patients to the CIDG Hospital for post-operative care and convalescence as well as for any secondary surgery that is needed such as closure of wounds, fixation of fractures, etc. Thus, as much as 50% of the major surgery performed at the CIDG Hospital now consists of reconstructive or secondary operations. As a result of this, the number of major surgeries performed has increased four-fold. Up to 35 major surgical cases are done per week with only two operating rooms and one operating crew. The result of the above two trends — the quadrupling of the amount of major surgery, and most operations being reconstructive or secondary — has been that the Hospital has become a center for reconstructive care. Often patients from II and IV Corps are sent here in order to receive amputations prior to being fitted for prosthesis. Much of the work involves reconstruction of hands, bone grafts, bone pins and nails, and skin grafts. In addition, secondary abdominopelvic procedures (celiotomy closures, for instance) and secondary thoracic surgery (decompression surgery, for instance) and secondary thoracic surgery (decompression surgery, for instance) are performed. The emphasis on reconstructive-type surgery is possible because of the assistance and advice of the US Army surgeons at the nearby 93rd and 24th Evacuation Hospitals. One additional reason that the Hospital has become a reconstructive center has been the establishment of a 40-bed Convalescent Care Center at Long Nai. This was established to provide long-term care for disabled patients, both those permanently disabled (e.g., paraplegics) as well as those on extended convalescence. The original idea was to increase the usable "acute" bed space at the CIDG Hospital, removing those patients not requiring close medical supervision but only rehabilitation and/or physical therapy. The center accomplished this goal. But then, the other Corps areas began to send their permanently-paralyzed patients to the Convalescent Center. Before being sent there, such patients had to have a surgical operation at the CIDG Hospital to provide a permanent form of urinary drainage. Thus, the III Corps CIDG Hospital, with its sophisticated surgical capability, is helping to fill the last remaining gap in medical treatment for Civilian Irregular Defense Group War casualties. The III Corps setup for medical and surgical care is probably a forerunner for a system of complete medical treatment for CIDG throughout Vietnam.

IV Corps Tactical Zone (Company D):

(a) USASF Medical Care. Personnel wounded on operations are immediately evacuated to the 59th Evacuation Hospital, CAN THO, or to the 3rd Surgical Hospital DONG TAM. Personnel requiring dental treatment are treated by the Dental Officer, 13th Aviation Battalion Dispensary. Those needing dentures are sent to the Dental Lab, SAIGON.

(b) CIDG Medical Care. During the reporting period Company D medical section treated 674 CIDG patients and 2,371 dependents/civilians. USASF medical personnel at the A and B detachments treated a total of 32,035 CIDG patients and 29,066 dependents/civilians. A total of 1,050 persons received inoculations. The
preventative medicine program consists of a continuous effort to procure vaccines, cholera, plague, smallpox, and tetanus for the CIDG troops. 22,000 5cc Syringes have been issued. AID is furnishing the vaccines, needles, and syringes. The shipment is due to reach Company D during the month of October. Shot records for CIDG troops were provided by AID. MSF wounded are evacuated to the 29th Evacuation Hospital. CIDG troops are sent to ARVN hospitals located at CAN THO and LONG XUYEN. Anderson Clinic, C-1, functions as a convalescence center for MSF and CIDG troops released from other hospitals. From here troops are either returned to duty, discharged, or sent to CAN THO if they need artificial limbs.

(c) Veterinary Medicine. There were 2 serious outbreaks of Hemorrhagic Septicemia. In Kien Tuong Province, BINH HIEP area, 400 water buffalo died before the disease was brought under control. CPT. Gilpin, Veterinarian from 4th Medical Bn, TDY to 13th Aviation Bn, was contacted by this unit to assist in handling this problem. CPT Gilpin made the diagnosis and treated 150 sick animals. He then procured through CORDS 4,000 doses of anti-pasteurella vaccine. With the help of local R-D Cadre, corrals, and shutes were built at several sites to control the animals during the vaccination procedures. 2,000 water buffalo were inoculated. The other 2,000 doses of vaccine was used two weeks later to prevent a similar loss in the Binh Thanh Thon area. CPT Gilpin recommended that all water buffalo be inoculated every year just prior to the rainy season to prevent these severe outbreaks.

(d) Medical Supply. Medical supply to Company D is good. The only problem stems from the fact that this unit does not have the Supply Officer and medical supply specialists authorized by TOE. As a result, sometimes, the proper stock level is not maintained.

(e) Training Program. A and B detachment medical personnel conduct O.T. for CIDG and civilian medical personnel. The Company Medical Operations Section gives a laboratory procedures course. VN lab tech and the USASF medical officer are the instructors. Detachments send selected medical personnel to attend the two week course. The Dental Officer 13th Aviation Bn assists this unit by conducting a training program for CIDG medics. Students are taught the principles of dental anesthesia, methods of obtaining anesthesia, and tooth extraction. Two students have finished the course while a third is in training.

(f) MEDCAP's. All USASF medical personnel at A detachment level are continually conducting medical patrols within their TAOR's. Many of these patrols are in conjunction with combat operations. Company D/VNSF C-1 conducted a MEDCAP in the CAN THO area, in conjunction with the CA section. About 375 patients were treated. The dental officer from 13th Aviation Bn assisted and treated 60 dental patients.

(g) Miscellaneous. The medical officer C-1, contacted COL Conger CORDS representative IV Corps and identified a VD problem in the CAN THO area.
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Medical Officer suggested a control program utilizing a contact report from the principal be initiated for the CAN THO area. COL Conger appointed a representative from his office to contact all US units having assigned medical officers, the Province medical officer, the National Police, and the US Provost Marshal. A meeting was held and it was decided that the contact form would be filled out by the medical officers administering the treatment to the infected individual. Once completed the VD contact form would be taken to the Provost Marshal. The latter would be responsible for picking up the VD suspect and taking the patient to the province hospital for appropriate treatment. This procedure was tried out found to be ineffective because of problems at the province hospital. Since this is a new program it will take time to get it functioning properly. Meanwhile the 346th Dispensary located in CAN THO is treating all VD suspects picked up by the Military Police. Lectures were given in the Company concerning the prevention of VD. This company had only one case of VD in the past month. The reports from other units in the area also indicate the disease rate is dropping.
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(1) Operations. During the reporting period all means of communication utilized within 5th SF Gp continued to operate at a high level of efficiency.

(2) Training. The Signal Company of the 5th SF Gp, under the guidance of the Group Signal Officer, continued to conduct the Communications Orientation Course for incoming communications personnel. An average of twelve (12) personnel receive the refresher training each week and then are sent to their units.

(3) New Concepts/Equipment.

(a) With DA approval coordination has been completed for a teletype and voice circuit with the 1st SF Gp (Abn) in Okinawa. This circuit utilizes the communications center AN/TSC-26 and gives valuable on-the-job training with equipment specifically designed for Special Forces operations. This circuit will prove particularly useful since it provides both teletype and phone patch service with the Counter Insurgency Supply Office and the staff of the 1st SF Gp.

(b) There has been an addition of secure voice FM circuits between C, A and three of its B Detachments and Co C with three of its A Detachments. This continuation of a program to utilize secure voice equipment for all FM circuits within the 5th SF Gp will further improve communications security.

(c) An inventory was completed of all signal items of equipment in the Logistical Support Center. The result of this inventory was the updating of stock record cards in both the LSC and the Signal Office.

(d) Miscellaneous. A complete revision and update of the 5th SF Gp SSI/SOI was made during the reporting period. The previous SSI/SOI did not conform to USARV Regulations 380-12 and 380-13 since frequencies and call signs were not changed on a monthly basis.

(5) I Corps Tactical Zone (Company C).

(a) Operations. Secure teletype is still the primary means of communication with higher headquarters, with a tropo circuit to SFOR and a land-line circuit to III MAF COC. In addition to the SFOR and III MAF circuits, a new circuit has been installed between this headquarters and DANANG south comm center. This eliminates the need for time consuming messenger runs, and greatly reduces the handling times for flash and operational immediate traffic. The KWM-2 provides the company command net extremely reliable twenty-four hour communications with all A Detachments in I Corps. Unclassified traffic is sent in the clear. Classified messages are encrypted on one-time pads and sent CW. Back-up for the KWM-2 is the AN/PRC-74. No problems have been experienced with either radio.

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(b) Training. With the influx of non-Special Forces qualified radio operators who are unfamiliar with Special Forces communications, our on-the-job training program has been expanded to cover every aspect of signal operations. This training includes not only the operations of the radio nets and maintenance of the equipment, but also, special operational techniques unique to Special Forces communications. After this training every operator assigned to Company C will be able to fill any communications position in the company from an A-Detachment radio supervisor to a Base-Radio chief radio operator. Radio teletype personnel, attached from E Company at NHA TRANG, are being thoroughly cross-trained on our company command net operations so that during an emergency they can provide temporary assistance on our radio nets.

(c) New Concepts/Equipment. This headquarters has just recently received and put into operation the FM secure voice equipment KY-8 and KY-38. These items of equipment have given us a capability never before experienced. When THUNG Duc came under attack by a Multi-Regimental size NVA force, the camp had secure voice, KY-38, capability with C Company headquarters as well as with the lst Marine Division's Regimental headquarters who had OPCON of the camp's TACR. Planning was conducted via radio from TOC to TOC facilitating coordination and eliminating completely the need for encryption of transmissions. This enabled messages of a tactically urgent nature to be sent "in the clear". Presently, two A-Detachments, our American Liaison at CAN LAM, and this headquarters have secure voice capability. All our other detachments will have secure voice as soon as the equipment is available.

(d) Miscellaneous. The Signal advisory effort has been quite effective. Counterpart relationships are firmly established and mutually rewarding. VNSF and USASF commo facilities are co-located in the C-1 compound. The current expansion to the command center will, when completed, provide much additional working space for our counterparts. Rewiring of the C-1 compound internal telephone circuits is being accomplished by a VNSF wire team. Future training of the VNSF will provide orientation and OJT instruction in all phases of US commo equipment.

(e) II Corps Tactical Zone (Company B).

(a) Operations. The efficiency of all means of communications within the 5th SFSA is reliable with the exception of one radio teletype circuit between B-23 and PFEKU. All circuits are due for conversion to tropospheric scatter in the near future.

(b) Training. Sometimes replacements are being assigned who have had no prior Special Forces training. A few require code training on nets and must be taught radio procedures. A program has also been implemented to provide all incoming radio operators with a two day orientation on C detachment communications activities.
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(c) New Concepts/Equipment. The conversion of the B-24 teletype circuit from radio teletype to VHF has improved the quality of teletype messages to and from B-24. The conversion eliminated the use of the T-368 transmitter, thus reducing the amount of generating equipment in the communication centers. An additional AN/FRC-93 was installed in the TOC radio room to operate in the IFFV command net. This provides the commander with another means of communications to IFFV Hq.

(7) III Corps Tactical Zone (Company A).

(a) Operations. Company A headquarters terminates two VHF teletype circuits, one from Detachment B-33, RON QUAN and one from Detachment B-34, SONG BE. These provide expedient teletype communications. Requests have been submitted to USARV for VHF circuits to Detachments B-32 at TAY NINH and B-36 at LONG HAI. This request has been approved and both circuits will be installed in November. All operational B Detachments and the 3rd MSFC have radio teletype communications. Detachments B-32 and B-34 use this as a back-up should their VHF circuits fail. The Single Side Band Voice radio, AN/FRC-93, provides the Commander radio to all subordinate detachments. All B Detachments and the 3rd MSFC monitor this net on a 24 hour basis. The staff section of Company A use this extensively to communicate with subordinate detachments. This decreases the volume of teletype traffic. FM Voice is used not only as a back-up for radio teletype and single side band but also as a primary means of communications. Due to the extremely flat terrain in this area it is possible to communicate over much greater distances with FM equipment than is normally anticipated. A radio relay site is located on NUI BA DEN mountain and has proven vital in operations. Through this relay any team in III Corps can communicate with any other. Speech security equipment has been installed and has greatly enhanced the value of FM communications in III Corps.

(b) Training. Company A continues to experience a critical shortage of qualified communications personnel. On-the-job training programs have been initiated at all team levels. At the A detachment, personnel are given cross-training as radio operators. At the B and C teams radio operators are trained in radio teletype procedures.

(c) New Concepts/Equipment. Speech security equipment, the KY-8,TSEC, has been installed at all B Detachments, NUI BA DEN relay, and Co A headquarters. There is also a circuit between the TOC at Co A headquarters and II IFFV TOC. This system is a valuable asset because it can transmit critical information much faster than teletype. However, this system is not fully reliable since the operators are not fully informed about its operation. Extracts have been taken from RAO-10LOC/TSEC (Operating instructions for the TSEC/KY-8 (U)) and will be distributed to all operators. At present Co A is awaiting the arrival of the AN/FRC-77. This is similar to the AN/FRC-25 but is adapted for use with the
KF-38 TSBK which is designed for secure voice at the A Detachment level.

(ii) Miscellaneous. A new fifty-pair cable was installed from III Corps frame to Co A Headquarters. Twenty-five pair are utilized for communications equipment within the Communications Center and the remaining twenty-five are used for the Headquarters and billeting portions of this compound. In the past Co A has experienced numerous problems especially with the TA-236 dial telephone. This cable not only increases the number of circuits but also provides an efficient system of training for the cause of circuit failures. The Company A communications center has been remodeled in order to lessen the possibility of a security violation and to improve the working conditions for the personnel assigned. Prior to this, staff sections sent personnel into the center to pick up and deliver messages. It is now so designed that messages are handled through a small window.

(iii) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Company D).

(a) Operations. Communications systems are adequate for the type and volume of traffic within company D. However, the radio teletype system is inefficient in that all incoming messages have to be retyped to correct errors caused by radio noise interference. This causes a delay in traffic and requires an extra MCS 72B operator to be on duty. Installation of a very High Frequency (VHF) teletype system to B-40 and B-43 will greatly improve efficiency. This system is not affected by radio noise interference and will give correct hard copies, ready for distribution. It has been requested and approved by MACV J-6. IV CTZ is ideally suited for FM radio communications due to the extremely flat terrain. Expansion of Company D FM communications, however, has been limited by the lack of adequate antenna towers. These have been requisitioned and will be installed as soon as possible. This will greatly improve secure voice communications.

(b) Training. Communications personnel from detachment B-4l and A-412 conducted training for VNSF personnel of Camp A-412. The purpose was to give the VNSF the capability to operate and maintain US communications equipment when the camp is transferred. Training concentrated on two areas: Single sideband (FRC-93) tuning and operator maintenance, and HT-11 operator maintenance.

(c) Miscellaneous. A joint decision was made by the US and VNSF signal officers that the installation of a single sideband (FRC-93) radio in the VNSF C-41 comm center would greatly improve the VNSF communications capability. The VNSF High Command net is single sideband. The VNSF at C-4l are now forced to use the US sideband for contacts with High Command. A single sideband radio has been requisitioned.
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Subject: Appropriated Fund Management.

(a) During October managers were appointed within the primary and special staff for the in-country portion of the Operations and Maintenance funding program and out-of-country Procurement of Equipment and Missiles funding program. Funding ceilings have been provided to the program managers for the first and second quarters of Fiscal Year 1969. These funding ceilings will continue to be provided on a quarterly basis. The comptroller will furnish expenditure and obligation data so that progress can be measured against program objectives. The expenditures made for each program within a company will be reduced to expenditure per individual CIDG soldier paid. This will permit horizontal analysis of companies in terms of relative performance as well as in terms of total expenditures, and will allow the Commander to determine objectively each C Detachment Commander's effectiveness in utilizing resources economically. The obligation data in PEMA will be provided to each program manager enabling him to evaluate his position relative to programmed objectives. Each will be required to maintain density reports on existing equipment to determine if supplies and equipment programmed are in fact essential to mission accomplishment. This will establish a system of constant review of program versus objective and provide the Commander timely data on relative position within each program.

(b) The administrative and operational control of the ammunition portion of the obligation authority in PEMA is still a problem. The 1st Log Command in Vietnam, the main supplier of ammunition to the 5th SFGA, does not currently have an effective method for documenting and costing these ammunition issues. The problem is further complicated because the 5th Group is but one of many customers within a principally free issue ammunition system. One solution would be to place 5th SFGA on a non-reimbursable basis for ammunition issued by the 1st Log Command. But this proposal has the disadvantage of eliminating financial management control for ammunition from the Parasol Switchback Funding System. Whether or not there are financial management controls, some timely and accurate method must be implemented for reporting and documenting ammunition issues so that these issues can be properly controlled.

(2) SFGA Cost Reductions. Increasing emphasis is being placed on reducing costs in the 5th SFGA. The Comptroller records and classifies any savings according to budget project code, material category, or expenditure cost code. An inventory of vehicle repair parts was conducted. Excess parts were identified and returned to depot. Savings to date are $154,003.66. All contract administration for engineer projects was centralized under the Group Engineer. Over $100,000 has been saved by this action. A review of all items still on order resulted in substitutions of cancellations which saved $100,000. Cancellations of orders for unneeded signal equipment saved $738,000. Local purchasing of R & U items has been reduced by the development of comprehensive R & U stockage lists for US manufactured items.
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Often these local R & U items were both expensive and inferior. The stockage list has saved 5th SFGA $200,000. Reduction of non-essential civilian personnel produced another saving of $756,000. The United States Army CSO now purchases indigenous rations directly from the item manufacturer instead of from a middleman contractor, as before. This has saved $1,100,000. Total savings to date in FY 65 credited to the Group cost reduction program are $3,638,000.
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2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel.

Port of Embarkation and Debarkation

(a) OBSERVATION. Prior to 1 October 1968 officer and enlisted personnel of 5th SF(GA) had been departing RNW from Saigon. Approximately 90% of all replacements from CONUS had been arriving in-country at Saigon. Such a stop-over there was useless for all personnel assigned to 5th SF(GA) since they had to be processed in and out at Nha Trang, the Headquarters of 5th SF(GA). A study conducted by the Unit Personnel Officer, 5th SF(GA), concluded that 114,000 man days per year could be saved for members of 5th SF(GA) if Cam Ranh Bay was used as the aerial port rather than Saigon. Additional savings would result from the fact that it would no longer be necessary to air move such personnel from Saigon to Nha Trang. Through coordination with GFO-DA and HK, USARV, Special Forces personnel as of 1 October 1968 now arrive and depart RNW at Cam Ranh Bay.

(b) EVALUATION. None.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That higher headquarters program the air movement of all military personnel in and out of RNW according to the criteria that now apply to 5th SF(GA).

b. Operations.

(1) Determine Procedures for MEDEVACS.

(a) OBSERVATION. Criticism has been directed against operational detachments on several occasions when URGENT Medevac requests were submitted for non-battle evacuees.

(b) EVALUATION. It is understood that the establishment of the various precedences for evacuation, URGENT, PRIORITY, and ROUTINE, was devised in order that some system be utilized for the gradation of priorities and to facilitate the dispatch of aircraft to take into account the relative severity of various types of wounds and illnesses. What was not taken into account is the effect of the precedence on the operational capability of the requesting unit. The following example illustrates this problem. On an operation suppose a non-U.S. soldier falls ill but he is in no immediate danger of death. Under current directives an URGENT medevac cannot be submitted. The unit may have to remain in position for 24 hours or longer. This waitin time might allow a hostile unit to fix the friendly's position or prepare ambush sites.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION. That each Medevac request carry two precedence statements (1) as to the condition of the evacuee and (2) as to the effect of operational capability. Thus, in the example above, the precedence would read "Evacuee-Routine, Operational-Urgent". Such a system would provide a clearer picture of the entire situation and would allow for a more efficient and logical evacuation system.

(2) Refugee Return to Own Control. (Co A)

(a) OBSERVATION. Sometimes friendly efforts have not been fully coordinated in the handling of refugees.

(b) EVALUATION. None.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Any program involving the care of refugees must be very carefully planned. Living quarters, food, and clothing must be on hand to distribute to the refugees upon arrival at their new homes. Medics should be present to help the sick. At the same time interrogation teams can gain immediate tactical information.

(3) Air Support. (Co C)

(a) OBSERVATION. During times of increased enemy pressure on a camp, air support for its defense can be requested either by the District or by the "A" Detachment independently through different channels. Such multiple requests can dangerously overcrowd airspace in the area. Even during normal resupply operations, airspace often becomes congested.

(b) EVALUATION. These situations increase the possibilities for mid-air collisions, the bombing of friendly forces, and other accidents.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the VNSF Commander have OPCON of his TAOR with sole authority to clear and coordinate all air activities in this airspace.

(4) Casualties due to Friendly Fire.

(a) OBSERVATION. While a medevac ship was on the ground, it received one small arms round. The ship radioed directly to its gunship support in the air. The latter, without consulting the ground commander, fired into friendly positions and caused several casualties. Similar incidents have happened with FAC's calling in artillery support.

(b) EVALUATION. Needless to say, such incidents gravely damage morale besides inflicting physical losses.
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(c) RECOMMENDATION. All aircraft must be briefed that they are only to fire in support of ground troops upon the decision of the ground troop commander. The latter should also have the final say as to whether artillery fire is too close or not and the FAC should follow his precise instructions.

(5) Casualties from Friendly Fire: Need for Emergency Warning Device.

(a) OBSERVATION. A recent CSF operation was attacked by gunships resulting in 13 CSF WIA, 4 CSF KIA, and 2 USASF WIA.

(b) EVALUATION. This situation occurred through judgement errors of the pilots and those who briefed the pilots. This occurrence, however, points out the need for an emergency signal for friendly troop identification by aircraft.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. One possible solution would be to have ground troops, when they have aircraft in the area whom they cannot contact on the radio, throw smoke or expose marker panels. This would indicate to the aircraft that further checking of the ground troops is necessary since the troops are not attempting to conceal themselves. This system is not a positive one since the VC/NVA may in time learn the system and use it to their advantage, but it should be an indication to the pilots that a double check for ground clearance is necessary.

(6) Moving along Trails.

(a) OBSERVATION. CSF troops have a tendency to move along trails. When they want to eat, they stop right next to the trail. Every individual proceeds to build a fire. After eating, they leave their trash and garbage scattered around the area.

(b) EVALUATION. These habits give away the size and location of friendly units to the enemy, thus increasing the possibilities of ambush and harassing attacks by fire.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Use trails only when movement through the jungles is impossible. When stopping for chow, move off the trail where cooking fires are not likely to be observed. Sterilize camp areas by burning all traces of indigenous ration packets.

(7) Special Requirements for Recon Personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION. U.S. advisor personnel without prior combat experience in Vietnam are being assigned to recon units.

(b) EVALUATION. It is imperative that U.S. advisor personnel so assigned have such prior experience.
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(1) RECOMMENDATION. U.S. advisor personnel assigned to recon units should have a minimum of three months with a combat unit. It is also desirable that these individuals attend the MACV Recondo School.

(2) Use of VR Aircraft and FAC to Detect Previous Enemy Sampan and Foot Traffic. (Co D)

(a) OBSERVATION. Our VR and FAC pilots have discovered they can detect enemy sampan and foot traffic through an inundated area as much as 24 hours after this has occurred. In their movement the enemy leaves a distinct trail, very obvious from an aircraft, by disturbing the water and vegetation. The optimum time for such sightings is at first light before the area is disturbed by civilian traffic.

(b) EVALUATION. None.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

(3) Employment of Airboats During Hours of Darkness. (Co D)

(a) OBSERVATION. We now have a procedure set up for our "A" Camps, to be utilized when the situation warrants, wherein the airboats at "A" Sites will be utilized during the hours of darkness to intercept large sampan movements detected by Delta Black Hawk. The airboats will be employed in conjunction with either Gooney or Firefly aircraft overhead to provide the light and guidance.

(b) EVALUATION. None.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

(4) OPCON of Special Forces. (Co B)

(a) OBSERVATION. For nearly two years US Special Forces have been OPCON to major units working in and around SF camps.

(b) EVALUATION. The fact that USASF are advisors and not commanders makes the OPCON role extremely difficult. On one side is the major US unit commander. He, by virtue of OPCON powers, directs the SF advisor to put operations into certain areas (mostly outside of the camp TAOR). On the other side are the VNSF. They are the commanders and have their own plans for employment of their troops. In addition the VNSF must meet certain requirements given them by Corps ARVN and the major regular ARVN unit in their area. According to the strict definition of OPCON, the VNSF and CIDG are not OPCON, only the US Special Forces; yet the major US unit is supposedly given the authority to direct CIDG operations. If the VNSF do not want to support the
operation, the advisor is placed in a ticklish situation. The result of this is strained relations between the advisor and his counterpart and the advisor and the US unit.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION.** That USASF be released from OPCON of major US commands and revert back to mutual coordination and cooperation.

(ii) **Air Support for Airboat Operations.** (Co A)

(a) **OBSERVATION.** Extensive damage has been caused to airboats when they hit obstructions while traveling at high speeds. Oftentimes these boats will also have a difficult time determining their location.

(b) **EVALUATION.** In order for airboats to be effective, they must travel at high speeds through the tall grass. Naturally, such movement hampers visibility as well as increasing the risk of hitting obstructions.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION.** When airboats are used, especially to cover large areas of unfamiliar terrain, an aircraft should be assigned to help spot hidden obstacles and to give position checks.

(i2) **Stay Behind Force after Contact.** (Co A)

(a) **OBSERVATION.** Frequently the VC after contact will follow a friendly force. At times they have been able to inflict sizeable casualties.

(b) **EVALUATION.** Though the enemy force is usually small, by attacking the rear of a friendly column they are able to harass a much larger one.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION.** Small stay behind forces using good ambush techniques and patrolling procedures can effectively stop enemy units from following the main element.

(i3) **Warning Signs Prior to Attacks on Katum and Thien Ngon.** (Co A)

(a) **OBSERVATION.** Prior to the attacks on these camps, enemy activity increased in the area. There were numerous signs of digging and of new positions being prepared. Aircraft began encountering heavy ground fire. The camps received ground probes and a large number of incoming mortar and rocket rounds.

(b) **EVALUATION.** None.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION.** When there are indications that a camp is going to be attacked all support units should be alerted. If possible, Spooky should be on station during the most critical hours of the night when an attack is likely.
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14 Critiques after Operations. (MACV Recondo)

(a) OBSERVATION. New concepts, techniques and tips of the trade are mostly developed as the result of trial and error. Many of these techniques are taken for granted and are not passed on to other personnel. A critique period was initiated whereby all team advisors presented a recap of the combat operation to include actions taken upon contact.

(b) EVALUATION. This system provides an atmosphere conducive to the free flow of ideas and constructive criticism. It may be utilized to record and develop techniques, indicate weak points, serve as a basis for identifying deeds worthy of recognition, and build the feeling of unity and esprit de corps.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That all units consider the use of a thorough critique after each operation as an important teaching vehicle.

15 Necessity for Adequate Information when Aircraft are Downed. (Co A)

(a) OBSERVATION. While extracting troops, one lift was hit by hostile fire and forced to land. Troops in the remaining aircraft were landed to secure the downed craft. All aircraft, however, then left the area without notifying the ground troops where the downed craft was located. The troops unknowingly moved directly away from it. Not finding it after a two hour search, the troops set up a night defensive position. They were then ordered to move out of this position and told where the craft was. Before they reached it, a recovery had already been made, and so the troops returned to their night position.

(b) EVALUATION. None

(c) RECOMMENDATION. All support aircraft and commanders in aircraft should be briefed on ditching procedures. This should include:

1. General location of friendly troops.

2. Responsibility of the aloft commander to guide the ship down as near as possible to friendlies.

3. Responsibility of any aloft aircraft to notify all ground troops as well as the downed aircraft of the latter's exact location.

4. Request for the closest ground element to move immediately to secure the aircraft.

16 Comparison: McGuire Rig and the New Stabbo Rig. (MACV Recondo)

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(a) OBSERVATION. The McGuire rig was designed because of the need to extract personnel from the double and triple canopy jungle where the ladder or set-down method was impossible. It has been responsible for saving many lives in RVN. However, it does have a number of disadvantages. When mounting the rig, an individual must stand erect and therefore expose himself. He is not free to use his hands to fire his weapon or otherwise protect himself when being dragged through the trees. He may be knocked out of the rig. Moreover, it is almost impossible to use the rig for the extraction of a seriously wounded person.

(b) EVALUATION. Two approaches were possible in designing a new rig. It could be either dropped from an aircraft or carried by the individual. The former has been tried several times before, but too much time was always required for the fastening of various straps and buckles. The latter approach was thought more feasible. A harness was constructed from Type III nylon webbing that utilizes pull-down leg straps for body support and is worn similarly to a parachute harness. Ammo pouches and other load bearing equipment are mounted on the harness which is worn by the individual. Before the arrival of the aircraft, the pull down leg straps are passed between the legs and fastened to the "D" rings mounted on the front of the harness. By using a criss-cross pattern, the belt does not support the body weight and, if necessary, one harness strap alone will support the individual. During extraction a nylon rope tied with a double bowline is lowered from the aircraft. Snap links on the nylon rope are attached to floating "D" rings on the harness shoulder straps. The individual can be either in a prone or kneeling position during hook-up. His hands are free at all times to use his weapon or radio. The time for extraction is greatly shortened. Wounded can also be extracted by this method. If aircrew members were to be provided the basic harness, any helicopter would have the capability of effecting an extraction.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. The new extraction harness, called the STA-BO RIG, should be considered for development and issue to all LRRP personnel and aircrew members.

c. Training.

(1) Quick Kill.

(a) OBSERVATION. Most contacts with the enemy are made at close range while both sides are moving through heavy vegetation. Oftentimes contacts are the result of chance meetings in which both sides are surprised.

(b) EVALUATION. Under such circumstances personnel seldom have the opportunity to get a clear shot.
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(c) RECOMMENDATION. Commanders should stress the "quick-kill" method in engaging the enemy. A few hours of good instruction will give a friendly soldier the needed edge in such encounters.

(2) Sniper Program. (Co B)
(a) OBSERVATION. The enemy will try to move along the treeline whenever possible, especially in the morning and late in the afternoon.
(b) EVALUATION. By traveling this way the enemy can stay close to cover and ready concealment. However, well-trained sniper teams, if placed along such clearings, can inflict casualties on the enemy and seriously curtail such movement.
(c) RECOMMENDATION. Sniper techniques and programs should be developed at all levels.

Intelligence.

(1) Destruction of VC Infrastructure (VCI).
(a) OBSERVATION. In order to defeat the enemy it is not sufficient to destroy only its tactical units. The enemy's underground cells or infrastructure must be neutralized before the enemy is totally defeated. Special Forces teams serving in a dual-role of military and district advisors can play an important part in destroying this infrastructure (VCI).
(b) EVALUATION. The VC infrastructure is the enemy's main source of tactical intelligence and political control. By eliminating the VCI within an area, two objectives are accomplished: One, GVN control of the area is insured; and two, the enemy's source of intelligence is cut off.
(c) RECOMMENDATION. It is recommended that all C Detachments coordinate with the local advisor for the "PHOENIX" program in their respective areas. Both the S2 and S5 should work with the PHOENIX coordinator to establish plans for destroying the VCI. At each camp with a dual advisory role a District Intelligence and Operations Command Center (DIOCC) should be established. This organization would be the nerve center for VCI operations. The DIOCC would be staffed by GVN personnel and advised by a member of the PHOENIX program. Information on VCI targets would come from such sources as the National Police and the Special Forces intelligence nets. Once a target has been identified, plans for removal could be made. There are several sources of manpower available for the execution of these removal plans. These include Police Field Force, Mobile Strike Force, CIDG and FMAF combat units. The ideal situation would be for VSF/CIDG units to secure a village while the Police Field Force went in and apprehended VC suspects.

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(2) Communications Intelligence Support

(a) OBSERVATION. During the battle for CIDG Camp THANG DUG 23 Sep to 11 Oct 68, a two-man advisory team was deployed by the 403d Special Operations Detachment in order to provide communications intelligence support to the camp. The concept of operation was in direct response to operational doctrine outlined in the United States Army Security Agency's ASAT 32-2800 and order of attachment.

(b) EVALUATION. Statistically the 403d SOD furnished about 50 percent of all the reliable intelligence and provided targets for most of the artillery and tactical air strikes during this battle.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. It is recommended that continued emphasis be placed upon deploying 403d SOD elements to all CIDG camps under heavy enemy pressure. Further it is recommended that the 403d SOD Special Intelligence After Action Report of THANG DUG be reviewed at the highest level.

(3) Uniform System for Reporting Captured Prisoners and Materials (B-33)

(a) OBSERVATION. No comprehensive systematic method is used by the subordinate A detachments in reporting necessary information concerning captured enemy prisoners, documents and materials.

(b) EVALUATION. Due to the lack of uniformity in reporting information, incidents arise in which one or more essential elements of information are omitted in the report. In addition, much time and effort is wasted by explanations describing the information, e.g., "Weapons in POW's possession at time of capture: AK-47".

(c) RECOMMENDATION. A format has been published for use by all detachments which sets forth exactly what information is to be entered on each line number of a report. For example, utilizing this format, a report would be submitted with the entry: "Line 6: AK-47." The following format and example will illustrate the effectiveness of this system.

FORMAT:

Subject: POW

Line #1: NVA (VC) NR
Line #2: DTG of capture
Line #3: Coordinates of capture
Line #4: Capturing unit designation and operation number
Line #5: Circumstances of capture
Line #6: Weapon in POW's possession at time of capture

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Line #6: Physical condition of POW at time of capture.
Line #8: Description of clothing and equipment.
Line #9: Additional remarks (Result of initial interrogation or any information not covered by other line numbers).

EXAMPLE:

Line 41: NVA NR 331-P-1
Line 42: 65-100H AB 68
Line 43: XU 721D
Line 44: Loc: Ninh CRP 50
Line 45: POW was found in fox hole during sweep of area subsequent to contact with estimated NVA company.
Line 46: AK-47
Line 47: Well fed, healthy
Line 48: Tan and green khaki, pith helmet, new pistol belt, rucksack, 200 rounds of AK-47 ammunition.
Line 49: Initial interrogation presently being conducted. Results to follow.

(4) Discussion of Unilateral and Bilateral Collection Nets. (S2 Coll Br)

(a) OBSERVATION. An effective intelligence collection net contributes greatly to the overall intelligence program of a unit. Occasionally, however, due to a variety of reasons, the USASF and VNSF intelligence personnel may choose to operate unilateral collection nets without the concurrence or knowledge of the other. This practice engenders suspicion and mistrust between the intelligence personnel and could retard or even defeat one objective of 5th SFG which is to teach the VNSF techniques in intelligence collection.

(b) EVALUATION. A bilateral operation wherein both the VNSF and USASF intelligence personnel work together and are equally knowledgeable of all the assets is most effective. All detachments should strive to establish such operations. However, often due to circumstances beyond one's control, it may be necessary to operate separate unilateral collection nets. Good intelligence can result from such operations but there must be mutual understanding between the USASF and VNSF Case Officers.

(5) Recruitment of Intelligence Agents. (S2/Coll Br)

(a) OBSERVATION. To establish fully operational intelligence collection nets as stipulated in approved operation plans, ambitious agent recruitment efforts have been undertaken by case officers. In a number of instances,
however, a short time after agents have been coded, they have been terminated without prejudice because they were found unsuitable for the job. This quick termination is due to the case officer's failure to conduct proper assessment of potential agents prior to initiating coding action. Such mistakes cause unnecessary administrative burden at all levels of command.

(b) EVALUATION. The spotting, assessment and recruitment of an agent cannot be haphazardly accomplished regardless of the type of agent being sought. During the assessment phase, determination must be made as to the individual's degree of intelligence, access to target, available or necessary cover, and motivation. Recruitment and coding action should be initiated only after there is reason to believe that the individual possesses the necessary attributes to fulfill the needs of the case officer.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

(6) Exploitation of VC Infiltrators.

(a) OBSERVATION. The number of counterintelligence internal nets is greatly increasing in 5th SFOD. These operations will identify enemy infiltrators, saboteurs, and espionage agents on Special Forces installations. Personnel on these installations, however, have been over-reacting to the presence of enemy agents in their camps. Their first response has been to remove the enemy agent as quickly as possible from their compound.

(b) EVALUATION. Removing the enemy agent from the camp would be wasting the intelligence value of that agent. It also informs any other infiltrators that their position is in jeopardy or, possibly, has already been disclosed. The enemy agents will also realize that there is an internal net and that any future operations in that camp should be conducted with this in mind. This may endanger friendly agents in the internal net as enemy agents will try to discover and eliminate them.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. When enemy agents are detected within a camp, overt actions should be taken unless the camp or its personnel are in immediate danger. Identity of the enemy agents should be disseminated on a limited need to know basis only to ensure that the agent does not learn he has been detected. The internal friendly net should be targeted to observe the infiltrator, find out who his friends and associates are, what information he has collected, what his mission is and whether a net operation has been set up by the enemy agents. Procedures for the apprehension and interrogation of the infiltrators should be operational at all times so that implementation can be immediate. At all times camp security should be able to cope with all reactions caused by the detection and/or removal of the agent from the camp.
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(7) Black, Gray, and White Lists.

(a) OBSERVATION. In the past files were not maintained on individuals indicating whether or not they were friendly to the United States or Vietnamese Governments. Thus individuals fired for unreliability by one agency have been able to go elsewhere and be rehired by another agency. Recently, however, efforts have been made to establish and maintain files on friendly, unfriendly, and questionable persons.

(b) EVALUATION. Through the use of internal counterintelligence operations, external collection operations, volunteer informant programs, captured enemy documents, the polygraph program, and POW interrogations, files can be established, identifying various personalities.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Black, Gray, and White List Files should be maintained at all echelons. Information on personalities should be disseminated to various hiring agencies so that individuals identified as questionable or unfriendly will not be hired. Such information can also be useful in apprehending these persons.

(8) Conduct of Physical Surveys.

(a) OBSERVATION.- All "A" and "B" Detachments are required to conduct annually Counterintelligence (CI) Physical Surveys.

(b) EVALUATION. This CI Survey is highly involved and requires at least one week of concentrated effort to complete. Considering the tactical location of many "A" and "B" detachments, they do not have time to conduct these surveys annually. Secondly, this survey is not meant to be a recurring requirement. It is usually conducted at new installations or to those where a drastic change in the physical structure has taken place. Once the survey is completed, it remains valid until there is a change. Finally, CI personnel at these levels are not normally qualified to conduct such surveys unless they are assisted by Provost Marshal personnel who are so qualified.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. CI Physical Surveys should be required only at new units or camps or when a drastic change has taken place in the physical structure of such locations. Existing surveys should be considered valid until changes occur. Furthermore, liaison should be established with local Provost Marshal personnel to determine the possibility of these surveys at "A" and "B" detachments.

(9) Counter-Intelligence Inspections.

(a) OBSERVATION. It has been observed that some sections within 5th SFGR were unaware of provisions of security regulations. This resulted in careless and improper handling of classified materials.
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(b) EVALUATION. A program of announced Counter-intelligence Inspections was implemented by the CI Branch and all units of the Command are now being inspected on a regular basis. Through these inspections, weaknesses and irregularities have been uncovered and corrected. Responsible individuals have been informed about the provisions of security regulations and the necessity for observing them. Unannounced CI Inspections are also being conducted. This procedure serves as an additional reminder of the necessity for safeguarding classified material. These inspections have resulted in a noticeable improvement in the security of the Group.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Counter-intelligence Inspections should be conducted on a continuing basis at all levels of the Command.

10. Special Forces Intelligence Personnel (Go A)

(a) OBSERVATION. Some Special Forces intelligence personnel are not fully trained nor aware of the procedures and techniques required for efficient intelligence collection operations.

(b) EVALUATION. One of the principal missions of Special Forces is the collection of intelligence through agent collection systems and combat operations. It has become apparent in recent months, that the Special Forces enlisted personnel (MGSH IP) being assigned to this command are not sufficiently prepared to perform in the capacity expected of them. Specifically, these personnel have demonstrated weakness in the following areas:

- Agent net organization
- Agent recruiting
- Agent targeting based on EEI
- Agent debriefing based on EEI
- Debriefing of operations
- Agent net administration and records
- Order of battle
- Counter-Intelligence operations

The lack of knowledge in the above areas has seriously affected Special Forces intelligence operations in this Corps Tactical Zone as well as the intelligence advisory effort.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Once a Special Forces intelligence NCO arrives in-country, it is too late to train him. USASWC and USASWS at Fort Bragg, USAINTS, at Fort Meade, and the numbered Special Forces Group should be made aware of this deficiency in an effort to stimulate additional training in the areas mentioned.
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(11) Airborne Personnel Detectors

(a) OBSERVATION. None

(b) EVALUATION. The Airborne Personnel Detector has proven to be an effective tool in intelligence operations in this Corps Tactical Zone. Its use has been of particular value in targeting for air assets or in programming for future operations. In the past, this Company has had to rely on the cooperation or assistance of US Divisions in the CTZ for APD support. While in past cases, this support has been forthcoming, the availability of organic equipment would greatly enhance these operations and add much flexibility to the system.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the Airborne Personnel Detector equipment, either Airborne or man-pack versions, be issued to the Special Forces Company. (Due to limited air assets available, two sets of equipment would be adequate in this CTZ.)

(12) Shakedown of Indigenous Personnel

(a) OBSERVATION. Through a continuous rigorous shakedown program of indigenous personnel upon entering and departing the USASF Compound, numerous chits, cokes, beer, cigarettes, and PIR rations have been recovered.

(b) EVALUATION. None

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None

(13) Security Company Alerts

(a) OBSERVATION. There has been an increase in alerts conducted by the Company's Cambodian Security Company. The alerts are conducted both day and night and are unannounced.

(b) EVALUATION. With the increase in unannounced alerts, there has been a marked increase from an average of 70 percent present for duty to a remarkable 95 percent. When CIDG personnel are aware that unannounced alerts and roll calls will be conducted throughout the week, they have a tendency to remain within the confines of their compound.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None

e. Logistics

(i) Class V Allocation

(a) OBSERVATION. Due to enemy activity and the required rate of use

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During contact, subordinate detachments have run extremely low on their stocks of Class V.

(b) EVALUATION. The allocation of ammunition is programmed one month in advance and therefore cannot take into consideration the enemy situation that develops during the period. Weekly ammc status reports are submitted to the Forward Supply Point. Critical items are redistributed from detachments who have an excessive amount based on the enemy situation. When such redistribution is impractical or stocks are short in all camps, additional support is requested from the logistical support center.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Present allocations will have to be increased if this unit is to remain combat effective.

(2) Air Delivery Problems.

(a) OBSERVATION. Damage to the runways at Camp Thien Ngon and Camp Katum from mortar and rocket attacks limited resupply attempts to the use of the Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System (LAPES). The improper release of the LAPES load from the aircraft caused additional damage to the runway as well as destroying some of the cargo. Due to the weight of the cargo on the platforms, derigging, and the limited amount of time between loads, the removal of the platforms from the runway created another problem. Engineer squads were required from II Field Force to repair the airstrip. Katum can now handle C-23 and C-7A aircraft; however, THIEN NGON can only handle C-7A aircraft. LAPES are still required there when the cargo exceeds the capabilities of the C-7A. Additional time between LAPES sorties was requested from the 834th Air Division so that loads could be removed from the airstrip.

(b) EVALUATION. None.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

(3) Air Cargo and the Necessity for FAC and TAC Air Coverage.

(a) OBSERVATION. The 834th Air Division requires FAC and TAC air to rendezvous with supply aircraft at certain detachments where they feel that the aircraft will be subject to enemy fire.

(b) EVALUATION. Since the time of rendezvous has to be established a day prior to the mission in order for the resupply ship to meet the time-over-target, it is sometimes necessary for the aircraft to remain on the ground for a period of time. This reduces the aircraft flight time, therefore cutting down the resupply missions that could be accomplished.
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(c) RECOMMENDATION. The 834th Air Division has been requested to reduce the requirement for FAC and TAC coverage at the detachments.

(h) Dealings with Vietnamese Contractors (Co B)

(a) OBSERVATION. In dealings with Vietnamese contractors, difficulty has been experienced due to variance in construction requirements and variance in quality between contractors.

(b) EVALUATION. Past contracts have been vaguely drawn up. They have not set high standards of quality or of performance.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS. Additional requirements should be placed in the existing contracts, more clearly defining the construction standards expected of the contractor. Additionally, more clearly defined plans must be provided to the contractor before he can realistically be held to the specifications of the contract. The Staff Engineer officer does have detailed plans which can be made available upon request by either the contractor or the assistant Staff Engineer. Periodic inspection of the construction by the Staff Engineer will determine the quality of work. Furthermore, penalties should be assessed for sub-standard work and rewards given for exceptional work on projects completed before anticipated completion date.

(5) Camp Maintenance (Co B)

(a) OBSERVATION. At a number of camps maintenance of positions and defences has been neglected. In many cases the serious deterioration is the result of neglect.

(b) EVALUATION. Great quantities of sandbags, timber, cement, tin, and other construction materials are now required to correct this situation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Command emphasis is being placed on camp maintenance. Numerous projects are being planned to restore all camps to a satisfactory defensive posture. Periodic inspections will be made by detachment commanders to identify minor maintenance problems as they occur, thereby precluding major rehabilitation projects.

(6) Time Lapse between Requisitioning and Receiving Supplies. (Co A)

(a) OBSERVATION. An inordinate time lapse occurs between date of requisitioning and date of reception of supplies. Weeks stretch into months before an item is received. Sometimes the item is never delivered to the requester.
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(b) EVALUATION. DA Form 2765-1, Request for Issue and Turn-In, is submitted to a supply agency and the request is programmed against the incoming supply of like items. In cases where no shelf or warehouse stock is available to fill the request, a due-out is given the requester.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Supply regulations should be revised to insure periodic review of all requisitions submitted at all levels. When an appropriate time length has elapsed and a review has shown unfilled requisitions, a renewed requirement should be submitted by the supply agency to their higher logistical support unit.

7) Emergency Resupply

(a) OBSERVATION. During emergency resupply of camps under attack, time has been lost in the past rigging items for air drops and determining the priority for resupply.

(b) EVALUATION. After DAK SEANG was attacked on 18 August 1968, loads of Class IV and V materials were pre-rigged and are held for future need.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

8) Operators Maintenance

(a) OBSERVATION. Operators maintenance continues to be a problem at the "A" detachments. Increased support from 1st Log units, however, has improved the total maintenance situation in Company B.

(b) EVALUATION. None.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. As soon as sufficient ECCI personnel are available, Company B will initiate a training program for detachment indigenous mechanics.

9) Emergency Requisitions

(a) OBSERVATION. Sometimes during an emergency, units are forced to request equipment and ammunition which they should have had on hand.

(b) EVALUATION. Units do not keep a close count of equipment and ammunition on hand. Depending on the situation, commanders should, in most cases, be able to anticipate future needs.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS. A commander should insure he has a count of all equipment and ammunition in camp. A frequent check of his requisitions

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should be made and close coordination with his counterpart should be made to anticipate future needs.

(10) **Shortage of Cargo Nets** (Co D)

(a) **OBSERVATION.** Camps that must be resupplied by CH-47 do not always return cargo nets promptly.

(b) **EVALUATION.** Too often the personnel who receive the resupply helicopter fail to secure the nets and return them to the "B" detachment. Nets not secured may be destroyed by CSF policing the LZ.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION.** Commanders must be made fully aware that there is a shortage of nets and the failure to return them may abort a vital resupply mission.

(11) **Accountability for Controlling Equipment and Supplies.** (Co C)

(a) **OBSERVATION.** A large quantity of equipment and supplies shipped throughout the Aerial Port System is either lost, stolen, or otherwise not accounted for.

(b) **EVALUATION.** Cargo losses can be expected when the consignor and consignee do not have close coordination and quick communications. The Air Force handling system whereby E-2's and E-3's sign for supplies with hurried signatures makes it difficult to trace cargo once it has been off-loaded. The frequent change of personnel increases the problem.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION.** A study should be made of the Aerial Port System to determine ways in which the above problems can be corrected. Also, there should be a method of notifying the consignee when his cargo has arrived at an aerial port.

(12) **Resupply of Camps.**

(a) **OBSERVATION.** During the monsoon season or during a prolonged siege it may be difficult or impossible to resupply a camp.

(b) **EVALUATION.** In I Corps a three-week supply of rice, PIRs, mogas, diesel, personnel equipment, and ammunition is maintained at each camp. This reserve proved invaluable during the siege of HA THANH and again at THUONG DUC. The reserve allowed the camp to continue its mission while requesting from the forward supply point only those items it consumed above the normal rate. The reserve also enabled the forward supply point to continue resupplying the other A teams, thus not placing any of the latter in a critical position.
(c) RECOMMENDATION. All A Teams should maintain at least a three week reserve of rice, PIRs, mogas, diesel, personnel clothing and equipment, and ammunition.

(f) Political Warfare

(3) Skits between Classes (Co A)

(a) OBSERVATION. During Motivation and Indoctrination sessions, unless a particularly interesting subject is being presented, the attention of the audience tends to wane after 30 to 60 minutes.

(b) EVALUATION. By presenting a short skit or singing session between classes during such session, the POLWAR team can maintain audience interest.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. A skit or singing session can be presented during the short break between classes. Since most MKI sessions consist of 2 classes, each 1 hour long, only one skit or entertainment period is necessary for a session. If possible, the skits should relate to the subject being presented.

(2) Movies and Classes (Co A)

(a) OBSERVATION. It is often difficult to get troops to attend lectures and then maintain their interest. To overcome this problem, one POLWAR team showed the troops movies with a Payops message. During the break between reels, a member of the team would give a five to ten minutes lecture on a motivation and indoctrination theme.

(b) EVALUATION. The movie reinforced the attitude presented in the lecture while the lecture established a frame of reference for the audience.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.
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(i) VN History and Political Subjects for Dependents (B-52)

(a) OBSERVATION. None

(ii) EVALUATION. The POLWAR Team can help to improve the morale of the CSF by establishing a school. Any building that is available can be used. Supplies for this can be obtained by the S-5. The POLWAR team by teaching VN History and political subjects can help improve nationalist spirit.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

(iv) Camp Loudspeaker System (B-34)

(a) OBSERVATION. A loudspeaker system is being used to convey motivation and indoctrination materials to the Camp Strike Force Soldiers. The speaker is also used for entertainment. Records and songs recorded by the CSF soldiers or by civilian entertainers are played over it. Chieu Hoi speeches are broadcast to any VC/NVA in the immediate area.

(b) EVALUATION. In the past, meetings and rallies had to be used to communicate information to the troops. These have to be planned in advance and are extremely time-consuming. The loudspeaker system is much quicker and more efficient.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. All "A" camps should be authorized funds to purchase and maintain a loudspeaker system.

(v) PSYOPS Coordinating Committee (C-9)

(a) OBSERVATION. In III CTZ, the Provinces have a large number of US and Vietnamese agencies involved in PSY activities. These agencies include Special Forces, JUSPAO, Sector S5, MACCORDS, Vietnamese Information Service, National Police, Armed Propaganda Teams and all military units S5.

(b) EVALUATION. Lack of coordination between these agencies in the PSYOPS field often results in conflicting themes, counter-productive propaganda, duplication of effort and a failure to share resources and lessons learned.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. An effective solution in one province has been for the Senior PSYOPS Agency, which is JUSPAO in III CTZ, to establish a PSYOPS Coordinating Committee. This one agency is responsible for assisting and coordinating all the other agencies on theme development, target audience, target area, and means of dissemination available. The other agencies are responsible for providing feeder reports on plans, projects, and resources available to assist each other. Although no strict chain of command can be
established, an informal PSYOPS committee can reduce duplication of effort, establish relevancy of themes, and share resources.

(6) Pre-Planned PSYOPS Aircraft (C-3)

(a) OBSERVATION. In the past, pre-planned PSYOPS aircraft support has not been used to its fullest potential as an integral part of the PSYOPS program in III CTZ. By using pre-planned aircraft support, a continuous PSYOPS program can be developed.

(b) EVALUATION. Pre-planned PSYOPS aircraft support has proven effective in providing a continuous leaflet and loudspeaker broadcast support system. Pre-planning allows the individual Psy-Operator to coordinate and plan long-range aircraft support. The overall effect is that pre-planned aircraft support allows the Psy-Operator to focus all support possible to maintain the highest media density level.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS. That PSYOPS plans include pre-planned aircraft support whenever possible.

(7) Quick Reaction PSYOPS Aircraft (B-33)

(a) OBSERVATION. Occasionally a PSYOPS opportunity calling for immediate exploitation by leaflets has presented itself. Regular PSYOPS plans have not always been immediately available to exploit the situation. Also, it is desirable sometimes to drop small quantities of leaflets on targets selected from current intelligence reports. However, such missions would not warrant a pre-planned leaflet drop.

(b) EVALUATION. None.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. The detachment work chopper or a visual reconnaissance plane with the pilot's consent can be used for the additional mission of dropping leaflets. Also any aircraft missions over hostile territory can be used for a secondary mission of PSYOPS media dissemination.

(8) New Methods to drop leaflets from Choppers (B-33)

(a) OBSERVATIONS. At Detachment B-33 the work chopper is used as a supplementary means of disseminating both strategic and tactical PSYOPS leaflets. Various methods of dispersal have been used. The hand dispersal method was found unsatisfactory since it results in an erratic dispersion pattern, creates a danger of fouling the rear rotor, and causes leaflets to fly into the door-gunner's position.

(b) EVALUATION. A modified air package was found satisfactory. The
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Method consists of removing the top on a box of leaflets, splitting the sides, and lifting the leaflet stacks. The box is held together until over the target area. Then the entire box is thrown out. The box easily clears the helicopter. Then, due to the rotation, the leaflets spread out for an excellent dispersion.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

(9) Loudspeaker Broadcasts are the final clincher.

(a) OBSERVATION. During the month of August three NVA ralliers were received. All of the ralliers informed us during their debriefing that they had both seen leaflets and heard tapes. During the attacks on LOC N2NH Special Forces Camp over 30 hours of special tapes had been used. The themes of these tapes included facts contradicting the propaganda received by the NVA unit prior to infiltrating into South Vietnam; information on the Chieu Hoi program; facts on enemy losses; and an appeal to surrender under the threat of continued airstrikes and bombing. The NVA ralliers all indicated that the final decision to Chieu Hoi was based on listening to these tapes.

(b) EVALUATION. If sufficient military pressure can be applied against the enemy to add credibility and meaning to a PSYOPS theme, then loudspeaker broadcasts of tapes tailored for the target audience are the most effective means of communication. Although leaflets may have some effect, the use of loudspeaker broadcasts in these three cases was determined to be the deciding factor in convincing the individuals to rally.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

(10) List Names of enemy at leaflets

(a) OBSERVATION. In late August a member of a local force V/NI unit surrendered to Province under the Chieu Hoi program. A special leaflet was prepared appealing by name to the remaining nine members of his squad to surrender. In early September a second member of the same unit surrendered with the leaflet in his possession. Another quick reaction leaflet was disseminated showing both Hoi Chanhs and containing another personal appeal. A week later a third member of the unit surrendered bringing with him the latest leaflet.

(b) EVALUATION. None.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Whenever possible a tactical leaflet should be prepared with an appeal listing the names of known members of the unit. This information can be obtained from either a Hoi Chanh or POW.

(11) Chieu Hoi instructions on leaflets

(a) OBSERVATION. There have been frequent reports from Hoi Chanhs, POW's and agents that an individual or group wanted to surrender under the Chieu Hoi Program but didn't know how or where. A special leaflet was designed giving instructions and a map for each detachment area.
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(b) EVALUATION. None.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

(12) Disseminating Information on Hoi Chanhs.

(a) OBSERVATION. (C) Due to the fundamentally aggressive nature of the GSFs mission and the ethnic composition of certain CSF and MSF companies, Hoi Chanhs tend to rally to GVN outposts and other fixed allied installations in I CTZ. They are then processed through channels and removed from USASF/VNSF.

(b) EVALUATION. (C) An assessment of the effectiveness of psychological themes and campaigns is seriously impaired when the results of these programs are not known.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. (C) That all commands receiving Hoi Chanhs inform all other commands whose TAOR's the Hoi Chanh passed through of the results of the psychological and political interrogation.

CIVIC ACTION

(a) Storehousing Supplies

(a) OBSERVATION. In the past, an A Detachment had to wait up to 1½ months before receiving any requested S5 supplies, due to the many Headquarters that must process the request. By establishing a warehouse and stocking an adequate level of supplies, Company A has been able to reduce this reaction time to between 2 and 6 days in most cases. When the Company receives a request from subordinate detachments, the items requested are immediately issued, then items are requisitioned to re-stock the warehouse. As long as adequate levels of supplies are maintained, this system functions smoothly and efficiently.

(b) EVALUATION. Maintaining adequate supplies on hand to provide quick reaction support to the B Detachments increases the timeliness and effectiveness of the Company CA program.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Each C and B Detachment S5 should be authorized and encouraged to maintain a one or two month level of supplies to support their subordinate detachments. The vast majority of the supplies are utilized at a Detachment Level. Supplies should therefore be available on short notice to meet the changing situations that occur at that level. (All C & B Teams are now required to keep warehoused one month's supplies for their subordinate detachments).

(11b) C.A. Projects for CIDG Dependents

(a) OBSERVATION. On numerous occasions in the past, ambitious CAPO Officers would begin projects or programs near their camps that aided and benefited the local civilians. On several occasions these projects did not include the CIDG dependents.
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(c) EVALUATION. Since the CIDG are supported by Special Forces and required to fight under their guidance, it is important that we retain their respect and maintain their loyalty and morale. The CIDG expect to live just as well as the civilians in their area. It is important that their dependents be included in any CA/POLWAR program that benefits the local civilians.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. When planning CA/POLWAR projects or programs, always include the CIDG dependents.

(E) Effective C.A. Planning (31 MBF)

(a) OBSERVATION. It has been found that frequently the largest and best planned Civic Action Projects have had negative results, failed to overcome apathy, or at least failed to create enthusiasm.

(b) EVALUATION. None.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. More effective Civic Action Projects have been produced by following these guidelines.

For your initial project in an area, choose a project that the people want, even if a more practical project is needed.

Short term projects, where the people can readily and quickly see the end results, are necessary before enthusiasm and confidence can be created for a long range project.

Use self-help projects whenever possible. It may take longer to complete the project but the people will appreciate the end result more, and they will recognize many other projects they can perform themselves where only a minimum amount of material for support is required.

Never distribute commodities without having the appropriate government official present. Your presence will speak for itself, and his support may prove invaluable at a later date.

(16) Using Indigenous Rations in CA Projects. (K-23)

(a) OBSERVATION. At one of the camps dehydrated foods, i.e., cottage cheese, prunes, and potatoes, were distributed to the CSF and their dependents. They were given verbal instructions on how to reconstitute the dehydrated foodstuffs. The next day two CSF reported on sick call with cases of diarrhea which resulted from overeating the prunes. Another CSF reported with a swollen belly and dehydration. He had eaten a large quantity of dehydrated potatoes without reconstituting them, then he drank large quantities of water to quench his thirst, making it necessary to give him intravenous fluids.
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(5) EVALUATION. None.

(6) RECOMMENDATION. When distributing Civic Action Commodities to local personnel, a demonstration should be presented in addition to verbal instructions. Also, a rationing system would be effective in minimizing overuse of the foodstuff.

(7) Planning MEDCAP's.

(a) OBSERVATION. The distribution of CA commodities during the MEDCAP's can either be a success or a free-for-all, depending upon the foresight of the individual in charge.

(b) EVALUATION. None.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. A great amount of aggravation on the part of military personnel and people involved in MEDCAP's can be avoided if sufficient prior planning is made for the orderly distribution of CA commodities.

(17) CIDG Medical Care

Background. The CIDG Hospital is composed of two (2) 60 bed wards with an additional area where a GP medium tent can be erected which would hold another 20 patients. The hospital has two (2) operating rooms, a combination laboratory and X-ray facility, Mess Hall, and supporting activities. It handles emergency, medical, and surgical patients. Normally the daily census averages eighty (80) patients; 60% of these are surgical in nature. During the past two (2) months there has been an upward trend with the hospital averaging 70 to 75 patients. At the end of his stay the patient either returns to active duty, or goes on limited duty, or receives a CIDG discharge with compensation. Patients with long term diseases, eg. tuberculosis, are discharged and treatment is continued in government sanatoriums at a cost of 80$/per day for a period not to exceed one year. Patients with a non-service connected disability are discharged without compensation. Patients requiring prosthetic devices are referred to the National Rehabilitation Hospital for necessary brace prosthetic work before discharge. The addition of the 60 bed Convalescent Care Hospital at LONG BAY has provided a facility for long term care of disabled patients. This has resulted in an increase in usable "Acute" bed space in the CIDG hospital, TIC HCA. The medical officer makes frequent visits to the Convalescent Hospital to provide medical follow up for in-patients.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the reporting period the Medical Section, Company A, established a Forward Mobile Hospital at TAY NINH to help alleviate some of the problems we have had in past operations in that area. Personnel included one (1) MG, one (1) MSC, and one (1) medic from the C-Detachment, the 3rd Mobile Strike Force Command, and B-32 (TAY NINH). Vietnamese SF medics from B-32 and
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for Period Ending 31 October 1968. RCS CSFOR-65 (K) (U)

CSF medics and nurses from 3rd Mobile Strike Force Command also were used.

(c) EVALUATION. The section's mission was to provide direct medical support for a three (3) Battalion operation in War Zone C during the periods 25 Sep 1968 to 21 Oct 1968. Priority was given to treatment of casualties with referral of the more seriously wounded to the CIDG Hospital BIEN HOA and, when necessary to the 45th Surgical Hospital, TAY NINH. Lightly wounded patients were then treated on site before transfer to BIEN HOA. During the operational period 25 Sep 1968 to 25 Oct 1968 this facility handled over 350 patients and performed more than 200 minor debridements. Only one (1) CSF died of wounds after reaching this treatment facility. 190 patients were transferred to the BIEN HOA CIDG hospital. During the same time Camp KATUM (A-322) and camp THIEN NGOC (A-323) came under heavy ground attack adding to the number of personnel treated at the Forward Mobile Hospital. The final benefits realized from the establishment of a Forward Mobile Hospital are: a "dead of wounds" ratio lower than ever encountered before in operations of equal size; less crowding of US Medical facilities; and the capability of providing front line medical care during a larger than battalion sized operation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. This system should be utilized for all operations involving more than one battalion. Necessary supplies should be prepackaged for immediate deployment and operation of a Forward Mobile Hospital at any A or B Detachment in III CTZ.

(i9) OJT Medical Training.

(a) OBSERVATION. Presently we have an OJT program for Camp Strike Force personnel and civilian nurses employed by A and B Detachments. In the past two (2) months the training period has been increased from two (2) to four (4) weeks. Also a medical training program for VNSF is being conducted. Recently 15 Camp Strike Force personnel were sent to this location for training, with emphasis being placed on Oral Hygiene and Dental Surgery.

(b) EVALUATION. At the end of each training period they are tested and evaluated by the VNSF and USASF medical personnel. During these visits their progress is checked. The experience gained through training and practical application enables them to maintain a high degree of proficiency. This greatly reduces routine medical visits to the CIDG Hospital C-3.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Continuation and expansion of present training program.

(26) Planning for Vietnamese Holiday.

(a) OBSERVATION. None.

(b) EVALUATION. When planning the celebration of a Vietnamese Holiday in

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conjunction with Civic Action/Psychological Operations, maximum effect can be 
reaped only by close cooperation with Vietnamese counterparts to determine local 
customs and traditions.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Advisors should insure complete understanding between 
themselves and their counterparts when planning for the celebration of a Vietnamese 
holiday.

(21) Planning for Refugee Emergencies.

(a) OBSERVATION. When USAF/VNSF camps come under siege in populated areas, 
major refugee problems result. The agencies responsible for refugee relief, out- 
side of USAF/VNSF channels, have difficulty keeping abreast of the situation 
and taking advantage of all available resources, including the USAF/VNSF. This 
command instituted the procedure of dispatching a Liaison Officer to major GVN/ 
MACV/CORDS provincial headquarters during recent operations at Det A-109.

(b) EVALUATION. Close coordination is necessary to effect efficient, 
economical, and timely refugee assistance, and to avoid duplication of effort.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That at the earliest possible moment, liaison be 
established with all interested units and parties.

(a) Veterinary Successes.

(a) OBSERVATION. An outbreak of epidemic Hemorrhagic Fever Z. 101 in 
the B-33 area during September was responded to and controlled by the Veterinary 
Section, 5th SFG (Abn).

(b) EVALUATION. This contributed greatly to S-5 work in the area.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None
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25 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

i. Organization. None

ii. Other.

COMMUNICATIONS

(1) Administrative Air/Ground Frequency.

(a) OBSERVATION. The common frequency, compatible with both old and new family FM radios, was used in the Company Command net for administrative and tactical traffic in 3 CORPS. This was done to insure A-Detachments of reliable air/ground communications even with aircraft possessing only old family radio capability.

(b) EVALUATION. This common administrative and tactical frequency proved extremely inadequate because if an "A" camp or patrol were in contact, normal traffic from other detachments interfered with the tactical air support coordination between the unit in contact and the Forward Air Controller (FAC).

(c) RECOMMENDATION. An (A-1) P12-D5G aircraft with the ARC-144 radio and any other aircraft with the old family of FM radios should be modified so that they have a new family capability. The following is one temporary method of doing this. The two audio and two transmit lines from a PRC-25 tactical manpack FM radio are soldered to the appropriate pins on an ARC-144 7 pin plug and this connector is then inserted into the ARC-144 receptacle in the mount under the co-pilot's seat. With this set-up the pilot still retains all the ARC-144's capabilities of continuous monitoring, keying from the stick, etc. In addition he will have the increased frequency capability. The PRC-25 is placed to the left of the pilot's seat for easy access and a short antenna cable is attached to the ARC-144 antenna for complete compatibility.

(2) Total Communications.

(a) OBSERVATION. For total communications, the ideal situation would be to have direct FM capability from the A-Detachment to the most distant "A" detachments. At the present time, distant FM communications are limited to manual relay.

(b) EVALUATION. In most instances, direct FM communications can be accomplished by placing an automatic retransmission station between the A-Detachment and the distant camps. The retransmission box used in providing this capability, however, is an optional item and is in short supply.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Until the FM retransmission box is available through normal supply channels, an apparatus can be fabricated by fitting two audio connectors to the ends of a three foot length of four-wire cable and plugging them into the retransmit R/W receptacles on the front of two separate RT-524s. This makes automatic retransmission possible and insures that both radios are in the new equipment position.

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15 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for Period Ending 31 October 1968. RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(i) Administrative Air/Ground Frequency.

(a) OBSERVATION. At one time we operated on a single administrative air/ground frequency common to all A detachments for both admin and tactical traffic in our I Corps FM Net.

(b) EVALUATION. This proved extremely inadequate because, if a camp control were in contact, normal traffic interfered with much needed tactical air support.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. With the increased frequency, range, and channelization of the new family of radios, each detachment can now use a separate air/ground frequency in addition to a common administrative frequency. This common frequency is compatible with the old family of FM radios, thus insuring air/ground communications between all camps and those aircraft having unmodified radio systems.

(ii) Problems with the Libby 10KW Generator.

(a) OBSERVATION. Trouble shooting on the Libby 10KW generator revealed that internal parts of the fuel injector pump were rusted and clogged and the distributor plates were bent.

(b) EVALUATION. Water and dirt in the fuel caused the fuel injector pump to rust and clog and distributor plates to bend. A factory defect, however, could also have been the cause.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Further tests should be conducted to determine whether bad fuel or a factory defect is causing the malfunctions in the fuel injector pump.

MEDICAL

(iii) Need for Medical Literature.

(a) OBSERVATION. During formal instructions the students miss many of the important points of a lesson because of the interpreter's unfamiliarity with medical terms and the absence of an English/Vietnamese medical dictionary.

(b) EVALUATION. The civilians presently working as male nurses in the camp's dispensary are very interested in advancing their knowledge in the medical field. However, this is very difficult without any medical literature. These nurses are an asset to the camp since they assist in the treatment of CSF troops and numerous civilians from nearby villages who come daily to the dispensary.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Medical reading material should be provided to assist interested individuals in the study of medical terms in both the Vietnamese and English languages.
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15 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for Period Ending 31 October 1968. RCS CSFOR-65 (RL) (U)

7) Emergency Lighting. (Co B)

(a) OBSERVATION. In the combat medical bunker at this location, it was found that when the generators were shut off for a simulated power failure flash lights and kerosene lanterns did not provide adequate light to conduct medical treatment and emergency minor surgery.

(b) EVALUATION. Note.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. A jeep headlight was mounted in a simple wooden frame and then attached to the ceiling. The frame was constructed to allow the light to be turned on or faced in any direction. Wires, with a switch, were then run across the ceiling and down the wall, where they were connected to a battery (two twelve volt types). Not only did this provide sufficient lighting, but also it furnished an ideal "hot spot" for moments of minor surgery.

8) Camp Sanitation. (Co B)

(a) OBSERVATION. Reports from the Combat Readiness Team and visits by the Company B Staff Surgeon and Preventive Medicine specialist have revealed that the primary medical problem in the A-1 is sanitation.

(b) EVALUATION. One preventive medicine specialist is authorized in each "B" detachment and two are authorized in the Medical Operations Section at the "C" detachment. At this time only two preventive medicine specialists are either assigned or attached to all of Company B. Time and distance factors make it impossible for them to support all the "A" detachments in Company B. Until the "B" detachments are properly staffed with preventive medicine specialists, many "A" detachments will continue to have problems with camp sanitation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Additional preventive medicine specialists should be requested from USARV so that all B detachments can be staffed.

AVIATION

9) Use of Special Forces Airstrips by other FWMAP Units. (Aviation Office)

(a) OBSERVATION. When FWMAP units decide to use a Special Forces airstrip for a forward operations base, the large influx of personnel, equipment and aircraft frequently causes confusion which interrupts logistical support and, sometimes, physically damages the airstrip.

(b) EVALUATION. The "A" team commander at an airstrip where his camp is the principle user is also the airfield commander. Much has been done recently to educate the "A" and "B" team commander concerning his responsibilities as airfield commander in ground traffic control, polices of runways and ramps, and minor repair and maintenance of runways. When a FWMAP unit moves in to use the field as an

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FCR, the necessary field maintenance exceeds the capability of the airfield commander who has no personnel or equipment for the job. Unless the tactical unit assists by organizing the area and controlling air and ground traffic, a hazardous situation results. On one occasion uncontrolled helicopter traffic became so dangerous it interfered with air-land resupply operations. On another occasion helicopters hovering over and near a membrane runway caused it to tear and the field had to be closed until engineers could repair it. Vehicles running across the runway often cause ruts which adversely affect the serviceability of the field. Once an artillery unit set up firing positions on the end of the runway rendering a portion of the field unusable. Litter from "C" rations, ammo boxes, etc., have occasionally been left behind for the CIDG to police up.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. The organization and control of an airstrip being used for an FOB should be given more consideration and emphasis in the planning and execution of operations. The units using the airstrip should be required to furnish personnel and equipment needed to control effectively air and ground traffic. An aviation representative, preferably a safety officer, should help with the physical layout of the FOB.

(10) Need for Tactical Airlift. (Aviation Office)

(a) OBSERVATION. Special Forces "C" and "E" detachment commanders are having difficulty adequately supervising their subordinate units because the latter are spread out at isolated locations and air transportation is often not available. Moreover, if the capabilities of the Mobile Strike Force are to be fully exploited, tactical airlift is required. Rotary wing logistical airlift in IV CTZ for Company D weekly falls about 10 CH-47 sorties short of our needs.

(b) EVALUATION. See 5th SFGA Army Aviation Support Staff Study at Incl 13.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Aviation support recommended by the study should be provided to 5th SFGA.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RGS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

6.Incl.-Inclosures 2, 3 & 6 thru 14 w/d, See Table-of-Contents

HAROLD R. AARON
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

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1. CINCPAC (ATTN: J3 Special Operations) APO 96620
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1. SWC Combat Dev., Ft Bragg, N.C., 28507
1. CG, RYUKYU Island, APO 96558
1. CG, CONARC, Ft Monroe, Va., 23351
1. Research Analysis CoAF, McLean, Va., 22101
1. CO, 1st SFOD, 1st SF, APO 96312
1. CO, 6th SFOD, 1st SF APO 96517
1. CO, 10th SFOD, 1st SF, APO 96516
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1. CO, 30th SFOD, 1st SF, APO 96126
1. CO, 40th SFOD, 1st SF, APO 96130
1. Co D, 4th SFOD, 1st SF APO 96618
1. CMD In Det, 5th SFOD, 1st SF APO 96643
1. US Army CSSO APO 96108
1. CO, USARV, ATTN: NR, APO 96237

25 November 1968
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AVIPOC-DSI (15 Nov 68) Ist Ind (C)

SUBJECT: Operational Report for 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for Period Ending 31 October 1968. CSFOP-65 (r1)(U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES Army, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 8 JAN 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: SPOP-DT, APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne).

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (U) Reference item concerning port of embarkation and debarkation, page 54, paragraph 2a. Concur in the recommendation.

b. (C) Reference item concerning procedures for MEDDEVACS, page 94, paragraph 2b(1). Nonconcur; paragraph 3b, USAV REG 40-10, provides for an additional statement regarding tactical urgency with routine/priority patient evacuation requests. The regulation further cautions commanders not to use this procedure solely for the purpose of clearing priority and routine patients from their areas of operation when the tactical situation does not require their immediate evacuation.

c. (C) Reference item concerning comparison: McGuire Rig and the new Stabba Rig, page 99, paragraph 2b(16). Concur in recommendation that the new extraction harness (Stabba Rig) be considered for issue to all LLP personnel. An RSUS request for the rig has been received by this headquarters.

d. (U) Reference item concerning conduct of Physical Surveys, page 105, paragraph 2d(8). There is no USAV regulation that requires an annual CI Survey as stated in the referenced paragraph.

e. (U) Reference item concerning SF intelligence personnel, page 106, paragraph 2d(10). Concur in the recommendation. This is a matter of concern for higher headquarters.

f. (C) Reference item concerning airborne personnel detectors, page 107, paragraph 2d(11). Concur. The 5th SFG presently has eight modified Personnel Detectors. Beginning in February 1969, new A&D Airborne Detectors (APD) will start arriving in SVN. The proposed basis of issue for the incoming APD's provides four for the 5th SFG. This distribution will all one APD per SF company. 126
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7. (C) Reference item concerning class V allocations, page 107, paragraph 2a(1). Nonconcur. USAFE Reg 700-7 provides the procedure for units to request additional ammunition. HQ USAFE has not been advised by the 5th SFM of any recent requirement for increased ammunition allocation.

8. (C) Reference item concerning time lapse between requisitioning and receiving supplies, page 109, paragraph 2a(6). Concur. Current regulations provide for periodic reconciliations of due-outs between supply activities and customers at all levels. Corrective action is being taken by the 1st Logistical Command to reduce this time lapse. (These comments apply to requisitions submitted against the USAFE supply system only as this headquarters has no control over requisitions submitted through counter-insurgency support office (CISO) channels.)

9. (C) Reference item concerning accountability for controlling equipment and supplies, page 111, paragraph 2a(11). Nonconcur. Procedures now in effect as required by MILSTAMP, MACV Air 55-4, and 834th Air Div Manual 76-1 are sufficient to provide accountability and control over cargo moving through the aerial port system.

10. (U) Reference item concerning administrative air/ground frequency, page 121, paragraph 2h(1). The changing of radios does not solve the problem of having one common administrative and tactical frequency. Additional frequencies solved the problem as indicated in item concerning administrative air/ground frequency, page 122, paragraph 2h(3). All AIC-44 radios are being replaced by the AIC-24 or AIC-131 radios under a systematic retrofit program. The temporary substitution of the AN/PRC-25 radio for the AIC-44 radio is a practical solution.

11. (U) Reference item concerning total communications, page 121, paragraph 2h(2). A sufficient supply of AN/VRC-49 radios and C-22 control boxes for FM retransmission should be available by March 1969. The fabrication of four-wire cable for temporary use with RT-524 radios for FM retransmission is a practical solution.

12. (C) Reference item concerning a need for medical literature, page 122, paragraph 2h(5). Concur. This headquarters has initiated action to procure medical training film (with dubbed in Vietnamese language) and medical literature to support this or comparable medical training programs. The Surgeon, 5th Special Forces Group, has been advised of this action.
AVHGC-DST (15 Nov 68) 1st Ind (C)

SUBJECT: Operational Report for 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for Period Ending 31 October 1968. HCS CSFOR-65 (R1\(U))

m. (C) Reference item concerning need for tactical airlift, page 124, paragraph 2h(10). Nonconcurs. Any additional airlift support for the 5th Special Forces Group could be obtained only by reducing support provided other forces. The current support arrangements are responsive to established priorities in order to effect the most efficient utilization of available assets.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. ARNZ

CPT, AG
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy: Chain:
HQ 5th SFG
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GPOP-DT (15 Nov 68) 2d Ind (C)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 5th Special Forces Gp (Abn) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed.

2. (C) The following additional comments pertain to paragraphs indicated:

   a. Reference item concerning Destruction of VC Infrastructure (VCI), page 101, paragraph 2d(1). In addition to coordination with the District Intelligence Operations Command Center (DIOCC), recommend liaison with Census Grievance (CG) personnel, Revolutionary Development Cadre (RDC) and Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU); operating against the VCI. Although these organizations are required to report to the DIOCC, experience has shown that professional jealousy and lack of communication and training often preclude full dissemination of VCI information.

   b. Reference item concerning black, gray, and white lists, page 105, paragraph 2d(7). Concur in the recommendation. Suggest close coordination with District Intelligence Operations Command Center (DIOCC), Sector Intelligence Operations Command Center (SIOCC) and National Police in preparing lists since these agencies have organic capabilities and responsibilities for operations of this type.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHOFIT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

Cy furn:
CG USARV

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1. (C) Missions:

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2. (C) Contacts:

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b. VC attacks on installations and convoys:

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c. Incidents:

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3. (C) Confirmed VC Losses:

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b. CPTR

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c. Quarterly Comparison of Confirmed VC Losses Country-wide:

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4. (C) USASF Losses:

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b. WIA

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c. MIA

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Incl 5 to 5th SPGA ORLL for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968.

135°
### STATISTICAL DATA (CONT)

#### d. Quarterly comparison of USASF casualties country-wide:

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5. (C) VNSF Losses:

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CTZ</td>
<td>CTZ</td>
<td>CTZ</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. KIA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. WIA</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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#### Quarterly comparison of VNSF casualties country-wide:

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<tr>
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<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4th Quarter 67</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Quarter 68</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Quarter 68</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>41</td>
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<td>3rd Quarter 68</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>35</td>
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6. (C) CIDG Losses

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<tr>
<td>a. KIA</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>461</td>
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<td>b. WIA</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>531</td>
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<td>c. MIA</td>
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#### Quarterly comparison of CIDG casualties country-wide

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<td>104</td>
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<td>430</td>
<td>1477</td>
<td>237</td>
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<td>1668</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>2274</td>
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<td>1409</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1899</td>
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7. (C) RF/PF Losses:

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<th>MIA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td>a. KIA</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>37</td>
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<td>b. WIA</td>
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#### Quarterly comparison of RF/PF casualties country-wide

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<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4th Quarter 67</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Quarter 68</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>340</td>
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<td>2nd Quarter 68</td>
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<td>200</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>312</td>
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8. (C) Weapons

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Enemy Weapons Lost</th>
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<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>179</td>
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<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>397</td>
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<tr>
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<td>95</td>
<td>273</td>
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<tr>
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<td>32</td>
<td>226</td>
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CONFIDENTIAL
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 68

CO, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces