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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

AGAN-P (M) (28 Feb 69) FOR OT-UT-684445

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 29th General Support Group - Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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29th General Support Group
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Oct 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R-1) (U)

THRU: Commanding General
US Army Support Command, Saigon
ATTN: AVCA SGN GO S
APO 96491

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

SECTION I
OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

A. COMMAND

1. (U) During the 92 day period, the 29th General Support Group continued operations as a major subordinate command of the US Army Support Command, Saigon, providing broad and varied logistics support to US Army and Free World Military Assistance Forces—primarily in the III Corps Tactical Zone—in addition to general support maintenance, classification and evacuation services for both III and IV Corps Tactical Zones. General support of fire control instruments was provided for forces throughout the Republic of Vietnam and several maintenance contracts for generators and other non-standard items of equipment were administered. The Group Headquarters continued to exercise tactical responsibility for defense of the eastern perimeter of Long Binh Post, including approximately 15 kilometers of defensive positions and communications.

2. (C) Principal organizations supported logistically were the 1st, 9th, 25th and Thai Infantry Divisions, one brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, (which was replaced by a Bde of the 82nd Airborne Division), the 199th Inf Bde, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and various other combat and combat support units including the 23rd and 54th Artillery Groups, the 79th and 159th Engineer Groups, such elements as the 10th MP Brigade (-), the 1st Signal Brigade (-), the 1st Aviation Brigade (-), the 14th Medical Brigade (-), the 5th Special Forces (-) as well as major logistical organizations including the 4th Transportation Command (TML), the US Army Depot, Long Binh, the 48th Transportation

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Group and the 64th Quartermaster Battalion (O-2). In addition, the Group provided organizational maintenance in support of some 59 units and over 500 vehicles operated in the SIVI area while providing field maintenance support to the US Embassy, Headquarters, 25th Division; Headquarters, USARV; Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command; and Headquarters, 1st Support Command, Saigon.

3. (U) During the period of this report, the 29th Group finalized its reorganization from a functional to a composite logistics organization. By 31 October, the Group contained six composite direct support battalions (two of them provisional), a General Support Maintenance BN, and an Ammunition BN. Five battalions supported divisional and non-divisional forces in different geographic areas (1st Division, 25th Division: Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force, Capital Military Assistance Command, and Long Binh Post), and one supports major non-divisional tactical areas on a non-geographic basis. The general support maintenance battalion was being directed of all direct support maintenance responsibilities and of its retrograde mission. (The retrograde mission was transferred to the 35th Army Dep't, Long Binh on 31 Oct). There was no basic change in the Ammunition Battalion organization. By 31 October all battalion headquarters had manageable numbers of units under their control and some improvements were apparent in administration, morale, discipline, operational supervision and in relations with customer units. Personnel strength continued to drop, however, across the board, and this was reflected in all aspects of the operation.

4. (U) The most significant areas with respect to concern attention were artillery maintenance for the two field artillery groups (deadlines remained under 2%, bulldozers and dump trucks for the two engineer groups (deadlines 15% and 12% respectively), which were engaged in extensive land clearing, construction and road maintenance operations, and tanks and armored personnel carriers for the vital-running 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (deadlines 15% and 5%). Parallel problems with respect to direct support units involved rough-terrain and commercial forklifts (deadlines 20% and 21%), cranes (deadline 26%) and 5 ton trucks (deadline 15%).

5. (U) Deadline rates, in general, were much lower than the previous quarter due primarily to increased overall demand. Overall workload of the 29th General Support Group steadily increased in the year as personnel strength diminished.

a. The workload in Lao is directly correlated to the critical supply situation. Current priorities are: (a) tire filling, welding, spark plugs, repair kits for many direct support items, engines for 1 1/2, 3/4, 2 1/2 and 5 tons, clutch plates and drums, brake linings and radiators were usually at zero balance. In some instances, contracting difficulties in CONUS caused these shortages. Currently, some engines, clutch plates and batteries are beginning to trickle in. Should repair parts suddenly break loose, manpower would become the limiting factor. The 29th GP Group is currently short 691 of its 1249 authorized mechanics. Of particular concern is the high 5-ton truck and tractor deadline (28%) within the 48th Transportation Group and 64th Quartermaster Battalion. Both have long-term transportation missions and requirements

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INCL 2

are closely pressing. Truck availability. The principal problem here has been non-availability of parts, particularly engines. Workload created by these longhaul units is exceptionally high. The 48th Transportation Group has 422, 5-ton trucks and tractors. During the period 1-31 October, 295 trucks and tractors of the 48th TG Gp required field maintenance. Fluristically speaking, the entire density of the Group passes through field maintenance in something less than once every two months. This high failure rate is due to a number of factors including high mileage vehicles, inexperienced operators and organizational mechanics and hard usage on unimproved roads under tropical conditions. Emphasis has been placed upon providing technical assistance at the operator/organizational maintenance level and upon expediting the parts and assemblies required for repair of these vehicles.

b. Major emphasis has also been put upon organizational and support maintenance organization and procedures, beginning with an intense effort to obtain more precise equipment density information. A letter from the CO, 29th Group, was dispatched to all major customer units commanders soliciting their cooperation, but accurate and timely data from battalion and company-size customer units is still difficult to obtain. With a vehicle density in excess of 30,000 and hundreds of thousands of other equipment items, this will be a recurring problem requiring command attention and support at the USARV level.

c. During the period, the general support program for the remainder of FY 69 underwent a major revision. Revision became necessary due to repair cart shortages, lack of personnel resources, the requirement to accelerate the ½-ton cannibalization and overhaul of associated components exclusively in-country, and the increasing field maintenance repair mission of vehicle park assets. Based upon the needs of the command and assets available, programmed assembly overhaul for ½-ton trucks was tripled while overhaul of 5-ton multifuel and 3/4-ton engines was proportionately reduced. Transmissions, transfers, axles and differentials were deleted from the program for all vehicles except the ½-ton. Vehicular on and items were all deleted from the program. The sporadic nature of requirements for vehicles does not lend itself to programming. End-item repair will be continued as required upon a work order basis.

6. (U) Problems in the area of services were aggravated by aging bakery equipment and parts problems with Edel laundry machines.

7. (U) During this period, attention shifted from quantity to quality in retrograde of materiel. After reaching a peak of 11,332 short tons evacuated through the 218th CCOR Co during June, more stringent shipping standards imposed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and greater efforts to preserve and safeguard materiel in transit slowed the flow through Long Binh. Later in the period, there was a halt in the free-flow of equipment to Newport due to a lack of ships and improvements being made in that port facility. This resulted in a buildup in the backlog at Long Binh to over 3200 tons by the end of October. During this period, however, approximately 1400 tons were recovered from Tay Ninh despite increased enemy activity along the convoy route.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Oct 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R-1) (U)

Major improvements were also made in retrograde facilities and organization at Long Binh. The 218th CC&S Co was deactivated with implementation of the new Long Binh Army Depot TDA and operational control was being passed to the Depot in late October. It is estimated that with present facilities and manpower assets, a period of some two months will be required to work off this backlog.

8. (U) The 29th General Support Group continued to receive, store, inspect and process excess equipment. Approximately, 350 trucks, 29 track vehicles and 433 trailers were received by the 79th Maintenance Battalion during the reporting period. To fill in-country requirements, 61 trucks, 22 track vehicles and 37 trailers were repaired and returned to depot stocks. With the exception of trailers and 5-ton series trucks, which by regulation must be repaired in-country, these vehicles which exceeded the capability and capacity of organic maintenance units to repair were placed in retrograde channels. This amounted to 215 trucks and 7 track vehicles. Currently, there are 153 trucks (including 79 trucks, 5-ton series), 77 track vehicles and 472 trailers on hand pending repair or other disposition.

9. (C) During the report period, demand accommodation for supply was 59% and demand satisfaction was 41%, an increase from last quarter's accommodation of 49% and a decrease from last quarter's satisfaction of 45%. By direction of the CG, 1st Logistical Command, a massive effort was initiated in the area of supply management. This involved a complete review and purification of stockage lists, evacuation of excess stocks, cancellation of orders, reconciliation with depot and customer units and the weekly validation by commanders of inventory and stock control procedures on selected items. HQ, 29th Group, contributed ideas to organization of this overall effort as well as selected personnel to man various teams monitoring these projects for the command. As a result of the intensive reconciliation efforts and purification of stockage lists, combined group ASLs have been reduced from 122,738 to 77,000. As the above techniques are continued, it is anticipated that demand satisfaction will significantly improve through better supply management.

10. (C) Thruput ammunition tonnage increased each month during the period. The increase is attributable to (1) closer coordination between Long Binh Ammunition Depot and 48th Transportation Group, (2) improved management of transportation assets, and (3) increased receipts in the type of cargo conducive to thruput operations. Listed below are thruput tonnage for the period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>1673 short tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>3063 short tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>3708 short tons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. (C) In the area of retrograde ammunition, there was an upsurge in the tonnage shipped from the previous quarter. The trend went from three short tons in August to 1,867 short tons to date. This increase in tonnage was due primarily to (1) increased emphasis on the retrograde program and (2) the
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availability of more ship space. The improved condition is expected to continue with a minimum goal of 2500 short tons per month. There are 1,044 short tons prepared and offered for movement with preparation in progress on another 3,973 tons presently located in Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot.

12. (U) During this period, group and battalion staffs were diverted from basic mission activities by a number of special studies bearing upon personnel. One of these was preparation of a TDA to replace the 79th Maintenance Battalion's TO&E. Another required cooperation with a commercial concern in analyses relating to contracting for the entire general support maintenance operation. At the same time, one study was underway to "civilianize" military spaces in the 29th Group and another was being conducted to reduce civilian spaces. The Group was directed to "line delete" a number of company and platoon size units, and word was received that two Heavy Equipment Maintenance Companies would be deactivated and other maintenance units would be converted to different configurations. Any one of these studies would have constituted a major drain on over-extended staff sections. All of them going on at about the same time created considerable turbulence and organizational uncertainty. This problem was compounded by key personnel and space losses, often without qualified replacements, in group and battalion staffs.

13. (U) On 30 Aug 68, the Tay Ninh LSA was redesignated as the 277th S&S Bn. This action was made possible by the 506th Army Depot reorganization under a TDA. The new TDA depot organization dropped the TO&E HQ elements of the 277th S&S Bn and these elements were transferred to the 29th Gen Spt Grp.

14. (U) The 9th Infantry Division had been providing logistical support for units located at Bearcat. When the division moved to the IV Corps Tactical Zone in July, the 266th S&S Bn was tasked with establishing an FSA at Bearcat. The 590th Maint Co from the 185th Maint Bn was attached to the 266th S&S Bn and placed under the operational control of the FSA commander.

15. (U) On 10 September 1968, the 266th S&S Bn relinquished control of the Bearcat FSA when a Logistical Support Activity was established at Bearcat by 29th Gen Spt Grp General Order Number 29.

16. (U) The mission of the Bearcat LSA is to provide direct support maintenance, field service support (less TO aviation and medical) to US and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) composed of the Royal Thailand Army Volunteer Force (Division) (RTAVF) at Bearcat.

17. (U) On 24 and 25 September, the 1011th S&S Co, a reserve unit from Kansas selected for mobilization, arrived in-country and was attached to Bearcat LSA. The 1011th S&S Company had been modified at mobilization and arrived minus the laundry and bath platoon.

18. (U) Also during this reporting period (16-17 Oct), the 826th Ord Co, a called-up reserve unit, arrived at Long Binh and was attached to the 3rd Ord Bn.
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19. (C) On 21 Oct, the 551st Ord Dst (Ammo) was transferred to the 53rd GS Gp for use at Can Tho.

20. (C) On 27 Oct the 269th Ord Dst (EDD) was attached to the 3rd Ord Bn. This unit will be transferred to the 53rd GS Gp when facilities are made ready to receive them.

21. (C) On 5 Oct, the 29th GS Gp was directed to drop 545 TOES military spaces by 5 Nov 68. Later instructions received on 31 October reduced our immediate requirements to draw down military spaces from 545 to 297.

22. (U) As a result of a manpower survey conducted during the quarter by a USARV G3 Team, the Gp TDA for LN civilians was cut by 426 spaces. This reduction will take place for the most part by attrition. Even so, it effectively prevents hiring of sorely needed LNs, particularly in the GS maintenance areas.

23. (U) The facing sketch indicates the 29th General Support Group's area of operations for direct support. The 277th Supply and Service Battalion, the 610th Maintenance Battalion and the Bearcat LSA (Prov) supervise across the board logistical support in the TAOI's of the 25th Division, the 1st Division and the Royal Thailand Army Volunteer Forces (Division) respectively. The same across the board logistical support responsibility for Long Binh Post and CHAC has been given to the 266th Supply and Service Battalion and the Saigon LSA (Prov) respectively. The 185th Maint Bn performs a similar mission for various non-divisional tactical units including the 11th ACR, 199th Inf Bde, and 54th Arty Group on a non-geographic basis.
AVCA SG CO
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968
RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)(U)
B. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE AND DISCIPLINE

1. (U) The overall personnel situation continues to be less than satisfactory with the percentage gap between authorized and assigned officer and enlisted strength improving over the past quarter for officers and widening for enlisted personnel (79% and 78% respectively). The persistent officer shortage has a continuing serious impact on all areas of management. Enlisted shortages have at this time become critical in the automotive mechanic, radar repair, engine equipment repair, NCR 500 repairs fields, and less than satisfactory in overall strength.

2. (U) At unit level, the problem is compounded by a lack of experienced officers.

3. (U) At Group level, the TOE is inadequate in both numbers and grade. The 506th Field Depot which augmented the previous TOE from their spaces during the past quarter is now operating under a TDA as the US Army Depot, Long Binh, and the 14 spaces have consequently been withdrawn from 29th General Support Group. The Group Headquarters is only authorized 22 officers and is not officially authorized a JAG, Civil Affairs Officer, S-4 or Administrative Officer. It is understaffed in virtually all supply, maintenance and administrative elements.

4. (U) The military personnel strength of the 29th General Support Group at the end of the reporting period was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Warrant Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted Men</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>287</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>7654</td>
<td>8062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>6046</td>
<td>6367</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. (U) During the period 1 August to 31 October 1968, the Local National Direct Hire Authorization decreased from 2017 to 1591, a drop of 426 spaces. These spaces were all lost from the Table of Distribution and Allowances. As of 31 October, there are 1377 Local Nationals working for group under TDA.
authorization and 214 working under Program 6. Daily Hire authorization during the same period (1 Aug - 31 Oct) increased from 498 to 705, a gain of 207 spaces. As of 31 October, there are 705 Daily Hire personnel working for Group. Daily Hire personnel cannot, however, be utilized for mission-type tasks.
6. (U) **PERSONNEL STRENGTH**

   a. On 31 October the Group continued to be considerably short of authorized strength.

   b. The opposite chart indicates the break-out of military and civilian strength, authorized and assigned.

   Charts on the following pages indicate the trend in officer, warrant and enlisted grades as compared to the previous quarter and last year.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>VGS (IN)</th>
<th>DAILY HIRE (AIR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AUTH</td>
<td>ASGD</td>
<td>AUTH</td>
<td>ASGD</td>
<td>AUTH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ CC</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D ORD BN</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79TH MAINT BN</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>185TH MAINT BN</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>266th S&amp;S BN</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>277th S&amp;S BN</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>610TH MAINT BN</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAIGON LSA</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEARCAT LSA</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>7653</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL MILITARY | 6363 |
TOTAL LN       | 2322 |
31 OCT 66
7. (U) OFFICER STRENGTH

On 31 October the officer strength was at 59% of the recognized requirement. The assigned strength remains fairly steady, although considerably below the authorized strength.
8. (U) WARRANT OFFICER STRENGTH

The warrant officer strength is at 80% of the authorized strength. This is a drop of 4% from the preceding reporting period.
9. (U) ENLISTED STRENGTH

a. The enlisted strength was 78% of the authorized strength on 31 October 1968. The critical shortages in automotive mechanic, radar repairmen, engineer equipment repair, and NCR 500 repair field MOS.

b. There has been a 6% net loss of enlisted men from the preceding reporting period.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966

RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)(0)

AVCA VGN 5G CO

EXPIRED SECRECY

28TH QTR CE

AVCA VGN 5G CO

EXPIRED SECRECY

28TH QTR CE
AVCA SGN SG OP

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Oct 1968 (RC5 CSFOR-65) (R-1) (U)

10. (U) The following awards and decorations were processed for personnel assigned to HHC, 29th General Support Group during the reporting period:

- Legion of Merit 1
- Bronze Star Medal 4
- Army Commendation Medal 5
- Purple Heart 0

11. (U) The R&R spaces to areas indicated below were utilized by personnel of HHC, 29th General Support Group during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>NO. SPACES UTILIZED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pehang</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. (U) Military police citations were issued to seven individuals of HHC, 29th General Support Group during the reporting period. Offenses included traffic violations, in off-limit areas, drunk and disorderly, and curfew violation.

13. (U) Promotion of enlisted personnel assigned to HHC, 29th General Support Group during the reporting period were as follows:
AVCA SGH SG OP

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for
31 Oct 1968 (RGCSFOR-65) (R-1) (U)

TO PAY GRADS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>E7</th>
<th>E6</th>
<th>E5</th>
<th>E4</th>
<th>TOT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of allocations received</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of EM promoted</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14. (U) Reenlistment information for HHC, 29th General Support Group during the reporting period is as follows:

a. Number of Enlisted Men who reenlisted: 1

b. Number of Enlisted Men who redeployed to CO US or separation and were eligible for reenlistment: 6

15. (U) Key personnel changes during the reporting period were as follows:

a. LTC Douglas E. Fox, QMC, Chief Administration Division was replaced by LTC Robert U. Boyd Jr., Inf.

b. MAJ Roy J. Farmer, AGC, Adjutant was replaced by MAJ Samuel R. Cary, AGC.

c. MAJ Igeary H. Webster, SigC, Chief Supply Branch was replaced by LTC James P. Van Camp, QMC.

d. MAJ Raymond R. Roth, TC, Chief SHQ was replaced by LTC John H. Carlson, Inf.

16. (U) Non-judicial punishment and court martial figures for the 29th General Support Group for the period 1 Aug - 31 Oct 68 are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-judicial punishment</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>JNF</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>229</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>603</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary Court Martial</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>JNF</th>
<th>OCT</th>
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<td></td>
<td>18</td>
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</table>

Other legal activity during the quarter included six Article 32 Investigations within the 29th General Support Group and 225 Legal Assistance actions, including 46 instruments drafted, by the Group Legal Officer.

17. (U) Civic Action ranged from completed projects, such as the school at Tam Hiep and API Section of Bien Hoa and the dispensary in the hamlet of Nui Dat, to other projects, including waterlines for Bien Hoa Provincial Hospital, road construction into Bien Hoa, Med Cap at Tam Hiep, Tram Thi, and the API, II and III Section of Bien Hoa which are near completion. The Civic Action Program coordinated by this headquarters during the period
AVCA SGN SG OP

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Oct 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R-1) (U)

1 August to 31 October 68, furnished the monetary equivalent of approximately 150,000 $VN in aid and assistance.

C. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. (C) Enemy activity during the reporting period was highlighted by a renewed offensive on the 17-18 of August. The strongest offensive activity occurred in Tay Ninh Province with other areas in III Corps experiencing increased enemy-initiated activity. The climax of the Third Offensive failed to materialize. Among possible explanations for this: the intent of the plan was the need to draw friendly forces away from Saigon; that plan failed. Allied spoiling operations hurt the enemy posture. Other than the above, offensive enemy activity was characterized by harassing tactics, terrorism, stand-off and line of communication interdiction. Intelligence reports and captured documents indicate the development of a Fourth Offensive during November.

2. (C) Major incidents occurring at locations of interest to this command during the reporting period were:

   a. At 200230H Aug 68, the Dau Tieng Base Camp received 25 rounds 82mm mortar and five rounds of an unknown type rocket. Results: 29th Group: One tent destroyed.

   b. At 220447H Aug 68, nine or more 122mm rockets landed in and near the LBASD. Three rounds impacted at YT078087. One each round impacted at YT070082, YT077081, YT078079. Nine craters were located and various pieces of shrapnel were recovered. The estimated back azimuth from YT077081 is 150°. No injuries or damage was sustained.

   c. At 251145H Aug 68, an 80-vehicle convoy from the 48th Transportation Group, traveling to Tay Ninh on Highway 1, was ambushed by an estimated battalion size NVA force. Results: Friendly 12 KHA (10 Ist Log) WHA (18 Ist Log) 25 vehicles were either damaged or destroyed. Enemy: 103 KIA.

   d. At 211445H Aug 68, YS125967 (vic Bearcat), one individual from 177th Ord Det traveling Hwy 15 was ambushed by 10 man VC force. Results: 1 US KHA.

   e. At 310030H Aug 68, Bearcat ISA received 5-6 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and at 0835 H received three more rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Results: 266th S&S Bn reported one hit in Class I yard resulting in $4,000 damage and no casualties.

   f. At 201715H Sep 68, the 277th S&S Bn at Tay Ninh received two rounds of unknown-type rocket fire. One round landed outside of the perimeter and the other impacted in the battalion troop area. Results: Friendly: No casualties, 4 tents were damaged.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Oct 1968 (RG3 CSFOR-65) (R-1) (U)

g. At 19201511 Oct 68, on Long Binh Post, the 79th Maintenance Battalion at Long Binh received one 107mm rocket and one unknown type round. Both rounds impacted between the retrograde wash rack and the 120th Aviation helipad. Results: Two maintenance tents minor damage.

h. At 19203511 Oct 68, on Long Binh Post, the 185th Maintenance Battalion received two mortar rounds and one rocket round. All rounds impacted in the 140th HEM Co area. Results: Two buildings minor damage and one 2½ ton truck extensive damage, one US WM1.

3. (U) The 524th MI Detachment conducted a Counterintelligence Survey Inspection of 29th General Support Group, Headquarters, 79th Maintenance Battalion, 185th Maintenance Battalion and the 277th Supply and Service Battalion. The counterintelligence measures in all units inspected were found to be satisfactory.

4. (U) The weather during the reporting period was characterized by light to heavy showers or thunderstorms with the continuation of the rainy season. Otherwise the weather was fair to partly cloudy with the temperature ranging from a high 97°F to a low 70°F. The weather had little effect on the operations of the group.

D. S-4

(U) Most of the engineer effort available to the Group during this period was self-help. Very little was done on the two major scheduled engineer projects: Several modifications remain to be done on the four buildings erected for the PA&E Fixed Field Maintenance Facility at Long Binh before that agency can move from its old location in Saigon; virtually nothing was accomplished toward the renovation of the pads and berms scheduled for repair in the Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot. Of the 140 pads and berms requiring repair, only five were completed. Work is scheduled to begin on the building modifications for the PA&E Facility in November; there is no forecast as to when work will resume in the Ammunition Depot.
E. LOGISTICS

The Group continues to perform its mission of providing logistical support to the United States and Free World Military Assistance Forces in its area of responsibility.

1. (c) SUPPLY

   a. Class I

      (1) During the quarter, seven Class I supply points were operated by the Group in support of approximately 97,000 troops. Six Division Class I supply points were operated in support of approximately 38,000 troops. These facilities were resupplied from the US Army Depot, Long Binh by the 48th Transportation Group, 29th General Support Group organic vehicles, and contract commercial transportation under direction of Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Saigon.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968
RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)(U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 Oct 1968 (HCS CSPOR-65) (R-1) (U)

(2) (U) Class I issues for the quarter totaled 8.8 million rations
which represents an increase of 0.2 million rations over the previous quarter.
This increase was caused by the arrival of additional units in the III Corps
Tactical Zone.
b. (U) Class II, IV, VII and IX.

(1) During the reporting period, four Class II & VII supply points, one Class IV supply point and eight Class IX supply points were operated by units of the Group in eight separate locations.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968

RCS, CSFOR-6 (R-1)(U)

AYCk SON SO

- REPORTED PER 6-17-68

CLASS II & V, III & VI SUPPORT

29TH QG CP

- NUMBER OF ALT LINE ITEMS

PHN 115

- REASON PNR 6-17-68

CLASS II & IV, III & V SUPPORT
During the quarter, the 29th General Supply Group and VII supply points received 65,075 requisitions for authorized stockage list (ASL) items, a demand satisfaction of 41%. Initial fill of ASL requisitions from stock was 16%, for a demand satisfaction of 41%. During the previous quarter 63,542 requisitions were received of which 31,286 were ASL. This represents a demand satisfaction of 49%. 14,213 of these ASL requisitions were initially filled from stock for a demand satisfaction of 49%.
AVCA SGN 3G CO
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968
RCS GSFOR-65 (R-1)(D) thousands

CLASS IV & V FILL SUPPLY PERFORMANCE 1968
AVGA SGN 96 OP
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 Oct 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R-1) (U)

(3) During this quarter, a total of 245,656 requisitions were received for Class IX items. Of this total 174,911 requisitions were for ASL items, a Demand Accommodation of 69%. Initial fill of ASL requisitions from stock was 68,221, a Demand Satisfaction of 39%. This represents a 4% increase in demand accommodation over the previous quarter when out of 259,838 requisitions 168,513 were for ASL items. Demand accommodation was 65%. 66,439 of these ASL requisitions were filled from stock for a Demand Satisfaction of 39%.
AVCA SGN SG CO
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968
RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)(U)
c. Class III

(1) (C) During the reporting period, the Group operated 13 Class III supply points with a total bulk capacity of approximately 1,177,000 gallons. Divisional elements operated an additional seven Class III supply points with an approximate bulk capacity of 945,000 gallons. All 13 Class III activities were resupplied primarily by the 64th Quartermaster Battalion. The Bearcat Logistical Support Activity and Phu Loi Supply Points are resupplied with organic transportation. Some commercial transportation (under the direction of Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Saigon), was also used to resupply locations in the immediate Saigon area.
(2) (C) Issues of Class III for the quarter totaled 4.9 million gallons. This represents a decrease of 0.4 million gallons below last quarter's issues.
AVCA SGW SG CO

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968
RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

[Diagram showing data over time from 1967 to 1968]
d. Class V

(1) (C) The Group operated three Class V activities located at Long Binh, Tay Ninh and Tan Son Nhut. Division Ammunition Supply Points (ASP's) were operated at locations designated by an asterisk on the facing chart. Numbers on this chart indicate the stockage at each location.
(2) (U) Group Class V Activities issued a total of 93,173 short tons during the quarter. Issues last quarter totaled 92,412 short tons. Receipts for the period were 106,892 short tons. Receipts were more than issues by 13,733 short tons and is attributed to the decreased level of combat operations. Reworking for the quarter was 84,412 short tons. Corrective measures taken on the storage of ammunition by lot number and the consolidation of suspended ammunition lots contributed to the high reworking figure.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Oct 1968 (KCS CSFOR-65) (R-1) (U)

2. (U) RETROGRADE

a. Resurfacing of the Newport holding area, mandatory clearing of retrograde items in accordance with U.S. Department of Agriculture standards after the items are called forward to Newport, and incomplete loading of available ships caused a decline in retrograde shipments. Completion of the resurfacing of the Newport holding area will again permit free flow of clean retrograde items and increase shipments.

b. Significant advances were made in retrograde shipments from the forward areas during this reporting period. Shipments totaling 1,456 short tons were received from Tay Ninh. This reduced the Tay Ninh backlog during the quarter from 1,300 short tons to 444 short tons at the end of the reporting period.

c. Total short tonnage of retrograde for the quarter was 20,520 compared with 31,471 short tons for the previous quarter.

d. On 31 October 1968, responsibility for collection, classification and salvage (CC&S) functions formerly performed by the 29th General Support Group (218th CC&S Company) was transferred to the U.S. Army Depot, Long Binh. Future reports concerning CC&S will be provided by this depot.
AVCA SEN SG Or
SUBJECT: Operational Report Sealed Remained for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Oct 1968 (RES CSPOH-65) (R-1) (U)

3. (U) SERVICES

   a. Bakery Production

   A total of 1,939,920 pounds of bread was produced during the quarter by the Group's two operating facilities. This represents a 10% increase in production from the previous quarter. This shortfall in bread production has been partially offset through installation of a local contract for 12,000 pounds of bread per month. Two new Model M-1945 ovens were installed during the quarter and are being installed. This additional capability should offset the shortfall in bakery production caused by the constant breakdown of M-1945 ovens.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968
RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)(U)
b. Laundry Production

The ten Group laundry sites kept pace with demand by processing a total of 1,547,963 pounds of organizational and individual laundry during the reporting period. This is a 21% decrease over the previous quarter. During the first part of the quarter, the Group's largest laundry facility, located at Long Binh, burned down.
c. Bath Production

During the quarter, 110,603 personnel were processed through the nine shower points operated by the Group. This represents a 36% decrease in production from the previous quarter. Bath production continues at only a fraction of total capability because of the existence of fixed shower facilities at most camp sites in the Group's area of responsibility.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968
AVCA SGN SG Gr

SUBJECT: Operational Report Ic:.,..,,r ... for Quarterly Period ending 31 Oct 1968 (Military) C/Report O

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d. Graves Registration

Five of the twelve graves registration collecting points in the III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) are operated by the 29th General Support Group. The remaining seven are operated by division elements. Remaining processed through Group graves registration points during the quarter totaled 516. Of this total 411 were US Military, 15 Area World Military Assistance Forces, 60 Vietnamese Civilian and CIC. This total is a 23% increase over the previous quarter and reflects the increased level of enemy contact in the III CTZ.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for the Quarter 31 Oct 1968 (SSG CSPOL-65) (R-1) (U)

FIELD MAINTENANCE PRODUCTION

a. (U) Ordnance Automotive

(1) During the past quarter, workload averaged 20% more per month than during the previous quarter. Backlog dropped significantly and as of the end of this quarter, it had nearly doubled from the backlog at the end of the previous quarter. The increase in workload for the month of August can be attributed in part to the extensive inspection requirement for turn-in of Thai Volunteer Regiment equipment. The Thai Volunteers were required to turn-in all U.S. Government equipment on or in Vietnam prior to departure. The turn-in included 269 wheeled vehicles and trailers and 17 tracked vehicles. Parts shortages continued to multiply during the period. Fast-moving items such as tire tubes, batteries, spark plugs, repair kits for many direct exchange items, engine for d/3/2, 2½ and 5-ton trucks and M113A1 personnel carriers, clutch plates and disks, brake lining, radiators and transfer cases for M48A3 tank carriers were usually at zero balance. Some of these parts are now being received and manpower is rapidly becoming the limiting factor. The 27th Group is currently short 491 of its 1249 authorized mechanics. Vehicular density within III CTZ is increasing due to movement of units into the area from CONUS and in-country locations.

(2) During the period, 18 M109 self-propelled howitzers of 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery were replaced with new fifth year production models. Parts peculiar to the new model continue to be supplied. In-country overhaul of M48A3 was discontinued during this period.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968

AVCA 50 SG CO

CHRONOLOGICAL PRODUCTION
29TH CS GR
b. (U) Artillery

Receipts and completions of artillery decreased during the quarter primarily to newer weapons being infused into the field. The field maintenance rose to 6.5%, an increase of 3% from the previous quarter. This increase is due to the number of older weapons on hand being repaired for turn-in or being repaired for maintenance float. Interest and supervision combined with a ready source of parts have reduced disassembly and retrograde artillery have significantly contributed to keeping the readiness low.
AVCA SGN SG CO

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968
RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)(U)

[Graph of backlog, completions, and received items over a period from 0 to 14 Hundreds]

53
Fire control receipts and completions leveled off during the rainy season, which was a major cause for fire control failures in moisture. Production has lagged behind receipts primarily because of repair part and personnel shortages. Although the backlog stands at 3.6%, seldom is artillery deadlined for fire control. Backlog for the most part is confined to maintenance float and direct exchange stocks.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968

CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)
AVCA SCW SG OP

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Oct 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R-1) (U)

d. (U) Signal

During the period, the electronics and communications commodity experienced an increasing trend in receipts and production. The sharp increase in workload during the month of August was due in large part to emphasis placed upon increased readiness in anticipation of stepped-up enemy activity. Since most defective equipment was turned in during August, receipts dropped somewhat during September; however, the upward trend resumed through October. Density of communication and electronic equipment continues to increase in the III CTZ. For this reason, it appears that receipts, completions and backlog will continue upward. Repair part shortages have curtailed production. Repair parts for FADAC, particularly memory units, continue in critical supply. Lack of maintenance float radios, FADACs and radars limit response of maintenance units to customer unit needs when critical repair part shortages are encountered.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968
RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)(U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period ending 31 Oct 1968 (RCS CPOR-65) (R-1) (U)

e. (U) Heavy Engineer Construction Equipment

During the period, the trend in receipts and completions was down due in main to limited activity of engineer units during the peak of the rainy season and also to newer D7E tractors being infused into the Land Clearing Company. Backlog dropped sharply in August due to a concerted effort to retrograde equipment which had been waiting parts in excess of 45 days. Availability of repair parts, particularly engines and transmissions, is the major factor causing the 10% field maintenance deadline.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968
RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)(U)
The trend of receipts and completions has been generally downward. This is due in part to less organizational work being done by direct support contact teams. (During the previous period, high organizational deadlines and lack of organizational mechanics necessitated frequent contact team assistance for performance of organizational maintenance. This requirement was reduced during the current period.) Backlog has fluctuated during the period; however, backlogs on 1 August and 31 October are practically the same. Non-availability of repair parts and assemblies are the principal cause for the 8.2% field maintenance backlog. The policy of retrograding items waiting parts in excess of 45 days continues in effect.
During the period, the trend in receipts and completions dropped sharply. A possible explanation for this was the reduced number of units operating in the field during the peak of the rainy season (units in base camps usually have commercial power available to them). The sharp drop in backlog which occurred during August was due to a period of increased repair part availability. Availability was short-lived and backlog resumed its upward trend for the remainder of the period. Density of generators within III CTZ is increasing and, with the expected increase in field operations during the dry season, higher deadline rates can be anticipated. Increased availability of replacement generators and repair parts will be required to reverse this trend.
(1) During the period, backlog continued to increase; however, composition of the backlog changed. The backlog of generators decreased slightly to 154 and refrigeration equipment backlog decreased sharply to 147. The backlog of electrical motors requiring rewind peaked at slightly over 600 at the end of October. Capability in the electrical motor area is limited due to lack of trained personnel. An on-the-job training program has been initiated to increase skill levels. Reduced backlogs in generators and refrigeration are attributed to use of USAPAV procurement funds to purchase critical repair parts and to increase personnel skill levels which resulted from on-the-job training programs started in June.

(2) Repair part availability remains a problem area. Military standard ASL items are at 36% zero balance. Line items due in from depot stand at 1700. The nonstandard item ASL is at 66% zero balance. Of the 1512 item backlog, 631 items are waiting parts.

(3) Move of the P & E Fixed Field Maintenance Facility from Saigon (Cholon) to the newly constructed facility at Long Binh has been delayed. Due to the requirement for installation of process electrical power, hardstands, a water supply and modification of existing buildings, the projected date for the move has slipped to 3rd Qtr, '69.
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AVCA SGH SG OP

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Oct 1968 (AGS CSOR-65) (E) (U)

1. (C) Deadline and Equipment Status

Selected equipment status of major units supported by the 294th Group is identified below. Reflected are the quantity of equipment authorized, on hand, deadline at organization and field maintenance and % of equipment available (availability is expressed as a percentage of equipment on-hand). Data was obtained from reports provided by major units and is current as of 20 October 1968.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>O/H</th>
<th>ORG D/L</th>
<th>FM D/L</th>
<th>AVAIL (%)</th>
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CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Oct 1968 (RCS CP0R-65) (R-1) (U)

## Engineer Construction

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<th>ORG D/L</th>
<th>FM D/L</th>
<th>AVAIL (%)</th>
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<tr>
<td>159th Engr</td>
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<td>111</td>
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## Comel

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<th>FM D/L</th>
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## Armanent

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<th>FM D/L</th>
<th>AVAIL (%)</th>
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<td>66</td>
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During the quarter, general support production (repair for return to stock) by the 79th Maintenance Battalion for selected commodities was as follows:

## Commodity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>August</th>
<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major Auto Assemblies</td>
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<td>167</td>
<td>176</td>
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<tr>
<td>Auto Subassemblies</td>
<td>1535</td>
<td>995</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms</td>
<td>1080</td>
<td>1615</td>
<td>1616</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wheel Vehicles</td>
<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td>Track Vehicles</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
A. PERSONNEL

1. OBSERVATION: Inadequate personnel management tools are not furnished to the Group Commander to enable him to effectively tailor subordinate units to meet the demands of shifting mission requirements or to intelligently designate priorities of assignment by MOS and grade.

   a. OBSERVATION: Adequate personnel management tools are not furnished to the Group Commander to enable him to effectively tailor subordinate units to meet the demands of shifting mission requirements or to intelligently designate priorities of assignment by MOS and grade.

   b. EVALUATION: The present centralized method of military personnel management is essentially management by exception. The Group spends much time reassigning personnel when the Personnel Services Center has assigned them to units by TOE paragraph and line number without regard for Group priorities. This problem is compounded by the fact that the PSC is unable to provide the Group with accurate and timely information as to the number of MOS by MOS and grade presently assigned to its units so that intelligent priorities for assignment may be made. The Group must depend on this inaccurate information to meet its own requirements and those of higher headquarters with respect to levies, MOS testing, gains and losses. The single management tool furnished is the PIR, which is neither accurate nor current. Additionally, units are identified on the PIR by a UIC code. As the lowest element which has machines is the PSC, identifying units becomes a problem at both Group and battalion level. It is apparent that commanders at the Group and its lower echelons do not understand the workings of the PSC nor the rationale behind most of its actions. It is equally apparent that the PSC does not understand the needs of the commanders. This is further complicated by the distance which the PSC is separated from units. This alone has effectively taken the personal out of personnel. Personnel management has thus become centralized to the point of inflexibility. Whereas the present degree of centralization may be adequate in static conditions and in low-tour areas, it is wastefully inadequate in periods of personnel turnover caused by the shifting of missions and the changing of task organizations. The constant moving of units, their elements and individuals unit to unit between organizations in an area where the normal tour is twelve months makes it that personnel management be decentralized to a level where it is rapidly responsive to command. It would appear to be most responsive at either battalion or group level.

2. RECOMMENDATION:

   1. That the personnel management function be decentralized to the lowest level possible.

   2. That, failing the above:
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Oct 1968 (RED CSPOR-65) (R-1) (U)

a. The PSC furnish both Group and battalion a list of weekly losses and gains by unit, MOS and grade.

b. The PSC record on the next PIR all changes submitted by companies.

c. The PSC stagger preparation of the PIR, i.e., prepare x number of unit PIRs each week, rather than all at once as is the present practice.

d. The PSC require units to correct the PIR over a two-week period, rather than over a period of a month. The PSC would then immediately issue the unit an updated PIR upon receipt of the corrected one.

e. Both Group and battalion be furnished weekly lists of shortages by unit, grade and MOS.

f. Both Group and battalion be furnished a monthly PMOS inventory with projected losses.

B. OPERATIONS - None

C. TRAINING - None

D. INTELLIGENCE - None

E. LOGISTICS

1. (U) ITEM: Excessive Failure of M548 Cargo Carrier Transfer Assembly (FSN 2520-918-0599).

a. OBSERVATION: The high failure rate and the shortage of replacements has increased the deadline rate for M548 carriers within the III CTZ during the past quarter. Failures are due in large part to malfunctioning of the check valve FSN 4820-693-3314 which either allows too much oil into the transfer assembly or no oil at all. Too much oil creates excessive pressure within the transfer causing the transfer seal FSN 2520-7140-149 to fail. Lack of lubrication causes the transfer assembly to lock up.

b. EVALUATION: This problem is a matter of concern especially to artillery and armored cavalry units which depend on these carriers for the transportation of ammunition and equipment. An EIR has been submitted.

c. RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that a properly functioning check valve replace the one now installed or a modification be performed on the present check valve to insure proper functioning. It is also recommended that, while these possibilities are being investigated, replacement transfer assemblies be expedited into the theater.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Oct 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R-1) (U)

2. (U) ITEM: Shift to Contractual Services

a. OBSERVATION: It is becoming increasingly difficult to carry out the logistics mission within existing personnel limitations. This is particularly evident in the areas of general support maintenance, i.e., the overhaul of major items, assemblies, sub-assemblies and components in the 79th Maintenance Bn and in the receipt, storage and reworkhousing of ammunition in the 3rd Ordnance Bn in order to conform to mounting peak load requirements and more stringent storage regulations.

b. EVALUATION: Security and other non-mission requirements coupled with the mounting shortage of military personnel and local national space reductions have reduced production by the 79th Maintenance Battalion's 553rd and 632nd Maintenance Companies to only a small percentage of that potentially obtainable in these exceptionally fine facilities. Expanded port offloading capabilities and command pressure to consolidate lot numbers in storage have increased the need for handling capacity in the Long Binh Ammunition Depot. Prospects for release through established channels do not appear promising.

c. RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that arrangements be made to contract for general support maintenance and ammunition handling activities to civilian concerns in the same manner as has been done in the Qui Nhon Support Command. If this can be done through extension of existing contracts, relief will be provided with a minimum of delay.

3. (U) ITEM: Limitations of the NCR 500 System

a. OBSERVATION: NCR 500 system programs and training are not sufficiently developed to mesh smoothly with the supply system. Personnel at all levels have received insufficient training to understand NCR 500 capabilities and limitations or to recognize and trace errors, predict problems, accurately assess what the system can and cannot do or how long it takes the system to complete tasks it is capable of doing. The result of this is that many time-consuming mistakes are made at the operational level and that misguided directives are issued at various staff levels which compound the inefficiency of the system.

b. EVALUATION: Personnel are arriving in-country with insufficient training to operate or supervise the NCR 500 system. Operators do not have enough training or experience to recognize errors or, when they do, they are unable to determine whether it is a machine error or a program data input error. They have little knowledge of the Army Supply System and consequently do not understand the data fed into the NCR 500 nor the machine's capabilities and limitations with respect to the supply system it serves. Some personnel have never seen the NCR 500 before arriving in-country. They are given a two-week course and sent to technical supply activities as operators. Their performance indicates their inadequate
training and motivation. The greatest motivational problem is the lack of adequate promotion opportunity to E5 in this MOS.

Technical supply stock control section supervisors arrive in-country with even less knowledge than operators. They do not know capabilities, limitations nor the mechanics of operations. They cannot answer operator or maintenance personnel questions and often receive snow-jobs from their own operators. They do not adequately learn the system on-the-job as they immediately become involved in day-to-day operations, special projects and learning the variations of the overall supply system.

Commanders and staffs at most levels do not understand such basic things as the system's capacity for numbers-of-lines AT stockage, numbers of requisitions processed, numbers of transactions processed, what computations the system can and cannot make, what questions it can and cannot answer, and the amount of manual preparation necessary prior to running a program. The NCR 500 will add, subtract and compute the R/O, but the input for these transactions requires manual preparation with all of its attendant human-error and time-loss. Routine actions, such as processing receipts, are mostly manual. Pulling dues-in and dues-out, converting and merging them with cancellations, offsetting the stock record ledger and feeding each ledger into the console are also manual operations. Much manual preparation and machine time is in the Daily Update Program of posting transactions to ledgers. Unit requests were received at DSU roughly 24 hours prior to going into the updating process. During this 24-hour period, the following types of transactions are also received and manually prepared for updating:

a. Cancellations from depot.

b. Cancellations from units.

c. Receipts from depot (complete, partial, short shipment and receipt not due-in).

Dues-out to units are manually pulled from file for each receipt and fed into the updating process. Dues-in for each receipt are pulled from the manual file for updating. Each of these different transactions must then be manually (except in those few cases where large tech supply activities have IBM sorters) sorted in stock number sequence and matched against stock record ledgers. The ledgers must be manually off-set to identify to the operator which ones are affected. The operator places the transaction cards for these ledgers into the card reader in FSN sequence. Only then can he feed the ledger into the NCR 500 for posting.

The machine will increase or decrease the following, depending upon the transaction:
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a. Quantity on hand.
b. Quantity due-in.
c. Quantity due-out.
d. Requisition objective.

Any error placed into the machine may cause a halt. Halts may also be caused by worn and filled ledgers.

Typical daily receipts of 500 lines require an input of approximately 1500 cards. This represents about 12-hours processing-time. During this time, other MIROs are out, except for high-priority immediate releases. All warehouse denials and zero-balance cards must be run prior to the next updating.

Excessive manual preparation is required to run programs because of inherent limitations in the NCR 500 system and because changes to the supply system have been directed which involve formulas for computations for which programs do not exist. An example of this is the recent change to the demand criteria for ASL stockage and retention.

Keypunching monthly and quarterly Materiel Readiness Reports seriously encroaches upon desperately needed machine time, time which is needed to keep up with customer transactions, posting receipts and issues, daily updates, weekly reports, bi-monthly reconciliations, 60-day reconciliations, monthly reports, reviews, inventories and special projects.

c. RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That adequate programs be developed to eliminate the time-consuming, unnecessary manual massaging required for reviews, computing demand data, etc.

2. That machine limitations be considered when directives requiring additional machine time and manual processing are issued.

3. That instructional courses in CONUS and in-country be reevaluated and improved to insure that adequate training on both the NCR 500 and the entire supply is provided. Personnel should be administered tests to insure their proper understanding of these systems prior to sending them overseas or, in the case of in-country schools, assigning them as operators.

4. That an NCR 500 supervisor's course be developed in CONUS and that it be mandatory training for all 76P NCOs on Vietnam assignment orders.
5. That a middle-managers' NCO 500 course be developed in-country and that all NCO's OICs, staff officers and commanders who direct operations utilizing the NCR 500 be required to attend it.

6. That a senior officer's NOR 500 system orientation course be developed to acquaint senior officers responsible for policy decisions and directives affecting activities employing the NCR 500 with the system. This course would explain the system's capabilities and limitations to include speed of operations.

F. ORGANIZATION

1. (U) ITEM: Battalion Organization.

   a. OBSERVATION: The conversion of two Direct Support Maintenance Battalions and two Supply & Service Battalions from their functional roles into organizations providing composite logistical support "across the board" has decided advantages when operating over an area as extensive as the III Corps Tactical Zone. Although some technical personnel had to be exchanged between the two different types of headquarters and the battalion commanders and their executives may not be as technically qualified in some functions being supervised, the level of general management has been improved. More intense local supervision is provided over morale, discipline and production and communication with supported units has been definitely improved. There is now only one representative of the 29th General Support Group, the Saigon Support Command and the 1st Logistical Command in each division tactical area of interest to supervise all logistical activities.

   b. EVALUATION: Compared to the previous functional arrangement, under which two maintenance battalions supervised all maintenance operations and two supply and service battalions supervised all supply and services operations over an area of approximately 130x140 miles, the composite organization is decidedly superior. Whereas previously, there were two companies of the 29th Group located at some base camps, each under a different battalion, all such operations have now been consolidated and every group operation within a given geographical area is under a single battalion commander and all units at any location are under authority of the senior local commander, regardless of function.

   e. RECOMMENDATION: That except in situations where it is clearly preferable to maintain the functional type organization, i.e. high customer density in a restricted area, direct support battalions be tasked with composite, across-the-board, logistical responsibilities regardless of maintenance or supply orientation.
MCVA SGN 3G OP

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Oct 1968 (RGS CSFOR-65) (R-1) (U)

G. OTHER - None

SECTION III

Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information - Escape and Evasion Lessons Learned.

NEGATIVE REPORT

THOMAS J. MCDONALD
Colonel, Ordn
Commanding
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Oct 1968 (CSFOR-65) (R-1) (U)

HQ, US Army Support Command, Saigon APO US Forces 96491

TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO 0 APO 96384

1. (U) The Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968, of the 29th General Support Group is forwarded in accordance with para 9, AR 1-19.

2. (U) Reference Section I, para B4(a): The authorized strength should read 265 Officers, 116 Warrant Officers and 7,296 Enlisted personnel for a total of 7,677.

3. (U) Reference Section II, para A1: Based on further review and evaluation by this headquarters, the recommendation to decentralize personnel administration is not favorably considered. Alternate recommendations concerning exchange of information between PSC and units serviced will be acted on in accordance with AR 600-16, AR 600-17, and as mutually agreed upon between Commanding Officer, 29th General Support Group and Chief, PSC.

4. (U) Reference Section II, para E2: This headquarters has submitted a Purchase Request and Commitment (DA 14-115) to 1st Logistical Command for contract maintenance of the general support maintenance facility for FY 69 commencing on 1 March 1969.

5. (U) Lessons Learned, observations and recommendations are concurred in by this command, with the exceptions above. A copy of this endorsement has been provided the originating headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

FREDERICK R. HUCK
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff
TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

1. The Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 29th General Support Group for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 is forwarded.

2. (U) Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference Section II, para E1. ATAC is publishing MWO to correct this deficiency. Subsequent production with delivery scheduled in 3rd quarter 69 will have modification applied. Modified Transfer Assemblies are being furnished against Red Ball requirements only, due to shortage in CONUS.

   b. Reference Section II, para E2. Concur. Saigon Support Command is restaffing a request for single contract for Stevedoring, Motor Transport and Ammunition Depot Services, dtq 13 September 1968. It is expected that some contractual services will be provided in the future and this service will reduce the problem caused by personnel shortages. No action required by higher headquarters.

   c. Reference Section II, para E3(1&2). Concur. Program control is exercised by automatic Data Field System Commands. Specific recommendations in this area should be submitted to this headquarters, ATTN: ATAC GL-PM-SD, 3k4 concur. It is imperative that operators be thoroughly trained prior to assignment in the system. This should be accomplished at the school operated at Fort Lee, Virginia. It is additionally important that once in country, trained personnel be assigned in their primary MOS.

   d. Reference Section II, para F. Concur. Command control of dispersed support elements should be enhanced by this arrangement if care is taken to insure optimum distribution of the available qualified battalion staff personnel.

3. (U) Concur with the basic report as modified by indorsements. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

ROBERT W. MUNSON
ILT
AGC
Army AG

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AVHGC-DST (10 Nov 68) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period ending 31 October 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) (h-I)(U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 29th General Support Group.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning limitations of the NCR 500 system, page 70, Section II, paragraph E3 and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2c. Nonconcur with recommendations contained in paragraph E3 cl. Programs presently used are deemed adequate and capable of accomplishing the various reviews. Some manual operations are required; however, all systems are equipped with an IBM sorter to assist in arranging transactions in stock number sequence.

b. Reference item concerning limitations of the NCR 500 system, page 70, Section II, paragraph E3 and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2c. Concur with recommendations contained in paragraph E3, c2 to c6. This headquarters is studying the feasibility of establishing a centralized data reduction and processing facility for the Materiel Readiness Report. It is anticipated that the feasibility study will be completed 5 Feb 69 and further consideration will be given to this program at that time. Presently, NCR 500 instructional courses in CONUS are being reevaluated and are scheduled for all Quartermaster, Ordnance, and Transportation tech supply officers, and NCO's with MOS 76P. Tests are administered in all CONUS NCR 500 training courses. Personnel attending the CONUS operators course are continually tested, with failing students being either dropped or recycled. In-country training by Detachment 4 ADPSC is being phased out. Plans will be developed for in-country training programs to replace these courses conducted by Detachment 4.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

W. C. [illegible]

CITY, AC:

Annot: [illegible]
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 29th Gen Spt Gp for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSPOR-65 (R1)
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC

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**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 29th General Support Group, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)**

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 1968.**

CO, 29th General Support Group

**Report Date**: 10 November 1968

**Contract or Grant No.**

N/A

**Project No.**

N/A

**Originator's Report Number(s)**

684040

**Other Report Nos. (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)**

N/A

**Distribution Statement**

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OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

**Abstract**

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