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AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

AGAM-P(M) (17 Feb 69) FOR OT UT 684283  25 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division
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US Army Forces Southern Command
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 3D BRIGADE, 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96228

AVBK-AC

30 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for period 1 August 1968 to 31 October 1968.

SEE DISTRIBUTION:

The inclosed Operation Report Lessons Learned is forwarded in compliance with PCV Regulation 525-2 and USARV Regulation 525-15.

ALEXANDER R BOLLING JR
Brigadier General U.S.A.
Commanding

Official:

JOHN M GRIEG
MAJ INF
Adjutant

Incl

AS:

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2 - CO, 1-505 ABN INF
2 - CO, 2-505 ABN INF
2 - CO, 1-508 ABN INF
2 - CO, 2-321 ABN ARTY
2 - CO, 82 SUP BN
2 - CO, B/1-17 CAV
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FOR OFFUT
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for period 1 August 1968 to 31 October 1968.

A. (U) COMMAND

On 30 September 1968 Colonel Alexander R. Bolling Jr was promoted to Brigadier General and remained in command of the brigade.

B. OPERATIONS

1. (C) The 1st Bn (Abn) 505 Inf from 1 August through 16 September secured Fire Base Birmingham (YD606103) and Route 547, a main supply route for elements in support of operations in the A Shau Valley. From 22 August until 1 September the 1st Bn (ABN) 505 Inf had the additional mission of securing Fire Base Boyd (YD737133), Landing Zone Satan II (YD761055), and the Nam Hoa Bridge (YD755139). This economy-of-force operation along Route 547 released elements of the 101st Airborne Division for participation in operations being conducted in the A Shau Valley. Also, other elements of the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division were released for operations against the 22d NVA Regimental Base Camp, located south of Route 547. From 16 September the area of operations along Route 547 was assigned to the 1st Bn (ABN) 508 Inf and elements of the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. At this time the 1st Bn (ABN) 505 Inf began operations to GOLDEN SWORD movement from 1 Corp to III Corp Tactical Zone. Upon arrival in III Corps Tactical Zone the battalion was placed under the operational control of the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and remained so until 6 October, the arrival date in III Corps Tactical Zone of the command element 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division. From 6 October until the end of the period, the 1st Bn (ABN) 505 Inf continued its basic mission in III Corps Tactical Zone to defend the western approach to Saigon. Characteristic operations of the period were reconnaissance-in-force, detailed searches of suspected enemy areas, and ambushes, with relatively little enemy contact.

2. (C) The 1st Bn (ABN) 508 Inf from 1 August to 22 August secured Fire Base Boyd (YD737133), Landing Zone Satan II (YD761055) and Nam Hoa Bridge (YD755139). During this period emphasis was placed on reconnaissance-in-force operations and detailed searches of the Hue-Phu Bai Rocket belt region southwest of Hue. From 23 August until 16 September the battalion was engaged in extensive operations against the 22d NVA Regimental Base Camp, located 20 km southwest of Hue. During this period Fire Base Brick (YD855985) was established to provide support for the battalion. Reacting to intelligence supplied by a NVA Hoi Chan, the 1st Bn (ABN) 508 Inf completely routed the 22d NVA Regiment from their base area and captured numerous enemy weapons and supplies. On 16 September the battalion returned to secure Fire Base Boyd, Landing Zone Satan II and the Nam Hoa Bridge. The 1st Bn (ABN) 508 Inf began movement from I Corps Tactical Zone on 30 September and arrived in III Corps Tactical Zone on 3 October. On 6 October it began operations in the area west of Saigon. By use of reconnaissance-in-force,
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for period 1 August 1968 to 31 October 1968.

Detailed searches, and extensive night ambushes, the 1st Bn (ABN) 508 Inf secured the western approaches to Saigon with minor enemy contact.

b. (c) The 2d Bn (ABN) 505 Inf from 1 August to 24 August secured Fire Base Veghel (YD550033) and Bastogne (YD621109) located on Route 547. On 25 August the battalion was moved to the heavy canopy area 10 km southwest of Phu Bai to assist the 1st Bn (ABN) 508 Inf in operations against the 22d NVA Regiment. The 2d BN (ABN) 505 Inf moved to a new area of operations along Highway 1 on 3 October. The battalion secured Fire Base Anzio (YD919048) and bridges along Highway 1 between Phu Bai and Phu Loc. The unit continued this mission until it moved from I Corps to III Corps Tactical Zones, arriving on 16 October. The 2d BN (ABN) 505 Inf moved into an area of operations northwest of Saigon and defended this important approach to Saigon with minor enemy contact.

2. TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES:

1. (c) Terrain has been the greatest factor influencing the tactics used by the maneuver elements of the brigade.

a. Types of terrain encountered during the reporting period include the heavy canopy area west of Phu Bai where the enemy moves with relative freedom. Here, the brigade employed company size elements in reconnaissance-in-force operations. Thick vegetation in this area required that elements move in some type of modified file formation. Upon gaining contact companies normally withdrew several hundred meters to utilize artillery and tactical air strikes. Once this superior fire power had been employed, units could move into the target area by fire and maneuver to secure it.

b. The second general type of terrain encountered was the heavily populated rice growing area along the coast southeast of Phu Bai and northwest of Saigon. In these areas small group saturation patrolling was used. Enemy activity in these areas was limited to the procurement of food and attempts at infiltrating the area at night. Night ambushes along likely avenues of movement were found to be the most successful method of obstructing enemy movement.

2. (c) In the Saigon area open terrain and lack of jungle canopy presented a better opportunity for use of artillery time fire. The variable time (VT) fuse therefore, has been employed extensively, whereas HE fused with both fuse quick and delay predominated in jungle terrain. The techniques used to control indirect fire in the brigade area of operations around Saigon have been complicated by the large civilian population, concentration of friendly elements and the high density air traffic. Unobserved fire is restricted to the hours of darkness and then only in certain specified areas. During daylight hours no indirect fire can be employed without prior visual reconnaissance of the target area to insure the area is clear of civilians. The task of obtaining both military and political clearance for artillery fire further complicates the fire coordination problem. Air clearance, as opposed to posting air data, is required

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TNCL 1
OPERATIONAL REPORT OF 3D BRIGADE, 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION FOR PERIOD 1 August 1968 TO 31 October 1968.

Over most of the current brigade area of operations. All of these factors have necessitated more centralized operations at artillery battalion level. Not only must all fires be directed by the battalion FDC, but all data must be checked to insure the accuracy of each round fired.

I. TRAINING

1. (U) During the reporting period elements of the brigade conducted training in all subjects prescribed in USARV Regulation 350-1.

2. (U) In the latter part of the previous reporting period a large number of replacements were received in the brigade to replace many personnel deployed with the brigade and chose to return to CONUS. Throughout the current reporting period emphasis was placed on fundamentals of squad and platoon tactical operations. To increase individual proficiency in operation of crew served weapons, special classes were conducted under company supervision.

3. (C) The 2D RN (ARM) 321 Artillery conducted a daily training program with primary emphasis placed on fire direction, firing battery techniques and howitzer section drill. Training in other areas has been covered by the OJT program or informal instruction. The results of this program, particularly FDC training and howitzer crew drill have been reflected in the low reaction times recorded for the nightly Capital Military Assistance Command Hamburger reaction tests. The 2-321 Artillery has consistently attained the lowest reaction times of all artillery units under OPCON of CMAC and has on several occasions massed fires of the entire battalion on a single target in less than one minute.

II. ORGANIZATION

Refer to Troop List 3D Brigade, 82D Airborne Division (Enclosure 2).

III. INTELLIGENCE

1. (C) Operation NEVADA EAGLE continued into October terminating on 3 October 1968 with the movement of the 3D Brigade, 82D Airborne Division, north to the Saigon area in III Corps Tactical Zone and the start of Operation TOLBERT PHASE II. The last phase of NEVADA EAGLE was characterized by relatively heavy contact on two battalions (1-505 INF and 2-573 INF) moved into previously enemy secure areas resulting in 30K new KIA.

2. (C) During the period 1 August 1968 to 22 August 1968, enemy activity was characterized by low level incidents to include mining of roads, booby traps, assassinations and sniping. Only one incident of harassing of friendly indirect fire was noted. Heavy reconnaissance by enemy units was constantly evident.

INCL 1

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for period 1 August 1968 to 31 October 1968.

3. (C) During the period 23 August 1968 to 3 October 1968, allied units, aided by accurate intelligence consisting of agent, Red Haze, Bloodhound, and Secure Reports, moved into the enemy's base camps and met stiff resistance.

4. (C) Enemy casualties and equipment losses during the period August 1968 to 3 October 1968 were 215 NVA KIA, 750 crew served and individual weapons captured. Enemy units contacted within the area of interest in I Corps were as follows:

22d NVA Regiment
4th NVA Regiment
803d NVA Regiment
C115 Local Force Company
C119 Local Force Company

5. (C) During the period 4 October 1968 to 31 October 1968 contact with units of significant size was not achieved. Reconnaissance-in-force, cordon and search, and snatch operations (attack of VC infrastructure) greatly hindered the enemy's ability to stockpile rockets or mobilize troops for a coordinated attack on Saigon. However, indications of major deployment of enemy units around the area of operations and low level reconnaissance indicate his plans for a future offensive against Saigon area. Enemy units within the area of interest in III Corps Tactical Zone consists of the following:

Bong Nai Regiment
267th Main Force Battalion
269th Main Force Battalion
D12 Sapper Battalion
6th Local Force Battalion

6. (C) During the period 1 August 1968 to 3 October, intelligence information was gained for the most part by electronic sensors and actual contacts. Red Haze, Bloodhound, SLAR, Secure Reports, and agent reports were used extensively to pinpoint enemy locations with subsequent exploitation of the suspected area. Very little information was gained as a result of placing individuals within the VC infrastructure since the area of operation was primarily double and triple canopy jungle, uninhabited by the indigenous population.

7. (C) During the period 3 October 1968 to 31 October 1968 in which the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division moved south to the Saigon area, intelligence sources remained the same; however, greater emphasis was placed on working with the large civilian population and disrupting the VC infrastructure. Red Haze and SLAR missions were conducted in the area of operations almost
every night; however, due to the large population they were relatively ineffective. Radar was placed throughout the area of operation and was an invaluable aid in detecting small enemy size units on the move. Agent reports were much greater in number and required careful evaluation, but many were useful for filling gaps in the overall intelligence picture. It was imperative to make daily liaison with local agencies including DI0CC's, National Police, 525 MI Group and province headquarters.

8. (C) RECAPITULATION OF ENEMY LOSSES: (C)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>NEVADA EAGLE (1 August 68 - 3 Oct 68)</th>
<th>TOAN THANG PHASE II (3 Oct 68 - 31 Oct 68)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VC/NVA KIA</td>
<td>10/215</td>
<td>4/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC/NVA POW</td>
<td>0/3</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Weapons**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NEVADA EAGLE (1 August 68 - 3 Oct 68)</th>
<th>TOAN THANG PHASE II (3 Oct 68 - 31 Oct 68)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew served</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ammunition**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NEVADA EAGLE (1 August 68 - 3 Oct 68)</th>
<th>TOAN THANG PHASE II (3 Oct 68 - 31 Oct 68)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms (rds)</td>
<td>308,192</td>
<td>3545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew Served (rds)</td>
<td>8,218</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockets (122mm, 107mm)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radios</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22d Regiment: As a result of the above losses during Operation NEVADA EAGLE, functioning of the 22d Regiment was greatly hindered for a period of approximately two months. Its command and control group was dispersed over a large area and its communications were disrupted when a large portion of their radios were captured.

6. CHEMICAL:

1. (C) During the period 1 August through 31 October 1968 this unit conducted the following operations:


b. Installing of flame field expedients for perimeter defense at FB Panther II and FB Panther III from 30 August to 2 September 1968.

c. Defoliation of Camp Red Ball compound was conducted on 12 October 1968.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for period 1 August to 31 October 1968.

3. Defoliation of Nam H34 Compound was conducted during the period 11 - 13 September 1968.

2. (C) During the period 6 - 8 August 1968 this unit trained personnel from 1st Bn (ABN) 505 Inf in the construction and employment of flamethrowers expedited.

3. The 52d Chemical Detachment was trained in the operation and use of the XM2 MFD. Training was conducted by personnel from the 14th LAM Company.

II. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

(C) Although the major impact of the DA decision to reorganize the brigade conforming to the light infantry concept and its subsequent personnel turbulence occurred last quarter, replacements continued to arrive to fill the increased number of authorized duty positions and MOS shortages. Specifically, 450 replacements arrived in August, 229 in September, and 198 in October, bringing the total brigade authorized strength on 31 October to 4673 or 100% of that authorized. This figure is somewhat misleading, however, as shortfalls do exist in some enlisted military occupational specialties. Most battalions average 80 shortages of infantry related MOS's. Additionally, few technical specialty MOS shortages exist in other brigade subordinate units. Headquarters, 3d Brigade, is 100 above TOE authorization because of tactical requirements to maintain a Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRP), interdiction security platoon, and additional aviation related MOS's to provide weapons maintenance for escort aircraft. Requests for TOE authorizations of these elements have not yet been confirmed. The quarterly period also witnessed a major move by the brigade (covering 400 miles from the northern portion of SVN to the south central portion and described at length in the S-4 portion herein) which dictated some adjustment of personnel handling procedures. It is significant to mention that personnel administration continued to function with organization and forethought with no diminishment of service or responsiveness to the soldier or to higher headquarters. Detailed information relating to S-1 activities follows:

1. (C) Activities of Adjutant General's section were highlighted during this period by two important events. The promotion of Colonel Alexander E. Bolling, Jr to Brigadier General has allowed the approval of a substantial number of awards at this headquarters, thereby increasing the timeliness of awards presentations in the future. Operation "GOLDEN SWORD" presented the opportunity for audit of records and the provision of other direct support to the units during their stand-down at Bien Hoa Post. Individual records checks were completed on 2,461 men and ID (Dog) tags provided for 366 soldiers. Audits of Morning Reports were also conducted under direct supervision of the AG as each unit passed through Bien Hoa. In addition, the following information of specific areas of interest is provided:

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SUBJECT:  Operational Report of 5th Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for period 1 August to October 1966.

a. Awards and Decorations: Approval and processing were completed on the following:

Purple Heart 125
Army Commendation Medal 125
Air Medal 3
Bronze Star 109
Silver Star 16
Distinguished Flying Cross 2

b. Casualties: The following casualties were incurred during this period:

Killed, Hostile Action 31
Wounded, Hostile Action 123
Non-Battle Death 1
Non-Battle Injured 212

2. (C) Public Information Office Quarterly Report

a. During the reporting period the Public Information Office accomplished the following activities:

(1) Home Town News Releases: 45
(2) Photographs with caption releases: 49
(3) Feature news stories: 46
(4) Radio broadcasts: 51
(5) USA television: 2
(6) Number of national news media representatives escorted: 12

b. This office has been severely hampered in category (2), paragraph 2a above, photographs with captions, because it has not had, until recently, an organic photo laboratory. In the past PIO had to depend on other units for the developing of contacts and prints. Film was frequently poorly developed, and on several occasions several frames were ruined.

(1) On 25 October construction was completed on the brigade's photo laboratory located at Phu Loi. It is now fully operational, developing contacts and prints.

(2) With this additional capability the PIO will be able to increase the number of photographs released. The increase will be especially important in the area of the Home Town News Release. Such a release, on the occasion of a new assignment, promotion, award, or decoration, is considerably enhanced by an accompanying photograph. Previously, the Public Information Office experienced difficulty getting this type of photograph printed in quantity, except in case of an important award. It is planned now to release a

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photograph with a hometown story whenever appropriate.

d. The other major problem area has been with the Home Town News Releases themselves. In the past, these have not been handled on a systematic basis. Coverage, especially in the event of a new assignment, was irregular.

(1) The Brigade Public Information Office has recently published a letter emphasizing the importance of the Home Town News Release Program, and how it should function. Each battalion now has one officer assigned on appropriate orders with the additional duty of Information Officer for the unit.

(2) Guidance pertaining to the Home Town News Release was also provided to smaller than battalion size units of the brigade in this letter.

d. Preliminary work was also accomplished this quarter to publish a brigade monthly newspaper and semi-annual magazine. Funds have been procured, and the first issue of the paper is scheduled for distribution by 1 December. Funding for the magazine is not yet firm, but it is planned that distribution of the finished product will occur by 1 February 1969.

3. (C) Activities of the Staff Judge Advocates:

a. Non-Judicial Punishment 97
   (1) Company Commander 79
   (2) Field Grade 18
   (5) Demotions 2
      (a) Whole 0
      (b) Partial 2

b. Summary Courts-Martial 1

c. Special Courts-Martial 12

d. Legal Assistance 93
   (1) Correspondence 8
   (2) Wills 2
   (3) Powers of Attorney 25
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for period 1 August 1968 to 31 October 1968.

4. (U) The activities of the Brigade Chaplains were as follows:
   a. Services Held 511
   b. Attendance 10,441
   c. Hospital Visits 157
   d. Counselling 1,624

5. (U) Personal Services: The efforts of the American Red Cross and Special Services are shown below:

   a. Prior to 29 September, American Red Cross support was provided by the 101st Airborne Division. On that date, the brigade was assigned its own Assistant Field Director, who immediately began operations and established his office at Camp Red Ball. The records of the ARC reflect the below listed data from 29 September to 31 October. (Data for the remainder of the period is on record with 101st Airborne Division).

   (1) Leaves 39
   (2) Benefits 5
   (3) To Assist - CO 1
   (4) To Families 94
   (5) To Servicemen 12
   (6) Personal Counselling 41
   (7) Family Problems 24

b. Special Services: The following data reflects the R&R Program during this period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Allocations Received</th>
<th>Reallocations Acquired</th>
<th>Standbys Used</th>
<th>Turbaboys</th>
<th>No-Show</th>
<th>Allocations Used</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HAWAII</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>184</td>
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<td>SYDNEY</td>
<td>138</td>
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<td>BANGKOK</td>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division for period 1 August 1968 to 31 October 1968.

KUALA SIRIMUT

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MAJUNTA

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<th>16</th>
<th>47</th>
<th>884</th>
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</thead>
</table>

TOTALS

909 31 7 16 47 884

% of allocations used for period stated............................97.5%

6. Postal Activities: The AG Postal Section during this period received approximately 105,000 lbs of mail and dispatched 19,000 lbs. Approximately $145,000 worth of money orders and $1400 worth of stamps were sold. Some difficulty was experienced in mail routing when the port of entry was changed from Da Nang to Saigon on Sept 25. Mail continued to arrive at Da Nang and also at Saigon. This problem was resolved in two days, thereby minimizing mail delay.

6. (c) Personnel Strengths:

a. The authorized strengths of the brigade units are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>1-505 Inf</th>
<th>2-505 Inf</th>
<th>1-508 Inf</th>
<th>2-321 Arty</th>
<th>82d Spt Bn</th>
<th>HEE, 3d Bde</th>
<th>307th Engr</th>
<th>516th MI Det</th>
<th>405th BRD</th>
<th>50th Sig Co</th>
<th>52d Chem Det</th>
<th>3 Trp 1-17 Cav</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>A</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>574</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. (c) Personnel Strengths:

b. The total strength of brigade on 1 August is as follows:

4079 assigned strength; 3772 present for duty
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for period 1 August 1968 to 31 October 1968.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-505 Inf</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>750</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-505 Inf</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>734</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-508 Inf</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>753</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-321 Arty</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>483</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82d Spt Bn</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>604</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 3d Bde</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>261</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>307th Engr</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>175</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>171</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>518th MI Det</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>405th Bn</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50th Sig Co</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>115</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52d Chem Det</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Trp 1-17 Cav</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>205</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>198</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4595</td>
<td>4207</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*405th Bn is not included in the authorized and personnel status strength.

I. LOGISTICS

1. (c) Logistic support for the brigade has greatly increased during this period due primarily to the fact that the Support Battalion, which was organized on 25 May 1968 under General Order Number 231, received the majority of its TOE equipment which had to be requisitioned. The support battalion was formed from maintenance, medical, supply and administrative support units which deployed with the brigade to Vietnam. Formation of the support battalion gave the brigade an organic support element capable of providing supply, direct support maintenance, medical services and miscellaneous services for all assigned or attached elements of the brigade.

2. Organization for support

   a. The 82d Support Battalion is organized under the following MTOE:

      (1) Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, MTOE 29-246T, PAC 1/68.
      (2) Company A (administration), MTOE 12-197, PAC 4/68.
      (3) Company B (Medical), MTOE 29-197, PAC 1/68.
      (4) Company C (Maintenance & Supply), MTOE 29-247, PAC 2/68.

      // CONFIDENTIAL
b. On 3 October 1968, a Forward Support Element (FSE) was established at Tan Son Nhut Air Base to provide on-the-spot supply and maintenance support to the forward elements of the brigade. All classes of supplies are handled at the FSE except Class V, in addition to direct support maintenance in automotive, signal, ammunition, engineer, and service and evacuation areas.

3. Material Services provided during this period are as follows:

   a. Class I (rations) support was established on 3 October with the opening of the FSE. Prior to that date Class I was not handled by the Support Battalion. At the present time, the Class I section is handling rations on a daily basis to feed approximately 4,000 troops.

   b. Class II (clothing) is handled through the Brigade Supply Office (BSO). Effective 1 November, a central issue facility will be opened at Phu Loi. Prior to that date all clothing requests have been handled on a bulk issue basis to the units.

   c. Class III (petroleum products) support was initiated with the establishment of the FSE. Since its establishment, the Class III section has dispensed an average of 2000 gallons of mogas and 1500 gallons of diesel fuel per day. Packaged products, such as lub oil and grease, are also stocked and handled by the Class III section.

   d. Class IV (construction & barrier material) is handled at both BSO and the FSE. The majority of Class IV items are handled directly through BSO, and the actions for ASL items reflects the large number of requests for barrier material and engineer construction material submitted by the units as they entered a new area of operation. Supply actions for this period are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fringe Items</th>
<th>ASL Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Demands</td>
<td>2068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cancellations</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demands Processed</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demands Satisfied</td>
<td>952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Due-outs to units</td>
<td>1150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   e. Class V (ammunition) is handled through BSO with no stocks physically being maintained on hand. All class V items are issued on a through-put basis from the 3d Ordnance Battalion, US Army Depot, Long Binh, directly to the units field trains at Tan Son Nhut. Issues were made to establish an operational load of ammunition for each battalion as they entered their new areas of operation.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 54th Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for period 1 August 1968 to 31 October 1968.

f. Graves registration is the responsibility of the Support Battalion, however, during this period a graves registration section was not operational because of TOE shortage of personnel and equipment. From the period 1 August 1968 to 31 October 1968 this service was provided by the Graves Registration Detachment, 22d Surgical Hospital, Phu Bai. From that period to date, graves registration services have been provided by the mortuary at Tan Son Nhat under 29th General Support Group. Two personnel were placed on Special Duty to the graves registration element of the 29th General Support Group on 31 October 1968 for OJT.

g. Laundry facilities were provided in the Phu Bai area by a Korean contractor at Gia Le combat base. The support battalion has no capability in this area. Laundry services in the Phu Loi-Saigon area are contracted through the 29th General Support Group.

h. Bath service was provided by the 26th General Support Group in the Phu Bai area and by the 29th General Support in the Phu Loi area. The support battalion has the mission of providing this service, but due to TOE shortages of personnel and equipment is unable to meet this commitment.

4. Transportation requirements for this period exceeded normal operational requirements due to the move of the entire brigade from the Phu Bai area to the Saigon-Phu Loi area. Sea and air transport facilities were used extensively in the move because of volume and the distance involved. Land transportation requirements increased sharply once the brigade reached the Saigon-Rien Hoa-Phu Loi area. In the Saigon-Phu Loi area, backup transportation support is provided by the 48th Transportation Group. The organic transportation capability of the support battalion was almost nonexistent due to TOE shortages until about 10 October 1968, when 26 2½ ton trucks were issued to the battalion. These trucks were immediately formed into a truck platoon with the drivers coming from the resources of the support battalion; mechanics, clerks, and repairmen. The total short tons of personnel and equipment moved during this period by organic and support transportation was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Short Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>8,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>7,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air</td>
<td>10,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>26,035</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Maintenance:

a. Direct support maintenance is provided to the brigade by Co C, 82d Support Battalion. Organisational maintenance is the responsibility of the using units. Backup support maintenance was provided by the 67th Maintenance Company and the 576th Light Equipment Co when the brigade was located in the Phu Bai area. In the Bien Hoa and Phu Loi area, backup support maintenance was widened by elements of the 29th General Support Group. Job order status was as follows:

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for period 1 August 1968 to 31 September 1968.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JOBS</th>
<th>RECEIVED</th>
<th>COMPLETED</th>
<th>EVACUATED</th>
<th>ON HAND AT END OF PERIOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instruments</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svc &amp; Evac</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Repair parts supply is handled through the Repair Parts section of C Co, 82d Support Battalion. At the present time, the repair parts section is in the process of converting their stock accounting records to the NCR 500 automated accounting system. With the conversion completed the repair parts section will have a much more efficient operation and will greatly increase its capabilities. The ASL status report for this period was:

- Lines stocked: 1808
- Lines zero bal.: 635
- Total request rec: 3556
- ASL reg. rec.: 1908
- Fringe req. rec.: 1386
- Total Requests filled: 2024
- ASL filled: 1638
- Fringe filled: 266
- Demand accommodated: 54%
- Demand satisfaction: 80%
- Customer satisfaction: 57%

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for period 1 August 1968 to 31 October 1968

J. CIVIL AFFAIRS

1. (c) The S-5 Section was involved with five separate districts in two corps areas during this period. The districts were Heng Thuy and Nam Hoa in the I Corp Tactical Zone and Hoc Mon, Go Vap, and Tan Binh in the III Corp Tactical Zone. In addition to providing medical assistance under the MEDCAP program, one long term project was started and many small ones were completed.

2. (c) During the period the brigade operated in the I Corp Tactical Zone, the area of operations was located in an area of relatively sparse population. As a result, civic action projects were greatly affected.

3. (c) The following is a listing of the various civic action projects that were undertaken during the reporting period.

   a. Construction of a school in Nam Hoa, which when completed will provide facilities for 246 children.

   b. Arranged for the removal of a cataract from the eye of a blind child in Nam Hoa. The operation was successful and vision was restored in the eye.

   c. Completion of 31 wells in Heng Thuy that will provide water facilities for approximately eight to ten thousand people.

   d. Completion of rebuilding of the market place in Nam Hoa.

   e. Distribution of food to flood victims in Nam Hoa.

   f. One house was constructed in Hoc Mon District.

   g. In an attempt to bolster the local economy in Nam Hoa, permission was granted to local civilians to enter previously inaccessible areas around American firebases for the purpose of cutting heavy timber. The 3d Brigade provided supplies and transportation for these projects. In almost all cases the labor was provided by the Vietnamese people.

4. (c) In addition the following foodstuff's and materials were distributed:

   77,000 lbs. of cement
   2,108 lbs. of soap
   6,000 lbs of rice

30 sheets of metal (tin)
68 sheets of 4 x 8 plywood
500 cases of "C" rations
60 1st Aid Kits
1,200 feet of 2 x 4 lumber
600 feet of 4 x 4 lumber
320 feet of 12 x 12 lumber
12 cubic yards of sand
2 tons of gravel
50 lbs. of children's clothing
1,500 lbs. of sand

5. (c) MEDCAPS: Forty-eight planned MEDCAPS were held in which approximately 4,066 people were treated. Several of the planned MEDCAPS included PayOps missions as well. In addition, individual and impromptu MEDCAPS were held by the various units within the brigade.

6. (c) Projects for the Community Welfare:
   a. One well was capped in Tan Binh District.
   b. One road was repaired in Hoc Mon District.
   c. One culvert was repaired in Hoc Mon District.

K. (c) Psychological Operation

1. During the reporting period psychological operations were carried out using leaflet drops, loudspeaker missions (ground and aerial), leaflet distribution, armed propaganda teams, face to face discussions, and the displaying of posters. These operations were supported by the 7th Pay Op BN in the I Corp Tactical Zone and the 6th Pay Op BN in the III Corp Tactical Zone. The above units provided support utilizing C-47 aircraft and U-10 loudspeaker aircraft. Organic missions performed by the brigade and the 101st Airborne Division were flown using the OHID helicopter. In the I Corp Tactical Zone an NI team consisting of
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for period 1 August 1968 to 31 October 1968.

Two HE and a ground speaker system was attached to the brigade. In the III Corps Tactical Zone an HE team is also attached but in this case the team is commanded by an officer from the 6th Pay Op Bn.

2. Pay Op accomplishments during the period are as follows:

- Air Leaflet Missions: 76
- Ground Leaflet Missions: 21
- Air Loudspeaker Missions: 47
- Ground Loudspeaker Missions: 39
- Audio-Visual Presentations: 14
- Armed Propaganda Missions: 6
- Newspaper Distribution: 890
- Magazines Distributed: 420
- Posters Distributed: 40
- Leaflets Handed Out: 19,000
- Leaflets Dropped: 7,200,000
- Broadcast Hours: 94

Themes used most often in the conduct of Psychological operations were:

1. Chieu Hoi
2. Rewards Program
3. Atrocities by VC and NVA
4. News and music
5. American allies are your friends

3. During the reporting period all HoI Chanks were interrogated concerning the effectiveness of Pay Op efforts and their observations were incorporated into future messages.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 34 Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for period 1 August 1960 to 31 October 1960.

1. (C) The following ailments have been treated by B Company, 82d Support Battalion during the reporting period.

(a) Total patients -2605
(b) Total dental patients - 570
(c) IRHA - 229
(d) Non-battle casualties - 464
(e) Malaria - 37
(f) VDU - 110
(g) Diarrhea - 81
(h) Skin disease - 412
(i) Gastroenteritis - 107
(j) Heat injury - 12
(k) Neuropsychiatric - 00
(l) Foot problems (non IRHA) - 60
(m) VD - 41
(n) URI - 166
(o) Hepatitis - 10
(p) Other - 972
(q) Med Evac - 70
(r) Med Cap - 259 people observed (these figures cover illnesses at Phu Bai, Bien Hoa, and Tan Son Nhut.)

1. (C) Result of the above data as compared to the last reported date of 31 July 1960, indicates the following actions should be taken:

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tat Alrtnt Dirlilo« for p«rlod
1 AifU« 1966 *• 51 0«tob«r 1968.
(a) Malaria rate has increased, and the following measures should be
more carefully supervised:

(1) Taking of malaria tablets.
(2) Use of insect repellent.
(3) Use of mosquito netting.
(4) Rolling down sleeves in mosquito infested areas, especially
after darkness.

(b) Skin disease or dermatitis shows an increase of almost 100 patients.
Recommendations are:

(1) Troops should have hand washing facilities readily available.
(2) More showers and shower facilities should be encouraged, especi-
ally in the southern area where the humidity is higher.
(3) Encourage increase in personal hygiene practice.
(4) Timely change of clothing.

(c) Increase in hepatitis the need for:

(1) Supervision of purification tablet for impure water.
(2) Insuring availability of purification tablets.
(3) Command information program on the dangers of drinking unpur-
ified water.
(4) Insuring the use of potable water for drinking, as well as pot-
able ice.
(5) Handwashing facilities for all kitchen workers (US and civilian).

(d) The great number of N. B. C. (Non-battle casualties) encourage the
following action:

(1) Safety programs for motor pool and vehicle operation.
(2) Unit Safety Officer on Safety HCO should inspect the unit for
safety hazards.
(3) Be on the lookout for personnel under excessive alcohol, drug
or narcotic influence (e.g., opiates, marihuana) for they could be dangerous.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for period 1 August 1968 to 31 October 1968.

(e) The still high rate of foot disease can be lowered by command supervision of the following:

1. Tactical situation permitting, boots should be removed for ventilation of feet, especially after prolonged exposure to wet conditions.
2. Whenever possible in a rear area, shower shoes should be worn.
3. Adequate changing of socks.
4. Liberal use of foot powder.
5. Replace unserviceable boots.

H. SIGNAL:

1. (C) On 7 September 1968 four-channel systems were activated to FB Nineyard in support of 2-505 Inf. At the same time a four channel system was put in operation to Phu Bai for use by the artillery at FB Nineyard for AECO purposes. When the 1-508 Inf moved to FB Nineyard, later redesignated FB Amnic, two circuits from the existing system from Camp Rodriguez were rerouted to the 1-508 Inf from the 2-505 Inf. Upon departure of the 1-505 Inf from FB Boyd and FB Birmingham, 12 September 1968, the 1-508 Inf occupied these FB's setting up their battalion command post at FB Boyd. As a result, the VHF system from Camp Rodriguez to FB Birmingham was changed over to FB Boyd. Later the 2-505 Inf came under OCP of 1st Bde, 101st Airborne Division and 501st Signal assumed the VHF commitment from there. The 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division assumed OCP of 1-327 Inf at FB Bastogne. The telephone requirement was met by the utilisation of two channels of the VHF channel system already operational at that location. When the 1-505 Inf replaced the 1-506 Inf at FB Boyd and FB Birmingham, the 501st Signal picked up the system to FB Boyd in place of the 506th Signal. The FH status changed slightly with OCP units entering the Brigade Command and the Brigade Secure nets as needed. The RATF rig remained on the air from Phu Bai until change of command passed to the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

2. (C) Golden Sword:

a. On 1 September 1968, the advance party departed Phu Bai for what was to be the new brigade command post at Phuoc Vinh. The advance signal element consisted of the Brigade Signal Officer and 301 Clerk, OIU 50th Signal Co and a 10 man detachment. Equipment included on AN/VSC-2, SB-66 switchboard, telephones, wire, and 3 FM radios to include an AN/FRC-77/KX-38 secure radio. The AN/VSC-2 was successfully employed in a secure radio teletype net with the brigade main station at Phuoc Vinh. This net was instrumental in the rapid passing of messages to and from the advance party. No FM was utilised at Phuoc Vinh, except for monitoring of the frequencies assigned by II FMOSV in order to ascertain which were the clear frequencies to be assigned critical nets. During the week the brigade was programmed to go into Phouc Vinh extensive coordination was made with the post signal unit for service to the brigade and with II FMOSV and USARV to obtain frequencies, KAC codes and secure crypto keylists, since
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 34 Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for period 1 August 1966 to 31 October 1966.

this was the first time the brigade had truly functioned as a separate unit. When it was officially decided that the brigade would not be deployed to Phu Vinh, but rather would be under OPCON of II FFORCV for further OPCON to CMAC for operation in the Saigon - Tan Son Nhut area, equipment was deployed from Phu Vinh to the staging area at Bien Hoa.

b. The AN/VSC-2 was relocated at Bien Hoa and continued passing messages to and from Phu Bai. A FM radio was established to support the arrival airfield control party and to pass traffic to and from the advanced party in the area by vehicle and helicopter. On 30 September a secure radio was placed in the II FFORCV secure net to allow contingency operational messages to the brigade command group during the move from Bien/Phu Bai to the Saigon area. It was not necessary to recoordinate frequencies, call signs and EAC codes as a result of relocating the advance party to Bien Hoa, since those previously assigned were valid in the entire III Corps Tactical Zone. An SOI was developed and published with the assistance of the 101st AC reproduction section. Normal exchange of SOI's was accomplished between II FFORCV, CMAC, 199th LIB, 25th Inf Div, 11th ACR and other units. While at Bien Hoa, very limited dial telephone service was provided to support the staging area. After the decision to place the brigade under OPCON of CMAC was announced, it was determined that 12 channel VHF equipment would have to be obtained in order to terminate the brigade portion of the CMAC system. In mid September, the brigade was issued AN/MRC-69's, AN/MRC-73's and one communication patching panel, SB-611. While in excellent physical condition, the equipment contained numerous inoperable components, thus as of the end of October only 1, 12 channel system had been established.

c. At 1200H 6 October the new command post at Camp Red Ball, vicinity Tan Son Nhut, was placed into operation. Prior to this date extensive planning and work went into getting the command post operational. The 69th Signal Bn, 160 Signal Group and 1st Signal Brigade played a very important role in placing the dial telephones in operation. In a period of less than 24 hours approximately 50 pair were laid from Camp Red Ball to MACV DF6's 9 dial main lines, a 4 wire EAC instrument and 3 switchboard ring down circuits were also installed. Additionally 3, 60 ft telephone poles were set through several heavy rock layers to support VHF, AM and FM antennas found in the brigade command post. One 12 Channel VHF system to CMAC was placed into operation on 5 October. Included in the channelisation was a half-duplex teletype circuit. As a back-up to the VHF system CMAC placed an AN/GRC-142 RATT rig and team at the brigade command post. One 4 Channel VHF system has been installed to the 1-505 Inf and 2-321 Arty with a relay to the 1-505 Inf. Systems are planned to the 2-505 Inf and brigade trains area, and a 12 Channel system to Phu Loi, the brigade rear. One SB-86 is in operation at the brigade command post with plans to install another unless the traffic load decreases. At Phu Loi coordination is being effected to provide for Army Area support to include telephone service and over-the-counter communications center support for administrative traffic.
Subject: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for Period 1 August 1968 to 31 October 1968.

1. (c) During the period 1 August 1968 to 31 October 1968 C Co 307 Engr engaged in supporting the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division operations. Throughout the period, the engineers from C/507 Engr supplied both direct and general combat engineer support to all brigade units. The engineer support plan followed during most of this period of operation was to have attached at all times one engineer squad to each infantry battalion with the remaining two squads under the control of company headquarters. Direct support missions such as combat demolitions and landing zone clearing were carried out by these attached squads. Larger missions were carried out by assigning additional squads and equipment from the equipment platoon to the infantry battalions on a mission basis. Missions accomplished in this manner included sweeping all lines of communications within the brigade area of operation, fire base defoliation, construction of gun emplacements and ammunition bunkers for the storage of rounds for the artillery batteries located at the forward support bases.

2. (c) The general support missions were undertaken by the equipment platoons and the elements of the line platoons under company control. General support missions during this period included augmentation of organic brigade transportation with 2½ ton dump trucks, continued base development, road maintenance, culvert construction, construction of roads, construction of TOE for both the 3d Brigade 82d ABN, and the 101st ABN.

3. (c) During this period of operation, the basic support plan purposed by the engineers had to be drastically altered because of the nature of brigade operations.

   (1) While the main body of the company was to move south two platoons remained with the infantry battalion they were supporting.

   (2) During Operation Golden Sword, the remainder of the engineer company was distributed in the same manner for the purpose of moving, one platoon for each infantry battalion.

4. (c) While under control of the 2-505 Inf, second platoon conducted many combat support missions to include combat demolitions, bunker construction, operation of water point, and the clearing of a mine field, which resulted in two engineers being wounded.

5. (c) Summary of Operations

   (1) Missions

   Helicopter LZ cleared or constructed 35
   Enemy bunkers destroyed 145
   Brigade and Battalion TOE's constructed 9
   Tunnels and tunnel complexes destroyed 5
**SUBJECT:** Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for period 1 August 1968 to 31 October 1968.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task / Action</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aid stations constructed</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firing positions constructed or cleared</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads constructed or repaired</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culverts constructed or repaired</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mess hall construction</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APO construction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parking areas cleared</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water points in operation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bde offices constructed</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miles of road cleared</td>
<td>2100 miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopter pad prepared</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers constructed</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fill hauled by 40 ton trucks</td>
<td>800 loads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trees cut or blown</td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) **Explosive Ordnance Disposal**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ordnance</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>250 lb bomb</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106mm rounds</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42mm mortars</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61mm rounds</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-79 rounds</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chisum mines</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-40 rockets</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAOG-7 rounds</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-4 grenades</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61mm rounds</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAWS</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-14 mines</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Addendum**

1. (C) Marine Air and 7th Airforce provided the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division with preplanned and immediate air strikes throughout the period.

2. (C) Army Aviation support was provided by the brigade aviation section. While under OPCON of the 101st Airborne Division, aircraft support was provided from 101st Airborne Division assets and maintenance was provided by the 861st Aviation Battalion. Co A, 101st AAS provided one command and control UH-1D, five UH-1H, and one light fire team (UH-1C) for combat assaults. On a daily basis, one UH-1D for command and control and logistical support use by each infantry battalion, one OH-23 for an airborne observer, one OH-23 and additional OH-23’s for use by engineers, liaison officers and other mission was provided from 101st Airborne Division assets. While under OPCON of CMAC the brigade received one command and control UH-1A, ten UH-1E, and four UH-1C generally every other day.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for period 1 August 1968 to 31 October 1968.

Section II

Commanders Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations

A. (C) PERSONNEL - Infantry MOS Shortage

1. OBSERVATION: There is a shortage of personnel with Infantry MOS's in the rifle battalions.

2. EVALUATION:

a. Higher headquarters furnished personnel fillers to complete the light infantry brigade authorization in various MOS's. At present and at the authorized manning level (4,651) the brigade has surplus enlisted MOS skills in the following units:

- 518th MI Det - Auth 33; Assd: 60 or 182%
- 58th Sig Co - Auth 99; Assd: 118 or 118%
- Co A (Admin), Spt Bn - Auth 177; Assd: 240 or 135%
- Co C (S2/H), Spt Bn - Auth 184; Assd: 218 or 115%
- HHC, 3/82 - Auth 155; Assd: 256 or 165%

b. Firepole strengths in the rifle battalions are lower than might be expected because approximately 80 infantryman shortfalls exist within each rifle battalion.

3. RECOMMENDATION:

a. Requests to modify TOE in HHC, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division have been submitted to grant authorization for LRP platoon, internal security platoon, and a corresponding number of aviation mechanics for helicopters furnished.

b. A plan has been developed with USARV to exchange excess MOS's within 518th MI Det, 58th Sig Co, Spt Bn, HHC, and other organizations having non-brigade authorized MOS's for 11 series MOS's. The exchange will involve initially 1000 personnel.

B. (C) OPERATIONS - Artillery Incident

1. OBSERVATION: Adjustment of artillery is made by direction, not on the GT line.

2. EVALUATION: While adjusting artillery fire during a contact mission the observer became disoriented as to the actual direction of the line between the battery and the target. Although he was calling for corrections on the GT line, he was actually observing the rounds in a direction in excess of 2000 miles from the GT line. As the fire was brought within 200 meters of his position "Danger Close" was announced precluding shifts in range of more than 50 meters. Under the policy then in effect no limitation was placed on deviation and the observer called for a right 200, which was converted to an actual
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for period 1 August 1968 to 31 October 1968.

right 140; add 170. The increase in range brought the rounds into the observer's own position. Due to disorientation, the correction given by the observer resulted in 4 U. S. killed and 10 U. S. wounded.

3. RECOMMENDATION: When conducting a "Danger Close" fire mission, range and deflection changes should not exceed 50 meters. All ground observed missions will be fired with a direction and not fired on the gun target line.

C. (C) OPERATIONS - Mortar Incident

1. OBSERVATION: All mortar fire should gain clearance from the artillery direct support battalion before firing a mission.

2. EVALUATION: A mortar crew was conducting service practice near Landing Zone Panther II (YD800109) and fired without obtaining ground or air clearance. A rifle company was operating 2500 meters to the west of Panther II and when mortars fired, rounds impacted in the middle of a platoon resulting in eight U. S. wounded.

3. RECOMMENDATION: It is essential that a single agency be responsible for clearing all indirect fire within an area of operations, regardless of the source of the fire. Normally, the FDC of the 155 Artillery Battalion is best equipped to provide this clearance. Clearance will be granted after air, ground and political clearance has been obtained by battalion FDC.

D. (C) OPERATIONS - FDC Operations

1. OBSERVATION: Artillery Battalion Fire Direction Centers in Vietnam are becoming more oriented to tactical operations rather than technical operations.

2. EVALUATION: Rather than actually computing data for fire missions, the battalion FDC is normally more concerned with the clearance and control of artillery fires. During a three day typhoon in the Hue-Phu Bai area, two batteries of 2nd Bn 321st Artillery lost their FDC and assumed technical operations for the two day period they were non-operational.

3. RECOMMENDATION: Battalion Fire Direction Centers should maintain the capability at all times for assuming technical operations of Battery FDC's in event they become non-operational due to weather or mortar-rocket attack. More centralized control will increase the capability of the battalion FDC to mass the fires of all fire units and decrease the incident of artillery errors.

E. (C) OPERATIONS - Support of 81mm Mortar Baseplate

1. OBSERVATION: Field expedient methods must be used to fire mortars in the soft soil of rice paddies.

2. EVALUATION: In the area around Saigon the baseplate of the 81mm will frequently sink when the mortar is fired. The soft soil in some rice paddy areas will not sufficiently support the baseplate and the resulting mortar fire was erratic.

3. RECOMMENDATION: The placement of a 2½ ton truck tire beneath the baseplate provides a good support for the mortar. Using this method settlement is reduced and the mortar can be fired in an effective manner.

F. (C) OPERATIONS - Use of Battalion Radio Net

1. OBSERVATION: The battalion radio is sometimes used excessively.

2. EVALUATION: When a company in the field requests tactical air or gunship support, the battalion radio net is usually used. During a multiple company operation when enemy contact was made, traffic on the battalion radio net was excessive and control for the commander was difficult.

3. RECOMMENDATION: Company radio nets can be used to control tactical air and gunship support. Excessive traffic will thereby be eliminated from the battalion radio net and the commander can control multiple company operations more effectively. In addition, the problem of having more than one company in enemy contact with both requiring air support may be resolved.

G. (C) OPERATIONS - Additional Combat Equipment

1. OBSERVATION: In areas which require excessive use of small maneuver elements, extra equipment is needed.

2. EVALUATION: Due to the type of current enemy opposition, it is desirable to often operate in squad strength. If the squad is to have sufficient fire power to destroy enemy units of platoon size and larger it is imperative that they have a machine gun. It is also desirable that each squad which operates independently have reliable communication in the form of a PRC-25 radio. The current TOL provides for two M-60 machine guns per platoon and two PRC-25 radios.

3. RECOMMENDATION: That each platoon be authorized three M-60 machine guns. This means an addition of 24 machine guns per battalion, since the weapons platoon of the rifle companies are often employed as a fourth rifle platoon. Each platoon should have five PRC-25 radios which would be an increase of 39 for the battalion.

H. (U) SIGNAL - Termination and Reactivation of Telephone Service

1. OBSERVATION: Prior to moving from one location to another, no firm instructions or SOP on discontinuance of telephone service was provided.

2. EVALUATION: Three different courses of action were taken by subscribers as they prepared to move:

   a. Subscriber left his telephone (TA-312PT) where his office was located and the installers in some instances may not have recovered the telephones.

   b. Subscriber disconnected his telephone, but packed it in inaccessible location of his comex; thus, it was not readily available for installation down south.

   c. Subscriber disconnected his telephone and packed it where it was readily available for installation.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS: An SOP on discontinuance of telephone service is needed to eliminate future problems and should provide for the following:

   a. Subscriber will hand receipt all TA-312's and carry them with the section on moves.

   b. Subscriber will have telephones immediately available for telephone installers in the new area.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65

DA, HQ, CMAC (PROV), APO 96243, 11 December 1968

TO: See Distribution

1. Subject report has been reviewed by this Headquarters and is forwarded with the following corrections:

   a. Para H, 1b: Total casualties should be 267 instead of 447.

   b. Para H, 6a, Authorized Personnel Strength: Totals should be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>256</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>4651</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. No other comments deemed necessary.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. L. ERRHALT
Major, AGO
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
HQ, IIIFORCEV, ATTN: AVFBC-RE - 1 cy
HQ, DA, ATTN: ACSFOR - 2 cy
1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for the period ending 31 October 1968, as indorsed, with the following comments.

2. (C) Reference Section II, para C, Mortar Incident. Nonconcur. While centralization of clearances is under most circumstances highly desirable, it should not be established as an inflexible policy. In many instances control at a single headquarters could result in less reliable, less rapid clearances, e.g., in most cases an 61mm mortar platoon leader should obtain his US ground clearance from the infantry commander on the ground with whom he normally has immediate contact.

3. (C) Reference Section II, para G:
   a. Concur with the addition of one M-60 machinegun to each rifle platoon.
   b. Nonconcur with the addition of three M-60 machineguns for the weapons platoon. Use of the weapons platoon as a rifle platoon with the resultant loss of indirect fire support is not considered desirable. Employment of the weapons platoon in this manner is not normal for most rifle companies.
   c. The statement in para G2 that each platoon is authorized two PRC-25 radios is incorrect. MTOE 7-177T, dated 1 February 1968, under which the brigade is organized, authorizes 12 radios per rifle company: four in the company headquarters, five in the mortar platoon and one in each of the three rifle platoons.
   d. Nonconcur with the recommendation that each platoon be issued five PRC-25 radios. This headquarters agrees that a squad on an independent mission often requires a PRC-25 radio and that the PRC-25 radios authorized a rifle company in Vietnam are already fully committed. Since a rifle company would not normally have more than three squads on independent missions when the remainder of the company was fully committed, it is felt that five PRC-25 radios in each platoon would be excessive. It is recommended that each rifle
AVFBC-RE-H (30 Nov 68) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for period 1 August 1968 to 31 October 1968.

company be authorized three additional PRC-25 radios for use by squad size elements on independent missions.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

O. B. FORT
1LT, AGC
Asst AG
AVNOC-DST (30 Nov 68) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for period 1 August 1968 to 31 October 1968

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 8 JAN 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning infantry MOS shortage, Section II, paragraph A; and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 1. As of 31 December 1968, the unit was authorized 2334 Series 11 MOS and had 2402 assigned.

   b. Reference item concerning additional combat equipment, Section II, paragraph G; and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 3. No NTOE action to incorporate M60 machineguns and AN/PRC-25 radios has been received by this headquarters from the reporting unit. Upon receipt of a request for tabular authority, proper justification, and a staffing with units under the same NTOE to insure a like requirement exists, this headquarters will take action to add M60 machineguns and AN/PRC-25 radios in the authorization document.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

W. C. ARNTZ
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

31
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. L. Shortt
CPT, AGC
Arm AG
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for period 1 August 1968 to 31 October 1968.

Inclusion II (Task Organization - Troop List)

3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division

MHC, 3/82d
1st BN, 505th Inf
2nd BN, 505th Inf
1st BN, 506th Inf
1st BN, 27th Inf (OPCON From 6 October 1968 to 15 October 1968)
2nd BN, 321st Arty (105mm)
82d Spt Bn
Trp B, 1st Slda, 17th Cav
1st Slda, 11th ACR (OPCON 6 October 1968 to present)
Co C, 307th Engr
Co C, 2nd BN, 34th Arm (Released OPCON 3 October 1968)
3d Plt, 82d MP Co
58th Sig Co
Plt, 82d Ave Bn
Plt(+), 356th RRU
Det, 82d AG and Admin
Det, 82d MID
TACP
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 68

CG, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division

30 Nov 68

684283

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310