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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (28 Jan 69) FOR OT UT 684158 3 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.

3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

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US Army Aviation Test Activity
10th Combat Aviation Battalion
AVGD-AE

9 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)


a. (C) General. The mission of the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion did not change during this reporting period.

b. (U) Personnel.

(1) Although an infusion took place in the last quarter within the 10th Battalion, the battalion suffered an excessive loss of personnel this quarter. The percentage of loss to those authorized by TOE during the August - October 1968 period is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Loss Percentage</th>
<th>Number (Men)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
<td>(64 men)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officers</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
<td>(65 men)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted Men</td>
<td>36.3%</td>
<td>(439 men)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 10th Combat Aviation Battalion had 32 Officers, 52 Warrant Officers, and 322 enlisted men DEROS in the month of October alone. In the month of November the battalion will lose an additional 12 Officers, 17 Warrant Officers, and 151 enlisted men. Replacements have been, for the most part, directly from flight school. Total replacements for the quarter were 44 Officers, 63 Warrant Officers, and 356 enlisted men. Of these, 22 Officers, 16 Warrant Officers, and 225 enlisted men arrived in the month of October alone.

(2) There continues to be a need for non-rated supply officers, MOS 761A, within the Battalion. The 243rd Assault Support Helicopter Company has not been augmented with a TOE slot for a supply officer. One company is now short a supply officer and another company will DEROS the supply officer on 12 November 1968. This results in three aviators filling supply officer positions.
AVOID-AE

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(3) Changes in command and primary staff positions were as follows:

(a) On 13 August 1968, Major Robert E. Harris, 076197, assumed command of the 16th Assault Helicopter Company from Major Jerry L. Fleming, 075355.

(b) On 15 August 1968, Major Andrew J. Hillor Jr., 0F102760, assumed command of the 261st Assault Helicopter Company from LTC Donald R. Ruskauf, 065371.

(c) On 9 September 1968, Major Jerry L. Fleming, 075355, assumed duties as the Battalion S-3 from LTC Ronald E. Becker, 04009862.

(d) On 11 September 1968, Major Paul G. Stringer, 075542, assumed command of the 192nd Assault Helicopter Company from Major Charles W. Erick, 071294.

(e) On 12 September 1968, Major Claude T. Ivey, 052420, assumed command of the 52nd Assault Helicopter Company from Major Eugene G. Miller, 0400641.


(g) On 23 September 1968, Major John E. Rease, 04613760, assumed the duties as Battalion S-4 from Captain James D. Covey, 05120130.

(h) On 26 October 1968, Major Robert E. Jones, 0F117197, assumed the duties as the Battalion S-1 from Major Bobby E. Sinclair, 0F109612.

(i) On 28 October 1968, Captain William D. Killgore, 054479, assumed the duties as the Battalion S-2 from Major Patrick D. Stockton, 0551574.

(j) Unit strengths as of 31 October 1968. (incl 1).

(c) (C) Intelligence.

(1) Physical Security: Continuous improvement of installation defense throughout the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion marked this reporting period.

(a) Better quality perimeter lighting has been installed at critical areas along the sectors of the Dong Ba Thin perimeter for which the Battalion is responsible. Additional concertina fencing has been erected in the headquarters area.
The 155th Assault Helicopter Company at Ben Ho Thiet, RVN, greatly improved their physical security facilities during the last quarter. More concertina barriers were constructed, additional claymore mines and trip-flares have been positioned around the perimeter, new and more efficient perimeter lighting was installed, and five new bunkers were constructed. A 20 mm augmentation force was organized and deployed to Ben Ho Thiet to assist in the construction.

Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence: During this quarter, attacks on friendly installations were initiated mostly by local force Visit Dong.

(a) There were two attacks on the 281st Assault Helicopter Company at Hoi Tran, RVN: One mortar and one 75mm recoilless rifle attack. The attack caused minor damage to one aircraft. The second caused no damage.

(b) The 155th Assault Helicopter Company at Ben Ho Thiet, RVN, was attacked three times during the quarter: One 122mm rocket, one 75mm recoilless rifle, and one mortar attack in conjunction with a sapper team probe. One aviator was slightly injured and three UH-1H aircraft received minor damage during the first attack. The second attack caused minor damage to a third infantry division aircraft. Again during the third attack three UH-1 aircraft received minor damage. No major damage to aircraft or facilities was inflicted by either attack.

(c) An Invasion and Escape SOP has been completed and personnel are receiving increased instruction in E & E. The importance of SEED is being reemphasized. Personnel leaving country on R & R receive a special SEED briefing prior to departure.

d (C) Operations.

(1) Plans: At the close of the reporting period the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion is assuming and coordinating the missions of its assigned units from its base camp at Dong Ba Thin, RVN. The Forward Tactical Operations Center was transferred to Ben Ho Thiet on 24 August 1966 to command and control 17th Combat Aviation Group assets committed to Task Force Splicer. With the termination of Task Force Splicer on 27 October 1966, the Forward TOC was returned to Dong Ba Thin on 29 October 1966.

(2) Operations: Units of the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion continue to provide aviation support throughout the seven southern provinces of the II Corps Tactical Zone. The Battalion continues its support to Task Force South, a joint US, ARVN operation in the Lai Khe, Gre Loc, Phu Ninh area, supporting ARVN Marine and Infantry units in addition to support operations.
provided to the 9th ROK Infantry Division (White Horse), the 22nd and 23rd 1.1.VN Divisions, 5th Special Forces and general support missions throughout the battalion area of operation. No unit displacements have occurred during the quarter. The 52nd Assault Helicopter Company continues to maintain a base camp at Dong Ba Thin but supports elements of Task Force South from its forward area located at Eco Loc. The battalion coordinated aviation support of Task Force Sporlar at Bn McNair throughout the quarter provided by elements of the 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion and 26th Combat Aviation Battalion of the 17th Combat Aviation Group. Task Force Sporlar was formed in the early hours of the Battle of Duc Lap and 10th Combat Aviation Battalion was tasked to provide the Army Aviation Element to coordinate overall aviation assets.

(a) Operational results of support to Task Force Sporlar by 17th Combat Aviation Group elements under the operational control of the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion are as shown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sorties Flown</th>
<th>Troops Lifted (tons)</th>
<th>Cargo Lifted</th>
<th>Enemy Structures Dammed</th>
<th>Sampans Dammed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,768</td>
<td>41,554</td>
<td>1,668</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Operations of the 46th Assault Helicopter Company: The 46th AHC continued its direct support role of the 9th ROK Infantry Division including command and control, daily resupply, combat assaults, extractions, administrative troop movements, VIP transport, convoy cover, reconnaissance, and medical evacuations. Support was also rendered on an individual request basis to US and ARVN units. The missions included medical evacuation, gunship support and assistance toupply outposts. During the quarter, the White Horse ROK Infantry Division, supported by the 46th AHC, killed 550 enemy and captured 112 weapons captured: 213 grenades, 130 small arms, 10 machine guns, 9 mortars, 9 81-mm rockets, 4 radios and 22,321 rounds of small arms ammunition. A total of 32,577 sorties were flown, 51,378 troops transported and 2,605 tons of cargo lifted by the 46th AHC. In the offensives of the 26th ROK Infantry Regiment were airlifted by the 46th AHC during offensive operations in the 196th ROK Combat Assault resulting in 26 VC KIA, 1 POW, and the capture of 12 small arms and 10 grenades. More than 3,000 troops of the 27th ROK Infantry Regiment were airlifted by the 46th AHC during offensive operations in the 29th Regiment's AO, resulting in 22 VC KIA and the capture of 21 small arms and 22 grenades. Nine Viet Cong were returned to government control under the "Open Arms" program. Over 11,000 troops of the 30th ROK Infantry Regiment were airlifted by the 46th AHC during offensive operations in the 30th Regiment's AO resulting in 92 VC KIA and the capture of 12 small arms and 19 grenades. In addition all three regiments participated in a company sized minefield assault. This operation "Falk Na 9" was preceded by a deceptive combat assault west of...
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AVGD-AB
5 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operations report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968

VCS CSFOR-65 (II) (V)

Dong Ba Thin. On 13 October 1968, "EAK" IA 9" started with an air mobile assault on the "Grand Sommet" BP 9145, and other mountains south of the Tran, by the 30th PD Infantry Regiment. The attack was backed up by a coordinated ground assault by the 26th and 29th regiments to clear off the base of the mountain complex. The purpose of this mission was to close with and destroy the enemy that had dominated the area for several years. On 16 October 1968, 99 barrels of diesel fuel were dropped by UH-1 into an area approximately 300 meters by 400 meters to ignite by TAC air dropping napalm to burn away the vegetation and expose the enemy from the cave entrances. But this effort failed because the fuel didn't burn. (See Lessons Learned Section II). On 22 October, 25 bombs were dropped by UH-1 on enemy positions in an effort to force him to expose himself. This tactic also failed because the hand maggots malfunctioned. (See Section II, Lessons Learned). The operation achieved the following results: 360 VC KIA, 9 POW, captured; 92 small arms, 3/60mm mortars, 6/60mm mortars, 9/7-140 rockets, 2/81mm, 8/107mm, 22,361 rounds of small arms ammunition, 86 rounds of miscellaneous ammunition, 150 hand grenades, 18 radios, 22 rifles, 384 and 19 protective masks. The 16th AHC moved 1,387 troops during the operation. The 16th AHC also accounted for 12 enemy killed by air during the quarter.

(c) Operations of the 92nd Assault Helicopter Company: The primary mission of the unit continued to be general support of the II Corps Tactical Zone. This mission was divided between direct support to Task Force South and general support missions to IFFV. Nine lift ships and four gunships were committed to TF South from 1 August through 25 October, when the commitment was reduced to three lift ships and two gunships. These TF South units included the 2nd LAVN Ranger Group, 2nd Battalion, 503 Infantry, 173rd Airborne Brigade, 3rd Special Forces units, and WPFF units in Lam Dong (Sou Lao) and Truyen Duc (Dac) Provinces. The 92nd frequently lifted as many as 1,000 US and ARVN troops on simultaneous lifts. The unit was augmented by medium helicopters of the 223rd AHC on these occasions. The 92nd AHC provided daily support in the form of command and control aircraft, troop lift, extractions, combat assaults, resupply, medical evacuations, LAVF insertions and extractions, "Smoke" missions, convoy escort, and gunship support. During the period many VIPs were transported, including the Secretary of the Navy and General Creighton Abrams. The unit flew 3,249 hours, 3,559 tasks, 9,112 sorties, 15,720 troops were lifted, 289 tons of cargo hauled, 63 medical evacuations performed, and expended 236,700, 7.62mm rounds, 1,756 rockets, and 2,388 40mm rounds for TF South. In addition, the 92nd AHC flew support for DSL II Corps (i.e. Lao, Phan Rang, Dacot, and Nha Tran), MACV Navy, and the 16th Engineer Brigade. The 92nd AHC flew 2,166 hours, 2,363 tasks, 6,276 sorties, 9,067 troops were lifted, 193 tons of cargo hauled, 28 medical evacuations performed, and expended 157,600 rockets and 1,590 40mm rounds in support of these activities. The unit's gunships also augmented the 155th AHC guns during the latter part of this period.
Operations of the 155th Assault Helicopter Company: This quarter was characterized by the commitment of the majority of the units aircraft in support of the 23rd ARVN Division and 1st Infantry Division operations. Several major company and platoon size operations were accomplished. During periods between lifts, numerous Eagle flights were conducted throughout the Ben Ho Thuan area. In addition to support provided to ARVN and US Forces, the company furnished daily an aircraft for Quang Duc and Dariel sectors. In addition to supporting Task Force Sporider during the Battle of Duc Lap, the 155th AHC accomplished major lifts in Quan Ron, Cho Lo and numerous flights for Special Forces units. At 0105 hours on 3 August 1968, the Battle of Duc Lap began. The 155th AHC, twenty-five miles northeast, had gunships on station within 30 minutes. Continuous armed helicopter support was provided throughout the night. The unit provided 5 lift ships and 2 gunships to reinforce the beleaguered outposts. This was accomplished in spite of intense ground fire. On 28 August, 7 lift ships and 2 armed escort helicopters were provided to reinforce the besieged forces. The 155th AHC continued throughout the quarter to support this vital action. Unit aircraft sustained many hits but 3 were lost due to enemy action. Cargo and control aircraft, combat assaults, people "sniffer", flare ships, troop lifts, extractions, LRRP displacements, medical evacuations, Eagle flights, refugee movements, convoy cover, and VIP flights were among the many roles the 155th performed. On of these VIP flights included transporting President Thieu, his staff and party to Duc Lap. Unit aircraft flew 6693 hours, 21,224 sorties, 26,469 passengers were lifted, 739 tons of cargo hauled, 72 medevacs were performed, and the gunships were credited with 72 enemy killed. These achievements were accomplished during adverse weather. On 18 August, while engaged in a combat assault for B-23, 5th Special Forces, a UH-1C received minor damage from two rounds of small arms fire, however one crewmember was seriously wounded. At 0700 hours on 3 August one UH-1C "sniffer" was shot down while on an "sniffer" flight over Duc Lap. Although one of the crew was seriously wounded they managed to fight their way to a friendly compound 100 meters away. Twenty six rounds of small arms and anti-aircraft fire were received that day. The following day a troop carrying lift helicopter was brought down by enemy small arms at Duc Lap. The aircraft crashed and burned with four passengers fatalities. The crew was rescued and evacuated to Ben Ho Thuan. Seven aircraft were hit on the 24th of August. At 0200 hours, 26 August, Camp Coryell, home base for the 155th AHC was subjected to 10 rounds of recoilless rifle fire. One aviator was slightly injured and 3 UH-1H helicopters received minor damage. There was light damage to other facilities. On 27 August two UH-1C uninsured were ridden by enemy small arms at Duc Lap as they began a fire in progress. One aviator was killed, two received facial injuries and one was saved when a bullet struck his chest protector. The two crippled helicopters returned to Camp Coryell. At 0215 hours, 31 August, the 155th compound was again subjected to a
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968 (CSFOR-65) (U)

122mm rocket attack. Twenty rounds fell, inflicting minor injuries to 5 personnel from support units and incurring minor damage to three 10th Infantry Division UH-1 aircraft. At 1100 hours, 8 September, on a return flight from Duc Lap, the 23rd ARVN Senior Advisor's aircraft was forced down due to unknown causes. The aircraft crashed and burned on impact and all aboard perished except the two enlisted crewmembers, who were seriously injured. General An, the 23rd ARVN Division Commander, and Colonel Sae, the 23rd ARVN Senior Advisor, were listed among the dead. On the afternoon of 23 September, while engaged on a Ci in the Duc Lap area, a UH-1H was forced by enemy fire in a landing zone. No one was injured in the crash but an aviator was slightly injured by a mortar round. The aircraft was destroyed by fire and the crew was not extracted until several hours later due to intense enemy fire. At 0220 hours, 8 October, Camp Coryell was again subjected to a hostile attack. Forty rounds of 60mm mortars and 4 B-40 rockets fell on or near the compound. Three aircraft were slightly damaged and minor damage was inflicted to the compound. During the attack a sapper team of two men penetrated the eastern perimeter, when they attempted to cut the inner fence, guards on Post #5 heard the noise and fired a hand flamethrower. They sighted the team and engaged them with M-60 machine guns. The sappers disappeared into the underbrush, leaving trails of blood. Enemy casualties could not be determined.

(c) Operations of the 192nd Assault Helicopter Company: The primary mission of the 192nd AHCo was the direct support of the 3/506 Infantry, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) in ÁO McClain. Support was also rendered to DMC II Corps and recurring missions were for Dalat NAGC, Phan Rang NAGC, Phan Thiet NAGC and the 5th Battalion 27th Artillery. No major operations were conducted in August. On the 25th of August a major contact was made with an estimated battalion of VC. The 192nd AHCo moved 2 companies into the vicinity of AN 8116 to reinforce elements from Binh Thuan Section. Gunships were used in suppression of the enemy. The lift was completed by 1825 hours. The 213rd ASHC assisted in airlifting the companies. Shortly after the insertion a night resupply was conducted to supply ground forces with ammunition and flares. The remainder of the quarter saw light action in areas of Operation McClain. Most combat assaults were platoon sized and few exceeded company size. The only major assault was made on 11 October. It consisted of elements from the 3/506th Infantry and the 1/24th ARVN Infantry Battalion. The lift began at 0600 hours with an element of the 3/506th Infantry securing a terrain feature at AN 0531 for a fire support base. After completion of the FSB move, elements of the 3/506th were lifted into company size.' The 1/24th ARVN was then lifted in to complete the joint US ARVN operation. Operations from 27 through 31 October were severely hampered by fuel contamination found in 192nd aircraft. During this period the company was capable of limited
support only. The 192nd
missions consisted of combat assaults,
daily resupply, insertions and extractions, convoy cover, gunship
support, LRRP displacement, and flare drops. During this quarter
the 192nd accomplished the following: 30,964 troops lifted, 16,719
sorties flown, 776 tons lifted, 14 structures damaged, 6 sampans
destroyed, and 12 enemy killed. The 192nd flew 5,423 hours in support
of these activities.

(f) Operations of the 211st Assault Helicopter Company: The
211st AH C continued in its primary mission of general support to the
II Corps Tactical Zone. A secondary mission during this period was
direct support of the 5th Special Forces (Project Delta). During the
quarter the 211st AH C actively supported Task Force South, Task Force
Spiller, Detachment B-20 and Company "EF" 20th Infantry in AO Green.
Coastal support missions throughout II Corps were also flown. The
211st AH C lift aircraft flew 4,015 hours, had 201M tasks, flew 12,663
sorties, lifted 25,162 passengers and 186 tons of cargo, and performed
4 medical evacuations. The unit had 6 lift ships hit by hostile
fire during the period. Gunships accounted for 1197 hours, 667 tasks,
1815 sorties, 15 enemy killed, 51 structures and 4 sampans destroyed.
A total of 411,750 small arms rounds, 2,376 rockets and 3,682 40mm
grenades were expended. Four gunships were hit by ground fire with
no losses.

(g) Operations of the 243rd Assault Support Helicopter Company: The
243rd ASHC continued in support of Task Force South with an average of 5
aircraft committed daily. Four aircraft were allocated to units in the Ben
Loc/Dalat area in support of the 173rd Brigade. One aircraft was employed
in support of the 3/506th, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), in AO
McClain in the Phan Thiet area. Additional support was rendered
to the 9th ROK Infantry Division, the 4th Infantry Division, COORDS, 5th
Special Forces, and Doric Province H.C.V. The 243rd ASHC augmented the
lift capability of the assault helicopter companies of the 10th Combat
Aviation Battalion. Missions consisted of combat assaults, resupply,
fire base moves, refugee relocation, logistic operations, and tactical
emergencies. Sixteen OH-1 aircraft were recovered by the 243rd ASHC
during the quarter. On 20 October, between 0700 and 0730 hours,
CH-47 #66-19053 disappeared enroute to Ben Ho Thuhn. The last report
from the aircraft commander fixed his position as somewhere in the Ninh
Hoa Valley on a westerly course. No further transmissions were received.
Search and rescue efforts were hampered by weather for three days. An
intensive search and rescue was conducted by the US Army and Air Force
where weather permitted. No trace of the aircraft has been found and the
crew, of five, is missing in action. One aircraft sustained 12 hits by
enemy small arms fire. One aviator was wounded and evacuated to Japan.
The 243rd ASHC flew 3715 hours and 10,596 sorties, lifted 30,027 troops,
and hauled 13,128 tons of cargo.
(h) Operational Results (incl 2).

(U) Training.

(1) Training has been characterized this quarter by increased emphasis on aviation training, particularly on rules of engagement and gunship crew duties. Formal classes on the rules of engagement and gunship crew duties have been added to required training subjects. Unit commanders are including in command information classes discussions on rules of engagement at least once monthly in addition to a one time class conducted for all personnel this quarter. Additional emphasis has been placed on the selection and training of gunship crews particularly in crew duties and target engagement. Added to the 90 day standardization check ride is an examination of the gunship crews proficiency, and knowledge of equipment and systems, by a qualified gunnery instructor pilot. Casualties to friendly forces will be eliminated as a result of the training being conducted.

(2) Standardization: The Battalion Standardization Instructor Pilot was replaced during August. Frequent liaison and training visits were made to the companies during the quarter. A standardization guide on UH-1 crewmember duties, information on use of the UH-1C hydraulic accumulator system, and a 50 question examination for the UH-1C, were formulated and reproduced for the companies. The examination for the UH-1C is being copied by the 6th Aviation Brigade to be utilized by all Brigade units. Numerous standardization publications and information from Fort Rucker, USAVU, 1st Aviation Brigade, 17th Combat Aviation Group, and the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion were disseminated. Thirty-five SIPs and II's were qualified by the Battalion SIP's, in addition to administering thirty-five, aircraft commanders, in-country orientation, and 90 day check rides. Approximately 200 hours were flown in support of these activities. Increased emphasis was placed on standardization and instructor pilot qualification throughout the quarter.

(3) Summary of unit training emphasis are discussed in paragraphs below:

(a) 48th Assault Helicopter Company: The training program has been geared to provide replacements, required orientation within the first week in country. On the job training has had special emphasis. Command information, character guidance, escape and evasion and CTR classes have been conducted. Supplemental training such as the employment of flares and smoke Grenades was accomplished.

(b) 92nd Assault Helicopter Company: The large turnover of personnel during the quarter required special emphasis on replacement training. Special emphasis was placed on training of unit instructor
pilots. One standardization and one instructor pilot was trained. Orientation, 90 dry standardization, and transition training into gunships accounted for the 114 hours flown in aviation training.

(c) 155th Assault Helicopter Company: Aviation training included employment of flare ships, qualification of aircraft commanders, administration of quarterly check rides, and on the job training for crewmembers and maintenance personnel. All other training requirements were met and supplemental classes in many areas were conducted.

(d) 192nd Assault Helicopter Company: Scheduled classes in compliance with directives from higher headquarters have continued throughout the period. In August, aviation training, character guidance, command information, survival, civil affairs, safeguarding defense information, and aviation duty classes were conducted. During the rest of the quarter training in the Code of Conduct, Geneva Conventions, weapons qualification, survival, escape and evasion, and CFR was accomplished.

(e) 201st Assault Helicopter Company: Aviation training was influenced by the rotation of many experienced personnel to CONUS. As a result, extensive training was accomplished to raise the experience level. Training was conducted in night operations, including combat assaults, and identification and engagement of targets. Classes on flight safety and standardization flights were also conducted. Other training included CBR, weapons safety and handling, first aid, escape and evasion, character guidance, and survival.

(f) 213rd Assault Support Helicopter Company: During the quarter, three standard RW instrument tickets and three tactical RW instrument tickets were renewed. Check rides were administered by the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion SIP, unit SIP and unit IP's. Six newly arrived aviators were signed off as operationally qualified. One unit SIP and two IP's were trained. Eight aviators were made aircraft commanders. The unit continued its cross training of non-aviator crewmembers. Qualifications in individual and crew serve weapons were accomplished. Monthly classes in standardization and safety were conducted. All training requirements in non-aviation subjects were also met.

f. (U) Logistics.

3. Major logistics efforts during this reporting period have been directed toward:

(a) Dust suppression and soil stabilization

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Cavalry Division Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968 CS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(b) Replacing unserviced tents at Phan Thiet with WABTOC buildings with metal roof and wood floor

(c) Improving overall maintenance operation

(d) Procurement and issue of NAMX flight suits, flight gloves, and flight helmets

(e) Supporting the movement of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) through the battalion area of operation

(2) POL: 500 barrels of pens prime has been shipped to Phan Thiet for dust suppression. Necessary requests have been submitted for a more permanent type soil stabilization, and is awaiting USARV approval. 250 barrels of pens prime was ordered for Ben Ho Thiet where an effective program in dust suppression has been initiated.

(3) Services: Efforts are being made to replace general purpose tents of the 192nd Assault Helicopter Company at Phan Thiet with metal covered WABTOC buildings. A plan has been approved by the Phan Thiet Base Development Board for this project and a request for construction has been submitted to USARV.

(4) Maintenance: A CJI team was served at battalion level and all units have been visited. This type of assistance has proved most effective in educating new personnel, and maintenance within the battalion has improved. Return visits have reflected a marked improvement over initial visits. Maintenance personnel now seek the help of the team in setting up and maintaining better FIL's, THERS forms and scheduled maintenance. A lateral parts search by the battalion team has resulted in reducing down time on ground support equipment and vehicles.

(5) Supply: NAMX flight clothing has been received by the battalion S-4, and is being issued to all companies. NAMX flight gloves and sun glasses continue to present a problem. Every effort is being made through channels, to draw NAMX gloves or an acceptable substitute, and sun glasses.

(6) Support: The S-4 section is presently supporting the movement of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), which started 26 October 1968. Three additional refueling points were set up at Dan Be Thinh and nine additional refueling points at Phan Thiet. Hot meals, transient billets and aircraft parts are provided on an as needed basis as well as aircraft recovery. The operation to date has been smooth with no difficulties encountered.

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(7) The 192nd AH-1C experienced a complete grounding of all its operational aircraft. Over an eleven day period seven precautionary landings were executed resulting from a mysterious reduction of engine power. Fuel filters and fuel control servo filters were inspected in these aircraft and found to contain dirt, rust and in some cases a slime like substance. Refueling from the mini port was terminated until the fuel could be analyzed for contamination. Samples were taken from each of the aircraft and storage tanks located on the beach. The fuel analysis laboratory found all samples were on grade except for samples taken from the bottom of the storage tanks, which had some salt water contamination. Fuel cells were examined and several aircraft were discovered to have residue in the cells that seemed to be held to the bottom by a slimy substance similar to that found in the filters. Samples were taken and sent to the Army Floating Aircraft Maintenance Facility in Vung Tau. Initial observations of these samples indicated that a fungus or yeast was present. To this date there has been no growth from these samples under lab conditions, consequently it has not been established that there was organic matter present. Removal of this fuel cell contamination was done using approximately 20 gallons of isopropyl alcohol per aircraft and JP-4. Since all fuel cells have been cleaned there have been no engine problems similar to those prior to the grounding of aircraft.

(8) The 100 hour inspection of tail rotor hubs continues to plague unit availability with excessive down time at the periodic inspection. Twice during the quarter the general support unit has had work stoppages, while awaiting parts for two hundred or more hubs found defective during the 100 hour inspection. UH-1H mast assemblies have caused a similar problem due to the number of aircraft down simultaneously for the 100 hour period. This component has, as still is causing excessive down time but this problem has been somewhat alleviated by the General Support Unit's recently initiated overhaul and return to service program.

(9) Aircraft status as of 31 October 1968 (incl. 3).

g. (C) Organization:

(1) The assigned aviation companies remained the same during this period.

(2) The 170th Assault Helicopter Company was placed under operational control of the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion on 21 August 1968 and was released from OPCON on 1 October 1968.
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(3) In accordance with paragraph 2 General Order number 62, Headquarters, 17th Combat Aviation Group, dated 5 October 1968 the 348th Aviation Support was attached to the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion effective 25 September 1968.

h. (U) Civil Affairs. During the past quarter units of the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion have supported a number of civilian institutions.

(1) The 192nd Assault Helicopter Company has contributed to the rehabilitation of people in a Phan Thiet poor house. The theme of this effort was to assist the people in helping themselves, rather than just giving, in the name of charity. Facilities were repaired and showers installed and a barber shop was set up for the occupants.

(2) The 155th Assault Helicopter Company took up a collection to help the children of a Ban Me Thuot orphanage. A total of $199.00 was donated during the quarter.

(3) During the month of August four aviators of the 92nd Assault Helicopter Company initiated a scholarship fund, using volunteer donations for the purpose of helping deserving high school and college students from the Cam Ranh Bay area. The fund, entitled "The Pat Ward Memorial Scholarship Fund", is in memory of SP4 Pat Ward of the 92nd who was killed in action 22 August 1968 near Di Linh, RVN. As of 15 October the fund is being used in support of 2 Vietnamese girls attending the Girls Public School of Dalat and 3 Vietnamese boys attending the Boys Public School of Dalat.

(4) The 243rd Assault Support Helicopter Company is helping to support an orphanage near Dong Ba Thin.

(5) Medical aid was also given to Vietnamese citizens in the Dong Ba Thin and Phan Thiet areas. The aid was in the form of immunizations and routine sick calls. A total of 1,696 patients were treated in the past quarter.

h. (U) Surgeon.

(1) The activities of the Battalion Surgeon consisted of advising the commander on medical matters, coordinating and supervising the medical facilities and activities of the battalion, providing emergency and routine medical care for Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment and other US forces in the Dong Ba Thin area, and monitoring the battalion environmental sanitation and nutrition. During the last quarter it was discovered, during a post aircraft accident physical examination, that a door gunner had defective depth perception. After a rapid spot check with other flight
surgeons in the battalion there was sufficient reason to believe that there were a number of crew chiefs and door gunners with defective vision of one variety or another.

(2) During this quarter, over three-fourths of the crew chiefs and door gunners were checked for visual acuity, depth perception, peripheral vision, and color vision. It was determined that 10.7% did not have 20/20 vision and either needed glasses or needed their present glasses changed. 2.3% failed the depth perception tests, and 8.9% failed the color vision tests. There were none who failed peripheral vision tests.

1. (U) Information.

(1) The 10th Battalion public information program continued to provide coverage of events occurring at the Dong Da Thin complex and outlying unit areas.

(2) A bi-weekly publication THE VAGABOND VOICE is published at battalion level and contains information of interest to commanders and personnel in the battalion. It also assists in the dissemination of command information.

(3) Following PIO releases for the quarter processed through headquarters:

   (a) Number of printed releases 9
   (b) Number of pictorial releases 20
   (c) Number of hometown releases 36
   (d) Number of hometown pictorial releases 19
   (e) Number of taped interviews 0

J. (U) Safety. From the aviation safety standpoint, an undesirable trend in accident prevention has been established this quarter. Because of inadequate infusion of aviators during the past calendar year, there has been approximately a fifty (50) percent turnover of assigned aviators during this quarter. The sudden influx of inexperienced aviators just out of flight school has led to a drop in the pilot proficiency level within the battalion. Consequently an increase in aircraft mishaps is being encountered, and more can be forecasted until a high degree of proficiency can be attained by newly assigned personnel. Units are encountering myriad training and safety problems as a result of the loss of experienced Aircraft Commanders and unit instructor pilots.
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AWOD-AE
9 November 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968 AGS OSGX-65 (RL) (U)

k. (U) Signal.

1. Detailed attempts to obtain ARC-102 antenna kits in an adequate quantity for installation in the 10th CAB helicopters have been successful. Units have on hand an adequate quantity of the necessary RF units, antenna couplers and control heads for a high frequency radio capability throughout the battalion, but the antenna kits have not been forthcoming.

2. A GRM-6 low frequency radio beacon was obtained for, and installed by the 155th AHC at Ban Me Thuot. Also a new airfield control tower was established at that location with technical assistance provided by the 155th AHC.

3. Airfield control tower responsibility was transferred from the 10th CAB to the 326th Aviation Support Detachment at Dalat Camly Airfield.

4. A voice solo user circuit was effected between battalion headquarters and the 15th AHC at Ninh Hoa. This circuit now satisfies the goal of a separate solo user voice channel from battalion to each of its companies. Also acquired was a hot line concept telephone circuit for the battalion commander and primary staff from headquarters directly to Cam Ranh LD switchboard, bypassing Dong Ba Thin switchboard. This results, in addition to a more punctual response for distant phone calls, in another backup link, supplementing high frequency radio, should Dong Ba Thin switchboard become unable to accommodate traffic.

5. EOCW assistance was received in a request for technical assistance to improve the transmission quality of the TRC-126 high frequency radio.

6. Effective communications checks were accomplished between Battalion Headquarters and companies using the KY-28 voice scrambler. One KY-8 ground mode voice scrambler has been received and put into operable condition in the Movements Control Center at battalion headquarters.

1. (U) Chaplain.

1. The 10th Combat Aviation Battalion Chaplain, during the quarter has conducted a total of 31 Sunday and 65 weekday Catholic services with a total attendance of 1785 soldiers. Additionally 4 memorial services were conducted.

2. Services were conducted in Dong Ba Thin, Phan Thiet, Ban Me Thuot, Ninh Hoa, Nha Trang, An Hoa, and Bao Loc to units of the command.

3. One hundred twenty (120) counsel interviews were conducted by the Chaplain.
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WGB-4E

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFUR-65 (R1) (U)


a. (U) Personnel.

(1) Clerical Personnel Qualifications.

(a) Observation. Clerical personnel arriving in this organization do not possess the basic requirements listed in AR 611-20.

(b) Evaluation. During the quarter this battalion had received numerous replacements in MOS 70D10 and 71B20. Most were unable to type or at best typed 15 to 20 words per minute. They also showed little knowledge of basic correspondence procedures. Effective utilization was impossible without OJT, and as many of these individuals were to replace losses in more advanced MOS (71B30 and 71H20), the quality of administration has suffered during this quarter.

(c) Recommendation. That those individuals attending administrative MOS producing schools in CONUS be more stringently graded. When their advancement is less than average and the acquired knowledge or skill is not in keeping with the standards of the MOS, recommend they be awarded a lesser skilled specialty.

(2) Aviator assignment to CH-47 Units.

(a) Observation. CH-47 units receiving newly rated aviators as compared to experienced aviators.

(b) Evaluation. Newly rated aviators arriving in a unit at the same time, place a heavy burden on the IP's and CO's. The new aviator has to be flown with an IP for a minimum of 25 hours prior to being released as an operational pilot. Normally, 500 hours is required before the newly rated aviator can be considered for training as an aircraft commander.

(c) Recommendation. That newly rated and experienced aviators be assigned to CH-47 units on a one to one ratio. Space the influx of pilots so as to give the units sufficient time for training prior to receiving others.

b. (C) Operations.

(1) Aerial Drop of Diesel Fuel and Gasoline.

(a) Observation. On 18 October 1968, during the current division sized combat operation South of Kha Trang, the 48th Assault Helicopter Company was required to drop 55 gallon drums full of diesel fuel, rigged
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in cargo nets, 3 to a load, carried externally, over a designated area. The aircraft, six UH-1H's, flew in trail formation and were guided from an observation post to the target and told when to release the loads. The purpose of the drop was to allow the diesel fuel to spread over a large area, then be ignited by napalm when dropped by Tactical Air, thus burning away foliage and exposing cave entrances, etc.

(b) EVALUATION. The aircraft must travel at approximately 60 knots, at 500 feet to adequately perform this mission. A total of 99 barrels were dropped in 33 loads which included 33 sets of cargo nets, slings, and hooks. The target area was not satisfactorily saturated with the fuel due to the inaccuracy of the method used for dropping and therefore did not ignite when napalm and bombs were dropped on the area.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That ground troops use flame throwers, or napalm be delivered by Tactical Air and this method of fuel drop not be used. Exposure of aircraft at low altitude and airspeed plus loss of fuel, slings and nets is not satisfactory for the results received.

(2) Aerial CS Gas Drop.

(a) OBSERVATION. On 22 October 1968, during the current 9th ROK Infantry Division sized operation south of Nha Trang, this unit was required to drop cases of CS gas grenades from the aircraft, at altitudes, which were designed to break on impact allowing the grenades to explode thoroughly dispensing the gas in the area.

(b) EVALUATION. This field expedient gas dispenser is unsafe for drop from aircraft as presently designed. The common pins are pulled and if any grenade is turned in side the box, it can ignite allowing the gas to escape in the aircraft and start a fire. Depending on the location of this box in the stack and the reaction time within the aircraft loss of aircraft and crew is possible. Four such boxes did ignite when pins were pulled, one inside a UH-1H and 3 others in the pickup zone. This box device is very similar to the E158R2 CS gas dispenser manufactured and designed for helicopter drop. The E158R2 is presently available and on hand in RVN.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the box device not be used at all but use the properly designed E158R2 CS gas dispenser as recommended in TM 3-1325-232-12 dated November 1967. (This item is also referenced in quarterly report dated 31 July 1968).

(3) Repelling.

(a) OBSERVATION. 9th ROK Infantry Division personnel repelling into unprepared LZ's while on combat assaults take an average of 5 minutes

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Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, ROCS CSFOR-65 (HI) (U)

per man to rappel. They are hesitant to rappel from both sides of the aircraft at the same time due, in part, to inadequate training. On occasion the terrain prevents use of both sides of the aircraft.

(b) EVALUATION. During training prior to a recent rappelling operation proper rappelling equipment was not available. A one inch rope with knots was substituted. It was found using this rope and a hand over hand method that the time for one man to rappel was decreased by one half (2½ minutes). It was further noted that personnel were not hesitant to exit from both sides of the aircraft simultaneously. The time over the LZ was decreased by approximately 12½ to 15 minutes per sortie thereby, decreasing aircraft and personnel exposure time.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the hand over hand knotted rope method be experimented and developed for possible utilization by untrained personnel in rappelling operations.

(4) Night Resupply by CH-47.

(a) OBSERVATION. Problems encountered by delivery of sling loads by CH-47 into dusty areas at night.

(b) EVALUATION. Night operations into dusty areas have several inherent problems. The most hazardous appears to be encountering IFR conditions due to the dust obscuring all references. The use of the aircraft landing light increases the glare when the dust begins to billow around the aircraft during load touchdown.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. When possible, illuminate the landing zone well enough so that the aircraft landing light will not have to be utilized. Place another light on a reference point well forward of the point of touchdown. With the use of this lighting method, visual reference can more easily be maintained with the point of touchdown and the reference point in the distance.

(5) Training.

(1) Flight Training and Standardization of Newly Assigned Aviators.

(c) OBSERVATION. The mass exodus of well qualified aviators during the quarter imposed a great burden on the flight standardization program. The majority of incoming aviators are recently out of flight school. A pronounced drop in the experience level in the battalion occurred. An undesirable situation has evolved, where units must compromise quality by utilizing inexperienced aviators to train replacements.
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(e) EVALUATION. A minimum of one Standardization Instructor Pilot and three IP's are needed in each unit to train incoming aviators. Due to high operational commitments, neither aircraft nor pilots have been available for IP qualification. The high incidence of aircraft mishaps and loss has also retarded progress.

(f) RECOMMENDATION. That instructor pilots be trained in CONUS where time and assets are available. That these individuals be closely managed by USARV to maintain an acceptable level of qualified instructor pilots throughout RVN.

(2) Standardization of UH-1H Training.

(c) OBSERVATION. When operated at light gross weight, with the battery in the rear, the UH-1H has a pronounced nose high altitude.

(b) EVALUATION. During landings the nose high altitude restricts forward visibility and the danger of striking objects with the tail is increased. During pick-up to hover an undesirable nose pitch up is also created.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the battery be placed in the front for normal operations and sand bags be placed behind the pilot and co-pilot seats during auto rotation training.

(3) Crewchief and Doorgunner Training.

(c) OBSERVATION. That CONUS should trained personnel be employed in these positions rather than on the job trained personnel. Both are being used at present. Personnel are arriving in the theater in insufficient numbers to fill the quotas of the aviation units involved.

(c) EVALUATION. Due to the heavy operational commitment requiring the use of all available experienced crewchiefs and doorgunners on a daily basis, the current policy of units training some of these men on a regular basis is at best cumbersome, and the result is an inferior end product.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the personnel be extensively trained in CONUS prior to their arrival in-country as either crewchiefs or doorgunners and that these personnel arrive in sufficient numbers to replace the personnel departing for CONUS, to alleviate the current deficit presently in aviation units.

d. (C) Intelligence. Security Forces at Outlying Units.

(1) OBSERVATION. The shortage of security force personnel at outlying units is critical.
(2) EVALUATION. Flight personnel have had to take over security positions previously manned by security platoons or excess personnel. Aircraft crewmen are performing their normal duties during the day, and then perform as security guards at night. This results in their being inefficient the following day. This loss of trained crewmen hinders the accomplishment of the unit's mission.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That security forces of 35 men each be attached to outlying units and that vacancies due to DEPLOS or casualties be filled as they occur.

e. (U) Logistics.

(1) Fuel Cell Contamination.

(a) OBSERVATION. Over an eleven day period the 192nd AHC experienced several precautionary landings executed as a result of a mysterious erosion of engine power.

(b) EVALUATION. Fuel filters and fuel control servo filters were inspected in these aircraft and found to contain dirt, rust and in some cases a slime like substance. Fuel samples were taken from each of the aircraft, and from the storage tanks and dispenser nozzles of the local mini-port. According to the fuel analysis laboratory, all samples were on grade, except for those samples taken from the bottom of the storage tanks, which had some salt water contamination. Fuel cells were examined and several aircraft were discovered to have trash in the cells that seemed to be held to the bottom by a slimy substance similar to that found in the filters. Samples were taken of this slime and sent to a medical laboratory at Cam Ranh Bay and a laboratory facility in Vung Tau. Initial observations from these samples indicated that a fungus or yeast was present. To this date there has been no growth from these samples under lab conditions, consequently it has not been established that there was organic matter present. Removal of this cell contamination was done using approximately 20 gallons of isopropyl alcohol per aircraft and JP-4. The alcohol was introduced into the cells and allowed to set 30 minutes to one hour. It was then flushed out using pressurized JP-4 from one 1200 gallon tanker and pulled through the fuel cell system using the de-fueling apparatus of a second 1200 gallon tanker connected to the sump pump assembly hole. This method was used in lieu of those prescribed by TM 55-405-3. All fuel system filters were changed, the aircraft were run-up, checked for leaks and test flown and released for operational flight. All aircraft have now been run through this process and since their completion there have been no engine problems similar to those prior to their grounding.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Units experiencing engine problems under similar climatic conditions, inspect the fuel cells of suspect aircraft for fuel cell contamination and to consider the use of the fuel cell cleaning procedures described above.

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(2) Permanent bunker construction.

(a) OBSERVATION. Bunker material (sandbags) which are used for constructing permanent type bunkers deteriorate after a period of 5 to 7 months.

(b) EVALUATION. It has become necessary to rebuild bunkers constructed from sandbags due to short service life. Weather creates a rapid decay of the sandbag material. The personnel used to rebuild these fortifications must be taken from their normal duties, which sometimes creates manpower shortages in critical areas.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. A more permanent type material for sandbags would alleviate the problem. For permanent type installations material such as lumber and concrete should be utilized and made available for these projects.

(3) Modification to XM-21 System.

(a) OBSERVATION. The cross over system of the XM-21 minigun has been the source of frequent malfunctions and stoppages.

(b) EVALUATION. During this period the 281st AHC made a modification to minigun systems that has proven noteworthy. Rather than the old ammunition boxes, two boxes have been installed, one per gun, approximately 19" high by 40" long. Then cross over drive is rigged to one end of each box with a direct drive to the gun itself. This has eliminated a countless number of stoppages caused by the cross over system. It has also appreciably reduced stoppages because of broken links, and jams in the feeder delinker. The 281st has submitted an EIR on this modification along with a recommendation to the Suggestion awards Committee. This modification allows expenditure of ammunition, when required, using both guns simultaneously, also the gun will continue to fire after being interrupted by the rockets.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That this modification be reviewed by units employing the XM-21 system for possible application to their gun systems.

f. (U) Organization. None.

g. (C) Signal.

(1) Transmission and Reception Quality of TRC-146.

(a) OBSERVATION. Transmission and reception quality of the TRC-146 high frequency radio between Battalion Headquarters and the outlying companies was somewhat less than indicated in its operators and repair manuals.

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(b) EVALUATION. Repeated trips to Direct Support and General Support Maintenance shops resulted in little or no improvement in quality or operability of the TRC-146, within the parameters of published specifications. ECOM was contacted for assistance and it was decided that an electronics representative be sent to check the equipment while in its functional state at Dong In Thin. It was found that the connective coupling between the terminal point of the coaxial cable and the entry point into the antenna coupler case had been fabricated, either at the factory, or in the initial installation and had resulted in an impedance mismatch. This impedance mismatch was sufficiently significant that the signal strength was attenuated and resulted in an appreciable degradation from optimum operating levels, both in transmit and receive modes.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Utilize an AN/GRC-106 or an AN/GRC-95 radio and perform an operational comparison check between either of those and the TRC-146, using the same antenna. If a difference is noted in the transmit or receive levels and is not correctable by normal maintenance means, it is suggested that ECOM be contacted for assistance.

(2) INSTALLATION AND OPERATION OF THE KY28.

(a) OBSERVATION. The advent of the KY-28 Voice Encoder/Decoder into 10th CAB and the incidental retrofit to accommodate these items has posed the requirement to assess the characteristics of these items under field conditions.

(b) EVALUATION. Installing the KY-28 into its shock mount, without altering the wiring harness as assembled by ZH/ZZ retrofit personnel, was almost a physical impossibility. Little foresight was used in determining the routing and hold down points, for these needed to be rerouted from their configuration in order to have sufficient wiring length to effect connection into the KY-28. In operating the KY-28 it was found that use of the squelch disable mode on the Rh control head slightly increased the operational range of the set. It was further noted that heavy foliage such as that encountered around the Tan Hoa Thuc area significantly attenuated the signal, when the KY-28 was in the cipher position, as compared to operating in a location where sparse vegetation exists such as in the Khe Hoa area.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That units utilize the KY-28 as often as possible thus gaining knowledge and familiarity with the operating characteristics of the set in various terrain.

(3) ALIGNMENT OF THE KY/GRC-54 RADI0.

(c) OBSERVATION. Alignment and adjustment has caused damage to the adjustable tuning slugs in the tuning coils of R.F. amplifier modules in the GRC-54 radio.
Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CMR-65 (R1) (U)

(b) EVALUATION. The tuning slugs are secured in place by a cement such as Alytol which must be removed or loosened in order for the slugs to be adjusted. Maintenance personnel have attempted to remove this cement by picking away at it with items such as screwdrivers and have damaged or broken the tuning slugs in the process. Since these items are generally difficult to obtain in RVN, the avionics shops suffer the possibility of compounding the problem unless due care is exercised.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. In order to be able to adjust the tuning slugs, it is advisable to obtain a solvent which will dissolve the cement affixing the tuning slug to its stationary position. In the absence of solvent, it has been found that a hot iron will sufficiently soften the cement to enable the slug to be adjusted.

h. (U) Safety. Use of Protective Gloves in Refueling Operations.

1. OBSERVATION. Refueling of helicopters with JP4 has resulted in frequent cases of skin irritation on the hands of the refueling personnel. The leather and nomex flight gloves now being utilized during refueling do not resist absorption of excess JP4. The fuel soaks through the glove and makes contact with the skin of the refueler.

2. EVALUATION. To eliminate the skin irritations, the refuelers have to immediately wash the JP4 from their hands with hot soapy water. This solution is impractical since hand washing facilities are not available at POL points. Another course of action has been taken by this command. A rubber glove, FSN: 8415-641-4601, used in handling chemicals was tested at the 44th Assault Helicopter Company. The glove proved pliable enough so refuelers had no difficulty in handling the refueling equipment, yet the glove has not only cut down the cases of skin irritation, but also has saved the flight gloves from the wear and tear of refueling. The rubber gloves are worn over the flight gloves. The gloves also have been found to be fire resistant.

3. RECOMMENDATION. Utilization of the rubber glove, FSN: 8415-641-4601, in refueling should be an operational procedure to reduce cases of skin irritation and deterioration of flight gloves, as well as affording some protection from fire.


1. OBSERVATION. Due to the need for crew chiefs and door gunners in RVN there has been a relaxation of medical examination standards.

2. EVALUATION. The physical examinations for Class III Flying Duty are forwarded to the 1st Aviation Brigade and are evaluated and approved by the Brigade Flight Surgeon. Since a Standard Form 88 and 89 must be
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completed, the examination given is necessarily complete. The physical examination given to door gunners varies from excellent to very poor throughout RV, ranging from a complete Class III physical to a quick superficial examination. Undoubtedly there have been flight dispensaries where either the large volume of physical examinations required, or the lack of adequate facilities (or both), set the scene for laxity in physical examinations. A program initiated in the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion revealed that of three-fourths of the gunners and crew chiefs checked for visual acuity, depth perception, peripheral and color vision, 10.7% did not have 20/20 vision and either needed glasses or needed their present glasses changed. 2.3% failed the depth perception tests, and 8.9% failed the color vision tests. There were none who failed peripheral vision tests.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Periodic re-evaluation of all door gunners and crew chiefs for visual acuity, depth perception, peripheral and color vision.

As

WILLIAM H. WALKER

LTC, Infantry

Commanding

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AVGD-SC (9 Nov 68) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1966, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, Headquarters, 17th Combat Aviation Group, APO 96240 25 November 1966

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFA-GC-OT, APO 96350

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the basic letter from the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion. Pen and ink corrections of minor errors have been inserted.

2. (C) This headquarters submits the following comments.
   a. Section 1, Operations.
      (1) Paragraph 1d(2), Operations, pages 3 through 8: Units of the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion provide aviation support in the seven southern provinces of the II Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ). The terminology "direct support" and "general support" is incorrect. Operational control flows from I Field Force Vietnam (I FFOCV) through this headquarters and the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion to each aviation company. No aviation company is in direct support of any ground unit in the II CTZ. Because of close proximity to ground unit areas of operation, certain aviation companies habitually support specific ground units, as follows:
         (a) The 48th Assault Helicopter Company habitually supports the 9th ROK Infantry Division.
         (b) The 92nd and 192nd Assault Helicopter Companies habitually support Task Force South, which includes the 3rd Battalion, 506th Infantry.
         (c) The 281st Assault Helicopter Company habitually provides support throughout the battalion area of operation.
      (2) Paragraph 1k, Signal, page 15: CONCUR with actions taken and results produced.
   b. Section 2, Lessons Learned.
      (1) Paragraph 2a(1), Clerical Personnel Qualifications, page 16: CONCUR. However, clerical personnel unavoidably lose some proficiency subsequent to school attendance because of the 30 or 40-day period required for overseas processing, leave, and travel.
      (2) Paragraph 2a(2), Aviator Assignment, page 16: CONCUR with basic concept; however, implementation of the recommendation is not feasible. Replacements lagged behind scheduled losses during the quarter and the primary assignment concern was maintaining strengths among like units relatively constant.

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AVGD-SC (9 Nov 68) 1st Ind 25 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968; RCS CFR-65 (R1) (U)

(3) Paragraph 2b(1), Aerial Drop of Inflammables, pages 16 and 17: CONCUR. Recommend this headquarters not be tasked for further missions of this type.

(4) Paragraph 2b(2), Aerial CS Gas Drop, page 17: NONCONCUR. The field expedient gas dispenser is safe if properly handled and employed. In addition, the expedient container is readily fabricated and is much less costly than the E158R2 Gas Dispenser.

(5) Paragraph 2b(3), Rappelling, pages 17 and 18: CONCUR. Although the simple overhand knot reduces rope strength by forty percent, the concept is noteworthy and should be evaluated for standard adoption.

(6) Paragraph 2b(4), Night Resupply, page 18: CONCUR with the described method of lighting as a workable procedure to facilitate night landings. This headquarters will circulate a copy of the basic letter to inform other subordinate commands.

(7) Paragraph 2c(1), Flight Training, pages 18 and 19:

(a) NONCONCUR with the observation that units must compromise quality by using inexperienced aviators to train replacements. The Standardization Section of this headquarters is manned with experienced Instructor Pilots and is available to assist group units in training newly assigned aviators; the most recent visit to the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion was 5 through 8 November 1968.

(b) CONCUR with the recommendation that Instructor Pilots should be trained in CONUS. Only experienced aviators should be selected for the program, and they should be MOI trained at the appropriate aviation school. Although CONUS trained Instructor Pilots would require a ten-hour in-country flight orientation, they would possess the necessary technical skills and ability to properly instruct inexperienced, newly assigned aviators.

(8) Paragraph 2c(2), UH-1H Training, page 19: NONCONCUR. Aviation Training Bulletin Number 4, this headquarters, dated 29 January 1968, specifies that the battery will be in the aft position on all UH-1H aircraft, as follows:

"3. BATTERY LOCATION IN UH-1H. A recent study by the 17th C.G Maintenance Section on center of gravity travel in the UH-1H revealed that with the battery in the forward position, the aircraft is often out of CG limits. This occurs with a light fuel load and average resupply type loads. So, the word is, put the battery in the aft location, leave it there, and observe the rule of having two people in the cockpit."

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AVGD-SC (9 Nov 68) 1st Ind 25 November 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(9) Paragraph 2c(3), Crewchief and Doorgunner Training, page 19: CONCUR. The 10th Combat Aviation Battalion is presently short fifty crewchiefs (MOS 67N20). This headquarters provides qualified replacements when received, and each battalion receives a prorata share. Until the strength of the battalion reaches 100 percent, it will be necessary to conduct OJT for crewchiefs.

(10) Paragraph 2d, Security Forces, pages 19 and 20: CONCUR. The 52nd Security Platoon, with an authorized strength of 152 personnel, is assigned to this group. A formal security survey conducted on 19 November 1968 recommended that your headquarters relieve the 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion of all tactical operational requirements in their assigned area of operation adjacent to Camp Holloway. The 52nd Security Platoon currently satisfies these tactical requirements. This headquarters is preparing a letter requesting relief from the 30 square kilometer area of operation near Holloway. Upon approval of the request, this headquarters will redeploy segments of the 52nd Security Platoon to provide internal and perimeter security for group units at Kontum, Holloway, and Ban Me Thuot.

(11) Paragraph 2e(1), Fuel Cell Contamination, page 20: CONCUR. The fuel cell cleaning procedure described is appropriate. The Cam Ranh Petroleum Laboratory recommended the use of alcohol. Alcohol, JP4, or JP5 with manual agitation has proven effective for cleaning in the past. Recommend that fuel cells be inspected, and cleaned if necessary, during every third periodic inspection.

(12) Paragraph 2e(2), Permanent Bunker Construction, page 21: CONCUR. Permanent bunkers can be constructed using bricks or rocks and cement, and would afford more protection during attacks. Although more expensive to build, brick or rock bunkers would be cheaper over an extended period because of savings in maintenance over sandbag bunkers. The following lesson learned is an extract from the Operational Report of the 223rd Combat Support Aviation Battalion for the period ending 31 July 1968:

(a) OBSERVATION. Locally constructed bunkers of sand/laterite/cement bricks are less expensive and require less upkeep than sandbag bunkers.

(b) EVALUATION. Sandbags cost 28 to 36 cents each and deteriorate rapidly, requiring replacement within three to six months. Bricks of sand, laterite, and cement can be constructed locally at an average cost of five cents each using brick press machines such as issued to many Special Forces Camps. Two bricks replace one sandbag. Brick bunkers
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AVGD-SC (9 Nov 68) 1st Ind 25 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

require a wall thickness of four bags. Although brick construction requires more time, the finished structure is permanent, self-supporting, provides more effective protection, and requires no maintenance. Five laborers can produce 350 bricks per day and can build a four-man bunker of 12 by 12 by 6 feet in five days. The brick structure costing 45 dollars replaces a sandbag bunker costing 400 dollars.

"(c) RECOMMENDATION. Provide portable brick press machines to units on fixed installations, and replace sandbag bunkers with permanent brick structures.

(13) Paragraph 2g(3), XM-21 Subsystem, page 21: CONCUR. Recommend higher headquarters evaluate the concept for possible future standards adoption. Ammunition boxes should not contain more than 6400 rounds, or the aircraft could be overloaded.

(14) Paragraph 2g(1), TRC-146, pages 21 and 22: CONCUR. The "operator and repair manuals" referred to in paragraph 2g(1)(a), page 21, are actually manufacturers publications. The battalion has effectively used the services of EOKK personnel. The 1st Aviation Brigade Signal Officer is currently conducting a study of the AN/TRC-146 maintenance system. Results of this study should improve and disperse the general support maintenance capability for the radio set throughout the Republic of Vietnam.

(15) Paragraph 2g(2), KY-28, page 22: CONCUR. One cable clamp must be removed from the bottom of the mount to allow the cable to extend sufficiently for connection to the KY-28. Once the set is properly installed, the problem is eliminated.

(16) Paragraph 2g(3), AN/AAC-54, pages 22 and 23: CONCUR. This headquarters will query other subordinate commands for an evaluation of the stated recommendation and for additional suggested solutions to the problem.

(17) Paragraph 2h, Protective Gloves, page 23: CONCUR. This headquarters will circulate a copy of the basic letter to appraise other subordinate commands of this worthwhile recommendation.

(18) Paragraph 2i, Physical Examinations, pages 23 and 24: CONCUR. The improved examination and screening of doorgunners and crewchiefs pinpointed a problem area which precipitated thorough evaluations throughout the group. Physical standards for these personnel have been rigidly applied, and they will be closely and carefully examined in the future.

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AVGD-SC (9 Nov 68) 1st Ind 25 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL) (U)

- Section 3, Headquarter, Department of the Army Survey Information. The 10th Combat Aviation Battalion had no input during the quarter for the DA survey on escape, evasion, and survival.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

JOSEPH C. LE FLOËE

LT, AGC

Adjutant

CF:
2 ACSFOR, DA, Washington, DC 20310
8 CO, 10th CAB
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AVFA-GC-CT (9 Nov 68) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350

TO: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96384

(C) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and indorsement and makes the following comments:

a. Reference paragraph 2b(2), Section 2, page 17, Aerial CS Gas Drop. Nonconcur for reasons stated by the 17th Combat Aviation, 1st Indorsement. This headquarters has monitored operations using the field expedient gas dispenser and found it to be safe when employed by trained personnel.

b. Reference paragraph 2c(1), Section 2, pages 18 and 19, Flight Training and Standardization of Newly Assigned Aviators. Nonconcur for reasons stated by the 17th Combat Aviation Group, 1st Indorsement.

c. Reference paragraph 2c(2), Section 2, page 19, Standardization of UH-1H Training. Nonconcur for reasons stated by the 17th Combat Aviation Group, 1st Indorsement. Additionally, paragraph 12-116, TM 55-1520-210-20 specifies that the battery should be mounted in the aft position when armor seats are installed in the helicopter.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Robert Criswell

Cy thru:
17th Cbt Avn Gp

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AVBA-C (9 Nov 68) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968 RCS CSFOR (RL) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-QT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be adequate, and concurs with the contents.

2. (C) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

   a. Paragraph 1f(4), page 11. This headquarters concurs with the concept of forming battalion Assistance Teams to improve the maintenance posture of any subordinate unit.

   b. Paragraph 1f(5), page 11. Nomex flight gloves remain in short supply. USAICC is requisitioning 5,000 pair per month for replacement issues. Both the old brown flying gloves and the gray leather gloves will be stocked until adequate supplies of the Nomex gloves are available. Approximately 2,000 pair of sun glasses have been issued to units in the past few weeks. Present stock is 700 pair in the Qui Nhon depot and 1,200 pair in the Da Nang depot. Requisitions for 12,000 pair for stock have been sent to CONUS. They are being shipped by Sea-Land in unmarked containers for security purposes.

   c. Paragraph 1h, page 13 and paragraph 21, page 23. Medical qualification requirements for crew chiefs (Flying class 3) and door gunners are prescribed in AR 40-501, USARV Regulation 40-43, and 1st Aviation Brigade Regulation 40-2. At present, the local flight surgeon certifies class 3 exams if they are qualified. If the individual is disqualified and requests a waiver, it is forwarded through channels to HQ, USARV for action by the USARV Aviation Medicine Consultant. (At present he is also the 1st Aviation Brigade Surgeon.) No waiver is approved for flying class 3 unless recommended by the examining flight surgeon and the unit commander. Experience has shown that a large percentage of the individuals with appropriate MOS's cannot pass class 3 standards. The commander has the choice of accepting an individual with waived defects or to continue looking for fully medically qualified personnel. Door gunners require a certificate from the examining flight surgeon based upon a records check and general examination. A complete class 3 exam is not feasible due to the numbers involved. Qualification will be a function of the flight surgeon’s evaluation and the commander’s desires. Again, experience indicates that if the FS adheres to strict standards on these exams, it is difficult to obtain adequate numbers of individuals. A recurring problem
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AVIA-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968 RCS OSPOR (RI) (U)

in Vietnam has been the practice of placing individuals on flight status long before he is examined. When major defects are discovered the commanders in some cases have insisted that waivers be obtained because "you're just taking away his money" and "he has to fly anyway." The requirement for periodic examinations or reexaminations of individuals on flying status in RVN has been waived by DA unless deemed necessary by the flight surgeon or commander. Based upon the above comments periodic exams would appear of questionable value as a general rule since we already know many individuals have defects. The battalion surgeon, however, is perfectly free to reexamine any he believes requires it, at any time. Comments by the battalion surgeon of the 10th CAB regarding examinations "throughout RVN" are inappropriate because of his limited sphere of information and concern. Any deficiency in quality of examination within the 10th CAB is his responsibility to correct.

d. Paragraph 2a(1), page 16 and paragraph 2b(1), lst Indorsement. This headquarters concurs with unit's recommendations concerning clerical personnel. Many 70A1C and 71B20 personnel observed by this headquarters have been school trained in their MOS although AAB scores indicated low aptitude for the clerical and administrative fields.

e. Paragraph 2c, page 18. Concur. lst Aviation Brigade is currently conducting a UH-1 IP School to train and standardize operational UH-I IP's in all units throughout the Brigade. A one week refresher course is conducted for those IP's who have previously attended a USAAVN MOS course and a two week course for those personnel, recommended by unit commanders, who have not completed an MOS IP course. The ultimate goal of the school is to train a minimum of two standardized Brigade IP's in each AHC or Air Cavalry Troop, and one in each Battalion, Squadron or Group Standardization Section.

f. Paragraph 2c(2), page 19, paragraph 2b(8), lst Indorsement and paragraph c 2a Indorsement. Battery should be located in the position that affords the aircraft the best CG during a given mission. It is the responsibility of the operator to insure that the aircraft is operated within CG limits at all times and to determine which configuration (battery in forward or rear position) is best for his mission. There is no constant "Rule of the Thumb".

g. Paragraph 2c(3), page 19 and paragraph 2b(9), lst Indorsement. A three and one half week course is currently being conducted at Fort Rucker, Alabama to train basic entry maintenance personnel (MOS 67A10) as aircraft door gunners (MOS 67A11). The training however, is insufficient to fill the requirements of aviation units in RVN. An OJT program must still be conducted after the individual arrives in-country to familiarize him with unit SOP's, methods of operation and to augment training received at the formal door gunner school in CONUS.
h. Paragraph 2d, page 19 and paragraph 2b(10), 1st Indorsement. Concur with need for extra security guard personnel. However, individual locations will determine exact number required. The security guard problem is recognized by USARV and some security guard spaces have been allocated to the CAGs. USARV G-3 Force Development indicates that extra spaces for security force personnel are not available. Personnel for a security force must therefore come from in country assets. Unit request for such personnel should be made to CAG HQ for reevaluation of security force personnel at that level.

i. Paragraph 2e(1), page 20 and paragraph 2b(11), 1st Indorsement. Message containing information has been dispatched to all Brigade Groups for their consideration.

j. Paragraph 2e(2), page 21 and paragraph 2b(12), 1st Indorsement. Penetrating sandbags doubles service life of sandbags, however, for more permanent type of bunker construction, fortification materials, i.e., lumber, can be requested through supply channels or from supporting engineer units. Normally, cement is available only for MCA construction.

k. Paragraph 2c(3), page 21 and paragraph 2b(13), 1st Indorsement. USARV Aviation Armament Section and the 34 GS Group have been apprised of the modification mentioned in this report. 34th Group will study the modification, if it is approved they will issue instructions to modify all XM-21 systems in country.

l. Paragraph 2h(1), page 23 and paragraph 2b(17), 1st Indorsement. The rubber glove, FSN 8415-641-4601, presently being utilized by the 48th AHC, is not authorized for this purpose in CTA 50-901, dated 5 Oct 66. However, rubber glove FSN 8415-823-7455, LIN J69845, is authorized, 1 pair per individual when duty requires hand protection from organic solvents. Authority found in CTA 50-901, page 46. Recommend that rubber glove, FSN 8415-823-7455, be utilized by refueling personnel. This item is authorized and can be requisitioned through normal supply channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

LEE S. PETERSON
ILT, AGC
ASST ADJ GEN

CONFIDENTIAL
AVHCC-DST (9 Nov 68) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period
Ending 31 October 1968 RCS CSPOR-65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 2 9 Dec 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CSPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 10th
Combat Aviation Battalion.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning qualifications of clerical personnel, page
16, paragraph 2a(1) and 3d Indorsement, paragraph 2d. This headquarters
will initiate a survey throughout USARV to determine the specific problems.
Based on the results, action will be initiated to remedy the situation.

   b. Reference item concerning flight standardization and training of
newly assigned aviators, page 18, paragraph 2e(l); 1st Indorsement, para-
graph 2e(7); 2d Indorsement, paragraph b; and 3d Indorsement, paragraph
2e. Concur with comments in the indorsements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. ARNTZ
CPT, AG
Assistant Adjutant General

Furn:
HQ 1st Avn Bde
HQ 10th CAEB
GPOP-DT (9 Nov 68) 5th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period
Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 10 JAN 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. L. SHORIT
CPT, AGC
Army AG
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OPERATIONAL RESULTS AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1968

1. (C) Results.

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<th>Cargo Troops Lifted</th>
<th>Cargo Lifted (TONS)</th>
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10 CAB | 113354 | 191196 | 17888 | 126 | 32 | 0 |

2. (C) Losses.

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10 CAB | 14 | 43 | 36
AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1968

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Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug to 31 Oct 1968

CO, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion

9 Nov 1968
N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310
The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

**ITEM 1**

* SUBJECT TITLE ________________________________
** FOR OT RD # ________________________________
*** PAGE # ________________________________

**ITEM 2**

SUBJECT TITLE ________________________________
FOR OT RD # ________________________________
PAGE # ________________________________

**ITEM 3**

SUBJECT TITLE ________________________________
FOR OT RD # ________________________________
PAGE # ________________________________

**ITEM 4**

SUBJECT TITLE ________________________________
FOR OT RD # ________________________________
PAGE # ________________________________

**ITEM 5**

SUBJECT TITLE ________________________________
FOR OT RD # ________________________________
PAGE # ________________________________

* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.
** FOR OT RD #: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.
*** Page #: That page on which the item of interest is located.
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Force Development
ATTN: Operational Reports Branch
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310