<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNCLASSIFIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AD NUMBER</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD394510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CLASSIFICATION CHANGES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TO:</strong> UNCLASSIFIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FROM:</strong> CONFIDENTIAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LIMITATION CHANGES**

**TO:**
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

**FROM:**
Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 15 AUG 1968. Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Adjutant General (Army), Washington, DC 20310.

**AUTHORITY**
AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
SECURITY MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 173d Airborne Brigade, Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.

3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned  
(1 May – 31 July 1968)

THRU: Commanding General  
I FFORCEV  
ATTN: AVFA-SC-OT  
APO 96350

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff  
For Force Development  
Department of the Army  
Washington, D.C., 20310

The inclosed Operational Report Lessons Learned is forwarded in compliance with USARV Regulation 1-19 and AR 1-19.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. A. SCHMIDT  
CPT, AG  
Asst AG

FOR OT UT  
683298

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10

Inclosure 1

CONFIDENTIAL
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Significant Organisational and Unit Activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Organisation</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Intelligence</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Combat Operations</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Training</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Psychological Operations and Civic Action</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Logistics</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Personnel Administration</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Chemical Operations</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Commander's Observations - Lessons Learned</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Inclosures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Roster of Key Personnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Brigade Organization Chart</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Supply and Combat Services Activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 173d Airborne Brigade Jungle School Training Schedule</td>
<td>Withdrawn, HQ, DA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 173d Airborne Brigade Staff Directory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 3d Bn 503d Inf CAAR - OPM Cokeusz ee 29 March - 17 June 1968</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CAAR 88 X 076)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

I. Significant Organizational and Unit Activities

1. Introduction

This Operational Report Lessons Learned covers the period 1 May 1968 through 31 July 1968. The 173rd Airborne Brigade has continued to conduct operations aimed at locating and destroying Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces and installations. As I Field Force's reserve, the Brigade remained ready to meet any required mission, and continued operations in the Brigade's TAOR (Tactical Area of Responsibility). Its civic action program continued to play a key role in the Brigade's counterinsurgency efforts.

To best accomplish its mission, the 173rd Airborne Brigade conducted four major operations during the reporting period. Operation Boilong II, which commenced 17 September 1967, continues to be conducted in Phu Yen Province by the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry and D Company 16th Armor. Operation Walker, including the defense of Camp Radcliff at An Khe and the surrounding AO, is being conducted by the 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry. Operation Cochise, involving the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry and the 3d Battalion, 503d Infantry (prior to its involvement in Operation McClain as an element of Task Force South, as of 18 June 1968). Operation Cochise continues to center in the Bong Son plains area.

The 173rd Airborne Brigade continued to be under the leadership of Brigadier General Richard J. Allen, who assumed command of the unit on 20 March 1968.

A native of Atlanta, Georgia, General Allen joined the Army as an enlisted man in 1940 and rose in rank to First Sergeant. After attending and graduating from Infantry OCS in 1942, he served as an officer with the 101st Airborne Division during World War II and participated in the invasion of Normandy, the invasion of Holland, and the battle of Bastogne.

General Allen's last assignment was as assistant division commander of the 101st Airborne Division. His decorations include the Silver Star, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, Combat Infantryman's Badge, Distinguished Unit Citation with one oak leaf cluster, Army Commendation Medal, and Croix de Guerre with Bronze Star (France).

He is a graduate of Georgia Military Academy, the University of Maryland, Infantry OCS, Parachute School, Armor Advanced Course, the Command and General Staff College, the Armed Forces Staff College, and the Air War College.

In June 1968, The Society of Military Engineers presented the Itschner Award, its annual award to the "Best Engineer Company" in the United States Army, to the officers and men of the 173rd Engineer Company, 173rd Airborne Brigade.

The award was presented at LZ English by Brigadier General William T. Bradley, commander of the Engineer Construction Agency, Vietnam. General Bradley stated that the Engineer Company, "in winning the Itschner Plaque, has exceeded the records of over 200 engineer companies here in Vietnam, and a comparable number of companies throughout the world."

The bronze Itschner Plaque is named for Lieutenant General Emerson C. Itschner, former Army Chief of Engineers and past president of the society.

On 25 June 1968, the 173rd Airborne Brigade celebrated its fifth anniversary. Organized from the 2d Airborne Battle Group, 503d Infantry, and activated on 25 June 1963 on Okinawa as a quick-strike guerrilla-warfare reaction force, the past five years have been filled with impressive victories. The Sky Soldiers have trained...
deployed into combat and jumped into combat. In doing so, the Sky Soldiers have compiled a proud record of FIRSTS in time, place and accomplishments that can be held by all with pride.

While on Okinawa, the 173d underwent extensive airborne, guerrilla and jungle warfare training, and traveled throughout the Asian theatre on training missions prior to deploying to the Republic of South Vietnam. It was during this period of training that the paratroopers received the nickname "Sky Soldiers," from the admiring Nationalist Chinese Army and the population of Taiwan.

On 5 May 1965, C-130's carried the Brigade from Okinawa to Bien Hoa, Republic of South Vietnam. They were the first American Army combat troops to be committed to the strife-ridden country.

Shortly after arriving, the paratroopers became the first American unit to fight in War Zone D, and several operations later, the first to move into the Iron Triangle. On February 22, 1967, the Brigade achieved still another "first" as the first to make an American combat parachute assault since the Korean War. Spearheading Operation Junction City, the Brigade accounted for 266 enemy killed and the destruction of a most vital enemy propaganda office.

However, it was in November of 1967 that many feel the Brigade had its finest hours. Near Dak To, in Vietnam's Central Highlands, the Sky Soldiers made repeated heavy contacts with large NVA forces in a bitterly contested, twenty day period. On Thanksgiving Day, 1967, the paratroopers swarmed to the crest and ousted the last NVA defenders on a remote hill designated 875, in one of the most brutal actions of the Vietnamese conflict. The battle was that of Dak To.

Four Sky Soldiers from the 173d Airborne Brigade have received the Medal of Honor in Vietnam, an outstanding record for a single brigade, a small fraction of the military strength in the Republic of South Vietnam.
2. **Organisation**

During the past quarter the major organisational changes in the Brigade have been the continued reorganisation of the Brigade’s Infantry Battalions under TOE/MTOE 7-175T and the formation of Battery D, 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery, under MTOE 6-2170.

USARPAC GO 122, dated 15 February 1968, authorised activation and organisation of the 173d Airborne Brigade’s Infantry Battalions under TOE/MTOE 7-175T. The date for re-organisation actions was left to the discretion of commanders concerned based upon the availability of personnel and equipment resources.

The re-organisation was accomplished in two phases; Phase I commenced on 2 April 1968.

1. **Phase I:** Company D (Provisional) in each infantry battalion was in-activated by Brigade General Order on 2 April 1968 and Company D established under TOE/MTOE 7-175T. All personnel assigned to Company D (Provisional) were reassigned to Company D from Headquarters Company by proper morning report entries. Subsequently, property and equipment accountability were transferred from Headquarters Company to Company D and requisitions were submitted for equipment shortages. As replacements became available, the Adjutant General assigned personnel to each respective company until authorised strength levels were reached.

2. **Phase II:** Phase II consisted of the organisation of Company E in each infantry battalion on 1 May 1968. On 15 May the Heavy Mortar Platoon was transferred from Headquarters Company to Company E. The cadre for the reconnaissance platoon was constituted on 1 June 1968; thereafter, replacements are assigned to the platoons as they become available. By 1 August 1968, all re-organisation authorized under TOE/MTOE 7-175T had been completed.

Battery D, 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery, was activated and organised on 10 May 1968 by authority of HQ, USARPAC GO # 229 under MTOE 6-2170. Equipment required and not available was requisitioned through normal supply channels. Personnel required by the formation of Battery D were assigned from locally available resources, with new personnel assigned as they became available through replacement sources. By 1 June 1968, re-organisation as authorised had been completed.
3. Intelligence:

a. The enemy situations before and during each operation conducted by the Brigade during this period are broken down as follows: Operation Cochise/Dan Sinh, Operation Rolling/Than Hoa and Operation Walker.

(1) Operation Cochise

(a) Enemy Situation:

1. Disposition: The 173d Airborne Brigade relieved the 3d Brigade 4th Infantry Division and assumed operations in AO Cochise on 30 March 1968. Since the end of January 1968, the Bong Son area of operations had been the site of increased enemy activity, the enemy not fully controlling this area due to the presence of friendly troops and successful efforts of the government's revolutionary development program. Intelligence has reported the following units within the Bong Son area or close enough to have influence within the Cochise area of operations.

   a. HQ & support units NT3 NVA Division
   b. 2d VC Regiment
   c. 93d Bn/2d VC Regiment
   d. 95th Bn/2d BC Regiment
   e. 97th Bn/2d VC Regiment
   f. 18th NVA Regiment
   g. 7th Bn/18th NVA Regiment
   h. 8th Bn/18th NVA Regiment
   i. 9th Bn/18th NVA Regiment
   j. 22d NVA Regiment
   k. 7th Bn/22d NVA Regiment
   l. 8th Bn/22d NVA Regiment
   m. 9th Bn/22d NVA Regiment
   n. 40th Sapper Bn
   o. XCIII MP Bn
   p. 300th Sapper Bn
   q. 50th LF Bn

   During May, the 22d NVA Regiment and the 2d VC Regiment continued coordinated operations in Hoi An and Phu My Districts. Movement of the 18th NVA Regiment from Phu Cat to Phu My District was reported, but not confirmed. Increased trail activity and numerous sightings of small enemy units in the northern An Lao Valley
indicated the possible presence of a new enemy unit. This unit is possibly one battalion of the 40th NVA Regiment which has been in contact with forces of the American Division in southern Quan Ngai Province.

In the month of June, the reported move of the headquarters, 3d NVA Division and elements of the 2d VC Regiment and the 22d NVA Regiment to an area north of AO Cochise on the Kontum/Quang Ngai border was confirmed. The 18th NVA Regiment was involved in heavy contact with Capitol Division (ROK) forces in the Phu Cat Mountains in late June. The XC II VC Battalion confirmed operations in AO Cochise, working generally out of the Nui Sui Ham (Tiger) Mountains and the Bong Son coastal plains.

During July, the major NVA elements normally facing the Brigade in AO Cochise, the 3d NVA Division, the 2d VC Regiment and 22d NVA Regiment, remained out of contact in southwestern Quang Ngai Province. The 18th NVA Regiment remained out of contact after heavy contact with ROK forces in June. It is probably reorganising and re-equipping at this time. Although NVA units in the AO were generally inactive, there was increased activity on the part of VC units, with a notable increase in sniper incidents along roads. The XC II MP Bn continued operations in the area to the north of the Nui Sui Ham (Tiger) Mountains.

2. Peculiarities and Weaknesses:

a. The enemy continues to be vulnerable to sustained friendly operations, attempting to evade and avoid contact until such time as they feel an insured victory over allied forces can be had, then striking.

b. The enemy continues to be vulnerable to air and artillery retaliation, aerial observation and photography, intermittent artillery firings, APD and Red Haze readings.

g. The enemy continues to be prone to hunger and personal illness through sustained living in the jungle environment.

d. Psychological warfare will no doubt continue to have effect on enemy morale and effectiveness, especially due to successful allied operations in early and middle May.

3. Enemy Capabilities:

a. The enemy continues to carry out small-scale attacks, gaining for him a certain degree of success, allowing him to cause friendly casualties at a minimum risk to his forces. He can be expected to continue such operations.

b. The enemy can be expected to continue his interdiction of lines of communication, mining of primary and secondary routes of communications, sabotage operations against pipelines and small-scale attacks against isolated outposts.

g. The enemy can be expected to use extensively with increased emphasis sapper units. This quarter showed a marked increase in such activities. Sappers enjoy an elite status among VC/NVA units, specialising in spearheading infantry operations, in explosives and demolitions, land and water mine warfare, assassination, terrorism, kidnapping, sabotage and bridge destruction. Their primary mission is to precede enemy infantry in attack, breaching barbed wire and other obstacles impeding the infantry's advance.

d. The enemy can be expected to continue to employ
Operational Report Lessons Learned

mortars and recoilless rifles against aircraft, both of the fixed and rotor variety, as this type of attack involves little risk to his forces, and, if successful, can cause considerable damage and cause aircraft to be inoperable for varying periods.

g. Reports continue on the possibilities of the enemy launching full-scale attacks against convoy operations, isolated outposts or possibly Bong Son/LZ English itself.

f. Likely targets for sapper unit activities, company and battalion size attacks are Phu My District Headquarters, ARVN installations, Bong Son bridge, LZ English.

g. An increase in VC/NVA rice-gathering units and VC/NVA tax collectors into Phu Tuy, Phu Cat and Tuy Hoa Districts can be expected after harvest.

h. Propaganda lectures, involuntary drafting and kidnapping of fighting-age civilians, laborers and specialists (doctors and nurses), continued infiltration and harassing activities, making full use of sapper-type units, are expected to continue in AO Cocsiar.

i. Combat Efficiency: Successful combat operations conducted during the month of May, which were based on combat intelligence, rendered hardships on existing VC/NVA units (see Enemy Order of Battle and Decisions and Plans Adapted with Reasons Based on Enemy Situations), caused enemy units to remain out of further major contacts with allied units for the remainder of May and the months of June and July. It is believed that replacements, with supplies, are coming into Binh Dinh Province, and that, once up to combat strength and possessing supplies and equipment necessary, the enemy will commit himself to large-scale attacks

(b) Significant Contacts:

1. May:

Results: Unk.

a. 011105 BR773748 A/3/503 engaged 2 NVA w/SA fire.

b. 010120 BR965899 LRRP Tm "C" received 3 incoming grenades. Results: 1 US KHA, 4 US WMA, ex. any unk.

c. 021330 BR96750 2d Plt D/2/503 made contact with 3 NVA. Results: 1 US WHA, 1 NVA KIA.

d. 021621 CR013803 C/1/50 engaged 2 NVA with SA fire.

e. 021669 CR013809 C/1/50 engaged 1 NVA. Results:

1 NVA KIA (BC).

g. 021100 BR902859 Convoy received SA and AW fire from west of road. Results: Neg casualties, enemy unk.

h. 030954 BR931045 B/2/503 engaged 5-7 VC and received heavy resistance from BR932048. Results: 3 US WHA, 2 VC/NVA (BC), 2 VC WIA (CIA).

i. 031355 BS92050 B/2/503 engaged 4-5 VC. Results:
AVBE-SC/MID
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

15 August 1968

CCNFIDLNTIAI-
AVBE-SC/MHD
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

1. 031550 CRO07793 C/1/50 engaged 3 VC. Results: 3 VC KIA.

2. 044800 CR739747 C/3/503 a platoon size stay behind ambushed and engaged 7 VC. Results: Negative friendly casualties, 1 VC KIA (BC).

3. 050445 BS910051 & BS913048 B/2/503 ambushed engaged 25-30 VC with SA and AW fire. Results: 8 US WIA, 13 VC KIA (BC).

VC KIA (BC).

4. 050806 BS932059 A/2/503 engaged 1 VC. Results: 1 VC KIA. (BC).

VC aboard, engaged. Results: 1 VC KIA (BC).

5. 050845 BS945062 aircraft spotted 5 boats with wounded VC aboard, engaged. Results: 5 VC KIA (BC).

VC KIA.

6. 051150 BR911054 B/2/503 engaged 1 VC. Results: 1 VC KIA.

7. 051300 BS912056 B/3/503 engaged 2 VC. Results: 1 VC KIA (BC).

1 NVA KIA (BC).

8. 053015 LZ Ollie C/1/50 received small ground attack. Results: Estimated 2 NVA Platoon's. C/150 and B/3/69 reinforced as of 052000. Results: 6 US KHA, 9 US KIA, 50 US WHA, 100 NVA KIA (Poss), 5 M113 destroyed, 1 UH-1C destroyed.

9. 061345 BR917523 A/2/503 made contact with an unk size force. Results: 2 US KHA, 18 US WHA, 10 NVA KIA (BC).

1. 061451 BR909818 B/3/503 made contact with an estimated NVA Platoon. Results: 1 US KHA, 4 US WHA, 4 NVA KIA.

2. 060740 BR925806 B/1/50 sweep of contact area. Results: 18 NVA KIA (BC).

3. 071100 BR846885 LRRP Tm "P" made contact with an estimated VC Platoon. Results: 2 US KHA, 2 US WHA.

4. 081452 BR877797 A/2/503 platoon engaged 3 VC. Results: 1 VC KIA (BC).

5. 081452 BR877797 A/2/503 platoon engaged 3 VC. Results: 1 VC KIA (BC).


7. 111344 BR874735 C/1/50 made contact with an estimated NVA Bn. Results: 3 US KIA, 33 US WIA, 60 NVA KHA.

A. 111100 BR865932 84th Engineer Convoy received fire from west of road. Results: Negative casualties.

7

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBD-MC/MDC
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

1. 121220 BR862738 C/2/503 engaged 6 VC/NVA. Results: 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC).
2. 130352 BR868752 D/3/503 engaged 3 VC/NVA. Results: Negative friendly casualties, 1 VC KIA.
3. 201200 BR878840 D/2/503 engaged 3 VC. Results: 2 VC KIA (BC).
4. 221640 BR8477887 B/2/503 made contact with an estimated 6 VC. Results: 2 US WHA, unk enemy casualties.
5. 230255 BR852868 C/3/503 received 30 rounds 60mm and 82mm. Results: 1 US KHA, 6 US WHA.
6. 231515 BR947953 LRRP Tm "E" made contact with and estimated 2 NVA squads. Results: Unk.
7. 241210 BR823917 E/17 received heavy AK-47 fire from both sides of the road. Results: 1 US KHA, enemy unk.
8. 251110 BR883720 C/1/50 made contact with an estimated company. 2 US KHA, 18 US WHA, 33 NVA KIA (BC).
9. 310508 BS925054 B/2/503 ambush made contact with an estimated 16 VC. Results: 7 US WHA, 2 VC KIA (BC).

2. June:
10. 010020 BS932036 A/2/503 received SA fire and five 60mm mortar rounds from the northwest. Results: 1 US WHA.
11. 010094 BS932027 A/2/503 engaged 6 VC/NVA wearing khaki uniforms. Results: 1 VC/NVA KHA and one M-1 CIA.
12. 011400 BS909039 D/2/503 engaged one individual with SA fire. Results: 1 VC/NVA KHA (BC).
13. 011920 BS855168 D/3/503 made contact with an estimated VC platoon, received SA AW and 60MM mortar fire. Results: Unk.
14. 0219/45 BS865140 D/3/503 received SA and M-79 rounds from the northeast. Results: 1 US KIA.
15. 031545 BR954855 recon element from 1/50 made contact with an unk size force. Arty called with unk results.
17. 060225 BS859010 Recon element from B/2/503 ambush engaged an unk size force with SA. Results: 3 VC/NVA KIA (BC).
18. 0708/5 BR795698 E/17 Cav made contact with an unk size force. They received SA, AW and mortar fire (type unk), from the east. Fire was returned with SA and M-79 rounds. Arty was called. Results: 1 US KHA, 1 US WHA.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

10 July 1968

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

f. 021120 BR242493 B/1/69 engaged an unk size enemy force firing on pump station #3. The station received SA fire and 15 rounds 60mm mortar from the south. Results: 2 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

g. 040914 LZ English perimeter defense reported bunkers 31, 32, 33 and 36 received 6 to 8 rounds of AW fire. Fire was returned with SA and a patrol was sent to search the area with negative results.

h. 042000 LZ English perimeter defense reported bunkers 31, 32, 33 and 34 received SA fire. Fire was returned with unk results.

i. 041220 BR894718 elements of 1/69 observed 2 individuals in a hedgerow with weapons. The individuals fled and were pursued. Results: 1 BC PW and 1 M-1 rifle CIA.

j. 051945 LZ English perimeter defense reported bunker 31 was receiving approximately 100 to 150 rounds of AW. Fire was returned with SA and M-79 with unk results.

k. 051300 BR918858 A/1/69 received fire from SA and AW's. Arty was fired on the suspected enemy locations and the area searched with negative results.

l. 050935 BR284453 B/1/69 received light SA fire. Fire was returned with unk results.

m. 070815 BS883055 Recon element from 2/503 received approximately 150 rounds of SA fire from 2 individuals 5000 meters north of their position. SA fire was returned and the area was checked out with negative results.

n. 071730 BS72122A A/2/503 received SA fire and rifle grenades (type unk) resulting in 1 US WHA. Fire was returned with SA, AW, and by gunships with unk results. Individual WHA did not require dust off.

o. 070745 BR829719 C/1/69 supported a CSF contact with unk size enemy force with unk results.

p. 080615 BR897725 elements of 1/69 engaged 3 VC/NVA with SA fire. Results: 2 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 1 VC/NVA WIA, one M-1 carbine and 5 lbs of documents CIA.

q. 081345 BR877842 LRRP Tm "C" sighted 9 individuals with weapons moving east. Gunships were employed. Results: 3 VC/NVA KIA (Poss).

r. 110002 BR919992 A/2/503 received SA fire and HG's resulting in 6 US WHA and 1 US KHA. Fire was returned with SA and arty with unk casualties.

s. 111048 BS71179 C/2/503 received AW fire from an unk size force. Fire was returned with SA and arty. The area was searched with negative results.

t. 111517 BR904997 A/2/503 received 10 rounds of SA from BR905003. Fire was returned with SA and arty with negative results.

u. 112000 LZ English perimeter defense reported bunker 33 received light SA fire from approximately 150 meters to their front. Fire was returned with SA and illumination was fired with negative results.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

v. 120621 BR500982 A/2/503 observed a house on fire and heard several SA rounds explode. Unit moved in to investigate and received SA fire resulting in 1 US WHA. Unit returned SA fire and called arty on the enemy location with unk results.

w. 121550 BR904035 A/2/503 received 5 rounds of SA. Fire was returned with SA with negative results.

x. 121615 BS870157 B/2/503 received AW fire from an estimated individuals. Fire was returned with SA and the area was searched with negative results.

y. 121700 BR937868 A/1/50 in contact with unk size enemy force resulting in 2 US WHA. Dustoff was called and received fire from BR932849 resulting in the pilot receiving 1 hit in the foot. There was negative damage to the aircraft.

z. 121800 BR935876 A/1/50 received M-79 fire and engaged the enemy with 81mm mortar fire with unk results.

a. 121550 BR806624 LRRP Tm "E" made contact with 7 NVA resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC). The contact broke and NVA fled in several directions. The NVA were dressed in tan khaki uniforms, pith helmets, and carried rucksacks, LBE and AK-47's.

b. 121750 BR811692 LRRP Tm "D" was in contact with an estimated 15 VC/NVA and employed SA fire, 1 claymore and 15 M-26 HG's. The enemy used AK-47 and AK-50 fire and 2 HG's. Gunsights were called and a reactionary force committed to support the contact. Results: 1 US WHA, 4 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 6 VC/NVA KIA (Poss), and 1 AK-47, 10 lbs miscellaneous equipment and 1 lb of documents CIA.

c. 120755 BR 273463 A/1/69 received SA fire from an unk size force. Fire was returned with SA with negative results.

d. 130216 BR920720 Scout element 1/50 engaged 5 VC in a rice field with SA fire. Results: 1 VC KIA (Poss).

e. 131540 BR844826 element of E/17 was inserted for BDA. The element engaged 1 VC/NVA with SA resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 1 lbs documents CIA.

f. 141432 BS862224 B/2/503 received 5 rounds SA fire from the south. Fire was returned with SA and the area searched with negative results.

g. 142035 L2 English perimeter defense reported bunkers 1, 2, 3 received SA fire from the south. Fire was returned with SA and M-60 MG's with unknown results.

h. 142130 L2 English perimeter defense reported bunkers 1 and 5 received SA fire and M-79 rounds. Searchlights revealed 1 individual approximately 100 meters to the front of the perimeter. SA and M-60 MG fire was employed with negative results.

i. 141918 BR911864 B/1/69 observed 5 VC installing a mine and engaged them with SA fire. Individual fled and approximately 20 VC appeared and returned fire with SA and AW. The tanks returned fire and the contact broke at 1925 hours with unk enemy results.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBE-SC/MHD

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

142200 LZ English perimeter defense reported bunker
3 received M-79 rounds and SA fire resulting in 1 US KHA. Fire was returned with
negative results.

150841 BS865158 B/2/503 received SA fire and M-79
rounds resulting in 2 US WHA. Fire was returned with SA, AS and arty fire. The
area was searched with negative results.

151610 BS705200 C/2/503 received light SA fire from
the west vicinity BR695208. Fire was returned with SA and the area searched with
negative results.

151700 BS858155 B/2/503 received SA fire and M-79 fire
resulting in 1 US WHA. Fire was returned with SA fire and area searched with
negative results.

150911 BR955843 A/1/50 received light SA fire from
an estimated 4 individuals. Fire was returned with SA and AW fire and the enemy
fled southwest. The area was searched with negative results.

151920 BS862016 E/17 reported an ambush element
moving into position received approximately 15 rounds SA fire and 1 M-79 round.
Fire was returned with SA, AW and arty with unk results.

170945 BS722212 B/2/503 received light SA fire from
1 individual. Fire was returned with SA and SA fire with negative results.

171145 BR795983 M3F Co 201 engaged 1 VC/NVA squad
with SA fire resulting in 2 VC/NVA KIA (SG) and 2 carbines (US) CIA. The individ-
uals were dressed in green khaki uniforms and broke contact fleeing south. There
was 1 rucksack containing 3 lbs documents, 1 flare, and an electrical device (pass
radio transmitter).

172057 BS862011 Recon 2/503 made contact with 3 VC
armed with AK-47 and HG's. Fire was exchanged resulting in 1 US WHA, slight.
Enemy casualties were unk and enemy fled east leaving a heavy bloodtrail.

171052 BR990838 A/1/50 made contact with an esti-
mated VC squad sized force using SA's and M-79's. Unit returned fire with SA, AW
and arty. The contact broke at 1200 hours with the enemy dispersing in several
directions. The area was searched with negative results.

172150 BR946854 Scout Section 1/50 engaged an unk
size enemy force with SA fire and claymore with unk results.

181910 BR872964 E/17 reported receiving light SA
fire from west side of river. Element returned fire with SA and AW with unk results.

181330 BS621163 LRRP Tm "D" made contact with 3 VC/NVA
armed with SA. Fire was exchanged with SA and AW resulting in 1 US WHA. E/17 Cav
reinforced the contact and the enemy fled the area. The area was searched with neg-
ative results.

190815 BS722208 B/2/503 received approximately 30
rounds of SA from an estimated 2 VC/NVA. The fire was returned with SA, AW and ary.
The area was searched with negative results and negative US casualties.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

X. 201330 BR581962 MSF Co 221 engaged an estimated VC squad with SA fire resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 AK-47 and 3 rucksacks with rice CIA. The company reported 2 friendly WIA by punji stakes.

XI. 211123 BR724961 LRRP Tm "A" was in contact with an estimated 20 VC and requested gunships and a reaction force. Gunships and airstrikes were employed on the enemy position and E/17 Cav reaction force was committed. A search of the area was conducted by LRRP Tm "A" and E/17 resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), 6 VC KIA (Poss), and 3 rucksacks containing clothing and documents CIA.

Z. 221140 BR896630 LRRP Tm "E" pursued 1 individual and made contact with unk size force. Gunships and arty were employed and E/17 Cav reaction force was inserted. There were negative US casualties.

AA. 221545 FSB Natalie LRRP Tm 13 was inserted and made contact with unk size enemy force resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC WIA who evaded the area. The KIA had 1 pouch, a knife, and 1 can of lube oil.

BB. 230710 BS760030 MSF 209 reported an ambush engaged an unk size VC force resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC), 3 rucksacks, unk amount of documents, 3 pith helmets, assorted clothing, and rice bags with "Donated by the Friendly People of the US" written on them CIA.

CC. 241838 BS670010 2/503 reported FSB received approximately 6 rounds or SA fire from 3 individuals and fire was returned with SA with negative results.

DD. 251128 BS851189 B/2/503 received approximately 150 rounds of SA fire from 150 meters to the south resulting in 3 US WHA. Fire was returned with negative results.

EE. 270330 BR814598 C/1/50 reported receiving 12-15 rounds of B-40 rockets and a heavy volume of SA/AV fire from the north. Fire was returned with organic weapons and arty and the contact broke at 0340. Results: 4 US WHA and 1 APC moderately damaged.

FF. 281508 BR820894 D/2/503 received SA fire from 4-5 individuals in a house. Fire was returned with SA, AW and arty. The contact broke at 1525 hours and the area was searched with negative results.

GG. 282030 BS670010 D/2/503 reported 2 US WHA from 3-4 MG's thrown from the southeast. Fire was returned with SA and M-79 with unk results.

HH. 280210 BR814599 1/50 reported FSB Catskill received 6-8 mortar rounds and SA fire from the west. Counter mortar was returned with arty with unk results. There were 3 US WHA as a result of this contact.

II. 280805 BR908865 B/1/69 received approximately 75 rounds of SA fire from an unk size enemy force. Fire was returned with 50 Cal MG and M-79 fire. The area was searched with negative results.

II. 290740 MSF 209 in contact with estimated 4 VC and employed SA and AW fire resulting in 1 VC CIA and 2 VC WIA (Poss). Element pursued blood trails leading to the east.

KK. 291805 BR903946 LRRP Tm "E" observed 7 armed VC 15-20
meters from the Team's position at Coord BR 901947 and 8 individuals at BR900950. The team attempted to evade the area for extraction and drew fire at 1815 hours. The team moved to the valley floor and the contact broke at 1820 hours.

11. 301230 A/2/503 made contact with an estimated 4 individuals. SA fire was exchanged and arty called on the enemy location at BR620040. Element searched the area with negative results. There was 1 US KHA and 1 US WHA as a result of the contact.

12. 311050 BR787945 MSF Co 209 made contact with a VC squad armed with RPG, SA, and AW's. Fire was returned with SA and AW with gunships supporting. Results: 1 MSF WHA, 1 VC KIA (BO)

13. 311227 BS580972 MSF 221 made contact with an estimated NVA platoon at 1040 hours. The enemy force attacked an ambush site of the Company with SA and AW. The ambush site was reinforced and returned MB, AW and SA fire resulting in 2 NVA KIA (BO), 1 AK-47, 1 rucksack, and miscellaneous LBE CIA. The enemy broke contact at 1100 hours fleeing west.

(c) Enemy Disposition:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>EST STRENGTH</th>
<th>PROBABLE LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MAY</td>
<td>JUNE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NT3 NVA Division</td>
<td>5640</td>
<td>5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d VC Regt</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93d Bn/2d VC Regt</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95th Bn/2d VC Regt</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97th Bn/2d VC Regt</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th NVA Regt</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Bn/18th NVA Regt</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Bn/18th NVA Regt</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Bn/18th NVA Regt</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22d NVA Regt</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Bn/22d NVA Regt</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Bn/22d NVA Regt</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Bn/22d NVA Regt</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40th Sapper Bn</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XGII MP Bn</td>
<td>UNK</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300th Sapper Bn</td>
<td>UNK</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50th LP Bn</td>
<td>UNK</td>
<td>UNK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(2) Operation Rolling IX

(a) Enemy Situation:

1. Disposition: Since the allied victory in the BATTLE OF TUY HOA NORTH (30 and 31 January 1968), the Rolling area has remained a relatively secure area of operation. The enemy does not fully control the area around TUY HOA City due to the presence of allied troops plus an aggressive revolutionary development program which has reduced the hold by the enemy on the population. Intelligence has reported the following units within the TUY HOA area or close enough to have influence within the Rolling area or operations:

a. HQ, 5th NVA Division
b. 95th NVA Regiment
c. 4th Bn/95th NVA Regiment
d. 5th Bn/95th NVA Regiment
e. 6th Bn/95th NVA Regiment
f. 30th MF Battalion
g. 85th MF Battalion
h. IK-7 LF Company
i. IK-9 LF Company

The 95th NVA Regiment withdrew to the jungles west of TUY HOA City after suffering heavy casualties at the hands of ROK and ARVN forces in April, 1968. This Regiment continued to operate in this area during the months of May, June and July, appearing to be avoiding contact in order to reorganize their forces. During July, indications were received that the 95th NVA Regiment may have left one battalion as a stay behind force and moved west in order to pick up new replacements and supplies.

2. Peculiarities and Weaknesses:

a. The enemy supply system flows from west to east and can best be interdicted on the western edge of PHU YEN Province. The enemy's logistics system is currently operating at a marginal level, thus the indications of a move by the 95th NVA Regiment to the west. The major weakness of the enemy has been his inability to sustain contact due to their marginal logistics system.

b. The success of US, ARVN and ROK operations from January through April makes the VC/NVA vulnerable to psychological warfare, especially as the enemy continues to be prone to hunger and personal illness through both sustained living in the jungle environment and a marginal logistics system.

c. The enemy continues to be vulnerable to air and artillery retaliation, aerial observation and photography, intermittent artillery firing, APD and Red Base readings.

3. Enemy Capabilities:

a. The enemy can be expected to continue harassment,
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

15 August 1968

terrorist and base camp and installation infiltration, making full use of sapper-type unit.

b. The enemy will continue to rebuild their units through infiltration, involuntary conscription, native recruitment and kidnapping of civilians of fighting age, common laborers and specialists (doctors and nurses).

g. The enemy can be expected to attempt company or perhaps one battalion-sized attacks, reinforced by local forces, on weakly-defended district headquarters and outposts, as a victory for propaganda means.

d. The enemy can be expected to continue interdiction of communication lines, mining of primary and secondary routes of travel, sabotage operations and small-scale operations against such targets as the bridge at CQ201351, as this is the primary crossing across the SONG BA River at TUY HOA City.

g. In line with a country-wide emphasis, the enemy can be expected to employ sapper-type units, their primary mission continuing to be infiltration of TUY HOA Air Force Base, with the mission of destroying allied airplanes, helicopters and equipment.

f. It is expected that VC/NVA tax collecting and rice-gathering units will be increased in the TUY HOA area of operations with the coming rice harvest.

g. Combat Efficiency: The suspected withdrawal of elements of the 95th NVA Regiment to the west suggests that no large-scale multibattalion attacks are probable in the near future, or until replacements have been obtained and a more efficient logistical-chain has been established. Emphasis will, in all probability, rely on sapper-type units to conduct missions for the purpose of destroying or damaging allied airplanes, helicopters and equipment at TUY HOA Air Force Base. This type attack can also come in the form of mortars and recoilless rifle fire, as this type causes considerable damage to vital equipment and employs a minimum of enemy forces to carry out the operation.

(b) Significant Contacts:

1. May:
   a. 021005 CQ006496 C/4/503 squad size ambush engaged an unk enemy size force. Results: 7 VC/NVA KIA (BC).
   b. 021310 CQ005498 C/4/503 squad size element engaged 2 VC. Results: 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC PW.
   c. 041030 CQ022342 B/4/503 engaged 1 VC. Results:
   d. 131430 BQ967555 B/4/503 engaged 2 NVA. Results:
   e. 151230 BQ933344 B/4/503 engaged 6 VC. Results: 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC PW.
   f. 151415 CQ014064 LRRP Tm 15 made contact with an estimated VC squad. Results: 1 VC KIA (BC).
CONFIDENTIAL

AVEE-SC/66D

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

15 August 1968

2. June:

A. 011645 BQ870602 B/4/503 engaged 4 NVA with SA fire.
Results: 1 NVA KIA (BC), 1 SKS rifle CIA.

B. 012300 CQ007415 LRRP Tm 15 engaged 2 VC/NVA with SA fire. Results: 2 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

C. 121445 CQ015445 LRRP Tm 14 made contact with an estimated 3 VC/NVA with SA. Results: 1 VC/NVA KIA, 1 rucksack CIA.

D. 100843 BQ939757 D/16 Armor had a APC hit a mine. Results: 6 US WHA.

E. 301630 BQ908533 B/4/503 made contact with an estimated 3 VC armed with SA. Results: 2 NVA KIA (BC), 1 M-2 Carbine CIA.

2. July:

A. 021300 BQ938857 A/4/503 engaged 1 VC/NVA with SA fire resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 1 M-1 carbine with 40 rounds ammo CIA. An undetermined amount of documents were found and were extracted for evaluation.

B. 041600 BQ898748 LRRP Tm 12 made contact with an estimated VC platoon and was extracted without incident.

C. 041830 BQ867754 LRRP Tm 16 made contact with an unknown enemy force resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC). Gunships were employed with unknown results.

D. 081150 BQ903759 LRRP Tm 13 engaged 1 individual with SA resulting in 1 VC/NVA WIA (CIA). The individual died en route resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

E. 101210 BQ906660 C/4/503 engaged 7 individuals armed with weapons resulting in 1 VC/NVA WIA. The blood trail was followed to a house containing 1 individual with shoulder wound resulting in 1 VC/NVA CIA.

F. 142160 CQ266349 4/503 reported an OP received SA fire from a sampan. SA fire was returned and swift boat called to support the contact. There were negative US casualties and unknown enemy casualties.

G. 201610 BQ159390 D/4/503 reported a platoon made contact with an unknown size enemy force and employed SA, AW, gunships and airstrike. The contact broke at 1640 hours with unknown results. There were 3 US WHA as a result of this contact.

H. 281750 BQ902469 LRRP Tm 14 made contact with an unknown size enemy force and SA and AW fire was exchanged resulting in US WHA and an unknown enemy casualty figure.

I. 300945 CQ006667 LRRP Tm 12 made contact with an estimated VC squad. SA and AW fire was exchanged resulting 2 VC KIA (BC) and 1 Mauser rifle and 1 rucksack CIA.

(c) Enemy Disposition:

CONFIDENTIAL
### Operational Report Lessons Learned

**15 August 1968**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MAY</td>
<td>JUNE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th NVA Division</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>3625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95th NVA Regiment</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Bn/95th Regiment</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Bn/95th Regiment</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Bn/95th Regiment</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th MF Bn</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85th MF Bn</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX-7 LF Co</td>
<td>UNK</td>
<td>UNK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX-9 LF Co</td>
<td>UNK</td>
<td>UNK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**3) Operation Walker**

(a) Enemy Situation:

1. Disposition: The 1st Bn/503d Infantry (Airborne) continued operations in AO Walker during the months of May, June and July 1968. This area of operations has been relatively secure for some period of time, the enemy not being able to form and deploy large-scale attacks due to the continued presence of US troops since the latter part of 1965, a continuing good rapport with the Vietnamese citizens and the successful efforts of the government's revolutionary development program. Intelligence has reported the following units within the AN KHE area or close enough to have influence within the Walker area of operations:

   a. 95th B NVA Regiment  
   b. 4th BN/95th B NVA Regiment  
   c. 5th BN/ 95th B NVA Regiment  
   d. 407th Sapper Battalion  
   e. XC 503d Battalion

During the months of May, June and July activity was slight in BINH DINH Province and AO Walker. The 1st Bn/503d Infantry, assumed the mission of again providing and maintaining road and bridge security along the main two highways in the AO, from QUI NHON to AN KHE and from AN KHE to PLEIKU. The 1st Battalion also maintained the perimeter security of Camp Radcliff through the operational control of the three Provisional Rifle Companies formed for the basic mission of perimeter defense of Camp Radcliff. As the Brigade reaction battalion, the 1st Battalion had, for most of the reporting period, either one or two infantry rifle companies opconed to other units, among them were the 2d Battalion 503d Infantry and Task Force South.

The 5th BN/95th B NVA Regiment continued harassing actions along Highway 19, for the most part west of FSB Schuler, but was never able to form its forces for a sustained attack on any installations in AO Walker or Camp Radcliff proper.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBE-SC/MHD
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

2. Peculiarities and Weaknesses:

a. The enemy is vulnerable to aerial observation and air and artillery retaliation in most areas of the TAOR. He is also vulnerable to intermittent artillery firings, APD sensings and Red Haze readings.

b. Due to the widespread support of allied operations in AO Walker, the continued successful rapport with the Vietnamese civilians, through such means as the hiring of Vietnamese workers on Camp Radcliff, the success of revolutionary-development programs, and the protection offered the Vietnamese farmer through the continued presence of US troops, the enemy is not able to coerce populace through terrorist or sabotage activities as evident in other areas of South Vietnam.

g. By virtue of the Allied-Vietnamese relationship, the operational successes of US troops, and our continued presence, the enemy, most especially the VC, is particularly vulnerable to the Chieu Hoi and other psychological operation programs.

3. Enemy Capabilities:

a. The enemy is able to employ, to a limited extent, mortars and recoilless rifles against Camp Radcliff. If successful, such an attack can cause both personnel injury and damage to both fixed-wing and rotary aircraft.

b. The enemy is able to conduct company and perhaps battalion-size attacks in both isolated villages and hamlets and outpost and checkpoints maintained by US forces along Highway 19.

g. The enemy can conduct isolated mining of primary and secondary routes of travel, interdiction of lines of communication, sabotage operations against pipelines, and terrorist activities, including sporadic but effective sniper firings, against the outposts and checkpoints maintained within the AO along Highway 19.

d. The enemy can be expected to attempt to use extensively and with increased emphasis sapper units, most particularly in the destruction by explosives and demolitions of vital bridges along Highway 19 and aircraft and primary buildings within Camp Radcliff itself.

2. Combat Effectiveness: The continued successes of the government revolutionary development programs within AO Walker, the maintenance of good relations with the Vietnamese within the Provinces and the continued presence and strength of the allied forces themselves all combine to form the belief that no large-scale enemy attacks can be formed in the near future. Enemy emphasis will, in all probability, continue to be placed on harassment and terrorist activities, and propaganda lectures, with an increase of sapper-type infiltration activities.

(b) Significant Contacts:

1. May:

a. 050325 Check point 21 received a moderate ground attack. Results: 2 US KIA, 7 US WIA, 1 ARVN WIA, negative enemy assessments.

US WHA, 1 NVA KIA (BC).

CONFIDENTIAL
AVBE-SC/MED
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

1 VC KIA (BC).

a. 061246 BR547168 A/1/503 engaged 3 VC. Results: 1 VC KIA (BC).

b. 071230 BR248377 B/1/503 engaged 5 VC. Negative results.

c. 081025 BR234997 C/1/503 engaged 3 NVA. Results: 1 US KHA, 1 US WHA, 1 NVA KIA (BC).

d. 081030 BR248413 C/1/503 made contact with an unk size enemy force. Results: 1 US KHA, 6 US WHA, 20 NVA KIA (BC).

e. 091100 BR281322 LRRP Tm 26 made contact with 5 VC/NVA. Results: 3 VC/NVA KIA.

f. 101249 BR217408 B/1/503 engaged 1 VC. Results:

g. 101510 BR217408 B/1/503 made contact with a NVA platoon. Results: 1 US KHA, 4 NVA KIA (BC).

h. 121510 BR241400 B/1/503 engaged 1 VC. Results:

i. 171025 BR265354 B/1/503 engaged 2 VC. Results:

j. 180950 BR187329 C/1/503 engaged 1 VC. Results:

2. June:

a. 011830 BR262473 Check point 27 was attacked by mortar fire coming from the west. Fire was returned and a search of the area produced negative results.

b. 011825 BR338462 Check point 24 received a ground attack supported by mortars, gunships and arty called. Results: 1 US WHA, enemy unk.

c. 071035 BR286532 D/2/503 made contact with 6 NVA armed with carbines. Unk results.

d. 172125 Camp Radoliff: 1/69 reported receiving approximately 50 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from the northwest. Results: 12 US WHA, enemy unk.

e. 301218 BR539444 B/1/503 engaged 3 VC. Arty was called. Results: 1 NVA KIA (Poss).

3. July:

a. 021200 BR256394 D/1/503 engaged 1 individual with SA resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 1 French sniper rifle CIA. Individual was carrying 1 NVA canteen, wearing US web gear and dressed in khaki shirt with green trousers.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

b. 041228 BR219390 D/1/503 made contact with an estimated 2 VC/NVA armed with SA's. Fire was exchanged resulting in negative US casualties. A search of the area produced negative enemy results.

g. 051130 BR410608 1/503 reported that gunships engaged 10 armed individuals with mini guns resulting in 5 VC KIA (BO) and 3 VC KIA (Poss).

g. 071130 BR260740 1/503 reported gunships engaged 2 individuals resulting in 2 VC/NVA KIA (Poss).

g. 071410 PR318357 1/503 reported gunships engaged 1 individual resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (Poss).

f. 102130 BR278486 An Khe Greenline Tower 22 received approximately 45 rounds of SA fire. Fire was returned with SA with unk results.

(c) Enemy Disposition:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>ESTIMATED STRENGTH</th>
<th>PROBABLE LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MAY</td>
<td>JUNE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95 B Regt</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Bn/95 B Regt</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Bn/95 B Regt</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>407th Sapper Bn</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XC 503d Bn</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>UNK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Decisions and Plans Adopted with Reasons Based on Enemy Situations:

(1) May: During the month of May maximum utilization of all intelligence resources resulted in the detection of three enemy battalion formations prior to these formations reaching their particular objectives.

(a) Combat operations on 5 May 1968 were based on intelligence gleaned from POW statements, agent reports and APD readings. This collection of information resulted in the overwhelming defeat of the 93d and 95th battalions of the 2d VC Regiment and heavy casualties inflicted on the 7th Bn/22d NVA Regiment.

(b) Combat operations conducted on 11 and 25 May against the 97th 97th Bn/2d VC Regiment were planned in direct response to agent reports and special intelligence. The 97th Bn/2d VC Regiment was rendered combat ineffective as a result of these actions. It is felt combat operations conducted during the month of May, based on combat intelligence, rendered the 2d VC Regiment combat ineffective.

(2) June: In the month of June again maximum utilization was made of all intelligence resources in attempts to locate and fix enemy forces.

(a) At 0830 hours 7 June 1968, as a result of APD sensings, IR readings and agent reports, E/17th Cavalry made contact with unknown size enemy force at BR795968. E/17th Cavalry employed SA, AW and M-79 fire, artillery and airstrikes were brought in on target, with undetermined enemy losses.

CONFIDENTIAL
AVBE-SC/MHD  
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

15 August 1968

(b) During the period 24–25 June 1968, as a result of APD sensings, IR readings, Agent reports and visual reconnaissance, a combined US/ARVN operation involving elements of the 2d Bn 503d Infantry, 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Infantry and 40th ARVN Regiment in the Niu Mu Mountains resulted in 3 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

(3) July: During July again maximum use was made of all intelligence resources in attempts to locate and fix enemy forces.

(a) As a result of APD sensings, IR readings, agent reports and visual reconnaissance, a combined operation involving elements of the 2d Bn 503d Infantry and MSP Co 221 engaged an estimated VC squad at BR581962 resulted in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

(b) At 1610 hours 20 July 1968, the 4th Bn 503d Infantry, as a result of APD sensings, IR readings and agent reports, made contact with an unknown size enemy force at BQ159590. The 4th Bn 503d Infantry employed SA, AW M-79 fire, gunships and airstrikes with undetermined enemy results.

(4) Based on IR readings, APD sensings and LRRP operations, artillery, naval gunfire and airstrikes were directed against suspected enemy formations, base camp areas and infiltration routes. These operations were instrumental in keeping the enemy off-balance and interdicting his routes of supply and communications. The majority of interdiction fires, airstrikes, artillery and naval gunfire were based on combat intelligence.

c. Enemy Personnel and Equipment Losses: As a result of operations for the months of May, June and July 1968, the following enemy personnel and equipment losses are reported, by combat operation:

(1) Enemy personnel losses as of 31 July 1968:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OPN COCHISE</th>
<th>OPN BOLLING</th>
<th>OPN WALKER</th>
<th>BRIGADE TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NVA/VC KIA (BC)</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA/VC KIA (POSS)</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA/VC PW</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Defendants</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detainees</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Enemy equipment/supply losses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEAPONS</th>
<th>OPN COCHISE</th>
<th>OPN BOLLING</th>
<th>OPN WALKER</th>
<th>BRIGADE TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pistol</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1 Rifle</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMG</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
### Operational Report Lessons Learned

**AVEE-SC/MID**

**SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OPN COHILSE</th>
<th>OPN ROLLING</th>
<th>OPN WALKER</th>
<th>BRIGADE TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-2 Rifle (carbine)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG-2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-72 LAW</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-16 Rifle</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.30 Cal Rifle</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK-47</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAR</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKS</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Springfield</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauser</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shotgun</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Sniper Rifle</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-2 SMG (French)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.50 Cal MG (US)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home-Made Rifle</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home-Made Pistol</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-40 Rocker Launcher</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**AMMO, MINES and EXPLOSIVES**

| Small Arms Rds | 12,506 | 406 | 250 | 13,162 |
| Chicom Claymore Mine | 5 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| M-26 Hand Grenade | 42 | 2 | 1 | 45 |
| 81mm Mortar Rds | 85 | 0 | 0 | 85 |
| Chicom HE | 25 | 1 | 0 | 26 |
| Hand Flares | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Chicom Mine | 15 | 0 | 3 | 18 |
| Thermit Grenade | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Chicom Antitank Mine | 27 | 3 | 0 | 30 |
### Operational Report Lessons Learned

**15 August 1968**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>COCHISE</th>
<th>BOLLING</th>
<th>WALKER</th>
<th>BRIGADE TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Firing Devices</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butterfly Bomb</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blasting Caps</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-40 Rocket Rds</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60mm Mortar Fuses</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-40 Booster Charges</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82mm Fuzes</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60mm Rds</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shape Charges</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG-2 Rds</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG-7 Rds</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57mm RR Rds</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FOOD</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice, lbs</td>
<td>107,105</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>107,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salad Oil, gal.</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soy Sauce, gal.</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MISCELLANEOUS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rucksack (VC/NVA)</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boots, pair</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helmet, Steel</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blanket</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canteen (NVA)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canteen Cup</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistol Belt</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poncho (VC/NVA)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG (M-16)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG (M-1 Carbine)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG (AK-47)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Operational Report Lessons Learned

**Date:** 15 August 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>OPN COCHISE</th>
<th>OPN POLLING</th>
<th>OPN WALKER</th>
<th>BRIGADE TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAG (M-14)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayonet</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing, lbs</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC-10 Battery</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chop Sticks, sets</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Antenna</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hammocks (NVA)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mess Kits</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belt (VC/NVA)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ho Chi Sandals</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbwire, feet</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gasoline, gal.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Supplies, lbs</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosquito Nets</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas Mask Carriers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas Mask (VC/NVA)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helmet, Pith</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shovels (NVA)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camera (US)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicycles</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wooden Tng Grenades</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice Bowls</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stoves</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documents, lbs</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**d. Use of Long Range Partols (LRP):** Extensive use was made of the 74th Infantry (LRP) in the conduct of Operation Cochrise during the months of May, June and July. The mission assigned to the various LRP teams was generally that of trail watching operations in areas of suspected enemy activity for various amounts of time, generally from three to five days per operation. Secondary missions of bomb damage assessment, artillery assessment and the capture of prisoners were assigned.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

During the month of May a total of 24 LRP operations were fielded. Artillery fire was adjusted onto observed and suspected enemy positions by LRP teams and four company-size search and destroy operations were conducted, based on LRP findings.

In June 21 LRP operational missions were conducted, and in conjunction with the missions, the LRP teams on six occasions adjusted artillery fire into observed enemy personnel. Nine of these missions were comprised of joint US and ARVN Long Range Patrol personnel. These joint patrols proved to be most successful, each team recognizing benefits, and such patrols are to be continued in the future. Based on observations of LRP teams, again several company-size operations were conducted in AO Cochise, including one in which intelligence provided by LRP personnel led allied units to enemy storage and supply point locations.

During July 23 operations were conducted, and in conjunction with these missions, LRP teams on 14 occasions adjusted artillery fire into observed enemy personnel. Several company-size operations were conducted in AO Cochise based on LRP observations, and a platoon-size reaction force was also committed in three instances to exploit LRP observations.

e. Operational Methods of Sapper Units:

(1) Sapper action is often a specific sabotage tactic employed in two levels: In separate attacks on installations and in support of infantry and artillery attacks.

(a) In separate attacks conducted by small forces, the sappers infiltrate deep into US and FWMF controlled areas to sabotage airfields, docks, vital bridges and important buildings and equipment. In this small force the sapper also has the mission of kidnapping, assassinating and performing other terrorist acts. Their greatest aid is the relative freedom of movement through a possible area of operation, affording the sapper unit access to and surveillance of their intended targets.

(b) In employing sapper units in support of infantry and artillery units in a general, all-out attack, their mission is to create a breach in the defensive network of the attacked installation to permit an infantry-type frontal assault. They use sticks, prongs and C-hooks to raise or spread the outer perimeter barbed wire, or either, with wire cutters snip the lower strands of wire. The sapper units also mark passages through mine fields with pegs or other means of identification. The infantry and heavy weapons units will wait in concealment while these tasks are being accomplished.

(c) The final task in preparing for the assault is the destruction of installation barricades, watchtowers, machine guns and other targets with satchel charges and grenades, and, at the same instance, to detonate explosives planted along the perimeter defenses or in the minefields. After breaching an entrance for the infantry, the sapper units may remain in the battle or withdraw and prepare to cover the infantry withdrawal.

(d) Other sapper-type actions are to conduct ambushes prepared along principal roads and waterways; to conduct surprise raids on airfields, supply areas and other facilities in rear areas not easily approached by large infantry units and terrorism and sabotage, especially in large cities. The size of sapper units varies from complete sapper battalions with up to 300-man strength in the larger cities down to separate sapper platoons at the lower level (district and province). Sappers also collect detailed intelligence from bar girls, cycle drivers, civilian employees of free world forces, and numerous others under their employ on potential sapper targets. Their tactics range from concealing a grenade in a loaf of bread to driving an explosive-laden vehicle into a target area.
Sappers are well-schooled, selection criteria are high, and only the most outstanding and dedicated are selected for training. Thus they enjoy a higher esprit de corps than conventional units, and, as a result, their combat effectiveness is generally high.

Sapper units employ five basic tactical principals:

(a) Detailed planning and reconnaissance, insured through minute planning and rehearsal until performance without error is assured.

(b) Secrecy and surprise in the planning and performance of the assigned mission.

(c) Speed, with sapper units moving rapidly to enable assault troops to reach their objectives in as short a time as possible and thus exploit all aspects of the defender's disorganization.

(d) Initiative, taking advantage of any favorable circumstances which might arise during the performance of the mission. Initiative is constantly encouraged through training and indoctrination.

(e) Flexibility, sapper units tailor its needs for men, weapons and equipment according to the mission.

f. Terrain and Weather:

(1) Terrain - Operations Cochise and Rolling II:

(a) Existing Situation: In the northern part of Binh Dinh Province the principal urban area is Bong Son (BR 8796). In the flat seasonally inundated coastal plains, there are three low mountain spurs with numerous adjacent hills and hill locks. The lowland plains grade westward into rolling plains, foothills, and then into steep heavily dissected mountains. The terrain becomes increasingly rugged from east to west. The predominant vegetation is rice cultivation in the lowlands and light to dense undergrowth in the hills and mountains. There are numerous valleys which facilitate movement; however, all expedient movement is restricted to existing trains, roads and waterways.

The principal avenues of movement are in a north-south direction. The coastal lowlands area is a preferred avenue of movement to rugged western mountains. In the south avenues of movement are broad with numerous alternate routes, but to the north they become constructed and the alternate routes become limited. Expedient movement in the coastal lowlands in a north-south direction would be to the east of and parallel to Route 1. Concealed movement would probably be north along the Suoi Ca River Valley (BR 802654) to the Nuoc Lang River (BR701875) Valley and then along the Kim Son River Valley (BR818899). The An Hai River Valley (BR768669) is a major avenue of movement from the north to either the south via the Kim Son River Valley (BR818899) or to the east along the Lei Giang River Valley (BR62942). The Kim Son River Valley (BR818899) affords many good avenues of movement from east to west through the Nuoc Tuong (BR701875), Suoi Tim (BR684829) and S Lon (BR773838) River Valleys. Accompanying trails allow movement further west to the Suoi Son River Valley (BR839831) in the extreme west. The Son River Valley (BR876662) is the only major north-south avenue of movement in the west.

(b) The steep slopes encountered in these rugged areas are obstacles to movement. Swollen rivers and streams also present an obstacle to movement in these areas. Avenues of movement in the coastal plains are unrestricted in all
directions; however, flooding in the wet season will present some problems to movement. The numerous streams and canals in this area will also present an obstacle to movement.

(2) **Terrain - Operation Walker**: Relief was characterised by high mountains with dense undergrowth with triple canopy in certain areas throughout the AO. Streams were generally full throughout the AO with the main river flowing SSW, with its source in the northern portion of the AO. Cultivated fields are found throughout the AO, especially around AN HIE. Trails are numerous throughout the AO and were generally well used. Because of the wide area for maneuver and the unlimited staging areas available to the enemy, he can easily avoid contact, engaging US forces only on his own terms. Highway 19 bisecting the TAOR from the east to the west, is paved and passable. There are two mountain passes on each side of the AO.

(3) **Weather - Operations Cocktail and Rolling II**:

(a) **May**: During May all Southeast Asia is under influence of the southwest monsoon, the weather beginning to follow a somewhat regular pattern with afternoon showers occurring almost everyday. Cloudiness continues to increase. Low ceilings occurred on a few mornings, but were relatively rare in the afternoon and evening except in passing thunderstorms and rain showers. Visibility was relatively good but rated excellent because of hazy nature of the equatorial air mass. In general, an increase in rainfall from April. Average monthly precipitation 6.1 inches; average temperature 92 degrees; average humidity 78%.

(b) **June**: Continuing under the influence of the southwest monsoon, the weather became patterned on a daily basis, with clear mornings and early afternoons and afternoon showers almost everyday. Cloudiness continued to increase. Low ceilings occurred on a few mornings, but were relatively rare during the afternoon and evenings except in passing thunderstorms and rain showers. Visibility was relatively good to excellent. Average temperature 92 degrees; average humidity 78% per cent.

(c) **July**: The area continued under the influence of the southwest monsoon, patterned on a daily basis as previously. Cloudiness continued to increase. Low ceilings occurred on a few mornings, but were relatively rare during the afternoon and evenings except in passing rain showers and thunderstorms. Visibility relatively good to excellent. Average temperature 92 degrees; average humidity 78%.

(4) **Weather - Operation Walker**: For the months of May, June and July, 1968 the weather in the AN HIE area was generally fair and warm, with temperatures ranging from a high of 95 degrees to a low of 65 degrees. Winds, for the most part, were from the East at 3-8 knots. Sky conditions were generally overcast clouds at approximately 2500 feet, with some morning fog, usually clearing around 0900 hours daily. Visibility ranged from 6 to 7 miles during the mid-morning to late afternoon. Rain showers and thunderstorms were sparse, normally beginning in the late afternoon and terminating in the early morning hours.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBE-SC/MID

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

15 August 1968

4. Combat Operations:

a. General: During the months of May, June and July 1968 the 173d Airborne Brigade continued to conduct combat operations Cochise, Rolling II and Walker, encompassing the Vietnamese provinces of Binh Dinh, Phu Yen and Phu Bon. The Brigade headquarters continued to operate out of LZ English, north of Bong Son, and also continuing to serve as headquarters for operation Cochise. The 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry and 3d Battalion, 503d Infantry (until 18 June 1968) were also headquartered at LZ English and the 1st Battalion (Mechanized) 50th Infantry, attached to the Brigade by I FFORC, headquartered at LZ Uplift, south of Bong Son. The 1st Battalion 69th Armor, OPOCOn to the Brigade, also was headquartered at LZ Uplift.

The 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry continued to conduct Operation Walker in the Camp Radcliff/AN KHE City tactical area of responsibility, and the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry continued to conduct Operation Rolling II in the TUY HOA City/Phu Yen Tactical area of responsibility. These combat operations are reported by operation by month.

b. Operation Cochise: In the conduct of Operation Cochise during the month of May, the Brigade's primary enemy was the 3d NVA Division, known as the Yellow Star and considered to be the most elite NVA unit in South Vietnam. Besides carrying the task of locating and destroying the 3d NVA Division, the Brigade also was mounted with other missions. Most important is the continued conduct of security on Highway 1, insuring that this vital economic line remained open and free of enemy contact, so that both Vietnamese and allied forces and the Vietnamese populace might continue to make use of this primary communication route for both military and civilian needs. This mission included bridge and culvert surveillance, constant mine-sweeping operations and continuous operations and reconnaissance over possible enemy ambush sites.

A second strategic mission is the continuing assistance of the Brigade in the province and district revolutionary development - civic action programs, including such diverse activities as the construction of the Bong Son Village market place, the incorporation of ARVN troops into the Brigade LRP teams, and the training of ARVN LRP teams. This includes the continuation of combined US - ARVN operations, a movement which becomes more professional, more coordinated and more successful with each passing combined operation.

In mid April the Brigade organized, equipped and trained three Brigade Advisory Teams, formed primarily to work and train with province RF/PF units in an effort to increase their efficiency. These teams have been most successful, to the point that these teams, in incipience, were only designed to operate until regular MACV Training Teams arrived. Upon the MACV team’s arrival, the Brigade effort had proven so beneficial that the district and province chiefs asked Brigadier General Allen to allow the teams to continue in their mission, and they now continue to do so.

Each team is five men, comprised of one infantry lieutenant, one infantry NGO and one infantry, engineer and medical enlisted man. These teams were placed under the senior district advisor, and teach subjects as recommended in the MACV Program of Instruction. Their three basic goals are to improve the basic military skills of the RF/PF forces, to improve their personal knowledge of the uses, limitations and advantages of their own weapons and equipment and to instill in the Vietnamese esprit do corps, a pride in their local unit, their district, province and country. Emphasis is placed on learning by performance rather than formal instruction. The teams are currently providing training to Regional Force Companies and Popular Force Platoons in the districts of Hoai An, Hoai Nhon and Phu My.
Operation Cochise began the month of May with much activity, the first two days resulting in 5 NVA KIA (BC) and two possible VC kills in six friendly and eight enemy initiated actions. On 3 May, Bravo Company, 2d Bn 503d Inf, at 1045 hours, having pursued five to seven VC into the village of Truong Lam (2) at BR932048, encountered heavy resistance from the enemy occupied bunkers and trenches. Gunships were called in, and at approximately 1200 hours contact was broken, resulting in two VC/NVA KIA (BC) and two VC wounded in this action were captured, along with miscellaneous equipment and documents. At 1355 hours, B Company engaged another four to five VC, killed one (BC) and captured one SKS weapon. After B Company had lagered for the night, they received an undetermined number of 60mm or 82mm mortar fire from the West, resulting in one US MHA and three US WIA.

As both Bravo and Delta had found freshly dug holes and trenches, various bunker structures, and kitchens, playing cards and various equipment, it was obvious that both companies had uncovered a battalion-size enemy base camp. The following morning (4 May), Alpha, Charlie and Delta Companies continued search and destroy operations, resulting in more document and equipment findings, plus the gravesites of VC/NVA killed 3 to 4 weeks earlier as a result of airstrikes.

Companies from the 2d and 3d Battalions both had personnel injured by numerous booby traps and punji stakes freshly-placed. The 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Inf, operating south of Bong Son, also reported findings of NVA equipment, including ponchos, bags of rice, sleeping mats, rucksacks, magazines, a gas mask, canteen and sweater. By this time, there was no doubt but that the enemy had returned. If only contact could be made.

On 5 May the Brigade had its chances, and took all advantages of this opportunity. Bravo 3d Bn 503d Inf began the day's activity with a 0445 hours ambush of twenty-five to thirty VC at BS910051 and BS915048, with gunship and artillery assistance. The VC broke contact at 0600 hours, and left 13 bodies as evidence of a well planned and well executed ambush. Eleven weapons were captured, with 8 US personnel being wounded. Later in the morning, at 1845 hours, at BS945050 on the South China Sea coastline, Alpha Company 2d Bn 503d Inf, after following heavy blood trails, found that these trails ended abruptly at the water's edge. The wounded VC from Bravo's early morning ambush had captured four or five local Vietnamese civilians fishing boats as a means of escape. Gunships were quickly called in, resulting in 11 VC KIA (BC) and one boat destroyed. At mid-morning (1010 hours) Alpha Company, while patrolling in the hills above the coastal area (BS930073), engaged still another VC force, killing 5 (BC) and retaining 37 detainees. Bravo Company again made contact at 1150 hours at BR911044, engaging and killing 1 VC (BC). Delta 2d Bn 503d Inf after locating enemy bunkers during reconnaissance in force operations on the morning of the 5th, at 1128 hours found an enemy base camp approximately 200 to 300 meters in diameter and containing 32 bunkers, 11 caves, 7 foxholes and 2 kitchens with stoves, along with 11 rucksacks and many green, khaki and black uniforms. While searching the base camp area, Delta Company received sniper fire, returned this fire, resulting in 1 US KHA, 2 US WHA and 2 NVA KIA (BC). A further search of the area revealed a small hospital and miscellaneous documents.

While the 2d Bn 503d Inf was constantly in contact, Alpha Company 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Inf made tremendous heavy contact with an estimated two NVA Battalions. Halting at the base of the primary north-south mountain range in rice patties (BR912799) for lunch (1146). Upon dismounting from their APC's, the infantrymen immediately came under intense SA, AW, B-40 rocket fire, 57mm recoilless rifle fire and 82mm mortar fire from all directions. Alpha continued returned SA and AW fire from the APC's and called for artillery gunships and tactical air support. At 1255 hours Alpha Company, 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Inf and B Company 1st Bn 69th Armor reinforced Alpha Company in the contact area and also received heavy AW and B-40 rocket fire, at 1515 hours a gunship in support of the infantryman was shot down and exploded on
SU.BJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

August 15, 1968

Contact, resulting in 4 US KHA. Bravo 1st Bn 69th Armor continued receiving fire
while securing the extraction LZ, and the initial contact continued until approxi-
ately 1930 hours, resulting in 6 US KHA, 9 US MHA, 50 US WHA, 100 NVA KIA (Poss). Equipment losses were 5 M113 APC's destroyed, 1 UH-1C destroyed and three UH-1C's
damaged. The NVA were reported by Alpha Company 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Inf as dressed
in green fatigues and silk pajamas, well armed and well camouflaged.

Contact resumed on 7 May when Bravo and Charley Companies 1st Bn (Mech) 50th
Inf with Bravo Company 1st Bn 69th Armor, laagered at BR925806, began receiving
moderate to heavy SA fire. At 0350 hours B-40 rocketing was reported, along with
several 82mm mortar rounds. Artillery began firing close-in defensive fires, and at 0430 hours enemy firing ceased as the NVA attempted probing attacks from the North and South on the perimeter defense. At 0455 hours an enemy B-40 rocket hit
the infantryman's ammo supply point, and all ammo was destroyed, and at 0520 heavy
AW fire came from north of the perimeter, which "Spooky" engaged with undetermined
results. At 0535 mortar and B-40 rocket fire began to fire again, from the south.
"Spooky" engaged this firing, and at 0545 hours mortar and B-40 fire ceased. The
night's results were 7 US KHA, 43 US WHA, with undetermined enemy results.

In conducting a search of the contact area at first light, Bravo Company found
18 NVA KIA (BC) and rockets and weapons. Later in the morning (0750 hours), at BR 910798, an aerial observer observed 30 NVA in the open and immediately put an air
strike in on the fleeing targets, resulting in 30 NVA KIA (BC). Bravo Company at
1040 hours found 4 NVA bodies, all booby trapped, at BR900795, and at 1150 hours
at BR915803 gunships from the 61st AHC, who had been supporting the Brigade con-
tinuously in Operation Cochise, found 10 NVA in the open and killed all 10.

The 6th of May found Bravo Company 2d in 503d Inf again in contact. OPCON
to the 3d Bn 503d Inf, at 1049 hours at BR890825 Bravo Company made contact with
an enemy force of undetermined size. Artillery and Tactical Air Control supported
Bravo Company, with the result that 2 US were KHA, 18 US WHA and 10 NVA KIA (BC).
Various weapons were captured. Again in the early afternoon tactical air and artil-
ery were brought in by Bravo Company when approximately 200 VC/NVA were spotted
in the open at BR 900820. Enemy was observed fleeing in all directions, with un-
determined results. Bravo 3d Bn 503d Inf at 1451 hours made contact with an esti-
mated NVA platoon at BR909318. Artillery and TAC air were brought in, with the
results of 1 US KIA, 4 US WHA and 4 NVA KIA (BC).

At 1400 hours on 7 May, in reconnaissance operations in portions of areas af-
fected by 6 May contacts, Bravo Company 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Inf found a total of 20
NVA KIA (BC). Findings were at BR910799 and BR902789. No weapons or documents
were found on the bodies. One PRC-25 was also located which had also been used by
the NVA.

Twenty-five more NVA bodies were found by D Company 3d Bn 503d Inf on 8 May
at 1330 hours. The bodies were dressed in green uniforms, and were approximately
three days old. All had been killed by either artillery or airstrikes, and again,
ocuments were to be found on the bodies. Enemy bodies continued to be found.
On 9 May, 4 bodies were located, one at BR888403 by D Company 2d Bn 503d Inf, two
by D Company 3d Bn 503d Inf at BR903804 and one by B Company 3d Bn 503d Inf at
BR905795. All had been killed by tactical air or artillery.

On 11 May at 1344 hours at BR874735 B and C Companies of the 1st Bn (Mech)
50th Inf were again in contact, this time made while conducting a reconnaissance-
in-search operation to the north. The NVA employed SA, AW and either 60mm or 82mm
mortar fire, and the infantrymen retaliated with artillery, tactical air and gun-
ships. Initial contact broke at 1540 hours, resulting in 3 US KHA and 31 US WHA.
The FAC in support of the infantrymen reported 60 NVA KIA (BC) as a result of a
airstrike at BR875736, with other enemy casualties remaining undetermined.
CONFIDENTIAL

ADEF-SC/MHD
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

15 August 1968

The 12th of May found the 3d Bn 503d Inf engaging in most of the contacts made in AO Cochise, finding 26 freshly dug latrines, many bunkers, cooking ovens, 82mm rounds, 60 mm rounds, B-40 rockets, shovels, canteens, clothing and other equipment and documents. Also found were 3 NVA, killed by either tactical air or artillery. This was at BR885732. The 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Inf continued to hold reconnaissance in force operations in the area of the 4th through 7 May contact, and on 13 May reported 43 NVA bodies located. All again were wearing green fatigues, being either buried in shallow graves or lying in the open. Various trench systems and bunker complexes were found in the area that 30 bodies were located, thus this area (BR875732) was believed to be either a battalion or regiment command post. All documents found were extracted, along with 1 NVA body thought to be Chinese.

From the 14th until the 24th of May, enemy contact was slight but constant, reflecting a movement on the part of the enemy to withdraw to well-camouflaged jungle areas for the replacement of personnel and supplies lost in earlier battles. Brigade efforts were centered around insuring that the enemy was not afforded the opportunity to re-form his forces for a large-scale attack on units and installations, depriving the enemy of replacement personnel and equipment through surveillance and interdiction of known enemy routes of advance and supply trails, constant reconnaissance in force operations and nightly ambushes along trails and ridge-lines. The Brigade's efforts were successful. The enemy was not allowed to set up any sort of permanent base camp, and was constantly deprived of needed supplies, combat equipment and rice.

On 25 May Bravo 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Inf made contact with a fleeing estimated company-sized unit at 1110 hours and BR8372820. The enemy used heavy SA and AW fire, B-40 rockets and mortar fire in attempts to break contact, the infantrymen retaliating with gunships, tactical air strikes, artillery and their own individual and crew-served weapons. The contact continued until late afternoon, with the 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Inf recognizing that the enemy had fled and dug into hamlets to the north and west of BR891727, and enemy size was believed to be 1 battalion reinforced with a heavy weapons company.

Bravo Company was resupplied at 1620 hours, and began a counter-attack on the various hamlets immediately. In sweeping the hamlet area, the estimate proved true, and at 2300 hours it was reported that 33 NVA had been killed in the counter-attack. The enemy was dressed in green fatigue uniforms with new web gear, all individuals were camouflaged and armed with individual weapons, recoilless rifles, M-79's, 60mm and 82mm mortars. Anti-tank teams were believed to be set up to the south of the hamlets, and six of the possible locations were attacked by tactical air with undetermined results. US losses were 2 KIA and 18 WIA. There was doubt but that this unit was comprised of fresh replacements for the 3d NVA Division, and also that the Brigade had most positively stopped this new enemy infiltration. Enemy bodies as a result of this contact continued to be found in varying numbers for a weeks period, eventually totaling seven NVA KIA (BC). The remainder of the month of May was similar in content to the period 14 to 24 May, with contact generally consistently lighter than formerly.

The month of June showed a restraint in enemy activity, making clear that the 3d NVA Division and its assigned and attached units had sustained heavy casualties from allied attacks during the month of May. The enemy had presumably relocated his headquarters out of the Cochise area of operations, concentrating on the infusion of fresh replacement personnel to expand his depleted combat ranks and on the replacement of destroyed and captured arms, ammunition and equipment. The enemy avoided contact, and the local VC elements were ordered to increase sniping, boobytrap and mining operations to in part substitute for the NVA absence. It is noteworthy that there is regularly an increase in this type of warfare upon the regular NVA unit's departure from a given area of operation, and a decline upon his return.
Operational Report Lessons Learned

15 August 1960

Punji-staking of routes and trails of ground movement is increased, CBU units are a favorite item for booby trapping, as are command detonated mines of various size and composition. Hand grenades and dud and live artillery and mortar rounds are also extensively used. Task Force 2d Bn 503d Inf, Task Force 3d Bn 503d Inf and Task Force 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Inf continued to conduct reconnaissance in force, search and clear, search and destroy and cordon and search operations along the length of AO Cochise, with little enemy-initiated contacts excepting sniping and booby-trap engagements. Brigade elements continued to ambush and engage smaller squad and fire-teams size enemy movements through successful ambushes and search and clear operations, depriving the enemy of vitally needed foodstuffs, weapons, ammunition and equipment, also destroying enemy bunkers and huts to deprive him of shelter and protection.

On 18 June Task Force 3d Bn 503d Inf was relieved from AO Cochise and became a part of Task Force South (first called Task Force Cleland), under the operational control of I FORCV and operating in AO McNair on the southern border of II Corps around the Vietnamese village of BAY LOC. Elements of Task Force 1st Bn 503d Inf, continuing to operate in AR Walker, were also OPCONed to Task Force South, as were elements of the 101st Airborne Division. Task Force South, as of 31 July, remained under the command of Colonel John R. Cleland, and continued to be comprised primarily of the 3d Bn 503d Inf.

In July Operation Cochise was a repetition of the latter part of June, with again the enemy avoiding contact with allied forces and presumably remaining out of the Brigade TAOR, either having moved north or south as reported in June. The enemy was evidently not able to complete the integration of new replacement personnel into his various assigned and attached units or to re-supply and re-equip his earlier losses through the formation of a satisfactory logistics system.

The primary Brigade elements operating in AO Cochise continued to be Task Force 2d Bn 503d Inf, Task Force 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Inf and 1st Bn 69th Armor. These units were strengthened with the arrival of MSF Companies 201, 209, 221 and 222 on 15 July to assist and alleviate the void caused by the movement of the 3d Bn 503d Inf to BAY LOC and Task Force South. These four units were placed under the OPCON of the 173d Airborne Brigade for an unspecified period of time, and are based out of PLEKU and QUI Nhon. They are under the command of US Army Special Forces personnel.

The largest single contact for the month of July occurred on 12 July at 1755 hours at BR 61692 when LRP team Delta made contact with an estimated 15 VC/NVA. Team Delta employed 3A fire, claymore mines and M-26 hand grenades against the enemy, the enemy responding with AK-47 and AK-50 fire and hand grenades. Gunships were called in and a reaction force committed to support the contact. Contact was broken at 1825 hours and team Delta was extracted without incident. This contact resulted in one US WIA, 4 VC KIA (BC), 6 VC/NVA KIA (Poss) and 1 AK-47, 10 pounds of miscellaneous equipment and 1 pound of documents captured.

Thus July ended as June had, with no major enemy contacts nor any immediate possibilities of such. The Brigade had performed well its mission in AO Cochise during the months of May, June and July. It had defeated the enemy and inflicted terrible personnel and equipment losses on his units. It insured that Highway 1 remained open and accessible to both military and civilian vehicular traffic without incident, allowing the Vietnamese citizen to continue to realize the economic and morale benefits derived from this vital span of transportation remaining open. It had continued with increasing responsibility its civic action program and its training program for Vietnamese RF/PF forces. The 173d Airborne Brigade had served well. For a listing of enemy contact in AO Cochise for the months of May, June and July, see Section III, Intelligence, Significant Contacts.
In June the enemy force was again evading contact. The largest sighting proved to be by LRP Team 15 at 0815 hours on 15 June, when, at CQ01U62, they sighted 30 individuals with weapons and rucksacks. Airstrikes were called in, but with undetermined results. Other than this sighting, no contact was made with enemy elements comprised of more than five individuals. The enemy continued to avoid any contact.

In Operation Boiling II the month of July paralleled June's activities until the end of the month, when the enemy made use of sapper units in an attack on Tuy Hoa Air Force Base. On the 2d and 3d of July, LRP team 16 observed 25 and 23 individuals moving in a westerly direction, engaged them with SA and M-79 fire, killing 1 VC (BC) and capturing an AK-47 and a Mauser. Again on 15 May, B Company made contact with six or seven NVA in khaki uniforms at BQ935544 at 1230 hours. One NVA was killed (BC), one NVA captured (POW), 12 pair of khakis, 25 pajama shirts, 45 pajama pants, 20 rounds of rice and one hand grenade were also captured, with two US wounded in action. Later on the 15th, at BQ894444 at 1815 hours, A Company, Task Force 4th Bn 503d Inf spotted and engaged 1 VC, killed the VC (BC) and captured 1 M-2 carbine. Through the remainder of the month of July, Operation Boiling II, Task Force 4th Bn 503d Inf continued reconnaissance and force and search and destroy operations, finding enemy bunkers, both fresh and well-used, several enemy rice caches and signs of recent movement, but the enemy was not to be found.

In June the enemy force was again evading contact. The largest sighting proved to be by LRP Team 15 at 0815 hours on 15 June, when, at CQ014462, they sighted 30 individuals with weapons and rucksacks. Airstrikes were called in, but with undetermined results. Other than this sighting, no contact was made with enemy elements comprised of more than five individuals. The enemy continued to avoid any contact, and was again engulfed in attempting to re-form and re-supply his forces.

But the enemy forces, after taking heavy casualties from US, ROK and ARVN combat operations in middle and late April, were not easily located. As noted, the primary enemy organization in AO Boiling continued to be elements of the 25th NVA Regiment. On 2 May C Company 4th Bn 503d Inf, at 1005 hours at CQ006496, engaged a small size enemy reconnaissance patrol. Using SA, AW and claymores, Charley Company accounted for 7 VC KIA (BC), captured 4 AK-47 and 3 SKS rifles, and had no friendly casualties. D Company 16th Armor and the 577th Engineer Battalion, while continuing construction of a roadbed for Operation REBUILD, on 8 May found 16 60mm mortar rounds in a canal in the vicinity of BQ955444, and destroyed the rounds in place.

On 13 May, B Company, Task Force 4th Bn 503d/Inf, at 1430 hours at BQ965555, spotted 2 VC/NVA moving in a westerly direction, engaged them with SA and M-79 fire, killing 1 VC (BC) and capturing an AK-47 and a Mauser. Again on 15 May, B Company made contact with six or seven NVA in khaki uniforms at BQ935544 at 1230 hours. One NVA was killed (BC), one NVA captured (POW), 12 pair of khakis, 25 pajama shirts, 45 pajama pants, 20 rounds of rice and one hand grenade were also captured, with two US wounded in action. Later on the 15th, at BQ894444 at 1815 hours, A Company, Task Force 4th Bn 503d Inf spotted and engaged 1 VC, killed the VC (BC) and captured 1 M-2 carbine. Through the remainder of the month of May, Operation Boiling II, Task Force 4th Bn 503d Inf continued reconnaissance and force and search and destroy operations, finding enemy bunkers, both fresh and well-used, several enemy rice caches and signs of recent movement, but the enemy was not to be found.

From the period of 5 July until 26 July, little significant activity took place in Operation Boiling II. Task Force 4th Bn 503d Inf, under the command of LTC David L. Buckner, who had assumed command on 1 February 1968, continued to perform its mission of finding, fixing and destroying the enemy forces, but later in-
Confidential

AVBE-SC/MHD

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

15 August 1968

Intelligence data revealed that the 95th NVA Regiment had been unable to rebuild its fighting strength after its heavy losses in the month of April and, due to steady and successful allied pressure on the regiment, had also been unable to re-develop a workable supply and logistics system.

Primarily for these reasons, the 95th NVA Regiment, in early and middle July, began to withdraw out of the TUY HOA City and the Bolling area of operations, moving westward toward and presumably into the Tri-Border Area, thus hoping to be able to re-equip itself with greater ease with new replacement personnel and supplies prior to returning to the Bolling area of operation. The 95th NVA Regiment left one of its three infantry line battalions, the 6th Bn 95th NVA Regiment, in the area to serve as a blocking force if needed.

On 29 July at 0150 hours, at Tuy Hoa Air Force Base, an enemy sapper team was successful in infiltrating the Air Force portion of the base perimeter defensive network and placing an estimated six demolition charges at various strategic areas inside TUY HOA Air Force Base itself. On exploding, these charges damaged two C-130 aircraft and one F-100 aircraft. In the ensuing action following the explosion, 6 VC were killed (BC) inside the defensive perimeter of the Air Force Base, and two AK-47's, two B-40 rockets, one 9mm pistol and an assortment of hand grenades and explosives were captured. Helicopter gunships, immediately in the air upon the explosions, accounted for another 3 VC kills (BC) at coordinates BQ195408.

This attack emphasized again the increased emphasis that the enemy is placing on sapper-type activity as a prelude or part of the expected third general offensive. For a description of sapper-units operational methods, see subparagraph E, Section III, Intelligence.

Thus, for the months of May, June and July, Task Force 4th Bn 503d Inf continuously carried out reconnaissance and force and search and destroy operations in AO Bolling, but were faced with the task of locating and sustaining contact with an enemy who had no desire for either being located or entering contact. In addition to its continuing field operations, the 4th Battalion and D Company, 16th Armor continued to provide security for the omnipotent Vietnamese rice harvest, provided for the security of the 577th Engineer Battalion and the 173d Engineer Company for their construction and mine-sweeping missions along Highway 436 and Routes 68 and 2D as a part of Operation Rebuild, assisted the Air Force in defending the perimeter of Tuy Hoa Air Force Base and provided at all times an infantry line company for a ready-reaction force as needed.

From 16 to 27 July, Task Force 4th Bn 503d Infantry conducted operations in AO Black, with negligible enemy contact. For significant contacts in the months of May, June and July in AO Bolling, see Section III, Intelligence: Operation Bolling II.

d. Operation Walker: In May the 1st Bn 503d Inf continued to secure the Camp Radcliff/An Khe complex, secure and maintain for vehicular traffic Highway 19 in the Tactical Area of Responsibility, conduct search and destroy, reconnaissance in force and cordon and search operations within AO Walker and to continue to support revolutionary development projects.

The continued presence of Task Force 1st Bn 503d Inf in AO Walker reflected a change in policy and desires by the Brigade, as previously infantry battalions had been rotated to Camp Radcliff and AO Walker monthly, but this policy was replaced by the thought that each infantry battalion could better fulfill its mission by remaining in a particular area of operations for a longer period of time, thus
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBE-30/HD
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

becoming more familiar with the specific area in regard to terrain and populace. The 173d Support Battalion (Airborne) continued to furnish guards and emergency support for the defense of Camp Radcliff.

During the month of June, the 1st Bn 503d Inf again remained in AO Walker. The battalion, under the command of Major Raymond E. Gunderson, employed company-size search and destroy operations, night ambushes, joint US-ARVN operations, was again responsible for the security of the AO Walker portion of Highway 19 and constantly held one infantry company as the Brigade ready-reaction force.

Contact with enemy forces was light during the month of June, involving for the most part sniper fire and small, unsuccessful ambushes along Highway 19 by the enemy. At 2125 hours on 17 June, Camp Radcliff reported receiving approximately fifty rounds of 82mm mortar fire, with minimum damage to the installation camp. Twelve US personnel were wounded. Enemy mortar positions were engaged by 81mm mortar and artillery fire with unknown results. It is felt that continued close coordination and combined US-ARVN operations, which proved to be successful, were instrumental in halting enemy incidents along the Camp Radcliff perimeter and AO Walker as a whole.

In July Task Force 1st Bn 503d Inf continued to perform its mission in AO Walker. The Quick Strike Battalion (temporary designation of the infantry battalion located at Camp Radcliff) mission continued to be the responsibility for the defense of Camp Radcliff, with assistance from the three Provisional Rifle Companies drawn from each of the major tenant units located at Camp Radcliff: 173d Support Battalion (Airborne); rear elements of the 1st Air Cavalry Division and elements of the Qui Nhơn Area Support Command. The 1st Bn 503d Inf also continued to staff the Camp Radcliff Tactical Operations Center and maintains a one infantry reaction force for any tactical emergency in either AO Walker or the Brigade TAOR. Two infantry companies continued to conduct reconnaissance in force missions in AO Walker and one infantry company continued to maintain the highway and bridge security of Highway 19, through the responsibility of checkpoints 18 (West of An Khe Pass) through 27 (east of Man Yang Pass). For results of contacts in AO Walker for the months of May, June and July, see Section 3, Intelligence, Significant Contacts.

Intelligence as recorded in the previous reporting period indicated the enemy would launch another major offensive during the months of May, June or July in AO Walker. These intensified attacks were to come in the form of short but sharp mortar attacks against Camp Radcliff; increased harassment of vehicular traffic along Highway 19 and small, vicious ground attacks against isolated and vulnerable checkpoints and outposts. Such attacks were not launched; reasoning for their not being attempted can best be found in the continuance of a strong and successful revolutionary development program, the continuance of reconnaissance in force operations by Task Force 1st Bn 503d Inf and the continued strong rapport between US and ARVN forces. For a review of enemy capabilities in AO Walker, refer to Section 3; Intelligence: Operation Walker.

e. Enemy and Friendly Casualties by Operation:

(1) Operation Combat:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VC/NVA LOSSES</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA (BC)</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA (POSS)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US LOSSES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHA</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHA</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVBE-SC/MSD

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VC/NVA LOSSES</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Defendents</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**US LOSSES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MHA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Battle Dead</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Operation Rolling II:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VC/NVA LOSSES</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA (BC)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA (POSS)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Defendents</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**US LOSSES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KHA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHA</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Operation Walker:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VC/NVA LOSSES</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA (BC)</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA (POSS)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Defendents</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**US LOSSES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KHA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHA</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**f. Combat Support Activities:**

(1) **Aviation Support:** The 173d Airborne Brigade Aviation Platoon (Casper), continued to support all combat operations during the months of May, June and July. The statistical report of the Aviation Platoon's activities for these three months is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UH-1H MISSIONS</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SORTIES/MISIIONS</td>
<td>SORTIES/MISIIONS</td>
<td>SORTIES/MISIIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resupply</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command/Control</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
## Operational Report Lessons Learned

### Administration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total hours flown</td>
<td>483</td>
<td></td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### OH-6A MISSIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command/Control</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Hrs flown</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Naval Gunfire Support

Additional artillery support was provided from United States Navy destroyers on-station with either two or three twin-mounted 5" guns. The destroyers and their on-station sequence for the period May–July is reported as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>DESTROYER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1–6 May</td>
<td>USS Fletcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6–14 May</td>
<td>USS Epperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17–25 May</td>
<td>USS Fletcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 May–5 June</td>
<td>USS Mansfield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6–7 June</td>
<td>USS John A. Bole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–27 June</td>
<td>USS Mullany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 June–7 July</td>
<td>USS Canonade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11–14 July</td>
<td>USS Buckley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17–20 July</td>
<td>USS Clarion River</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Naval gunfire liaison was provided by Sub Unit One, First ANGLICO, composed of Navy and Marine personnel.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBE-SC/MID
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

5. Training:

a. During the reporting period the 173d Airborne Brigade continued to conduct jungle warfare training of newly arrived replacements. A breakdown of personnel trained by month follows:

   (1) May:
      (a) Personnel assigned to the 173d Airborne Brigade: 31 Officers and 793 Enlisted Men.
      (b) Personnel not assigned to the 173d Airborne Brigade: 4 Officers and 140 Enlisted Men.

   (2) June:
      (a) Personnel assigned to the 173d Airborne Brigade: 28 Officers and 683 Enlisted Men.
      (b) Personnel not assigned to the 173d Airborne Brigade: 10 Officers and 137 Enlisted Men.

   (3) July:
      (a) Personnel assigned to the 173d Airborne Brigade: 18 Officers and 681 Enlisted Men.
      (b) Personnel not assigned to the 173d Airborne Brigade: 4 Officers and 95 Enlisted Men.

b. Indigenous personnel trained during this period were as follows:

   (1) ARVN - 143
   (2) Montagnards - 60
   (3) RF/PF - 40

c. The 173d Airborne Brigade Jungle School training schedule is included as Inclosure 4.
6. Psychological Operations and Civic Action

a. May:

(1) General: Civic Action and Psychological Operations continued to increase in scope and quantity for the month of May. Delivery of food and building materials increased by 100% from the last reporting period. Three additional sites for MEDCAP were added during the month of May, resulting in an increase in May of 3,869 patients over the month of April.

(2) Coordination with local GVN, ARVN, and MACV/CORDS personnel continued on a daily basis to improve community relations between local populace and the 173d Airborne Brigade.

(3) Civic Action:

(a) MEDCAP: 7,588 patients treated.

(b) Community Relations:

1. The items listed below were distributed to local orphanages, refugee camps, villages and schools:

   a. Food: 13,379 lbs.
   b. Clothing: 2,000 lbs.
   c. Lumber: 130,560 board feet.
   d. Captured Rice Distributed: 25.64 tons.

2. Construction Material: 125 bags of cement, 60 lbs of nails, 12 rolls barbwire, 60 six foot steel pickets, and 224 feet of steel culvert.

3. Health Items: 350 bars of soap and 400 lbs lice powder.

(4) Psychological Operations:

(a) 9,651,000 Chieu Hoi, safe conduct leaflets were delivered by air in AO Cochise, Walker and Rolling.

(b) 174 loudspeaker missions totaling 85 hours and 40 minutes were broadcast in conjunction with combat operations.

b. June:

(1) General: The 173d Airborne Brigade continued on an aggressive civic action and psychological operations program during the month of June.

(2) Civic Action:

(a) MEDCAP: 4,152 patients treated.

(b) Community Relations:
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

1. The following commodities were distributed to schools, hospitals, refugee camps and District Headquarters in Hoai Nhon, Hoai An and Phu My Districts:

   a. Food: 9,550 lbs.
   b. Lumber: 72,045 board feet.
   c. Rice: 1½ tons.
   d. Tin: 230 sheets.
   e. Cement: 9,000 lbs.
   f. Tents: 9 GP small, 9 GP medium.

2. 20,000 $VN were spent for the Bong Son High School for purchases of school supplies.

   c. July:

   (1) General: The 173d Airborne Brigade once again continued an aggressive civic action and psychological operations program during the month of July. Civic actions and psychological operations have continued to increase in both scope and quantity.

   (2) Civic Actions:

      (a) MEDCAP: 103 MEDCAP's conducted, during which 4,555 patients were treated.

      (b) Community Relations:

         1. Donations to local villages and orphanages: Food Stuffs: 18,400 lbs.

         2. Assistance given towards rural development includes the start of construction on the Market Place Road, Bong Son, and the distributing of 15,800 pounds of cement, 75 sheets of tin and 37,465 board feet of lumber to areas within Hoai Nhon and Hoai An Districts.

         (c) Psychological Operations:

            1. 2,796,000 leaflets dropped.
            2. 39 hours of loudspeaker missions.

            3. Psychological Operations-Field Team 6, LZ English, conducted 16 hours of ground and speaker operations. Four hours of airborne speaker operations were "quick reaction" missions supporting combat operations.
7. **Logistics**: During the reporting period, the Brigade's capabilities have been required to be continuously split three ways and furnish logistical support to the BONG SON area, the AN KHE area and the TUY HOA area. The BAO LOC area is supported by task force from Cam Ranh Bay Support Command (as noted). The logistical posture continues to remain excellent. Tactical operations were supported by land and air lines of supply. A logistical summary by classes of supply is furnished by month in Inclosure 3.
AVBE-SC/MHD
15 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

6. Personnel and Administration:
   a. General:
      (1) May: The Brigade posture is somewhat below that of the last reporting period; line battalions are short an average of 22 EM per battalion. Major shortages, as of 31 May 1968 are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>EM SHORTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 503d Inf</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 503d Inf</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Bn, 503d Inf</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn, 319th Arty</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall the Brigade is over 186 EM. Data on individual MOS shortages is not available. Casualty fill action is still being made from an airborne pool that is maintained at 22d Replacement Battalion and 90th Replacement Battalion. Three infusion programs being completed are as follows:

(a) 38 out of 100 EM (E1-E7) have been assigned to the 3d Battalion, 503d Infantry from the replacement stream. Target date for completion is 30 June 1968.

(b) The infusion of 101st Airborne Division personnel with the 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry (Mech) is almost completed. 37 EM are due to report for out processing on 12 June 1968 for assignment to the 101st Airborne Division.

(c) 82 EM from the 101st Airborne Division are expected to infuse into the 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery on 10 June 1968.

(2) June: The Brigade posture is excellent at this time. Line battalions are at or above authorized strength with the single exception of the 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery. The 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery has increased in authorized strength during the month due to the creation of Battery D. Originally 82 EM were to be levied from the 101st Airborne Division to help fill the 3/319th. This requirement, however, was changed to 56 EM. A total of 38 replacements arrived from the 101st Airborne Division on 1 July 1968. Telephone contact was made with the 101st AG, WO Dupree, concerning the remaining 18 personnel. Information furnished was that these personnel will be shipped as soon as they arrive from the field and are cleared. Target date for arrival is 15 July 1968. Overall the Brigade is over 318 EM. Data on individual MOS shortages is not available at this time. CW2 North, Brigade Personnel Management Officer, is presently visiting USARV Headquarters to realign Brigade figures in order to report a meaningful picture of critical MOS shortages.

(3) July: The Brigade posture is excellent at this time. Line Battalions and assigned units are all at or above authorized strength. Overall, the Brigade is over 900 EM.

b. Personnel:
   (1) The strength of the Brigade as of the last day of each month is as follows:

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBE-SC/MHD
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

15 August 1968

(a) May:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>AGG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorised</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6281</td>
<td>6685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>6128</td>
<td>6563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDI</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6012</td>
<td>6374</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) June:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>AGG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorised</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6364</td>
<td>6786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>6517</td>
<td>6959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDI</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6060</td>
<td>6439</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) July:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>AGG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorised</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6364</td>
<td>6780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>6969</td>
<td>7413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDI</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>6492</td>
<td>6879</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Losses and gains by month were as follows:

(a) May:

1. Losses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>AGG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KHA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHA</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEROS &amp; ETS</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>947</td>
<td>1040</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Gains:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>AGG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reassignment Gains</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>869</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) June:

1. Losses:
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBE-SC/MHD

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

15 August 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>AGG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KHA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEROS &amp; ETS</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>787</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Gains:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>AGG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reassignment Gains</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>1020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hosp. Returnees</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1230</td>
<td>1325</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) July:

1. Losses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>AGG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KHA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEROS &amp; ETS</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>769</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Gains:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>AGG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reassignment Gains</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>918</td>
<td>967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hosp. Returnees</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1153</td>
<td>1206</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Key Personnel Losses and Gains: Key personnel losses and gains, to include principal heads of staff sections, special staff sections, and battalion commanders were:

(a) May:

**LOSES**

Maj Byrne - Bde AG

**GAINS**

Col Kanta - Bde Dep Cndr

CONFIDENTIAL
LOSSES
Maj Keyes - Bde IG
Maj Peters - Asst Bde Chaplain
Maj Waterman - 172d MI
Maj Parson - Bde PM
Maj Scott - Bde S-4
(b) June:

LOSSES
LTC Bertholf - CO, 1/50th Inf
LTC Meese - Bde S-3
Maj Musil - Bde SJA
(c) July:

LOSSES
LTC Johnson - Bde XO
LTC Weisinger - CO Spt Bn

GAINS
LTC Schmoor - Bde S-3
Maj Crouch - Bde AG
LTC Carter - CO, 1/50th Inf
Maj Ray - Bde SJA
Maj Schmid - Bde Eng
Col Delamater - Bde Dep Omdr
LTC Angel - CO, Spt Bn
LTC Williams - Bde Chaplain
LTC Weyland - CO, 4/503d Inf
Maj Nicholson - Bde S-3

(4) Awards and Decorations: There were a total of 3,065 awards for valor and meritorious service during the reporting period. A breakdown follows.

APPROVED AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Cross</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legion of Merit</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldier's Medal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star Medal (Valor)</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star Medal (Merit/Achievement)</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal (Valor)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal (Service)</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AVBE-SC/WM

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal (Valor)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal (Merit/Achievement)</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>1212</td>
<td>1088</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Discipline, Law and Order

(1) The discipline in the Brigade has been good during this reporting period. In addition to the activities listed below, the SJA section gave 26 commander briefings; legal instruction to over 2200 replacement personnel; reviewed 57 reports of survey; and 20 CID investigations. The stockade population for the Brigade as of the end of July was 21 personnel, one of these was pre-trial confinement and 20 as a result of post-trial confinement.

(2) Legal assistance was rendered to 857 personnel. This includes Brigade and non-Brigade personnel.

(3) Article 15 and non-judicial punishment involved 511 cases. Following is a breakdown of personnel punished during this quarter:

(a) E-4 and below - 426
(b) E-5 and above - 94
(c) Officers - 4

(4) Military Justice: The following is a breakdown of the type of courtmartial cases for the Brigade during this reporting period:

(a) General - 2
(b) Special - 43
(c) Summary - 8

(5) Claims Processed: The following is a breakdown of the types of claims processed for the Brigade during this quarter:

(a) AR 27-20 (Foreign Claims) - 99
(b) AR 27-29 (Personnel Property Claims) - 94
(c) MACV 25-5 (Solatium) - 48

d. Development and Maintenance of Morale:

(1) Morale within the Brigade remained excellent due to increased and improved services and facilities.

(2) Finance: The Brigade Finance Section (Company "A", Administration) continued to provide financial support throughout the reporting period.
Newly arrived replacements were made aware of the Soldiers Saving Program and the various allotments available to them through orientations and various newsletters. The total payments and pay complaints processed and made during this reporting period were as follows:

(a) Regular monthly payments - 21,037
(b) Partial payments made - 11,212
(c) Travel vouchers paid - 3,533
(d) Pay complaints processed - 212

(3) Chaplain:

(a) General: During the reporting period religious activities were widespread with relatively good coverage of all units in the Brigade. The places in which these activities occurred were base camps, areas of operations, check points, observation points, and hospitals. They occurred on group and individual levels.

(b) Total services conducted and attendance were as follows:

1. Protestant: NUMBER ATTENDANCE
   603  11,790

2. Catholic: NUMBER ATTENDANCE
    444  9,089

(e) Administrative Services:

(1) Postal Services:

(a) General: Postal services were good with incoming mail being received on 91 out of 92 days. The average days in transmission from San Francisco to actual recipient at field locations was 7 days. Outgoing mail was dispatched on 92 out of 92 days. The average transmission of mail from sender to the APO in San Francisco was 5 days.

(b) Mail Processed (pounds):

1. May:
   a. Received - 66,069 lbs - Daily average - 3,303 lbs.

2. June:
   a. Received - 66,922 lbs - Daily average - 2,230 lbs.
   b. Dispatched - 29,446 lbs - Daily average - 981 lbs.

3. July:
   a. Received - 82,922 lbs - Daily average - 2,766 lbs.

(c) Total amount of money orders sold:
1. May - $155,925.25
2. June - $337,474.74
3. July - $236,087.60

(d) The total amount of postage and parcel post fees was as follows:
1. May - $5,229.00
2. June - $4,620.00
3. July - $5,560.00

(2) Special Services Activities:

(a) May:
1. General: The Special Services Program continued during May with R & R being the main attraction.
2. There were no USO shows during the month of May.
3. Number of R & R's:
   a. In-Country: Allocated, 100 - Used, 105.
4. There were a total of 98 films shown during this month.

(b) June:
1. General: The month was highlighted with the acquisition of a showmobile. The equipment includes a 1600 square foot stage, lighting, and public address system. R & R continued to be a main attraction.
2. There were 3 USO shows during this month with an estimated attendance of 1,650.
3. Number of R & R's:
4. There were a total of 99 films shown during this month.

(c) July:
1. General: Recent acquisition of musical instruments has started a Brigade search for personnel to play in a Brigade band. R & R remained the Special Services Main attraction.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBE-SC/MD
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

15 August 1968

2. There were no USO shows due to a shortage of USO shows in Vietnam during July.

2. Number of R & R's:
   a. In-Country: Allocated, 140 - Used, 142.
   b. Out-of-Country: Allocated, 511 - Used, 553

4. There were a total of 161 films shown during this month.

(3) Public Information Office Activities:

(a) May:

1. General: The 173d Airborne Brigade Information Office has launched an ambitious Home Town News Release Program, increasing monthly output by 700 per cent. The Information Office has initiated the publication of a bi-weekly newspaper titled "Fire Base 173". Total output of the Information Office has more than doubled.

2. Significant coverage was allotted to:
   a. A two-day battle on the Bong Son Plains resulting in 145 enemy dead.
   b. A battle 30 miles north of Qui Nhon resulting in 47 North Vietnamese dead.
   c. Elements of the 173d Airborne Brigade discovering part of an NVA division headquarters 17 miles northeast of An Khe.
   d. The 1st Battalion, 50th (Mech) Infantry awarded the right to wear the patch of the ROK (Republic of Korea) Tiger Division, for its part in Operation Vulture.

2. Information activities were as follows:
   a. News releases 109
   b. Press visits 2
   c. Press accommodations 2
   d. Home town releases 603
   e. Home town tapes 11
   f. Home town pictures 58

(b) June:

1. General: The 173d Airborne Brigade Information Office continued to increase its production during the month. Completion of a command information regulation and new internal SOP enhanced operations. Also, a new public information regulation is being staffed. A new hometown news release program gives more adequate coverage of awards.

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

2. Significant coverage was allotted to:
   a. Gifts to Bong Son children by paratroopers of the Brigade.
   b. The 173d Engineer Company being awarded the Itschner Plaque, highest award given to engineer units throughout the world.
   c. The 173d Airborne Brigade celebrating its 5th anniversary on 25 June 1968.
   d. Sky Soldiers sink sampans in the South China Sea.

3. Information activities were as follows:
   a. News releases 139
   b. Press visits 0
   c. Press accommodations 0
   d. Home town releases 782
   e. Home town tapes 15
   f. Home town pictures 88

(c) July:

1. General: The 173d Airborne Brigade Information Office is making provisions to include six color pages in the next quarterly publication, "Sky Soldiers". Previously the magazine has been done in black and white. Coordination with the 221st Signal Laboratory has given the information office the capability of producing greater photo coverage of combat and civic action operations.

2. Significant coverage was allotted to:
   b. A successful LRRP ambush.
   c. E Troop, 17th Cavalry Picture Story.
   d. Launching of RF/PF Leadership School sponsored by the 173d Airborne Brigade.
   e. Rebuilding of a village.

2. Information activities were as follows:
   a. News releases 150
   b. Press visits 1
   c. Press accommodations 1
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

1. Home town releases 639
2. Home town tapes 0
3. Home town pictures 39
9. Chemical Operations: The 51st Chemical Detachment of the 173rd Airborne Brigade provided chemical support on a standby basis whenever requested by elements of the Brigade. The following missions were accomplished:

a. Herbicide Missions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>METHOD</th>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 May 68</td>
<td>CH-47 with 600 Gal Bladder</td>
<td>QL 7B</td>
<td>Ambush Sites</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13 Barrels WHITE 1000 Gal Sprayed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 May 68</td>
<td>CH-47 with 600 Gal Bladder</td>
<td>QL 7B</td>
<td>Ambush Sites</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9 Barrels WHITE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 May 68</td>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>LZ Uplift</td>
<td>Perimeter</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 Barrels ORANGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 May 68</td>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>LZ Geronimo</td>
<td>Perimeter</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 Barrels BLUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 June 68</td>
<td>UH-1D with Jerryrig</td>
<td>LZ Uplift</td>
<td>Perimeter</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>110 Gal BLUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 June 68</td>
<td>UH-1D with Jerryrig</td>
<td>An Khe</td>
<td>Green Line</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>440 Gal BLUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 June 68</td>
<td>UH-1D with Jerryrig</td>
<td>An Khe</td>
<td>Hong Con Mtn Sig Installation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>55 Gal ORANGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 June 68</td>
<td>PAAE Fire Truck</td>
<td>An Khe</td>
<td>Green Line</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>110 Gal BLUE 740 Gal Water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 June 68</td>
<td>PAAE Fire Truck</td>
<td>An Khe</td>
<td>Green Line</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>110 Gal BLUE 740 Gal Water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 June 68</td>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>An Khe</td>
<td>Green Line</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>220 Gal BLUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 July 68</td>
<td>UH-1D with Jerryrig</td>
<td>FSB Tater</td>
<td>Draw Used as Approach</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>110 Gal BLUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 July 68</td>
<td>UH-1D with Jerryrig</td>
<td>AO Rolling</td>
<td>VC Rice Paddies</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>80 Gal BLUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 July 68</td>
<td>UH-1D with Jerryrig</td>
<td>FSB Hawaii and Area West of LZ English</td>
<td>Perimeter of FSB and 45 VC Rice Paddies</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>55 Gal BLUE 55 Gal ORANGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b. Riot Control Agent CS:

(1) On 11 May 1968, a CS bag drop was conducted to deny terrain to the enemy vic BR 830704 to BR 8067. Sixty bags of CS1 were dropped near LZ Fony.

(2) On 12 May 1968, 50 bags of CS1 were dropped vic BR 8484, BR 8584, BR 8583 from a UH-1D to deny terrain to the enemy.

(3) On 16 May 1968, 50 bags of CS1 were dropped vic BR 827790 to BR 823783 to deny access to draws used as routes of escape to the populated valleys.

(4) On 17 May 1968, 50 bags of CS1 were dropped vic BR 795608 to BR 800815.

(5) On 21 May 1968, 50 bags of CS1 were dropped vic BR 770793 to BR 778795 to deny terrain to the enemy.

(6) On 25 May 1968, three E-158's were dropped vic BR 905769 to root enemy out of suspected locations. Negative results were found by 1/50th Mechanized Infantry.

(7) On 8 June 1968, 400 pounds of CS1 were dispersed using an M-5 riot control agent dispenser in a UH-1D helicopter vic An Khe. The agent was used to deny draws and ambush sites to the enemy along QL 19.

(8) On 14-16 June 1968, 100 pounds of CS1 were dispersed vic BQ 949645 to flush out tunnels.

(9) On 30 July 1968, a three man tunnel team from the 51st Chemical Detachment placed 232 pounds of CS1 in caverns discovered by A Company, 1/503d Infantry, vic BR 745645.

c. Personnel Detector Program:

(1) One MPD operator from the 51st Chemical Detachment supported the 1/503d Infantry in AO Walker, flying 40 missions and a total of 46 5/6 hours during May, June and July 1968.

(2) One MPD operator of the 51st Chemical Detachment supported the 4/503d Infantry in AO Boiling flying 52 missions and a total of 102 hours during May, June and July 1968.

(3) One APD operator from the 51st Chemical Detachment supported the Task Force 173d Airborne Brigade in AO Cochise flying 80 missions and a total of 118 2/3 hours during May, June and July 1968.

(4) One 2 hour mission was flown for the ROK's on 25 May 1968.

(5) On 15 May 1968, the APD aircraft received fire vic BR 849862 after particularly heavy readings. In excess of 50 NVA/VC were spotted; air strikes and a ground assault followed. Approximately 100 bunkers were found, indicating a regimental headquarters was present.

(6) On 2 June 1968, vic BS 756213, heavy reading were recorded by the APD and 25-30 NVA/VC were sighted. The targets were fired on by the mini-Cav and airstrikes with undetermined enemy casualties.
(7) On 16 June 1968, the Snoopy aircraft at LZ English was flying vic Suoi Kon River when it took one hit at BR 590695 and 30-40 rounds of fire at BR 543842 after receiving heavy readings. Gunships and airstrikes were called with undetermined results.

(8) The MPD aircraft at LZ English detected what appeared to be a trail pattern on 23 July 1968. A LARF team was inserted and counted at least 88 VC going into a village.
10. Combined US - ARVN Operations and Training:

a. Combined Operations: The 173d Airborne Brigade has continued to increase its use of the combined ARVN - US combat operation, the purpose being to further assist the ARVN and their territorial forces to attain a higher level of combat effectiveness, to increase the Government of South Vietnam's continued progress in rural pacification, revolutionary development, to continue the defeat of VC/NVA forces, to increase the security of various Government of Vietnam programs and to make more available to ARVN Forces US equipment and logistics support. In the area of combined operations, a total of 23 were conducted. During one, the US and ARVN CP's were co-located. This combining of CP's proved to be most effective and enlightening for both ARVN and US personnel, as each was afforded the opportunity to observe, question and benefit from this combination. Thus, in future operations, more such combined CP's are to be established. The following combined operations are reported, by battalion, for the month of July 1968:

1. 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry: In AO Walker, Task Force 1st Bn 503d Inf conducted nine combined operations totaling twenty-two operational days ranging from combined squad level ambush operations through platoon level, with multi-platoon operations consisting of one US platoon, one PF platoon and one US tank platoon. In addition, on 27 July 1968 the 108th RF Company, with one squad from D Company 1st Bn 503d Inf and the scout section of 1st Bn 69th Armor, conducted combined operations southwest of LZ Schuller.

2. 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry: The 2d Bn, operating in AO Cochise, conducted twelve days of combined training with elements of the 47th ARVN Regiment. Subjects included in instruction were: First aid, ambush and counter-ambush techniques. Also, Task Force 2d Bn 503d Inf, with assistance from the 173d Engineers, improved the firing range at LZ Dog, facilitating the combined classes held there.

3. 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry: Operations in AO Boling, the 4th Bn conducted combined operations with the 47th Infantry Regiment and Phu Yen RF units. From 19 July and continuing as this reporting period ended a tri-country combined operation was being conducted with Task Force 4th Bn 503d Inf, 3d Bn 47th ARVN, and elements of the 9th ROK Infantry Division. D Company, 16th Armor also conducted combined training and operations with elements of the 47th ARVN Regiment. Task Force 4th Bn 503d Inf has integrated their Long Range Patrols, utilizing two ARVN and four US personnel per team, with good results forthcoming. SITREP, INSTUM and daily liaison has been effected between the 47th ARVN Regiment, Task Force 4th Bn 503d Inf and the 173d Airborne Brigade. This continues to prove to be mutually advantageous for all concerned elements.

4. Ist Battalion (Mechanized), 50th Infantry: Operating in AO Cochise, Task Force 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Inf held six combined operations with elements of the 40th and 41st Infantry Regiments. From 3 to 7 and from 26 to 31 July the 1st Bn 41st infantry and 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Inf conducted operations in the upper Soul Co Valley. One-day operations were conducted on 13, 15, 17 and 19 July. During the 26 to 31 operation the CP's of the two battalions were co-located with favorable results, as previously mentioned.

5. 1st Battalion, 69th Armor: Operating in AO Cochise and AO Walker the 1st Bn 69th Armor conducted six combined reconnaissance in force operations and one combined cordon and search operation. One operation, on 8 July, with two RF Platoons, two PF Platoons, and Task Force 1st Bn 69th Armor, resulted in two VC KIA (BC) and one VC CIA. On 22 July, in Phu My District, a combined operation with two Task Force 1st Bn 69th Armor companies, one 1st (Mech) 50th Inf rifle company and one rifle company from the 40th ARVN Regiment was conducted. The RF/PF Platoons and ARVN Platoons were found to be comparable to these combined operations.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBE-SC/MHD
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned
15 August 1968

insure rapid response to ARVN requests for tank supporting fires and to enhance aggressive calls for fire a US personnel is placed down to ARVN level. These operations are proving to beneficial for both ARVN and US personnel.

(6) 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery: The 3d Bn 319th Arty has continued throughout the past month to coordinate all artillery fire within the AO with ARVN units. This is in the form of passing information on all fire missions between the Battalion FDC and the Battalion Liaison Section, located with the 40th ARVN Regiment, and also to RF/PF units under the control of the 40th ARVN Regiment. All ARVN requests for US artillery which originate within the 40th ARVN Regiment are passed from the Battalion Liaison Team to the Battalion FDC, then to US firing units in the form of a call for fire. US advisors call directly for fire to the Battalion FDC. All advisors have Battalion FDC radio frequencies and are aware of the location of US artillery in support of them. Likewise, the Battalion FDC is informed of ARVN operations, and posts operations on the artillery situation map in the Battalion FDC. Daily liaison visits continue, with the results being faster clearance of US artillery in support of ARVN units.

The 3d Bn 319th Artillery has also been instrumental in providing FO's for 40th ARVN operations. While the Battalion has not always been able to provide FO's from its own reserves, coordination with the 41st Artillery group has resulted in the obtaining of FO's from General Support Artillery. In AO Rolling, the 6-32d Artillery performs the fire support coordination tasks as outlined above.

(7) Aviation Support: Of significant importance is the rendering of aviation support to ARVN units. During July, a Command and Control ship was provided to the 22d ARVN Division for a total of nineteen days. Also during July sixteen combat assaults, involving 3,400 troops, were conducted. Similar support was rendered to CSF, MSP and RF/PF units. During these actions gunship support was provided with combat assaults and all reports of contact.

(8) Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations: To assist the Government of South Vietnam in their efforts in rural development and pacification an increased emphasis has been placed on civil affairs and psychological operations at Brigade and Battalion level. Coordination between the Brigade and Battalion S-5's and their sector and sub-sector counterparts are coordinated to increase the capabilities of both and to insure complimentary programs. Particular attention has been paid to expanding the following activities:

(a) Development of the town meeting, where US and sub-sector personnel, personnel from the Vietnamese Information Service and the hamlet chiefs present a brief outline of Government of South Vietnam goals and capabilities to village personnel. Following, a question and answer period is initiated and the villagers, represented by village elders, are encouraged to discuss problems they are encountering. Corrective action is then programmed, with rapid responsiveness as the goal.

(b) Increased emphasis has been placed on logistical support provided to rural development and CORDS projects in process. An example is the re-building of the Bong Son market place, as well as the distribution of construction supplies to other projects.

(c) The distribution of commodities to orphanages, hospitals and schools, as well as the MEDCAP program, has been a continuing program. For a breakdown of psychological operation and civil affairs programs for the quarter, refer to Section VI, Psychological Operations and Civ Action, page 40.

(9) Other Activities: In addition, continuous operations are being conducted with Mobile Strike Force (MSF) and Camp Strike Force (CSF) elements.
During all operations artillery, aviation and TAC air support is coordinated and is provided on request. The continuous operations of CSF elements from Ha Tay CIDG Camp are also coordinated and integrated into the overall scheme of maneuver with artillery and aviation support. The Vietnamese CSF at Phu Loc Tuan conducted a seven day combined operation with Brigade elements during July and a Brigade forward observer and liaison team were provided to facilitate needed fire support. Task Force 7th Bn 503d Inf coordinates the efforts of the Cuong Son CIDG Camp in Phu Yen Province and continues to provide fire support and aviation assets. Also, a movement to improve the responsiveness of combat elements to requests for assistance from the three province chiefs, the exchange of daily SITREPS has been initiated, SITREPS between this headquarters and the 22d Infantry Division are also being exchanged on a daily basis.

b. Training: The Brigade continues to put emphasis on the training of ARVN, Regional Force and Popular Force personnel through various training elements and training programs. A synopsis of these follows:

(1) The RF/PF Leadership School: The establishment of this school, utilizing the facilities and the selected cadre of the Brigade Jungle School at An Khe, has already begun to realize benefits. With a POI covering thirteen training days, the RF/PF Leadership School presents high-caliber instruction to 45 to 50 RF/PF students from Binh Dinh Province per cycle. The cycles are designed to include both officer and NG0 personnel on the basis of one officer class to three NG0 classes. The first class, an officer class of 47, graduated 19 July, and the second class of 51 NG0s was in-progress as the reporting period ended. The school is operationally organized under the 173d Support Battalion (Airborne).

(2) The Office of RF/PF Affairs: The establishment at Brigade level of an office of RF/PF Affairs, under the direction of a field-grade officer with the mission of coordinating and assisting the efforts of RF/PF project officers in each battalion and separate unit, has been of continued benefit.

(3) Brigade Advisory Teams: As noted in Section IV, Combat Operations, page 29, the Brigade has continued the auxiliary Mobile Assistance Teams. These teams have been expanded to include a Mobile Maintenance Contact Team, consisting of specialists in weapons, vehicle and signal maintenance. The mission of this team is to provide advice and assistance to the sector and sub-sector maintenance and repair personnel in their various shop locations. Positive results are being noted.

(4) The RF/PF Affairs Officer: At battalion and separate unit level an officer has been designated as RF/PF affairs officer. His mission is to know the companies and platoons, their mission, level of training and current esprit. Based on this information he is to design specific assistance programs to supplement the combined operations currently utilized in RF/PF affairs, including such areas as instruction and assistance in village defense and the conducting of RECON for platoon members and their dependents.

c. The Utilization of "Kit Carson" Scouts: The Brigade "Kit Carson" scout program was fully implemented on 24 June 1968. Since this date, scouts have working at the company level, aiding the paratrooper with their intimate knowledge of the terrain and territory of operation, the various suspected and known enemy locations, and the enemy placement techniques of booby traps and explosive devices. The individual infantryman, while hesitant on the "Kit Carson" program worthiness on incipciency, has been quick to grasp the value of the knowledge the "Kit Carson" scout possesses, and now regards the scout as an integral performer in his organization.

At present, the Brigade employs a total of 84 scouts, the breakdown being:
The Brigade S-5 holds primary staff responsibility for the scouts, assigning them to battalions and separate company level. Their pay is 5,000 piasters per month, the total amount being drawn monthly from the Assistance in Kind Fund, Saigon.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

II. Comments: Observations and Recommendations:

During the operational period, various lessons were learned. These lessons learned were drawn from all the operations which occurred during the period extending from 1 May 1968 through 31 July 1968.

A. Operations

1. OBSERVATION: CHIEF HOI Program.

EVALUATION: When initiating an extensive CHIEF HOI Program at known and suspected enemy forces a readily identifiable turn-in point must be established.

RECOMMENDATION: The CHIEF HOI turn-in point should be on a prominent terrain feature and visual aids such as smoke pots or marker balloons should be utilized.

2. OBSERVATION: Stay-Behind Forces.

EVALUATION: When a battalion moves out of a fire support base to another AO, a rifle platoon clandestinely remains in the vicinity of the old FSB for several days. This platoon establishes day and night ambushes and conducts short patrols. Successful results have been noted with this type operation.

RECOMMENDATION: As noted in evaluation.

3. OBSERVATION: Evacuation of Captured Foodstuffs.

EVALUATION: When on operations many units find large food caches, weighing up to 5 or 10 tons, filled with rice and other foodstuffs.

RECOMMENDATION: An individual work force can be procured to evaluate the foodstuffs, thus releasing the tactical unit to continue operations.


EVALUATION: Current requirements dictate that personnel in grade E-6 and above have a minimum security clearance of interim secret. Due to operational commitments, processing personnel for clearances is usually a slow process as personnel are not readily available to complete the required forms.

RECOMMENDATION: Records of newly assigned personnel in grades E-6 and above should be screened prior to assignment to a unit and those personnel requiring clearances should be processed. An opportune time for accomplishment of clearances would be while personnel are attending jungle school at An Khe.

5. OBSERVATION: Use of Waterproofing Material.

EVALUATION: The waterproof plastic sheets found in artillery and mortar packing cases may be used for preparing overlays and drops, as well as for waterproofing bunkers and equipment.

RECOMMENDATION: As noted in evaluation.

6. OBSERVATION: Booby Traps.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

EVALUATION: In populated areas under VC/NVA control or influence booby traps are one of the main hazards to be encountered. They are often armed by old men, women or children who know the location of one booby trap and when told, will arm the device. Experience has shown that dud 105 rounds and M-26 hand grenades are most often used. A thin, transparent gut type line, which is extremely hard to see, is usually used as the trip wire. Trails and natural passages, areas of induced vegetation, or hedgerows are the most frequent booby trapped positions.

RECOMMENDATION: Grappling hooks can safely clear a trail when employed. The best size is 8" long and 6" in diameter with a 100" nylon parachute cord attached. This will be small and light enough to be carried by troops in the field.

A combined operation of infantry and armor can be useful in the populated flatlands. Tanks or personnel carriers can break trails disclosing booby traps that would injure or kill men on the ground. The speed and mobility permit rapid changes of areas of operation so friendly troops can be displaced as often as necessary to avoid newly set booby traps. This does not give the local populace a warning, as do a slow moving infantry column, that friendly troops will be in the area, so booby traps can be set.

7. OBSERVATION: Hedgerows.

EVALUATION: In lowland areas hedgerows exist in many areas even though not shown on current maps. They provide excellent concealment for ambushes, caches and bunkers. A trench line or troop movement on the far side of a hedgerow from an observer is impossible to detect from the ground.

RECOMMENDATION: An aerial observer can be of tremendous benefit to the ground commander when he is operating in this type of terrain. The observer's birds-eye view can see behind and beyond the hedgerow giving the ground commander a feel for the situation and, in case of an ambush, tell the commander where the enemy is and how he is moving. As the view of a forward observer is limited on the ground, here again the aerial observer can be of benefit as he can better observe the entire situation and more effectively place fire. Sometimes a shift of a hundred or so meters may bring the fire from the middle of a rice paddy to a useful target opportunity.

The 81mm mortar is effective in reconning hedgerows by fire as it can safely be called in closer to troops than can artillery. It also only needs the ground commander's clearance, thus the first round can be fired more quickly than any other type of fire support.

The enemy will many times use the cover and concealment of hedgerows to snipe at friendly forces. With attention drawn to the front the enemy may try to slip to the flank where lesser attention is centered. A wedge formation has been effective against this tactic due to its firepower and readily maneuverable.

8. OBSERVATION: Reaction to Intelligence.

EVALUATION: The enemy (VC/NVA), realizing our superiority of mobility and surveillance capabilities, will seldom remain in one area for any length of time. He can be expected to move every couple of days, especially in populated areas.

RECOMMENDATION: Highly reliable or confirmed intelligence, B-2 rating, or sighting by Special Forces, should be reacted to immediately. Any delay will give the enemy a chance to move out of the area.

9. OBSERVATION: Column Formation.
EVALUATION: Thick terrain in Vietnam necessitates a formation with as much control as possible while still maintaining platoon integrity and permitting rapid deployment.

RECOMMENDATION: The column formation is generally considered the best all-around formation for thick terrain. The formation as diagrammed below allows great versatility and control and is easily formed into a perimeter.

10. OBSERVATION: Selection of Laggier Site.

EVALUATION: When in an AO, Company sized units are often given orders to establish laggier sites on very high ground a lengthy distance from the previous evening's perimeter. This necessitates a company-size move with rucksacks over what is usually dense terrain. As a result, a day is spent with no opportunity to successfully search the low ground at the base of mountainous terrain where enemy activity is usually centered. The VC and NVA use streams as reference points for their comrades to locate them and join forces. Many contacts have been in easily accessible but canopy-ridden areas near low ground and if possible, close-by or on a readily available source of water.

RECOMMENDATION: Most base areas and staging areas of concentrated groups of enemy forces are found on low ground near an available source of water; too much time is spent on moving to high ground on a route where contact with the enemy is unlikely.

11. OBSERVATION: Resupply.

EVALUATION: In recent operations an effort has been made to supply the infantry company with 5 day subsistence capability. Observance of helicopter resupply orbiting and landing in a friendly occupied area by an intelligent and combat trained enemy is dangerous to the friendly force. An enemy could learn much about the size, capability and morale of the American infantry unit merely by counting the number of sorties the resupply helicopter flies and in many instances what the helicopter contains.

RECOMMENDATION: One suggested change would be to have 50% LRRP rations and 50% combat C-rations. This would make a lighter and smaller load. It would also decrease the possibility of poor police of the area.

12. OBSERVATION: Combat Tracker Team.

EVALUATION: A combat tracker team is not given the mission to develop a combat situation. This is the support element's job.

RECOMMENDATION: In instances where a combat tracker team is brought in to develop a hot trail situation, at least 2 rifle squads with machine gun crew should be detailed for support.
13. OBSERVATION: RTO's.

EVALUATION: RTO's should carry their radio so that it is camouflaged. This can be accomplished by covering the radio when on the rucksack and when possible, by bending the antenna down through the frame of the rucksack, especially when the operator knows that his communications are but a short distance away.

RECOMMENDATION: A preferable way is to carry the radio in a demolition bag, hung around the neck with the radio resting on the front left of the individual. This keeps the radio easily accessible at all times, even when patrols drop rucksacks and cloverleaf. Ironically, this also protects a vulnerable portion of the body.


EVALUATION: An element, while moving toward a suspected VC location on a hilltop, was struck by a command-detonated mine which wounded four men. Security was placed and a search of the area conducted, with negative results. The company then moved forward. Upon reaching the top, one platoon was assigned to clear a landing zone for extraction of the wounded. Minutes later another command detonated mine wounded eight of the platoon clearing the landing zone.

RECOMMENDATION: After there is contact there is a tendency to assume that the enemy has left the area. Many times this is true, but not always. Once it is determined that the enemy is in the immediate area, maximum security should be established. Movement should be with a heavy point, flank and recon security. Once a suitable landing zone is found, the area must be thoroughly screened. After a defensible perimeter and OP's have been established, then work can begin for cutting and clearing a landing zone for extraction of the wounded.

15. OBSERVATION: Technique of Fire at Night.

EVALUATION: An element was moving at night. The CP group was behind the 1st platoon. Movement was heard to their left and 3 VC were seen. The CP group fired on these, expending several magazines. In searching the area, no bodies or bloodstains were found.

RECOMMENDATION: All personnel must be instructed to keep their fire low, and engage the enemy with 2 or 3 round bursts or semi-automatic fire.

16. OBSERVATION: Expedient CS Crystal Grenade.

EVALUATION: The destruction of extensive fortifications and bunker complexes is time-consuming and frequently ineffective without requesting large quantities of explosives and pioneer tools.

RECOMMENDATION: A quick and effective method of denying the enemy use of these complexes is the use of an expedient CS grenade. The grenade is fabricated by filling the fiber hand grenade or smoke-packing container with CS crystals. The container is taped and wrapped with two or three loops of det cord and equipped with time fuse, non-electric blasting cap and igniter. Fortifications and bunkers are quickly rendered unserviceable and contaminated by the employment of this device.

17. OBSERVATION: Identification of Hook-Up Man.

EVALUATION: CH-47 pilots have had difficulty in identifying the hook-up man on the ground when picking up external loads.
CONFiDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

RECOMMENDATION: To assist the pilot in his approach the hook-up man should wear a brightly-colored pullover, fabricated from a colored aircraft marking panel. This technique reduces confusion, simplifies aircraft approach, and eliminates the frequent use of smoke as a marking device.

18. OBSERVATION: Colored Smoke-Marking Code.

EVALUATION: In the displacement of a fire support base, considerable numbers of external loads must be moved by CH-47. Aircraft commanders may not always know the content of their loads or for whom it is intended.

RECOMMENDATION: The use of prearranged color code simplifies the move of external cargo and insures its delivery to the appropriate element. For example, all artillery loads of both P2 and L2 are marked with violet smoke, all heavy mortar loads are marked with yellow smoke, and all battalion headquarters loads are marked with green smoke. This technique alleviates confusion and eliminates excessive traffic on the air-ground control net. The pilot knows immediately the type of load picked up and will be alert to an identical color at the LZ for set-down.

19. OBSERVATION: Control Frequencies for Displacement of a Fire Support Base.

EVALUATION: Considerable confusion results when both outloading and receiving ground elements and CH-47 pilots attempt to use the same FM control frequency. Instructions to the pilots and the ground elements are confused, misunderstood and tie up the single net.

RECOMMENDATION: This problem can be rectified by placing the air-ground controller on one frequency and all ground-to-ground elements on a different frequency. The ground controller having two frequencies has the ability to communicate directly with aircraft commanders and to loading-receiving personnel on the ground without interference and confusion.

20. OBSERVATION: Action Taken When Ambushed While Mounted or Dismounted.

EVALUATION: A recon patrol was ambushed during operations. No maneuver element was designated or employed, thus permitting the VC to fire on the patrol and then withdraw without aggressive pursuit.

RECOMMENDATION: When moving by road, personnel must be organized in such a manner that fire and maneuver can be quickly employed against an ambushing force. The maneuver element can then drive the enemy force from their prepared positions and relieve the pressure of friendly personnel in the killing zone.


EVALUATION: When vehicles are to be employed as part of the defense of a night location, such as 106mm (rr) and Cal. 50 "jeeps", measures should be taken for the protection of the vehicle.

RECOMMENDATION: The radiators and tires of the jeeps should be sandbagged to protect these areas from small rounds and/or shrapnel. It takes only a few minutes to accomplish this and it insures that the vehicle will not be crippled. This is particularly effective when vehicles are parked facing out and from the center of the perimeter.

22. OBSERVATION: Use of Agent WHITE on Jungle Canopy.

CONFIDENTIAL
EVALUATION: Agent WHITE is approximately 6. or 7 times as effective as agent ORANGE. It is also considerably slower-acting than ORANGE. Recommendations were made to spray WHITE undiluted.

RECOMMENDATION: Using a 110 GMP pump hooked to a 600 gallon bladder, uneven and inadequately distribution was obtained with pure agent WHITE. Dilution of WHITE gave much better coverage. The dilution factor used was 1 gallon of agent to 3 gallons of water.

23. OBSERVATION: Clearing Fields of Fire.

EVALUATION: An expedient method of clearing underbrush in thickly vegetated areas is the use of det cord and composition C-4. The area to be cleared is prepared with concentric "ring mains" of det cord. Large shrubs and trees are further prepared with C-4. The result is a pattern of C-4 and det cord shaped something like a spiked wheel (see Fig. 1). Once in place, the ring main is detonated, clearing the desired area.

RECOMMENDATION: This technique tends to blow away secondary growth to chest level. Its other advantage is that it allows personnel to shape the area to be cleared to conform to the shape of the defensive position perimeter.


EVALUATION: A method used to cover the insertion of LRRP teams is to insert them at the same time a larger-unit extraction is initiated. The same ship used to lift out the larger unit can carry the LRRP team in.

RECOMMENDATION: LRRP teams inserted in this fashion provide excellent security for the last flight of extraction aircraft. It is an opportune time to enter the AO undetected to ambush or observe enemy scavengers. This technique further reduces the requirement for additional C & C ships and gunships if the team was to be inserted separately.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-QC-OT (15 Aug 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 173d Airborne Brigade for Period
Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350 1 4 SEP 68

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375

(C) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and concurs. The
following comments are made for clarification.

a. Reference paragraph 3a(1)(c), Section 1 page 14. 40th Sapper. The
40th Sapper should be the 400th Sapper.

b. Reference paragraph 3a(1)(c), Section 1 page 14. XCII MF Bn. This
headquarters, order of battle, lists the XCII unit as a local
force (LF) battalion not a main force (MF) battalion.

c. Reference paragraph 3a(2)(c), Section 1 page 18. 85th MF Bn. This
headquarters order of battle lists the 85th Battalion as a local
force (LF) battalion not a main force (MF) battalion.

d. Reference paragraph 3a(2)(c), Section 1 page 18. Enemy
Disposition. In addition to the units listed this headquarters lists
the CQ-1 Co, 377 B Co, DK-3 Co, DK-5 Co, DK-7 Co, K65 Engr Co and the
K76 Engr Co as active in Phu Yen Province.

e. Reference paragraph A1, Section 2 page 56. Chieu Hoi Program. Concur
with recommendations provided adequate security is available at
the prominent terrain feature to prevent stand-off or ground attacks.

f. Reference paragraph A13, Section 2 page 59. RTO's. Concur
that camouflage of radios is desirable; however, the personnel fatigue
caused by carrying a radio suspended around the neck in a demolition
bag may be excessive. The ST-138 provides the most acceptable method
of carrying the PRC-25/77 radios for any extended period of time.

g. Reference paragraph A19, Section 2 page 60. Control
Frequencies for Displacement of a Fire Support Base. Concur with
recommendation provided equipment and frequencies are available without
degradation of units internal communications.

h. Reference paragraph A22, Section 2 pages 60-61. Use of Agent
WHITE on Jungle Canopy. The EVALUATION should read as follows: Agent

CONFIDENTIAL

66
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 173d Airborne Brigade for Period Endng 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

WHITE is approximately 6 or 7 times more viscous on heavy canopy than agent ORANGE.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

ROBERT C. GABBARD
LTC, AG
ASS'T ADJUTANT GENERAL

Copies furnished:
2 - ACSFOR, DA
1 - 173d Abn Bde
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters, 173d Airborne Brigade and concurs with the report as modified by the preceding indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. ARNNTZ
Chief, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
HQ I FFV
HQ 173d Abn Bde
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 173d Abn Bde for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed, with the following administrative correction.

2. Reference 1st Indorsement, subparagraph h: On page 63, the word "vicious" should be "viscous."

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. Shonty
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

Cy furn:
CG USARV
ORGANIZATION: 173d Airborne Brigade

ASSIGNED
ATTACHED
MI: Military Intelligence Detachment
IPSB: Infantry Platoon Scout Bog
MH: Military History Detachment
APU: Army Postal Unit
USAF: U.S. Air Force Control Party
PI: Public Information Detachment
CTT: Combat Tracker Team
GSR: Ground Surveillance Radar
LRRP: Long Range Recon Patrol
SUBJECT: 173d Airborne Brigade Jungle School Training Schedule

15 August 1968

CLASS

Physical Training
(1 hour)

Exercises are taken directly from TM 21-200 "The Army Daily Dozen". Students are required to be mentally alert and to participate to the maximum extent.

Invocation and remarks
(10 minutes)

The Brigade Chaplain welcomes the students and explains the Chaplain program within the Brigade.

Introduction of TAC's
(5 minutes)

The Jungle School Commandant introduces the TAC's to the students by name and rank. This is to let the students see for themselves who will be instructing them for the next six days.

Explanation of Course and History and Organization of the 173d Abn Bde
(30 minutes)

The Jungle School Operations NCO fully explains the course and the grading system, then proceeds with the complete history and organization of the 173d Abn Bde.

Preparations for Jungle Operations
(40 minutes)

Class is designed to show the student the important items of equipment to be taken when on a combat mission. A few of the ways to pack a rucksack is also included along with ammo, chow and toiletries.

Techniques of Jungle Operations
(50 minutes)

All the different terrains and climates are covered here followed by, Point of Origin, Loc Stat, Base time and Base azimuth.

Compass and Map Reading
(50 minutes)

Introduction to military maps, to include colors, contour lines and grid coordinates. The proper way to read a compass in conjunction a map.

Characteristics and Mechanical Training of the M-16 Rifle
(50 minutes)

To include firing, safety and handling. Pros and cons of the weapon.

Maintenance, Functioning, Stopages and Immediate Action of the M-16 Rifle
(50 minutes)

How the weapon functions, causes for malfunctions, proper cleaning methods.

Characteristics and Defense of Operational Base

This gives the student a better understanding of how a perimeter is set up in a defensive position. Physical security is stressed.

Trip Flares
(40 minutes)

Troops gain a working knowledge of the M48A1 surface trip flare and the uses of it. Practical work is included.

Characteristics of the Enemy
(1 hour and 15 minutes)

Class instruction given to provide the student with a look at how the VC and NVA have prepared for the war, and how to fight him, also a look at how they live. Includes his clothing, equipment and weapons.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Care &amp; Maintenance of the M-16 Rifle</td>
<td>All students are required to spend at least one (1) hour maintenance on his individual weapon, each day. TAC's will be on hand for supervision and to answer questions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M18A1 Claymore Training (50 minutes)</td>
<td>Each student is taught the procedures of using the M18A1 anti-personnel mine. Safety procedures are also instructed. Each student sets up and detonates one (1) claymore.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics of the M-60 Machine Gun</td>
<td>Each man is given individual training on the operation procedures of the M-60 LMG, because of its importance within the squad. Firing demonstration concludes the class.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-72 LAW Training (50 minutes)</td>
<td>The students are given a demonstration and lecture on the M-72 LAW. All students practice firing procedures, and the proper malfunction procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-79 Training (50 minutes)</td>
<td>The student is given a complete course of instruction on the M-79, demonstration is included. Each student is allowed to fire the weapon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-16 Zero and Familiarization Course (1 hour and 50 minutes)</td>
<td>Each student is given a class of instruction before zeroing his individual weapon. Sight alignment is instructed here.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quick Kill (50 minutes)</td>
<td>This class is designed to train students to use their reflexes and quick reactions, using the M-16 rifle. Keeping both eyes open, firing low and semi-automatic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-26 Hand Grenade Training (1 hour)</td>
<td>Class instruction includes the different types of US grenades and the effectiveness of each. Each student is given one M-26 hand grenade to throw for practical application.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geneva Convention (50 minutes)</td>
<td>Class instruction is presented by an officer from the Brigade SJA Office. All the rules and regulations governed by the convention are presented in this period of instruction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Support, Adjustment of Artillery and Mortar fire, (50 minutes)</td>
<td>Class instruction is given to the student as to all of the fire power he is supported by on a combat mission. Proper adjustment of artillery and mortar fire is a must for the individual soldier in the forward areas. Rules for calling in a fire mission are emphasized in this period of instruction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Aid, Lifesaving Steps (50 minutes)</td>
<td>Different type wounds and how to treat them are presented here by a Brigade medic who has served in combat. Immediate action and how to best assist the medic in the forward areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLASS</td>
<td>REMARKS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medevac and Dustoff (50 minutes)</td>
<td>Class instruction is given to show the students the correct procedure for calling in a dustoff. The equipment used in a hoist mission is also demonstrated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airmobile Operations and Safety Around the Aircraft (50 minutes)</td>
<td>Lecture is followed by practical work on unloading and loading of a helicopter on a combat heli-borne assault. Safety is emphasized in this period of instruction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications and Communications Security (2 hours)</td>
<td>Class shows the student the proper way to use the AN/PRC-25, how to clean it and the security regulations governed by ASA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search and Destroy (30 minutes)</td>
<td>Class instruction gives the student a better understanding of what a search and destroy mission should cover and what equipment is necessary to complete the mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Action, Mine Rules, Cheiu Hoi, 969 and 101 (30 minutes)</td>
<td>This class is designed to give the student a better understanding of the Vietnamese people and their way of life. Also why are U. S. troops in South Vietnam. This period of instruction also brings out two of the anti-communism programs the allied troops have with the South Vietnamese Government, Cheiu Hoi and 969 (101).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demolitions: Care, Handling and Safety (3 hours)</td>
<td>This class is designed to give the student a better understanding of military explosives. The different types of explosives and under which circumstances each would be used. Each student is allowed to rig up his own charge and to detonate it under the strict supervision of the cadre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC/NVA Mines and Booby Traps: Safety Procedures and Detection (1 hour)</td>
<td>This class is designed to show the student the fundamentals of booby trap detection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search of VC Base Camp and Tunnel Complex (50 minutes)</td>
<td>Students are shown how the Brigade clears Viet Cong base camps and tunnel complexes. Tunneling teams are explained, along with equipment used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC/NVA Mines and Booby Trap Confidence Course and Village (2 hours)</td>
<td>Students are taken through a VC village and are made to thoroughly search it in the same manner that they were taught. After they have searched the village they conduct a tunnel clearing. They then move the booby trap before he detonates it. A quarter pound of TNT is used to simulate the booby trap. This is strictly supervised by the TAC's on the course.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: 173d Airborne Brigade Jungle School Training Schedule

15 August 1968

CLASS

Patrol, Technique and Planning and POW's
(1 hour 15 minutes)

REMARKS

This class explains the procedures taken by an element leader in order to prepare his men for an effective patrol. The Five Paragraph Field Order is covered from start to finish, so the student will know how to run an effective patrol when the time comes. POW class is designed to stress the importance of taking a prisoner of war, and his rights under the Geneva Convention. The five S's are also taught in this period of instruction.

Issue of Operations Orders
(1 hour)

The Jungle School Commandant gives the students the operations order. He follows the Five Paragraph Field Orders as close as possible. The Order consists of where the school will be conducting their weekly operation, and all information pertaining to the mission.

Ambush and Counter Ambush
(1 hour 40 minutes)

The students are given the different types of ambushes and techniques of reacting to the different enemy ambushes. Class is then divided in half and practical work is done.

Squad Tactics
(50 minutes)

This class covers the basic squad formations within the Brigade. Which formations are used in different terrains. Drills are included to make the class more effective.

COMBAT OPERATIONS

On the fifth day of training the entire class is taken on a live combat operation. There are at least 2 TAC's assigned to each squad, but they are only to advise. The students have complete control of the mission.

The operation begins with either a heli-borne assault or movement by convoy. The student CO will then assemble his unit and start moving towards the objective. Once the objective is reached he will put the company in a defensive perimeter. The company then starts building their positions, clearing fields of fire, OP's go out and security is maintained.

Towards evening the ambush and clearing patrols move out of the perimeter. The people on the line are now setting up their trip flares and claymores. At whatever time the CO thinks best he will call Stand To. At this time all personnel will be in their positions ready to fight. After Stand To one man will be awake and alert, while the other men sleep.

The next morning, before dawn, the CO will again call Stand To. During this time the clearing patrols will depart. The same clearing patrol that went out the night before will go out in the morning. The ambush patrol will be coming in about this time.

After Stand To the CO will send out a recon or S & D patrol. The patrols will be debriefed as soon as they return.

The company will now return to the base camp, conducting a search and destroy mission on the way back.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep) (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May - 31 Jul 68

CG, 173d Abn Bde

1. REPORT TITLE

2. AUTHOR (First name, middle initial, last name)

3. REPORT DATE

4. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.

5. PROJECT NO.

6. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER

7. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)

8. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

9. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

10. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY

11. ABSTRACT

12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY

UNCLASSIFIED
The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM 1</th>
<th>SUBJECT TITLE</th>
<th>FOR OT RD #</th>
<th>PAGE #</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ITEM 2</td>
<td>SUBJECT TITLE</td>
<td>FOR OT RD #</td>
<td>PAGE #</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITEM 3</td>
<td>SUBJECT TITLE</td>
<td>FOR OT RD #</td>
<td>PAGE #</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITEM 4</td>
<td>SUBJECT TITLE</td>
<td>FOR OT RD #</td>
<td>PAGE #</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITEM 5</td>
<td>SUBJECT TITLE</td>
<td>FOR OT RD #</td>
<td>PAGE #</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD #: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

***Page #: That page on which the item of interest is located.
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
ATTN: Operational Reports Branch
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310