### UNCLASSIFIED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AD NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD394055</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASSIFICATION CHANGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>confidential</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIMITATION CHANGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 21 APR 1967. Other requests shall be referred to Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Washington, DC.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHORITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 Apr 1979, DoDD 5200.10; OAG D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

IN ACCORDANCE WITH
DOD 5269.1-R & EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

THIS DOCUMENT IS:

CLASSIFIED BY

Subject to General Declassification Schedule of
Executive Order 11652-Automatically Downgraded at
2 Years Intervals- DECLASSIFIED ON DECEMBER 31, 1973.

BY

Defense Documentation Center
Defense Supply Agency
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
SECURITY MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAH-P (M) (17 Apr 67) FOR OT          21 April 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division for quarterly period ending 31 January 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl

DISTRIBUTION:
Commanding General
US Army Combat Development Command
US Continental Army Command
Commandants
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army War College
US Army Air Defense School
US Army Artillery and Missile School
US Army Armor School
US Army Chemical Corps School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Military Police School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Intelligence School
US Army Medical Field Service School

(Continued on page 2)
CONFIDENTIAL

OPERATION REPORT FOR
QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING
31 JANUARY 1967

1st BRIGADE
101st
AIRBORNE DIVISION

DIPLOMATS
AND
WARRIORS

Incl 1

CONFIDENTIAL
Confidential

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION (U.S.)

SUBJECT: Operational Report, for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967

TO: See Distribution

Special Documents


Significant unit activities: Elements of the Brigade were involved in combat operations during the entire reporting period with the exception of 5 Dec 66 and 20-25 Jan 67. Training was conducted concurrent with combat operations and during periods when units were refitting and preparing for future missions.

A. Combat Operations: A summary of the concept and execution of each of the Brigade's operations is given below.

1. Operation GERMANIO
   b. Mission: Conduct search and destroy operations to locate and destroy VC/NVA force in the PHU YEN Province.
   c. Location: PHU YEN Province, RVN.
   e. Forces involved:
      (2) Others: 17th Regiment (ARVN).
   f. Concept and execution (See Inclosure 1, Combat After Action Report, GERMANIO).

2. Operation PICKET
   b. Mission: Conduct search and destroy operations adjacent to the Cambodian border and north and east of KONTUM City.
   c. Location: KONTUM Province.
   e. Forces involved
      (1) US: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, PL/30th Arty (CPON) FOB-2, 5 Special Forces group KONTUM, provided 2 reconnaissance and one intelligence platoon for screening and security missions.
CONFFDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967

(2) Other: 22d Host (ARVN), 26th Special Tactical Zone, RF/FF Forces and CIDG Forces.

1. Concept of operations: See Incl 2, Covert After Action Report, POCETT.

3. Operation PARAGUAT.

a. Dates: Conducted on 26 Jan 67 and will be covered in the next quarterly operations report.

b. Missions: To conduct search and destroy operations against VC/NVA forces in the I NHN THUAN Province.

c. Locations: NHN THUAN Province, RNW.


e. Results to 31 January 1967:

Losses (Enemy)
23 VC KIA (12)
1 VC WIA (5)
1 KIA
16 NVA arms
1 grenade
6 rockets
28 LCM rounds
10 transistor radios
1 cache
2 typewriters
1 microscope
6.3 tons of rice
2.5 tons of corn

B. Training. Most of this reporting period was spent in the conduct of tactical operations. During brief periods of refitting and preparation for new phases of combat operations, training intensified towards those areas which received improvements as was noted during previous operations. In addition to the emphasis placed on small unit tactics, the following training was organized at Brigade level:

1. All incoming personnel continued to be processed through the Brigade replacement detachment at PIAK RANG, where they received 6 days of rigorous training in small unit tactics, weapons indoctrination, survival, land navigation, patrolling, enemy mines and booby traps, sniper techniques, and physical conditioning. The training period also served to acclimate personnel to the hot, humid climate of Vietnam. On 7 January 1967 an inspection team from the Brigade S3 was sent to PIAK RANG to review and update the instruction program.

2. In each area of operations, firing ranges were immediately coordinated for the local units. Free fire zones were established and ranges were scheduled for maximum utilization during periods when the units were preparing for new operations.

3. Helicopter repelling training was again conducted, as was training in the use of metal and rope ladders to increase the proficiency of personnel in the techniques of helicopter entry into dense jungle terrain. The training was oriented towards training Brigade and battalion reconnaissance elements and Engineer Landing Zone clearing teams.

Incl 1

2
1. On 6 December 1966 and 15 January 1967 Driver Training Classes were conducted prior to the Brigade's moves from DXI to and KONTUM. Training was oriented towards on-loading and off-loading aircraft from a front or rear pintle. The classes resulted in the expedited utilization of aircraft, and was a primary factor for the Brigade's record move from DXI to KONTUM in 199 sorties in 19 hours.

2. Airborne ground training with simulated combat jumps was completed at KONTUM while still conducting combat operations. Training was conducted 26 - 30 December 1966, 3 - 7 January 1967, and 25 - 29 January 1967. The modified POU consisted of two days of ground training with one day for the jump. Several attached unqualified personnel were qualified pending final approval from CG, USAV. Heavy drops were made. A TAC CP was dropped, set up and briefly assumed control of Brigade operations.

3. The Brigade Chemical Officer conducted a two day school on the Minepack Portable Detector (Chemical) 7 - 8 December 1966 at the rear base, PHM RDA. Forty-two personnel from the Brigade attended; 12 from each battalion and 6 from 42/17 Cav.

On 28 and 29 December 1966, 6 pilots from the 117th Aviation Company were trained in the techniques of dropping the E 15A and E 159 CS/Clusters.

Flamethrower training was conducted from 23 December 1966 to 1 January 1967. A total of 27 personnel were trained (3 42/17 Cav, 3 42/101 Engrs, 3 Security Plnt 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div and 7 personnel from each battalion.

Effective 23 December 1966 the name of the Combat NCO Academy was changed to The Combat Leaders Course to more accurately reflect the type personnel in attendance. On 7 Jan 67 an inspection team from the Brigade sent to PHM RDA to revise and update instruction being taught.

5. The 2/320th Artillery (Rein) continued its mobile training team concept. The team conducted classes for aviators from the artillery branch who were not currently working in an artillery NCO. The same type instruction was conducted concurrently, in separate classes for, ARN artillery personnel, advisors and selected Special Forces personnel. Classes stressed the latest changes in the artillery techniques as well as current methods of employment. Live fire demonstrations of the XM 146 (Rocket) ammunition were fired on 6 January 1967 at KONTUM for all personnel.

During the early part of November, an orientation course for the 1st Brigade and 4th Infantry FO's, LNO's, chief of firing batteries and radar was conducted. Emphasis was directed to the employment of artillery in RVN based on the Brigade's experience in-country.

From 24 December 1966 through 5 January 1967 a survey section surveyed a compass course for the Special Forces Camp at KONTUM.

6. On 2 January, the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division established a 3 day Pre-Records School consisting of 12 hours of formal map reading and 4 hours of practical work to include a compass course. The initial levy for the Pre-Records School is for twice the quota the Records School requires; after a three day school, the top individuals are selected; the remainder are returned to their units.

7. Communications on-the-job training was continually conducted by the Brigade to increase the efficiency of the radio/telephone transmissions as well as communications security. All ROT's before being assigned in the Brigade are
SUHJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967

11. Artillery seminars were conducted after Operations GERONIMO and PICKETT. Efficient methods of artillery employment, as well as problems, were discussed; recommendations were agreed upon and published throughout the Brigade.

12. The Staff Judge Advocate conducted classes in military justice include the duties of the trial and defense counsel. Training was also conducted for legal clerks.

All incoming replacement personnel were lectured on the provisions of the Geneva Convention and disciplinary problems under the Code of Military Justice as applicable to the Republic of Vietnam.

13. A class on the Trace Metal Detector Kit was conducted at PHALS for personnel from 52 sections of the Brigade as well as the 1st Platoon Detachment.

14. A special two hour course in administration was given to all First Sergeants and personnel NCOs, and company clerks within the Brigade, with the objective of increasing the efficiency and operation of administration throughout the Brigade.

15. On 30 December 1966, a special two hour class was given by the Brigade Postal Officer to all First Sergeants, Battalion and Unit Mail cushy concerning special mail handling and postal regulations.

16. Selected personnel within the Brigade received specialized training in the use of the sniper weapon (Winchester, Model 70 rifle) and sniper techniques.

17. Tactical air training was continued to familiarize all units with proper air request procedures, types of air support and selection of targets.

C. OPERATIONS. The following OPERADS were published during the reporting period. The Brigade was not called upon to execute any contingency plans.

1. OPERAD 181-66 (PAUL) dated 9 Nov 66 covering the deployment of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to conduct search and destroy operations south of PHALU. This operation was based upon numerous intelligence reports of enemy activity in the proposed area of operations. Postponed due to the decision to reenter KIAO area on GERONIMO I.

2. OPORD 187-66 (GERONIMO I) dated 24 Nov 66 covering the deployment of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to conduct search and destroy operations in the KIAO area west of TUY NOI and south of CUNG SON. This operation was proposed and initiated because of the rapid increase of enemy activity in the proposed area of operations. Postponed due to the presence of enemy units in that area.

GERONIMO I was terminated early due to the intelligence buildup in the vicinity of the CAMBODIAN border.

3. OPORD 193-66 (PAUL) dated 6 Dec 66 covering the deployment of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to conduct search and destroy operations west of KONON City near the CAMBODIAN border. The operation was based upon the buildup of intelligence reports of enemy activity near the border.

4. OPORD 2-67 (PAUL REVE W) dated 12 Jan 67 covered the deployment of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to reinforce the 6th Infantry Division along the CAMBODIAN border west of PHALU. The plan was not executed because contact with the enemy diminished and the 6th Infantry Division did not require reinforcement.

Incl 1
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967

5. CORD 6-67 (PARRAG U III) dated 19 Jan 67 covering the deployment of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to conduct search and destroy operations south and southwest of PHAN RANG. This operation was the reaction to the intelligence reports which prompted the original plan PARRAG U (PLAN 12H-66).

6. CORD 7-67 (ROAD RUNNER) dated 24 Jan 67 covering the overland movement of TASK FORCE MAGNUM from KOTON City to PHAN RANG. This operation was conducted to demonstrate the progress in clearing and securing the overland routes from the central highland to the coast (KOTON to PLEIKU to QUI Nhon) and along the coast (QUI Nhon to PHAN RANG).

D. Organisation. See Inclosure 1, 2 and 3 for Task Force Organisation.

E. Intelligence.

1. The following is a list of losses inflicted on the enemy during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERSONNEL</th>
<th>GERING O 1</th>
<th>PICKET 2</th>
<th>APPROACH 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VC/NVA XEA (SG)</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC/NVA (POSS)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC/NVA KBAP (SG)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC/NVA KBAP (POSS)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOLUNEC</td>
<td>33/12</td>
<td>15/3</td>
<td>2/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KILLED</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOUNDED</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEAPONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INDIVIDUAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIVIDUAL (Cache)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KILLED SERVED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KILLED SERVED (Cache)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Intelligence Problem Areas:

   b. Discussion: The value of pictazaps is being realized more every day. The maps provide an excellent supplement to topographic maps, and aid navigation while giving the user a more extensive picture of the terrain. However, complete coverage of an area is not always available, leaving undesirable gaps.

   c. Action Taken: This Brigade is presently requesting pictazap coverage of an AO prior to the commencement of the operation. Additionally, followup requests are submitted in an attempt to complete the requested series.


F. Personnel.

1. Unit Strengths

a. Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of the reporting period were as follows:

   Authorized Augmented (MTOE) | 16510
   Assigned | 1791
   Present for Duty | 1557
   No Present for Duty | 194

CONFIDENTIAL
SUET: t
[Image 0x0 to 599x814]

CONFIDENTIAL

ADMV/HQ:
SUBJECT: Operation "Perdido Key" 5th Division: 31 January 1942
(HQ OMG-408) (3)

b. Submarine Defense Strength: 31 January 1942:

|Base| F| N
|---|---|---|
|HMS 326| 1| 7
|S20| 3| 3
|S21| 1| 1
|204 PT FLT| 7| 7
|IL 307 FLT| 1| 1
|END SPT BN| 14| 14
|LA CH Co| 10| 10
|ME 269| 10| 10
|SE| 10| 10
|S| 12| 12
|C| 12| 12
|2/327 INF| 35| 35
|2/327 INF| 35| 35
|2/320 AGT| 10| 10
|AE TOTAL| 129| 129

c. The designed strength was 320 per. After the recent evacuation of personnel, the designed strength was 325 per.

b. The average for duty strength was 28 per. The present for duty strength was 28 per. The present for duty strength was 28 per.

d. Considerable improvement has been made in strength as per the last reporting period. The present for duty strength has not been reached. The present for duty strength has not been reached.

(1) Reciprocal personnel. The staff of the OMG (2) is preparing a report on personnel replacement. The report is prepared on personnel replacement.

(2) Reciprocal personnel. A reciprocal increase in personnel replacement. A reciprocal increase in personnel replacement. A reciprocal increase in personnel replacement.

Casualties:

(1) As a result of Hostile Actions:

- Killed: 36
- Wounded: 90
- Missing: 0
- Total: 226

(2) As a result of non-Hostile Actions:

- Killed: 7
- Injured: 93
- Total: 160

(3) Total casualties sustained during reporting period: 396.
AVOC-C-3ist
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 2 January 1967
(OPS CSG-7-67 317)

* Friendly Casualties Taken during

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GENERAL</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Journal entry number 1, 50th, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division 18 February 1967

(a) Total casualties to date are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Killed, hostile action</th>
<th>Killed, non-hostile action</th>
<th>Wounded, hostile action</th>
<th>Wounded, non-hostile action</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>406</td>
<td></td>
<td>2697</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Personal Progress:
The following programs were initiated and/or continued during the reporting period:

a. Memorization: The memorization board convened during the reporting period and approved a number of facilities for memorization. Indication of these facilities will be in the near future. Moreover, the command instituted a program whereby it memorizes members of the Brigade who were killed as the result of hostile action. Basically, each unit will have its own honor roll consisting of a hardened plaque of dark finish, engraved with a fitting notice, and followed by individual bronze plaque bearing the name, rank, and date of death of each member killed as a result of hostile action.

b. Operation Streamers: An "Operation Streamers" award program was initiated during the reporting period to recognize superior performance in combat operations. The streamer is awarded to the battalion or separate company with the best overall performance in the campaign. The unit is also recognized in a Brigade General Order.

c. Accuracy of Personnel Records: Continued emphasis was placed on the accuracy of personnel records. During this period, 212 officers and 365 enlisted personnel were afforded the opportunity to personally review their military 201 file and make changes in emergency data cards.

d. Awards and Decorations: In addition to citing personnel in Brigade General Orders for valor in combat, the following number of awards and decorations were presented:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DIS</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>LCM</th>
<th>DFC</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>BS (V)</th>
<th>BS (H)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM (V)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
e. Enlisted Promotions: During the reporting period, this command utilized the following number of enlisted promotion allocations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>E1</th>
<th>E5</th>
<th>E6</th>
<th>E7</th>
<th>E8</th>
<th>E9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. Postal Activities:

1. Mail Services: During this period, due to the holiday season, an increased volume of mail was handled, both in incoming and outgoing. The postal section was appropriately augmented by special duty personnel from organic units to ensure fast and continuous flow of mail to addressees. During the holiday season the postal system handled an average of 2.8 tons of mail daily.

2. Money Orders and Stamp Sales: Money order sales average $355,000.00 monthly during the reporting period. Monthly stamp sales averaged $8,600.00.

3. 16th AF: Although the 16th AF was attached to this command on 1 October 1966, actual fillers for this unit began arriving on 5 January 1967. At present, the eight enlisted personnel are present for duty, with the Postal Officer due in-country on or about 28 February 1967.

4. The quarterly postal course was conducted on 28 January 1967 with attendance by all unit mail clerks and postal officers.

5. Projectorist School: In an effort to improve the operation of sound movie projectors, a four hour course of instruction on the 16mm sound movie projector was sponsored by the Brigade Special Services Office. Twenty-six enlisted personnel, representing all units within this command having movie projectors, were trained and licensed by the USAVR Instructor Team.

6. USO Shows: Two USO shows visited the Brigade during the reporting period. Martha Raye performed at TUY HOA South and TUY HOA North and spent one full day with the Brigade. The second show “Fun Time” was held in PHAN RANG at the Red Cross Recreation Center, and consisted of 3 male and 2 female performers.

i. The PHAN RANG Beach Areas: The beach area is 90% completed. The unfinished area is the bath house which will have locker and shower facilities. Although not fully completed, the beach area is operational and ready to be dedicated. The club house is in operation and open for daily use. Life guard and trained medical personnel are on duty daily.

j. Red Cross:

1. The Red Cross Recreational Unit continued in their visits to the forward area to distribute literature and serve in the mess line. During the Christmas period the Red Cross unit organized distribution of a “Dirty Bag” Christmas gift to each member of the Brigade. They also distributed over 5,000 Christmas cards and 750 individual letters addressed to the Brigade.

2. Following is a breakdown of services rendered by the Red Cross during the period:

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nov 66</th>
<th>Dec 66</th>
<th>Jan 67</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cases Served</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaves &amp; Extensions</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discharges &amp; Gov't Benefits</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Problems</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Problems</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wires Transmitted &amp; rec'd</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correspondence In/out</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1290</td>
<td>972</td>
<td>1211</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Personnel Planning: Coordination and planning was initiated to spread the officers rotational hump early summer 1967. A plan was submitted to USARV on 14 December 1966; however, a recent directive by DA disapproved our request to extend a select number of officers. The Brigade still plans to curtail a select number of officers.

4. Problem Areas: The command was short shipped some 600 enlisted personnel in grades E-1 through E-6 during December 1966. The predominate shortages were combat type MOS which caused a drop in "fox hole" strength of in-determine the cause of short shipment.

5. Morale: Morale remained "Excellent" throughout the period.

COMMANDEERS AND PRINCIPLE STAFF

6. Brigade Headquarters:
   - BTRY, S. M. Matheson
   - COL, Chester B. McCall
   - LTC, Harry A. Buckley
   - LTC, John M. Tatum Jr.
   - MAJ, John M. McDonald
   - MAJ, John W. Gilboux
   - MAJ, Thomas F. Bligh Jr.
   - MAJ, Harold P. Austin

7. Battalion Commanders:
   - LTC, Joseph E. Collins
   - LTC, Donald E. Rosenblum
   - LTC, Frank L. Dietrich
   - LTC, William R. Yaddon
   - LTC, Edmond P. Abood

8. Separate Companies:
   - CPT, Dale H. Wagner
   - CPT, David R. Sallee
   - CPT, Loyd K. Gardner

9. Logistics

   a. Support Battalions: Provided a Forward Support Element (FSE) to sustain activities in the Brigade's area of operations. The FSE consisted of the following elements:
(1) Headquarters Detachment executed the command and control functions and was organized into command operations, communications, and maintenance control sub-elements.

(2) Administrative Detachment provided personnel actions, pay, and mail services.

(3) Supply Detachment was responsible for the receipt, storage, and issue of all classes of supply. It also provided a rigging capability.

(4) Maintenance Detachment provided repair capability for small arms, artillery, cavalry, automotive, signal, and quartermaster equipment. It was organized in a small office, recovery, and combat team.

(5) Company B, 35th Medical Battalion (Pro) provided servicing station facilities for all organic action, medical, dental, casualty, treatment center, and dental sections.

b. Laundry and Iris Services. The TUY 30A Sub Area Command CUS Army Support Command, OSA Bay provided laundry and bath support to the Brigade during operations in PHN YEN Province. Such support in the vicinity of KONTUM was provided by the Force Area a Forward Supply Area from the US Army Support Command, OSA Bay.

c. Water, Reliable water was obtained in PHN YEN Province from both the organic container capacity of 500 gallon cisterns for supporting elements of the TUY 30A Sub Area Command, a 600 gallon per hour water purification unit sustained activity in the vicinity of KONG THE Special Forces Camp during operations conducted there in the month of November.

d. General Information. Support in PHN YEN Province was provided by the TUY 30A Sub Area Command.

3. MATERIAL AND SERVICES.

a. Supply.

(1) Class I, "A" and "C" rations formed the bulk of Class I supplies consumed by the Forward or committed elements of the Brigade. "A" ration supplements were available in greater quantity than ever before and any Class I supplies throughout the reporting period. Support received from US Army Support Command, OSA McPherson during the period 9 Dec 1966 to 20 Jan 1967 was excellent. Fresh fruits, vegetables, and ice cream were available nearly every day while the Brigade was operating in KONTUM.

(2) Support Battalion continued to provide the majority of Class II and IV supplies. Such supplies were obtained primarily from the US Army Support Command, OSA McPherson Bay and then flown to the Brigade's field train area by C-74 and C-130 aircraft. Of major importance during the reporting period was the turn in of equipment deemed excess by the Brigade as a result of its experience over a 15 month period. The reduction in equipment included major items such as chemical apparatus, crew served anti-tank weapons and vehicles, as well as numerous minor items. The quantitative reduction in equipment insured a corresponding qualitative rise in the Brigade organic maintenance capability, since far fewer items of equipment required maintenance.

(3) Class III: During operations in PHN YEN Province, all POL products were drawn through the TUY 30A Sub Area Command, USASC OSA McPherson provided POL during operations in KONTUM Province. A total of 776,639 gallons of POL products was consumed during the period. This amounted to 236,120 gallons. In spite of the stringent controls placed
such items as pyrotechnics, Class V stocks were sufficient to support all operations. A total of 535 short tons was operated during the reporting period.

(5) Maintenance: The maintenance program continued to receive strong command emphasis. Particular emphasis was placed upon a system of roadside spot checks designed to maintain maintenance deficiencies in the Brigade's vehicles. US Army Vietnam also provided a team of small arms experts who provided instruction on maintenance of the M-16 rifle to subordinate units. The overall equipment deadline rate remained remarkably low. The following job orders were received and completed during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camp</th>
<th>Received</th>
<th>Completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>1065</td>
<td>1064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartermaster</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Transportation:

(1) Vehicular: The primary means of moving supplies from CAN KANH Bay depot to the base camp at PHAN NAM remained land transportation. During the reporting period, the forward elements received the bulk of supplies by land LOC. The only exception was Class II and IV supplies. Aside from barrier materials, Class II and IV supplies continued to arrive in the forward area at the end of an air LOC originating in PHAN NAM. Approximately one-fourth of the vehicles organic to the brigade were committed to support in the forward area.

(2) Air: USAF C-130 and C-123 aircraft provided virtually all fixed wing support to the brigade. Air transportation carried primarily fuel, Class II and IV supplies and passengers. Of particular interest was the utilization of C-130 aircraft as air drop supplies to a forward supply point established near DON TAI Special Forces Camp northwest of TUY HOA. Air drops were conducted on 3 separate days utilizing heavy drops and container delivery system techniques. Heavy ground winds caused some scattering of loads on the drop zone. Nonetheless loads up to and including full 500 gallon bladders of JP4 fuel were successfully dropped. Sorties and tonnage flown in support of the Brigade were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Short Tons</th>
<th>Passenger</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>3,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>2,664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>1,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>921</td>
<td>7,237</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Helicopter Resupply: UH-1D helicopters continued to provide the bulk of supplies to committed units. CH-47 helicopters continued the task of deploying and resupplying artillery units.

h. Civil Affairs:

1. General: During this reporting period elements of the Brigade operated in three provinces: PHU YEN, KOTCH, and NHU TPHAN. Since the
Brigade has just recently arrived in Ninh Thuan Province, the majority of the Brigade's civil affairs/civic action activities were about evenly divided between Phu Yen Province and Ninh Thuan Province. Provide efforts in Ninh Thuan Province, where the Brigade Area is located, were directed mainly towards maintaining liaison with local GVN officials and providing some limited support to local civic action projects.

2. Civil Affairs: Civil Affairs activities during this quarter were centered on price and wage controls to prevent a violent impact on the local economy and to assist in the Brigade's public control program. Prior coordination was made with local GVN officials and their counterparts in Kony and Kinh Thuan, in Ninh Thuan Province. Price lists were prepared and distributed, and enforced in cooperation with the National Police.

3. Civic Action:
   a. Civic Action Project Reports:
      
      Health and Sanitation 16
      Public Works 26
      Transportation 12
      Agriculture and Natural Resources 19
      Education and Training 20
      Public Affairs 7
      Community Relations 22
      Psychological Warfare and Communications 13
      Refugee Assistance and Public Welfare 54
      
      TOTAL REPORTED PROJECTS 211

      b. Medicine Show operations were continued and refined. These are high impact combined civic action, psychological warfare and intelligence gathering operations which are conducted jointly by US and Vietnamese forces. These operations are conducted while performing civic action to enhance the image of the GVN and gain information concerning the hamlet VC infrastructure.

      (1) Problem area: These operations have all too often been on a one-time basis only.

      (2) Discussion: The problem developed both as a result of the Brigade's constantly changing locations and as a result of having members of the Brigade primarily responsible for organizing the shows.

      (3) Action taken: A special effort has been made by the Brigade to encourage GVN initiative and responsibility to an extent that ensures perpetuation of these operations in an area.

   c. One of the most significant civic action projects in terms of GVN participation was a joint US/Vietnamese bridge repair. The Brigade initiated a joint effort to repair the footwalks on the main bridge in Kon area.

      (1) Problem area: The project was nearly scuttled.

      (2) Discussion: Further investigation by ARVN Engineers led to a decision to repair the entire bridge. With the Brigade's abrupt departure from Kon, the project was nearly cancelled.

      (3) Action taken: The project was begun nevertheless, and with the turn-over of lumber procured by the Brigade for the bridge repair, the ARVN Engineers assumed complete responsibility. This was a valuable...
one of the much appreciated projects which reflected very favorably on the image of ARVN with the local population.

d. Another joint project was conducted with GVN participation: the priest in TRUNG KANG, KOTUI Province requested assistance in constructing a building to serve as a day nursery and school. Members of the Brigade erected the metal framework and ARVN troops stationed there completed the building when Operation PINECONE was terminated.

e. The Brigade completed several valuable projects at KOTUI's Montagnard Hospital which vastly improved the facilities serving the local population.

   (1) A shelving system was constructed in the hospital warehouse and the medical supplies were organized and shelved in an orderly, useful system.

   (2) A fish pond was constructed and stocked to provide a constant source of protein.

   (3) The hospital's vehicle was overhauled and put into working order again.

   (4) The steel framework for a permanent building was erected and roofed. When complete it will serve as a tuberculosis ward.

f. (1) Problem area: To assist the DZ 2 TAC Refugee Center near TUY HOA, PHU YEN Province with self-help civic action projects.

   (2) Action Taken: In conjunction with the HIEU XUONG District Chief and in cooperation with local Fi, Province USAID and IVS representatives, Province Refugee, Health, and Agriculture officials, the Brigade undertook the project of improving the XUONG TAC Refugee Center. The project was undertaken step by step, with each step being explained and "sold" to the people and showing some tangible result.

      (a) A Health and Farm Show was presented to approximately 1000 of the refugees. Members of a Revolutionary Development Cadre Team band entertained, a Refugee Center official explained the self-help irrigation project underway and announcing a contest to choose the cleanest dwelling at the Center. Finally TV and film on health, sanitation and refugee camps were shown. The cleanup contest gained the interest and participation of most of the refugees, generating enthusiasm for all of the self-help projects underway.

      (b) A latrine, four wells and irrigation system, and a community center were built by the refugees with Brigade technical and material assistance.

      (c) USAID officials participated in all phases of the project in order to insure continuity of effort. When the Brigade left TUY HOA, this project was turned over to US units remaining in the area.

4. Lessons Learned:

   a. Brigade civic action projects, unless they are of very limited scope and duration, should include local GVN officials and troops for at least two good reasons: (1) the essence of civic action involves Vietnamese participation; and (2) to insure continuity of effort when the Brigade leaves the area.

   b. When entering a new area, the Brigade should not assume that
locally stationed personnel have the initiative or is well in hand. By taking the initiative and setting the example, the village can mould the local effort from its present undisciplined state of anarchy.

c. Before visiting a local village, it is wise to contact the local priest or chief. As the religious or spiritual leader of the people, the local priest is the most trusted member of the people but very often he is the most untrustworthy, unscrupulous or cruel person in local village activities. He is a strong supporter of the local communist movement and is respected and obeyed by members of his tribe. His reports and advice on civic action projects will be more to their interests and wishes.

d. To be successful, these civic action projects involving a change in routine must first be sold to the people. This often requires a massive educational effort prior to initiating the project.

I. Chemical. No significant activity during the period.

J. Engineer. As noted in Inclosure A.

K. Signal. No significant or unusual activities during the period.

L. Psychological Warfare.

1. Inclosure T (Psychological Warfare) in next Operations after Action Report, Operation OAHIC-701 (D). (Inclosure 1 to this Operational Report).
Part I Observations (Lessons Learned)

A. General

During the past three months the Brigade has used stealth, whenever possible when entering the battlefield. Additionally, the production of timely combat intelligence has improved and proven a valuable asset to the small unit commander. Counter-intelligence techniques, strict adherence to the basic principles of cover and concealment teams, and excellent fire discipline have added materially to the overall efficiency of the Brigade's fighting team.

B. Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. Item: Red-Yarn

Discussion: At the onset of the reporting period, Brigade Medical Units were afforded the opportunity to operate in an entirely new configuration which proved highly successful. The AD for this operation was some 50-70 km distant from the Brigade Train Area, wherein the Brigade Clearing Station was established. This great distance combined with the rains, terrain and marginal weather prevailing in the area demanded a medical facilities closer to the engaged maneuver elements. This was accomplished by airlifting the Clearing Station into the DMZ TRE Special Forces Area in the center of the AD by C-121 aircraft, while the 503d Medical Company (Clearing) located adjacent to the trains area assured the coverage for the remainder of the Brigade Forward elements. The placing of the Clearing Station FPO in the center of the AD provided a proximity of medical treatment facilities to the combat unit never before seen within the Brigade. This was made possible to a great extent by the availability of a non-organic medical unit in the trains area which was quickly and effectively integrated into the Brigade Medical organization. Establishment of the Clearing Station was accomplished after all combat elements had withdrawn using CH-47 helicopters. This late extraction insured complete medical coverage right up until the last trooper left the AD.

Observation: Integration of locally available non-organic medical facilities into the Brigade medical facilities coupled with displacement of organic medical facilities into the operational area provide outstanding medical coverage when operating over extended distances.

2. Item: Use of Scout Dogs in Combat Operations.

Discussion: After four months of utilizing scout dogs with rifle companies in combat, it is evident that the dogs have been a valuable asset in detecting and surprising the enemy. Although they require special treatment and rations, the results achieved appear to be worth the care and extra effort required.

Observation: The practice of employing trained scout dogs in combat operations has been successful thus far. Scout dogs should continue to be programmed for use in combat operations.

3. Item: Technique of Using Knowledgeable Detainees as Guides.

Discussion: This technique continues to complement our intelligence capability in pinpointing VC locations and cache sites. It eliminates the confusion resulting from correlating map coordinates to prisoner testimony and avoids the problem of distinguishing which of several hamlets bearing the same name is the one in question.
Observation: Use of trained and untrained men in an effective way to gain intelligence, and should be exploited wherever possible.

4. Item: Vietnamese Language Barrier.

Discussion: Conducting language training can increase a unit's intelligence collecting capability. Important is the ability to learn a few important phrases well and with proper accent, and then memorizing a large number of phrases which, because of their accent, are unrecognizable to Vietnamese.

Observation: Language training, that is both new limited in scope, will increase a combat unit's ability to collect intelligence.

5. Item: Counterintelligence. Using stealth to enter the battle field.

Discussion: On 31 Oct 1965, the 21st Inf (A), 23th Inf executed a night air mobile assault in an area (128313) and in the KNG Li River, the success of this night entry into a battle area, followed by five days of uninterrupted clandestine operations, confirm in external concept - the noise of a helicopter assault or fragmentation, if conducted properly and followed by appropriate measures to ensure security, deception, and surprise, need not compromise an operation. The nature of the contacts that followed plainly demonstrated that if the enemy knew US troops were in the area, he did not know where, and in that strength.

Observation: The noise of a night air mobile assault or even a daytime assault need not negate the secrecy of execution of an operation, if followed by clandestine activities, covert surprise can be achieved against the enemy.

6. Item: Attachment of a Trained Interrogator to the Infantry Battalion.

Discussion: This FIC has had considerable success with its attached interrogators. This was vividly pointed out during the period 1-12 Nov 66 when 36 PW's were captured by the 12th Inf, 23rd Infantry. By having a trained interrogator available to capture these PW's rear of at the FIC, much information was gained that would otherwise not been lost if the PW's were evacuated to the rear. Another area where the advantages of having a trained interrogator at an level at which large number of civilians are in the area of operations. The interrogator can sort out the personal obtained by rifle combat and refused individuals of no intelligence value, thus avoiding flooding FIC with these people.

Observation: Interrogators attached down to an level increase a units intelligence collecting capability, and follows such of the pressure imposed on FIC by having to process large numbers of detainees.

7. Item: Several disadvantages result from using only one LZ for an air mobile assault by one or more battalions.

Discussion: When only one LZ is utilized for a unit or large as a battalion, the terrain initially covered is very limited, and observation by the enemy is better able to determine the size of the force and annuls and types of equipment brought into the area of operations. As the companies and smaller elements move off of the LZ, their movement tend to push the enemy away from the main body of friendly troops instead of blocking or containing him.

Observation: Battalion size air mobile assaults should utilize multiple LZ's with the subsequent movement of sub-elements directed toward the center to contain the enemy.
CONFLICT

5. Item: Night offensive results are feasible and desirable.

Discussion: During the reporting period, battalion size units conducted several night small unit attacks. These tactics permitted clandestine entry into the battle front, thus preventing many in-depths of the operations. Interrogation of prisoners captured by the enemy indicated the noise of the helicopters was easily heard by the enemy, but they were not aware that a landing had been made in their vicinity.

Observation: Night small unit attacks further deceive the enemy of the location, size or intentions of friendly forces entering the battlefield.

6. Item: Dummy works.

Discussion: The enemy often uses dummy works at night to determine the location of positions where a friendly defensive perimeter, on one occasion, appeared and increased security was achieved by deploying several dummy quicks forward of the actual perimeter. Counting the night these dummy positions were preceded without falling to friendly troops, but the positions were occupied, casualties inevitably would have resulted.

Observation: Dummy positions will deceive the enemy as to the actual disposition of friendly troops and enhance overall security.

10. Item: The use of a curtain for the FL-79 may not be as effective as desired.

Discussion: Test firing a limited number of buckshot rounds indicated that the best pattern results occurred at a small area until the pellets close to below behind the net. At one hundred yards the pattern for these rounds are centered in an areaicon inch wide and two inches high. Greater dispersion can be achieved by deliberately ricocheting the pellets off the ground.

Observation: There should be another testing of the FL-79 shotgun round.

11. Item: Surprise encounters with the enemy require 'lick-fire' marksmanship.

Discussion: The characteristic close-in firing experienced in the jungle and wilderness calls for speed and accurate firing by the individual soldier. Often, the only contact with the enemy is a sudden, brief encounter offering little time for careful aiming and firing.

Observation: The natural ability of the individual soldier to fire accurately without deliberately aiming his weapon can be enhanced by a conscientious training program.

12. Item: Agile reaction is targets of opportunity.

Discussion: A unique opportunity to exploit our superior mobility and flexibility exists in areas with narrow LIMs where enemy contact is with small units (3-LO INHW). By positioning one command and control, two troops carrying and two armed helicopters at the battalion forward command post domination of the battlefield can be increased. The speed and flexibility of response to enemy activity as evidenced by the mobile command and observation posts, the搞得 provided a mobile blocking force, and the troop transports can insert an immediate action force to engage the enemy before he has an opportunity to escape, hide weapons or place booby traps.
CONFIDENTIAL


Observation: An immediate action force retains a greater area of forces and greater coverage of the battlefield.

13. Item: Artillery Firing

Discussion: It may become a habit of our forces to make contact with the enemy at an undetermined point by support before the size or disposition of the enemy force is known. The enemy, realizing the supporting power confronting him, will disengage before a break contact. On one occasion, because of artillery fire, our troops were unable to continue and engage our enemy unit by withholding artillery fires while the artillery forces were moving into position.

Observation: The infantry commander should consider withholding artillery fires until the enemy force has reached contact and cannot easily break contact.

14. Item: Ungrouped Loudspeaker units on enemy territory

Discussion: The enemy site, fire point, or unit is only to detach himself from our sight and from aircraft because the aircraft's location from which to bomb and the thick foliage tends to interfere with the enemy's view. However, when a ground mounted loudspeaker set is used, the joint enemy units to maintain the sound and extend the range. At the same time, a trained observer's touch can be added by a trained broadcaster right on the spot by an observer who have been properly briefed and encouraged.

Observation: A loudspeaker team on the ground is more responsible to any change in the psychological warfare pattern and can reinforce the efforts of the infantry commander.

15. Item: Inception planning

Discussion: Counters efforts must be made to deceive the enemy into our true intentions. To mislead them, the efforts of our possible countermeasures may be combined for the enemy and area, the enemy will account for the preparation and often participate normally associated with combat operations. Heavy and direct fire attacks can further conceal our true intentions from the enemy for the objective area. Another measure is the use of night airborne operations.

Observation: Our plans, airborne attacks, and night airborne assaults increase the security of friendly forces and deceive the enemy.

16. Item: Ground communications for utility and light helicopters while in the static position

Discussion: Commanders and helicopter crews on alert have frequently experienced difficulty in maintaining communications with units when shut down. There are problems with static noise on certain radios while the engine is not running (operating).

Observation: A system could be established that would authorize additional FSO-E5 radio for this purpose. In situations where systems, radio, and other visual means would generally hinder.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

(RCS CSFC2-67) (U)

Part II Recommendations: NONE

Incl:
1 - After Action Report, Operation CUMMIIIO
2 - After Action Report, Operation PICKET
3 - Operations Report, Support Battalion, 1st Bne, 101st Airborne Division

Distribution:
2 - CG, 1 IPPAC, APO 96350, ATTN: AVTA-00 007
2 - AssCofS for Force Development DI, Washington, DC 20310 (thru channels)
2 - CINCUSAFCON, ATTN: GOP-MG APO 96558
3 - DCS USARV, ATTN: AVD-HIST APO 96307
1 - CG, 101st Abn Div, Ft Campbell, Ky
20 - CG, 22nd Mil Hist Det APO 96397

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-CC-7 (31 Jan 67)  1st Ind
SUBJECT:  Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January
1967 (RCS CSPOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, APO 96350  8 MAR 1967

TO:  Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

1. (U) Concur with the contents of the Operational Report of
Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 of 1st
Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

2. (C) Reference Section 2, Part I - Commander's Observations.
   a. Reference paragraph B6: The attachment of a trained interro-
gator to a battalion would be of doubtful value at that level.
   If the interrogator is bilingual (Vietnamese - English) he will be
   valuable in questioning FIs and screening detainees. However, such
   bilingual interrogators are rare, therefore it is necessary to pair
   interrogators with interpreters.
   b. Reference paragraph B8: The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne
   Division pioneered the conduct of battalion size night airmobile assaults
   in 11 CTZ. In coordination with the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion,
   which conducted special training for night operations and developed
   techniques for formation flying, navigation and aircraft control at
   night; the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division proved the feasibility
   of such operations. A detailed summary of planning considerations and
   operational techniques developed by both the brigade and the supporting
   aviation battalion would be useful to other organizations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/\Inclsl
--\       /\;

CHARLES L. JOHNSON
CPT, AGC
ASG AG

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.