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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (MACV/62/10/12)

THRU: Commanding General
II Field Force, Vietnam
APO U.S. Forces 96227

TO: Commander
U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J34
APO U.S. Forces 96249

In accordance with I. C. V. Directive 335-6, the following report is submitted:

173d AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEPARATE) OPERATION DENVER

1. GENERAL: Operation DENVER was conducted in the vicinity of Song Be Sector in the northern half of Phuoc Long Province during the period 10 April to 25 April 1966. The objective of the operation was to locate and capture or destroy Viet Cong and North Vietnamese personnel, supplies, and equipment.

The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) was the controlling Headquarters. Brig. Gen. Paul F. Smith is the reporting officer for this report.

The Task Organization and Task Force Commanders for the operation were as follows:

- Task Force 1/250 - Lt. Col. Tyler
  1st Bn (Abn), 503d Inf
  1st Bn, 5th Arty
  FM Team
  FAC Team

- Task Force 2/310 - Lt. Col. Horst
  3rd Bn, 310th Infantry
  3rd Bn, 503d Infantry
  1st Bn, 5th Arty
  FM Team

  3rd Bn, 319th Infantry
  1st Bn, 51st Artillery
  1st Bn, 55th Arty

Rear Detachments of all assigned and attached units.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (MACV/25/03/32)

2. Concept of Operation:

a. At 092000CH Apr 1966, 173d Abn Bdo (Sep) OPORD 5-66 was published outlining plans for the conduct of Operation ENVER. Because of the short notice on which the operation was initiated, the OPORD was concerned primarily with air movement of the Brigade into the Song Be area. Specific search and destroy missions were initiated by FRAG Orders issued in the Area of Operations. Coordination was effected with ARVN Forces in the area, daily liaison was maintained, and joint participation of Allied Forces in specific actions was emphasized.

The operation was conducted in three phases as follows:

(1) Phase I - Movement of Brigade by air to Song Be 10-13 Apr 66.

(2) Phase II - Conduct of search and destroy operations (14-21 Apr 66).

(3) Phase III - Redeployment of Brigade to Bien Hoa by air (22-25 Apr 66).

b. During the operation, Army Air Support was provided by six (6) different units. Tactical Air Support was provided by the 2d Air Division, USAF.

c. The Commanding Officer, TF Rear assumed responsibility for Brigade TAOR on D-Day. One (1) company from 1st Infantry Division conducted security operations in the Brigade TAOR throughout the period of the operation.

3. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Enemy Situation Before Operation: The operational area was known to contain at least one VC Provincial Battalion (C-270) and one Provincial Company (C-280). In addition, each district had approximately one company sized guerrilla unit, and each VC controlled hamlet had a security force composed of a minimum of one squad to a maximum of one platoon of guerrillas. Two VC captured in late March stated that the 602nd and 603rd NVA Battalions were located approximately seven kilometers to the northeast of Song Be and that the 605th NVA Battalion was located 22 kilometers to the west of Song Be. On 8 April 66, a raider turned himself in to Song Xoai (YT 0876). This raider stated that the VC 271st Main Force Regiment was located vicinity YT 1173 as late as 30 March. Local force elements could have been expected to be encountered anywhere in Phuoc Long Province with the exception of the few hamlets under government control. Several infiltration routes were known to exist to the west and northeast of Song Be, and it was felt that the reported NVA units were merely moving through the area in a southerly direction into War Zone "D". The chances of contacting elements of the VC 272nd or 273rd Main Force Regiments in the vicinity (primarily south) of Song (Noi (YT 0876) were fairly good. It was known that both of these units moved into this area during the latter stages of Operation SILVER CITY (9 March to 22 March 66).

b. Enemy Situation During Operation: Forty four contact were made with VC forces during the period of the operation, of which 29 were VC initiated. VC forces encountered were of platoon size or smaller and believed to be local force elements. No evidence was found to identify the unit designations of the elements contacted. Highlighting the operation was the capture of a NVA Captain and his subsequent interrogation (see Inc 1 attached interrogation report) which revealed the location of the NVA 602nd, 603rd, 604th, and 605th Battalions of the Bac Uong Group, a regimental sized unit reportedly subordinate to the 250th Infiltration Group. He stated that he was in command of the advance party of the NVA 605th Battalion which was to infiltrate to the south, using the infiltration route to the northeast of Song Be. He further stated that his assignment was to guide the NVA 605th Battalion along the prescribed route (attached interrogation report) to Bunard (YT 2987), where another advance party/
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AVA-6C
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (MACV/JCS/33/32)

The guide would assume responsibility. He did not know where the battalion would be taken after it arrived at Bunard (YT 2987). Visual reconnaissance revealed a trail which had been subjected to recent heavy vehicular traffic, extending from Bunard (YT 2987) south to a secondary road at YT 1969. This secondary road is a direct route into War Zone "D". Several Local Force VC of varying importance were captured. Aircraft received ground fire, small arms and automatic weapons from the area of operation on 16 different occasions.

c. Area of Operation:

(1) Weather conditions: The monsoon cycle in the area was the same as that in the Bien Hoa area. The rainy season extends from May through Nov.

(2) Terrain: The terrain throughout the area of operation was hilly. The mountain "Suoi Ba Ta" (YU 1801) dominates the area around Song Be. There were a few scattered rubber plantations in the area, but the majority of the terrain consisted of hill masses covered with thick forest. The forests and plantation vegetation afforded good concealment and cover. Ground observation and fields of fire were restricted throughout the area of operation.

d. Final Analysis: Intelligence obtained during the operation, as well as that available before the operation began, points to the fact that heavily traveled infiltration routes exist to the east and west of Song Be. These routes are used by NVA and VC units to move supplies and troops from II Corps into III Corps, through Phuoc Long Province, into War Zone "D" and points further south and east.

A VC stated that the NVA 602, 603, 604, 605 Battalions were located approximately 30 kilometers to the northeast of Song Be and that at least one of these battalions, the 605th, intended to infiltrate south using the route to the east of Song Be. This would indicate the presence of a new NVA Battalion and possible an NVA Regimental sized force, in III Corps.

Throughout the operation intelligence was received indicating that the VC 27th Main Force Regiment, was located to the southeast of Dong Locai, outside the area of operations, and remained in that area during the entire operation.

No major VC base camp areas were found in the operational area. The area was found to contain primarily VC Local Force guerrilla and security elements. Interrogation of a VC suspect revealed the presence of the VC Provincial Battalion which had been reported earlier. Numerous agent reports were received indicating the presence of at least one and perhaps two VC Local Force Companies within the Area of Operations.

4. EXECUTION:

a. D-2 (8 Apr 66): 173rd Abn Bde (Sep) was notified at 1220Z that Operation AUSTIN I, scheduled to begin at 0900 on Apr 66, was cancelled. The Bde was instructed to be prepared for movement to an Area of Operations in a different location beginning 10 Apr 66.

b. D-1 (9 Apr 66): Notification was received on the morning of 9 Apr that the operation would take place in the Song Be (Phuoc Binh) area, (YU 1306), and would be a search and destroy operation. It was decided that, because of the small amount of time available for planning, the Operation Order would contain instructions for movement of the Brigade to Song Be. Subsequent combat operations would be initiated by fragmentary orders issued in the operational area. OPORD 5-66, Operation JENGER, was completed and issued on the evening of 9 Apr 66.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (NCOV/ACS/13/66)

1. D-Day (10 Apr 66): 173d Abn Bde (Sep) initiated Operation DEXTER at 0007H. The 1/503d Inf was airlifted to Song Be Airfield. Upon landing, the 1/503d Inf deployed around the airfield and secured it for the introduction of subsequent elements of the Brigade. This was accomplished by 00542H. Elements of Trp B, 17th Cav, 3/319th Arty, and elements of 173d Spt Bn were subsequently moved into the area using 35 sorties of C-130 aircraft. Movement was completed by 01090H.

There were no VC activities until 0231H, when elements of 1/503d Inf sighted and fired upon 1 VC platoon of YU 130059. There were no friendly casualties from this encounter and VC casualties are unknown.

d. D+1 (11 Apr 66): The 173d Abn Bde (Sep) strength was increased in OBJ area introducing the 2/503d Inf, 3/319th Arty (-), 173d Engr Co, the remainder of the Cav Trp, the 3d Fed CP, and elements of 173d Spt Bn. Movement of the Infantry Battalion was accomplished by Army CV-2 aircraft. The 2/503d Inf closed into the objective area by 111922H and immediately assumed responsibility for security of Song Be airfield from 1/503d Inf.

All other units were lifted by C-130 or CV-2 aircraft and closed into the base camp at the following times: 3/319th Arty (-) 111921H, 173d Spt Co 1602H, and Trp B, 17th Cav elements at 1602H.

Bde CP Forward was operational as of 111100H. The engineer water point was operational at 11150H. The final sortie of the day landed at 111923H. The key locations at the end of D+1 were:

- Bde CP - YU 111073
- 2/503d - YU 131066
- 3/319th - YU 131071
- 17th Cav - YU 131071

1/503d Inf conducted six platoon size "Show of Force" patrols in the area within a five kilometer radius of Song Be airfield as directed by Frag Order 1 to OPORD 5-66. All platoons moved overland to selected LZ's searching for VC suspects and installations enroute. Departures were at irregular intervals between 0700 and 1000H. All patrols were extracted by helicopter, returning between 1330 and 1430H. None of the "Show of Force" patrols made contact with VC.

CP Locations of new units being introduced into the Area of Operations were:

- 1/503d - YU 111069
- 3/319th - YU 111071
- 17th Cav - YU 131071
- 1/503d Spt Co - YU 131100

2. D+2 (12 Apr 66): Build-up continued in the objective area with the introduction of 161st Fld Btry RNZA, Co A, 82d Avn, Co D, 16th Armor, and supplies. Movement was accomplished in 38 sorties of C-130 aircraft and was completed by 121810H.

1/503d Inf conducted six platoon size "Show of Force" patrols in the area within a five kilometer radius of Song Be airfield as directed by Frag Order 2 to OPORD 5-66. All platoons moved overland to selected LZ's searching for VC suspects and installations enroute. Departures were at irregular intervals between 0700 and 1000H. All patrols were extracted by helicopter, returning between 1330 and 1430H. None of the "Show of Force" patrols made contact with VC.

CP Locations of new units being introduced into the Area of Operations were:

- 161st Fld Btry RNZA - YU 131074
- Co A, 82d Avn - YU 131068
- Co D, 16th Armor - YU 131068

3. D+3 (13 Apr 66): Build-up of the airhead was concluded with the air-landing of the 1st Bn, RAR at Song Be Airfield. Air movement was accomplished by 31 CV-2 sorties and three sorties of C-130, beginning at 1200H. Movement was complete into Song Be Airfield at 121100H.

Two separate search and destroy operations were conducted by 1/503d Inf, reinforced by Trp E, 17th Cav with one platoon of Co B, 16th Armor, and Trp B, 3/319th Arty attached. One ARVN rifle Company and one ARVN armored car platoon conducted concurrent coordinated operations. Both operations involved a company size Eagle Flight linking up with a force moving overland, and both involved ARVN units. They were IAW Frag Order 2 to OPORD 5-66. (See App 2,3 to Annex B).
AVAM-2C

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Ni:CV/103/6/13/22)

The first operation was conducted southeast of Song Be and consisted on an overland movement by B Co, 1/503 and one ARVN rifle company moving at 0625H, to position Green, while C Co was air lifted to LZ BLACK. The C Co air assault began at 1113H and was completed at 1125H. At this time, C Co began moving toward position WHITE, and B Co and the ARVN rifle Co began a search and destroy operation astride Route TAN, with C Co on the south and the ARVN Co on the north. C Co moved from LZ BLACK into blocking Pan MTE at 1143H, discovering numerous trenches and bunkers in the area and receiving occasional ineffective sniper fire. B Co and the ARVN Co continued to move along Route TAN toward the C Co blocking position. While searching a village complex, one member of B Co encountered a pressure type AP mine, resulting in one friendly KIA. C Co moved from LZ BLACK into blocking Pan WHITE at 1145H, and the ARVN Co began moving toward position HITE, and phase and the ARVN Co began a search and destroy operation astride Route TAN, with C Co on the south and the ARVN Co on the north. C Co moved from LZ BLACK into blocking Pan MTE at 1143H, discovering numerous trenches and bunkers in the area and receiving occasional ineffective sniper fire. B Co and the ARVN Co continued to move along Route TAN toward the C Co blocking position. While searching a village complex, one member of B Co encountered a pressure type AP mine, resulting in one friendly KIA. C Co moved from LZ BLACK into blocking Pan WHITE at 1145H, and the ARVN Co began moving toward position HITE, and

The second operation was conducted northwest of Song Be and consisted of an Eagle Flight by A/1/503d Inf linking up with Trp 1/17th Cav (reinf). Trp E, 17th Cav (reinf) departed Song Be at 1307H, escorting Dtry 5, 3/319th Arty, to establish a fire support base. At 0651H this force encountered 3 VC at YU 031135. The VC had only small arms and fled to the west. There were no friendly casualties. Dtry B was laid and ready to fire in Pan BLUE at 0931H. One platoon of E/17th Cav was left to secure this fire support base, while the main force proceeded toward Pan BROWN. A VC mine was discovered at 0955H, located at YU 091325, by lead elements of Trp E. By 0955H all elements had closed into Pan BROWN and were prepared to support the air assault on LZ RED, which commenced at 1005H and was completed at 1030H. Trp S, 17th Cav received automatic weapons fire from an estimated 12 to 15 VC located at YU 001235 at 1056H. Fire was returned resulting in two VC KIA (BC). The remaining VC fled to the west. At 1240H one friendly KIA resulted when a member of Trp S stepped on a booby trap. In the same vicinity, between 1250 and 1330H, three caches of rice totaling 2500 lbs, and two 55 gal drums, also full of rice were located.

At 1401h, Co A, 1/503d Inf and Trp N, 17th Cav effected link-up in the vicinity of XU CA532, where Trp N apprehended 23 VC suspects, one of which was later confirmed to be a VC. 9/17th Cav was released from OPCON of 1/503d Inf and A Co, 1/503d Inf proceeded toward LZ GRAYNE. At 1545H Trp N encountered a VC sniper at YU 091325 resulting in one friendly KIA, two KIA, one VC KIA (BC), and capture of one carbine. The extraction of Co A, 1/503d Inf from LZ GRAYNE to Song Be began at 0030H and ended at 1018H. At 1056H Trp N, 17th Cav began its return to base camp, escorting Dtry B, 3/319th Arty. All elements of this force closed into base camp at 1255H, thus concluding the operation. A reaction force of one infantry company was maintained throughout the day by the 1/503d.

g. D4 (14 Apr 75): 173d Bct Bde (Sop) continued Operation LAMBER by conducting two battalion size search and destroy operations, employing both air-mobile and ground assaults, 2FM Pr 0 3 to 0900H 5-66. (See App 4, Annex B).

The 1/503d Inf conducted two company size Eagle Flights in the area south of Song Be. Co B was helilifted into LZ JADE at 0610H and conducted search and destroy operations in that vicinity. Seven VC were killed and the fire support operations were effective in that vicinity. Seven VC were killed on the 12 but no contact was made. At 0910H Co B discovered and destroyed four tons of rice at YU 233997, and also detained two male and six female suspects and eleven children. Later at 1535H seven additional tons of rice were located at YU 233997, and at 1540H Co B received small arms fire from the village at YU 210976. Arty was fired and the village was swept with negative results. B Co continued searching the area until 1700H when it was extracted from LZ JADE and returned to base camp. Captured rice, VC suspects, and refugees were also evacuated by helicopter.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (MACV/DS/35/32)

Co C, accompanied by one ARVN Ranger Plat, was helilifted into LZ OPAL at 0915H to conduct search and destroy operations in that area. At 104CH, Co discovered 1000 lbs of rice at YU 197992, captured one VC, detained 33 refugees, captured an M1 carbine, two shotguns and a bicycle. Co was extracted from LZ JADE at 1831H.

Co J, 1/503d Inf was held at Base Camp as a reaction force throughout the operation.

The lst Battalion, 1AR with 161st Fld Ltry, NZA, Co B, 16th Armor, one plat of Trp I, 17th Cav, one 155M Co, and one plat of Armored Cars (ARVN), conducted search and destroy operations in the area northwest of Song Be. Units deployed by air assault and ground movement to the objective area. The overland elements, consisting of Co D, 1/AR; 161st Fld Ltry NZA; Co D/16th Armor; one plat, Trp B, 17 Cav; one ARVN Co; and the ARVN Armored Car Plat, departed base camp at 0630H. They proceeded to LZ ORANGE without incident. The force closed into LZ DIAMOND with the Artillery ready to fire at 0902H. Co's B and C, 1/503d conducted an air assault on LZ DIAMOND at 1055H after a ten minute Artillery and a five minute armed helicopter preparation. By 1115H the company force had secured LZ DIAMOND, and continued search and destroy operations that continued. At 1710H the ARVN Company made contact with 6 VC in a deserted village via YU 0513. The VC were pursued and Artillery was fired at them, with unknown results. At 1750H, three local force VC were contacted at YU 0515, resulting in two VC KIA (VC) and two VC killed. At 1900H a patrol from D Co made contact with an estimated 8 VC with three automatic weapons, via YU Chil. Results were 2 friendly KIA and no VC casualties. 1/503d and attachments remained in vic of LZ's DIAMOND and ORANGE through the night of 14 Apr 66.

h. D+5 (15 Apr 66) 173d Abn Bde (Sep) continued Operation DENTVEN, terminating one Battalion size search and destroy operation and conducting two company size Eagle Flights, 2AM Frag 0 4 to OPORD 3-66 (see App 5, Annex B).

1/503d conducted search and destroy operations northwest of Song Be. At 0830H, and again at 0840H, B Co made contact with 3 VC. Results were negative on both occasions. B and C Co's were extracted from LZ DIAMOND at 1200H and returned to base camp. After extraction was completed, the remaining elements proceeded overland to base camp and closed at 1310H.

Co's A and C, 1/503d Inf conducted Eagle Flights to LZ LILLY and LZ DIAMOND respectively to conduct search and destroy operations in the area east of Song Be. Operations were supported by Co B, 1/503d which conducted a fire support base by Trp E, 17th Cav. Co B, 1/503d remained at Song Be as a ready reaction force.

Btry C, 3/319th Arty was in position and ready to fire at 0730H via YU 18105. A ten minute Artillery preparation was fired on LZ LILLY from 0815H to 0821H followed by armed helicopter preparation. The 1st lift of Co A landed on LZ LILLY at 0830H without VC contact. Co A closed at 0840H. At 0915H two VC were contacted via 257160. After being fired upon the VC fled, leaving one M1 carbine, one Hauser 98 rifle and one medical kit. At 0927H, two VC suspects were captured via YU 253156. Later, at 0930H, Co A also located seven tons of rice, a tunnel complex, and 25 women and children. Bags were requested for the loose rice and a recovery party was sent to LZ LILLY to evacuate rice and suspects. The recovery party captured two suspects at 1002H and two more at 1115H, one of them had 8000 Piastres in his possession. All were found via YU 253156. The company (-) moved to Obj TULIP where contact was negative. A Company returned to LZ LILLY and was instructed to remain overnight and to continue extracting rice. At 1735H, sniper fire was received from YU 249162, resulting in one friendly KIA. Armed helicopters and TAC air strikes were used to suppress this fire. A deceptive extraction was made at 1830H to confuse the enemy.

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AVAR-3C
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (USCINCAP/3132)

Co C, 1/503d Inf was airlifted into LZ EYEBALL between 0900H and 0930H, and deploying one element to Obj PAINST and another to Obj ROSE. At 1110H two VC scouts were captured at YU 266144. Under interrogation, the two individuals stated that there were 30 VC in prepared positions across the river, via YU 270144. Two elements of C Co crossed the river to investigate. An armed helicopter, firing suppressive fires in support of the crossing, overshot the target and fired into friendly troops, wounding three, at 1225H. A sweep of the suspected area was conducted with negative results. Two VC and their families were captured in a tunnel system via YU 260138. All elements of C Co returned to LZ EYEBALL at 1655H and were extracted by helicopter to Song Be.

While securing Btry C, 3/319th Arty, Trp E, 17th Cav elements picked up two Nodies via YU 183109 at 1100H. They stated that VC were in position at YU 213116 and also had a base camp at YU 218115. Artillery was fired on the locations, resulting in three possible VC KIA. Co Btry and Trp E, 17th Cav remained in position.

1. D+4 (16 Apr 66): 173d Abn Bde (Sep) continued Operation DENVER by conducting a Battalion size air assault and reconnaissance in force southwest of Song Be. While securing Btry C, 3/319th Arty, Trp B, 17th Cav elements picked up two Nodies via YU 183109 at 1100H. They stated that VC were in position at YU 213116 and also had a base camp at YU 218115. Artillery was fired on the locations, resulting in three possible VC KIA. Co Btry and Trp E, 17th Cav remained in position.

1st Bn, RAR and 161st Btry RNAA began movement into 40 SP IN at 0645H. Movement was by UH-1B and OH-47 helicopter to LZ JUNE, B Co 1/503d landing at 0700H, and the 161st Btry at 0750H. The 2nd lift of UH-1's placed 4 Co on LZ JURY at 0800H, and the 3rd lift landed D Co at 0845H, also on LZ JURY. C Co was held at Song Be as a ready reaction force.

Co A secured the fire support base at LZ JURY and conducted limited reconnaissance in that area, while Co's A and B conducted a reconnaissance in force toward Obj BILL. At 1015H, Co A discovered a 4-6 month old platoon size VC Camp via YU 089405. At 1100H B Co found two 6 month old bunkers via YU 079401. Co B made contact with 4 VC at 1255H via YU 079404. The VC were fired upon but all escaped. Co's A and B, 1/503d, were extracted from Pan Bill between 1600H and 1630H. The 161st Btry and Co B were then extracted from LZ JURY. All elements closed into Brigade Base Camp by 1715H.

Task Force DUNLP, consisting of Co D, 16th Armor reinforced by two platoons, Trp G, 17th Cav, and one Co (-), 2/503d Inf, departed the Brigade base at 0700H with the mission of moving to LZ LILLY, linking up with Co A, 1/503d Inf, accepting captured supplies from Co A, and transporting these supplies back to the Song Be area. The task force encountered 4 VC at YU 222115 at 0945H. Artillery fire was placed on the VC with unknown results. At 1255H one of the 4/17th Cav vehicles broke down via YU 222116 and was evacuated to Song Be by OH-47 helicopter. One VC suspect was captured at 1350H via 228159. Two women and one child suspected of being VC dependents were also detained. The link up was accomplished at 1400H. All elements of TF DUNLP closed into the Co A, 1/503d perimeter. Co TF DUNLP was instructed that the task force would remain in that location overnight under OPCON of Co C, 1/503d Inf.

Co A, 1/503d Inf continued searching via LZ LILLY and discovered two caches at 0820H, containing enough loose rice to fill 400 50 kilogram bags. At 1425H another 300 lbs of rice was uncovered in the same vicinity. Co A remained at LZ LILLY during the night of 15 Apr.

2. D+7 (17 Apr 66): 173d Abn Bde (Sep) continued Operation DENVER by returning Co A, 1/503d Inf, TF DUNLP and Btry C 3/319th Arty to Song Be, and by initiating a Battalion size search and destroy operation southwest of Song Be. (See App 7 and 8, Annex B).

Task Force DUINLIP departed LZ LILLY at 0730H and proceeded without incident back to base camp, closing into that location at 1050H. Extraction of Co A, 1/503d Inf by helicopter began at 1120H, and the last element closed into the Brigade area at 1145H. Btry C, 3/319th Arty moved back to the Brigade base, closing at 1225H. At 1315H, 1/503d announced that it had assumed responsibility for security of the Brigade base. 1/503d Inf began preparing for a four day search and destroy operation.

1/RAR initiated a two day search and destroy operation in AO NONGWAY southwest of Song Be, beginning 0800H to OPORD 5-56. 1/RAR and 161st Btry were airlifted into LZ SAM and secured by Co A, 161st Btry. 1/503d Inf moved at 1530H, and the last element closed into the Brigade area at 1850H. At 1900H, 1/503d Inf began a three day search and destroy operation in progress, and another was initiated. (See Appendix B).

The 2/503d Inf, supported by Btry A 3/319th Arty, Trp E, 17th Cav and one ARVN Ranger Co, began a search and destroy operation in AO DELAUD, located south of Song Be, beginning 0800H to OPORD 5-56.

From 0715H to 1215H, Trp E 17th Cav conducted an air assault to secure LZ HAVAJID as a fire support base. Btry A, 3/319th Arty was lifted onto LZ HAVAJID by CM-47 helicopter between 0715H and 0900H. Trp E 17th Cav remained as the security force. The 2/503d Inf conducted an air assault on LZ YALE after an Arty preparation. The 1st lift moved at 0655H and the last element closed LZ YALE at 1012H. One VC suspect and 1000 lbs of rice were captured vic YU 249996 at 1012H, and at 1015H another 500 lbs were located vic YU 249996. At 1030H several incidents occurred. A second suspect was captured; a trench and tunnel system were located at YU 249996, in which a suitcase full of documents was discovered; two more suspects were captured at YU 249996; and at YU 249996, a Hauser 98 rifle was captured when a VC sniper fired the weapon and then fled.

At 1110H, 2/503d Inf elements captured one wounded VC with a shotgun. The VC died later. At 1300H, 2/503d Inf elements detained three refugees and a VC suspect who stated that 30 to 40 VC cadres had been in a village at YU 249996. This area was searched by a patrol at 1400H. Three bags of clothing, three bags of rice and numerous documents were found. At 1400H, one ton of rice was located at YU 249996, and another ton at YU 249996. At 1730H one wounded VC was captured at YU 249996. He was armed with a French M-29 Light machine gun and was carrying a basket of documents and a box of medical supplies. The 2/503d Inf ceased operations at 1755H and spent the night vic YU 249996.

1/RAR continued search and destroy operations in AO NONGWAY and, at 0815H, Co C found a cache containing fifty 10 lb bags of rice in a company sized VC position approximately one year old. At 0915H, Co C contacted one local force VC who fired upon contact, and Co C captured two VC vic YU 068833 at 0921H.

At 1520H, 1/BM began displacing to a new location. They were extracted by helicopter from LZ SUN and moved directly to LZ COLGATE in AO WAVIS. Movement was completed and all elements closed in at 1745H. A fire support base was established on LZ COLGATE to support subsequent operations and the night was spent in vio of that location. Positions of elements were:

- CP - YU 286967
- A - YU 286965
- B - YU 288970
- C - YU 284967
- D - YU 288967
- 161st RDA - YU 288969

At 2000H, Co B 1/RAR detained one suspect carrying medical supplies. Another was apprehended at 2345H under the same circumstances. The capture of this prisoner was a highlight of Operation DENVER, the prisoner being an NVA Captain. See paragraph 3 (Intelligence) of this report.

A reaction company was kept vio Song Be Airfield by the 1/503d Inf throughout the day.


At 1300H, movement of Btry A, 3/319th Arty from LZ MUSE to LZ COLGATE was begun. The entire Btry closed in by 1410H. Movement of Trp E 17th Cav was begun at 1515H and was concluded by 1549H.

The 2/503d Inf continued searching operations to the south in AO IRELAND. There was no significant VC contact made during the day and perimeter was secured vio YU 259946 for the night.

The 1/503d Inf continued search and destroy operations in AO WALES south of LZ COLGATE employing three companies. Co C remained with 161st Btry, RDA as security for the fire support base. There was no significant contact made with the VC. A perimeter was secured vio YU 259946 for the night.

2. D+10 (20 Apr 66): Operation DENVER continued with both battalions searching to the south in their respective AO's. 2/503d Inf closed LZ BUNAM at 1112H and then continued south to vio YU 259946 where a perimeter was formed. At 1915H a VC with an automatic weapon approached an ambush patrol at YU 259943. The VC was fired upon with unknown results.

1/RAR captured 4 VC suspects at 1430H vio YU 288979. Investigation revealed that they were carrying 40,000 Piastres, medical items, and papers requesting food, hats, and 400 pairs of black pajamas. A perimeter was formed vio YU 289929.

m. D+11 (21 Apr 66): Operation DENVER continued with the two battalions continuing to search to the south, linking up for the night at LZ BAYLOR.

1/RAR commenced movement at 0800H, continuing search and destroy operations. At 1104H, one VC was encountered at YU 019194, resulting in one possible VC killed. At 1324H Co D made contact with an unknown number of VC at YU 290097, resulting in one VC KIA (LBD), and 1 KIA (possible). At 1503H, D Co contacted 3 VC wearing black and white uniforms at YU 290091, but all escaped. 1/RAR linked up with 2/503d Inf vio of LZ BAYLOR at 1506H.

The 2/503d Inf commenced movement at 0930H and proceeded to search BUNAM village (YU 2768) where, at 1112H, they detained seven men and 23 women and children. The men were carrying tow leather e-tchels containing clothing, documents, medicine, ammunition, and ID cards. At 1300H, Co C captured 3 VC
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SUbject: Combat Operations After Action Report (MACV/ROCS/33/32)

suspect via YU 260900, and at 1605H, B Co received ten rounds of small arms fire from via YU 13043. Link up was accomplished with 1/58th as stated above.

a. D+12 (22 Apr 66): Operation DENVER continued with both battalions and the fire support base being extracted by helicopter to Song Be, and by the commencement of movement of the Brigade back to Bien Hoa. (See App 11, Annex E).

The extraction of 161st Btry, RNZA began at 0800H and continued until 0921H. All of these units, plus D/16th Armor, were airlifted back to Bien Hoa during the afternoon.

The 2/503d Inf continued searching via LZ BAYLOR. At 0705H, elements apprehended one refugee at TU 269880, and at 0750H, two VC were sighted and fired upon in that same location. At 0905H, 28 Vietnamese were found hiding in bunkers and two in a hut via YU 277893. Two were VC suspects. All others were treated as refugees. At 1000H, one VC was captured via YU 277893. He had one hand grenade and two bags of clothing and documents. Extraction of the 2/503d Inf began at 1020H and was complete at 1620H. Battery 101/319th Arty and Trp E 17th Cav were extracted from LZ BAYLOR between 1000H and 1730H.

p. D+13 (23 Apr 66): Operation DENVER continued as elements of the Brigade returned to Bien Hoa. Perimeter security of the Song Be Airfield was assumed by the 2/503d Inf at 0700H. All elements of the Brigade except 2/503d Inf, one Arty Btry, Trp E 17th Cav, and elements of 3d En, were returned to the Bien Hoa area by a combination of C-130 and CV-2 aircraft.

q. D+14 (24 Apr 66): Air movement to Bien Hoa was suspended because of lack of aircraft. The Brigade (-) conducted normal security operations in the Bien Hoa area and the 2/503d Inf continued to secure Song Be Airfield. While returning from a night ambush site, a small patrol from 2/503d Inf encountered a booby trap via YU 140804, and sustained a total of five casualties (WIA).

r. D+15 (25 Apr 66): Operation DENVER officially terminated when the last element of the 2/503d Inf was airlifted back to Bien Hoa, closing in at 1645H.

5. Supporting Forces:

a. 3d En, 319th Arty with 161st IId Btry, RNZA attached, was located at the Brigade base, vicinity of Song Be Airfield, in general support of the Brigade. For specific operations, batteries were placed in direct support of particular battalions or task forces and often displaced to establish separate fire support bases within supporting distance of a specific area of operations.

(1) Size of Force: Three (3) six (6) gun 105mm Howitzer batteries, one (1) four (4) gun Howitzer battery, and two (2) four (4) gun 4.2 inch mortar platoons.

(2) How and when employed:

(a) Preparations on landing zones were fired by Brigade Arty as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battery</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RED</td>
<td>13 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JADE</td>
<td>14 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPAL</td>
<td>14 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIAMOND</td>
<td>14 Apr</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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LILLY 15 Apr
INGRAM 15 Apr
YALE 18 Apr
COLEGATE 18 Apr

(b) On call missions from 10 Apr to 25 Apr 66.
(c) Harrasing and interdiction fires from 10 Apr to 25 Apr 66.

(3) Results: During Operation DENVER the Brigade Artillery fired a
total of 806 missions expending 6,574 rounds. The ammunition expenditure
breakdown was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
<th>ROUNDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bde Arty</td>
<td>614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar Plt, 2/503</td>
<td>723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar Plt, D/16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Artillery fires were effective during this operation. LZ pre-
paratory fires successfully reduced VC resistance. On numerous occasions,
fire was placed on areas of reported ground fire or VC sightings, resulting in
the stopping of fire and dispersal of VC, undoubtedly inflicting casualties.

(4) Timeliness: Because of coordination effected in the Brigade Fire
Support Coordination Center between Artillery, Army Air, and Air Force TAC Air,
the timeliness of Artillery fires was excellent.

b. U.S. Air Force:

(1) Size of Force: A total of 86 tactical Air Sorties were flown, exp-
ounding 97.7 tons of ordnance, and 56 ALO/FAC Sorties were flown during Operation
DENVER. In addition, 229 sorties of inter-theater aircraft transported 2618 tons
of supplies and equipment into the area of operations.

(2) How and when employed:

(a) Elements of the Brigade were airlifted to and from the Area
of Operations.

(b) TAC air provided pre-planned, on call, and quick reaction
missions throughout the operation. Use of TAC air was limited because there
were no major contacts. On 19/20 Apr 66, a quick reaction mission was placed
on the suspected location of a regular force VC battalion as reported by the
NVA Captain captured on 10/11 Apr 66. Results are currently unknown.

(c) An airborne FAC was available at all times during the oper-
ation, either in the air over the AO, or on strip alert. Ground FAC teams
were furnished each task force employed.

(d) Resupply was provided from Bien Hoa to Song Be throughout
the operation by inter-theater aircraft.

(3) Results and effectiveness:

(a) Limited TAC air support was utilized during the operation.
No large VC formations were encountered and the number of VC killed by Air (NVA)
cannot be determined. Several secondary explosions occurred due to TAC air strikes
however.
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(b) The airborne and ground FAC's used during the operation were effective, resulting in timely and accurate support by TAC Air.

(4) Timeliness: See 5b(3)(b) above.

(5) Air Request Net Utilized: The SOP for Air Request Net was utilized during Operation DENVER. Requests were initiated by the ground commander sent to the Brigade CP by either the ground FAC, Airborne FAC, or through Army channels, and then to II FFORCE Direct Air Support Center (DASC). If a mission was requested when both FAC and TAC air were airborne, no further coordination was needed and the strike was conducted.

(6) Air Ground Marking System: In all cases during Operation DENVER, targets were marked for TAC Air by the airborne FAC utilizing white phosphorus rockets, except on one occasion when 1/503d Infantry used smoke grenades to mark the trace of their front line positions.

c. Army Aviation:

(1) Size of Force: During Operation DENVER, Army Aviation support was provided by the following units:

(a) Co A, 82d Aviation Company
(b) 173d Aviation Platoon
(c) 161st Recon Flight (Australian)
(d) 11th Aviation Battalion
(e) 145th Aviation Battalion
(f) 57th Aviation Company
(g) 57th Medical Detachment (Helicopter Aid)
(h) 61st Aviation Company

(2) How and when employed:

(a) Heliborne Assault: 12 separate company and battalion size heliborne assaults were conducted. These utilized 1,689 combat assault sorties.
(b) Armed helicopter - 422 sorties.
(c) Resupply Flights - 622 sorties.
(d) Command Liaison Flights - 357 sorties.
(e) Command and Control Flights - 160 sorties.
(f) Aerial Reconnaissance Flights - 151 sorties.
(g) Psychological Operations Flights - 4 sorties.
(h) RDU Flights - 16 sorties.
(i) Aerial Artillery Observer Flights - 19 sorties.
(j) Medical Evacuation Flights - 19 sorties, including 12 sorties flown by "Dust-Off" aircraft.

(k) Radio Relay - 11 sorties.
(1) Miscellaneous - 102 sorties.
(a) Total sorties flown = 3,392.

(k) Radio Relay - 11 sorties.
(1) Miscellaneous - 102 sorties.
(a) Total sorties flown = 3,392.

(3) Results and Effectiveness: Aviation support during Operation DENVER was excellent. All requested missions were accomplished with a minimum of time lag, except in one case where CH-47’s arrived late. The following are examples of the outstanding support rendered:
(a) Co A, 82d Avn Co flew 1,170.6 hours in support of the Bde transporting 5,590 passengers and moving 176 tons of cargo.
(b) The 161st Recce Flight flew 132.8 hours in support of the Brigade, averaging 10.2 hours daily. Utilization was for Radio Relay, Command and Liaison, and Aerial Observation.
(c) The 8th Medical Detachment (Helicopter Medical) flew 15 hours in support of the Brigade, evacuating 19 injured personnel.
(d) Throughout the Operation, Army Aviation transported a total of 13,528 passengers and 323 tons of cargo.

(4) Timeliness: See 5c (3) above.

6. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. General: To support Operation DENVER, a FWD Bde Support Operations Center (BSOC) was established at Phouc Binh (7U 141072). It included supply, transportation, maintenance and medical facilities from the 173d Support Battalion. Elements of 1st Log Command provided unit distribution to Brigade rear elements and resupply of the BSOC was by Air Force fixed-wing aircraft from KHHN BOK Air Base. A total of 229 C-130 sorties delivered 1,216 tons of all classes of supply, vehicles weighing a total of 1,402 tons, and 1,419 personnel.

b. Supply and Transportation: Representatives from each unit involved in the operations were located adjacent to the BSOC. Resupply of deployed units was accomplished by road when possible and by rotary wing aircraft when otherwise inaccessible. A total of 2,461 sorties were flown, delivering 65 tons of supplies. Approximately 75 tons of all classes of supplies were required daily to sustain the Bde Task Force. Brigade infantry battalions moved to and from the operational area by OV-2 aircraft. A total of 167 sorties were flown to support these moves. The remainder of Bde elements moved by C-130 and CH-47 sorties. A total of 134 sorties of C-130 and 17 sorties of CH-47. No administration problems were encountered during the operation.

c. Maintenance: Because of lack of road access and limited number of Bde vehicles at the BSOC, Company "D" (Mech.), 173d Support Battalion, provided a small co-tent team for mechanical, signal and armament maintenance. Repairs were made when possible, otherwise the equipment was removed and processed to the rear. A total of 69 jobs were handled, 50 completed at the BSOC the remainder evacuated to the rear.

d. Medical: Company B (Medical), 173d Support Battalion operated a forward clearing station at the BSOC. The 57th and 254th Medical Detachments (Helicopter Ambulance) provided standby medical coverage at the BSOC. A total of 12 medical missions were flown in support of DENVER. When re-
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required because of severity of wounds, personnel were evacuated direct to
the 93rd Evacuation Hospital. Wounded personnel enroute to the 93rd Clear-
ing Station were treated as necessary and then evacuated to HHC NVA or re-
turned to duty. During the operation, a total of 290 patients were treated
at the clearing station.

Communications: The primary means of communica-tions during the
operation was FM radio. Wire communications were utilized within the 93rd Base.
Radio Relay systems were established to communicate with task forces
when necessary. Secure teletype and VHF telephone patch systems were
established to 11 FRORES and to the Brigade Rear Base at 93rd NVA.

7. CONCLUSION: The 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate) Operation
DENVER was valuable as a training vehicle for the large numb-of replace-
ments, both Officers and Enlisted men, who had arrived throughout the 93rd.
Areas in which additional training was needed were evident.

a. Civil Affairs/Fly Ops:

(1) Civil Affairs: During this operation, 65 families were re-
locted from insecure areas into more secure areas in the vicinity of the
Provincial Headquarters at Song Bo. Our part in this operation was the
transport of families and belongings to the Provincial Headquarters where
they were delivered to the GVN Provincial officials for resettlement in
established refusue villages.

(2) Civic Action: 126GAP teams from Bde 55 worked in the area of
operations daily at two sites. The Medical Company each day provided one
doctor to work in the Provincial Hospital and one Doctor to work in the
surrounding villages. A dentist was also provided on a daily basis to
work one half day and to clonstrate in the surrounding villages. Brigade
126GAP teams treated 2664 persons during the operation and the 126GAP
treated 93 persons. Twenty tons of rice were recovered from Viet Cong caches and returned to the Provincial Chief for distribution to needy
families. This rice was extracted by helicopter from forward positions
and deposited in the Provincial Headquarters. A rice recovery team was
organized and used to good advantage during this operation. This team
consisted of a 10 man engineer company and a 25 man security element.
After caches were located by the forward elements this team would be sent
out, landed in, secure the area, and load the rice, releasing the
finding unit to proceed with its mission. After the completion of the
rice by the helicopter extracted the rice and the recovery element.
It was found that this method was very good with large caches, but that
small caches could be more expeditiously handled by the finding unit. In
other Civic Action projects the 173rd Engineer Company assisted the local
forces in the construction of prefabricated homes for refugees entering
the area. The Brigade also turned over empty ammunition, over to the Pro-
vince for use in refugee and needy families' homes construction projects.
Thirty five boxes of canned food stuffs were also distributed to needy
families and refugees.

(3) Psychological Operations: Fourteen Psychological Operations
speaker missions were flown in the operational area using the Chiou Ho
teams directed at the Viet Cong Guerrilla Panas. Four leaflet missions
were flown distributing 300,000 leaflets of the terror and Chiou Ho
type. The leaflets were made and distributed in area of suspected Viet Cong Guer-
rilla concentrations.

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b. Intelligence: Contacts with VC were few, all being with small VC local force units. None of these were positively identified. Evidence to confirm intelligence gathered prior to the operation was not gained. The NV. Captain who was captured on 19.5 r.65 may prove to be a very valuable informant if information gained from him proves reliable.

c. Tactical Operations: The Tactical elements of the Brigade gained valuable experience in airmobile operations and search and destroy techniques due to the large number of separate operations which took place. There was also adequate opportunity to re-orient and adjust arty fires and TAC air strikes. The enemy reaction was to flee without engaging Brigade units, except by limited harassing actions.

Results for Operation DENVER are as follows:

1. US forces:
   - KIA: 1
   - WIA: 16

2. Australian Forces:
   - KIA: 1

3. New Zealand Forces:
   - None

4. Viet Cong Forces:
   - KIA: 16 (65) 15 (est)
   - WIA: 23
   - WOS: 45
   - Refugees: 97

Equipment Lost:
(a) Weapons: (1) US Carbine, (2) US shotguns, (2) German K98 rifles, (2) US M1 rifles, (1) French M29 LMG, (1) US .45 cal pistol.
(b) Ammunition: 182 r/s/a rds, (2) hand grenades, (3) rifle grenades, (1) 81mm mortar round.
(c) Other:
   1. Demolitions: 1 body trap
   2. Commo: 1 radio
   3. Transport: 1 bicycle
   4. Rations: 34.4 tons
   5. Documents: 2167
   6. Miscellaneous: 2-55 gal drums, 1 medical kit, 432 assorted medical items, 2 compasses, 1 loudspeaker, 1 ground flare, 13 batteries, 1 carbine magazine, 3 M60 magazines.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Conclusions:

(1) Operation DENVER was valuable as a training vehicle. Areas in which need for additional training was evident were:

Map Reading & Navigation
Adjustment of arty Fire
March & Bivouac Discipline
Village Searching

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Detection and Avoidance of Booby Traps
Nozitive Procedures
Handling of POW’s, Suspects, and Refugees
Communications Security
Loading & Lashing of Vehicles for Air Movement

(2) Artillery & I fires should be fired in small volleys.
(3) Use of flares and illumination must be reduced.
(4) An airborne observer must observe every artillery LZ preparation.
(5) ARVN units in the area of operations must be involved in brigade operations whenever possible.
(6) A Pay-Off plan must be worked out for each operation.
(7) Response to fire requests must be rapid when intelligence reveals a lucrative target for either artillery or the air.
(8) Medical Aid Tents should be located away from airstrips and helipads (except medical pads) for sanitary reasons.
(9) Prisoners of War, Suspects, and Refugees must all be tagged with as much complete information as possible. This is an absolute necessity.
(10) Refugees must not be confused with other civilians. Ordinary civilians will have no desire to be relocated in refugee housing areas.
(11) Trailer hitches should be welded on the front of some vehicles to aid in loading trailers aboard aircraft.
(12) Installations may be able to improve landing zones used for extraction to enhance speed and ease of operation.
(13) There is little advantage to be gained by a quick search and destroy operation. A unit needs time to do a thorough job.
(14) Loading plans for air movement must be selective. Mission essential equipment of all units should be brought in before administrative equipment for other units.

L. Lessons Learned:
(1) To save time in recovering VC rice caches, each soldier of a unit should carry an empty rice bag with him. There will be no necessity to delay recovery while rice bags are brought forward.
(2) Enemy units must be positioned where they can be observed. If not observed, they can be turned around by the VC, to point at friendly forces.
(3) It is a good idea to introduce replacements directly into an operation rather than allow them to wait in the rear area. The battlefront indoctrination period is shortened considerably.

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AVIA-06
SUBJECT: Combat Oper times after Action Report (MACV/OS/33/32)

(4) In many cases, a battlefield evacuation can be performed by
an ordinary UH-1B helicopter just as satisfactorily as by a special Med-
evac (Dustoff) aircraft, since Dustoff Aircraft are in high demand and
short supply, ordinary UH-1B's may provide quicker reaction.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

CHUCK J. SMITH
Capt., USA

ANNEXES:
A-Bdb Base Schematic
B-Ops Schematic

27
*1/503d Inf and 2/503d Inf alternated missions during the Operation. 2/503d Inf was the security force from D+1 until D+7. 1/503d Inf was security force from D+7 until D+14. 2/503d Inf alternated missions with 1/503d as the security force from D+14 until D+21.

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APPENDIX 7 (Opn Schenatic) to ANNEX B (Ops Schematic)

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APPENDIX 8 (Frag Order 8, D+7) to ANNEX B (Ops Schematic)

NOT DRAWN TO SCALE

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Preliminary Intelligence Report

1. Biographical Data:
   a. Full name: TiCai DOUG
   b. Alias: TUYET & TUJN
   c. Rank: Captain (NVN)
   d. VC/NVA unit assigned and assigned duties: Assistant to Combat Training Chief at 624th SVN Regiment, Headquarter. Last mission - sent to BTN BVN BVN 127 (TY 7207) to liaise with the 65th Battalion, 624th SVN Regiment which was moving north from their base camp area at VT 300 33 and was due to arrive near BTN BVN BVN 127 (TY 380380) on 21DEC 66.
   e. Date and place of birth: 1936 at THI NGUYEN District, VAN HINH Province.
   f. Parents names: Father - VU, THI NGUYEN (Deceased)
   g. Mother - NGUYEN NINH

2. Circumstances of capture or return to government control.
   a. When: 1959 (April)
   b. Where: TY 257707
   c. Documents and weapons in possession when captured or returned to government control: 1 US 45 cal pistol, with holster, transfer orders from 34th Division to 624th Battalion, letter of introduction from GI CIB (Staff office IDA) to 624th Battalion Headquarter, letter of recommendation from 34th Division to 624th Battalion, letter of recommendation from Political Officer at Hq.

3. Past Activities:
   a. 1965 to 1948 - lived in THI NGUYEN Village, VAN HINH District, KHUANH Hoi Province.
   b. 1948 to 1954 - lived in THANH HOA District, KHUANH Hoi Province.
   c. 1954 to 1956 - worked in JANH District, KHUANH Hoi Province.
   d. 1956 to 1957 - worked in THANH HOA District, KHUANH Hoi Province.
   e. 1957 to 1958 - worked in THANH HOA District, KHUANH Hoi Province.
   f. 1958 to 1959 - worked in THANH HOA District, KHUANH Hoi Province.

4. Other Information:
   a. Full name: TiCai DOUG
   b. Alias: TUYET & TUJN
   c. Rank: Captain (NVN)
   d. VC/NVA unit assigned and assigned duties: Assistant to Combat Training Chief at 624th SVN Regiment, Headquarter. Last mission - sent to BTN BVN BVN 127 (TY 7207) to liaise with the 65th Battalion, 624th SVN Regiment which was moving north from their base camp area at VT 300 33 and was due to arrive near BTN BVN BVN 127 (TY 380380) on 21DEC 66.
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   f. Parents names: Father - VU, THI NGUYEN (Deceased)
   g. Mother - NGUYEN NINH

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Infiltration route from NVN to SVN is as follows:
3. Entered LAO 5 May 1961, passed through LA VI LQG and NOUNG PHN, LAO
May 1961.
5. Left LAO and entered SVN on 6 June 1961 at unknown location. 14 months
after infiltration was completed. Source became a member of the NLF SVN on 20 July
1961.

Military Assignments:
1946 - 1954 3 months training at the NLANG NICH Provincial Unit, VIET MINH.
203 Independent Company (Squad Leader).
1954-1955 attended OSS at WES Lai City, VIET LQ Province, CHINA.
1956-1957 assigned to 324th Division as a platoon leader.
1957-1958 Civilian
1958 Recalled to service in NV.
1958-1960 Platoon leader in 3rd Division, 90th Regiment, 1st Battalion,
3rd Company, 2nd Platoon.
1960, May to Sep 1960 Assigned as Commanding Officer, 2nd Company, In-
filtration Group 600.
1960, September to May 1963 Commanding Officer, 2nd Company, 120th Lat-
tation. Source infiltration to SVN with this unit in mid 1961.
1963, Nov to August 1964 Production Section Chief NLD.
1964, August to September 1964 Inspector 80th Battalion in VIET DUC Pro-
vince 308 District.
1964, November to April 1966 Staff, Assistant Chief for Combat Training
1964, 20 April to 19 April assigned to 605th Regiment as assistant Combat
Training Officer.
Source was involved in two harassing actions in May 1962 at SONG KIA Stream,
DI, DUC District, KIHON NRV Province.

4. Areas of Special Knowledge:
Source was trained in NRV on the following weapons:
1. LLS 49
2. US .44
3. TULLE 50
4. 6cm Kurter
5. 6cm Kurter
6. 57mm DA
7. HU 52 (Water cooled)
8. US 45 cal pistol
9. M1
10. Carbine
Source knew how to operate a P-0-10 radio.

Military movement - 605th Battalion, BAC 3CN Regiment was moving on 18 Apr
66 from their base position near NIKI BA (TU 300355) to a location near DI, DUC
BURWII (TT 295885). Itinerary went south from the base position to TU 3721,
where they camped on the 17th night march. This area is on the northern bank of
the KODY LE River. The 605th battalion resumed travel on 19/04/66 April 66 mov-
ing southeast to a location on the northern bank of the stream located at YU3714.
This was the 2nd overnight stop. 605th Battalion was to leave this area on 20/04/66
Apr 66 and travel south southeast arriving at the junction of the trail and Huy.
04 Apr 2013/00 Apr 66. They were to proceed southwest along Huy 04 until day-
break. At this time they were to leave the highway on the eastern side at approx-
imately 21:1000 Apr 66 and rest there for 2 days. Then on 23 Apr 66 they were to
be met by an agent of the Central Committee of the NLFVN and be taken further
south. Source did not know their final destination. Source was to return to
BAC 3CN Regiment Headquarters once the 605th Battalion was picked up by the a-
bove mentioned NLFVN Agent.
Source gave the following military organization:

1. 

![Diagram of military organization]

Artillery Company has:
- 3 x 97mm
- 3 x 75mm
- 6 x 60mm mortars
- 3 x 12.7mm

The following personalities were obtained:
1. Sr Col Nguen Van Nha - Chief 15-6
2. Col Van Xuan - Asst Chief 15-6
3. Lt Col Nguen Cao - Chief, Staff Section 15-6
4. Sr Capt Le Van Nhu - Asst Chief, Staff Section 15-6
5. Lt Col Nguen Thi Nhu - Chief, Political Section 15-6
7. Sr Col Nguen Van Hia - Chief, Worksite 15-6
8. Banh Unknown - CHNB 20 - Chief, Finance & Economy Section 15-6
9. Lt Nguen Van - CO 34th Div
10. Hj Nguen Van - CO 34th Div
11. Sr Capt Nguen Xuan - CO 604th Bn
12. Sr Capt Nguen Xuan - CO 603rd Bn
13. Sr Capt Nguen Xuan - CO 605th Bn
14. Sr Col Nguen Xuan - CO 60th Bn (NVA)
15. Hj Nguen Xuan - CO 90th Bn (NVA)
16. Sr Capt Nguen Xuan - CO 90th Bn (NVA)
17. Hj Nguen Xuan - CO 90th Bn (NVA)
18. Sr Capt Nguen Xuan - CO 90th Bn (NVA)
19. Sr Capt Nguen Xuan - CO 4th Co, 120th Bn (Combat Spt)
20. Lt Nguen Xuan - CO 80th Bn
5. Assessment of source by interrogation/Intelligence officers.
   a. Source is in good physical condition.
   b. Source is knowledgeable on military matters.
   c. Source was confused at times during the interrogation as concerns dates, but otherwise he was very cooperative throughout the interrogation.