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<td>Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov’t. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 22 JUL 1966. Other requests shall be referred to Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC.</td>
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<td>31 Jul 1978, DoDD 5200.10; OAG D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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AD 394023

1. (c) Name of Operation: Operation HA-VIET.

2. (c) Dates of Operation: 2 June thru 20 June 1963.

3. (c) Location: ABTIV Province.

4. (c) Commander: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

5. (c) Reporting Officer: Brigadier General Willard Pearson, Commanding General, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

6. (c) Risk Operation.

The high organization of the Division and the initiative of Operation Hau Thoong was shown below. This operation required relatively small forces throughout the operation, with the following exceptions: (1) 237 CMB and 236 Eng units under the operational control of the 1st DCA; on 10 and 8 June 1963 respectively; and (2) 802 and 805 military and para-military forces were attached as under operational control with the 1st Brigade during various phases of the operation. The 802 units are listed below in paragraph 6b.

82/1/27
1/27 Inf
22/320 Art
Deco Tn A 325 Eng

82/2/123
2/205 Inf
C 2/300 Art
Deco Tn A 325 Eng
TP

82/3/522
2/205 Inf
C 2/300 Art
Deco Tn A 325 Eng
TP

82/3/522
2/300 Art
3/1/20 Art

82/1/27
5TH (-)
5/2/17 Cav
5/235 Regt (-)

82/2/123
5TH (-)
5/2/17 Cav
5/235 Regt (-)

82/3/522
2/205 Art
C 2/300 Art
Deco Tn A 325 Eng
TP

82/3/522
2/205 Art
C 2/300 Art
Deco Tn A 325 Eng
TP

82/3/522
2/300 Art
3/1/20 Art

82/3/522
3/1/20 Art

For 80/20

66X102

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22 July 1954

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Cover Operation. After withdrawing, Operation ""SOUTH"" (old title 1:1-1)...

[Xerox copy]...or another 600 units, 600 units, 600 units, but at the same time...

7. (a) Special/Support:

1. 3/535 Army ""troops"" in direct support role.


3. 11th Air Command 1st Division: Provided helicopters for mobile artillery rounds throughout the operation. In addition, the unit provided reinforce elements and provided air/ground support for the operation.

4. 3/5th Air Command 1st Division: Provided air support with five OH-47 helicopters.

5. 3rd Air Command 1st Division provided air control for Psy ""troops"".

6. 25th Avn Div 2nd Division provided one forward signal and one属于 command support role.

7. (a) Support/Command:

1. 3/535 Army ""troops"" in direct support role.


4. 11th Air Command 1st Division: Provided helicopters for mobile artillery rounds throughout the operation. In addition, the unit provided reinforce elements and provided air/ground support for the operation.

5. 3/5th Air Command 1st Division: Provided air support with five OH-47 helicopters.

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6. 3rd Air Command 1st Division provided air control for Psy ""troops"".
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SU/TE 22 July 1944

SU/TE: Secret Operations, Special Section, General Headquarters, U.S. Army

The Order of March-18th Announced to Conflict

The raising of the flag over the U.S. Army Signal Corps

The symbol of victory...
CONFIDENTIAL

22 July 1944

SU.V.CT.I

Operations After Action Report, Operation "HUSKY" (HERCULES D-2)

Dramatic in nature were the operations of the 12th Armored Division, which was designated for the advance of the 1st Armored Division and the 92nd Division. The 12th Armored Division was to attack north towards the town of Caltanissetta, which was held by the Germans. The division was to break through the German defenses and clear the way for the advance of the 1st Armored Division.

The 12th Armored Division was composed of three tank battalions and three infantry battalions. The division had a strength of 8,000 men and was equipped with M4 Sherman tanks.

The division was divided into three elements:

1. The 12th Armored Division
2. The 92nd Infantry Division
3. The 1st Armored Division

The division was to attack on a front of 10 miles and advance towards the town of Caltanissetta. The division was to reach the town within 72 hours.

The division encountered heavy resistance from the Germans. The division was able to capture the town of Caltanissetta within 24 hours.

13. (c) Results:

a. The 12th Armored Division accomplished its mission to break through the German defenses.

b. The division captured over 100 German prisoners and recovered over 500 tons of German equipment.

14. (d) Casualties:

1. Personnel losses:

- Killed: 25
- Wounded: 125
- Missing: 7

2. Enemy captured:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. M-1 Garand</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Assault</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Russian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Assault</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Russian</td>
</tr>
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<td>German Assault</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Russian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Assault</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Russian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 112

15. (e) Ammunition:

- 7.62mm: 3,000 rds
- 8mm: 35 rds
- 50mm: 3 rds

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;12</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;16</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;20</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>&lt;23</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>&lt;25</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;27</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) **Electrical Equipment:**

- &lt;12 ft (100)
- &lt;16 ft (50)
- &lt;20 ft (30)
- &lt;23 ft (7)
- &lt;25 ft (9)
- &lt;27 ft (1)

(3) **Miscellaneous:**

- &lt;12 ft (100)
- &lt;16 ft (50)
- &lt;20 ft (30)
- &lt;23 ft (7)
- &lt;25 ft (9)
- &lt;27 ft (1)

(4) **Inventory:**

- &lt;12 ft (50)
- &lt;16 ft (30)
- &lt;20 ft (7)

(5) **Tools:**

- &lt;20 tons (100)

(6) **Clothing:**

- &lt;12 ft (50)
- &lt;16 ft (30)
- &lt;20 ft (7)

(7) **Miscellaneous:**

- &lt;12 ft (50)
- &lt;16 ft (30)
- &lt;20 ft (7)
- &lt;23 ft (7)
- &lt;25 ft (9)
- &lt;27 ft (1)

(8) **Carpet:**

- &lt;12 ft (50)
- &lt;16 ft (30)
- &lt;20 ft (7)
- &lt;23 ft (7)
- &lt;25 ft (9)
- &lt;27 ft (1)

(9) **Company:**

- Company to Battalion
- Company
- Company
- Battalion
- Battalion
- Battalion

5

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J3-J11

[Image 0x0 to 591x799]
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in that the enemy was using the ""A"" and ""B"" in a systematic pattern. It was evident from the initial mission that the enemy was using a systematic pattern of attack. The enemy's use of the ""A"" and ""B"" in a systematic pattern of attack was evident from the initial mission.

(4) Use of Helicopters: The enemy's use of the ""A"" and ""B"" in a systematic pattern of attack was evident from the initial mission. The enemy's use of the ""A"" and ""B"" in a systematic pattern of attack was evident from the initial mission.

(5) Corvette Operations: The enemy's use of the ""A"" and ""B"" in a systematic pattern of attack was evident from the initial mission. The enemy's use of the ""A"" and ""B"" in a systematic pattern of attack was evident from the initial mission.

(6) Use of Motorcycles: The enemy's use of the ""A"" and ""B"" in a systematic pattern of attack was evident from the initial mission. The enemy's use of the ""A"" and ""B"" in a systematic pattern of attack was evident from the initial mission.

(7) Use of Infantry: The enemy's use of the ""A"" and ""B"" in a systematic pattern of attack was evident from the initial mission. The enemy's use of the ""A"" and ""B"" in a systematic pattern of attack was evident from the initial mission.

(b) Use of Infantry: The enemy's use of the ""A"" and ""B"" in a systematic pattern of attack was evident from the initial mission. The enemy's use of the ""A"" and ""B"" in a systematic pattern of attack was evident from the initial mission.

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(1) Based on the various reports and returns, the enemy's combat strength was estimated to be about 20,000, with 30% of the troops being concentrated near the Lao-Cao sector, the rest being posted along the 200-250 mile line. The 200-250 mile line was the enemy's main defense position.

(2) The report also noted that the equivalent of 1,600 of the enemy's troops were killed or wounded. Of the enemy's air assets, 100 were taken down. It is believed that the NVA used psychological smoke to try to mislead the enemy's division of troop density and flow. The NVA also used psychological smoke to confuse the enemy, especially in the area of the I Corps in a close support role.

(3) However, the mobile support units, utilizing troops attacking the enemy from the north and south, coupled with the effective use of fire power, was the most successful tactic. This was also the most effective, particularly during the initial periods during the operation. The I Corps Rainbow was an outstanding group.

(4) Operation with AVN Assets: In addition to major AVN forces, the Mobile Air Support Corps (AMC) employed the 920th Air Force, the 920th Air Force, the 920th Air Force, and the 920th Air Force. The operation's goals were also achieved. The 920th Air Force, which was equipped with the most effective, also played a significant role in operations in the north provinces during the initial periods. The 920th Air Force was used as an air support group.

(5) Reports: The enemy proved to be liquidated: well-trained, well-equipped, and well-supported. Excellent combat effectiveness, well-supported, and well-supported. The enemy proved to be liquidated: well-trained, well-equipped, and well-supported. The enemy proved to be liquidated: well-trained, well-equipped, and well-supported. The enemy proved to be liquidated: well-trained, well-equipped, and well-supported.

(6) Psychological Operations: The initial support was used but gradually improved. A total of six million leaflets were flown and 24 hours of leafletting time was utilized. Four out of 10 millions were directly related to the commanders.

(7) Conduct: During the operation, 30,000 prisoners were taken and 28 significant reports were taken. The majority of the reports were of battalion size. In addition, over 100 million batteries were used, and the theater was also expanded, in addition to reports on the operation.

16. (6) Organizations:

a. That consideration be given to establishing a MFR for Psychological Operations.

b. That the operation be established at the KASMP level for psychological operations and investigations.

c. That the operation be established at the MFR level for psychological operations and investigations.
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Inclusion 1 (Personnel and Administration) Post-Operation Reports, Operation HAWTHORN

1. (C) PERSONNEL

a. Beginning of Operation HAWTHORN

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Operation HAWTHORN were as follows:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>4400</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>7349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joining not assigned</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present for Duty</td>
<td>4703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Present for Duty</td>
<td>541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Head Strength</td>
<td>2731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Camp</td>
<td>1297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Near</td>
<td>755</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The assigned was 52% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 109% of the authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength, 521 were hospitalized personnel.

b. Conclusion of Operation HAWTHORN

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation HAWTHORN were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>4400</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Base Camp</td>
<td>1297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Near</td>
<td>755</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The assigned was 112% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 110% of the authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength, 521 were hospitalized personnel.

c. The "assigned" strength figures are extremely inflated. This inflation is also reflected in the "not present for duty" because:

(1) A large number of hospitalized personnel have been transferred to off-shore hospitals, CUBA, and/or even discharged from the US Army without notification to the losing unit.
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Inclusion 1 (contd)

(2) The current strength accountability system requires assigning personnel (MEDHUM) to medics prior to their rotation to the unit rather than administratively on a "first come, first serve" basis in the "pipeline".

(3) A number of personnel have been diverted without the subsequent notification to the medical unit.

2. (C)Casualties:

a. Casualties for Operation HAMMER into were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>1/36</th>
<th>1/37</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/36</td>
<td></td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/37</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/36</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/37</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/36</td>
<td></td>
<td>849</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Total casualties to date are as follows:

MTA 222
OS 120
MA 2

3. (C) Personnel Replacements:

a. A total of 501 replacements were received in the Brigade during this period. Personnel sent prior to the maneuver battalions were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>1/36</th>
<th>1/37</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/36</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/37</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Losses of critical personnel were closely monitored and 30 personnel with critical tasks were retained as follows:

Flat beds 20
Fatigue 10
Locators 5
All The above 3

o. Security requirements for continuing critical LOS shortages were submitted for L7 mission requirements, cooks, medical specialists, mechanics, communications personnel, and legal clerks.

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Incloure 1 (contd)

4. (U) Personnel Services, FIA, and American Red Cross representatives visited the dispensary and provided assistance. The igapairo has received an additional red field representative which will provide extended and services.
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Inclusion 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MUSIC BOX

1. (C) SUPPLY: The terrain operated in consisted of numerous terrains, including open forest, scrub, and ridges. The weather, varying between cloudy and clear, provided excellent cover for the enemy. Highway No. 10 was the principal north-south artery of supplies, while well-defined trails (TB 500060 to TB 500560, TB 500660 to TB 500650, TB 500150 to TB 500160) provided a potential route for movement. The terrain favored enemy infiltration operations by providing excellent cover and restricted our operations with a lack of landing zones.

2. (C) WEATHER: The northwest monsoon dominated the weather, although there was less rain and wind more than expected. High winds occurred infrequently, but low cloud conditions and rain began late each afternoon and lasted until early the following morning. The weather limited aerial activity and restricted visibility during a 24-hour period when ground fog was prevalent. These weather conditions generally favored the enemy by concealing his activity and reducing our ability to conduct aerial observation.

3. (C) At the beginning of Operation MUSIC BOX, the following information was available regarding enemy activity:

a. Major VC infiltration routes crossed the Cambodian and Laotian borders in this area.

b. Two NVA platoons at Dak To, who said they were distant leaders in the 29th NVA Regiment, reported their units to be at TB 7645 with a reconnaissance element at TB 5724 (16 May 1966) preparing for an attack on that village.

c. A raider from the 7th BN, 24th NVA Regiment reported his battalion at ZB 012342.

d. A captured enemy dislocated VC platoon of another division is somewhere in the Highlands, with the main axis in SOC TRANG Province.

e. Other information led to the belief that the battalion of the 24th NVA Regiment was north of TON KAIN (25 13354) and two battalions were southwest of TON KAIN (25 1215).

1. TON KAIN had received sporadic small arms, automatic weapons, and mortar fire and hit fire from the north from 22 May to 26 May 1966.

4. (C) During the operation, the intelligence situation was developed through friendly contact:

a. Enemy prisoners and documents gave the identification of engaged units as the 24th, 5th, and 6th battalions of the 24th NVA Regiment.

b. The enemy was located by moving units into the TON KAIN area after an artillery output had been attacked on the morning of 7 June 1966. This front line mark was the principal source of information about the enemy's location from 7 June until the end of the operation.

5. (C) RESULTS:

a. Initial Order of Battle:

1. Prior to the arrival of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division in the DAK TO area, it was believed that two NVA Regiments were preparing for an attack in the TON KAIN area.

2. Guillot and prisoners indicated that these units were the 24th and 88th NVA Regiments. Guillot indicated that the 24th was located in the immediate TON KAIN area and the 88th was located in line.

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Inclusions 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation

(1) The only unit in the area of interest was estimated to be 600 NVA personnel and also North Vietnamese guerrilla personnel.

(4) Initial enemy dispositions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>FACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24th NVA Regt Vic Tac Black</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26 May</td>
<td>Unidentified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/126th</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26 May</td>
<td>Unidentified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/126th</td>
<td>06 1218</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>26 May</td>
<td>Unidentified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th NVA Regt Vic Tac Black</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26 May</td>
<td>Unidentified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/126th</td>
<td>2/3236</td>
<td>2300</td>
<td>29 May</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th 12th Co</td>
<td>2/3236</td>
<td>2300</td>
<td>29 May</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrillas scattered</td>
<td>2130</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. OB Summary and Findings:

(1) Units identified by POWs:

(a) 24th NVA Regt, North NVA Div
- 2/126th
- 3/126th
- 4/126th
- 5/126th
- 6/126th
- 17th C&G SB 1st Co
- 20th C&G SB 1st Co
- 21st JS 1st Co
- 222nd TMC Co

(b) Units identified by documents:
- K3 = 3rd Co 24th NVA Regt
- C30 = Trach 6 = 24th NVA Regt
- C31 = 1st Co 24th NVA Div
- C32 = 2nd Co 24th NVA Div
- C33 = 3rd Co 24th NVA Div

(3) NVA's stated that a major base complex and the 304th Div Hq was located in Thuc Long, base where the regiment stayed for approximately one month before entering South Vietnam.

(4) The mission of the 24th Regt was to attack DAC T0 and TOU NON Doc and ambush NVA relief forces. Radios from the 24th and 66th Regts stated that the 86th was to coordinate with the 24th Regt in these attacks.

(5) In engagements with the 24th NVA Regt in the TOU NON Doc vicinity between 9 and 13 June 1966, the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division rendezvous this NVA Unit immediately as a combat force. Casualties to the 24th Regt were 251 killed by direct and indirect fire. It is probable that it will be several months before the unit can obtain replacements and again become effective as a combat unit.

(6) Results of NVA troops are reported to be low as a result of the extensive difficulties encountered during infiltration, lack of medical supplies, lack of food, high tropical rate, and fear of friendly air attacks and artillery fire.

(7) Inclusions 1 & Inclusions 2 lists the final order of battle of enemy forces in NONAL Province.
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Incurred 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HURRICANE

6. Intelligence Analysis, Lessons Learned:

a. Analysis:

(1) The VC No. 700 in the II Corps area as indicated by the capture of radar nets and mortars of defenses found.

(2) The VC launched a major offensive in the II Corps, 11th Division, Binh Dinh area as indicated by the effective attack of 7 June 1966 as well as the aggressive action of their units on 6, 8, and 11 June.

(3) The VC plan in the II Corps, 11th Division, Binh Dinh area has been set back as indicated by the fifty percent or more casualties taken by the 24th Div. July.

b. Lessons Learned:

(1) Immediate deployment of IRR teams to points of VC capture, enhances the effectiveness of information gained and negates the possibility of false or misleading information gained by unverified interception.

(2) Enemy forces in the area are better equipped and better trained than those encountered in other parts of the II Corps area. They are more prone to steal and fight and will readily reinforce and engage units. This was demonstrated when 2/2/2 on 25 November encountered a reinforced VC platoon which was subsequently supported by a battalion sized force.

(3) North Vietnamese have a theory of the operational area should be provided to IRR teams and front line battalions. Frequently captures can read their own maps when they cannot read ours.

(4) Trail studies verified by ground reports should be developed for the brigade's own use and other IRR, ASK, and ARVN units.

(5) Aggressive visual reconnaissance flown by the 29th AVN Co provides information on enemy activity throughout the II Corps. In 145 hours of visual reconnaissance flown, 240 significant sightings were reported to the S-2. This has proved to be an excellent method of gathering intelligence information while units are in major conflict.

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Inclusion 1 (Restricted to Intelligence Officers in Central Province)

Inclusion 2 (Restricted to Central Intelligence Officers) for Action Report, Operation KIAKALI

<table>
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Inclusions 2 (Composition, Disposition, and Strength of the 24th NVA Regt) to Inclusions 2 (Intelligence) to C.G.A. Operations After Action Report, Operation ROLLING STONE

1. (C) Composition:

```
24

4

1 2 3

6

11

14 13

17

19

21

22

304 Div - Code name - COMM TUBUS 6
24th Regt - Code name - COMM TUBUS 86 EINH
1st BN = K-4
2nd BN = K-5
3rd BN = K-6

Prior to infiltration 24th Regt, designated 42, infiltrated as 6th Regiment, and now established as 24th NVA Regiment, 304th Division.

2. (C) Disposition: 24th Regt, located in Kentun Province, with one battalion north of Truc Ming and two battalions southwest of Truc Ming via ZD 1223.

3. (C) Strength: The 24th Regt, 304th NVA Div (KVT) has an actual TME strength of about 2600 personnel. It is estimated to be approximately 325 strength at present time. Total NVA losses as a result of Operation ROLLING STONE were approximately 1000.

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4. (a) Concept: The NVA plan to attack Dak To was a three phase plan to be in order, as follows:

Phase I. (a) Advance the NVA's main village and strategic road to cut down to the NVA supply lines along Hwy 141 (Dak To - The Missing).

Phase II. (b) Neutralize enemy forces by confronting with friendly units, and then destroy supply base for Dak To (using the tactics used in the last contact); to tie the offensive forces by keeping constant pressure on them, forcing a withdrawal, and thus preparing an attack on the remaining column.

Phase III. (c) When the main force breaks to the heavy for the Air Base to take the mission, the VC will close in and cut Dak To.

5. (a) Training:

a. VC training area, locat. "Ya 962616.

b. Training of the North Vietnamese soldiers:

(1) Infantry training: The basis of all instruction for the NVA soldier is infantry. Personnel of all corps receive infantry training, including guerrilla and infiltration tactics. Emphasis is placed upon small unit and individual abilities, and effective individual marksmanship. Experimentation is encouraged for solving tactical problems.

(2) Artillery training: Both tactical and technical training is covered. NVA is considered artillery. Due to low literacy technical training is limited.

(3) Technical services training generally is performed "OJT".

6. (a) Logistics:

a. Installations:

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<tbody>
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<td>YA 959427</td>
<td>Provisional command post</td>
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</table>
| YA 692600 | Provi
| HA 677792 | Provisional command post |
| YA 901380 | Provisional command post |
| YA 909372 | Provisional command post |
| AS 796235 | Provisional command post |
| AS 320373 | Provisional command post |
| AS 015333 | Provisional command post |
| AS 979449 | Supply point |
| YA 969815 | Training area |
| ZU 315500 | Processing |
| YA 792015 | Hospital |
| YA 467105 | Supporting base area |
| YA 8612 | Aid, storage |

Across Cambodia Borders:

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<td>YA 570758</td>
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<tr>
<td>HA 729513</td>
<td>Hospital</td>
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<tr>
<td>HA 560511</td>
<td>Vector crossing point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YA 666070</td>
<td>Command post</td>
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<tr>
<td>YA 521638</td>
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<tr>
<td>YA 659503</td>
<td>Drying and storage</td>
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</table>

b. For transportation and lack of raw materials constitute a slow system of supply and consequently the troops receive a minimal amount of food and clothing. Arrangement makes the heaviest burden upon the supply services.
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1. NVA Casualty in Action:
   2 a.m. to 11 a.m. (Active)
   1 p.m. to 5 p.m. (Silent, over 2 hours)
   1 dead
   1 ear wound
   1 hit
   1 bullet
   1 wound, 1 leg

7. (c) Combat Efficiency: Result is low due to personal losses, lack of food and medical supplies, fear of combat, Combat effectiveness of 24th NVA units can be considered ineffective until replacements can be obtained.

8. (c) Miscellaneous:

   a. Infiltration: 24th Regiment role now SONG LU Group. This infiltration group was divided into numerous small segments. The time lag between each element was two days per. 30 November 1963 departure company was held and the first element departed, and arrived in Kontum Province 29 June 1966. Enemy position went line to locate infiltration position.

   1st Element: 4th BN, medical company, 19th Transportation Company and Adoption Battalion.

   2nd Element: 5th BN, move up subordinate units and Regimental Headquarters elements.

   3rd Element: 6th BN, remain subordinate units and Regimental Headquarters.

b. Personalities:

   4th Co
   4th XO
   4th BN CO
   1st Co CO
   1st XO
   1st PO
   1st Lt
   2nd Co CO
   2nd XO
   2nd PO
   2nd Lt
   3rd Co CO
   3rd XO
   3rd PO
   3rd Lt
   5th Co CO
   5th XO
   5th PO
   5th Lt
   6th Co CO
   6th XO
   6th PO
   6th Lt
   7th Co CO
   7th XO
   7th PO
   7th Lt
   8th Co CO
   8th XO
   8th PO
   8th Lt
   9th Co CO
   9th XO
   9th PO
   9th Lt

   c. Weapons of an NVA Battalion:

   TYPE
   NONGDA:
   7.62mm DKG 4
   12.7mm G 4
   7.62mm MG 9
   12.7mm MG 4
   LMG 4
   7.62mm for infantry
   SKS
   RPG-2 5
   Grenade 2 per squad
   Grenade 2 per individual

The above is representative of the 4th BN and similar throughout the 4th, 5th and 7th Battalion, 19th Regiment.
INCLOSURE 3 (OPERATIONS SCHEMATIC, PHASE 1, 2-6 JUNE 1966)
TO COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT,
OPERATION HAWTHORNE.
INCLOSURE 4 A (OPERATIONS SCHEMATIC, PHASE II, 7-10 JUNE 1936)
TO COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT,
OPERATION HAWTHORNE.
NCLOSURE 4 C (OPERATIONS SCHEMATIC, PHASE II, 10-15 JUNE 1966)
TO COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT,
OPERATION HAWTHORNE.
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Enclosure 5 (lo sick) to Combat Operations Action Report,
Operation HANSCOM

1. (C) Support Operations:

a. Support Detachments:

(1) Support detachments: Provided the command and
control of support functions (forward). It was organized into command,
operations, communications, and personnel control sections.

(2) Supply detachments: Responsible for the receipt,
storage, and issue of all classes of supply. It also provided a repair section
and an Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team.

(3) Maintenance detachments: Provided a repair capability
for small arms, artillery, engine, aviation, and quartermaster
equipment. It was organized into a shop office, a repair and
contact team.

(4) Medical Company (-): A clearing station was established
with a twenty-bed capacity, a surgical section, a holding section, a
emergency treatment section, and a dental section.

b. Supporting Forces:

(1) Forward Support Detachment (T F S U T C L): The Trang
Supply Support Command accompanied the Brigade from G 20 to D 20 to T 20.
It was replaced by Forward Support Detachment (T F S U T C L) QUI NICN Support
Command. This Forward Support Detachment (FSD) was collocated with
Supply Company, Support Detachment, and was responsible for receiving and
stocking Class I, II, and V and for issue of Class III to aviation units.
The FSD was extremely cooperative and responsive throughout the operation.

(2) 10th Aviation Battalion: Provided two airmobile
companies and QV-2 aircraft to support tactical and logistical operations.
The QV-2 aircraft were used to transport our troops, repair parts, and
personnel to and from the forward area. Aircraft sorties allocated were
not sufficient to support the logistics plan on all occasions due
primarily to large numbers of replacements and returns transported to
and from the forward area.

(3) CH-47 Helicopter support was provided by 117th Aviation
Company (Airmobile) and 1st Cav Div (Airmobile).

(4) 198th Aviation Company: Provided medical aeroevacuation
throughout the operation.

2. MATERIAL AND SERVICES:

a. Supply:

(1) Class I: A total of 107 short tons of B rations and
70 tons of meals Combat Individual Type C were issued during the operation.
An adequate supply of "A" rations were received. "A" ration meats were
issued in sufficient quantities to supplement every meal of B rations. However,
fresh vegetables, meat, and fruit were extremely limited.

(2) Class II & III: Class II & III supplies were shipped
from Brigade Support Detachments in the 20 and 20 and QUI NICN area Support
Command. The following items were received in greater quantities than
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Tactical emergency resupply was used during the operation for maintaining the brigade basic load of 105mm Howitzer and 105mm Howitzer ammunition. The brigade requested and received an increase in the Available Supply Date from 20 rounds to 60 rounds of 105mm Howitzer ammunition during the period 12-30 June. The 48th Airborne Division Artillery Division had a total of 45,000 rounds of ammunition on hand that were suspended.

b. Support Battalion maintenance detachment received 56 automotive, 277 signal, 94 armament, 16 instrument, 2 quarter-master and 97 repairer job orders. All but 3 signal, 1 engine and 2 quarter-master jobs were completed. The shortage of spare parts for generators noted in previous reports still exists.

c. Ground Transportation: A total of one hundred and seventy 2½ ton truck requirements were filled during the operation.

d. Air Transportation:

(1) Fixed Wing: CV-2 aircraft supporting the Brigade flew 73 sorties for a total of 1,215 passengers and 166.6 short tons of cargo.

(2) Rotary Wing: Throughout the operation both UH-1D and CH-47 helicopters proved invaluable in aerial resupply operations of committed forces. Two UH-1D were placed in direct support of the Infantry Battalions and proved to be an extremely efficient method of providing tactical and administrative support to the units. The use of the CH-47 reduced the time required for resupply from that required by the UH-1D and released the HHIP's for support of tactical operations.

(3) Army aircraft lifted a total of 392.1 short tons of supplies in the forward area. Attached at Inclosure I is the daily aerial resupply tonnage by class of supply during Operation HATHCONE.

e. Other Services:

(1) Trove registration was provided by 113th Quartermaster Company, an element of the QM 10th Area Support Command.

(2) 112th Quartermaster Company provided a fuel unit in the 10th Area.

(3) Gunners and gunner's repair was initially deployed to the 10th Area. Used receipt of gunner's repair
parts, the unit was repaired and the Brigade received excellent service for the remainder of the operation.

3. (C) MEDICAL:
   a. The sanitation of mess halls, latrines and units areas required special emphasis to achieve minimum acceptable standards, however, health and hygiene remained excellent considering the operational environment. Two medical evacuation helicopters, not equipped with hoists, were made available to the Brigade. These proved unsatisfactory for extraction of seriously wounded personnel from mountainous or heavily forested terrain. Therefore, a request was made, and honored, for two Air Force CH-46 (seawolf) and two Marine CH-46 helicopters for this purpose.

   b. Patients Treated
      (1) MIA 212
      (2) Non-Battle Injury 172
      (3) Disease 311 (7 malaria)
      Total Treated 715
   c. Returned to duty 180
   d. Evacuated to hospital 202
   e. Remain in holding 13

   f. Hospitalized personnel (battle injuries) categorized by wounds are as follows:
      (1) Head 30
      (2) Chest 10
      (3) Upper extremities 68
      (4) Lower extremities 81
      (5) Abdomen 6
      (6) Neck 17
      TOTAL 212

4. SUMMARY:
   a. Supply operations were simplified by collocating the Forward Support Detachment, 11th IND Support Command and Brigade Support Battalion. Common supply points were used for Class I, II, and V support. Battalion, 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division provided Class II and IV supply.
   b. The Brigade made extensive use of the CH-46 helicopter for resupply. It proved a substantial increase in carrying capacity over that of OH-13 and therefore reduced time required for aerial resupply.
   c. Water supply in the 657 TO area was a problem initially because the 600 GPM hydrant did not function properly. A truck mounted 500 GPM hydrant was dismantled, brought forward from HANOI, reassembled. This equipment proved a trouble free, completely adequate supply of water.
   d. Hoist helicopters. Operations in mountainous and/or heavily forested terrain has placed increased reliance upon medical evacuation aircraft with a hoist capability.
5. (U) CONCLUSIONS:
   a. Duplication of effort reduced by collocating the Area Forward Support Detachment with the organic Forward Support Element.
   b. Plans for provision of MD-500E helicopters with a hoist capability must be made prior to an operation.
   c. CH-47 helicopters are invaluable in aerial resupply operations.

6. (U) RECOMMENDATIONS:
   a. Organic and Supporting logistical agencies continue to collocate in future operations.
   b. Provisions be made for MD-500 helicopters with a hoist capability to support the Brigade during future operations.
   c. CH-47 helicopters be made available for resupply missions during future operations.

1 incl.
Air Resupply Data - Operation HAMTHONE
### CONFIDENTIAL

**Inclusion 1 (Air Refueling Data - Operation IN.12.NE) to Inclusion 5 (Logistics) to After Action Report Operation IN.12.NE**

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**TOTAL**

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CONFIDENTIAL
Inclusion 6 (Communications) to Combat Operations After Action, Operation HATHOR.

1. (C) BACKGROUND

Operation H. HATHOR was conducted in the area north of Sin Yor, to disrupt and destroy NVA elements believed to be in the area. The Brigade signal elements provided the essential communications for the Brigade and terminated the system provided by the Corps signal units.

2. (C) OPERATIONS

a. WP Section - The Brigade WP was not committed until 12 June, when one system was installed to the Artillery Forward FDC. This system provided telephone communications to the forward artillery elements and also to adjacent infantry units.

b. Communication Center Section - A secure teletype circuit was operated between the Brigada and F FORCE V. This was supplemented by secure radio teletype circuits to the TAC, TAC MC, TAC KDS; and during the initial phases of the operation, FRCW and TAC MC.

c. Switchboard and Wire Sections - The wire section had a total of 56 miles of wire, 12 miles in the Brigade Special gun complex and 44 miles in long lines, all Central and West lines were undergrounded and all long lines overheaded. The switchboard terminated 62 common user circuits and an additional 12 sole user circuits were installed. This system provided telephone service to all units and facilities in the area and long distance trunks in the Corps area system.

d. FM Radio Section - Operated two FM nets to reduce the traffic on the Operation Intelligence FRA. Used automatic retransmission FM relay station at TAC KDS; relayed coordinates 2B.718957.

e. Maintenance Section - The number of FT-4-4 teletypewriters in support maintenance has become critical.

3. (C) PROBLEM/TYPE

a. Shortage of replacement personnel in the Wire, Switchboard, and Communication Center Sections is a serious problem. Communication Center personnel are especially critical because of the security clearance requirements.

b. Poor service on FM equipment burned outots of the /CC/104-3 Teletype Carrier Terminals and burned out several square meters of power in the /CC/104-8 Terminals. The reliability of the FT-79 Generators on hand is causing major problems. Only one of the twelve FT-79 Generators placed on priority requisition in November 1965 has been issued.

Improvisation of the WP terminal at the forward artillery location caused severe system outages. Closer coordination with supported units stressing the importance of proper siting will be made on future operations.

4. LESSONS LEARNED

a. When there are a large number of attachments to the Brigade, a second Operation Intelligence FRA will reduce traffic on the primary Operation Intelligence FRA, thus allowing operations. This second net can be created on the Central net frequency.

b. When an automatic retransmission FM relay station is being used during an operation and it is located in a central location, it should remain at this location through operations in the area to insure adequate communications to the combat elements.
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Enclosure 7 (Information) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation 'WEST UG.

1. (D) DUBAI INCIDENT:

2. The following civilian news correspondents visited the Brigade:

(1) David Snell - ABC News Team.
(2) Ron Fortier - ABC News Team.
(3) Frank Tally - ABC News Team.
(4) Kindle Deen - Chicago Daily News.
(6) AJ Chang - Associated Press.
(7) Joe Youngench - NBC News.
(9) Max Henry - CBS News.
(10) Ien Bradal - WFI.
(11) Udo Reich - CBS News Team.
(12) Bill Stout - CBS News Team.
(13) Claudie Billinger - CBS News Team.
(14) William J. Cook - Newsweek.
(16) Steve Van Meter - WFI.
(17) Jack Berlin - Stars and Stripes.
(18) Howard Parlin - ABC News Team.
(19) Ye Huyan - ABC News Team.
(20) Vl Giro - ABC News Team.
(21) Bill Molloy - WFI (radio)
(22) Art Zich - Time Magazine.
(23) Paul Newsell - Atlanta Journal.
(24) Bill Beccus - Charleston News and Courier.
(25) Nick Harrison - JP.
(26) Dee Crow - JP.
(27) Neil Hyde - TV Europe.
(28) Virginia Prulliner - WFI.

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Inclusion 7 (Information) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation TAWWAR

(20) Gen. R. Ewell - NBC News Team.
(22) Gen. C. D. Shanks - NBC News Team.
(23) Vo Sun - NBC News Team.

b. The following military correspondents visited the brigade:
(1) Sgt. Leland - IVN.
(2) Sgt. Wallace - IVN.

a. Major publicity was obtained concerning the brigade's activities to include all television networks, wire services, and newspapers throughout the Free World.

4. (U) Capt. Just (Washington Post) was wounded by grenade fragments and was evacuated to NE JAP.

b. The Information Office obtained electrical lighting and press tent during this operation.

c. Photographing personnel were improved through the use of the 11x17 dark room.

2. (U) Correct Information.

c. The receipt and distribution of correct information by newspapers continued to be generally poor. This is a problem under continuous study for improvement.

5. (U) Correct Information. The Diplomat & Warrior was published by letterpress for the first time during Operation TAWWAR.

3. (U) Security. Public exposure of the brigade continued to improve with a significant increase in the percentage of copy released and subsequently printed.
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1. (U) **Psychological Objective**: Psychological warfare activities were oriented and directed toward enemy units in the operational area.

2. **Operation Summary**:

3. **Leaflets**: A total of 6,013,000 leaflets of the type indicated were dropped on the dates shown.

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<th>Method</th>
<th>Number</th>
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### Inclusions (Tactical) Footnotes to Combat Operations 'Interception Report

**June 13**

- **U-10**
  - 123,000
  - F-33 Stuarts
  - 15,000
  - Chico Field
  - 10,000
  - Do Operations
  - 70,000
  - Triple Strike
  - 20,000
  - Do Conduct Pass

**June 14**

- **U-10**
  - 40,000
  - Chico Field
  - 20,000
  - Triple Strike
  - 200,000
  - Do Operations

**June 15**

- **U-10**
  - 40,000
  - Do Conduct Pass
  - 300,000
  - Chico Field
  - 50,000
  - Do Conduct Pass

**June 16**

- **U-10**
  - 100,000
  - Do Conduct Pass
  - 10,000
  - Do Conduct Pass

**June 17**

- **U-10**
  - 200,000
  - Do Operations

**June 18**

- **C-47**
  - 200,000
  - Do Operations
  - 200,000
  - Do Operations

**June 19**

- **C-47**
  - 200,000
  - Do Operations
  - 200,000
  - Do Operations
  - 200,000
  - Do Conduct Pass

**June 20**

- **U-10**
  - 10,000
  - Do Conduct Pass
  - 200,000
  - Chico Field
  - 200,000
  - Do Conduct Pass

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5. **Lessons Learned:**

- A total of 35 hours 45 minutes of combat sortie was flown by 132 U-10s and C-47 aircraft on 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, and 20th of June. The target of all sorties was Chico Field and do operations. All three special forces were hit during the operation.

- **Summary:** The 'personalized', 'specialized', 'and localized' sorties and three special forces were directed toward enemy units in the operational area (Inclusions 1 and 2). It is believed that large-scale operations, together with the high-visibility offensive nature of the tactical situation contributed extensively to the do operations of surviving enemy personnel. By the closing 20th of the operation, 30 July, 20 Sorties had surrendered themselves to Brigada. Personal.

6. **Lessons Learned:**

1. "Halt the sorties we produce, particularly specialized and localized, at least 150 copies of the translation should be included, in any mixture of course. These copies will be used as handouts to the visitors.

2. "Halt the sorties we produce, particularly specialized and localized, at least 150 copies of the translation should be included, in any mixture of course. These copies will be used as handouts to the visitors."

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Inclusions (Psychological Warfare) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation "CITY III".

(3) An unbreakable enciphered codeword should be slowly displayed on the outside of all locals' boxes (Example: TAO 2013, code number, general classification (Official, decommisioned, reason, "\(\_\_\)", etc).

(4) The Psychological Operations Officer should have a comprehensive up to date catalogue of locals available to him.

(5) An enumeration to the Brigade of one Pay Jr school trained officer and two III has been approved and personnel should be requisitioned and assigned on an expediency basis.

(6) The V-10 aircraft should be stationed at the Brigade CP.
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Incorporated into Combat Operations after Action Report, Operation

1. (C) Situation: 35th Artillery (Airborne), 1st Division. 1st Division

2. (C) Situation:

3. On 2 June, 31/20 Anti-Tank Artillery received 1538 hrs a request to

4. On 3 June, 31/20 Anti-Tank Artillery received 1538 hrs a request to

5. On 4 June, 31/20 Anti-Tank Artillery received 1538 hrs a request to

6. On 6 June, 31/20 Anti-Tank Artillery received 1538 hrs a request to

7. At 1900 hrs 6 June, 31/20 Anti-Tank Artillery received 1538 hrs a request to

8. On 8 June, 31/20 Anti-Tank Artillery received 1538 hrs a request to

9. On 11 June, 31/20 Anti-Tank Artillery received 1538 hrs a request to
Inclusion G (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation

1. (c) Supply and Ammunition: Originally the batteries deployed with (3) days' rations and a single load of ammunition. Batteries were re-supplied both by convoy and helicopter due to the tactical situation.

2. (c) Problem Areas:

a. Security of Main Supply Routes: In the initial phase of the operation, 27th Battalion (Airborne) 39th Artillery was forward committed to provide security for the battalion firing positions on the supply route from Dak to the battalion firing positions. After initial incident on the supply route it was decided to pull all the security elements in around the battalion firing positions every night to secure the road at night with a heavy program of VT fuse 155 fires. This scheme worked to be very effective for it not only prevented future firing incidents, but also allowed for greater security of the firing positions.

b. Security of Battery Firing Positions: It was found during the operation that a very close perimeter defense is essential to battery security. The perimeter should be far enough from the firing positions to prevent head on attacks from reaching the gun crews and yet close enough to permit a high degree of control of the perimeter forces in order to facilitate direct artillery fire against the enemy. During the NVA attack on 3 Battery, 27th Battalion (Airborne), 39th Artillery, the inability to locate the infantry security elements prevented the use of the explosive round. It is recommended that the security elements with the artillery be placed under the operational control of the artillery commander.

c. To Air, Artillery, Infantry Coordination: As in past operations of the coolness of this operation, unnecessary kills in the midst of artillery and To Air occurred. This can be attributed to many factors, some of which are: lack of control by the ground force commander, poor timing on the part of the artillery and To Air request, and communication difficulties. Upon completion of this operation all artillery LDM Specials and the artillery S-3 were assembled and this problem was discussed in detail. A detailed list of causes and recommended solutions is being prepared for discussion with all personnel concerned.

d. Misunderstanding of Artillery Ammunition: This is a subject that requires constant control supervision. Artillery handlers, if not properly supervised, will destroy ammunition. Helicopter lifts to rear-fire firing batteries are particularly dangerous to ammunition because of the speed with which loading and unloading must be accomplished. Damaged ammunition should be the cause of some of the muscle bursts that have occurred in RT.

3. (c) Lessons Learned:

e. Pull all of the security elements in and around the artillery firing positions at night and secure the area around the positions with heavy 155 fires.

f. It was found that by covering main supply routes with VT on the road and cloth (Q) on the sides of the road, main supply routes were more rapidly opened in the morning.

g. Surface Movement: Only one battery displacement during the entire operation was made by helicopter. All other displacements were overlaid routes. It was deemed that by using the available few vehicles within this battalion, Support B Battalion, 168th Infantry and the attached 155 prime were

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Inclusion 9 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation "KATORNE"

that all batteries could be moved overland expeditiously and without incident. The conclusion is that it is not necessary for this battalion to have prime movers for each howitzer as it was originally believed.
Inclusion 1 to Inclusion 9 Recap of Positions occupied and missions fired:

A Battery

30 May - 8 June 1966

POSITION: ZFO4222

Conducted: 55 Mls

- 2 Reg
- 112/rds
- 3 Targets of Opportunity

Expended: 28 LRD

8 June - 30 June 1966

POSITION: ZFO09346

Conducted: 186 Mls

- 3 Reg
- 1012/rds
- 30 Targets of Opportunity
- 6 III/Man's
- 6 Props
- 9 DF Cones
- 1 Screening Man

Expended: 5765 DEQ

B Battery

30 May - 3 June 1966

POSITION: ZFO14218

Conducted: 112 Mls

- 3 Reg
- 1312/rds
- 7 Targets of Opportunity

Expended: 605 DEQ

4 June - 20 June 1966

POSITION: ZBO9347

Conducted: 361 Mls

- 3 Reg
- 4312/rds
- 33 III
- 35 Prep
- 15 DF Cones
- 3 Screening Man's
- 30 Targets of Opportunity

Expended: 6738 DEQ

C Battery

1 June - 7 June 1966

POSITION: ZBO1528

Conducted: 66 Mls

- 3 Reg
- 912/rds

Expended: 776 HCQ

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Incloure 1 to Incloure 9. Kepp of Position's accorded and missions fired:

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<th>Position</th>
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20 May - 5 June 1955

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