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<td>Controlling DoD Organization: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.</td>
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<td>31 Aug 1978 per DoDD 5200.10 document marking; Adjutant General’s Office [Army] ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980</td>
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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY
MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

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TO: ACoF, J3
FROM: ACoF, J4
DATE: 21 SEP 66

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MAJ 42-SU (6 Sep 66)

1. The attached report has been reviewed and matters of interest to me have been noted.

2. Although no significant logistical problems developed during the operation, two items, dry cell batteries and grease, were reported as being difficult to obtain or as being in short supply (para 2a(2) & (3), Incl 4). There are no known or reported shortages of these items at the present time. No shortages of these items which would affect combat operations are anticipated.

3. The report contained a recommendation that medical evacuation helicopters be provided a reliable winch or hoist capability for extraction of casualties where landing zones are not available (para 16). Twenty litter devices, used in conjunction with the UH-1D helicopter equipped with a hoist, are now being evaluated in-country by ACTIV. If proved satisfactory, this will provide a capability for extracting casualties where no landing zone is available.

4. The report also contained a statement that PE 75 generators should be replaced (para 3, Incl 6). PE 75 generators are being replaced as a part of the generator standardization program. The replacement generator is the 3 KW 60 cycle mil std generator. None of these generators are in stock. Thirteen hundred are programmed in, however, no anticipated delivery date is available at this time. This quantity includes requirements for the replacement program, maintenance float and depot stock.

5. These comments relative to reported logistical problems and equipment recommendations have been provided as a matter of information.

ACSFOR

19 OCT RD 66X098

DOWN GRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

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After Action Report - 1st Brigade
101st Airborne Division

To MACPD
J4

FROM ACoS, J3
LTC Grezaffi/ejc/40882

DATE 0881
CMT 1

1. The attached after action report is forwarded for action deemed appropriate. Your attention is invited to paragraph 16 of the report.

2. Request J4 return the attached report to J34 for file.

J. C. F. TILLSON III
Maj Gen, USA
ACoS, J3

1 Incl
as

DOWADMITTEDTOUNCLASSIFIEDWHENSEPARATED
FROMCLASSIFIEDENCLOSURE
1. (U) Name of Operation: Operation FILLMORE.

2. (U) Date of Operation: 25 March - 21 July 1966. The entire Brigade was involved in phase I of the operation covering the period 25 March through 8 April. Beginning 7 April, the Brigade (-) was withdrawn from the operation and TF 2/327 Infantry continued on Operation FILLMORE under the operational control of 2/327 Infantry. This report covers the period 25 March through 8 April 1966.


4. (C) Commanding Officers: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.


6. (C) Task Organization:

- 1/327 Inf
  - Ta, 3d BN

- 2/327 Inf
  - Demo Ta, A 326 Engr
  - B 2/327 Infantry
  - A 326 Engr
  - Ta, 3d BN

- 3/327 Arty
  - A 1/30 Art (CSSCO)

- 5/27 Arty (-)

7. (C) Supporting Forces:

- 2/320 Arty: Deployed in a direct support role.
b. 5/27 Arty (-): Provided general supporting fires during the operation.

c. 1/30 Arty (COMPO): Provided general support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

d. 6th Cav, 2d Plt, 25th Arty (Gunsight) (COMPO): Provided effective on-call illumination from several locations during the operation.

e. 10th Air Arm Br: Provided two light air-mobile companies in general support of the operation. These helicopters flew troop lifts and combat service support lifts to maneuver and fire support units. CH-47 helicopters were provided on a mission support basis for use in dispensing and resupplying supplies.

f. 7th Air Div, USARC: Flown 85 Tactical Air missions totalling 197 sorties. Of these sorties, six were immediate strikes requested through the Air Force Direct Air Request unit. Average response time for immediate strikes was twenty minutes from the initial request until time over target. The total of the above missions accounted for 25 structures destroyed, 31 structures damaged and 11 secondary explosions. In all instances the Tactical Air Support rendered was responsive and accurately delivered.

g. Strategic Air Command, USAF: Flown one B-52 mission in support of the operation.

h. 56th Medq. (Air-mobile): Provided responsive, rapid evacuation support to the area throughout the operation.

i. (U) Intelligence: See Inclosure 2, Intelligence.

9. (C) Mission: Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam directed that the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division secure and protect the rice harvest north and northeast of Tuy Hoa while continuing to locate, fix and destroy the remaining elements of the 9th NVA Regiment, 3d Viet Cong Main Force Regiment and local Viet Cong forces.

10. (C) Concept of Operations: The concept on the first phase of the operation was to have one battalion secure and protect the rice harvest, while two battalions conducted searches and destroy operations in the area.

11. (C) Execution: Operation FLINGES began without interruption, following the termination of Operation HICON. Brigade units were already deployed in the operational area. The 2/327 Inf continued operations east of 32.0° N, while the 2/327 Inf and 2/502 Inf continued operations in the central 30.0° N, rice crop and in the mountains south of 31.0° N. On 26 March, one company from the 2/327 Inf and one battery from the 2/502 Inf were conducted in highland country over the mountains from the south. The 1/327 Inf moved by tactical motor march to Tuy Hoa South Airfield on 27 March and resumed a mission as the Brigade and I Field Force reserve. The 2/327 Inf continued operation patrolling in the central rice crop, and began exploitation of the B-52 strikes in the southern mountains with one company (Company G, 2/327 Inf). The 2/502 Inf continued to operate in the mountains north of the B-52 strikes, and remained prepared to assist in the exploitation. Company B, 2/327 Inf completed the exploitation operation on 20 March when it attacked link-up with elements of the 2/502 Inf after having completely traversed the mountain range from south to north without enemy contact. The 2/502 Inf then began operations through the mountains south of Tuy Hoa with the aim of stopping actions in Highway 1. On 31 March, the 2/327 Inf moved north by tactical motor march on Highway 1.
CONFIDENTIAL

17 August 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation F occult

(Operation CSS CV-32) to an operational area near TUY No., north of TUY No., and begin search and destroy operations. The 1/327 Inf begins deployment from TUY No. South airfield to its next operational area near DUC TIE, with the air movement of one company by CV-2 aircraft during the night of 2 April.

During the day, the 2/327 Inf moved by helicopter water march to an area north of TUY No. to commence patrolling and search and destroy operations to protect the rice harvest in that vicinity. The 2/327 Inf, after completing its sweep to Highway 2, conducted a tactical water march to TUY No. South airfield where it assumed the mission of Brigade and 1 FARRRN reserve from the 1/327 Inf. A second company from the 1/327 Inf conducted a night air movement to DUC TIE by CV-2 aircraft on 3 April and immediately deployed to the south end east toward the mountainous plateau.

On 4 April, the 2/327 Inf conducted an airborne assault with one company, south of blocking positions occupied by elements of the 1/327 Inf, and then swept toward the 1/327 Inf with no enemy contact. Then one company from the 1/327 Inf made contact with an estimated Viet Cong company southeast of DUC TIE on 7 April, the remainder of the 1/327 Inf was committed to the attack on the engagement by helicopter assault in an attempt to secure the Viet Cong force. The engagements lasted throughout the day until the Viet Cong force withdrew suffering heavy casualties. The Brigade, minus 2/327 Inf, deployed to the northwest on 7 April and 8 April. On 9 April, the 2/327 Inf was detached from the Brigade and continued on Operation F occult under the operational control of 1 FARRRN.

12. (C) Results:

a. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division accomplished its mission to locate, fix and destroy Viet Cong forces in the TUY No. area and was successful in protecting the rice harvest north of TUY No.

b. Losses inflicted on the enemy during Phase I of Operation F occult included the following: 122 VC KI. (EC), 77 VC KI. (Jest), 12 VC KI. (RV), 130 WIA, 15 WIA, 1 killed, and 32 individual and crew served weapons captured. In addition, large amounts of supplies and equipment were captured or destroyed. (See Inclusion 2).

c. Friendly losses during the period included the following: 8 KI., 67 WIA.

13. (C) Administrative Matters:

a. Personnel and Administration: See Inclusion 1, Personnel and Administration.

b. Logistic: See Inclusion 4, Logistics.

14. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques: In one battalion, each of the companies formed a heliport and functioned as any functioned well and executed air movements.

Commander's Analysis:

a. Lessons Learned:

(1) The use of slings and nets in helicopter resupply was effective and reduced the time the helicopter was required to spend on the ground.

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17 August 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation PHILADELPHIA (Room 13-34)

(2) Periodic spraying of the area with DDT, utilizing a modified 1108/10 vehicle, was effective in suppressing insects.

b. Highlights of Operations:

(1) In an effort to obtain maximum effectiveness with Psychological Warfare, wounded NVA captives were given immediate medical attention. They were fed, given cigarettes, and were well treated. Photographs were taken of the prisoners while they were receiving this treatment with the intention of distributing the photographs throughout the operational area and among the civilian populace. In addition, Psychological Warfare teams were deployed using themes based on interrogations and discussions with the captives. The photographs were never reproduced, and small and not delivered until the Brigadier General was requested. The treas were ineffective when finally broadcast because of the altitude of the broadcast aircraft and insufficient amplification. Psychological Warfare can be a powerful tool for the commander, but in order for its full potential to be realized, the psychological detachment must be responsive to the Commander's requirements.

(2) In some areas units encountered extreme difficulty in extracting casualties because of a lack of suitable landing zones. Construction of landing zones was impractical in terrain where the jungle canopy frequently reached 100 feet or more in height. A solution, which met with success, was the use of USAF rescue helicopters which had a hoist capability. It was either to locate or construct a gap in the jungle canopy, large enough to allow extraction with a hoist from a hovering helicopter, that it would have been to construct landing zones large enough to accommodate a UH-1D aircraft.

16. (c) Recommendations:

b. That medical evacuation helicopters be provided with a reliable winch or hoist capability to enable extraction of casualties from areas where landing zones are not available.

Inclusions:

1. Personnel and Administration
2. Intelligence
3. Operations Schematic
4. Logistics
5. Civic Action
6. Communications
7. Artillery
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ATFD-C

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation PHILIPPINES
(RCS: NCAV J3-32)

Distribution:
1 - Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army
   Washington, DC 20004
1 - CC, USAYOC (ATTN: G320-40)
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5 - CDR, USJN (ATTN: HIC Historical Division)
2 - CC, I FORSCY
2 - CDR, 101st Abn Div, Ft Campbell, Ky
1 - G5
1 - G4
1 - G3
1 - G2
1 - J3
1 - J1
1 - JS
1 - A1
1 - J0
1 - JS
1 - JG

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Inclusion 1 (Personal and Administration) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FILLMORE.

1. (C) Unit Strength:

   a. The Brigade personnel strengths at the start of Operation Fillmore

      | Unit Strength | 4606 |
      | Assigned      | 4606 |
      | Present for Duty | 4373 |
      | Not Present for Duty | 172 |
      | Airfield       | 3369 |
      | Base Camp      | 921 |

   b. The assigned strength was 107% of the augmented authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 92% of the augmented authorized strength.

   c. Of the Not Present for Duty strength, 39% were hospitalized personnel. Because of casualties, CAS losses, and the number of personnel remaining in a hospitalized status, rifle company strengths were reduced during the period. Additional rifle company strength was obtained by the end of the operation by returning personnel assigned to provisional units to their parent units, reducing rifle company strength to the minimum, and through receipt of replacement personnel.

   The Brigade received 5 ARVN NCO interpreters during the period; 20 interpreters and 2 LING's were also attached to the Brigade.

2. (C) Casualties:

   Casualties for the operation were as follows:

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<th>WIA</th>
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<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>2/327th</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
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<td>2/320th</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>59</td>
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</table>

3. (C) Personnel Program: Various personnel programs were initiated during this operation.

   a. Safety Program: "Stay Alert and Stay Alive" Messages were disseminated to all units summarizing each accident in the Brigade. The purpose of the program is to reduce loss of lives and material damage.

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Inclusion 1(Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FILLMORE (contd)

caused by carelessness. Each message contains a "lesson learned". These messages are widely disseminated and are discussed at commanders conferences. Units involved in the accident are designated in the message. The messages are distributed in TIC format to gain attention.

b. Pay Program: A letter was published and disseminated on "Monthly Pay". The intent was to encourage the use of savings bonds and savings allotments by Brigade personnel. This program was intended not only to provide an added service to the troops (by saving the cost of money orders and speeding delivery of the funds) but also was designed to remove surplus funds from the forward area, thereby reducing the possibilities of loss, theft, etc. Commanders were requested to encourage all personnel to use this service. This program coincided with the Savings Bond Drive.

c. Personnel Services: To provide necessary personnel services to troops in the field, ST teams continued to periodically visit units—normally once a week—to sell money orders, rectify any discrepancies, provide legal assistance, and to keep personnel records current. Red Cross representatives also accompanied the ST teams to offer assistance in personal matters. In addition, a "Personnel Services Center" was established in the forward area on a permanent basis to provide services throughout the month.

d. Immediate Recognition for Valor: A program of citing personnel in Brigade General Orders for valor in combat progressed during the period. Purpose of this program is to provide immediate recognition of valorous acts, thereby boosting morale and providing greater incentive. Copies of these orders are provided to individuals, placed in their official files, and serve as a check list on the subsequent submission of awards. The program was well received by the unit commanders.

l. (U) Personnel Planning. Planning was initiated during the period in the following areas:

a. Centralized administration of officers' and noncommissioned officers' messes at the Base Camp area under the supervision of the Deputy Installation Coordinator.

b. Establishment of a formalized program of activities to be conducted by the three newly arrived Red Cross girls. Program will include crafts and hobbies activities and visits to units for distribution of literature.

c. Comprehensive water safety program.

d. Compilation of a Command Statistics Book which indicates, by month, statistical data covering various areas of personnel interest such as savings program, IG complaints, criminal offenses, AWOLs, courts martial, reenlistments, malaria, etc.

e. Personal letters to be sent to the next of kin of all newly assigned personnel within the first seven days of arrival. These letters will be signed by the commanding general and include a picture of each man.

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f. Personal letters from the commanding general to be sent to personnel of the command wounded in action.

3. (U) Problem Areas. Problem areas encountered during the reporting period included the following:

a. Recommendations for awards of the Purple Heart submitted as long ago as October 1965 have not been acted upon. Merit files have been screened and the necessary data provided to USARV. To overcome this difficulty in the future, the "flag" requested and obtained authority to award the Purple Heart.

b. Orders on personnel evacuated through medical channels are seldom received directly. As a result, personnel continued to be maintained on strength after departure from Vietnam. USARV appraised of problem and it is under review.

c. Morale. Morale remained "Excellent" throughout the period.
Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FILIGREE

1. (C) Terrain: The terrain in the area of operations consisted of heavily jungled mountains in the west around DOO #24, and flat sandy beaches along the coast. Numerous LZ's were available throughout the area. Observation and fields of fire were generally limited or non-existent in the mountainous jungle, but ranged from fair to poor throughout the remainder of the area. Power and concealment varied from good to excellent in the jungle, but only from poor to fair elsewhere. Principal avenues of approach were the KILO River from the north, the GI River and Highway 1 from the north. In general, the predominate open terrain prevented the enemy from observing and restricted his movement during daylight hours. Vehicular movement was possible only in the flatlands and was further restricted to the existing road net. Fort movement was possible in all areas but was restricted by the jungle and the flooded river.

2. (C) Weather: The weather in the area of operations was characterized by the transition from the TI to SB monsoons. There was very little ground fog, and cloud cover occurred only during early morning and late evening. Weather had little or no effect on enemy operations. The relatively clear weather favored the use of helicopters and visual airdrop resupply.

3. (C) Enemy Dispositions: Initially the third inter-Provincial Headquarters and the 6th BN, 95th BN Regt were located west of TUN A, and two (2) unidentified, unconfirmed battalions were reported to be in the vicinity of DOO #24. The 4th and 5th Battalions of the 95th BN Regt were reported to be in the KILO area, 1500 yards south of TUN A. Significant enemy displacement was noted as a result of US operations around the DOO #24, TUN A, and DOO #25 areas.

4. (C) Results:
   a. Order of Battle:
      (1) Units identified by WAC:
         28th Co Sig Cs, 95th BN Regt.
         19th Co Sig Cs, 95th BN Regt.
         21st Co Sig Cs, 95th BN Regt.
         377th En, 2377 Co, 85th Provincial En.
         600 Co A-2, 25th BN Regt.
         3rd Co A-3, 25th BN Regt.
         1-1-1, Guad, 51st BN Regt.
      (2) No new units were identified by documents during Operation FILIGREE.
      (3) WAC reported that the 95th BN Regt was at approximately 50% strength with very few mortars.
      (4) One squad of SNU NCO District local guerrillas surrendered with weapons.
   b. WAC equipment losses:
      (1) Weapon Captured:
         a. United States Manufactured:
            Shorty, 12 ga...
            Rifle, .30-06, 12...
            Machine Gun, .50...
            Submachine Gun, .45...
            Submachine Gun, .45...
            submachine gun, .45...
            submachine gun, .45...
AVBD-B

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Inclusion 2 (Intelligence to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation FLINTOCK)

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<td>Rifle, Kusan 91, cal 7.9mm</td>
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<td>(c) Italian manufactured:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rifle, M1926, cal 7.62mm</td>
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(2) Food:
- Rice destroyed: 34 tons
- Corn destroyed: 4 tons

(3) Camps or Buildings Destroyed (unless noted):
- Structures destroyed: 69
- Structures damaged: 27

(4) Signal Equipment (damaged beyond repair):
- Mk-1
- Mk-6
- Loudspeaker

(5) Munitions and Equipment:
- Grenades (various types): 600
- Grenade launcher

(6) Miscellaneous:
- Liquefies
- Living in china
- Dynamite
- Other:
- Medical supplies
- Uniforms
- Documents

5. (c) Significant VC Numperg: and Impact:
   a. 201034/1943/1943 - captured 3 wounded VC. On VC
      was from 19th Co. 95th NVN. 6th Co. 4th. VC had been due to NVA's losses.
   b. 201034/1943/1943 - L/D 7 tons rice with estimated VC 20 resulting in 23 VC KIA during extraction.
   c. 201034/1943/1943 - L/D 7 tons rice with estimated VC 20 resulting in 3 VC KIA (NC) prior to extraction.
   d. 201034/1943/1943 - L/D 7 tons rice with estimated VC 20 resulting in 15-20 VC, was forced to extract.
   e. 071202/1943/1943 - 071202/1943/1943 - 2/27 Inf caught 7 VC Co
      (or/identified in the 3rd Co, 4th NVN resulting in 28 VC KIA (NC),
      a couple and 800 grenades captured.

6. (c) Significant VC Numperg: and Impact in the Area of
   Development:
   a. Contacted and reinforcing Viet Cong units in the area south
      of western grid line 60 and north of western grid line 60, estimated
      of approximately 2,000 personnel. Assumed into a total of one NVA force
      battalion, one NVN battalion, two high NVA force battalions, two separate
      companies and ten separate platoons.

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Incleaure 2 (Intelligence) t Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation "LUMBER"

b. Viet Cong unconfirmed reinforcing capability consisted of two Regular Force battalions with a total strength of 750 personnel.

c. Disposition of Viet Cong committed units (Confirmed):

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<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
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| 6th Bn, 25th Inf Rgt | O019661 | 21 Mar 66 | 300 (Orig) | 4-02 mort, 2-02S | 1-145
| 85th F | O021755 | 26 Mar 66 | 400 (Orig) | 1-60 mort, 1-145, 1-132 |
| 2d AVN Rgt | Vic O01966 | 21 Mar 66 | 160 (Combined) | 12-15, Unknown |

d. Disposition of Viet Cong committed units (Unconfirmed, possible):

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Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation FALLTAPA.

1. (c) SUPPORT DEPARTMENT:

a. Support Battalion.

(1) Headquarters Detachment: Provided command and control for Support Battalion (Forward). It was organized into a command, operations, communications, and movements control section.

(2) Supply Detachment: It was responsible for the receipt, storage, and issue of all classes of supply. It also provided a parachute repair section.

(3) Maintenance Detachment: Provided a repair capability for small arms, artillery, engineering, automotive and signal equipment. It was organized into a shop office, a recovery and a contact team.

(4) Medical Company (-): A clearing station was established with a twenty-bed capacity, a surgical section, a holding section, an emergency treatment section, and dental section.

b. Supporting Forces:

(1) Forward Support Detachment, USA 24th Support Command; Provided area logistics support for all units participating in Falltapa. This element was extremely effective and responsive throughout the operation.

(2) I37th Aviation Company: Provided CH-47 aircraft to transport supplies, repair parts, and personnel to and from the forward area.

(3) I47th Aviation Company (Airtame) provided three CH-47 helicopters.

(4) I70th Aviation Company: Provided medical air evacuation throughout the operation.

2. (c) 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION:

a. Supply: Forward Support Detachment, USA 24th Support Command provided supply point distribution to Support Battalion, which in turn provided supply point distribution to Brigade units.

(1) Class I: "M" ration meals and meal, Combat, Individual were consumed during the operation. Supplements to the "M" ration, consisting of fresh meat, bread, and cold vegetables were issued daily. A five day stock level of meal, Combat, Individual was maintained by the USA 24th Support Detachment and Support Battalion supply point. There were 202 short tons of "M" rations and 37 short tons of meal, Combat, Individual issued.

(2) Class II & IV: The Support Battalion (rear), USA 24th provided class II & IV items. 15 short tons were issued during the operation. Certain dry cold batteries remained difficult to obtain.

(3) Class III: The USA 24th Forward Support Detachment provided all types of class III items. 90 short tons of PTO were issued during the operation, to include 13,000 gallons (60,000, 5,500 gallons Hydro, and 1,000 gallons F.O.S., oils were plentiful, grease was in short supply, but did not affect Brigade operations.

(4) Class VI: 232 short tons were issued. The Brigade entered the operation with its base load. The Forward Support Detachment, USA 24th Support Command, maintained a 15 day stock level. Support Battalion authenticated transportation orders and the Forward Support Detachment, USA 24th Support Command received, stored, and issued all ammunition. The
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Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation FILLME

The entire basic load for one infantry battalion and one artillery battery was hauled and palletized in the Brigade Class I supply point for immediate deployment with the Brigade reserve.

b. Maintenance: The Support Battalion maintenance detachment processed 27 automotive, 37 signal, 27 ammunition, 37 instrument, and 23 ammunition job orders. All but a automotive, 3 signal, 1 instrument, and 1 ammunition job were completed.

c. Transportation:

(1) Ground Transportation: The 2.5 ton trucks of Support Battalion were used on 153 missions.

(2) Air Transportation:

(a) Fixed Wing: The two CH-21's supporting the Brigade flew 113 sorties and carried a total of 926 PDS and 127 short tons of cargo.

(b) Rotary Wing: (Helicopter resupply)

1 UH-1D helicopters were used extensively to resupply committed forces.

2. Use of slings and nets was a particularly effective method of resupply, reducing aircraft ground time for loading and off loading to a minimum.

Helicopters lifted a total of 112 short tons of supplies in support of the Brigade. Attached as Inclosure 1 is the resupply tonnage by class of supply.

d. Other Services:

(1) Graves Registration was provided by 148th Quartermaster Company.

(2) Bath: 148th Quartermaster Company provided a bath unit via TUY HGA.

(3) Laundry: 148th Quartermaster Company provided laundry service.

3. (b)衛生

a. The sanitation of mess halls, latrines and unit areas was good. Health and hygiene were at a high level. Unit areas were sprayed with a mixture of 20% by 33% liquid vehicles, converted for spray purposes, to suppress insects.

b. Patients treated:

(1) ULA 61
(2) Non-Battle Injury 95
(3) Disease 457 (33 malaria)

Total Treated 613

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Inclusion 1: (Logistics) to Combat Operation After Action Report,

(5) Returned to duty 412
(6) Evacuated to hospital 194
(7) Remain in holding 6

The hospitalized personnel are categorized by wounds

(2) Head 5
(3) Chest 7
(4) Abdomen 2
(5) Upper extremities 21
(6) Lower extremities 21
(6) Back 5

- (C) OPERATIONS: No significant logistical problems developed during the operation. The Forward Support Detachment, 1st TAC, Support Command provided excellent support.

- (C) CONCLUSION: Slinging and nets provide the best and most rapid means of resupply.
Inclosure 5 (Civic Action) to Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation FILIGRE

1. (U) In the category of Health and Sanitation a total of 1,910 Vietnamese were treated by Brigade medical personnel. The conduct of the 1st Brigade during the two prior operations seemed to convince the people that we were there to help them, and explains the large attendance at Brigade sponsored sick calls.

2. (U) Repairing roads and bridges turned out to be the major project during the operation. A total of 88 kilometers were repaired along National Route 1 and Interprovincial Route 7 by Co A/326 Engr.

3. (U) Transportation continued to be provided for the rice harvest. Along with transporting workers to and from the harvest, the 1/327 Inf gave food and medical treatment to approximately 100 refugees and assisted in their relocation to the District Headquarters.

4. (U) In the "Back to the Village" campaign, designed to return refugees back to their former homes after clearing the rear of Viet Cong, the 1st Brigade assisted by repairing roads and bridges, and by providing security for the movement of the refugees.

5. (U) On 7 April, thirty-two US weapons, captured from the Viet Cong and restored, were presented to the province Chief for use in RF/FP units.
1. Background:
   The Brigade Signal elements had the mission of providing internal communications in support of Brigade tactical operations. The signal elements installed, operated, and maintained the Brigade Communication Center, the Brigade Switch Board, and the Brigade Switch Board and wire system. Voice circuits were installed, when possible, to subordinate units within the Brigade, primarily to the Infantry Battalions' train areas.

2. Operations:
   a. VHF Section - Provided 4 telephone circuits to the 2/320 T.G CP and telephone circuits to the 2/327 T.G CP, tying those lines in with both Brigade Headquarters and the Brigade area system.
   b. Communications Center Section - Terminated on secure teletype circuits from 1 FR-22 and audio and all messages received by supporting NCP radio teletype terminals. Provided radio service to the T.G CPs.
   c. Switchboard and Wire Section - Provided area support including lines to both the battalion forward and rear elements, all subordinate supporting, and adjacent units. The switchboard terminated 47 circuits user subscribers.
   d. Antenna Section - Operated a secure retransmission relay station on Hill 391 and Brigade Operations Intelligence Net and Brigade Administration Logistic Net. There were no difficulties encountered.
   e. Maintenance Section - PE-75 Generators required considerable maintenance.

3. Lesson Learned:
   Need replacements for PE-75 Generators.
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Inclosure 7 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FILLARE

1. (G) Background: The 2nd Bn, 320th Artillery (105 mm) (Airborne), attached to 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, provided direct support to the Battle in all phases of Operation FILLARE. Reinforcing fires were furnished by Btry "B", 1st Bn, 30th Arty (155 mm towed).

2. (G) Summary of Operations:

a. Initial displacement in this operation was that of Btry "B" to area TURNOAD, coord CQ166140, to furnish support to the 2/327 Inf En operating in area TURNOAD and along rds QR6L, Btry "B" displaced to area TURNOAD by CH-47 helicopter with movement commencing at 2615 hrs Mar 66 and closing at 2715 hrs Mar 66. The En (-) and Btry "C", 1/30 Arty remained in firing position via coord CQ0485 with the En Bn cp at Tuy Hoa North Airfield coord CQ13560. On 29 hrs Btry "C" rejoined the Bn at coord CQ3655, again moving by CH-47 and closing 291745 hrs Mar 66.

b. While in the above positions the En fired extensive H&I fires nightly to assist in the psy-war concentration and surrender program conducted by the Brigade. A recapitulation of missions fired, ammunition expended, and results achieved is at Inclosure 2.

c. On the 7/02 Inf pushed east, Btry "C" was displaced to coord CQ199340, closing 311135 hrs Mar 66 to insure continuous support to the Infantry.

d. On 1 Apr Btry "C" displaced to Tuy Hoa North Airfield, coord CQ153485 closing 011515 hrs Apr 66 in preparation for movement by CV-2 left to Dong Tra, coord B199693, and closing there 021230 hrs Apr 66. From that position Btry "C" furnished direct support to 1/327 Inf Bn and CIDG Forces (Dong Tra) during joint Bn operations conducted in Dong Tra area.

e. On 2 Apr 66, the En (- Btry (-)) commenced displacement to firing positions via coord CQ135653, Tuy Hoa. Btry "C" 2/320th Arty and 1 plt of Btry "C" 1/30 Arty furnished fire support for this rear movement to firing positions via coord CQ136583. The En (-) and Btry "B" 1/30 Arty were closed Tuy in exec. by 031350 hrs Apr 66 where continuous direct support was furnished to 2/327 Inf operating in area CRAWFORD and in extensive H&I program carried out. The attached aerolight action was replaced via coord CQ135583 with Btry "C" but had very limited use due to lack of suitable targets.

f. On 7 Apr 66 the En commenced movement to close back in Tuy Hoa area in preparation for movement to NF OPORD 84-66.
Incluoure 1 (Positions Occupied) to Inclusion 7 (Artillery) to Combat Operations
After Action Report, Operation FILLMORE

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1-7-1
Inclusion 2 (Summary of Missions Fired) to Inclusion 7 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FILLMORE.

MISSIONS FIRED

1. Total No of missions fired: 1314.
2. Total No of rounds expended: 9364.
3. Total No of registrations conducted: 33.
4. Total No of NCI missions fired: 1091.
5. Total No of rounds expended on NCI's: 5346.

Incidence:
- 57 VC KIA (Killed in Action)
- 2 VC KIA
- 16 NVA or sniper silenced
- 1 Building destroyed
- 1 Village left burning
- 1 Secondary explosion

On 29 Mar 66 Major General Critz fired the BM's 75,000 rd at "A" Btry location.