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AGAM-P (M) FOR OT RD 682121

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

This document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U. S. C., sections 793 and 794. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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  US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
  101st Airborne Division Artillery
Joint Action Control Office
USAF Air Ground Operations School
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 101st Airborne Division Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOX-65 (I.I)

1. Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

   a. Narrative of significant unit activities:

      (1) On February 1st, the day following the enemy TET offensive against the Bien Hoa area, Division Artillery began enlarging its communications capability in preparation for the Division's take over of the AO immediately surrounding Bien Hoa Air Base.

      (2) All subordinate units were in their normal direct support missions, however, the 1st Battalion 321st Artillery was in the I CT, supporting the 2d Brigade which was OPCON to the 1st Air Cavalry Division. The battalion was initially positioned at LZ El Paso, vicinity of grid 115 S12 159, near Phu Bai. The 2d Battalion 320th Artillery was supporting the 1st Brigade in Operation San Angelo at Song Be. Battery A, 2d Battalion 11th Artillery was in direct support of the 17th Cavalry in Operation San Angelo and was primarily used for base camp defense in that area. Battery A, 2d Battalion 11th Artillery was GS-R to Division Forces in the Operation San Angelo area.

      (3) At 1200 hours on 2 February 1968 the 101st Airborne Division Artillery assumed the mission of coordinating and clearing fires in AO Uniontown center and north as the Division assumed responsibility for these AO's. B/2/320 Arty displaced from Song Be to Tan Son Nhut AFB to provide support.
for defense of that area. The battery eventually moved to Cat Lai but was placed in a position that could not completely cover the supported unit (2/327 Abn Inf). No artillery headquarters was immediately available to this TF for supervision and coordination of artillery available to the TF.

(4) The 2d Battalion 319th Artillery continued its mission of Direct Support to the 3d Brigade with batteries at FSBs Meene, Nashua, and at Phuoc Vinh.

(5) C/2/320 moved to Bien Hoa to replace B Battery on 4 February. B/2/320 returned to FSB Hotel, northeast of Bien Hoa and C/2/320 moved north to FSB Concord in order to provide more fire support north of the Dong Nai River. 2/320 Arty was alerted for movement to the I CTZ as part of a Brigade TF. One platoon was detached from A/2/11 at Song Be by II FPV Arty.

(6) The 2/11 Arty (-) was attached to 101st Abn Div Arty on 7 February and Battery A eventually moved to the Bien Hoa area.

(7) Bien Hoa AB was rocketed at 110005 February 1968 and 180006 February 1968. The counter-rocket program was fired until helicopters were on station. Again, on 28 February, Bien Hoa and Phuoc Vinh came under heavy rocket attack. Large secondary explosions were observed as a result of counter-rocket fire in the Bien Hoa area.

(8) Selected personnel from all Division Artillery units received five days of FADAC training at 1st Infantry Division Artillery at Phu Loi from 17-23 February 1968. FADACs were issued to 2/319, 1/321 and HHB Div Arty on 9 February 1968. In addition, the personnel from all artillery with the Division received COFRAK orientation from training teams from Ft. Sill.

(9) Operation Manchester terminated on 18 February and the 3d Bde assumed responsibility for operations in the Song Be area and Uniontown north.

(10) Phuoc Vinh came under several intense mortar and rocket attacks during the early part of February with resultant insignificant damage.

(11) For the remainder of February, the 1/321 Artillery supported 2d Brigade operations north of Hue along QL 1 and eventually moved to LZ Sally, vicinity of grid YD 639 272.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 101st Airborne Division Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(12) The 2/320 continued to support the 1st Brigade, arriving in battalion TF increments, in the defense of Hue and vicinity. However, due to lack of aircraft, the Battalion Headquarters of the 2/320 took almost two weeks to displace and could not assume command and control of the firing batteries until 1 March. This lack of control presented problems for the firing batteries, especially in logistics.

(13) The 2d Battalion, 321st Artillery arrived in RVN as the direct support battalion for the 3d Brigade, 82 Airborne Division. This Brigade is currently OPCON to the 101st Airborne Division. The artillery battalion received its orientation training in the Chu Lai area and then road marched to the Hue - Phu Bai area where they have remained.

(14) Since a shake down period in which the battalion overcame the normal problems of a new unit, it has performed its mission in an excellent manner. The firing batteries have been successfully moved by air and road throughout the AO, providing excellent support to maneuver elements.

(15) One of the most significant artillery actions to date took place in the AO of B/2/506 Infantry on 1 March 1968. Five batteries were coordinated by the Div Arty FDC in response to an attack on night defensive positions of B/2/506. Illumination and HE was employed from 0400 until daylight in coordination with forward observer spotterings and the TPS-25 radar. At daylight, 22 KIA(BC) and one PW were found.

(16) On 4 March, Bien Hoa and Phuoc Vinh came under heavy rocket attack again and an increased number of radar sightings were noted around FSB Concord and Bien Hoa. On 5 March the TPS-25 radar was credited with preventing a possible ground attack of FSB Concord. Artillery fire was placed on locations designated by the radar and subsequently many blood trails were discovered at daylight the next day. On the same day, the 2/319 Arty destroyed three sampans, one raft, and 20 bunkers plus one VC KIA (BC).

(17) Pending movement of the Division TAC CP to I CTZ, the Div Arty FDC relinquished control of fire coordination in AO Uniontown to 2/40 Arty. COL Pohl, Div Arty Commander, departed for I CTZ on 6 March. On 8 March HNB (minus personnel other than drivers) and Headquarters and Service Battery 2/11 Artillery left Bien Hoa for a sea embarkation point in Saigon for movement to I CTZ. The remainder of the personnel moved by tactical airlift on 15 March.

(18) The 2/320 Artillery participated in Operation MINGO with 3d Marine Division Task Force X-Ray from 3-7 March and then swung immediately
A VDGD~~C A
1,1968

10 May 1968

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 101st Airborne Division Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968, KCS 5050 (RL)

into Operation JEB STUART with the 1st Air Cavalry Division, which the 1st Brigade participated in through 17 March 1968.

(19) The 1/321 artillery terminated their participation in operation JEB STUART on 10 March and the 2d Brigade, with the 1/321 artillery, returned to the control of the 101st Airborne Division. On 9 March Battery C, 2/31 artillery was attached in a reinforcing role to the 1/321 artillery.

(20) The 2/31 artillery continued to support the 3d Brigade 101st Airborne Division (O/FOR to I Field Force, Vietnam) in operations throughout the Bien Hoa, Phuoc Vinh, Long Be area in the 211 CIL.

(21) On 11 March and 13 March respectively, the 1/321 artillery and 2/32C artillery began support of their Brigades (3d & 1st) in Operation Carentan.

(22) The Headquarters elements of the 101st Airborne Division Artillery and 2/31 artillery arrived at the port of debarkation (K. Hang) and motor marched to Camp Eagle (YU 812 159) on 17 March. The Division Artillery Operations Center was operational on 18 March.

(23) At 0400 hours, 16 March an enemy ground attack against FSR Minky, occupied by B/1/321(-), was repulsed by direct and indirect fire resulting in 3C KIA. The attack was beaten off at approximately 0530 hours.

(24) Provisional Corps Vietnam Artillery began providing heavy General Support artillery to the Division through the 1st Battalion, 3rd Artillery. This support was greatly needed and continues to be an invaluable asset.

(25) Battery B, 2/31 Artillery, was released from the American Division and arrived in the Division AO to provide reinforcing fires for another direct support battalion. However, the Division remained one medium artillery battery short of the desired requirement for one per Brigade size force.

(26) The 1st Brigade and Division Engineers, supported by A/C air and artillery made a deep penetration into the jungle area south west of line and established FSR Bastogne vicinity of grid YU 629 030. The base now contains sufficient artillery to provide direct and reinforcing fires of
every caliber to all maneuver units within range, and long range artillery that can effectively strike the A Shau Valley. In the early stages of its development the base came under frequent mortar and small arms fire.

(27) On 31 March Provisional Corps Artillery provided one 105mm Howitzer battery, B/1/4C, for direct support of the 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry. On 16 April this unit was replaced by Battery C, 6/33 Artillery. Battery B, 6/33 Artillery proceeded to Camp Eagle where it was employed as base defense artillery. On 15 April the Division was also provided a third medium howitzer battery, Battery C, 6/16 Artillery. This unit was attached to the 2/11 Artillery for control. On 16 April the 1st Brigade began Operation Delaware with the 2/320 Artillery in direct support, B/2/11 Artillery in a reinforcing mission and six tubes of 8" howitzer from the 1/83 and 8/4 Artillery in general support.

(28) From the 28th of April until the present the 2d Brigade has surrounded a number of NVA company sized units in cordon operations. Artillery has been used to pound the area around the clock and illuminate the area at night to help prevent exfiltration. Nota: On May US Forces entered the area and found 141 NVA killed, 95 PIs, and 75 weapons captured.

(29) Light, organic Batteries have fired in excess of 200,000 rounds while in direct support during the reported quarter.

(30) Artillery incidents continue to be a problem area. The greatest proportion of the problems appear to be poor judgement by forward observers. The adjustment of close-in fires, particularly with respect to the gun-target and observer-target line requires continuing training and emphasis.


c. The following numbers of unit days were engaged in:

(1) Training: 12

(2) Troop movement: 48

(3) Operations: 204 operational days out of 270 possible

d. The detachment of major units and their combat support units from the major parent unit and placing them in OPCON of other forces results in
logistical support problems. The gaining unit is generally not equipped to provide necessary maintenance support and provide high density demand items. The time-distance factor can make it impractical for the parent unit to effectively continue proper support. This is particularly true when a brigade size task force is moved several hundred miles from its "base camp," assigned to another headquarters but given a separate AO and expected to conduct full scale operations.

(1) The problem of a proper logistics base being established to provide immediate support coincidental with the initiation of combat operations in a new AO is not new. However, the problem is intensified in the case of airborne and/or airmobile units because of the lack of organic motor transport. The logistics problem becomes particularly acute when one airborne/ airmobile unit is satellite upon another.

(2) In the artillery, support for fire control instruments, generators and the fire direction computer N-2 was inadequate. To compensate for this replacement items and repair parts were ferried back and forth, on scheduled courier flights, between the "base camps" and the near area of operations some 40 miles removed. Close liaison with other artillery units was also beneficial in keeping Howitzer batteries operational.

(3) The problems encountered in the past quarter when 2/546 Artillery and 1/321 Artillery moved with supported Brigades from I1 I-2 to I-4 were not really solved until the units were rejoined to the Division and the logistics base system began to "catch up."

I. Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

   a. Personnel: None

   b. Operations:

      (1) Providing close-in fire from mutually supporting fire bases.

         (a) OBSERVATION: Operational plans must insure continuous support. ... rapid change (prearranged) in missions for fire support units to include quick fire channels provide a solution to this problem and will always insure the maneuver element rapid direct support.

         (b) EVALUATION: During the early stages of the development of an airhead, when maneuver elements have not pushed out far enough to be
operational report of 101st airborne division artillery for period ending 30 april 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

supported by direct support artillery within the airhead, other fire units must be immediately available within range to provide required support. The feasibility of employing the habitually associated firing unit for support units in the airhead is not always possible.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That all artillery fire support plans for this type operation include the provisions for immediately available mutual support.

(2) Integration of the AN/TPS-25 radar, AN/MPQ-4 radar, gun direction computer M-18, and artillery for base defense.

(a) OBSERVATION. The AN/TPS-25 Ground Surveillance Radar is ideally suited and extremely effective for static defense of installations and is even more effective when combined with rapid response artillery/mortar units, the gun direction computer and AN/MPQ-4 counter mortar radar.

(b) EVALUATION. During the reporting period, the 101st Airborne Division Artillery, in conjunction with other combat and combat support units, has successfully employed the equipment listed above in defense of several base camp areas, particularly in the Bien Hoa area. The TPS-25 Ground Surveillance Radar is emplaced at a surveyed grid location as is the MPQ-4 Counter mortar radar. Firing batteries should also be surveyed, but it is not absolutely necessary. Current meteorological messages, weapon ballistic data and other data are stored in the gun direction computer, M-18. When the TPS-25 radar locates a target, the azimuth and distance to the target (from the radar) are introduced into the computer, which, in turn, determines more accurate target grids and, if desired, computes firing data for the artillery unit. At the same time, the MPQ-4 radar is oriented on the target grid and is prepared to adjust the rounds if necessary. The resultant surprise fire is especially effective at night when the enemy feels that he can move with relative impunity. Although no large body counts have been found, search of areas so attacked have revealed many blood trails, abandoned equipment, and immediate cessation of movement as detected by the TPS-25 radar. Upward of 20 sightings a night were detected and engaged around the Bien Hoa complex in the period immediately following the TET offensive. Even without the gun direction computer M-18 and the MPQ-4 radar, the effectiveness of this method of target detection and attack was still high. Helicopter gun ships have also been vectored over targets by the TPS-25 radar after the target was located. This met with only limited success due to night navigation problems for the helicopters.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That provisions be made where feasible for all base camp facilities subject to ground attack to employ the equipment as described above.

(3) Use of marking devices for countermortar and nighttime direct fire.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 101st Airborne Division Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(a) OBSERVATIONS. The above method has been tested on a number of occasions during daylight hours and nighttime and has proven both rapid and accurate.

(b) EVALUATION. A number of problems have been encountered in directing accurate countermortar (direct) fire during the hours of darkness. Viet Cong and Main Force elements have been found by this unit to require direct line of sight contact with their target to employ accurate mortar fire. This enables the artillery unit being mortared to return direct fire. The mortar flashes are usually dim and are difficult to locate in the howitzer's elbow telescope. This problem would be alleviated if a marking round of some sort could be fired on or about the location of the mortar battery, and the rest of the artillery pieces could adjust on this marker instead of the elusive mortar flashes. White phosphorus was initially tried, but, while brilliant, the round ruined night vision and did not last long enough for the battery to orient the direct fire telescopes. After considerable testing, the best solution was found to be an illumination round set on point detonating. The round impacts and the booster charge blows the illumination elements out onto the ground. The burning elements provide plenty of light to orient the direct fire sights but not enough to ruin the gunner's night vision. If the initial round was not on target, corrections "From the marking round" may be given to the battery in mils. This method insures rapid and accurate massed fire on the enemy position before he has a chance to break down his mortar position and make his escape under cover of darkness.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the above method be analyzed further for the possibility of incorporating into standard artillery procedures.

(4) Use of one-man, one-sight system on M101A1 105mm during night-time countermortar and direct fire.

(a) OBSERVATIONS. Through experience in several instances, it has been determined that the one-man, one-sight system of direct fire is preferable in countermortar and direct fire during the hours of darkness.

(b) EVALUATION. During countermortar and nighttime direct fire where tracking a moving target is not a factor, the one-man, one-sight system has been found to be accurate and far more rapid than the two-man, two-sight system. The disadvantages of the two-man system are: (a) the difficulty of identifying a target to both individuals during the hours of darkness and (b) the difficulty of coordinating the two men's tube corrections and the leveling of bubbles.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the one-man, one-sight system be used for tracking a moving target during the hours of darkness.
c. **TRAINING:**

(1) Indoctrination of forward observers with the inherent dangers of adjusting close-in artillery/mortar fires.

(a) **OBSERVATIONS.** Adjustment of close-in artillery/mortar fire is a dangerous and exacting procedure with which new and inexperienced artillery officers must become completely familiar.

(b) **EVALUATION.** Forward observers must be trained and made continually aware of the risks involved in calling for and adjusting close-in fires. Normally, any shifts made at distances less than 600 meters should require a simultaneous change in the observer-target azimuth. Many times, this is overlooked and can result in friendly casualties. Also, when changing from shell white phosphorous or HC Smoke to High Explosive, caution must be exercised by both the Fire Direction Center and the Forward Observer. Differences of ballistic characteristics between projectiles can result in friendly casualties. At distances of 600 meters or less from friendly locations, creeping fire (increments of 50 meters or less) is mandatory. The maneuver element commanders must also be made aware of the inherent risks involved in close-in artillery fires. There is also danger involved in attempting to adjust by sound in dense jungle when the rounds cannot be seen. Heavy jungle or large, unseen gulleys which muffle sound can result in a misjudgment of how close the impacting rounds are.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION.** That personnel be trained in the proper procedures and continuously supervised on the job. Maneuver element leaders must also be made aware of the dangers involved. Emphasis on fire adjustment techniques should be stressed in service schools.

d. **INTELLIGENCE:** None.

e. **LOGISTICS:**

(1) Establishment of Forward Support Elements with sufficient capability to support units of task forces that are detached from parent units and are far removed from them.

(a) **OBSERVATION.** Great care must be exercised in planning for detached task force operations to insure availability of replacement of repair parts.

(b) **EVALUATION.** A Brigade Task Force detached for operations must have sufficient accompanying maintenance and logistic support. To satellite a force of this size on another unit creates a near insurmountable burden on the gaining unit's logistics system. Units so detached must
provide sufficient transportation to allow PLLs to accompany them as well as some truck transportation for resupply. Airborne artillery units are vulnerable to resupply problems (particularly Class V) because of a lack of organic motor transport.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Although units to whom task forces are assigned as OPCON assume a certain degree of support responsibility, their supply system cannot "change gears" fast enough to accommodate large new demands for repair parts and associated items. Units should plan for this by establishing a sufficient means of resupply and maintenance.

f. ORGANIZATION: None.

3. Section 3, DA Survey Information: Cover and Deception.

Negative report.

RICHARD S. ACHL
Colonel, Artillery Commanding
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

DA, HQ, 101st Abn Div, APO US Forces 96383, 20 May 1968

TO: ACofS for Force Development, Department of the Army (ACSFOR, DA)
Washington D.C. 20310

1. Forwarded herewith is the subject report of the 101st Airborne Division Artillery.

2. Pertinent Comments to Section II of Subject Report follow:
   a. Paragraph b(1) page 6: Concur.
   b. Paragraph b(2) page 7: Concur. Although the experience factor is limited on the use of the TPS-25 radar to vector helicopters, it has been used with limited success. The technique while not new should be disseminated so that other units are aware of the capability.
   c. Paragraph b(3) page 8: Concur.
   d. Paragraph b(4) page 9: Concur.
   e. Paragraph c(1) page 9: Concur. Recommend that service schools place increased emphasis upon the training of Junior Officers on the proper procedures for adjustment of close-in artillery and mortar fires.
   f. Paragraph e(1) page 10: Concur. Forward Supply Elements are placed in support of each brigade task force. These FSE's are composed of a supply section, forward support maintenance platoon and a medical company; they are capable of providing adequate support for a brigade task force. It has been necessary at times to augment the FSE's because of transportation availability and distances involved to the next higher support facility. During the TET offensive this became a problem when the Division's 2d Brigade deployed to the ICTZ and its supply and maintenance support elements were unable to deploy with them, because of air transportation availability, for 3 weeks. This situation required the 1st Cav Div (Airmobile) to support the brigade during that period of time.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

WILLIAM P. TALLON, JR.
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 101st Abn Div Arty, for Period Ending 30 April 68, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, HQ, PCV, APO San Francisco 96308 25 JUN 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam
    APO San Francisco 96375

1. (U) The enclosed ORLL, 101st Abn Div Arty, is forwarded in accordance with USARV Regulation 525-15.

2. (C) Comments on commanders' recommendations:

   a. Item: Providing close in fire from mutually supporting fire bases, page 6, para 2b(1). Concur.

   b. Item: Integration of the AN/TFS-25 radar, AN/AFC-4 radar, gun direction computer M-18, and artillery for base defense, page 7, para 2b(2) and 1st Ind, para 2b. Concur. Integration of cited target acquisition devices to provide accurately controlled counter fires on an unsuspecting enemy has been successful. Although this integrated system is in use in the 3d Marine Division, as well as the 101st Abn Division, the limited number of AN/TFS-25 radar sets precludes full exploitation of this method. Additional success has been obtained by integrating automatic weapons and searchlights with one or more of the defensive measures discussed.

   c. Item: Use of ground burst marking devices for countermortar and night time direct fire, page 8, para 2b(3). Concur. Described method is feasible to provide a direct fire adjusting point.

   d. Item: Use of one-man, one-sight system on the M101A1 105mm for countermortar and direct fire during hours of darkness, page 8, para 2b(4). Concur.

   e. Item: Indoctrination of forward observers with inherent danger of adjusting close-in artillery/mortar fires, page 9, para 2c(1), 1st Ind para 2c. Concur. The following action has been taken to emphasize inherent dangers of adjusting close-in fires:

      (1) Detailed precautionary instructions will be incorporated into PCV Tactical SOP.

      (2) A safety letter is being prepared for dissemination to all artillery units.

CONFIDENTIAL

[Handwritten note: DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS. DOD DIR 3200.10]
AVII-OCT (10 May 68) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 101st Abn Div Arty,
for Period Ending 30 April 68, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

f. Item: Establishment of forward support elements with sufficient
capabilities to support task force units that are detached from parent units,
page 10, para 2e(1), and 1st Ind, para 2f. Concur.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. L. NURDIN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-US (10 May 68) 3d Ind (C) CPT Arnold/rdc/TBN 4485
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 101st Airborne Division Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSPOR-65 (Pl)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 5 JUL 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPO-NT, APO 96358

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division Artillery.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning integration of the AN/TPS-25 radar, AN/MPS-4, radar, M-18, and artillery for base camp defense, page 7, paragraph 2b(2); 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2a; and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2b: Concur. However, these assets are best used in support of combat operations rather than in a defensive mode. The US Army does not have sufficient assets to support the defensive requirement as stated.

   b. Reference item concerning marking devices, page 8, paragraph 2b(3); and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2c: Concur.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AG
Assistant Adjutant General

Copies furnished:
HQ, 101st Abn Div Arty
HQ, PCV

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 101st Abn Div Arty for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 12 JUL 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C.L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Ass't AG
Inclosure 1 (Organization) to Operational Report of 101st Airborne Division Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968, MCS C-10M-65 (R1)

1. Division Artillery is organized under the TOEs listed as follows:

a. Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Division Artillery; TOE 6-015G.

b. Two Field Artillery Battalions (Airborne/Airmobile); TOE 6-705L, and further organized as follows:
   (1) Headquarters, headquarters and service battery; TOE 6-706L, modified with paragraph C7, TOE 6-216L.
   (2) Three firing batteries; TOE 6-707L.

c. The 2d Battalion, 319th Artillery remains organized as follows:
   (1) Headquarters, headquarters and service battery; TOE 6-216F.
   (2) Three firing batteries; TOE 6-217F.

   (3) The three firing batteries, with a small augmentation of equipment, are organized into four, five tube firing batteries.

d. One of the TOE 6-705L battalions, the 2d Battalion, 319th Artillery, was attached to the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, which was made up from the 11th Field Force on 6 March 1968.

  e. Battery D, 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery (Provisional) supports the 3rd Abn Inf which is up from the 11th Field Force Vietnam.

2. One 155mm battery, Battery C, 2d Howitzer Battalion, 111th Artillery was attached to 1st Battalion, 321st Artillery in the I CTZ until its parent battalion arrived in the CTZ.

3. The 2d Howitzer Battalion, 111th Artillery, was attached to the division on 7 March however no written order or message to this effect has ever been received. This unit is organized under TOE 6-425E and is further organized as follows:

   a. Headquarters and Headquarters Battery; TOE 6-426E.

   b. Three Firing Batteries; TOE 6-427E.

   c. Service Battery; TOE 6-428E.
Inclosure 1 (Organization) to Operational Report of 101st Airborne Division Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS C-OfR-65 (R)

4. Battery C, 6th Howitzer Battalion 16th Artillery was more or less "given" to the 101st Division Artillery (as the third medium battery desired) by Provisional Corps Artillery. For purposes of control 101st Division Artillery attached the battery to the 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery. However no definite mission was assigned this unit, in writing, by any headquarters. This battery is organized under TO 6-427E.

5. Battery A, 1st Howitzer Battalion, 4th Artillery was used to support the 1st Battalion 321st Artillery from 31 March thru 16 April 1968. This unit filled a requirement of direct support to the 2d Reconnaissance Squadron, 17th Cavalry. It is organized under TO 6-646E.

6. The 2d Battalion, 5th Artillery, is in direct support of the 3d Brigade, 5th Airborne Division. The 3d Brigade is OPCOM to 101st Airborne Division. The 2/3d is organized under TO 6-705T and further organized as follows:
   a. Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Battery; TO 6-706T.
   b. Three Firing Batteries; TO 6-707T.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hqs 101st Airborne Division Artillery (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterguerrilla operations, 1 Feb - 30 Apr 68

CO, 101st Airborne Division Artillery

16 May 1968

N/A

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310