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31 Dec 1979 per Group-4 document marking; Adjutant General’s Office [Army] ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation WHEELER (RG 43-32)(K-1)

THRU: Commanding General  
Americal Division  
APO US Forces 96374

Commanding General  
III Marine Amphibious Force  
APO US Forces 96602

TO: Commanding General  
United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
ATTN: MAC-In  
APO US Forces 96222

1. (U) NAME OF OPERATION: Operation WHEELER (Search and Destroy Operation).

2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 11000-SSeptember to 251100 November 1967.


4. (U) COMMANDER: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

5. (U) REPORTING OFFICER: Brigadier General Salve H. Matheson, Commanding General, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

6. (U) TASK ORGANIZATION:

a. The task organization of the Brigade at the initiation of Operation WHEELER was as shown below:

1-327 Inf  1-327 Inf
4 LZ Clearing/Demo Tms 4/326 Engr 4 LZ Clearing/Demo Tms 1/326 Engr
3 Set Dog Tms 42 Inf Plat 3 Set Dog Tms 42 Inf Plat

2-327 Inf  2-327 Inf
4 LZ Clearing/Demo Tms 1/326 Engr 4 LZ Clearing/Demo Tms 4/326 Engr
3 Set Dog Tms 42 Inf Plat 3 Set Dog Tms 42 Inf Plat

2-502 Inf  2-502 Inf
1 Mobile Strike Force Co (Supporting) 1 Mobile Strike Force Co (Supporting)
4 LZ Clearing/Demo Tms 4/326 Engr 4 LZ Clearing/Demo Tms 1/326 Engr
3 Set Dog Tms 42 Inf Plat 3 Set Dog Tms 42 Inf Plat

1-14 Inf  1-14 Inf
2-20 Arty (OPCON) 2-20 Arty (OPCON)
A/326 Engr (-) A/326 Engr (-)
LRRP Plat LRRP Plat
Sety Plat Sety Plat
LZ Plat Plat Sct Dog (-) Sct Dog (-)

b. Numerous changes in the Brigade task organization were made during the operation and are described as they occurred in paragraph 11 (Execution) below.
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation WHEELER (RCS: MAC J3-32) (K-1)

7. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry was placed under operational control of the 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry at the beginning of Operation WHEELER, and later, under the control of the 1st Squadron, 1st Armored Cavalry. The troop returned to Brigade control on 17 November 1967.

b. Troop B, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry supported the Brigade during the period 2-4 October 1967 by flying armed reconnaissance missions forward of the Infantry battalions and within the Brigade area of operation.

c. The Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon of the Brigade was employed in a surveillance and stay behind force role.

d. Artillery: (See Inclosure 10, Artillery)

(1) The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery (10-155mm howitzers) was employed in a direct support role with each of its batteries collocated with an infantry battalion tactical command post. The battalion fired a total of 3,085 missions expending 54,893 rounds of ammunition during the operation.

(2) Battery B, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery (6-105mm howitzers) was placed under operational control of the Brigade's direct support artillery battalion during the period the 35th Battalion, 14th Infantry was operating with the Brigade (11-24 September 1967). The battery was given a direct support mission to the infantry battalion. Four hundred twenty-one missions were fired expending 2,407 rounds of ammunition.

(3) Battery A, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery (6-105mm howitzers) was placed under operational control of the Brigade's direct support artillery battalion during the period the 3d Battalion, 35th Infantry was operating with the Brigade (4 October - 4 November 1967). The battery was given a direct support mission to the infantry battalion. Six hundred thirty-five missions were fired expending 7,761 rounds of ammunition.

(4) Battery C, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (6-155mm howitzers) reinforced the 1st of the Brigade's direct support artillery battalion during the entire operation. The battery fired a total of 1,562 missions expending 14,169 rounds of ammunition.

(5) Battery C, 29th Artillery, Americal Division Artillery, supported the Brigade with one section of two searchlights from 7-24 November 1967. The section was employed at one of the Brigade's firebases and furnished infrared and white light support.

e. Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion (Airborne), provided each infantry battalion with teams for clearing landing zones, demolition projects, mine clearance and limited explosive ordnance disposal work. The remainder of the company supported the Brigade by operating water purification points at forward supply points, maintaining existing roads and improving the Brigade base camp (See Inclosure 9, Engineer).

f. The 44th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) provided each infantry battalion with a daily average of two scout dog teams during the operation.

g. The 9th Combat Tracker Team (Provisional) joined the Brigade on 25 September 1967 and gave the Brigade the capability of tracking enemy forces when contact was broken. Organized into two tracker sections, the sections were positioned at battalion tactical command posts for rapid employment. The team proved highly successful during the operation. Results directly attributable to the team were four enemy killed, two enemy captured, one weapon and ammunition cache discovered and numerous booby traps and punji pits discovered.
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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation WHITLR (RG: MAC J3-32)

h. Army Aviation: The 14th Combat Aviation Battalion provided the Brigade with aircraft for troop lift and flew combat support and resupply missions.

1) 176th Assault Helicopter Company was employed in a direct support role and provided helicopters for gunship support, troop lift and flew combat support and resupply missions, in addition to providing one command and control and one utility helicopter to each infantry battalion daily.

2) 161st Assault Helicopter Company, in general support of the Brigade, provided helicopters on a mission support basis for gunship support, troop lift, combat support and resupply missions.

3) 178th Aviation Company (Medium), in general support of the Brigade, provided CH-47 aircraft on a mission support basis for troop lift, heavy resupply and displacement of artillery units.

i. The 20th Chemical Detachment, in general support, flew combat support missions employing non-persistent G3 from helicopters, provided teams for tunnel and bunker denial and contamination of rice and salt caches using persistent G3, and provided ready charged flamethrowers. Detachment personnel, operating the Napalm Personnel Detector (People Sniffer) mounted in a helicopter, flew an average of two missions per week. Readings indicated on the detector were relayed to the battalions for exploitation by maneuvering forces into the area or by employing airstrikes and/or artillery fire. (See Enclosure 5, Chemical).

j. Indigenous Forces:

1) One Camp Strike Force Company from TIEN PRORC Special Forces Camp supported the Brigade from 11 September to 17 October 1967 by initially screening the southwest portion of the area of operation to detect enemy movement. From 26 September to 17 October 1967, the company assisted in providing security for a firebase consisting of one battery of 105mm howitzers and one battery of 155mm howitzers.

2) One Mobile Strike Force Company from Company C, 5th Special Forces Group (Bk NG) operated directly with the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry from 11 September to 2 October 1967. The company conducted search and destroy operations within their assigned portion of the battalion's area of operation.

3) One Reconnaissance Company from the 2d ARVN Division established blocking positions for the Brigade along likely enemy routes of egress from 28 September to 7 October 1967.

k. Tactical Air Support:

1) US Air Force and US Marine pilots flew 426 tactical fighter missions totaling 978 sorties. Of these sorties, 453 were immediate requests which were processed through the Air Force 1st Corps Direct Air Support Center (IDASC) in DA NANG with an average reaction time of twenty minutes. In addition, 201 Combat Skyspot sorties, 41 flareship (AC-47) sorties, and 188 transport sorties were flown in support of the Brigade. Forward air controllers flew 341 sorties in forward air control, artillery adjustment and visual reconnaissance missions. A total of 1,163,575 tons of ordnance was expended during the operation. The expended ordnance included 875.450 tons of general purpose bombs, 290.125 tons of napalm, 2,400 flares, 376,950 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition, 237,300 rounds of 20mm ammunition, 28 QUESTs and 1513 rockets.

2) The 9th Air Command Squadron provided support for aerial psychological operations to include leaflet dissemination and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts in the area of operation.
AVBD-C

1. The 244th Psychological Operations Company provided one loudspeaker team (HB) in direct support of the Brigade. (See Inclosure 8, Psychological Operations).

8. (U) INTELLIGENCE: See Inclosure 1, Intelligence.

9. (C) MISSION: American Division directed the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to conduct search and destroy operations commencing 11 September 1967 northwest of TAM KY (120367) to find, fix and destroy VC/NVA forces and to neutralize VC/NVA base camps.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: To accomplish the assigned mission and, at the same time, block enemy routes of egress to the south and the southwest, the Brigade air assaulted its three organic infantry battalions into UDM Area of Operation (Ao) located west of TAM KY. The 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted airmobile assaults into the southern portion of the area of operation on 11 September 1967. The following day the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry and the 3d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry air assaulted into the western and northern portions of the area of operation respectively. The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, under the operational control of the Brigade, initially was given an in-country mission to exploit any intelligence gained during the initial stages of the operation. One Camp Strike Force Company from TIEN PHUOC Special Forces Camp screened likely routes of enemy egress to the southwest of the Brigade's area of operation. Engineer LI clearing and demolition teams and scout dog teams were attached to the maneuver battalions. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery collocated one firing battery with each of the maneuver battalion tactical command posts. (See Tab A to Inclosure 2, Operations Schematics).

11. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Methods of Operation: To accomplish its assigned search and destroy mission and effectively defeat the guerrilla in his environment, the Brigade assumed a semi-guerrilla posture and modified its methods of operation. The tactics and techniques employed, while in this posture, were designed to offset the advantages the guerrilla has when operating in his environment. Once, however, contact was established with the enemy, the cloak of the semi-guerrilla was removed and all available firepower was placed on the enemy. The Brigade maneuvered freely throughout its area of operation, cross attached units and frequently changed boundaries to rapidly react to enemy movement and contacts. Some of the tactics and techniques employed are discussed below:

(1) Saturation patrolling: Because of the very nature of the enemy, specific or "hard" intelligence of the enemy's disposition, strength and methods of operation are difficult to obtain. Normally only the general location (several grid squares) of an enemy unit is known. To locate the enemy, all units of the Brigade conducted extensive saturation patrolling. Companies were air assaulted into multiple landing zones and, once on the ground, patrolled on three or four axes with a platoon size force on each axis. All platoons remained within supporting or reinforcing distance of each other (normally thirty minutes marching time). As the platoons searched along their axes, they periodically sent squad or fire team size patrols to the flanks. By employing this technique, large areas were able to be searched, the enemy's capability to determine the size and direction of movement of the unit in his area was reduced, and maximum flexibility was achieved to reinforce, attack or encircle an enemy when contact was established.

(2) Ambushes: With a search and destroy mission assigned, units of the Brigade seldom moved at night unless there was a specific operational requirement. Movement through the jungle and detailed search of an area at night proved difficult. To deny the enemy complete freedom of movement at night, units frequently ambushed trails found during the day, and if none were found, lines of drift such as stream beds and ridgelines were ambushed. Periodically, when well used trails were located during the day, units would immediately ambush the trail for one or two hours. If enemy movement was not detected, units continued in their search.
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(3) Stay behind patrols: The enemy frequently returns to the battle area or to known bilocation sites of US units. To exploit this tendency, units of the Brigade positioned patrols or larger size units in concealed positions. An immediate reaction force was designed to reinforce the stay behind patrol if necessary. The length of time the patrol remained behind depended on the higher unit’s method of operation, mission, terrain and size of the stay behind patrol.

(4) Raids: When specific or "hard" intelligence was received, raids were planned and executed using air mobility whenever possible.

(5) Large areas of operation: Areas of operation are required to be cleared by SVN forces and are, therefore, subject to being compromised. When areas of operation only large enough for a unit to operate in at one time are requested, the enemy can easily determine probable landing zones and firebase locations. To add a degree of security, the Brigade habitually requested areas of operation several times the size it could operate in at one time. A secondary reason for requesting large areas of operation was to provide the commander with sufficient room to freely maneuver to exploit intelligence from long range recce/reconnaissance patrols, aerial visual reconnaissance and other intelligence sources.

(6) Deployment with 3-5 days rations: To allow companies to fade into the jungle and assume a semi-guerrilla posture, all units deployed with 3-5 days rations and, at times, seven days ration. Resupply was then accomplished every 3-5 days. This technique also prevented the unit's location from being compromised by daily helicopter resupply flights. Only for emergency reasons were helicopters allowed to land at a unit's location.

(7) Movement from high to low ground: The terrain in the area of operation was mountainous with dense vegetation giving the enemy a distinct advantage over the Brigade units. To decrease this disadvantage, units conducted their search and destroy operations from high to low ground whenever possible.

(8) Artillery collocated with infantry: To provide immediate responsive and coordinated artillery support to the maneuver battalions, the Brigade collocated one direct support artillery battery with each of the infantry battalion tactical command posts.

b. The Brigade initiated Operation WHEELER on 11 September 1967 as planned. All battalions conducted air mobile assaults into selected landing zones unopposed by the enemy; however, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry did detonate enemy mines on two of its landing zones. The terrain in the area of operation consisted of jungle covered hills, rolling hills with elephant grass and flat, cultivated lowlands with rice paddies. The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry was employed on 22 September 1967 in an area of operation to the southwest of the Brigade and given a search and destroy mission. The initial phase of Operation WHEELER (11-25 September 1967) produced no significantly large enemy contacts nor any information to suggest large size enemy forces had operated in the area. Daily enemy killed (by body count), however, averaged fifteen per day. The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry was released from Brigade control on 24 September 1967.

c. Intelligence reports from numerous sources began to indicate that large size enemy forces, to include the 25 NVA Division Headquarters, were located approximately seventeen kilometers to the west of the Brigade's area of operation (AT312c). The Brigade developed a new concept of operation designed to block enemy routes of ingress in all directions and slowly close in on the encircled enemy.

d. The second phase of Operation WHEELER (26 September-8 October 1967) was initiated by air assaulting the 1st and 2d Battalions (Airborne), 327th Infantry into landing zones to the south and west of the suspected enemy locations. Because an unfordable river separated the two battalions and the area of operation of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry was too large to effectively block enemy routes of ingress with three companies, Company H, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry was placed under operational control of the 2d Battalion. The company remained with the 2d Battalion until 2 October 1967 when it was returned to its parent unit. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry, east of the enemy locations, commenced search and destroy operations to the west on multiple axes.
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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation WHEELER (NGS; MAC J3-32)

K-1

To block northern egress routes, one ARVN Reconnaissance Company was air assaulted into blocking positions and operated with the Brigade from 28 September to 7 October 1967. A US Marine reconnaissance team from the 5th Marine Regiment assisted by screening areas west of the ARVN company. One Camp Strike Force Company from TINH PHUOC Special Forces Camp and the Brigade Security Platoon assisted in securing the Brigade firebase consisting of one battery each of 105mm and 155mm howitzers. (See Tab B to Enclosure 2, Operation Schematics).

a. Contacts with enemy forces increased in intensity as the battalions began to close on and patrol nearer the suspected enemy division headquarters. All indications (enemy mortars, recoilless rifles, anti-aircraft fire, heavy machineguns, automatic weapons, prisoners of war and large size forces) confirmed the fact that several battalions, and possibly the division headquarters, were located between the units of the Brigade. Airstrikes, Combat Skyspots and artillery fires were employed extensively throughout the area on known and suspected enemy locations. Numerous small contacts were made daily with the enemy. Significant contacts are listed below.

(1) The tactical command post of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (BT07329) at 0050 hours on 27 September 1967 received an enemy mortar, recoilless rifle and grenade attack for fifteen minutes. Results of the attack were 7 US killed, 6 wounded (medevac), 1 NVA KIA (G) and 1 SKS captured.

(2) At 271645 September 1967 Company A, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (BT07324) engaged a dug in enemy force who employed 60mm mortars, automatic weapons and rockets. Weather at the time prevented the use of air strikes and gunships. The contact lasted into the night. Results of the contact were 2 US killed, 6 wounded (medevac), 1 NVA KIA (G) and 1 SKS captured.

(3) Company C, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry at 290627 September 1967 near BT03621 made contact with a company size enemy force. Heavy contact developed with artillery, gunships and air strikes in constant support. Contact was broken at 1835 hours. Results were 3 US killed, 15 wounded (medevac), 9 NVA KIA (G), 3 JX-47, 1 RPD, 1 60mm rocket launcher, 1 60mm mortar base plate and bipod captured.

(4) The ARVN company, blocking routes of egress to the north, ambushed an NVA platoon at 301300 September 1967 near BT093272 killing 13 NVA and capturing 3 JX-47 and 2 carbines.

(5) At 021815 October 1967 Company A, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry near BT05259 received heavy fire from an unknown size enemy force employing 60mm mortars, automatic weapons and .50 caliber machineguns. Company A maneuvered throughout the afternoon employing artillery, air strikes and gunships. Results were 7 US killed and 17 wounded (medevac). Enemy losses were unknown.

(6) Battery C, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery was subjected to a 50-60 round mortar and recoilless rifle attack at 021815 October 1967 near BT07326. Results were 11 US wounded (medevac).

f. Visual reconnaissance missions flown over the Brigade's original area of operation reported numerous sightings of enemy activity. To exploit this intelligence, the Brigade requested a fourth infantry battalion be placed under operational control of the Brigade. The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, part of the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division at MAC PEO, was airlifted on 4 October 1967 to TAM KY (east of the Brigade area of operation) and joined the Brigade. The battalion conducted airmobile assaults on 5 October 1967 into the northern portion of the Brigade's original area of operation and commenced search and destroy operations in their assigned area of operation.

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Numerous contacts with the enemy continued and the Brigade continued to employ large numbers of air strikes, Combat Skypots and artillery throughout the area of operation on known and suspected enemy locations. Weather throughout the area of operation began to hamper seriously operations, and, when numerous sampans were sighted to the west of the area of operation (AT8126 moving west) was believed to be elements of the enemy division headquarters, action other than Combat Skypots could not be employed.

h. Three significant enemy contacts were made as the battalions swept over suspected enemy locations.

(1) Company A, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (BT039235) occupying a defensive perimeter while resupplying and refitting on 7 October 1967, was attacked at 0245 hours by an estimated NVA company employing mortars, machine-guns and automatic weapons. Artillery, gunships and flareships supported the company. Contact was broken at 0420 hours with the enemy withdrawing southeast. Air-strikes were employed on the withdrawing enemy. Results were 7 US killed, 6 wounded (medevac), 18 NVA KL (C), RPD, 12 AK-47, 2 RPD, and 1 Chinese Communist flamethrower captured.

(2) At 083000 October 1967 (AT940270) Company A, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry made contact with an estimated two NVA companies. The NVA, employing 81mm mortars, rifle grenades and automatic weapons, conducted a two pronged attack and surrounded one platoon of Company A. Hand to hand contact ensued. Company B and the Reconnaissance Platoon of the battalion maneuvered against the enemy, caught the withdrawing enemy by surprise, and assaulted. Results of the contact were 17 US killed, 3 wounded (medevac), 60 NVA KL (C), 21 small arms weapons and 1 RPD captured.

(3) Company A, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry at 091830 October 1967 made contact with an NVA company near BT110285. Company A, supported by artillery and gunships, engaged the enemy. Heavy fighting developed and continued until 2115 hours when the enemy broke contact and withdrew north. Results were 10 US killed, 17 wounded (medevac), 24 NVA KL (C), and 3 AK-47's captured.

i. With the present area of operation searched and with weather restricting operations and resupply of units, the brigade began the third phase of Operation WHEELER (9 October to 5 November 1967) by reorienting itself on the original area of operation where the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry was making daily contacts with the enemy. Simultaneously with reorienting units, the brigade began rotating companies back to the Brigade base camp at ONU Li: I for stand-down. While the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Infantry (-) was at the Brigade base camp for stand-down from 25-26 October 1967, Company A of the battalion was placed under operational control of the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry. The last company to stand-down was reinserted into the area of operation on 27 October 1967. (See Tab C Inclosure 8, Operation Schematics).

j. Numerous small contacts with the enemy continued. Significant enemy contacts as the Brigade reoriented to the eastern portion of the area of operation are as follows:

(1) At 150315 October 1967 Battery A, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery, located adjacent to the tactical command post of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (BT066252) was subjected to a mortar and ground attack. One Camp Strike Force Company from 1ST BICO Special Forces Camp was assisting in the security of the battery. The enemy, estimated at 50-60 personnel, managed to dis-arm early warning devices and move past the outside perimeter. They attacked using automatic weapons, grenades and satchel charges. At one point, the artillery's inner perimeter was penetrated. Bad weather precluded the use of air strikes and gunships. The counter mortar radar positioned near the battery located the enemy mortars which were immediately engaged with artillery. Contact was broken at 0530 hours. Results: 5 US killed, 21 wounded (medevac), 6 GSF killed, 4 wounded (medevac); 6 NVA KL (C), 1 AK-47 and 1 9mm pistol captured.
On 22 October 1967 at 1630 hours, the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, made contact with an estimated NVA battalion (DTR1737010). Company D of the battalion maneuvered to reinforce the Reconnaissance Platoon. Heavy contact ensued and the enemy assualted the US positions using hand grenades and automatic weapons. Company C was air assaulted into a blocking position at 1905 hours to the southeast of the contact. "Spooky" was requested and arrived at 1910 hours. Contact continued until 2045 hours when the enemy withdrew. Results were 2 US killed, 13 wounded (medevac), 6 NVA KIA. (C).

On the same day at 1824 hours, the tactical command post of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (DTR28126) received 26 rounds of 80mm mortar fire followed by six rounds of rocket fire (estimated 6-40 rockets). Results were 8 US wounded (medevac).

Company D, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry made contact with a well entrenched enemy at BT2092096 on 27 October 1967. Approximately ten minutes after air assaulting, two platoons split west from the landing zone at 1245 hours, and became heavily engaged with an estimated NVA company firing automatic weapons. The company maneuvered and employed gunships, artillery and air strikes. At 1817 hours, Company A of the battalion was assaulted into blocking positions at BT160305. Contact with the enemy continued until 1835 hours, when the enemy withdrew to the west. Results were 11 US killed and 18 wounded (medevac). Enemy losses were 9 NVA KIA (C), 1 SKS and 1 pair of binoculars captured.

The Brigade continued to orient on the enemy and freely change boundaries and cross-attach units whenever necessary. From 28-31 October 1967 Company C, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry was under the operational control of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry because the 1st Battalion was better able to control the company because of its location.

With the 2d NVA Division elements avoiding major contacts with the Brigade during the period 28 October to 4 November 1967, increased emphasis was placed on attempting to locate the division. Special agent reports and other intelligence sources began to indicate that the division headquarters was located in the vicinity of AT9611 which was between the Brigade and the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) operating to the north. The Americal Division developed a scheme of maneuver employing the Brigade as a blocking force to the east and southeast, a US Marine battalion blocking to the northwest, and the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) blocking to the northeast and also attacking to the northeast with two battalions. To provide forces to the 3d Brigade, the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry was released from operational control of the Brigade on 5 November 1967 and placed under operational control of the 3d Brigade.

The fourth phase of Operation WHEELER (5-25 November 1967) began with a new scheme of maneuver for the Brigade. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry, occupying in the western portion of the Brigade area of operation air assaulted into the western portion and blocked routes of egress to the east. The 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry remained in its area of operation and reoriented to the north to block routes of egress to the southeast. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry was placed under the operational control of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry initially and later the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry from 7-16 November 1967 to provide sufficient forces to each battalion for accomplishing its blocking mission.

There were many small unit contacts which raised the number of enemy killed (by body count) to over 1000. Only one significant contact with the enemy occurred during the period 6-10 November 1967. On 11 November 1967 at 1215 hours, Company C, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (DTR170606) made contact with an estimated NVA company. The company maneuvered throughout the afternoon and employed artillery, gunships and air strikes. The heaviest fighting took place between 1630-1700 hours. To block enemy routes of escape to the west, Company A of the bat-
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation WHE LILN (RG5: MAC J5-32)

L5 /77//i- was air assaulted into an area west of the enemy at 1725 hours. Gunships engaged several groups of enemy in the general vicinity of the landing zone. By 1900 hours the fighting was reduced to sporadic firing. "Spooky" arrived at 1830 hours and fired on likely routes of escape. Results of the contact were 4 US killed, 5 wounded (medevac), 11 NVA KIA (C), 1 NVA FW, 1 RPD, 5 AK-47, 1 SKS and a large number of rucksacks captured.

a. On 16 November 1967 the Americal Division directed the Brigade to reorient two companies to the eastern portion of the area of operation (BT1227) to conduct search and destroy operations and block enemy routes of movement to the south. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry was assigned the mission and, in turn, assigned the mission to Company B and to Company C which was operating with the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry. Both companies were airlifted by helicopter to a landing zone secured by the Reconnaissance Platoon of the battalion and immediately began search and destroy operations. No significant contacts with the enemy were made by either company.

b. With all elements of the 2d NVA Division avoiding contact and intelligence reports indicating that the Brigade had seriously hurt the division, the Brigade began to prepare to move back to the II Corps Tactical Zone as directed by MACV. From 23-25 November 1967 the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry respectively were relieved in place by elements of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade deployed to the TAN KY Airfield and moved by US Air Force C-130 aircraft to the Brigade's base camp at PHAN RANG for a four day stand-down and preparation for future operations.

12. (C) RESULTS:

a. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division accomplished its assigned mission of conducting search and destroy operations to find, fix and destroy VC/NVA forces and to neutralize VC/NVA base camps.

b. The following losses were inflicted on the enemy:

- Killed (by body count): 1105
- Individual weapons: 162
- Killed (estimated): 26
- Individual weapons (cache): 24
- Prisoners-VC/NVA: 42/8
- Crew served weapons: 25
- Civil Defenders: 63
- Crew served weapons (cache): 9
- Returnees: 11
- Rice (tons): 198.7
- Detainees: 445
- Salt (tons): 5

c. The following losses were suffered by the Brigade:

- Killed: 124
- Weapons captured/destroyed: 23
- Wounded: 465
- Helicopters destroyed: 10
- Missing: 0
- Helicopters damaged by enemy fire: 32
- Captured: 0

d. The ratio of enemy bodies to weapons captured (cache not included) was 6:1. The ratio of enemy to friendly killed was 8.3:1.

13. (U) ADMINISTRATIVE Matters:

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation WHEELER (RCS: MAC J3-32)

d. Communications: Inclosure 7.

14. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:

a. Combat Tracker Team: Employed for the first time by the Brigade, the Combat Tracker Team added an essential skill to the conduct of search and destroy operations. Well trained and professionally led, the team reduced considerably the problem of tracking and finding the enemy. On numerous occasions, the team led maneuver units to base camps, well camouflaged tunnels and bunkers, hidden weapons and ammunition caches and detected booby traps and punji pits that would not have been found without their expertise. With only one team assigned to the Brigade and because the team could not move for several days with a company and still be able to accomplish its mission, the team was employed by placing each of its two sections in the area of operation at battalion tactical command posts. When a company required the team's assistance, the helicopter serving the battalion picked up the team and inserted it into the company or platoon area. Once the mission was accomplished, the team was extracted and placed at the tactical command post for employment in another area. This employment technique allowed the team, and especially the dog, time for rest, provided maximum flexibility to the Brigade, and furnished each battalion with a readily available team when needed.

b. Personnel Detector: The personnel detector or "People Sniffer" was used in an aircraft mode by mounting it in a UH-1D helicopter. During missions, two gunships and one spotter aircraft would accompany the helicopter with the personal detector. As the detector aircraft flew at tree top level, a spotter aircraft would fly at an approximate 1500 feet and determine the exact location of significant readings when notified by personnel in the detector aircraft. Once an exact location of a significant reading was determined, this information would be relayed to the battalion in whose area of operation the mission was being conducted. The battalion commander would then determine whether to engage the target with the gunships, air strikes, artillery or to maneuver troops into the area. When outside a battalion area of operation, gunships with the "People Sniffer" would immediately engage any area of significant readings.

c. "Daisy Cutters": The Brigade continued to use "Daisy Cutters", 500-1000 pound bombs with a three foot pipe welded to the fuse, for landing zone preparation in advance of airmobile assaulting troops. The "Daisy Cutters" did not crater landing zones; however, they did detonate or expose enemy mines on the landing zone in the immediate vicinity of impact of the bomb.

d. Sniper Teams: Many areas of the Brigade's area of operation were suited for the employment of sniper teams. Much of the low ground in the valleys was rice paddies surrounded by hedgerows. Hills overlooking the rice paddies were frequently bare of vegetation and provided a commanding view. Units of the Brigade employed sniper teams which consisted of one sniper and one spotter. The sniper was armed with a rifle and scope and the spotter was equipped with a 20 power scope which had a wider field of view than the sniper scope. Enemy were engaged by the teams from distances of 400-1400 meters with success.

e. HMXI Projected Charge: When intelligence indicated that landing zones were mined by the enemy, the Brigade employed a technique of clearing mines that used the "Daisy Cutter" and the HMXI Projected Charge. Once the landing zone had been prepared by air strikes and artillery, the initial assault helicopters would land where the "Daisy Cutters" had detonated. Aboard each of the initial helicopters would be three infantrymen and two engineers. The infantrymen would establish security, while the engineer employed and detonated the projected charge from the area cleared by the "Daisy Cutters". Capable of clearing an area 170 feet long by one foot wide of all mines and exposing any mines four feet on either side of the cleared area, the Projected Charge enables subsequent troop
units to move off the landing zone with little danger of mines.

f. AN/MPQ-4 Radar Set: The artillery battalion's organic counter mortar radar was positioned in the area of operation by collocating it with one of the firing battalions. The radar was employed in its normal role, but it was also used on one occasion to guide in a medical evacuation helicopter when critically wounded personnel needed evacuation and weather prevented the helicopter from flying with its instruments. The radar operator directed the helicopter to the landing zone, assisted it in making a safe landing and directed it out of the area of operation once the casualties were aboard.

15. (C) CONSEQUENCES ANALYSIS

a. Lessons Learned:

(1) Item: Enemy Pattern of Operation

(a) Discussion: The methods of operation, location of base camps and caches, and positioning and use of defensive positions vary among the enemy in different areas of operation. Knowing this pattern in a particular area of operation is vital to the successful conduct of combat operations. For instance, if the initial contacts with the enemy are made on the military crests of hills and the enemy is in fortified positions, it can be assumed, with a high degree of assurance, that the enemy will be in similar positions on other hills in the area.

(b) Recommendation/Solution: When operating in a new area of operation, emphasis should be placed, initially, on determining the pattern of activity of the enemy forces in the area. Once this information is obtained or information indicates otherwise, it can be assumed that the pattern is universal in the area and methods of operation can be modified accordingly.

(2) Item: Securing Landing Zones

(a) Discussion: During or after an enemy contact when emergency resupply or medical evacuation is required, it is not sufficient to secure only the actual location where the helicopter is to land. The approach into the landing zone must also be secured.

(b) Recommendation/Solution: Commanders must ensure that both the landing zone and approach are secure or be reasonably sure that enemy forces are not along the approach into the landing zone. If it is impossible to secure the approach or the enemy situation along the approach is not known, this information must be reported so that gunships can accompany the resupply or medical evacuation helicopter.

(3) Item: Province Reconnaissance Unit

(a) Discussion: When operating in areas that are populated and under enemy control, a need exists for an indigenous force familiar with the population and operations of the enemy.

(b) Recommendation/Solution: Province Reconnaissance Units were employed with the battalions with excellent results. The units proved exceptionally useful when searching villages and in extracting information from the local population.

(4) Item: Enemy Returning to Base Camps

(a) Discussion: The NVs encountered in the area of operation returned to established base camps once Brigade elements had swept the area.
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation WHEELER (RC5; MAC J3-J3) (R-1)

(b) Recommendation/Solution: To take advantage of this tendency, units of the Brigade employed stay behind forces, or when this was not possible, persistent CS was implemented into the tunnels and bunkers.

(5) Item: Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer (FADAC)

(a) Discussion: With the inception and successful utilization of the FADAC, a tendency existed to rely completely on the computer with consequent adverse effects on the firing battery’s manual capability.

(b) Recommendation/Solution: Each fire direction center maintains two manual charts, one primary and one check. Additionally, the FADAC is not used every other day to require fire direction centers to use the manual method to maintain a proficient manual capability and to allow service of the computer.

(6) Item: Defense Against Enemy Mortars

(a) Discussion: When resupply of units is required by helicopter, unit locations are compromised by the flights of resupply aircraft into the unit. The enemy in the area of operation had and frequently employed mortars against units of the Brigade, including units that had not displaced from the resupply location.

(b) Recommendation/Solution: Resupply of units was conducted as rapidly as possible and the units then displaced to a new location. In addition, flights in and out of the unit were minimized in an attempt to decrease the enemy’s ability to pinpoint a unit’s location.

b. Commanders Notes:

(1) Operation WHEELER produced the largest number of enemy killed (by body count) of any single operation conducted by the Brigade since its arrival in Vietnam twenty-eight months ago. The individual rifleman in the Brigade proved himself a determined and skilled fighter against the NVA who were well armed and equipped and who did not hesitate to maneuver against and attack units of the Brigade. Even though the Brigade was, at times, fighting battalion and larger size enemy forces, the real success of the Brigade was being made by the small unit leader – the squad leader, platoon leader and company commander. Only through their capabilities and tactical know-how in searching for and finding the enemy was the Brigade able to account for over 1100 enemy dead.

(2) Weather and the mountainous terrain combined to make resupply by helicopter and the conduct of airmobile operations difficult, particularly during the first week in October when the Brigade was searching for the 2d NVA Division headquarters. Because of the intense monsoon rains and low clouds, a large portion of the division headquarters was able to successfully escape into the mountains west of the area of operation. When sightings of large numbers of sampans were made, moving what was believed to be elements of the division, weather prevented the Brigade from air assaulting and employing gunships or air strikes. Only Combat Skypots could be employed in the attack and no assessment could be made by units on the ground.

(3) During the one three day stand-down period conducted by the Brigade during the operation, personnel from the Combat Tracker Team taught the rifleman the techniques of visually tracking the enemy. In addition the team taught the rifleman the signs being used by the enemy in the Brigade’s area of operation to indicate cache sites, booby traps and direction of movement.

16. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Combat Tracker Teams: The current Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) for the 9th Combat Tracker Team authorizes the team ten personnel
trained to operate in two five man sections. The size of the team is not sufficient to support adequately a separate airborne brigade with four infantry battalions conducting counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam. The very nature of the enemy — elusive, capable of blending into the terrain, difficult to find — requires that US units have the skills readily available to track the enemy once contact is broken. With only two workable sections for four infantry battalions, sufficient sections are not readily available for use when needed. In addition, when personnel of the team become casualties, are on leave or sick, the sections cannot operate effectively because team integrity is disrupted when one man is absent. It is recommended that the team's authorized strength be increased to at least twenty personnel organized into four five man sections. This team size would provide adequate support for the Brigade and insure that a minimum of three teams was always operational.

b. Visual Tracking: The biggest problem in fighting the enemy in Vietnam is finding him in order to fight him. A definite need, therefore, exists at the rifle platoon level for personnel familiar with and trained in the art of visually tracking the enemy. Many situations arise during operations when contact is made with the enemy, several are wounded, and means to evacuate. Blood trails are followed because they are relatively easy to locate, but once the enemy has time to bandage himself, the average rifleman loses the trail and the enemy is not captured. A by-product of knowing the principles of tracking is the ability to detect quickly things that are out of place or unusual such as enemy signs used to designate booby traps, dikes, punji pits or other dangers ahead. It is, therefore, recommended that the art of visual tracking be taught to rifleman prior to their arrival in Vietnam.

c. "Daisy Cutters": The "Daisy Cutter" has proved to be an extremely effective bomb for landing zone preparation in advance of assaulting troops and for landing zone construction. It is recommended that this bomb be standard issue in Vietnam to insure adequate supply to fulfill its required use.

Inclosures:
1 - Intelligence
2 - Operations Schematics
3 - Personnel and Administration
4 - Logistics
5 - Chemical
6 - Civic Action
7 - Communications
8 - Psychological Operations
9 - Engineer
10 - Artillery

DISTRIBUTION:
B - plus
Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation WHEELER (U)

1. (U) TERRAIN: The area of operation was dominated by rugged mountains throughout, with numerous hills and low mountains increasing in height to the west. Two rivers, the SONG CHANG and the SONG TRANH, afforded natural routes of infiltration and communication as well as one major rice valley to the north, paralleling the northern boundary of QUANG BINH Province and the southern boundary of QUANG NAM Province. The majority of contacts and most enemy fortifications were found on the heavily vegetated valley slopes and never far from the valley floor and rice crops, thus facilitating food resupply. Due to increased rainfall, the SONG TRANH and SONG CHANG Rivers became major obstacles to ground movement.

2. (U) WEATHER: The weather affected both ground and air activity considerably less than anticipated. Partly cloudy skies with frequent late afternoon or early evening rainshowers were prevalent and visibility was generally unrestricted. The enemy exploited the few days of heavy rain, capitalizing on our limited air capability during inclement weather. The temperature ranged from a high of 94 degrees to a low of 72 degrees while the maximum and minimum humidity was 99% and 46% respectively.

3. (C) ANALYSIS:

a. Intelligence Analysis:

(1) The initial stages of Operation WHEELER were characterized by small contacts with local force units to include elements of the 72d Local Force Battalion and possibly the "K" VC Local Force companies. The lack of contact in the area and significant intelligence to the west warranted a change in the area of operation.

(2) Once the Brigade moved west, significant contacts were made with elements of the 2d NVA Division which were well trained and armed with modern communist bloc weapons of the "New Family". The enemy's base camps and storage areas were seldom found high in the mountains or far from supporting populated areas. Interrogation of local residents indicated extensive enemy control of hamlets within the Area of Operation with a complex infrastructure of organizations, e.g., Farmers Association, etc. There was continual movement of NVA units through populated areas. During Operation WHEELER, the NVA, traveling generally in platoon or larger size units, moved predominately during the early hours of the morning (0400-0700) and late afternoon-early evening (1700-2200). Using major high speed trails, enemy units moved six to eight kilometers a night. Local residents were used extensively as laborers, to maintain surveillance of American forces and as an early warning facility. Initially, little information was gained from questioning local civilians; yet in the latter stages of the operation, information was volunteered by detainees and local Vietnamese in the area. This change in attitude was probably due to the heavy labor and rice requirements levied by NVA units to support operations. Numerous rice and weapon caches were found in the area.

(3) Enemy Offensive Operations: NVA units initiated numerous night and daylight attacks invariably supported by heavy supporting fires of 60mm or 81mm mortars. The enemy seemed to have abundant mortar ammunition and frequently used 77mm and 75mm recoilless rifles as well as B-40 rocket launchers. Reports indicated that prior to a planned large scale attack, shallow graves were prepared for disposal of dead during withdrawal. The majority of large enemy initiated attacks occurred in late afternoon or early evening. This was a standard policy of most elements of the 2d NVA Division and allowed the enemy to withdraw under cover of darkness.
Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation WHEELER (U) cont'd

darkness if the engagement was not in their favor after the first hour. This also exploited the American forces limited air support capability at night. The enemy exploited periods of inclement weather by initiating several attacks, confident that the Brigade could not employ air strikes or ambushes due to poor visibility.

(a) Night mortar attacks were effective even when not followed by a ground assault. The enemy continued to use both the 60mm and 81mm mortar for close support in the attack, usually 400 meters or closer to the objective. Sights were seldom used and adjustment was made either by the gunner or by an observer close enough to both see the rounds land and to relay the adjustment by voice.

(b) Prior to night attacks, lights were observed on numerous occasions and were evidently used as signals to guide the unit. The enemy's communication capability at lower levels was poor, as evidenced on several occasions when friendly ambushes remained at the same location an entire day and engaged four and five groups of enemy on the same trail.

(c) Enemy Defensive Operations: The Brigade area of operation did not include a major enemy base area; however, fortified base camps and storage areas were found. Of the total large bunker complexes found, the enemy defended only a few. In these instances, frequent use of outposts and land line wire communication was noted. Bunkers were mutually supporting and well built. Where two bunkers were employed, one which was usually well camouflaged would remain inactive until the friendly unit assaulted the other bunker, and would then engage with flanking fire.

b. Communication Security: During Operation WHEELER, a total of 6,136 telephone transmissions and 69,913 FM radio transmissions were monitored. A total of 1,944 man hours were spent in support of Operation WHEELER, and fifteen security violations were monitored. Types of violations and number follow:

- Disclosure of classified location: 1
- Disclosure of classified plans: 2
- Disclosure of callsigns and frequencies: 9
- Use of unauthorised codes: 2
- Disclosure of classified information: 1

c. Interrogation of Detainees:

(1) During Operation WHEELER, all detainees were screened initially by an interrogation team attached to each battalion, and finally classified at the 9th ARVN MI Detachment both in interrogations and document translations.

(2) Discussion: Comparison of the figures for the total number of detainees picked up in the field by the battalions and the number sent to the Brigade collection point indicated that the majority of these detainees were being sent to the Brigade. In many instances, these detainees were not knowledgeable and need never have come to the Brigade command post area. Circumstances of capture of these detainees were, for the majority, not sufficient to indicate any reason for sending them to the Brigade. Battalions were reminded that all regulations applicable to the handling of detainees state that units in the field are not to generate refugees. Unless there was good reason, i.e., belligerent acts, suspicious activities, etc., the detainees should not be sent to the Brigade.
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Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operation After Action Report,
Operation WHEELER (U) cont'd

Maximum utilization must be made of advisory personnel and Vietnamese
leaders at district and province headquarters, National Police, and
other civilian channels.

(3) Each battalion received one US interrogator, and when
ever were possible, two trained ARVN interrogators. In addition, each
rifle company and reconnaissance element should have an interpreter in
the field. During Operation WHEELER, especially while units worked in
populated areas, the need for interpreters was acute. In these areas,
due to valuable intelligence to be gained from interrogation of local
civilians, a manpower element was only partially combat effective without
an interpreter. Responsibility for procurement and assigning interpreters
falls with the Brigade S-2. In the past, intelligence needs had no
priority for interpreters over S-5 or the psychological warfare section,
and battalions operated with one or two interpreters on several occasions.
It is felt that since the primary concern for interpreters lies with the
S-2, procurement and assignment should also become the S-2 responsibility.

(4) Recommendations:

(a) Units must indoctrinate their men to complete
the capture data on detainee tags in sufficient detail to provide an
intelligence basis for interrogation and classification. The primary
factor in classification is what the detainee was doing at the time of
capture. Such statements as the following are not satisfactory: "Found
on S&D Clearing Operation; Village Sweep". Battalion S-2's must assume
the responsibility for correcting capture tags before the detainee is
forwarded. The place of capture must be checked for accuracy and must
indicate the actual point of capture. In some cases, capture cards were
prepared at the battalion command post and given its location for the
place of capture of the detainee.

(b) Full utilization of the IPW teams at the battalion
level must be made. Simple and direct questions at that level should be
concerned with answering questions of immediate value to the unit and
early determination of status. Innocent civilians must be identified as
early as possible to minimize hardships and facilitate their return to
their village or government control.

(c) Care should be taken to ensure that materials
captured with detainees are forwarded with them for exploitation during
interrogation. These items include radios, money, documents, badges of
rank or military identifying equipment and other items. Such items as
weapons must be reported with the detainees and forwarded as soon as
possible for use in interrogation.

4. (C) S-2 AIR ACTIVITY:

a. Visual Reconnaissance (VR): A major source of intelligence
during Operation WHEELER was visual reconnaissance flown from 0-1 aircraft
utilizing aerial observers from the Imagery Interpretation Section, 181st
MI Detachment. Reconnaissance missions were flown daily during Operation
WHEELER, and were occasionally limited by prohibitive weather or lack of
aircraft because of maintenance. Usually a substitute aircraft was
provided by division artillery in these instances. Visual reconnaissance
was flown in areas requested by the battalion S-2's and in the absence
of specific requests, flown in areas designated by the brigade S-2's or S-2
air. Coordination was made with each battalion commander prior to
entering his area of operation, and sightings of immediate tactical value
were called directly to that battalion. Upon completion of the visual
reconnaissance flight, briefing was accomplished by the S-2 air and a
complete summary of the visual reconnaissance flight included in the air
activity portion of the daily intelligence summary. Visual reconnaissance
using on 0-1 was effective, but was somewhat limited by the speed of the
aircraft. During low level flights, the planes moved too fast for the
observers to effectively search. The enemy's anti-air capability in the
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Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operation After Action Report,
Operation WHEELER (U) cont'd

Brigade area of operation, coupled with the shortage of aircraft, prevented the use of helicopters for visual reconnaissance.

b. "People Sniffer": "People Sniffer" missions effectively produced intelligence in areas of heavy vegetation where visual reconnaissance was ineffective. It was also invaluable in determining the reliability of agent reports, locations of enemy units, hospitals or storage areas, or derived from the interrogation of prisoners of war and document residue which produced accurate up-to-date intelligence pictures. Unfortunately, due to a shortage of aircraft, a "People Sniffer" mission required a minimum of one HH-53 and two gunships to support it. Because of frequent commitments for gunships within the area of operation, "People Sniffer" missions were constantly cancelled.

c. Red Haze: Red Haze coverage during Operation WHEELER was inadequate for a number of reasons. Response time to requests was often too slow to take tactical advantage of situations. Also, the Red Haze missions had to be cancelled frequently because of weather conditions. Thirdly, the time necessary for coverage did not allow for a changing situation.

d. Discussion: "People Sniffer", visual reconnaissance, Red Haze and photo missions all served as excellent sources of information. Intelligence derived from the above and from ground reconnaissance, and agent reports all tied in with interrogation of prisoners of war and document residue which produced accurate up-to-date intelligence pictures. Unfortunately, due to support difficulties, predominantly with aircraft, air activity was not constant; thus the Brigade could not capitalize on one of the best timely sources of intelligence.

5. (C) LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE DETACHMENT: The Brigade Long Range Reconnaissance Detachment, during Operation WHEELER, was employed within the Brigade Area of operation and usually under operational control of one of the infantry battalions. This was due to the density of large NVA forces in the area and the inability to provide an immediate reaction force of significant size to complete employment of all maneuver elements. The unit was employed effectively as a mobile long-range target acquisition element, and on stationary observation posts with the mission of blocking enemy movement through the use of artillery and air strikes. The need for a second officer in the unit was apparent. While the platoon leader led them in the field, no officer in charge, administration, planning and implementation of additional or planned reconnaissance missions was available.

6. (C) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS: Counterintelligence personnel aided the Brigade and battalion staff in preparation for the Annual General Inspection by conducting inspections and recommending changes. The Counterintelligence Cash Award Program for returnees and local residents resulted indirectly in the capture of 28 weapons and the discovery of 36 tons of rice in various caches. Document security and physical security inspections were conducted throughout the brigade with no significant discrepancies noted. Six personnel security investigations were initiated developing thirty-eight leads.

7. (C) ENEMY LOSSES: The following losses were sustained by the enemy during Operation WHEELER:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>WHEELER</th>
<th>TOTAL WITH</th>
<th>TOTAL IN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA (C)</td>
<td>703/312</td>
<td>2405</td>
<td>5961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA (P)</td>
<td>26/0</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>2036</td>
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<tr>
<td>VC/KIA</td>
<td>42/8</td>
<td>135/38</td>
<td>600</td>
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<td>CIVIL KIA</td>
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<td>164</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA/PRISONERS</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DET/KIA</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2922</td>
<td>524</td>
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<tr>
<td>BODY/PRISONERS</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC/PRISONERS</td>
<td>8.3:1</td>
<td>9.1:1</td>
<td>9.3:1</td>
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CONFIDENTIAL
Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation WHEELER (U) cont'd

b. Weapons: Total - Individual - 186 Crew Served - 34

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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<tr>
<td>M1 Carbine</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M16</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>M1 Rifle</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>BAR</td>
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<tr>
<td>M-72 LAW</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thompson SMG</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French SMG</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Carbine</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62 Type 51</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-72 LAW</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M16</td>
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<tr>
<td>M16</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M16</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- M16 Carbine - 23
- M16 Rifle - 1
- M16 SMG - 8
- M16 LAW - 2
- Thompson SMG - 1
- French SMG - 2
- Russian Carbine - 1
- 7.62 Type 51 - 1
- M-72 LAW (2)  
- M16 (34)

C. Ammunition:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ammunition Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms</td>
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<tr>
<td>50 Cal</td>
<td>230</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.7 mm</td>
<td>400</td>
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<tr>
<td>B-40 Rockets</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>60mm Mortar</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm Mortar</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82mm Mortar</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82mm Mortar</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicom Claymore</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bouncing Betty</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57mm RR</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75mm RR</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 60mm Mortar - 11
- 81mm Mortar - 10
- 82mm Mortar - 40
- Chicom Claymore - 3
- Bouncing Betty - 2
- Mines - 0
- 57mm RR - 1
- 75mm RR - 6

Food Stuff:

- Rice: 198.7 tons
- Salt: 5 tons

Installations:

- Base Camps
- Fortified Bunkers - Hut complexes - 14

Signal:

- 2 Transistor radios

Miscellaneous:

- 731 lbs Marijuana
- Medical Supplies
- 100 entrenching tool heads
- 13 Sampans destroyed
- 10 Sampans damaged
- 1 Japanese typewriter
- 1 Typewriter, German made (Vietnamese characters)
- 1 Drill press
- 4 Night sighting devices for 75 RR
- 78,200 plasters
- 1 - 2.4" HEG carriage w/wheels

1 Inclosure:

TA0 A = Order of Battle

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T.I.B. (Order of Battle) to Inclosure I (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation WHEEILR (U)

1. (C) VC/NVA ORDER OF BATTLE

   a. NVA Units

      (1) The largest known unit operating within the tactical areas of responsibility was the 2d North Vietnamese Army Division:

          (a) Headquarters element (approximately 200 personnel).

          (b) Two NVA Regiments (approximately 2,100 personnel).

          (c) Five NVA Support Battalions (approximately 1,150 personnel).

          (d) One VC Main Force Regiment (approximately 1,795 personnel).

      (2) The 3d NVA Regiment was operating at a reduced strength of approximately 1,100 due to heavy losses taken during Marine Operations UNION I and II, from April to early June 1967. Organized into three battalions (1st, 2d and 3d), these units were considered marginally combat effective. The regiment was located in the vicinity of DT 1728.

      (3) The 21st NVA Regiment was organized into three battalions (11th, 22d and 33d) and a headquarters element with a total strength of 1,100. Although operating at reduced strength, the unit remained marginally combat effective. The 22d Battalion, 21st Regiment was contacted in early August during Operation BONITON. The regiment was located in the vicinity of PT 1728.

      (4) The GK-30 Signal Battalion, GK-40 Engineer Battalion and GK-31 Anti Aircraft Battalion provided combat support for the 2d NVA Division. The combined strength of supporting battalions was approximately 1,100. It was unlikely that the units would operate as battalions since they normally supported the regiments with company size elements.

   b. VC Main Force Units

      (1) The one Main Force Regiment (1st VC Regiment) was subordinate to the 2d NVA Division with a strength of approximately 1,795 which was distributed among a headquarters element and three battalions (40th, 60th and 90th). Due to losses incurred during Operation WHEELER and an influx of new personnel, this regiment was considered marginally combat effective. The regiment was located in the vicinity of ST 0129.

      (2) The 70th VC Main Force Battalion was subordinate to QUONG HAM Province Headquarters.

   c. VC Local Force Units

      (1) The 72d Local Force Battalion was believed to be operating in the vicinity of BT 1324 with an estimated strength of 200.

      (2) There were seven Local Force Companies believed to be operating in the vicinity of our tactical area of operation or within reinforce; distance. These units were believed to be located as follows:

          (a) 74th Local Force Company - BT 2407

          (b) 7-57th Local Force Company - BT 3311

          (c) K-51 Local Force Company - BT 1536

\[\text{TABA to Incl / CONFIDENTIAL / 19}\]
CONFIDENTIAL

T.O. 4 (Order of Battle to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat
Operation After Action Report, Operation WHEELER (U) cont'd

(d) K-52 Local Force Company - BT 1608
(e) K-53 Local Force Company - BT 3111
(f) K-54 Local Force Company - BT 2225
(g) K-55 Local Force Company - BT 1634

4. Base Area: There was no base area within the area of
operation.

2. ORDER OF BATTLE FINDINGS AND SUMMARY IN THE OPERATIONAL AREA:

a. Units not contacted were:

(1) The 2d NVA Division Headquarters, GK-31, Anti Aircraft
Battalion, GK-32, Recoiless Rifle Battalion, 70th Battalion, QUANG NGA
Provincial Unit, 3rd NVA Regiment, 90th Battalion, 1st VC Regiment.

(2) Elements of the 72d Battalion.

(3) Prisoner of war and documents captured indicated
the presence of the GK-30, Signal Battalion and GK-33, Mortar Battalion
in the area of operation. Two Prisoners of war from the GK-30, Signal
Battalion and the GK-33, Mortar Battalion died from wounds. No signi-
ficant contact with these units was verified.

b. Units Contacted:

(1) On 29 September 1967, Company C, 2d Battalion (Air-
borne), 327th Infantry and Company C, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d
Infantry engaged an estimated company size unit in khaki, friendly
units employed artillery and gunships. Information obtained from doc-
cuments captured indicated this unit was possibly an element of the 60th
Battalion, 1st VC Regiment. The 60th Battalion was then believed to
be in the vicinity of 9227.

(2) The ARVN Reconnaissance Company, operating with the 2d
Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry engaged an estimated platoon sized
unit on 30 September 1967, possibly an element of the 1st VC Regiment.

(3) On 2 October 1967, Company B, 2d Battalion (Airborne),
502d Infantry engaged a reinforced NVA platoon with the aid of gun-
ships and artillery. This unit was possibly an element of the 60th
Battalion, 1st VC Regiment.

(4) On 3 October 1967, Company A, 2d Battalion (Airborne),
327th Infantry engaged an NVA Battalion in fortified positions. The
enemy employed 81mm and 60mm Mortars and 12.7mm heavy machine
guns. A Chieu Hoi Returnee confirmed this unit to be the 22d Battalion, 1st
Regiment. The 22d Battalion was then believed to be in the vicinity of
9229.

(5) On 6 October 1967, Company C, 2d Battalion (Airborne),
502d Infantry engaged an estimated enemy platoon in tiger fatigues car-
yring an M-60 machine gun. The company employed gunships and artillery.

(6) On 9 October 1967, Company C, 2d Battalion (Airborne),
327th Infantry engaged a heavy mortar and ground attack from an es-
timated reinforced company employing 81mm mortars. Company A, 2d Bat-
talion (Airborne), 327th Infantry engaged with artillery while Company B
and the Reconnaissance Platoon of the Battalion maneuvered to assist.
No positive identity was obtained; however, it was believed to be elements
of the 1st VC Regiment, acting as a screening force for 2d NVA Division
Headquarters located to the west.

CONFIDENTIAL

20
T.O.A. (Order of Battle) to I closure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation WHEELER (U), cont'd

(7) On 9 October 1967, Company C, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry attacked the 33d Battalion Headquarters, 21st NVA Regiment on two sides. The results of the engagement identified the units as elements of the 21st Regiment. On 11 October 1967 a Hoi Chinh captain confirmed this unit as the 33d Battalion Headquarters of the 21st Regiment, 2d NVA Division. The 33d Battalion was then believed to be in the vicinity of ST 7125.

(8) On 15 October 1967, the Command Post, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and Company A, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry received a mortar and ground attack in which grenades and satchel charges were used. This enemy unit was believed to be elements of the GI-40 Engineer Battalion Support. The GI-40 Engineer Battalion was believed to be in the vicinity of CT 0315.

(9) On 15 November 1967, Company C, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry engaged an estimated NVA company and employed artillery, air strikes and gunships. Documents captured identified this unit to be the 60th Battalion, 1st VC Regiment, located at AT 9524.

3. (C) Friendly operations initiated during Operation WHEELER reduced the enemy's combat effectiveness considerably and inflicted heavy losses in the areas of weapons, food and manpower. The enemy was forced to split into small units to avoid decisive contact and to attempt to regroup in safer areas. As a result, the enemy's capability to conduct large operations was extremely limited and fewer decisive attacks are likely for several months. (NOTE: It is estimated that approximately one third of the 2d NVA Division became casualties, either killed or wounded; however, not all enemy units of the division were contacted).

4. (C) ORGANIZATION, DISPOSITION AND STRENGTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>ON</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>2d NVA Div</td>
<td>11th Inf Div 2</td>
<td>4500</td>
<td>AT 9032</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1st VC Regt</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>AT 8725</td>
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<td>AT 9524</td>
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<tr>
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<td>AREA</td>
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<td>CO</td>
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<tr>
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<td>GK-30 Sig Bh</td>
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TAB A (Order of Battle) to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations
After Action Report, Operation WHEELER (U), cont'd

1st VC Regt

40th 26th
60th 17th
90th 15th

14th 17th 19th 12th 20th

3d NVA Regt/3d NVA Div

1st 16th 17th 11th
2d 51st
3d

19th 18th 15th 13th 20th

1-1-6

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25
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C.O.S.A (Order of Battle) to LClosure I (Intelligence) to Combat Operations
After Action Report, Operation ANTOLEER (O), cont'd
22d Bn/21st Regt

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70th Bn

70th Co, 409th Sapper Bn

721 LS Bn

Confidential 28
1. (C) UNIT STRENGTHS:
   a. Beginning of Operation WHEELER:
      (1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Operation WHEELER were as follows:
      
      Authorized Augmented (MTOE) 4368  
      Assigned 4398  
      Present for Duty 4483  
      Airhead - ORU LAI 3337  
      Base Camp - PHU RANG 886  
      Not Present for Duty 433  
      
      (2) The assigned strength was 110% of the augmented authorized strengths. The present for duty strength was 101% of the augmented authorized strength.
      
      (3) Of the not present for duty strength, 40 were intransit, 173 were TDY/SD status, 205 on leave, 10 in confinement, 1 missing, and 6 AWOL.
   b. Conclusion of Operation WHEELER:
      (1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation WHEELER were as follows:
      
      Authorized Augmented (MTOE) 5187  
      Assigned 5534  
      Present for Duty 5197  
      Airhead - ORU LAI 2691  
      Base Camp - PHU RANG 2206  
      Not Present for Duty 337  
      
      (2) The assigned strength was 107% of the augmented authorized strength.
      
      (3) Of the not present for duty strength, 13 were intransit, 170 were TDY/SD status, 140 on leave, 8 in confinement, 1 missing, and 5 AWOL.
   c. Replacements received during Operation WHEELER were assigned to subordinate units as follows:
      
      | UNIT | OFF | EM |
      |------|-----|----|
      | 1-327 | 6   | 112|
      | 2-327 | 6   | 55 |
      | 2-502 | 11  | 32 |
      | 3-506 | 2   | 40 |
      | 2-320 | 4   | 93 |
      | Spt Bn | 6   | 78 |
      | Sep Co | 18  | 94 |
      
   d. Total replacements received during Operation WHEELER were 557.

2. (C) CASUALTIES: Casualties for Operation WHEELER were as follows:

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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>M2L</th>
<th>VHAI</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-327</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-327</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-502</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-1</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>179</td>
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Inclosure 3 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation WHEELER (U)

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<th>WM</th>
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<tr>
<td>2-320</td>
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<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td>A-2-17 Cav</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>A-236 Engr</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>181 MI Det</td>
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<tr>
<td>62 Inf (Scout Dog)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Chem Det</td>
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<tr>
<td>501 Sig</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sgt Bn</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (U) PERSONNEL PROGRAMS:

a. A Red Cross representative, assigned to the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, was present at all times in the forward area of operation; brigade personnel also had access to the American Division Red Cross office in CHU LII.

b. The American Red Cross Center in PHAN RANG had a total attendance of 19,181 during Operation WHEELER.

c. Clubmobile visits during Operation WHEELER were 111.

(1) Total attendance at clubmobile visits was 6,247.

(2) The clubmobile unit travelled 1,262 miles and spent 65 hours and 50 minutes in vehicular and air travel to accomplish their mission.

d. The Chaplain Section moved by convoy to CHU LII. The Chaplain Section plan for the operation was to consolidate the billeting, logistics and counseling facilities for all chaplains in one area. This provided more effective coordination and control of all chaplain facilities.

(1) Services were held in the tactical area of operation. Companies and at times, platoons received religious services in the tactical area of operation at least once every seven days. Brigade headquarters and each battalion area had Protestant and Catholic services. Transportation was provided the Jewish personnel for their High Holiday services at DA NANG. Total number of religious services held during Operation WHEELER was 257.

(2) The Brigade Chaplain held services for the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry in their area of operation when they were under operational control to the Brigade.

(3) The Brigade regulation on memorial services was re-written during this operation.

4. (U) PERSONNEL PLANNING: The Adjutant General branch provided the following services during Operation WHEELER:

a. There were 2,638 awards processed during Operation WHEELER:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Crosses</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Flying Crosses</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldier's Medal</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star for Valor</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Comm. for Valor</td>
<td>120</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Inclosure 3 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation WHEELER (U)

Air Medal for Valor 15
Legion of Merit 2
Bronze Star (Meritorious) 266
Air Medal (Meritorious) 224
AROM (Meritorious) 504
Purple Heart 240
CIB 870
OMB 69
Parachute Wing 32

b. Administrative Services Division provided daily courier service to the forward area in addition to its normal functions of distribution of external and internal messages, control of suspense, reproduction service, control of forms, Brigade Classified Repository, preparation of finalized general, special and letter orders and control of Brigade regulations and staff memorandums.

c. Personnel management branch gave two courtesy Pre-IG inspections to all subordinate units of the Brigade.

d. Records branch conducted record checks during the Brigade stand down and placed special emphasis on records maintenance during this period. There were 1,666 records in-processed and 833 records were out-processed.

e. Personnel actions branch processed 971 leaves, congressional inquiries, special cases, applications for RA appointment, helicopter training and Warrant Officer appointments, OCS, and direct commissions.

f. AG casualty branch processed the following during Operation WHEELER:

- Killed Hostile Action 120
- Died of Wounds 4
- Wounded Hostile Action 465
- Killed Non-hostile Action 11
- Miscellaneous Injuries 76

WHEELER:

- Reenlistments 95
- School Applications 29
- In-Country Assignments 42
- ETS Extensions of U.S. Personnel 21
- ETS Extensions of AUS Personnel 3

h. The postal section, during Operation WHEELER, received and dispatched 1,393 pouches and sacks of mail with a total weight of 48,125 pounds. Incoming mail, with a total of 7,989 sacks and pouches, was processed. The weight of the incoming mail was 190,588 pounds. Transit data on mail is as follows:

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<tr>
<th>Number of days mail was received</th>
<th>Average transit time</th>
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<td>AIR MAIL</td>
<td>1ST CLASS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6 days</td>
<td>6.42 days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

i. Finance division activities during Operation WHEELER encompassed the following:
Inclosure 3 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation WHEELER (U)

1. Total payments prepared were 23,501.
2. Total cash disbursed was $2,464,272.43.
3. Total checks written was 8,626.
4. Total dollar amounts of checks was $4,321,657.53.
5. The finance officer and deputy finance officer conducted many day operations in the tactical area of operation providing direct financial advice to the needs of the paratrooper.
6. The smooth integration of the Finance Records of the 3d Battalion (Airborne), 506th Infantry with those of the Brigade was the direct result of excellent prior coordination on the part of the Finance Division, 1st Brigade and the Finance Division, 101st Airborne Division.

j. The post exchange conducted $442,568.91 worth of retail business during Operation WHEELER. The "Mobile PX" was sent to the forward area from PHN RANG during the October stand down and was received very favorably by the troopers. Sales success was encouraging.

k. Judge Advocate General activities during Operation WHEELER were as follows:
1. An average of 10 personnel were seen daily for legal assistance,
2. During Operation WHEELER the following court martials were processed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GENERAL</th>
<th>SPECIAL</th>
<th>SUMMARY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1. C Concept of Support:

a. General: External logistical support for the forward elements of the brigade was provided by the 15th Support Brigade, AFRICAL Division and the 50th General Support Group, 1st Logistical Command. Internal logistical support was provided by the brigade's organic support battalion.

b. Field Trains: All classes of supply and services were provided by the field trains consisting of a Forward Support Element of the Support Battalion and battalion trains elements. The Forward Support Element provided all classes of supply to the collocated battalion trains which, in turn, supplied the rifle companies exclusively by air lines of communication direct from the field trains location.

c. Combat Trains: During the early portion of Operation WHEELER, resupply to the forward companies was effected directly from the field trains location. This required an average of thirty minutes flight time one way. With the beginning of the monsoon season resupply from the field trains became extremely difficult due to the unpredictable weather. Stockage of the tactical command post/file locations were accomplished in an attempt to cut down the flight time to the rifle companies. Due to the weather becoming clear enough to effect resupply, utilization of combat trains out down the helicopter flight time to one quarter of that required to fly from the field trains area.

d. Forward Supply Points:

   (1) General: Two Forward Supply Points were established during Operation WHEELER in an attempt to shorten lines of communication and thereby cut down the minimum the air time of Army rotary wing resupply missions. Both Forward Supply Points were limited in nature, containing stockage of only the essentials: Class I (Hail Combat Individual), Class III, Class V, water and fast moving II & IV.

   (2) TEM P-000: The Forward Support Element established a Forward Supply Point containing Class V (without artillery ammunition), Class I, fast moving Class II and IV, engineer water point, and a limited 6000 gallon helicopter refuel and rearm point. Resupply of the Forward Supply Point was accomplished by C130 and C17 aircraft. Problems were encountered in maintaining the required stockage at the Forward Supply Point due to lack of space, nonavailability of aircraft, and bad weather which damaged the airfield and limited the number of aircraft sorties. Attempts were made to stock the Forward Supply Point by C130 aircraft. But they were unsuccessful due to a low priority and the limited number of aircraft available. Eventually, it was decided to change the concept of the Forward Supply Point from one of five days supply to one for four days supply only. Weather improved at the end of the operation, allowing the stock to be built up again through C130 sorties.

   (3) TAM KI: A Forward Supply Point was established at TAM KI by the 15th Support Brigade to effect resupply of the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry and the 2nd Battalion (Airborne), 50th Artillery, due to the large number of rounds and weight of ammunition required to resupply the batteries, and because of limited airlift, resupply to TEM P-000 with artillery ammunition was impossible. TAM KI, on the other hand, could be resupplied by truck convoy. Subsequent airlift from that location cut air time to battery positions to half of that required to resupply directly from CHU LAI. The Forward Supply Point was effective until the arrival of the monsoon season when flooding prevented further stockage of artillery ammunition. This problem was solved by sending a convoy to TAM KI every morning and lifting the previously stock ammunition from the SLP trailers to the fire-base by C123 helicopters.

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Incl 4
Inclusion of (logistics) to Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation WHEELER (U)

2. (C) Material and Services:

a. Supply:

1. Class I: "Meal, Combat, Individual" formed the bulk of all Class I consumed during the operation. "MA" rations were for main usage, and "CA" ration supplies for "CM" rations were readily available. No significant shortages were encountered. Total Class I rations issued was 259,920 and total weight was 479.7 short tons.

2. Class II and IV: The bulk of Class II and IV items used by the Brigade was drawn through the 94th Supply and Service Battalion, AMBUSH Support Command. Shortages included small sized fatigues, poncho liners, ruck sacks and, on occasion, bunker material. The large volume of 'enemy mortar fire received into the battalion tactical command posts created a demand for bunker material which, at times, exceeded resources. A total of 227 short tons of Class II and IV was issued to the forward elements.

3. Class III: The 221st Supply and Service Company provided all types of Class III in sufficient quantities to support logistical and tactical operations. The Brigade drew a total of 527.3 short tons of Class III and no problems were encountered.

4. Class V: The 23rd Ammunition Platoon supplied the Brigade with all Class V items, thus where no significant problems or shortages. The Brigade used a total of 1,556.2 short tons of Class V.

5. Water: Portable water was available from two water points on CHU LAI post. In addition, Company A, 106th Engineer Battalion (Airborne) established water points at TIN HAO and TAM KY. During the operation, the Brigade was issued 250 gallon collapsible water drums. These drums proved to be much more adaptable to air movement than the 400 gallon water trailers.

b. Maintenance: Direct support maintenance was provided by the 188th Maintenance Battalion through the maintenance load-chart of the Forward Support Element. Maintenance problems included nonavailability of major assemblies which resulted in salvage of the end item. A Brigade Command Maintenance Management Inspection team was formed and all forward units were inspected during material readiness stand-down periods.

c. Transportation:

1. Vehicular: Due to the Brigade's static position, vehicular transportation was utilized only for routine runs in the base area. Convoys were dispatched daily to move small loads of ammunition to TAM KY. Vehicular support was furnished by the 103rd Transportation Company.

2. Air: United States Air Force C-23, C-130, C-7A, and Army Aviation OH-6 and OH-13 aircraft provided airlift support for the entire operation. A daily C-23 shuttle between CHU LAI and TAM ANH was scheduled in direct support of the Brigade. Three airlifts were conducted at the close of the operation on the 23, 24th and 25th of November 1967, moving three infantry battalions and three artillery battalions. The airlift required eight sorties to move the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry with its direct support artillery battery, eight sorties to move the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry with its direct support artillery battery, and nine sorties to move the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry with its direct support artillery battery and counter-mortar radar.
Inclouro 4 (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation WHEELER (Continued)

(j)-Sealift: At the close of the operation, a sealift was conducted to PHAW BAKO with the Forward Support Element, battalion trains, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 300th Artillery, Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry Company A, 126th Engineer Battalion (Airborne), and Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company. The move required a total of eight Landing Ships, Tank (LST).

d. Other Services: Graves Registration and Quartermaster Laundry and bath services were available from the 221st Supply and Service Company.

J. (C) Medical Services:

a. General: Brigade medical elements were employed in their conventional unit and area support roles. Each battalion established and operated an aid station in the general vicinity of its tactical command post. The Brigade Medical Company operated a forty bed medical facility at the Brigade forward command post at CHU LAI.

b. Hospitalization and Evacuation: Casualties were evacuated from field locations to the 2d Surgical Hospital for treatment. Those casualties that could be returned to duty within three to five days were rehospitalized to the Brigade Medical Company and casualties that required more extensive care were further evacuated to the 67th or 85th Evacuation Hospitals located at QUI NHON. During periods of peak casualty loads, it became necessary to treat some patients at the rear by 1st Marine Hospital. The 1st Marine Hospital was augmented with our professional and paramedical personnel.

c. Aeromedical Evacuations: Initially this support was provided by the 498th Air Ambulance Company; it was subsequently assigned to the 137th Medical Detachment (Helicopter Ambulance). At times, medical ships were positioned at forward supply bases for prompt response to medical evacuation requirements. This technique was employed when the turn around time was considered excessive.

d. Medical Statistics:

(1) Killed Hostile Actions: 124
(2) Wounded Hostile Actions: 165
(3) Non Hostile Injuries: 89

(b) Significant Diseases:

(a) Gastroenteritis: 95
(b) Upper Respiratory Infection: 12
(c) Neuro Psychiatric Conditions: 17
(d) Hepatitis: 10
(e) Malaria: 267
(f) Fever of Unknown Origin: 162
(g) Dermatitis: 80
(h) Anemia: 20
(i) Foot Problems: 18

4-3
Inclosure 5 (Chemical) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation WHELTON (1)

1. (C) General: Chemical combat support activities conducted in support of Brigade tactical units can be categorized as follows:

a. Employment of riot control agent CS in ground and air assault operations.

b. Flare warfare

c. Tunnel denial operations

d. Destruction/contamination of enemy rice and salt caches.

e. Employment of manpack personnel detector in an intelligence gathering role.

2. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Aerial employment of riot control agent CS:

(1) On 21 September 1967 Company B, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry made contact with an unknown size enemy force in bunkered positions. Several tactical air and artillery strikes were called on the enemy positions; however the company continued to receive heavy automatic weapons fire. On 22 September at 1000H persistent riot control agent CS was employed against the enemy utilizing the 2.75 inch rocket pod (modified) attached to a UH-1D helicopter. A total of 890 CS grenades were dropped on the enemy position in six low level passes over the target area. The entrenched NVA immediately evacuated their bunkers and began fleeing to the west in an attempt to break contact. Tactical air and artillery were used against the fleeing enemy.

(2) On 28 September 1967 Company B, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry made contact with an entrenched enemy force. During the contact a total of 696 CS grenades were dropped on the enemy positions in four low level passes over the target area.

(3) On 10 October 1967 Company C, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry pursued an unknown size enemy force into a hamlet complex which contained several bunkers and was surrounded by a trench system. Prior to assaulting the enemy positions a total of 890 CS and 462 smoke grenades was dropped approximately 50 meters upwind of the hamlets. The CS and smoke drifted over the target area immediately causing the enemy to evacuate their trenches and bunkers while the smoke screened the Infantry company during their assault.

(4) On 12 October 1967 Company A, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry received sniper fire from several snipers throughout the morning. Artillery was called into the general area from which the snipers were firing, with negative results. At 1300 hours 632 CS grenades were dropped from a low flying UH-1D helicopter in five passes over the target area. The sniper fire ceased and Company A continued its assigned mission.

b. Contamination/destruction of rice caches: Of the total rice tonnage captured by tactical elements of the Brigade, 49.6 tons were located in areas that were inaccessible to helicopters to effect evacuation, or due to the tactical situation, could not be extracted. This rice was destroyed by engineer and chemical personnel by seeding the caches with CS and then scattering it throughout the area using cratering charges. A total of 893 pounds of bulk CS-powder were utilized in these operations.

c. Flamethrowers: Two flamethrowers were utilized by Company A, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry against two enemy bunkers. The operations were successful.

d. Flame Field Expedients: Fougasse employments were constructed at the tactical command post of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry
and 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry. Five emplacements were constructed on likely avenue of approaches to the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry tactical command post. Four were constructed for the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry. All emplacements were rigged for command detonation.

a. M-napack Personnel Detector ("People Sniffer")s During Operation WHEELER the "People Sniffer" was employed to gather intelligence information. Thirty-three missions for a total of 46 hours were flown with UH-1 series helicopters. Significant readings were immediately provided to the Battalion and Brigade S-2 and the Artillery fire support coordinator. Many of the "People Sniffer" readings were incorporated into the artillery Harassing and Interdiction fire plan.

(1) In the conduct of "People Sniffer" operations, four helicopters were utilized: Two UH-1D helicopters (one serving as the "People Sniffer" and the other served as the recording/extraction helicopter in the event the "People Sniffer" helicopter was forced down) and two gunships. The sniffer ship flew at tree top level at speeds up to one-hundred knots. The recording/extraction ship followed about 500 meters behind the "sniffer" and at an altitude of 1000 to 1500 feet. The gunships followed at altitude and speed so they could support the "People Sniffer".

(2) Two machines were used on each mission. A hot spot was only recorded when both machines registered a maximum reading.

3. LESSONS LEARNED

a. M-napack Personnel Detector ("People Sniffer")s are a reliable intelligence gathering source.

b. Combined CS/smoke grenade missions can be effectively conducted in support of assaults of bunkered positions and fortified VC/NVA hamlets.

c. Non-Persistent riot control agent CS can be utilized to reduce enemy fire when snipers are well concealed and only their general location known.
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Inclosure 6 (Civil Affairs) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation WHEELER (U)

1. (C) MISSION: The civil affairs mission was to control and coordinate:
   a. Refugee Movement
   b. Food Extraction
   c. Medical Assistance (MEDCAP)
   d. Return of Innocent Civilians
   e. Animal Evacuation
   f. Civic Action Projects
   g. Distribution of Supplies and Commodities
   h. Miscellaneous activities

2. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION:
   a. Refugees were evacuated to province headquarters in TAN KY where processing was conducted by government officials. Only refugees who volunteered to depart the area or those who hindered the tactical maneuver elements were extracted.
   b. Significant food caches in the area of operation were extracted to TAN KY or TAN PHUOC Special Forces Camp. Food in excess of two tons was considered significant enough to attempt extraction. Every reasonable effort, even under adverse circumstances, was exerted to extract polished rice or salt.
   c. A relatively secure base of operations provided opportunity for a broad MEDCAP program. Coordination was effected with other tactical units in order to identify clearly areas of responsibility. Brigade units undertook responsibility for the handling of MEDCAP in LY THANH District, QUANG TIN Province. One battalion was assigned to each of these three districts while still another battalion conducted MEDCAP operations at the TAN PHUOC Special Forces Camp. In addition, various MEDCAP were conducted in selected areas throughout the area of operation depending on the tactical situation, need of assistance and availability of MEDCAP teams.
   d. Civilians apprehended in the battle area as suspected Viet Cong sympathizers were extracted for questioning. Upon being classified innocent civilians, they were returned to their respective district in which apprehended, or being of draft age, were escorted to province headquarters for disposition by government authorities.
   e. Civic action projects began slowly but grew in size and number as security, local interest, transportation of commodities and coordination with supply channels improved. The technique used was for CUBES to supply the materials, Brigade personnel to provide the supervision and technical advice, and the Vietnamese nationals to perform the labor.

3. (C) EXECUTION: The civil affairs mission was executed in eight areas:
   a. Refugee Movement:

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Downgraded at 5 year intervals
Declared after 18 years
DOD DIR 5200.10
# Confidential

Enclosure A (Civil Affairs) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation "VICTOR" (U) (Continuation)

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TOTAL TR. 11,230

### D. INNOCENT CIVILIANS

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Inclosure 6 (Civil Affairs) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation WHEATON (U) (Continuation)

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<td>TOTAL INCIDENTS</td>
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### e. Animal Evacuation:

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<td>1</td>
<td>T.J. K'</td>
<td>Chicken</td>
</tr>
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</table>

TOTAL ANIMALS 2

### f. Civic Action Projects:

1. Water well
2. Water well renovated
3. Public shower stalls
4. Public showers
5. Four room school
6. Culverts
7. Three hundred fifty meter roadway
8. School flag pole foundation
9. Schoolyard landscape
10. Housing units for 126 families
11. Hospital Dispensary foundation
12. Three room school foundation
13. Heel & drainage system
14. Items of school furniture (chairs, tables, desks)
15. Water towers
16. Block and tackle

### g. Distribution of Supplies and Commodities:

- Steel plumbing - 112 linear feet
- Sawing machine - 1 each
- Lumber - 20,000 board feet
- Dirt fill - 60 cubic yards
- Crushed rock - 22.5 cubic yards

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Inclosure 6 (Civil Affairs) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation
WHEELER (U) (Continuation)

Water tanks - 2 (1-532 gal) (1-300 gal)
Concrete - 440 sacks
Tin roofing - 800 sheets
Woven steel hose - 25 feet
Rice bags - 1,134
Sandbags - 18,000 bags
Steel culverts - 3 (2-18' x 15') (1-18' x 20')
Barbed wire - 1600 feet
School kits - 225
Water pumps - 4 (4-1/2 hp, 3 each)
Polyethylene - 2,560 square feet
Shower heads - 5 each
Water pipe - 1 1/2 inch - 10 feet
Water pipe - 3/4 inch - 20 feet
Water pipe - 3" - 80 feet
Medic supplies - 75 pounds
Food - 2,138 pounds
Socks - 489 pounds
Tobacco - 33 pounds

h. Miscellaneous Activities:

(1) Salutary payments:

a. Payment of 1000,000 VNN to civilian worker accidentally injured while performing daily hire labor.
b. Payment of 400,000 VNN to parents of child fatally injured by accidental discharge of weapon.

(2) Awards and Honors:

(a) Brigade Certificates of Appreciation:

(1) Three civilian interpreters from QUANG NAM Province,
(2) Senior Provincial Advisor QND, QUANG NAM Province,
(3) Village Chief, LY TIN (H) LY TIN (D), QUANG TIN (I).

(b) Brigade Appreciation Plaque:

(1) Provincial Chief, QUANG TIN Province,
(2) Senior Provincial Advisor QND, QUANG NAM Province,
(3) District Chief, NAM HAM (D) QUANG NAM (7),
(4) District Chief, NOC 150 (Q) QUANG NAM (1),
(5) Provincial of QUANG TIN

(c) Vietnamese Awards:

(1) Vietnamese flag presented to Brigade from QUANG TIN Province,
(2) QUANG TIN Province Chief recommended nine Brigade members for Civil Affairs award,
(3) QUANG WAI Province recommended thirty-eight Brigade members for Civil Action Honor Medal.

(d) Joint Honors: Joint flag raising ceremony conducted at Los Banos Base Camp. QUANG TIN Province Chief and acting Brigade Commander jointly officiated.

4. (c) TOTAL OPER. WHEELER STATISTICS:

a. Refugees Relocated: 1,150 persons
b. Food Extracted: 43,550 tons
c. Persons Medically Treated: 11,200 persons
d. Innocent Civilians Returned: 302 persons
e. Animal Evacuation: 2 animals
f. Civil-action Projects: 267 completed
g. Distribution of Supplies and Commodities: As indicated
h. Miscellaneous Activities: 47 Actions
Include 6 (Civil Affairs) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation WHEELER (U) (Continuation)

5. (C) CIVIL AFFAIRS: For the following reasons, the Brigade has encountered difficulty in its civil affairs program.

(1) Areas not secured and enemy infested.
(2) Frequent movement of friendly elements in the operational area.
(3) Need of operation accessible only by air transportation.

It was observed that population movement and control presented a major problem to QUANG BINH Province. Existing facilities for receiving and caring for refugees needs further expansion. Further, new government security forces are urgently needed. The road between TISH 2/265 Special Forces Camp and TIN NAI City needs to be secured and opened. Plans should be developed for a US counterpart at HUE DUC District and QMN authority at HIE DISC District. This would allow province to capitalize significantly on the impact of tactical operations and begin effective pacification measures throughout the province.

It was noted that short duration, high impact type civic action projects can be executed successfully in the Brigade forward area even under adverse conditions. An example of this type project was the building of a four room school at LY M. Hamlet. This hamlet had limited dynamic security and at night was not secure. Even under these circumstances, the new school was completed in October. At 0030 hours on 7 November 1967, the enemy mortared the hamlet. Following this event, a thirty man Viet Cong force came through the hamlet, killed four and wounded seventeen persons and abducted eight teenagers. The Viet Cong attempted to destroy the new school and did in fact, blow out a wall section with demolitions; the wall was repaired later by the citizens. The citizens, in complete defiance of the Viet Cong, on 17 November 1967 dedicated their school to the 101st Airborne Division. The citizens decided to emboss upon their school the Screaming Eagle shoulder patch above which is printed in Vietnamese “Civil Affairs Delegation From 101st Airborne Division Presented To The People of LY M. Hamlet”. A courageous decision made by the hamlet elders and backed up by an even more courageous citizenry in their fight against Viet Cong oppression. The willing support of the hamlet people had certainly been won through a short duration, high impact civic action project.
1. **MISSION:** The Signal Company (Provisional) 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division had the mission of providing signal center service to units in the vicinity of the Brigade headquarters, installing and operating the Brigade command signal systems and providing access trunks to the Brigade multichannel system for all subordinate elements.

2. **OPERATIONS**

   a. **General:** The Signal Company (Provisional), 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division provided signal support during Operation WHATLER by establishing the Brigade command post communications system at CHU LAI.

   b. **VHF Section:** Organic VHF equipment was not used. VHF carrier support was provided by the 599th Signal Battalion, American Division. Twelve VHF circuits were provided for the Brigade command post. Of these twelve, five were common users and seven were sole user teletype circuits.

   c. **FM Radio:** FM radio communications were established at CHU LAI for Operation WHATLER. The operation consisted of eight Brigade FM radio nets as follows:

      1. Brigade Command Net.
      2. Brigade Command Net (secure).
      3. Brigade Operation and Intelligence Net.
      4. Brigade Administration/Logistics Net.
      5. Brigade Aviation Net.
      6. General Purpose Net.

   In addition, the Brigade entered the American Division command net and monitored battalion command nets on order. FM communications between the tactical area of operation and the Brigade command post were boosted by Brigade automatic retransmission relay sites. All nets operated by the Brigade were operational twenty-four hours daily.

   d. **The Switchboard/wire section established:**
      - The switchboard/wire section established the Brigade command post communications at CHU LAI terminating 98 telephone circuits. Approximately 45 miles of wire were installed.
      - The communication center terminated two teletype circuits at CHU LAI. One circuit was to American Division communication center and one to the Brigade rear communication center.
      - The X radio section operated secure radio teletype circuits at CHU LAI and PHU RANG.

   e. **Maintenance section:**
      - The maintenance section continued to provide signal maintenance support of the Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company and all attached elements.
Inolosure 8 (Psychological Operations) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation WHiLLER (U)

1. (U) MISSION: Assist the ground commander in the accomplishment of his tactical mission by issuing instructions to the population and by reducing the combat effectiveness of the VC and NVA units by exploiting the psychological vulnerabilities of the VC and NVA.

2. (C) EXECUTION:

a. General: During Operation WHiLLER 23,323,000 leaflets were distributed and 191.5 hours of loudspeaker broadcasts were made.

b. Psychological Programs: During Operation WHiLLER the following programs were conducted:

(1) Leaflets: Upon commencement of the operation, leaflets were used to notify the civilian population of allied presence in the area and to promulgate curfew instructions. After all the civilians had been notified, leaflet messages were used to demoralize the VC and NVA and to encourage participation in the CHI-HO program.

(2) Infrastructure: A special taped message, safe conduct passes and surrender instruction leaflets were targeted against local VC infrastructure by name each time names and locations in the area of operation could be correlated.

(3) Body Count: Daily special loudspeaker broadcasts were made in the area of operation which announced the day's and the cumulative enemy body count for the operation.

(4) Detainees: All personnel detained by Brigade forces, that were subsequently released, were given a leaflet which explained allied presence in their area. It pointed out that, contrary to what they had been told by the VC, the American forces had not harmed them.

(5) Base Camp Operations: Loudspeaker broadcasts were made around the Brigade base camp perimeter and along Highway 1 near CHU L.I. Curfew instructions, election results, CHI-HO instructions and folk music composed the broadcasts.

(6) MECAP: Tapes designed specifically for MECAP operations by the 24th Psychological Operations Company were played in conjunction with MECAP operations. Additionally, current copies of TU DO (JUSPAO newspaper) were distributed in all areas in which MECAP were conducted.

3. (C) SPECIAL PROJECTS: Delayed opening leaflet bundles (DOL) were prepared and distributed to personnel conducting visual reconnaissance flights. DOL's were distributed by these personnel on all enemy sighted. Additionally, DOL's containing a special leaflet were prepared and issued to Air Force forward air controllers for distribution in areas where the enemy had been located with the "People Sniffer" flights. Distribution was made following artillery fire or air-strikes.

4. (U) RESULTS:

a. Returnees, by month in QUANG TIN Province:

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<th>Month</th>
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<td>OCT</td>
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<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOV</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>19</td>
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b. The highest monthly number for the year in QUANG TIN Province occurred in the month of November. The previous monthly high of 54 occurred in the month of August at which time the Brigade was conducting Operation NOU RIVER in the Province.

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Downgraded at 2 year intervals
Declassified after 15 years
DOD DIR 5200.19
5. (C) CONCLUSIONS: The progressive increase in the number of HOI CHAIN per month represents a pattern different from that encountered previously by the Brigade in the conduct of combat operations. In past operations, the greatest increase in HOI CHAIN occurred during the first month of operations after which the level of returns dropped to a lower figure (but still higher than previous months when no operations were conducted in the area). This difference in pattern could be attributed to the fact that prior to Operation WHEELEER, no large-scale combat operations had been conducted in the province. The VC and NVA were well armed, equipped and had high morale. The suffering of many defeats over a protracted period apparently resulted in a lowering of the enemy’s morale with the resultant increase in returns as the enemy situation deteriorated. In the future, the enemy in the area will probably react to friendly operations in the more normal manner i.e., the most returns in the first month followed by a small drop in succeeding months as long as the memory of Operation WHEELEER affects their mental set.

6. (C) PROBLEM AREAS:

a. Speaker Ship Control: Communications were lacking between the division headquarters and supporting PSYOP aircraft which prevented adequate control of the aircraft during the conduct of loudspeaker missions. On several occasions, the loudspeaker aircraft interfered with artillery fire missions being conducted in the area of operation and could not be advised to leave the area.

b. Delays in leaflet printing: The time required to obtain leaflets from the 244th Psychological Operation Company was excessive. On one occasion, two weeks elapsed between request for a leaflet and delivery. On the same occasion, a stock of leaflets arrived after ten days with an incorrect message. The additional delay resulted from the leaflet having to be reprinted correctly.

c. Leaflet quality: In general, leaflets printed by the 244th Psychological Operation Company were of poor quality. Pictures were not clear, layout was poor and color selection, when color was used, was poorly determined.

d. Leaflet Rollers: A machine to roll leaflets for insertion into artillery leaflet rounds was not available for use thru PSYOP supporting agencies although a requirement existed within the Brigade for such a machine.

e. Lack of detailed psychological operations intelligence and feedback continue to be the two greatest problems in the field of PSYOPS. Detailed appeals cannot be devised because of this lack nor can accurate evaluation of effectiveness be conducted. As a result only general appeals can be used which limit the effectiveness of the psychological operations being conducted.
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In order to combine operation after action report, Operation Wheeler (tunnels and tunnel complexes destroyed: 17)

- Friendly losses for Operation Wheeler were one engineer killed and four engineers wounded. Enemy killed by engineer personnel are included in those reported by the maneuver battalions to which they were in direct support.

4. (C) PROBLEMS AREAS AND LESSONS LEARNED:

- The construction capability of the engineer company continues to be hampered by the lack of airmobile engineer equipment, primarily the lack of a vibrator, compactor, an airmobile grader, and primer distribution equipment. Issue of the airmobile engineer equipment kit (estimated in December 1967) would eliminate this problem area.

- The carbide tipped chain saw (Ensure 195) scheduled for issue in November 1967 is sorely needed.

- The tunnel exploration kit (Ensure 64) is needed.

- A more powerful liquid explosive (Astrolite - G) is needed for more effective tunnel destruction.

- It was found that mined helicopter landing zones necessitated thorough air strike preparation and a method to get the troops safely off the landing zone. A method was proposed and tested which involved the use of the M1 projected mine clearing charge to provide cleared paths off the landing zone. Use of these charges by engineers in the first lift of troops into the landing zone was accomplished prior to entry of other troops into the landing zone. A number of these M1 projected charges are now on hand for future operations.

- Enemy use of captured M16 antipersonnel mines necessitated an M16 mine study and training program to lessen casualties and eliminate misconceptions. It was effectively demonstrated that the mine does detonate when pressure of 8-20 pounds is applied to the prong of the fuse and that the mine will detonate regardless of whether or not the mine bounces out of the ground, and that the weight of an average man will not keep the mine from bouncing. It was further demonstrated that a man has 24 seconds after initiating the fuse to take some action. The action that will minimize casualties is to hit the ground, yell "Hてくれ" and cover up as a soldier would for an inc. ming grenade.

- There is a consistent danger of premature detonation of M16 Claymore Mines by static electricity, lighting, and most probably, by currents caused by radio frequency signals. There is extreme danger of this at the battalion tactical command posts where many radios are present and counter mortar radar is frequently placed. The safety procedure necessary to prevent these premature detonations is always to keep the shorting plug connected to the firing wire except when the firing device is connected for firing.
1. (C) MISSION: The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery supported the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. Battery C, 3d Battalion (155T), 36th Artillery was assigned the mission of reinforcing the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery. From 11 to 24 September 1967 Battery B, 2d Battalion (105T), 9th Artillery was placed under operational control (OPCON) of the battalion and provided support for the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry. From 4 October to 6 November 1967 Battery A, 2d Battalion (105T), 9th Artillery was placed under the OPCON of the battalion and provided support for the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry. A searchlight section (two lights) from Battery B, 29th Artillery was placed under the OPCON of the battalion and collocated with the tactical command post, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry from 7 to 24 November 1967.

2. (C) SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS:

   a. In the conduct of Operation WHEELER, the same techniques of artillery employment that have proven successful in the past were employed. The three organic batteries of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery continued to provide support for their normally attached infantry battalions from fixed positions in the vicinity of the infantry tactical command posts.

   b. The AN/SPG-4A Counterfire Radar was placed under the OPCON of the American Division on 11 September 1967 and remained in the CHU 5200 area. On 3 October 1967 the radar section terminated OPCON of the division and conducted an airborne displacement to the Firebase at CHU 992182. While at this location, it was necessary to establish a Tactical Intelligence Center collocated with the radar section. This center kept continuous, up-to-date plots of all friendly locations, slant range plots of all locations and record of all hostile mortar locations previously determined and engaged. Direct communications were maintained with the battalion command post to provide rapid response in case of an enemy mortar attack on friendly positions within range. The personnel to man this center came from the battalion survey section. Upon extinction of the firebase, the radar section, to include the Tactical Intelligence Center, conducted an airborne displacement on 17 October 1967 to CHU 132433 and was collocated with the tactical command post of the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, later replaced by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 506th Infantry.

   c. Additional forward observer requirements were imposed on the 3d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery with a Mobile Strike Force Company from Company C, 5th Special Forces Group (DAW) and the Reconnaissance Company, 2d Cavalry Division being attached to the Brigade from 11 September to 2 October 1967 and from 28 September to 7 October 1967, respectively. This requirement exceeded the organic capability of the battalion; however, two additional forward observer sections were formed and provided to the two units by using personnel from organic sections and battalion headquarters. Two additional liaison sections were also formed from battalion resources. One section was located at the MABOC Special Forces Camp to clear fire mission grids and obtain political clearance as required. The other liaison section was initially collocated with Battery C, 1st Battalion (105T), 77th Artillery effective 23 September (BT 091927), and subsequently dislocated to Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airborne) at BT 132433 with the mission to coordinate fires and obtain clearance of fire mission grids as necessary.

   d. Due to the requirement to provide an additional firing battery upon the arrival of the 3d Battalion (Airborne), 506th Infantry, Battery D (Provisional) 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery was organized on 10 October 1967. Personnel and equipment were gathered from existing resources within the battalion. To provide additional training before assuming support of the 3d Battalion (Airborne), 506th Infantry and to give the other three batteries of the battalion a short stand-down, the personnel of Battery D replaced the personnel of Battery C in place from 13 to 18 October 1967. Subsequently, Battery D personnel replaced Battery A personnel from 15 to 22 October 1967, and Battery B personnel from 23 to 25 October 1967.
Inclosure 10 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation WHEELE (U)

a. On 15 Oct 1967 Battery A, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery was subjected to heavy mortar and ground attack which resulted in 6 US killed and 29 wounded (modovac). Later in the same morning, the remaining personnel of Battery A were extracted to the Brigade's base camp for a stand-down and retraining. The recently formed Battery B (Provisional) assumed their mission. Within three days, Battery A received substantial reinforcements and completed an initial reorganization. During the following three days, the battery conducted extensive training to include a live fire exercise and a mobile displacement. On 22 October 1967 the personnel of Battery A returned to the field and resumed support of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

3. (C) EXECUTION:

a. H/2-320 Displacements:

(1) On 091050 Sep 67 HHD deployed overland from DUC PHO to CHU LAI via BT 592094. Unit closed 1400 hours and commenced movement to support OP WHEELER.

(2) On 091000 Nov 67 HHD (-) departed CHU LAI to embark on LST for displacement to FJNL RING. Unit sailed 1430 hours, closed FJNL RING base camp at 221230 November 1967.

(3) On 260800 Nov 67 four elements from HBD/2-320 deployed overland to TAM KY Airfield at BT 342129 and closed at 0935 hours. Further deployed by air (C-130) to FJNL RING base camp, closed at 1645 hours and commenced preparation for future operations.

b. /2-320 Displacements:

(1) On 091050 Sep 67 Battery A deployed by air (C-130) from DUC PHO to QMNS NGL Airfield at BT 592093. Unit closed 1400 hours.

(2) On 101330 Sep 67 Battery A deployed overland to TAM KY via BT 290230. Unit closed 1200 hours and commenced movement for Operation WHEELER.

(3) On 110955 Sep 67 Battery A deployed by air (C-130) to BT 131202. Unit closed 1200 hours. Priority of fires to 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry.

(4) On 260800 Sep 67 Battery A deployed by air (C-130) to BT 992183. Unit closed 1200 hours. Priority of fires to 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

(5) On 151155 Oct 67 Battery A (personnel only) deployed by air to Brigade base camp. Unit was relieved by Battery B. Unit closed 1310 hours.

(6) On 221300 Oct 67 Battery A (personnel only) deployed by air (CH-47) to BT 092448 and relieved Battery B in place. Unit closed 1415 hours. Priority of fires to 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

(7) On 250720 Nov 67 Battery A deployed by air (CH-47) to TAM KY Airfield. Unit closed 0925 hours. Further deployed by air (C-130) for FJNL RING.

c. B/2-320 Displacements:

(1) On 061110 Sep 67 Battery B deployed by air (CH-47) from firing position to QMNS NGL Airfield. Unit closed 1530 hours.

(2) On 091000 Sep 67 Battery B deployed by air (C-130) to TAM KY Airfield at BT 290230. Unit closed at 1330 hours and commenced movement for Operation WHEELER.

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On 150330 Oct 1967 Battery A, 2d Battlalion (Airborne), 329th Artillery was subjected to heavy mortar and ground attack which resulted in 6 US killed and 29 wounded (moderate). Late the same morning, the remaining personnel of Battery A were extracted to the Brigade's base camp for a stand-down and retraining. The recently formed Battery B (Provisional) assumed their mission. Within three days, Battery A received seventeen local counts and completed internal reorganization. During the following three days, the battery conducted extensive training to include live fire exercises and an RIMOBILE displacement. On 22 October 1967 the personnel of Battery A returned to the field and resumed support of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

3. (c) EXECUTION:

(a) HB/2-320 Displacements:

(1) On 091050 Sep 67 HB is displaced overland from Duc Pho to Chu Lai via BT 52094. Unit closed 1600 hours and commenced preparation to support Opn WHEELER.

(2) On 21130 Nov 67 HB (-) departed Chu Lai to embk tk on lst for displacement to Phu Lai. Unit closed 2330 hours, closed Phu Lai base camp at 22130 Nov 1967.

(3) On 260800 Nov 67 rear elements from HB/2-320 displaced overland to Tam Ky Airfield at BT 505192 and closed at 0935 hours. Further displaced by air (C-130) to Phu Lai camp, closed at 1830 hours and commenced preparation for future operations.

(b) A/2-320 Displacements:

(1) On 091050 Sep 67 Battery A displaced by air (C-130) from Duc Pho to Quang Nho Airfield at BT 550829. Unit closed 1400 hours.

(2) On 101330 Sep 67 Battery A displaced overland to Tam Ky via BT 290330. Unit closed 1200 hours and commenced preparation for Operation WHEELER.

(3) On 110930 Sep 67 Battery A displaced by air (CH-47) to BT 131202. Unit closed 1130 hours. Priority of fires to 2d Battlalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry.

(4) On 260800 Sep 67 Battery A displaced by air (CH-47) to BT 992183. Unit closed 1230 hours. Priority of fires to 1st Battlalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

(5) On 151155 Oct 67 Battery A (personnel only) displaced by air to Brigade base camp. Unit was relieved by Battery B. Unit closed 1300 hours.

(6) On 221300 Oct 67 Battery A (personnel only) displaced by air (CH-47) to BT 052628 and relieved Battery B in place. Unit closed 1215 hours. Priority of fires to 1st Battlalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

(7) On 250720 Nov 67 Battery A displaced by air (CH-47) to Tam Ky Airfiled. Unit closed 0925 hours. Further displaced by air (C-130) to Phu Lai.

(c) R/2-320 Displacements:

(1) On 001310 Sep 67 Battery B displaced by air (CH-47) from firing position to Quang Nho Airfield. Unit closed 1530 hours.

(2) On 091000 Sep 67 Battery B displaced by air (C-130) to Tam Ky Airfield at BT 290230. Unit closed at 1330 hours and commenced preparation for Operation WHEELER.
(3) On 121125 Sep 67 Battery B displaced by air (CH-47) to BT 162304. Unit closed at 1430 hours. Priority of fires to 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

(4) On 271030 Sep 67 Battery B displaced by air (CH-47) to BT 992232. Unit closed at 1345 hours. Priority of fires to 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

(5) On 160950 Oct 67 Battery B displaced by air (CH-47) to BT 159265. Unit closed at 1555 hours. Priority of fires to 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

(6) On 220900 Oct 67 Battery B (personnel only) displaced by air (CH-47) to Brigade base camp. Unit was relieved by Battery D and closed at 1450 hours.

(7) On 251200 Oct 67 Battery B (personnel only) displaced by air (CH-47) to BT 159265, relieved Battery D in place and closed at 1330 hours. Priority of fires to 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

(8) On 240915 Nov 67 Battery B displaced by air to T.E.M. Airfield, Unit closed 1300 hours. Further displaced by air (C-130) to PHUK 15203 base camp. Closed at 1630 hours and commenced preparations for future operations.

d. C/2-320 Displacements:

(1) On 090715 Sep 67 Battery C (personnel only) displaced by air (C-130) from D.C. PHO to U.M. N.W. Airfield at BT 552053, and further displaced overland to T.E.M. Airfield vicinity BT 290230. Unit closed at 1330 hours and commenced preparations for Operation WHEELER.

(2) On 120830 Sep 67 Battery C (personnel only) displaced by air (CH-47) to BT 074226. Unit closed at 1430 hours. Priority of fires to 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry.

(3) On 131030 Oct 67 Battery C (personnel only) displaced by air (CH-47) to Brigade base camp. Unit was relieved in place by Battery D and closed at 1400 hours.

(4) On 151155 Oct 67 Battery C (personnel only) displaced by air (CH-47) to BT 074226, relieved Battery D in place and closed at 1235 hours. Priority of fires to 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry.

(5) On 160900 Oct 67 Battery C displaced by air (CH-47) to T.E.M. Airfield at BT 290230. Unit closed at 1915 hours. Priority of fire to Troop 2-3, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 19th Cavalry.

(6) On 200800 Oct 67 Battery C displaced by air (CH-47) to BT 339242. Unit closed at 1435 hours. Priority of fires to 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry.

(7) On 221115 Nov 67 Battery C displaced by air (CH-47) to BT 130201. Unit closed at 1730 hours. Priority of fires to 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry.

(8) On 230930 Nov 67 Battery C displaced by air (CH-47) to T.E.M. Airfield and closed at 1145 hours. They further displaced by air (C-130) to PHUK 15203 base camp. Closed at 1615 hours and commenced preparations for future operations.

e. D/2-320 Displacements:

10-3

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(1) On 060000 Oct 67 Battery D disengaged from Brigade base camp to a firing position at BT 22550045 and conducted service practice. Upon completion of service practice, the battery disengaged by air (CH-47) from Brigade base camp and closed at 1615 hours.

(2) On 121200 Oct 67 Battery D (personnel only) disengaged by air (CH-47) to BT 072252, relieved Battery D in place and closed at 1305 hours. Priority of fires to 2nd Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

(3) On 151235 Oct 67 Battery D (personnel only) disengaged by air (OH-47) to BT 992595, relieved Battery A in place and closed at 1315 hours. Priority of fires to 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

(4) On 181330 Oct 67 Battery D disengaged by air (with Battery A equipment) (OH-47) to BT 052248. Unit closed at 1310 hours. Priority for fires to 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

(5) On 221500 Oct 67 Battery D (personnel only) disengaged by air (OH-47) to BT 159254. Unit closed at 1415 hours and commenced preparation for movement to FLAC RCR.

(6) On 311500 Oct 67 Battery D departed Brigade base camp for departure by LCT for movement to FLAC RDG and commenced preparations for future operations.

f. Radar Displacements:

(1) On 041000 Oct 67 radar displaced by air (OH-47) from DUB FD0 to BT 991234. Unit closed at 1700 hours.

(2) On 170945 Oct 67 radar displaced by air (OH-47) to BT 992564. Unit closed at 1705 hours.

(3) On 181300 Oct 67 radar displaced by air (OH-47) to BT 052218. Unit closed at 1415 hours and commenced preparation for movement to FLAC RCR.

(4) On 241546 Nov 67 radar displaced by air (CH-47) to FL 092153, Unit closed at 1630 hours.

(5) On 250745 Nov 67 radar displaced by air (CH-47) to FLAC RCR. Unit closed at 0915 hours and commenced preparations for future operations.

g. 1/2-9 Displacements:

(1) On 160900 Sep 67 Battery D (OPCOM) displaced by air (CH-47) from BT 225504 to BT 225514. Unit closed at 1605 hours. Priority of fires to 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry.

(2) On 200700 Sep 67 Battery D (OPCOM) transferred to 2nd Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and closed at 1605.

h. 1/3-9 Displacements:

(1) On 060000 Oct 67 Battery A (OPCOM) displaced by air (CH-47) from DUB FD0 to TAC HQ at BT 121592, Unit closed at 1415 hours and commenced preparation for future operations.
Enclosure 10 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation Whiskey (U)

(2) On 050000 Oct 67 Battery C (OPCON) displaced by CH-47 to CT 121203. Unit closed at 1150 hours. Priority of fires to lst Battalion, 35th Infantry.

(3) On 163915 Nov 67 Battery C (OPCON) displaced by CH-47 to CT 121454. Unit closed at 1200 hours. Terminated OPCON to 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery and assumed OPCON of the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Air-mobile) effective 1200 hours.

1. C/3-16 Displacements:

(1) On 260930 Sep 67 battery C displaced by CH-47 and CH-54 from CT 105124 to CT 091152. Unit closed at 1525 hours. The battery continued to reinforce the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery.

(2) On 170930 Oct 67 battery C displaced by CH-47 and CH-54 to 1199 POCO Special Forces Camp (CT 109162). Three (3) helicopters were displaced but remaining helicopters were unable to be moved due to adverse weather conditions and late arrival of CH-54 helicopter. Unit completed displacing on 1200 Oct 67 and continued to reinforce the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery.

(3) On 050700 Nov 67 battery C displaced by CH-47 and CH-54 from 1199 POCO Special Forces Camp to CT 050250. Unit closed at 1535 hours and continued to reinforce the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery.

4. (U) RESULTS:

a. 96 VC KIA (C)

b. 7 VC KIA (P)

c. 3 VC KIA (C)

5. (II) RECONSTITUTION OF MISSIONS FIRED:

a. Number of rounds fired:

(1) 105: 4,941

(2) 155: 1,562

b. Total rounds expended:

(1) 105: 65,027

(2) 155: 14,169

6. (C) CONCLUSIONS:

a. The loss of two (2) complete battery fire direction centers (FDC) in Battery A on 15 October 1967, and in Battery C on 23 October 1967, again emphasizes the continuing necessity to train fire direction personnel in depth.

b. When in areas of operation during the monsoon season, batteries must maintain two basic loads of ammunition on position. Every effort must be expended to move these units during periods open to air traffic. To that end, ammunition must remain in rapid fire site.

c. The M/80-4 Counter-Peuter Radar was employed within the area of operation of the opponent battalions for the first time since the Brigado's inception in Vietnam. Heretofore, the unit had been employed within the base camp perimeter.

10-5

CONCLUSION

58
Inclusion 10 (Artillery) to Combat Operations: After Action Report, Operation WHEEL (U)

Innumerable divisions were realized since the unit was able to adjust fire, vector medevac aircraft into the tactical area, monitor helicopter pads, adjust defensive concentrations, and confirm locations of hostile mortars.

d. With the inception and successful utilization of the Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer (FADC), a tendency existed to rely completely on the machine with consequent adverse effects on the battery's manual capability. To eliminate these effects, each FADC maintains two charts, one primary and one check. Additionally, the FADC is rendered inoperative every other day to maintain a proficient manual capability and to allow service to the machine.

e. Numerous lessons learned concerning defense of position, resupply and firing battery procedures were realized during periods of heavy contact. These lessons are now incorporated in the battalion TA SOP.
**Combat After Action Report - Operation WHEELER, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division**

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 11 Sep - 25 Nov 1967**

**CG, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division**

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<th>No. of Refs</th>
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<td>60</td>
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**Distribution Statement**

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**Abstract**

60