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AGAM-P (M) (9 Apr 68) FOR OT RD 681192 12 April 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 January 1968 (U)

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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US Army Weapons Command
II Field Force Vietnam
5th Infantry Division (Mech)
Commanding Officers
4th Brigade, 6th Infantry Division
1st Battalion, 82d Artillery
OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR PERIOD ENDING 31 OCTOBER 1967

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10
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7. Statistical Summary of Tactical Air Support.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96266

AVFO-CBM-H 21 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period
Ending 31 January 1968 (RCS GFOR-65) (W-DEO-TO-A) (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) COMMA(D

a. During the quarter there were five major changes in the
staff, II FORCEN.

(1) On 20 January 1968, Major General Keith L. Ware
became the Deputy Commanding General, II FORCE, replacing Major
General George S. Eokhardt. General Ware had previously served as
Deputy Commander II FORCEN.

(2) On 2 November 1967, Colonel Joseph D. Mitchell
became the Deputy Chief of Staff. Colonel Mitchell previously served as
Commanding Officer, 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. He replaced
Colonel Robert H. Offley.

(3) On 24 January 1968, Colonel Julian K. LePage became
the Provost Marshal, II FORCEN, after an assignment as Commanding
Officer, 89th Military Police Group. He replaced Colonel Paul B. Darus.

(4) On 30 January 1968, Colonel Joseph A. Janus became
the Engineer, II FORCEN. Before his present assignment he was Assistant
Chief of Staff, PEO, US Army Engineer Command, Vietnam. He replaced
Colonel Arthur T. Surkamp.

(5) On 22 January 1968, Lieutenant Colonel William V.
Muroko became the Headquarters Commandant, II FORCEN. Prior to his
assignment he was an instructor supervisor at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.
He replaced Lieutenant Colonel John P. Lamb.

b. The overall assigned/attached strength of II FORCEN
increased during this quarter. A comparison at the end of the last
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period ending 31 January 1968 (RG 55) (W-REO-TC-A) (U)

The following reporting periods follow:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>OFFICER</th>
<th>WARRANT OFFICER</th>
<th>NCOs/ROTS MNR</th>
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<td>359</td>
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<td>31 July 67</td>
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<td>31 Oct 67</td>
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<td>2807</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 Jan 68</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2915</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. II FFV Order of Battle, to include location and the control headquarters is shown in Enclosure 1.

d. A sketch showing the III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) with major unit CP locations is shown in Enclosure 2.

2. (FOUO) PERSONNEL, HEALTH, MORALE, SAFETY AND DISCIPLINE:

a. The personnel situation within units assigned, attached or under the operational control of II Field Force Vietnam remains satisfactory.

b. Vigorous implementation of the USA RV infusion program has resulted in reduced rotational humps in all units within the command. Continued participation in this program will solve rotational hump problems in II FFV units within six months.

c. The critical shortages in MOS 31M (Radio Relay and Carrier Attendant) and 19P (Automatic Weapons Crewman) reported in the last quarter's ORL were eliminated by personnel replacements provided by higher headquarters.

d. The G1 and AG sections assisted newly arrived administrative elements of the 101st Airborne Division in establishing initial operations. Coordination visits were made, applicable publications were provided and limited duplicating and reproduction support rendered.

e. Since 1 November, the AG section published two AG Newsletters. These newsletters contained information in the personnel field of interest and included an index to all previous editions. It is anticipated that additional editions will be published in the forthcoming quarter.

f. During the period 1 November 1967 to 31 January 1968, the Awards and Decorations Division processed, approved and issued awards as follows:
AVFBC-92
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period
Ending 31 January 1968 (NSC GOFR-95) (W-DHO-TD-4) (U)

Silver 17
Distinguished Flying Cross 0
Soldier's Medal 0
Bronze Star Medal 96
Air Medal 119
Army Commendation Medal 69
Purple Heart 42

TOTAL 343

Development of the II FFORCEV base camp continued satisfactorily. Status of significant projects as of 31 January 1968 follows:

1. Tropical Construction BOQ - completed.
2. EM Club - completed.
3. NCO Club - 80% completed.
4. Officers Club - 30% completed.

The health of the command continues to be excellent.

During the reporting period a total of 21 SOI shows visited the headquarters area.

INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

Intelligence aspects of tactical operations conducted in the II FFORCEV area are discussed in ORLL submitted by units under operational control of this headquarters.
b. Intelligence Collection:

(1) Prior to the arrival of the 101st Airborne Division, it was expected that it would be assigned a tactical area of interest (TAOI). As noted in the previous report, it was expected that a revised II FFORCEN Essential Elements of Information (EEI) would then be published with a new collection plan; however, the 101st Division was not given a specific TAOI. A new list of II FFORCEN EEI was published and disseminated to major units, including the 101st Airborne Division without revision of the collection plan. This consolidated list of II FFORCEN information requirements is the first guidance of its kind to be published by this headquarters. The EEI do not specifically incorporate the requirements set forth in the KAOV Intelligence Collection Plan, but rather were published as being complementary to that plan.

(2) The Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation for attack on VC Infrastructure (C) (ICAX) program made considerable progress during this reporting period. District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers (DIACC) were established in 51 of the 53 districts in III CTZ. The two districts without centers were in the Long Vai special zone (LSZ). Close liaison was established between US units and many of the DIACC, allowing for a free exchange of information between the agencies. Additionally, during the closing days of the reporting period, this headquarters began to initiate direct contact with the DIACC to better utilize their services and obtain information on a more timely basis. The DIACC emphasized the collection of and reaction to tactical intelligence rather than to intelligence pertaining to the infrastructure during this reporting period. This did not mean that the latter effort was neglected; considerable results against the infrastructure were achieved. In the field of tactical intelligence collection and reaction, the DIACC conducted a number of very successful small unit operations against the VC. The table below indicates those districts having DIACC in place and the provinces in which those districts are located as of 30 January 1968:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Districts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Tan Uyen, Con, Thanh, Duc Tu, Di An, Long, Thanh, Kho Trach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh Tay</td>
<td>Nam Khe, Tanh Linh, Binh Duc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Khanh</td>
<td>Xuan Loi, Dinh Quan, Kien Tan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phuoc Tay</td>
<td>Long, Le, Long, Bien, Dat Do, Bac Thanh, Xuyen Boc</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The new procedure for reporting information obtained from prisoners of war and ralliers, initiated in the previous quarter, proved successful. Still further improvements are being sought which will enable this type of information to be disseminated on an even more timely basis.

The G2 II FORGEY Intelligence ADF system was expanded during the reporting period. To better identify enemy activities occurring in a given area, all friendly initiated actions, prisoners of war data, incidents of firing on aircraft, mines and booby traps, EP/EP OP attacks, underground fortifications and military structures destroyed, were added. The project to add July 1967 data was recently completed and files containing six months of data are now available for comparative purposes. In order to better process the increased number of items recorded, an IBM card puncher was acquired. An enlisted man was trained to operate the puncher and the approximate daily output is 200 cards. Over 18,000 cards are now in the system. A new program was written in order to have a monthly readout by grid square. This new program, when added to the readout by date/time and type of incident, will give better coverage for targeting and order of battle purposes. There are plans to further expand the system to develop a data bank on order of battle for VC irregular forces.

During the period covered by this report, the CV-1C (Red Horse) assets of the 73d Surveillance Airplane Company (SAC) were increased by one new aircraft for a total of four aircraft now equipped with the AN/UAS-4A Infrared Sensor system. This system is more sensitive than the previously used item and it is...
Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period ending 31 January 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) (WJ-DIR-TO-A) (U)

expected that imagery quality will improve; however, during the dry season, the presence of natural and man-made fires throughout the III CTZ caused increasing difficulty in the discrimination of Red Haze emissions. This situation is expected to continue through the remainder of the dry season.

(b) Special maximum surveillance efforts were conducted during the truce periods which occurred during this quarter. The Christmas truce extended from 241800 to 251800 December 1967 and the New Year truce from 311800 December 1967 to 020600 January 1968. The TET truce began at 251800 January 1968 and was cancelled by the VC at 300930 January 1968 due to the unprincipled violations on the part of the VC. Cancellation of the TET truce did not cancel the concentrated SLAR/Red Haze coverage of selected areas in the TACI. This coverage extended into the new reporting period due to the enemy offensive. During the earlier truce periods, a successful effort was made to provide 24 hour coverage along the Cambodian border and the coast line of III CTZ. During these periods, a coordinated effort was effected using the assets of the 1st Infantry Division Aerial Surveillance and Target Acquisition Platoon (ASTAP), the 73d SAC, Army and Air Force O-1 aircraft, and the assets provided by the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW) of the 7th USARV. The reconnaissance effort thus effected provided excellent information on VC/NVA routes of movement into the III CTZ. One of the most active areas revealed was in the vicinity of "W9540 during the New Year truce period. This area was characterized by a buildup on the evenings preceding the truce, exceptionally heavy activity on the first night of the truce, a general tapering off of activity after the truce, and a complete absence of activity two days following the truce. The volume of surveillance effected during these special periods can be maintained only for limited periods of time due to maintenance requirements necessary to insure proper functioning of aircraft and sensor systems. The assets enumerated above provided aerial coverage of suspected enemy activity in the following manner during the truce periods:

1. VR reconnaissance aircraft of the 73d SAC covered the III CTZ border with Cambodia and the coastline for a minimum of twelve flying hours daily.

2. During the hours of darkness, each portion of the III CTZ was covered with SLAR once each hour. These missions were conducted by the 1st ASTAP and the 73d SAC.

3. Red Haze missions were conducted by all elements. The 1st ASTAP and the 73d SAC concentrated primarily on the border area while the 460th TRW principally covered the main VC/NVA base areas.

(6) There were continuing indications that the VC were experiencing serious difficulties as a result of Allied operations.

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Replacement from local resources of combat losses and replacements appeared to be a particularly acute problem. In this connection, it is believed that the infiltration of NVA replacements was increased to a great degree. Coercive measures against the local populace, the drafting of boys fifteen years of age, heavier taxation were some of the measures being reported to by the VC. Even these measures did not enable the VC to replace their personnel losses from locally available resources. The only recourse was the utilization of NVA invaders. The 7th NVA Division and the 88th NVA Regiment are probably almost wholly composed of NVA personnel. Of the five VC regiments in III CTZ, it was estimated that the one having the smallest proportion of NVA personnel had 35% and the regiment having the most had 75% such personnel. Even at the VC LF battalion level, NVA personnel are present in strength. Indications were that the D440 LF Battalion of VC Ba Bien province had 75-80% NVA personnel.

Document and PW sources of information continued to indicate a food shortage among VC forces. There is little doubt that Allied operations forced changes in supply routes and made all routes more hazardous during the reporting period. Nevertheless, the enemy proved his resourcefulness once again by almost totally re-arming his forces with a new family of weapons (AK assault rifles, rocket launchers, 122mm rockets). (Comment: Appearance of these weapons in large numbers will substantially increase the VC firepower and, consequently, alter the situation whereby the Allied forces had enjoyed overwhelming fire superiority in any situation. This may alter the course of small unit engagements.)

d. Targeting System: The G2 Targets Division developed an improved targeting system which provided timely targets based on all source intelligence indicators. The division provided targets for artillery, combat sky spots and B52 assets. The system included a current area analysis of the III CTZ based on terrain analysis and a continual study of enemy tactics and habits. Superimposed upon that analysis was a daily plot of intelligence indicators of enemy activity. The indicators included intelligence reports, contacts, sightings, attacks by fire and ground attacks, booby traps, "people sniffer" returns and caches. Approximately 300 such indicators occurred in III CTZ each day and were meticulously plotted and graphically retained for one week. Enemy installations were then targeted within the concentrated area of activity, collated with the area analysis and targeted for the most appropriate available asset. Finally, the system provided a rapid means of evaluating Agent Reports of enemy concentrations, VC sightings and photography readouts.

d. Description and Recapitulation of Enemy Order of Battle:

(1) Description: The Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) continued as the supreme military and political headquarters
for the VC in SVN and divided all territory in the II FFORC TAOI into Military Regions (MR) Sub-Regions (SR) and other provinces or zones. The precise political districting of all the territory is still not known with certainty; however, it is known that some boundaries recently underwent significant realignment. In October/November 1967, MR1, MR4, and Long An province of MR2 were divided into new areas designated as SR 1 through 5, U-1 and the metropolitan area of Saigon. War Zones C and D, Tay Ninh and Ba Rien provinces, formerly parts of MR1, appear now to be separate entities, but this is uncertain as is their relationship to COSVN. The Sub-regions, U-1 and the Saigon area are directly subordinate to COSVN. New boundaries are shown on Inclosure 3.

(2) Significant Order of Battle Developments.

(a) Information gained from documents, k'Ch, and Hoi Chanh indicated the formation of a new VC I/L Bn, designated L/10 in the former Ba Bien Province. Cadre for the battalion was extracted from the D445 VC I/F Infantry Battalion and other local force units in the area. The battalion, composed of an estimated 75% NVA personnel, was organized into three rifle companies and one combat support company.

(b) On 27 November 1967, B/7/RAR captured a copy of a resolution adopted at a conference held in April 1967. The resolution predicted that the Allied forces would seek to create a "no-man's" land between the populated areas of Saigon and the VC bases in the mountains to the north. The main objective would be the VC bases in War Zone "C". To counter those operations, MR1 and MR4 were to cooperate in extending "a steel belt" around the center of Allied/RVNAF activity, (the Saigon area). The resolution called attention to deficiencies of the VC forces, e.g., slow development of guerrilla warfare, ineffective "three-pronged attacks", lack of determination and aggressiveness and poor leadership. To insure success, the deficiencies would have to be overcome. Partial alleviation of the problems could be achieved by infiltration of agents into Allied/RVNAF bases, increased harassment to rear areas so as to neutralize military potential, and frustration of the Rural Pacification Program. The MR1 Party Committee indicated that their region was the most favorable area for the destruction of enemy (Allied/RVNAF) forces and also offered the greatest potential for attacks on Saigon-Cholon.

(c) A captured financial report prepared by the Rear Service Staff of MR1 provided an estimate of expenditures to be incurred by the VC Dong Nai Infantry Regiment during the 4th quarter of 1967. Included were pocket money allowances for 29 battalion and regimental cadre, 369 company cadre and 1964 soldiers. The total strength of 2362 listed in the document tended to confirm a previous report which indicated the strength of this regiment as being 2260. That strength labels it as the largest regiment in III CTZ.
An undated draft plan of the COSVL Forward Supply Council for 1967, directed subordinate units to "double their efforts to meet the increasing war requirements, motivate the population to increase farm production... and also mobilize manpower and resources of the areas controlled by the VC to serve the front line. The draft indicated that the low VC farm production and heavy Allied/RVN destruction of supply depots had severely limited VC food storage capacity. Intense allied/RVN operations also had disrupted VC supply lines by blocking entry-exit points, denying the VC use of major lines of communication and destroying base areas. These operations forced the VC to "depend entirely on the population for provisions."

An undated plan of activity, prepared by the permanent section of the Forward Supply Council Ba Bien province, for the second quarter of 1967, stated that the Council obtained only 15 to 25% of the prescribed quotas in the procurement of food supplies and recruitment of civilian laborers for the first quarter of 1967. It was required to procure for the second quarter of 1967 twice as much food and twice as many civilian laborers as in the first quarter of 1967. A report dated 20 July 1967, stated that the continuous attacks by allied/RVN troops, pacification activities and Chieu Hoi activities affected the food procurement efforts of the province. As a result, only 17% of the provincial requirement for recruitment of civilian laborers and procurement of food was met during the second quarter. An undated draft plan for the last quarter of 1967, and the first quarter of 1968, stated that the Ba Bien Province Forward Supply Council was facing a critical situation which resulted from the tight control exercised by elements of the US and Australian Forces on lines of communication. Procurement of provisions and the recruitment of civilian laborers were greatly limited. Finally, the document stated that the manpower and economic resources of Ba Bien Province were under Allied control. Therefore, to meet the logistical demands, it was mandatory that efforts be centered on the development of VC installations in GV areas.

An undated document, classified "SECRET", provided political orientation. It dealt with Allied capabilities and intentions during the 1967-68 Winter-Spring Campaign. It anticipated the "culminating point" of the war by that time and urged special efforts to wear down US and RVN forces. Such efforts would lead to a victory over the enemy and the creation of a coalition government in which the NLF would play a key role. It was pointed out that "coalition government will be only a strategy to deceive the enemy." Its main political purpose would be to compel US forces to withdraw from SVN because of political pressure. A document dated 20 August 1967 indicated that, "In order to have peace talks and to win at the peace conference, it is mandatory to destroy more enemy troops and to be more impressive in the diplomatic field. We must accept peace negotiations but peace talks do not help us reach our main objective - government under our control. It only confirms a diplomatic victory and is
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A strategy which aims at supporting the three pronged attack. A major VC offensive is cited as the way to bring about defeats and to provide a favorable bargaining position. Recognition of the LTFRTE as part of a coalition government would presumably lead to the withdrawal of US forces, thus creating conditions favorable to complete military, political and social victory for the VC.

(g) On 20 November 1967, rallier BAU VAL, a member of the 267th VC Main Force Infantry battalion, stated that all or the officers in the 267th battalion were NVA. An unidentified NVA who captured on 16 December 1967 reported that he had infiltrated from NVA with 20 other NVA soldiers and how arrived in SVN in September. The BA reported that approximately 25% of the 267th Battalion is NVA. (Comment: These reports suggested that the VC in IV CTZ are no longer able to acquire needed replacements from indigenous manpower resources.)

(h) Interrogation of NW NGUYEN VAL BA of the HMM TAUL element noted revealed information regarding recruitment problems in that area. According to BA, during the period 1966-1967, despite an intensive recruiting campaign, not a single person was recruited in BINH TAN District. All village chiefs claimed to have only a skeleton force of men in their villages and would not consent to losing any of them. Apparently, the 6th VC LF Infantry Battalion was not allowed to recruit from outside its own area and NVA HQ was able to supply only three men as replacements after levying guerrilla units in the area. Finally, it was said that "all units in MR4 are at approximately 50% strength and that there would be no outside help in the near future for at least six months." (Comment: While it is difficult to believe that no personnel have been recruited in Binh Tan for the last year, this report does indicate the severe personnel problems facing the VC in that area.)

(i) On 28 November 1967 vicinity XK315360 documents were taken from two VC KIA which had the designation K5-D16-05 written on them. The designation was believed to refer to the 5th Co/D16 VC Main Force Battalion/Tay Ninh Province which was previously mentioned in F/Rallier reports. The unit is believed to be newly formed with a mission of operating in southwestern Tay Ninh Province. Its strength was 350 and it was located in southern Tay Ninh along the Cambodian Border.

Recapitulation:

(a) The VC regions in III CTZ controlled 48 local force companies and 20 local force Platoons.

(b) Within III CTZ there were 14 local force battalions subordinated as indicated below.

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**LOCAL FORCE BATTALION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>Subordination</th>
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<tr>
<td>2d VC LF Guard Bn</td>
<td>TAY NINH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th VC LF Inf Bn</td>
<td>TAY NINH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th VC LF Inf Bn</td>
<td>TAY NINH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2440 VC LF Inf Bn</td>
<td>Sub-Region 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2445 VC LF Inf Bn</td>
<td>Sub-Region 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNL-LOI VC LF Bn</td>
<td>Sub-Region 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Independent VC LF Inf Bn</td>
<td>Sub-Region 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>506th VC LF Bn</td>
<td>Sub-Region 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d VC LF Inf Bn</td>
<td>Sub-Region 81</td>
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<td>3d VC LF Inf Bn</td>
<td>Sub-Region 85</td>
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<td>4th VC LF Inf Bn</td>
<td>Sub-Region 84</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th VC LF Inf Bn</td>
<td>Sub-Region 83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th VC LF Inf Bn</td>
<td>Sub-Region 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th VC LF Inf Bn</td>
<td>Sub-Region 81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) There were nine VC main force battalions, ten VC/NVA main force regiments, and one VC/NVA command operating in III CTZ.

**VC/NVA MAIN FORCE UNIT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Subordination</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st BN/66th Base Security Regt</td>
<td>COSVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st VC Guard BN</td>
<td>COSVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46th VC Recon BN</td>
<td>COSVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 10</td>
<td>Sub-Region 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>267th VC MF Inf BN</td>
<td>Sub-Region 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>269th VC MF Inf BN</td>
<td>Sub-Region 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>010 VC 1st Sapper BN</td>
<td>SAIGON/GIA DINH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(d) There were three VC main force battalions and one VC local force battalion which operated in My Tho Province of MB2.

(e) See Inclosure 4 for enemy unit locations in III CTZ and My Tho Province of MB2 as of 23 Jan 68.

(4) Summary of Recent Activities:

(a) During the reporting period, the VC/NVA elements subordinate to COSVN in the III CTZ conducted three phases in their current DOING XUAN (Winter-Spring) Campaign, which is believed to have begun.
on 20 October with the multi-regimental size attacks against the LOC Binh area in northern BINH LONG Province. The attacks were conducted primarily by major elements of the 9th VC Division, as well as elements of the 141st and the 165th NVA Regiments of the 7th NVA Division. The action was supported by the 8A NVA Artillery Regiment, and the 58th VC Artillery Battalion of the 69th VC Artillery Command. Although the action at LOC Binh was a massive military loss to the VC, it was, nevertheless, a significant political victory inasmuch as the VC succeeded in dispersing the populace and in holding the village for a short time. The second phase of the campaign was oriented on the BU LOP - Binh area in northern PHUOC LONG Province. The third, and current, phase began as an apparent counter mission in eastern War Zone "C". On the last day of the reporting period, the emphasis changed radically as the enemy began large scale attacks in the Salcon-Bien Binh-Loc Binh area, coordinated with lesser attacks throughout the remainder of the II PEOVEI. It apparently signaled the beginning of the general offensive. During the period, the D16 LP Infantry Battalion was formed in TAY BINH Province, and the D40 VC LF Infantry Battalion was formed in VC BA BIEN Province. The most significant new unit to be formed during this period was the Dong Nai VC MF Infantry Regiment, which was subordinate to Military Region 1, but under direct operational control of CO VN.

(b) The 5th VC Division remained split with elements located in PHUOC LONG and Ba BINH Provinces. The Division Headquarters probably remained located in northern PHUOC LONG Province. Indications of the move of the Headquarters from the HAT TAO Mountain Area became evident when Operation SANTA failed to develop significant contact in that area during November 1967. On 5 November 1967, the 275th VC Regiment was identified in contact, vicinity YU75931. That contact confirmed reports that the 275th VC Regiment had moved into southern PHUOC LONG Province. Reports have indicated that the 88th NVA Regiment had been subordinated to the 5th VC Division. (Comments: While some coordination appeared to be evident between the 88th NVA and 275th VC Regiments during November, such subordination remains unconfirmed.) In BA BINH, the 274th VC Regiment reportedly had been dropped from the 5th VC Division. Credence was added to those reports when the regiment was left behind in the HAT TAO area while the bulk of the division moved north. It is still possible, however, that the 274th remains subordinate to the 5th VC Division. The regiment has suffered from lack of food and an inability to replace personnel losses due to casualties, disease and desertion. On 20 December 1967, one of its battalions unsuccessfully attacked the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment, vicinity TS330820.

The 1st Battalion/274th Regiment was believed to have moved north across Highway 1 on 18 January 1968 and reportedly was moving to War Zone "D", with the identification of the 274th Regiment as one of those which initiated attacks on the Salcon-Bien Ba areas on 31 January 1968, it is apparent that the move of the 1st Battalion was designed to conceal the major attacks which were to begin shortly. What the disposition
of the regiment will be in the immediate future cannot be foreseen at this time.

(c) Throughout the period, the elements of the 7th NVA Division have remained in relatively static dispositions, and have assumed a primary support role in the conduct of the current Winter-Spring Campaign. Because of the recent increase of Allied activities near the "Fish Hook" area, Headquarters elements of the Division were forced to relocate to prepared bases in the central portion of Base Area 353 in northern Far Zone "C". After the LOC NHN action, the 141st NVA Regiment returned to Far Zone "C", leaving the area only once on 3 December, when the 1st and 2d Battalions were identified in contact against the 1st Battalion 16th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division Night Defensive Position at ATN66737 in central Binh Long Province. The Battalions subsequently returned to Far Zone "C", and the regiment was identified in contact on 20 December vicinity ATN93057. Documents captured as a result of that contact indicated that the 141st NVA Regiment had been reinforced by an additional Battalion, and detached from the 7th NVA Division to operate independently in the BO TUC - KATUM area, directly subordinate to COSVN. A previous low level agent report indicated that the 1st Guard Battalion/COSVN, had been put under operational control of elements of the 7th NVA Division to operate in northern Tay Ninh Province. The 107th NVA Regiment moved from traditional base areas in Far Zone "C" to the Michelin Plantation area in late November 1967, where the unit continues to be located with an apparent security mission. The 165th NVA Regiment, which took the most active part at LOC NHN, withdrew to a base area located approximately 10 km NW of COHAN THAI, where the unit remains with the apparent mission of providing security for southern Binh Long Province border. It is probably in the area to secure supply lines, and to neutralize the political effect of local patrolling by the 1st VC division. The regiment is also in an excellent position to reinforce any multi-regimental VC operation in Military Region 10, eastern Far Zone "C" or northern VC THU DAC HOC Province.

(4) Headquarters 9th VC Division remained in base areas along the Binh Long - Phuoc Long Province border, just south of Cambodia. The Division has apparently been assigned to be the primary CGVN maneuver element for the current Winter-Spring Campaign, taking the initiative in each phase of the operation. The 271st VC Regiment played a very minor role in the action at LOC NHN, but helped to launch the Phuoc Long Province phase by conducting a coordinated ground and rocket attack against the 1st US Division HMR and the USSF Camp at Bu Duc. That attack was in conjunction with the attack against the 3d US District headquarters by the 272d VC Regiment on 29 November 1967. The 271st was supported by the 122mm rockets of the 54th NVA Artillery Regiment in the attack at Bu Duc. That marked the second time that 122mm rockets had been employed in support of ground attacks in the III CTZ. The 273d VC Regiment participated in the second phase by attacking the USSF and CIDG Camp at Bu Duc on 8 December. Taking
advantage of the lull in Allied activities during the Christmas cease-fire, the 271st and the 272d VC Regiments displaced to Cambodian territory, in the vicinity of the "Fish Hook" area. On 1 January, during the New Year's Cease-fire, the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 271st Regiment, and the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 272d Regiment launched a coordinated mortar, RPG, and ground attack against the 3d Dragoon 25th US Infantry Division base camp at FSB Binh Vienna vicinity X1908050. The 2d Battalion, 271st VC Regiment, and the 1st Battalion, 272d VC Regiment provided logistical support and security for the action. A captured document indicated that the 272d VC Regiment has been assigned to the area of the contact until the end of January 1968, in order to interrupt Allied sweep operations. The 271st and 272d VC Regiments were believed to be located in the "Fish Hook" area. A raider reported recently that the 273d VC Regiment, which had remained in Phuoc Long province through December 1967, had crossed Interprovincial Route 13 east of Chi Linh on 19 January 1968. It was to have moved southwest for a planned attack against a city in the Phu Loi area. It was considered possible that the 273d VC Regiment might move into the "Catcher's Mitt" area.

(e) The 88th NVA Regiment, which infiltrated into III CTZ from II CTZ in September 1967, remained relatively inactive during the reporting period. The unit obviously avoided contact in order to replace heavy losses sustained in the attack against the 4/9th ARVN Infantry at PHUOC QA (VU186035) in PHUOC LONG Province on 27 October 1967. A P4 reported that elements of the 88th Regiment participated in the shelling of the refugee hamlet, MAK 309 on 3 December 1967, but there was no evidence that the regiment was involved in the raising of the hamlet on 5 December. On 6 January 1968, vicinity XT580990, elements of the 17th ACR, while conducting Operation PARIS, made contact with elements of the 2d Battalion, 88th NVA Regiment in western BINH LONG province. A P4 captured as a result of that contact indicated that the 1st and 2d Battalions were expected to join the 3d Battalion in the "FISH HOOK" area of Cambodia, at the BINH LONG - PHUOC LONG Province border. Recent information, and the lack of contact with the regiment in the "FISH HOOK" area indicates that elements of the 88th NVA Regiment have displaced to southern BINH LONG Province, probably near the NGOHDAI Plantation. Although various sources have indicated the subordination of the 88th NVA Regiment to the 5th VC Division, there has been no definite documentation to substantiate that fact.

(f) In the area formerly designated as MR IV and now split into sub-regions as described in subparagraph c above, the nine battalions remained dispersed in the new sub-region areas in a relative defensive posture. Despite that posture, battalion sized offensive operations were conducted in December 1967 and January 1968. The attacks were made against US and ARVN forces and fixed positions in the northwest portion of sub-region 81. Recently captured documents indicated that the VC are replenishing losses suffered during 1967. Replacements have been sent from NVA and IV CTZ and new weapons and equipment have been received from various areas.
The attacks which were initiated in the III CTZ on 31 January 1968 have been indicated, though the precise location and hour of the attacks was, of course, not known. As of the time this report was written, full details of the overall situation were not available and cannot be summarized properly. Among the many sites attacked during the early morning hours of 31 January 1968 were the following:

- The American Embassy in Saigon
- The Presidential Palace, Saigon
- Officer Quarters, Saigon
- Tan Son Nhut Air Base
- Bien Hoa Air Base
- HQ, III PAVN
- 199th Infantry Brigade
- HQ, III Corps (AVN), Bien Hoa
- Tan An
- Lai Khe
- Binh Cat

The attack on HQ, III PAVN area commenced at 0100 on January 31, 1968 with 122mm rockets. A ground attack commenced later and continued throughout the day. The enemy failed to penetrate the perimeter at any time and was engaged primarily by LPT's. The American Embassy compound in Saigon was penetrated, but firing guards successfully defended the building until reinforcements from the 101st Airborne Division landed on the roof-top helicopters. Nineteen VC were killed in the ensuing action. They were identified as members of the C10 VC RF Dapper Battalion. One Pd reported that there were 21 battalions assembled in the Saigon - Bien Hoa area.

Another reported that 1000 VC were assembled east of Long Binh, military installations. These reports were fragmentary and preliminary, of course, but in view of the events which took place in the afternoon of 31 January 1968, they were considered to be possibly true. It can be reported at this time that the current attacks in the III CTZ represent the largest and best coordinated series of attacks ever perpetrated by the VC/NVA forces in this area. Preliminary document recounts and interrogations of Pd indicated that the 274th and 275th VC Regiments together with several separate LF battalions were engaged in the attacks in the Saigon - Bien Hoa - Long Binh areas.

6. VC/NVA Battle Losses
CONFLICT

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period

Summary: 31 January—968 (RGUSG68-69) (D-809-70-A) (U)

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NOTE: The actual strength of Main Force units cannot be equated to battlefield losses for three reasons. First, supporting and local Force personnel normally accompany Main Force units into battle and unit identification is often not possible. Second, it is impossible to assess accurately the number of enemy casualties resulting from air and artillery strikes. Though not as thoroughly in some instances, as heretofore, the enemy continues to police the battlefield to prevent Allied units from entering the area. Third, there is considerable variation in the time that particular units require to have their losses replaced. Trained leaders from JSTF provide a high percentage of the replacements, but replacements are also drawn from local recruitment and by infiltration from other CTZ. Precise knowledge of the numbers of replacements and the time involved for their integration into the units is not available. Thus, the strength of individual units and the overall strength of the enemy in III CTZ must continue to be based in part on estimation.

f. Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities and Relative Probability of Adoption at the End of the Quarter:

NOTE: The following estimate is of necessity tentative due to the scope of the attacks initiated on 31 January 1968 and the preliminary and fragmentary nature of the intelligence as of the close of the reporting period. The capabilities and vulnerabilities of several major VC units will obviously be determined largely by the outcome of the series of battles now in progress. Indications at the close of the
AVPC-R&H
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period
Ending: 31 January 1968 (RCS CORFOR-56) (U-R-D-TO-A) (4)

Reporting period are that the 274th and 275th VC Regiments together with
several IV and LF Battalions suffered heavy casualties and the estimate
is based on the presumption that those early indications will be borne
out.

(1) Capabilities:

(a) Attack:

1. The enemy is capable of continuing the attacks
in the loaien - BIEN MA area with elements of the 7th NVA Division, the
9th VC Division, the VC DUCO NAI Regiment, and LF Battalions.

2. The enemy is capable of attacking installations
and LOC in TAY BINH, BINH LONG, and BINH DUCO Provinces with elements
of the 7th NVA Division and the 88th NVA Regiment, supported by elements
of the 69th VC artillery Command.

3. The 84A NVA Artillery Regiment, which possesses
a rocket capability, can be employed against targets throughout the III
CTZ.

4. The battalions of Sub-regions 31 through 35
are capable of conducting limited attacks against Allied units, outposts,
LOC and installations within their respective areas of operations.

5. The VC are capable of attacking in VC MY THO
Province with elements of the DUCO NAI Regiment and the 514th VC LF
Battalion.

(b) Defend:

1. The VC can defend in TAY BINH, and BINH LONG
Provinces with elements of the 7th NVA and the 9th VC Divisions and the
88th NVA Regiment.

2. The VC can defend in War Zone "D" and VC DA
BINH Province with elements of the DUCO NAI Regiment and Local Forces.

3. The VC can defend in PHUOC LONG Province with
elements of the 9th VC Division supported by Local Forces.

4. Confronted with a superior force, the enemy
is capable of breaking contact, dispersing into small groups, and with-
drawing to safe positions.

(c) Reinforces: The enemy can reinforce his attack
or defense in the northern III CTZ with 3 battalions from the II CTZ.
In southern III CTZ he can reinforce with 2 battalions from IV CTZ. It
is estimated that reinforcements could reach their destinations within
three to ten days after movement commenced.

(2) Vulnerabilities and Weaknesses:

(a) The enemy control over the populace is vulnerable
to revolutionary development and psychological warfare activities, ex-
pecially in areas where the infiltrated NVA troops have given rise to
apprehension among the people. As the GVN continues to gain the con-
fidence and support of the population, the enemy's influence weakens.

(b) Low morale in the enemy's ranks is vulnerable to
exploitation by Allied psychological warfare operations.

(c) The enemy's extended and insecure LOC are becom-
ing more vulnerable to Allied interdiction, except for those LOC in
neutral countries. The interdiction of enemy LOC has restricted his
movement and ability to establish tax collection stations throughout
the III CTZ.

(d) The neutralization of VC/NVA Base Areas in III
CTZ and the loss of caches has reduced the enemy's ability to resupply
adequately his forces from within the III CTZ. This has forced the
enemy to tax his supply system. An inability to resupply quickly has
weakened his capability to maintain any extended offensive or defensive
postures and also to hold any objective for an extended period.

(e) The enemy is vulnerable to reconnaissance in force
missions of Allied mobile forces which are supported by artillery and
close air support.

(f) There are increasing indications that the enemy's
ability to obtain sound tactical intelligence is declining. This is
possibly due to the forced dispersion of his units caused by aggressive
Allied operations and in turn has resulted in his loss of L/C and Irre-
gular support.

(g) In any large scale offensive action, such as that
initiated on 31 January 1968, the enemy is extremely vulnerable to Allied
firepower and force mobility.

(3) Relative Probability of Adoption at the End of the
Quarter: The intensity of the attacks increased at the end of the quarter
and indications that the enemy does not intend to withdraw lend credence
to the distinct possibility that the enemy has mounted his general of-
fensive. He will continue attacks to seize and hold whatever terrain
or population centers he can to place him in a position of power for
any "peace talks".
CONMEMIAI

AVFEC-RE-H
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968 (WSS CUPRR-65) (4-870-70-4) (U)

A. (C) OPERATIONS, PLANS AND TRAINING

a. Introduction:

(1) During the reporting period, II PFOCEV initiated the dry season campaign. Objectives of the operations included continued military pacification of the heavily populated provinces surrounding Saigon and security of the Allied base areas; neutralization of War Zone C and interdiction of main invasion routes into War Zone C; prescission of War Zone D; neutralization of VC main force capability and effective food resource control in the heavily populated Phuoc Long, Long Khanh, Binh Tay, Phuoc Tay, Bien Hoa, Binh Duong, Tay Ninh, Gia Dinh, Long An, Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa, Go Cong and Kien Phong provinces.

(2) During November, military activity in III CTZ was highlighted by the enemy's unsuccessful attempts to achieve a victory in MR 10. On three occasions (Loc Ninh, Song Be and Bu Ccp/Bo Duc) main force units were committed against seemingly vulnerable and lightly defended targets. In each case, the continuing improvement in the effectiveness of ARVN and RW/PF units was evident as RVNIF units withstood heavy assaults until additional units could be committed. The dry season campaign was initiated. Major elements of the 101st Airborne Division commenced arrival in country.

(3) December was marked by a significant increase in enemy contacts and willingness of the enemy to engage in sustained combat. II PFOCEV increased the scope of dry season campaign operations when operations YELLONTON, SARATOGA and FARGO were initiated. Additional combat power continued to arrive in III CTZ. The 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment closed at Nui Dat on 27 December increasing the strength of the 1st Australian Task Force by 796 personnel. The 101st Airborne Division (-) closed in country. Both units commenced training immediately upon arrival.

(4) January was characterized by increased offensive operations against the enemy particularly in War Zone C, northern Binh Long and Phuoc Long provinces, northern Kien Phong province and near the junction of Bien Hoa, Binh Duong and Long Khanh provinces. Enemy initiated activity increased significantly, characterized by repeated attacks against friendly installations and defensive positions. A major violation of the New Year's truce occurred on 1 January when elements of the 271st and 272d VC Regiments attacked Fire Support Patrol Base Hurl. During the attack, US forces killed 386 of the enemy. An additional 20 enemy were killed as they attempted to flee the area. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division came under operational control of II PFOCEV on 13 January, except the 3rd Battalion, 506th Infantry which remained under the operational control of I PFOCEV. The 3rd Squadron 17th Air Cavalry commenced combat operations and has performed
well in combat. The 101st Airborne Division commenced large scale combat operations when it assumed responsibility for Operation MANCHESTER on 12 January. On 24 January, the 1st Australian Task Force commenced operations in AO Columbus (between the Dong Nai River and Highway 1, east of Bien Hoa). Contacts with the enemy in MR 10 during Operation SAN ANTONIO remained light as main force units were concentrated in and near War Zone C in an effort to defeat Allied forces.

(5) In December ARVN units assumed complete responsibility for military operations in the Capital Military District, releasing the 199th Infantry Brigade for operations in AO MANCHESTER and UNIONTOWN. The significance of this action became readily apparent as the 199th Infantry Brigade commenced making heavy contact with enemy forces north of the Dong Nai River soon after initiating operations in that area.

(6) The continued steady improvement in the security status of road lines of communication (LOC) contributed to successful combat operations and to the economic growth of the RVN. Overland movement of convoys and supplies has reduced the time required to commit forces to battle and to conduct logistical operations. It reduces the airlift requirements for both USAF and US Army aviation units. The Vietnamese people move to and from work and transport commercial produce to market with less fear of taxation, LOC interdictions and other incidents. Until the end of January, convoys could move over all national highways in III CTZ with the exception of the Inter-provincial Highway LA route to Dong Xoai and then on Highway 14 to the northeast. The enemy attack on 31 January resulted in some temporary interdictions and an increase in the number of incidents directed against convoys. The enemy did not control or interdict critical highways for extended time periods, and the resulting severe defeat more than offset any temporary psychological victory which the enemy may have gained initially.

(7) Offensive operations against main force units have driven the enemy from former base areas and have proven conclusively that there are no "safe havens" within the III CTZ. Until late January, the major enemy threat was located in northern Military Region 10 where there are no formally designated base areas, in War Zone C, and along Highway 13. Local force units were widely scattered outside of base areas. Operation SAN ANTONIO was being conducted in MR 10 as the reporting period ended.

(8) A new technique adopted during late November was the employment of Company F (101st). 51st Infantry with the 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry in support of Operations MANCHESTER and UNIONTOWN. Company F engaged in training and preparation for future operations during November. The 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry commenced limited operations along the eastern portion of the ATLANTA area of operation in November. In late November and early December, both units were under
Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) (M/DNC-TC-A) (U)

the operational control of the 9th Infantry Division and 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light) in succession, and operated together in close coordination in the MANCHESTER and UNION TCN areas of operation. Commencing on 8 December, the 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry (less one air cavalry troop) participated in Operation YELLOWSTONE. One air cavalry troop and Company F (LRP), 51st Infantry remained under the operational control of the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light). In January the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division assumed operational control of Troop A, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry and Company F, 51st Infantry (LRP). Both units participated successfully in Operation MANCHESTER and then returned to operational control of the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light).

(9) The high degree of tactical mobility and rapid reaction capability of all friendly forces was clearly demonstrated during the quarter. Large numbers of personnel and quantities of supplies and equipment were moved to areas of contact at Loc Ninh, Long Se and Bu Gi. The 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry was deployed on short notice from Bearcat to Ban Me Thout in II CTZ on 21 November, and the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division was deployed to I CTZ in January. The Mobile Riverine Force (MRF) continued highly effective operations in the Delta area.

(10) Jungle clearing operations were continued in enemy sanctuaries and along land LOC. The long time base areas in the Ho Bo woods, Boi Loi woods and Iron Triangle were either cleared or cleared to the extent that military operations can be conducted with greater facility in these areas. The security status of key land LOC (Highways 1 and 13 for example) and some secondary roads was improved by clearing operations. Reconnaissance in force operations such as SARATOGA, FARGO, YELLOWSTONE, SANTA Fe I and ATLANTA included jungle clearing and road upgrading operations.

(11) The highlight of the reporting period occurred on 31 December 1967 when the enemy launched a coordinated rocket, mortar and ground attack throughout III CTZ. This treacherous attack was directed against both military and political objectives, particularly Saigon, the Long Binh - Bien Hoa complex, and province and district capitals. This attack was met by combined rapid reaction of maneuver forces, tactical air, army aviation and artillery which produced overwhelming firepower. A summary of major actions occurring on the initial day of the attack is contained on page 45.

b. Operations continuing into this reporting period.

(1) Operation LAM SON 67, initiated on 8 February 1967, continued through the reporting period. The 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, in close coordination with elements of the 5th and 18th Infantry Divisions (ARVN), conducted local reconnaissance in force, cordon
and search and security of revolutionary development operations in heavily populated Binh Duong Province. Continuous emphasis was placed on strengthening local defense, extending developmental projects, elimination of Viet Cong infrastructure, winning the support of the population and road clearing operations. An example of the continuing effort to keep enemy forces off balance and to destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure was the organization of Task Force Madden (redesignated Task Force Neyer on 6 January). This specially tailored unit consists of a headquarters and one or more infantry companies with attached mechanized or armor units. These elements work in coordination and cooperation with Vietnamese province and district forces in Di An, Lai Thieu and Chanh Thanh Districts. The Task Force conducted patrols, cordon and search operations and day and night raids in southern Binh Duong Province, apprehending a number of personnel suspected of being members of the Viet Cong infrastructure, destroying tunnels, apprehending military deserters and draft delinquents, and capturing a small quantity of weapons. Enemy contact was light and sporadic until January. At 0720 hours, on 6 January, Company A, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry conducted an air assault seven kilometers southeast of Ben Cat. At 0930 hours, Company A began receiving small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated enemy battalion. Artillery and tactical air supported the contact which was reinforced by the Reconnaissance Platoon, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry and Companies A and B, 2d Battalion, A/1st Infantry (M). At 1300 hours, the enemy broke contact leaving behind 90 dead, 2 captured, 14 individual weapons and two crew served weapons captured. Friendly losses were four killed and 14 wounded. On 11 January, the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry conducted a highly successful cordon and search operation approximately three kilometers south of Ben Cat, in coordination with Vietnamese district officials and National Police. The cordon was in place by 2311 hours. Friendly forces commenced the search at daylight. Throughout the night the enemy employed sporadic small arms fire. Company B, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry engaged and killed two VC who were trying to escape from the cordon. During the search an additional seven VC were found dead, 11 VC were captured, 17 VC suspects were apprehended, 14 VC were determined later to be VC) and eight individual weapons were captured. Friendly losses were one killed and two wounded. This highly successful action indicates the outstanding results which can be achieved in combined operations by thorough planning, maximum security and deception, and decisive execution. This operation has denied the enemy a previous safe area, contributed to identification and elimination of the VC infrastructure, and afforded additional training in combined operations to SVNAF and US forces. Clearing of the Ong Dong Jungle and along Highway 13 has neutralized a large VC sanctuary and has improved the security condition of this major north/south highway. Convoys have moved between Di An and Quan Loi since 3 November without significant incident. Highways 7B, 2A and 1A between Ben Cat and Phuoc Vinh were opened from 23 November to 21 December. Convoys of the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division traveled from Bien Hoa to Ben Cat on Highway 13 and then east to Phuoc Vinh. Convoys of the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry

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Division traveled from Phuoc Vinh to Quan Loi. Road opening and upgrading operations have been conducted along Highway 1A between Phu Cuong and Phuoc Vinh and the road is used periodically for military convoys. Operation LON SON 68 terminated on 31 December 1967. Cumulative results include 59 US killed and 576 wounded. Two hundred eighty-three (283) enemy were killed (144 during January), 2204 people were classified as detainees, eight crew served weapons and 165 small arms were captured. Seven small arms were destroyed. Operation LON SON 68 continues in the same area of operations with the same mission.

(2) Operation SHENANDOAH II was a combined reconnaissance in force mission with road clearing and improvement. It was initiated by the 1st and 3rd Brigades, 1st Infantry Division on 29 September and continued into the reporting period. The battle of Loc Ninh which began on 29 October was the highlight of the operation. At the beginning of the reporting period, enemy activity in the Loc Ninh area had decreased to sporadic contacts. Light contacts on 1 November resulted in two friendly personnel wounded and 20 enemy killed. Starting at 0045 hours, 2 November, the enemy attacked the subsector compound, CIDG camp, US 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry night defensive position, fire support patrol base at the Loc Ninh airstrip and both ends of the airstrip with a combination of 82 and 120mm mortar, RPG-2, automatic weapons and small arms fire. The small arms and automatic weapons fire at Loc Ninh came from the north, east and west. Between 0130 hours and 0600 hours, the enemy made at least three unsuccessful assaults on friendly installations and positions with massed forces. A combination of heavy, accurate fire by the defenders, artillery and effective close air support inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. Approximately twelve .50 caliber weapons fired intense anti-aircraft fire at close support aircraft. There was a decrease in the fighting after 0600 hours, but contact was maintained and further enemy casualties were inflicted. Throughout the day, the US Infantry Battalions continued reconnaissance in force operations at distances up to six kilometers around Loc Ninh while ARVN forces maintained close-in security. At 0830 hours, the US 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry moved from Quan Loi and conducted an air mobile assault six kilometers northwest of Loc Ninh. At 1200 hours, two airstrikes killed 22 enemy four kilometers southwest of Loc Ninh. Two Mobile Strike Force Companies closed into Loc Ninh by 1400 hours. At 1407 hours, the US 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry completed an air mobile assault six kilometers northeast of Loc Ninh, establishing a night defensive position at that location. Between 2205 hours and 2304 hours, the enemy probed the night defensive position. This was the most significant day from the standpoint of resources expended and enemy casualties inflicted. Seven friendly personnel were killed and 36 were wounded compared to 296 enemy killed. At 0220 hours, 3 November, the US 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry night defensive position six kilometers northeast of Loc Ninh received 14-50 rounds of mortar, .50 caliber, small arms and automatic weapons fire. During the remainder of the day, US units in the surrounding area swept the battlefield, located 54 enemy dead and captured seven prisoners.
The 36th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) closed into Loc Ninh at 0945 hours to assist the garrison and conduct close-in search and sweep operations. By this time, the 273d and at least one battalion of the 272d Viet Cong Regiments (composed mostly of North Vietnamese) had been identified along with unknown sized elements of the 141st and 165th North Vietnamese Army Regiments. Rockets used during the attack indicated the presence of the 84A North Vietnamese Army Artillery Regiment. Three friendly personnel were killed and 43 wounded; fifty-seven enemy were killed. The four US infantry battalions conducted reconnaissance in force operations around Loc Ninh on 4 November with only one minor ground contact. During the day one VC was killed and 27 others were found dead from previous contacts. Thirteen more enemy dead were found on 5 November. On 7 November, the 1305 hours, the US 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry engaged an unknown size enemy force six kilometers northeast of Loc Ninh. Light fire teams and FLC supported the friendly force until the VC broke contact at 1620 hours. US casualties were 17 killed and 21 wounded; sixty six VC were killed. Key statistics in the Loc Ninh battle from 290115H October to 080600 hours November indicate the magnitude of the battle. 452 close air support sorties, 36 Sky Spot (radar controlled bomb strikes) and eight B-52 strikes were flown. Thirty thousand one hundred twenty five rounds of artillery were expended. Eight hundred fifty two enemy were killed at a cost of 50 friendly killed and 234 wounded. By 9 November, three additional enemy had been killed, for a total of 855. Operation SHARD4FAL II terminated on 19 November. One hundred seven (107) US personnel were killed and 352 were wounded; enemy losses were 956 killed.

(3) Operation BAIJING 6AU0S was conducted by the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division in eastern Hau Nghia, southern Tay Ninh and southwestern Binh Duong Provinces from 17 May to 7 December. The area of operations included long time enemy sanctuaries in the Ho Bo Woods, eastern B-Loi Woods, Filhol Plantation and the Iron Triangle. Numerous small unit operations were conducted in conjunction with a massive land clearing operation. Large areas of jungle and forest were cleared by Rome Ploes. Operations resulted in generally light and sporadic contact with small enemy units. The evasive tactics of the enemy combined with high frequency and clever use of mines and booby traps made this a painstaking operation with a relatively modest enemy to friendly kill ratio of two to one; however, the persistence of friendly forces has provided increased security for the pacification effort, kept the enemy off balance and caused the relocation of some enemy units. Large areas, which until recently had been considered by the enemy to be safe sanctuaries, have been cleared. The long term benefits of this operation will include increased security along the Saigon River. One hundred and fifty two (152) US personnel were killed and 1060 wounded. Enemy losses were 304 killed, 2036 detainees, five returnees, 2034 small arms and 27 crew served weapons captured.

(4) Operation KOLEKOL was conducted from 13 May to 17
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December in Hau Nghia, Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces by the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. This was the most successful of the 25th Infantry Division "Monsoon" operations from a statistical viewpoint. It was also a vital adjunct to the revolutionary development programs being conducted in the area of operations. Combined reconnaissance in force, and cordon and search operations maintained steady pressure on the enemy.

Operations were characterized by rapid response to intelligence reports in widely scattered areas of the division TACI and light contact with small enemy units. In November, an increased number of combined operations were conducted with the 34th Ranger Battalion (ARVN). During Operation KOLE-KOLE, US and ARVN forces achieved a high degree of teamwork as they conducted combat operations, upgraded roads, repaired bridges, and provided security for the local population. These operations were instrumental in improving economic conditions in the area and enhancing the overland movement of military forces. The local population now uses restored highways to go to and from work and to transport products to market. Ninety-two (92) US personnel were killed and 640 were wounded. Enemy personnel losses were 645 killed, 1232 detainees and 30 returnees. Enemy material losses included 2627 artillery and mortar rounds, 286 individual weapons and five crew-served weapons either captured or destroyed.

(5) Operation DIAMOND HEAD was continued by the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division in southeastern Tay Ninh and western Binh Duong Provinces. This operation was initiated on 17 May as part of the division monsoon campaign. Most operations were battalion size and smaller conducted in the Michelin rubber plantation, the "Trapezoid" area and western Boi Loi Woods. Extensive day and night patrolling, reconnaissance in force, and cordon and search operations were employed. On 25 November, Companies B and C, 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry killed 20 VC in an engagement with an estimated company five kilometers southeast of the Michelin rubber plantation. A small weapons cache containing 16 small arms was found by the Reconnaissance Platoon, 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry four kilometers east of the Michelin Plantation. After Operation ATLANTA was initiated on 18 November in the Iron Triangle, there was a marked increase in the frequency and intensity of contacts in the Trapesoid area, between the Iron Triangle and the Michelin Plantation. The reaction was predictable and understandable from the enemy's viewpoint since his traditional sanctuaries along the Saigon River were being threatened. This was a difficult operation due to heavy jungle, numerous base camps and fortifications in the area of operations and the enemy's skillful employment of mines and booby traps. It proved again that friendly forces can enter and conduct sustained operations in any area because of their superior combat power. Eighty friendly personnel were killed and 620 were wounded. Enemy losses were 237 killed, 499 detainees and four returnees. DIAMOND HEAD terminated on 7 December.

(7) Operation ENTRPRISE was initiated on 13 February 1967, and continues into the next reporting period. The 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division is conducting this operation in Long An Province in coordination...
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with ARVN, RF/PF, and RVN. Reconnaissance in force, cordon and search, saturation patrolling and eagle flight operations seek out and destroy the enemy, thereby improving security conditions in support of pacification activities. Night operations, including air mobile insertions, received increased emphasis. Enemy contact was heavier than during the previous reporting period. There were increased ground attacks by company size or larger enemy units, mortar attacks and incidents along Highway 4. However, enemy units remain dispersed in small groups and must be located by methodical search of suspected locations. There was one major enemy attack during the reporting period and two major contacts.

At 0305 hours, 10 December, Company A, 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry at An Nhut Tan was attacked from the northeast by an estimated VC Battalion. Contact continued until 0550 hours. At 0407 hours, the 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry base camp at Tan Tru received 40-50 rounds of 81mm mortar fire. A light fire team, artillery and mortar fire supported these contacts. Two companies each from the 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry, 3d Battalion, 39th Infantry, and 5th Battalion, 6th Infantry moved overland (one company) and by air in reaction to these attacks to block escape routes from the area. Five PF companies assisted with these operations. At 1412 hours, on 17 January, while conducting reconnaissance in force operations approximately four kilometers west of Rach Kien, Company A, 3d Battalion, 39th Infantry was attacked by an unknown size VC force. Contact grew increasingly heavy and at 1619 hours the Reconnaissance Platoon, 3d Battalion, 39th Infantry conducted an air assault approximately two kilometers north of the area of contact. At 1530 hours, Company C, 3d Battalion, 39th Infantry air assaulted to a position five kilometers northwest of Rach Kien supported by artillery, light fire teams and tactical aircraft. Contact was broken at 1740 hours. Seventeen enemy were killed, one PW and eight individual weapons were captured. At 1324 hours, on 8 January, the 3d Platoon of Company A, 3d Battalion, 39th Infantry conducted an air mobile insertion approximately eight kilometers southeast of Can Gio. At 1330 hours, the platoon received heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated VC platoon. Contact continued, and at 1413 hours the 1st Platoon of Company A was inserted approximately two kilometers to the northeast. At 1444 hours, the 2d Platoon of Company A, 3d Battalion, 39th Infantry was airlifted from Rach Kien and inserted in the area of contact followed by the 4d Platoon of Company B at 1540 hours. At 1702 hours, Company B, 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry was airlifted from positions five kilometers southeast of Tan Tru and inserted into the contact. At 2340 hours, the enemy broke contact and withdrew. Of the battle, twenty-six dead on the battlefield. A search of the battlefield the following day revealed an additional eight enemy killed. Friendly losses were 23 killed and 31 wounded. ENTERPRISE has produced excellent results in support of pacification. Where abandoned villages once decayed and empty school rooms deteriorated, there is now a resurgence of normal life. There has been a steady increase in the number of residents returning to their former homes. The repair of bridges in the area has reopened roads and granted access to the market. There has been an increase in commercial activity. The constant presence of troops provides actual as well as psychological security for the inhabitants.

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Operations in the area provide security for the villagers from Viet Cong harassment. The soldiers participate in various civic action programs when not patrolling or conducting other combat operations. There is increasing cooperation between the local populace and military and civilian officials, indicating acceptance of government authority. Significant cumulative enemy losses include 1,607 enemy killed, 1,012 detainees, 35 returnees, 352 individual weapons and 25 crew served weapons captured. Friendly losses include 220 killed and 1,227 wounded. Operation PHILLIPS continues.

(9) Operation RILVY is a reconnaissance in force operation being conducted in Bien Hoa and western Long Khanh Provinces by the 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. This operation commenced on 22 July. Basic objectives are to support pacification by conducting reconnaissance in force operations, providing a ready reaction force for SF/PF outposts, assisting the GVN in completing developmental projects and clearing existing roads and trails. It has produced benefits in Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provinces similar to those resulting from Operation ENTERPRISE in Long An Province. Highways 1 and 15 are more secure and support increased commercial travel. Security conditions along the Saigon-Khanh Lo railroad are improved by the presence of military forces in the area. Significant cumulative enemy losses include 406 enemy killed, 516 detainees, 109 individual weapons and 60 crew served weapons captured. Friendly losses include 55 killed and 253 wounded. Operation RILVY continues.

(10) Operation MAHASAN: On 20 October, the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment initiated Operation MAHASAN in the Mon Trach District, Bien Hoa Province. Combat operations are conducted in conjunction with psychological and pacification activities to reduce enemy influence and

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improve the capabilities of GVN forces. This will ultimately achieve a
degree of pacification which will permit deployment of FAMSF to other areas.
The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment conducts extensive reconnaissance in
force, saturation patrolling, air mobile, riverine and ARVN NURGER opera-
tions. Until 20 December, it was extremely difficult to locate a large
size enemy unit. On 20 December, elements of the 124th VC Regiment con-
ducted a coordinated attack against six ARVN and FAMSF positions along or
adjacent to Highway 15 in Vung Tau District. Enemy forces employed
mortar fire against five of the friendly positions. At 2210 hours, an
estimated Viet Cong Company, supported by 60 and 81mm fire, attacked the
1st Company, Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment, 12 kilometers south of
Long Thanh, from the south and west. The Royal Thai, supported by light
fire teams and artillery, repulsed the attack inflicting severe casual-
ties on the enemy. At 2355 hours, the Viet Cong appeared to withdraw to
the west, restoring the attack at 2300 hours in an apparent attempt to
retrieve their dead. Again the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment fought
gallantly and brought all available firepower to bear on the enemy.
Sporadic mortar and small arms fire continued until 0645 hours when the
enemy forces withdrew leaving 66 of their dead behind. At first light,
a search of the area disclosed 20 small arms, 22 crew served weapons,
122 hand grenades, 52 RPG rounds, 30 mortar rounds, 7 mines, and 9977 rounds
of small arms ammunition. The Royal Thai army Volunteer Regiment lost 6
killed and 13 wounded. Cumulative results of Operation NARA'UAN as of 31
January are 21 Thai killed and 82 wounded. Enemy losses are 113 killed,
89 detainees, 76 small arms and 28 crew served weapons captured. Opera-
tion NARA'UAN continues.
c. Operations completed during this reporting period:

(1) Operation KIN GIAW 9-1 was conducted from 16 to 24
November as a reconnaissance in force in Dinh Tuong Province. The Mobile
Riverine Force, including the 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, the 5th
VNMC Battalion (ARVN) and elements of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Divi-
sion operated in coordination and cooperation with the 7th and 9th Infan-
try Divisions (ARVN) and supported by Navy Task Force 117. The most
significant contacts were on 23 November in western Dinh Tuong Province
by elements of the US 9th Infantry Division, 7th Infantry Division (ARVN)
and 5th VNMC Battalion. Nine US personnel were killed and 61 wounded.
Thirty nine (VC) were killed by US forces while the ARVN and VNMC Bat-
talions accounted for an additional 25 VC killed. The operation was re-
duced in scope when the 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry and 5th Battalion,
with Infantry (M) terminated participation on 18 November. The Mobile
Riverine Force and 5th VNMC Battalion, supported by a B52 strike, con-
ducted air and riverine assaults in the Cam Son Secret Zone on 23 Novem-
ber to locate and destroy elements of the 516th LF Battalion. Eight
kilometers southwest of Cai Lay, the 3d Co, 5th VNMC Battalion found a
weapons cache consisting of 16 Chicom carbines, 40,000 rounds of 7.62
ammunition and other miscellaneous items of material. Cumulative results
of US operations were 16 US killed and 113 wounded. Enemy losses were 73
killed, 48 detainees, four small arms and one crew served weapon captured. The 5th VNMC Battalion lost three killed and 35 wounded while accounting for 65 VC killed, 35 detainees and 82 small arms captured.

(2) Operation CAMEN was conducted from 17 December to 31 December in northern Binh Dinh and southern Tay Ninh Provinces by the 25th Infantry Division. The initial task organization for this reconnaissance in force operation consisted of the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry and one troop, 3d Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry. The 1st Battalion, 49th Infantry (ARVN) and 3d Battalion, 49th Infantry (ARVN) worked in coordination and cooperation with US forces. On 20 December, the 3d Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry (-) killed 14 VC ten kilometers east of Dau Tieng. On 21 December, the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, 27th Infantry in a day long contact five kilometers northeast of Trung Lap killed 12 VC while losing four killed and 17 wounded. Heavy contact involving the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry and an unknown size enemy force occurred on 22 December twelve kilometers southeast of Dau Tieng, continuing throughout the day. Approximately eight miles to the southeast, Troop C, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry engaged another unknown size force. All contacts for the day resulted in 17 VC killed at a cost of 24 US killed and 45 wounded. CAMEN terminated on 31 December. Cumulative results were 25 US killed and 118 wounded. Enemy losses include 101 killed, one returnee, 29 detainees, 18 small arms, one crew served weapon and 19 tons of rice captured. Thirty five tons of rice were destroyed.

(3) CORONADO IX was a combined riverine operation initiated on 2 November 1967 in western Dinh Tuong and eastern Kien Phong Provinces by elements of the 9th Infantry Division in coordination and cooperation with the 5th VNMC Battalion and Navy Task Force 117. On 4 December, operations were conducted in the My Tho area to locate and destroy elements of the 26th KP and 502d LF Battalions. The 5th VNMC Battalion was the lead element followed by the 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry as the force proceeded north on a river 12 kilometers east of My Tho. Upon receiving heavy small arms, automatic weapons, recoilless rifle and 81mm rocket fire from the west river bank, the 5th VNMC Battalion beached four companies and launched an attack against enemy positions. The 1st Company, 5th VNMC Battalion killed more than 100 enemy as it attacked a fortified position. The 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry beached two kilometers to the southwest of the 5th VNMC Battalion and attacked to the northwest. Three companies of the 4th Battalion, 47th Infantry were air lifted into blocking positions two kilometers to the northwest of the 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry. Pressed from the south, north and east, the VC units began withdrawing and were pushed into the 4th Battalion, 47th Infantry blocking position. Heavy to light contact continued throughout most of the day. Enemy losses from this engagement were 263 killed (136 by 5th VNMC), 24 detainees, 53 small arms and one crew served weapon captured. Friendly losses were 52 killed (40 VNMC), and 225 wounded (70 VNMC). There were two significant contacts during January. At 1605 hours, on 7 January while conducting reconnaissance in force operations twelve kilometers southwest of Ben Tre,
Company B, 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry, received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated two VC platoons. Fire was returned with organic weapons and 11th Airborne artillery and cinders supported the contact. At 2010 hours, the VC broke contact leaving behind 26 dead. US losses were seven wounded. At 1310 hours, on 10 January, Company A, 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry conducted an air mobile assault fifteen kilometers west of Duy Lang. The company received small arms, automatic weapons fire and rifle grenades from an estimated two VC platoons located near the landing zone. At 1610 hours, Company C, 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of VC approximately two kilometers west of the contact. At 1820 hours, approximately one kilometer west of the contact, Company A, 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry engaged an unknown number of VC. Companies A, B and C of the 4th Battalion, 47th Infantry were inserted at 1850 hours to reinforce Company C, 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry which remained in heavy contact. All three companies of the 4th Battalion, 47th Infantry were engaged as they moved west to link up with Company C, 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry. All elements remained in contact until 2235 hours at which time the VC broke contact. Enemy losses were 47 killed. US losses were 18 killed and 50 wounded. Operation CORRADO IX terminated on 18 January. Cumulative results of the operation were 454 enemy killed, 611 detainees, 84 individual and two crew served weapons were captured. Friendly losses were 75 killed and 374 wounded.

(4) Operation SANTA FE I was initiated on 3 November to clear, widen and open Highway 1 from Gia Ray to the II/III CTZ boundary, destroy VC/NVA forces and bases in the Hai Tan Secret Zone, and develop an LOC infrastructure between Highway 1 and Highway 23 within the area of operations. The operation was preceded by a deception plan designed to convince the enemy that a major operation would be conducted along Highway 20 and Route 332 in Long Khanh province. Deception measures included publication of a spurious operation plan for "Operation JUDEA VI", detailed coordination with Long Khanh province and district officials and the displacement of a FID into the "JUDEA VI" area of operations.

Elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (Airborne), 1st Australian Task Force and Detachment B, 56, Company A, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) also participated. Highway 1 from the vicinity of Gia Ray to the II/III CTZ boundary and important lateral roads, (Highway 23 from Junction Highway 1 to Ban Than, Highway 331 from Junction Highway 1 to Junction Highway 23 and portions of Highway 329 from Junction Highway 1 to Junction Highway 23) leading from Highway 1 have been upgrad. This will produce long range benefits to the civilian economy by helping control inflation, allowing goods to move freely to and from market, hindering the VC tax collection effort, reducing the probability of attacks by fire and other incidents. Enemy contacts have been extremely light and sporadic. The Hai Tan-Nui Be Sanctuary has been neutralized as a result of this operation, and over eight thousand acres of jungle have been cleared. The experience gained during this combined
Operation will prove valuable in future operations. By 3 January, US and Australian forces had terminated participation in the operation. The 18th Infantry Division (ARVN) remained in the area to ensure that maximum benefits would continue to be gained from the operation. Traffic now moves freely on Highway 1 in III CTZ. Cumulative results of the operation were six friendly killed (two US, one ARVI, and three AUST), and 55 wounded (15 US, 13 ARVI, nine AUST). Enemy losses were 126 killed (54 US, 63 ARVI, and 13 AUST), 119 SA (52 US, 48 ARVI, and 19 AUST) and 20 crew served weapons (10 by ARVI) captured.

(5) Operation FORGER was conducted by the 1st Australian Task Force from 23 November 1967 to 5 January 1968 in south central Phuoc Tuy Province to deny enemy access to the rice harvest. Extensive cordon and search, patrolling, and reconnaissance in force operations were employed to achieve the primary goal. Enemy contact was light, but the basic objectives were achieved. The extensive and wide ranging operations caught the enemy by surprise on several occasions. On 2 December, six VC were contacted near the south China Sea 12 kilometers southeast of Xuyen Loc. Four were killed and three small arms were captured. On 12 December, a Long Range Patrol engaged and killed seven VC and captured three small arms eight kilometers northeast of Phuoc Qui. On 23 December, 35 small arms were found in a weapons cache, four small arms were found in a base camp, three VC were killed and three small arms were captured at a third location. All were in the same general area 10 kilometers northeast of Da Ban. In addition to protecting the rice harvest in south central Phuoc Tuy Province, the operation has kept the enemy off balance, thus increasing his vulnerability to air, artillery, and ground engagement by maneuver forces. Cumulative results were five Australians killed, 31 wounded; enemy losses include 51 killed, 58 detainees, three crew served weapons and 114 small arms captured.

(6) Operation FARGO. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-3d Squadron) initiated FARGO on 22 December to open Highway 15 from An Loc to Loc Ninh, secure the construction of a heavy artillery fire support base at Loc Ninh and destroy VC/IVL forces in the Loc Ninh - Bu Doc - Song, Be area. The 3d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment deployed to the Loc Ninh area on 30 December, after being relieved of the KINTY H&K mission by the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry. The Regiment deployed around Loc Ninh, secured Highway 15 to maintain a land LOC open, conducted local reconnaissance in force operations and provided security for construction of the FSB. The area of operation was expanded later when the 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment began operations along the Cambodian Border in the vicinity of the "THICK ROK" area. On 6 January, as the 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment moved west toward the Cambodian Border and the "THICK NOK" area, the enemy reacted. Between 0815 hours to 1500 hours, Troop H was in a running contact with the enemy, ranging from small arms fire from snipers to medium to heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated VC platoon. Results of these contacts were eighteen enemy killed.
and one captured. Friendly losses were two killed and six wounded.

At 1030 hours, Troop E received small arms fire while reconnoitering in the vicinity of an air strike. Fire was returned and a subsequent search of the area revealed 16 enemy dead. On 21 January, the 1st and 2d squadrons of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, under the operational control of the 101st Airborne Division, moved to an area approximately ten kilometers east of An Loc for participation in Operation ATTALA. The 3d squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment remained at Loc Ninh, secured the Regimental CP at that location and continued to secure An Loc and Loc Ninh. Operation PAPER terminated on 21 January. Cumulative enemy losses were forty nine killed, ten detainees, five individual and three crew served weapons captured. Friendly losses were six killed and 47 wounded. The operation was characterized by very light enemy contact with the exception of 6 January actions discussed above.

(7) Operations MANCHESTER and UNICORN (formerly Operation 3-2MICH/IIIUNION). As the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light) relinquished responsibility for operations in Gia Dinh Province to the 5th Army Group (ARVN), operations in AO STRIKE and UNICORN were expanded. On 15 November, the 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry was relocated from Capital Military District. On 17 November, Operations STRIKE-I and UNICORN were terminated and Operation STRIKE/UNICORN was initiated in the same AO with the same mission. Concurrently, the 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry, assumed the STRIKE/UNICORN mission under operational control of the 9th Infantry Division. In late November, Company F (LRP), 51st Infantry and the 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry commenced operations in AO STRIKE/UNICORN, under operational control of the 9th Infantry Division. On 1 December, the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light) assumed the STRIKE/UNICORN mission and operational control of both the 3d squadron, 17th Air Cavalry and Company F (LRP), 51st Infantry. The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry was added to the task organization. The 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry (less one air cavalry troop) was released to the operational control of the 25th Infantry Division effective 8 December for employment in Operation YELLOWSTONE. One air cavalry troop remained under the operational control of the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light). After the 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry was released from FAIRFAX on 14 December, it was also employed in the STRIKE/UNICORN AO. The 40 was expanded to the north in view of the additional forces involved and the offensive nature of the STRIKE portion of the operation. Operation STRIKE/UNICORN was terminated on 17 December. Operations MANCHESTER and UNICORN were initiated on 18 December with no change in the overall AO or mission. MANCHESTER (in an AO north of the Long Bai river) replaces STRIKE and is an offensive reconnaissance in force operation directed against enemy main force units. Conversely, UNICORN is primarily a security mission designed to prevent rocket and mortar attack against the Long Dinh - Bien Hoa complex. The expanded UNICORN AO includes the area to the north of the Long Bai River from which the
enemy would most probably launch a rocket attack on the Long Binh - Bien Hoa area. This change in AO and separation of the operations provides the Commanding General, II Field Force, greater flexibility. The original mission can be assumed by another II Field Force unit on short notice if another battalion is required in the Hau Nghia area. Company units have been informed of this contingency. The 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light) had three heavy contacts north of the Dong Ha River during the reporting period. On 6 December, elements of the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry; 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry and Troop A, 17th Cavalry engaged an estimated VC battalion occupying well fortified positions. Twenty five US were killed and 82 wounded; 64 enemy were killed. On 19 December, the 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry (-) and Troop A, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry made sporadic to heavy contacts throughout the day with an unknown size enemy force. Forty nine enemy were killed at a cost of seven US personnel killed and 13 wounded. On 27 December, the 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry engaged an unknown size enemy force. Supported by artillery and a light fire team, the battalion killed 30 enemy while losing five killed and 34 wounded. Including the results of operations by Troop A, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry and Company F, 51st Infantry, 37 VC were killed during the day. Total US personnel losses were seven killed and 20 wounded. On 12 January, the 3d Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division assumed responsibility for Operation NAMHEHEE and operational control of Troop A, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry and Company F, 51st Infantry (Light). Major objectives of the operation remained the same. Throughout the remainder of the reporting period the operation was highlighted by the destruction of VC supply bases and hospital complexes as well as numerous contacts resulting in heavy enemy casualties. At 1105 hours, on 16 January, approximately ten kilometers northeast of Tan Uyen the Reconnaissance Platoon and Company B of the 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry contacted an estimated reinforced VC Platoons occupying a circular trench system protecting a VC hospital and supply base area. The VC fired claymores, small arms and automatic weapons at the friendly forces. Fire was returned with organic weapons, artillery, light fire teams and tactical airstrikes supported the friendly forces. At 1145 hours, Company A, 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry moved to reinforce followed by Company A at 1305 hours. The enemy broke contact at 1415 hours and left behind three dead. The 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry remained in the area to exploit the complex which was a well constructed battalion size base camp including; bunkers, hospital, mess and sleeping facilities with fighting positions. Several bunkers were under ground, some above ground level and some half underground. The bunkers were no higher eight feet inside with five feet of cover on top. There were at least 100 well
constructed bunkers connected by trenches. Contacts with the enemy remained heavy. On 17 January, ten kilometers southwest of Phuoc Vinh, Troop A, 3d Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry engaged an estimated thirty enemy, resulting in eleven killed. Contacts on 19 January resulted in eleven enemy killed. On 20 January, a brigade forward air controller directed artillery fire into an area resulting in nine enemy killed. On 21 January, Troop A, 3d Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry reverted to operational control of 159th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light) followed by Company F, 51st Infantry (Lmt.) on 22 January. As of 31 January, operations in Area CNET resulted in 345 enemy killed, 62 detainees, 23 individual weapons and one crew served weapons captured, and 37 tons of rice destroyed. Friendly losses were 32 killed and 181 wounded. Operation DUNCAN continues.

(8) Operation ATLANTA was conducted from 13 November to 23 December by elements of the 25th Infantry Division in coordination and cooperation with elements of the 5th Infantry Division (AIR). The initial task organization consisted of the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division with the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, and 3d Battalion, 2d Infantry. The objective was to destroy enemy forces and installations in the Iron Triangle area, southwest Quang Tri area. Major accomplishments of Operation ATLANTA were the destruction of a large enemy tunnel complex and ammunition factory, clearing of over 10,000 acres of jungle area with Rome Plows and disruption of normal enemy operations. On 23 November, the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry found a 55 gallon drum containing 65 Chicom carbines, two .45 cal pistols and one 8mm Mauser rifle. Cumulative results were 16 friendly personnel killed and 108 wounded. Enemy losses were 81 killed, 113 small arms, four crew served weapons and 119.5 tons of rice captured. The small arms and 72.2 tons of rice were destroyed.

(9) Operation AKRON V was conducted from 11 January to 21 January by elements of the 9th Infantry Division in coordination and cooperation with elements of the 1st Australian Task Force. The initial task organization consisted of the 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division with the 2d Battalion, 39th Infantry, 2d Battalion, 47th Infantry (H), Troop A, 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry and the 1st Australian Task Force. The objective was to locate and destroy elements of the 274th VC Main Force Regiment operating in the Hat Dich area southeast of the Binh Son Rubber Plantation. Major accomplishments of Operation AKRON V were the additional experience gained in combined combat operations, the destruction of a large enemy bunker complex and the disruption of normal enemy operations. On 14 January, while exploiting a bunker complex along the Duoi Le River, Company C, 2d Battalion, 39th Infantry found 11 enemy dead in graves. In the same area the company found a 60mm mortar, 3000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 27 grenades and 95 artillery and mortar rounds. Cumulative results were four friendly personnel killed and 80 wounded. Enemy losses were 47 killed, 15 small arms and 10 crew served weapons captured.
AVFLQ-68-6
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period
Ending 31 January 1968 (ROCS CYPHER-65) (W-IHM-TO-A) (U)

(1) Operations in the Bo Duc/Bo Duc area are significant because they demonstrate the outstanding reaction capabilities of friendly forces and indicate improved ARVN effectiveness. Bo Duc District Headquarters, two kilometers south of Bu Dop, was attacked by enemy forces on 16 November. Friendly forces at the time of the attack consisted of elements of one Regional Force company, two Popular Force platoons and the 5th Reconnaissance Company (ARVN). At 0027 hours, an estimated reinforced Viet Cong battalion, 272d Regiment, 9th Viet Cong Division, attacked the district headquarters compound from three directions, supported by 82mm mortar and 84mm rocket fire. By 0200 hours, the southern sector of the compound was penetrated, and friendly forces conducted a fighting withdrawal to the southern part of the compound. All available supporting fires were directed against the attacking force. Thirty-eight airstrikes, artillery and light fire teams assisted the friendly forces in containing the enemy penetration. By 0630 hours, the enemy was expelled from the compound. Enemy losses from this attack were 96 killed, one prisoner, nine small arms and five crew-served weapons captured.

Friendly losses were 15 killed and 57 wounded. In response to the attack at Bo Duc, two ARVN battalions were moved by helicopter to Bo Duc, and the US 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, with one artillery battery, moved by helicopter from Quan Loi to Bu Dop closing it to the enemy. The 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry established a night defensive position at the north end of the runway. Commencing at 2202 hours, enemy forces fired approximately 125 rounds of mixed mortar fire and an estimated 16 rounds of 122mm rockets into the position. At 2206 hours, a ground attack was launched by elements of the 271st VC Regiment, 9th VC Division and the 80A Replacement and Training Regiment. Close fighting occurred around the perimeter. At 2334 hours, an enemy squad was repelled by small arms fire as it attempted to enter the perimeter. Friendly forces were supported by airstrikes, artillery, a light fire team, forward air controller and an air observer. At 2357 hours, the enemy broke contact. Searches of the battlefield during the next two days revealed 59 enemy dead. Seven US personnel were killed and 11 were wounded. This is the first known employment of 122mm rockets in III CTZ against fixed installations. From 1 December to 4 December, there were numerous light contacts with enemy forces. The enemy employed mortars and rockets against friendly positions while avoiding major contact. On 5 December, the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry moved to positions approximately one kilometer northeast of Bu Dop. On 6 December, the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry moved to the vicinity of Bu Dop. On 8 December, the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry moved to the vicinity of Bu Dop. On 8 December, the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry was attacked by an estimated battalion of the 273d VC Regiment, 9th VC Division. At 0106 hours, enemy forces launched a mortar attack and 30 minutes later began firing small arms into the friendly positions. At 0212 hours, enemy forces initiated a ground attack from the east and northwest with small probes from the southeast and southwest. Friendly forces were supported by six airstrikes, four light fire teams, artillery, Spooky, an air observer and a forward air controller. After 48 minutes of fighting, the enemy withdrew. Friendly losses were...
Four killed and 14 wounded while the enemy lost 48 killed, six prisoners and 25 wounded captured. The 1st Infantry Division maintained at least one infantry battalion in the Bu Do area until 29 December. Cumulative casualties from US operations in the Bu Do area from 29 November to 29 December were 16 US killed and 66 wounded. Enemy losses were 151 killed, 22 small arms and 11 crew served weapons captured. On 13 December, the 1st Division, 26th Infantry moved by helicopter from Quan Loi to Song Bo. Until January, the 1st US Infantry Division conducted reconnaissance in force operations in the Song Bo area with one battalion.

(11) Opening of Highway 13 (includes battle at PSNS CALICO VI on 10 December). The 1st Infantry Division conducted operations to keep Highway 13 open during the reporting period. Semi-permanent night defensive positions and Fire Support Patrol Bases were constructed along this major north-south route. Construction included the clearing and leveling of fields of fire by bulldozers, installation of two triple bands of concertina around the perimeter and construction of minimum troop comfort facilities. This will permit more economical use of resources in carrying out the long term mission of maintaining Highway 13 open. Convoys have moved to Quan Loi since 3 November without significant incident. There has been a major increase in civilian traffic and economic activity along Highway 13. Allied forces conduct military operations by overland movement. The enemy once transported men and supplies along the highway and crossed it at will in movements between An Loc and D. It was reported violently to the loss of control of the road by attacking defensive positions and FoP along the highway. One example in the attack on PSNS CALICO VI, eight kilometers southwest of An Loc on 10 December. US forces at PSNS CALICO VI consisted of Company A, 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry; 3d Platoon, Troop G, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry; Battery A, 6th Battalion, 15th Artillery; Battery C, 8th Battalion, 6th Artillery. At 0200 hours elements of the 165th infantry launched a ground attack supported by mortars and 105mm fire, against the night defensive positions. Enemy forces employed claymores and Bangalore torpedoes on the north, east and west side of the perimeter to breach the defensive wire. Approximately 16 mortar rounds ranging from 60mm to 120mm were fired into friendly positions. Friendly forces were supported by four airstrikes, four light fire teams, Spooky, a forward air controller, an air observer, artillery and mortars. The attack was repulsed after a one hour and 20 minute contact. Enemy losses were 143 killed, two WIA, 43 small arms and 21 crew served weapons captured. US losses were one killed and 17 wounded.

(12) 101st Airborne Division (--)!

(a) On 2 August 1967, the 101st Airborne Division (--) was alerted for deployment to the RVN. Equipment and personnel readiness dates were changed from February 1968 to 1 December 1967 to permit early deployment of the division. An intensive training program was initiated to train new personnel; emphasis was placed on individual training, JCR/PKR requirements, quick-kill techniques, study of lessons.
Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968 (ROK-OF-PUR-65) (J-IND-70-A) (b)

Learned in Vietnam, and maximum attendance at on-post and off-post schools. A provisional schools command was organized using non-deployable personnel to supervise the schools program. The schools command trained 5,647 personnel in various combat skills. An additional 659 personnel attended off-post service schools.

(b) Movements:

On 10 November, the United States Air Force began Operation Angle Thrust, the movement of the division by C-141 aircraft from Fort Campbell, Kentucky to Bien Hoa, AFB, RVN in the following six echelons:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Range</th>
<th>Arrival Dates</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Pax</th>
<th>Cargo Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advance Command and Control Group</td>
<td>18-19 Nov 67</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>94.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Advance Party</td>
<td>21-25 Nov 67</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1013</td>
<td>1307.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Brigade TF</td>
<td>2-7 Dec 67</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>3874</td>
<td>1296.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division Troops</td>
<td>7-15 Dec 67</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>1092</td>
<td>901.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a Brigade TF</td>
<td>14-19 Dec 67</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>3248</td>
<td>959.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear</td>
<td>24-30 Dec 67</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The USAF flew an additional twenty-two C-133 sorties loaded with helicopters and outsized cargo. On 19 December, at 1900 hours, the division officially closed with arrival of the last aircraft from the 2d Brigade TF. The following is a recapitulation of air movement of the division:

Dates: 16 November - 30 December 1967
Sorties: 391
Passengers: 9794
Cargo: 5085.6 ST

In addition, two surface vessels, the Ruth Lykes and James Lykes, were loaded at Mobile, Alabama and on 6-8 November 1967, departed for the RVN with the following personnel and cargo:

Personnel: 16
Short Tons: 4110.6

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AV900-81-1

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Quarterl Period
Jan. 31 January 1968 (23C CAFS-68) (2-31-68-61) (C)

Measurement Tons: 17,661.9
Cones: 1281
Vehicles: 207


(c) Arrival/Recon: The 2d and 3d Brigade Task Forces were sponsored and escorted to base camps at Ch Qui and Phuoc Vih by the 25th Infantry Division and 1st Infantry Division, respectively. The bulk of personnel and equipment moved to base camps by military convoy in order to conserve critical airlift. The Division headquarters, Support Command, and 2d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry established base camp at Bien Hoa within the defense perimeter and facilities vacated by the 175th Airborne Brigade. As of 31 December, the USAF had supported the in-country movement to base camps by providing airlift of priority cargo and passengers as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C7A</th>
<th>C123</th>
<th>C130</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sorties</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passengers</td>
<td>1037</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo (short tons)</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Base Camp Development Period: After arriving at base camps, division units began an aggressive self-help improvement program. Special attention was required at each location for improvements in electrical facilities; potable water supply; drainage and erosion control; and construction of roads, revetments, bunkers, command posts, and ammunition storage facilities.

(e) In-Country Training Programs:

1. Concurrent with base camp development each brigade began a thirty-day training program to conduct advance unit training not completed at Fort Campbell and to practice special skills peculiar to combat in Vietnam. The 3d Brigade began its two-phase program on 11 December and the 2d Brigade on 18 December. The first phase consists of special orientations and classes on a variety of subjects. Areas of special interest include Vietnam Orientation, intelligence procedures, prevention of heat injuries and tropical diseases, first and self aid, local policies — off limits areas, currency control, convoy procedures and immediate action drills and safety orientations.

2. The second phase of the training program consisted primarily of company and battalion level tactical training.

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Emphasis was placed on air mobile operations, road clearing and security for fire support patrol bases, to include use of artillery and 2.5 air support. The 25th Infantry Division, 1st Infantry Division and 9th Infantry Division provided mobile training teams and allocated substantial numbers of school quotas for 101st Division personnel. Arrangements also were made for small unit leaders to accompany their counterparts on combat operations prior to leading their own patrols into the field.

A significant training problem experienced by the division was the need to provide combat personnel with those skills peculiar to the environment in Vietnam. A special need existed for experienced instructors on booby traps, mine detectors and tunnel operations. In these areas, the 25th Infantry Division and 1st Infantry Division provided valuable assistance.

The presence of an armed enemy in the training area instilled in the "students" a sense of urgency and importance seldom achieved in other training situations. As a result, the trainees of the division made substantial improvements in a very short time.
d. Operations commenced during the reporting period and continuing into the next reporting period.

(1) Operation SARATOGA was initiated by the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division on 8 December as a reconnaissance in force operation in Hau Nghia province in support of pacification activities. This operation has maintained a sizable military force in the southern portion of the division 1A01 while the majority of available resources are committed to Operation YELLOWSTONE. Contact has been infrequent with as large as battalion size enemy forces. On 14 December, the 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry killed 10 VC on 22 December near the Saigon River, 10 kilometers northeast of Trung Lap. On 21 December, the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry occupied a base camp between Trung Bang and Trung Lap and was attacked by an estimated VC battalion. 39 VC were killed, several wounded, 11 small arms and 11 crew served weapons captured with 11 US personnel being wounded.

The 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry killed 10 VC on 22 December near the Saigon River, 10 kilometers northeast of Trung Lap. On 21 December, the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry occupied a base camp between Trung Bang and Trung Lap and was attacked by an estimated VC battalion. 39 VC were killed, several wounded, 11 small arms and 11 crew served weapons captured with 11 US personnel being wounded.

Contacts with the enemy became increasingly heavy indicating the importance that the enemy attaches to the Saigon River LCC, its tributaries and surrounding area. On 4 January, the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry was engaged in sporadic contact throughout the day with the enemy in an area approximately eleven kilometers north-northeast of Cu Chi. The heaviest contact of the day occurred at 1240 hours when Company A, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry became heavily engaged with an unknown size enemy force resulting in seven friendly killed and 26 wounded. Artillery and air strikes supported friendly forces throughout the day. Results of the day's operations were 16 friendly killed, 22 friendly wounded and 20 enemy killed.

The enemy fired small arms, automatic weapons and RPG-2 rocket launchers. Fire was returned with organic weapons. Artillery (including direct fire beehive), light fire teams and "Spooky" supported the friendly forces. As heavy and accurate fire by friendly forces began to take their toll, the enemy broke contact and withdrew. All fires had ceased by 0540 hours. The enemy lost 74% of his dead, 11 crew served weapons and nine individual weapons on the battlefield.

Afternoon, Company B, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry found 22 enemy dead in fresh graves one kilometer north of the area of contact. In reaction to the attack, the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry and 4th Cavalry conducted an air assault along suspected routes of withdrawal. Aerial helicopters scanning the area engaged scattered groups of the enemy as they attempted to escape. These operations resulted in an additional 14 enemy killed for a total of 110 enemy dead during the day's operations. US losses were six killed and 29 wounded. On one occasion, a mortar and recoilless rifle attack
on a friendly base camp resulted in moderately heavy friendly casualties. As the reporting period ended, frequent enemy contacts continued as the enemy gave every indication that the Saigon River LOC and surrounding area were vital to his insurgency efforts in Hau Nghia Province. Cumulative results as of 31 January were 783 enemy killed, 79 individual weapons and 25 crew served weapons captured. Seventy-five (.75) crew served weapons were destroyed. Friendly losses were 82 killed and 447 wounded. Operation BLUESTONE continues.

(2) Operation YELLOSTONE was initiated on 8 December with the primary objective of neutralizing War Zone C and interdicting known invasion and escape routes to and from War Zone C. The task organization included major elements of the 25th Infantry Division, the 1st Battalion, 49th Infantry (ARVN), 3d Battalion, 17th Infantry (ARVN) and 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry (less one troop). This operation is providing security for the relocation of CIDG camps at Trai Bi and Frek Klok and to the new fighting camps at Thien Ngon and Katum. Construction at Thien Ngon began on 7 December. Construction at Katum will commence at a later date. Jungle clearing operations are being conducted along secondary roads such as Highway 4 between Nui Ba Den and Katum; resupply convoys are moving over this important route. The operation was reduced in scope because elements of the 1st Infantry Division were deployed to Bu Dop in reaction to enemy attacks on the CIDG camp at Bu Dop and the Bo Duc District headquarters on 29 November. An additional battalion was deployed to Song Be in December. On 6 and 9 December, the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry discovered 392 tons of rice 6 kilometers northwest of Katum. Between 0140 and 0530 hours on 30 December, the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry defensive position in the vicinity of Bo Tuc received approximately 250 rounds of 60 and 82mm mortar and was attacked by an unknown size force employing RPG, small arms and automatic weapons. Artillery, light fire teams and airstrikes supported friendly forces. Forty enemy personnel were killed, 19 small arms, eight crew served weapons and two radio were captured, six US personnel were killed and 22 were wounded. The expected violent enemy reaction to operations in War Zone C occurred on 1 January while the New Year's truce was still in effect. Fire Support Patrol Base Burt, located approximately 12 kilometers northeast of Nui Tre, was the target of the attack. Friendly forces at FSPD Burt consisted of 3d Brigade headquarters, 25th Infantry Division with the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry (R), 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, Batteries A and C, 3d Battalion, 77th Artillery and Battery A, 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery. At 1044 hours, a patrol sent to investigate noises on the eastern side of the perimeter received small arms fire. At the same time, the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry perimeter received 4 81mm mortars and the 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery received two 60mm mortar rounds. In reaction to the attack, a light fire team conducted an aerial surveillance of the area of operation and counter-mortal fire was employed. At 2052 hours, the fire support patrol base received 15 rounds of 81mm mortar fire in the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry area on the east side of the perimeter, 13 rounds of 60mm and 82mm mortar fire in the 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery area on the southern side of the perimeter and 3 RPG rounds in the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry area.

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on the west. Countermortar was fired and a light fire team was on station. At 2215 hours, a light fire team received small arms and automatic weapons fire taking an unknown number of hits. At 2220 hours, a light fire team observed lights and engaged them with small arms, automatic weapons, rockets and 40mm fire. Fifteen minutes later, Company A, 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry and a listening post on the perimeter observed 1 VC moving between the perimeter and the listening post. The VC was engaged with small arms and automatic weapons. At 2237 hours, a listening post received one hand grenade. At 2330 hours, the enemy commenced a mortar attack followed by small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire. The attack was mainly from the southeast although all sections of the perimeter were subjected to fire. All six reconnaissance patrols operating in the vicinity of the fire support patrol base became engaged with the enemy to some extent. Fire was returned with small arms, automatic weapons, light fire teams, tactical air, artillery and Spooky.

Thirty minutes after the attack began, the enemy launched a ground attack. The main effort was from the southwest, shifting subsequently to the southeast with secondary attacks coming from the northeast sectors. Direct fire artillery was employed using both beehive and high explosive ammunition and the local battalion reserve was committed. At 0145 hours, the enemy fire and intensity of attack lessened. At 0200 hours, fire increased and all sectors of the perimeter were again engaged with the main attack coming from the south and southeast and secondary attacks from the north and northeast. All available fire support means were used. At 0228 hours, tactical air was employed in the southern sector of the fire support patrol base while artillery fire was placed in other sectors. At 0311 hours, the attack lessened and ceased except in the south and southeast sectors where tactical air was being employed. At 0327 hours, all enemy efforts were directed at the south and southeast sectors of the perimeter with only sporadic fire directed at other areas. At 0500 hours, the VC began a withdrawal to the south, southeast and northeast leaving delays in order to screen movement. At 0745 hours, the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry began arriving at Fire Support Patrol Base Burt by helicopter to relieve the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry. The battalion closed at 1113 hours. The attack was made by the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 272d VC Regiment from the north and east. Throughout the morning the 3d Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry (-) and tactical air engaged the enemy along withdrawal routes. Numerous VC were observed fleeing the area and some were observed carrying dead or wounded. Observations were for the most part southeast and northeast of the fire support patrol base. The 271st and 272d VC Regiments had moved down from Military Region 10 in an effort to counter the Allied threat in kar Zone C. A search of the battlefield resulted in five enemy captured and revealed 335 enemy dead. Elements of the 3d Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry killed 20 additional enemy along routes of withdrawal as the enemy attempted to escape. Subsequent searches of the battlefield revealed an additional 31 enemy killed (total of 406 enemy killed in the Burt action), 76 individual weapons and 40 crew served weapons and
three additional VC captured. Friendly personnel losses were 23 killed and 133 wounded; material losses were one APC, three M2 duster and one 4 ton truck destroyed; one M35 Quad 50 and one UH-1D helicopter were damaged. Throughout the remainder of the reporting period the enemy continued to react violently to Allied presence in War Zone C. On 5 January, Company B, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry was extracting from an area approximately three kilometers south of the Cambodian Border, vicinity of the FISH HOOK. As the last platoon attempted extraction, it was engaged by an estimated reinforced VC Company. Artillery and tactical air supported friendly forces in 31 hours of contact. Sixty eight enemy were killed. Friendly losses were seven killed and sixteen wounded. On 17 January, while conducting reconnaissance in force operations four kilometers east of Katum, the 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated two VC companies. Fire was returned with all available means to include small arms, automatic weapons, mortars, artillery and light fire teams. The contact resulted in 17 enemy killed and one crew served weapon captured. Friendly losses were five killed and twenty one wounded. As the reporting period ended, Operation YELLOWSTONE continued to be characterized by heavy and frequent contacts with the enemy. Enemy harassing efforts to prevent US forces from operating in War Zone C are expected to continue. Cumulative losses on Operation YELLOWSTONE as of 31 January were 932 enemy killed, 137 individual weapons and 60 crew served weapons captured. Friendly losses were 112 killed and 937 wounded.

(3) Operation SAN ANGELO commenced on 16 January in northern Phuoc Long province. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division initiated this reconnaissance in force operation with two battalion air mobile assaults to the northwest and north of Song Be. A third battalion conducted air mobile assaults on 17 January to the northeast of Song Be. Sporadic contacts commenced on 17 January in widely separated locations. Some base camps and a hospital complex have been discovered, but there had been no major contacts as of 31 January. Cumulative results of Operation SAN ANGELO as of 31 January were 13 US killed and 65 wounded. Enemy losses included 42 killed, 22 small arms, two crew served weapons and 74.5 tons of rice captured or destroyed.

(4) Operation ATTALA was initiated on 21 January in southwestern Binh Long province by the 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (- 3d Squadron). The objective was to locate and destroy the 165th NVA Regiment which was believed to be located in the area of operations. The scheme of maneuver involved the establishment of blocking positions on Route 13 by 1st Infantry Division units while the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) blocked on Route 15 in the south and Route 245 in the north. The Airborne battalions were to conduct reconnaissance in force operations to drive the enemy into the friendly blocking positions where he could be destroyed. There was no major enemy contact during the operation. The 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division curtailed operations almost immediately after Operation ATTALA commenced.
and started preparations for movement to I CTZ in reaction to a major enemy threat in that area. Movement to the I CTZ commenced on 23 January, with the 1st Battalion, 502d Infantry closing on that date. On 23 January, the 1st Infantry Division assumed operational control of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (--) and responsibility for conducting Operation ATTALA. The operation terminated on 27 January 1968.

(5) Operation COBURG. The 1st Australian Task Force initiated Operation COBURG on 24 January. This reconnaissance in force operation is in AO COLUMBUS to the northeast of the Long Binh area, north of Highway 1 and south of the Dong Hai River. The 1st Australian Infantry Battalion has adapted readily to the new environment and had killed 37 enemy and captured 32 individual and two crew served weapons as of 31 January. Friendly losses were five killed and 29 wounded. Operation COBURG continues.

a. Highlights of 31 January Actions. Commencing at 0300 hours on 31 January, 1968, II Field Force and surrounding locations began receiving mortar and 122mm rocket fire. By 0400 hours, an estimated 90 rounds had been received in the Plantation area. The attack caused remarkably light personnel and material losses, although some rounds landed in close proximity to the headquarters and billet areas. At 0355 Ben Cat was attacked by an unknown number of VC employing small arms, automatic weapons, RPG-2 and 82mm mortars. In the Long Binh area, the ammunition dump was penetrated at 0410 hours by an estimated VC Company. Military Police reacted to this threat, R&D personnel discovered and removed some explosive charges armed with time fuzes. One section of the ammunition dump was destroyed by enemy expelled explosive charges. The Plantation area came under attack by small arms and automatic weapons at approximately 0430 hours. At 0515 hours, the 1st Infantry Division was directed to move a reaction force to Ho Nai village to the north of Plantation. While enroute to Ho Nai, Troop A, 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry was attacked by small arms and RPG fire at Trang Born. II Field Force units at Dar Tieng, Katum, and Sorg Be were attacked with mortar, RFG and 122mm rockets from 0615 hours to 0630 hours. At 0600 hours, the 199th Infantry Company occupied a VC unit in Ho Nai and engaged in a fire fight at the III Company compound. Simultaneously, the Duc Hoa subsector and 22d AVN Division Headquarters were attacked by an unknown size enemy force which penetrated the market place in Duc Hoa. 25th ARVN Battalion reacted and repelled the enemy, who withdrew to the North and South-west. On 31 January contact near Tan Son Nhat commencing at 0700 hours, 3d Battalion, 5th Cavalry killed 102 enemy and captured 34 prisoners while losing 15 personnel killed and 23 wounded. Three APC's and one tank were destroyed. Seven APC's and one helicopter were damaged. At Ho Nai village, gunships killed 27 VC. At 0845 hours, Troop A, 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry killed 27 VC along the east end of Bien Hoa airstrip. In response to an attack on the American Embassy in Saigon, a platoon from Company C, 1st Battalion, 502d Infantry arrived in Saigon at 0945 hours and secured the embassy by 1040 hours. A prisoner captured at 1045 hours near II Field Force headquarters was identified as a member of the 279th VC Regiment.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period ending 31 January 1968 (AGC 608-65) (O OH-10A) (O)

A report has already told the FM that the 274th and 275th VC Regiments were to cooperate in the attack. The 275th Regiment had moved to War Zone for training at the end of December, at 1115 hours, the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry arrived in Tan Son Nhut. Base security elements at Linh Hoa air base reported that in NVA prisoners had been captured as of 1400 hours at 1115 hours the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry commenced movement under heavy sniper fire into the Race Track area of Saigon. At 1200 hours, 200 VC were killed in 1400 hours. The 70th Division, 9th Infantry Division, captured 13 prisoners from the 18th VC Regiment at 1530 hours. During the day, 12 units in Capital Military District were placed under operational control of the Deputy Commanding General II FFRGVN. Dispositions were as follows: 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry and Troop A, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry were at Tan Son Nhut. Task Force 132A secured the Ben Lom Bridge. 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry was at Hoc Ha, where the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry conducted a combat assault near Hoa Nha. The 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry (-) was located at Hoa Nha. The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry (-) was at the Saigon Race Track and the 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry (-) at Bien Hoa. There were numerous other changes in dispositions of II FFRGVN OPDUN units in reaction to the attack. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (- 3d Squadron) moved from the Trapesoid and Iron Triangle area to Long Binh and Bien Hoa to assist in the security of HQ II FFRGVN, IIT ARVN Corps, and the III Corps. The 3d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) moved from Loc Ninh to Long Binh. Major elements of the 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry (N) moved to reinforce the 199th Infantry Brigade in the Vc Village and North Unicentre area. An additional battalion mission was to assist in defense of the Long Binh ammunition storage areas and III Corps Headquarters. The 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry (-) moved from Phouc Vinh to Bien Hoa to assist in the defense of that area. At 1545 hours, the 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was released to operational control of the Senior Advisor, IV Corps. In the Long Binh area on 12 January, the 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division accounted for 213 VC KIA, 32 detainees, and 23 small arms, 50 crew served weapons and 128 rounds of crew served ammunition captured. The 199th Infantry Brigade accounted for 303 VC KIA in the Long Binh - Bien Hoa area. Operations by units under operational control of II FFRGVN on 31 January accounted for 314 VC KIA, 123 detainees, 97 small arms and 65 crew served weapons captured; US/FWMAF losses were 52 killed and 323 wounded. The high level of enemy activity continues into the next reporting period. The major impact on operations in progress before 31 January was that they were reduced in scope to permit rapid reaction to the enemy threat and the application of overwhelming firepower against the enemy.

f. Major planning actions during the reporting period. Opening and securing of specified road LOC received increased emphasis. Priority of effort was devoted to Highway 13 from Saigon to Loc Ninh, Highway 1

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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period ending 31 January 1968 (NGS GSP-1-65) (L-GMS-TO-A) (U)

from Gia Rai to the III/II CTZ boundary, Highway 7B/2A/1A from Ben Cat to Phouc Vinh and Highway 1A from Phu Goung to Phouc Vinh. Another key action was planning for relocation of the 199th Infantry Brigade from Capital Military District. This operation has been discussed previously. Plans were developed for the 199th Infantry Brigade to provide support to ARVN forces in Capital Military District after the relocation of brigade units and for the 199th Infantry Brigade to assume the UNION-TOUIN mission. The 101st Airborne Division (-1st Brigade) completed deployment to Vietnam on 19 December 1967 in accordance with Operation Plan "QUICKSILVER". The Division initiated Operation SAN ANGEL on 26 January 1968. Planning for the dry season campaign was initiated in the previous reporting period and continued into this reporting period. Operation GILGALION was initiated in War Zone C; Operations SANTA FE I and SANTA FE II in the MAY TAO Secret Zone. Operations were expanded in AO BACHLINER, in the southern portion of War Zone D. A true Combined Campaign Plan was published for III CTZ through the joint effort of Headquarters III Corps and II FFORCV personnel. This combined effort typifies the close association and cooperative spirit which exists between the Commanding Generals and their staffs. Plans were developed and executed for deployment of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to division control. The Brigade closed at Song Be in mid-January. Contingency plans were developed for the deployment of one or two brigades of the 101st Airborne Division to I FFORCV. The 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division was deployed to I CTZ in late January and released to operational control of III MCRP. Plans for the Christmas, New Year's and Tet truce periods included blocking along key LOC and avenues of approach to prevent the movement of enemy forces across the Cambodian border into the III CTZ. The rapid reaction to the flagrant truce violations at FSB Durt on 1-2 January and throughout III CTZ on 31 January prevented the achievement of major military or psychological victories by the enemy.

g. Force Structure and Training.

(1) The following changes occurred in Force Structure.

(a) The 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry; 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry; 3d Battalion, 502d Infantry and 1st Battalion, 320th Artillery (-) of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division deployed to I FFORCV on 13 January 1968.

(b) The 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery (-) deployed from the Americal Division to I FFORCV on 10 January 1968.

(c) The 101st Airborne (-) closed in-country and became المسؤولتي III FMF 20 December 1967.

(d) The 3d Royal Army Regiment arrived in-country on 27 December 1967 and was assigned to the First Australian Task Force.
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(a) The 273d Assault Support Helicopter Company was assigned to the 12th Aviation Group on 19 December 1967.

(f) The 117th Assault Helicopter Company was assigned to the 12th Aviation Group on 1 January 1968.

(g) The following Long Range Patrol units were activated and assigned on 20 December 1967.

1. Company F, 52d Infantry assigned to 1st Infantry Division.
2. Company E, 50th Infantry assigned to 9th Infantry Division.
3. Company F, 50th Infantry assigned to 25th Infantry Division.
4. 71st Infantry Detachment assigned to 199th Infantry Brigade.

(h) Company F, 58th Infantry activated and assigned to the 101st Airborne Division on 10 January 1968.

(i) The 2d Brigade (-), 101st Airborne Division deployed to I FFRDCV from II FFRDCV on 30 January 1968.

(2) Training. Reciprocal Mobile Training Teams (RMTT) were established between 1st Infantry Division and 5th Infantry Division (ARVN), 9th Infantry Division and 18th Infantry Division (ARVN), 25th Infantry Division and 25th Infantry Division (ARVN), and 101st Airborne Division and 5th Ranger Group (ARVN) on 28 January 1968. The RMTT program provides an exchange of information, experience, and training techniques which will further improve the combat effectiveness of ARVN and US units.
5. LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION.

a. Arrival of the 101st Airborne Division (-) and accelerated tactical operations resulted in an increased requirement for positioning elements of the 1st Logistical Command in forward areas. A Forward Support Area (FSA) was established at Phuoc Vinh to support elements of the 101st Airborne Division at that location. This support by the 1st Logistical Command is required because of the austere logistical support capability organic to the 101st Airborne Division. This FSA was resupplied by a combination of air and land LOC. The road to Phuoc Vinh was opened periodically to permit a supply buildup. This permitted minimum reliance on scarce fixed-wing assets. A FSA was established at Katun to support 25th Infantry Division’s Operation YALLOUFFA. This FSA was initially on an air LOC, however, by the end of the quarter it was being resupplied primarily by a land LOC. A FSA was established at Loc Ninh to support the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment during Operation PAKOO. A land LOC has been used to resupply this operation. A FSA was established at Song Be to support the 101st Airborne Division during Operation SAVAEGALO. Due to its inaccessibility by road, all operations in the Song Be area are resupplied by an air LOC.

b. The 101st Airborne Division (-) arrived in RVN without many items of equipment required for sustained operations. The division received its essential equipment through extraordinary efforts of all concerned in the supply system.

c. Command emphasis was placed on using land LOC. Route 1-13 is now open on a continuous basis. This allows operations in the Quan Loi/Loc Ninh area to be resupplied primarily by road. This emphasis on the use of land LOC allowed USAF tactical airlift assets to be used to support operations in isolated areas.

d. Under the Closed Loop Program the exchange of gasoline powered APC for diesel powered APC was completed in the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and HEAVY. A reduction in actual combat losses vs programmed losses allowed this program to be accelerated.

e. The loss of seven tanks in the Saigon River plus low lift from CUIXU is beginning to cause critical shortages within II FFORCEV units. Programmed incoming assets for the 1st Quarter will be applied to first combat losses already sustained and will not be exchanged for high mileage and/or maintenance problem tanks.

f. II FFORCEV Regulation 750-3, subject: Organizational Maintenance, was published 31 December 1967. This updated organizational maintenance requirements for all assigned and attached units. This regulation may be used as a guide for all OPEC units.
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Status of Primary Land LOC as of 31 January 1968.

1. For the purpose of this report, the following terms on condition of land LOC are defined.

(a) **Condition I**: The route is capable of carrying up to Class 50 loads (all division loads).

(b) **Condition II**: Up to Class 35 loads (the majority of logistical transport e.g., 5000-gallon POL tankers).

(c) **Condition III**: Up to Class 16 loads (Armored personnel carriers and 20 ton trucks).

(d) **Condition IV**: Can carry only light civilian traffic; therefore, it is open only to light reconnaissance vehicles.

(e) **Condition V**: Closed to all traffic.

2. Route QL 1.

(a) Cambodian Border (XW282424) to Go Dau Ha (X382250), lowest bridge capacity, Class 12, route condition III.

(b) Go Dau Ha (X382250) to Cu Chi (X628126), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.

(c) Cu Chi (X628126) to Saigon (X779342), lowest bridge capacity, Class 60, route condition I.

(d) Saigon (X779342) to RJ 316 (X072130), lowest bridge capacity, Class 40, route condition II.

(e) RJ 316 (X072130) to (YT697026), lowest bridge capacity, Class 45, route condition II.

(f) YT697026 to II CTZ boundary (XT180014), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition III.

3. Route QL 4.

(a) RJ QL 1 (X845914) to (X423490), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.

(b) X423490 to Tieng Giang River (X985557), lowest bridge capacity, Class 15, route condition III.

4. Route QL 13. RJ QL 1 (X879971) to Cambodian Border (XS682353), lowest bridge capacity, Class 40, route condition II.
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(5) Route QL 14.
(a) Donq Hoa (YT079759) to blown bridge at (YT165-820) repair easily with fill, lowest bridge capacity, Class 30, route condition II. Condition will continue until the road is opened by tactical forces and repairs can be made.
(b) Route condition II continues to the damaged bridge at YU503010. From YU503010 to the II/III CTZ boundary (YU590-176) the road is accessible from II CTZ, lowest bridge capacity, Class 30, route condition II.

(6) Route QL 15.
(a) Bien Hoa (YT002114) to Baria (YS380607), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.
(b) Baria (YS380607) to Vam Tau (YT224444), lowest bridge capacity, Class 30, route condition IV.

(7) Route QL 20.
(a) RJ 4L 11 (IT343101) to bridge at YT537356, lowest bridge capacity, Class 37, route condition II.
(b) Bridge at (YT537356) to III CTZ boundary (YT763-572), lowest bridge capacity, Class 25, route condition III.

(8) Route QL 22.
(a) Go Dau 1a (XT382751) to (YT097764), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.
(b) XT097764 to Cambodian Border (XT074896) with AVLB abutments prepared at XT097764, route condition I, with AVLB, route condition I.

(9) Route LTL 16. Bien Hoa (YT002114) to RJ LTL 1A (XY867373), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.

(10) Route LTL 1A.
(a) RJ LTL 16 (XY867373) to X999558, lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.
(b) XY99558 to RJ 111 (YU133062), bridge destroyed, route condition V.
(c) RJ 111 (YU133062) to RJ LTL 1A (XY960221), bridge destroyed, route condition V.
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(11) Route LTL 2. RJ (YT437045) to Baria (Y3380607), lowest bridge capacity, Class 60, route condition I.

(12) Route LTL 5a. Saigon (XS016890) to Quy Nhon (YT2706538), lowest bridge capacity, Class 16, route condition III.

(13) Route LTL 23. Baria (Y3380607) to Augen Loc (Y3-657607), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.

(14) Route TL 2a and LTL 10. Saigon (Y2790690) to Luc Tinh (YT9280444), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route classification I.

(15) Route 335 - 354 - 355. RJ QL 1 (YT650085) to Tan Linh (YT935262), lowest bridge capacity, Class 25, route classification III.

(16) Route LTL 26 and 239. Tan Minh (KT259500) to Quy Tinh (KT290460), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route classification I.

1. Maintenance and Repair Programmed.

(1) Surface maintenance, drainage repair and reconstruction are in progress on the following routes: QL 1, QL 15, QL 22, QL 3, LTL 1a, 240, TL 10, TL 4, 246, TL 6a, LTL 16. Repair consists of reworking rutted surfaces, filling holes, patching pavement and repairing drainage structures.

(2) In addition to improving land LOC in support of tactical operations, an increasing amount of engineer effort is being placed on permanent rehabilitation of major LOC to include replacement of tactical bridging by permanent bridges.

6. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (RD)

a. The 1967 Revolutionary Development program continues to progress at an increased rate during the quarter with 144 hamlets completed and 90 more under development at the end of December. The 1967 program was extended through January with the result that the program objectives were achieved throughout III CTZ except for Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces where enemy activity in the last calendar year quarter seriously disrupted the program. In addition to the slipage in time for the 1967 program there was a general failure, even in the better hamlets, to meet some of the main objectives. First, the objective to eliminate the VC infrastructure was not met effectively. This is a necessary part of pacification, but is too ambitious an undertaking for the RJ team alone. More emphasis will be put on this objective in the future by using the resources of the District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers (DIOC) with the Provincial Reconnaissance Units.
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Ending 31 January 1968 (BC5 GSPWE-65) (V-HUG-JO-A) (U)

(PDF), the Combined Reconnaissance and Intelligence Platoons (CRIP),
and the National Police Field Forces (NPFF). Second, there was a
general failure to organize and train adequately hamlet self-defense
groups. The B team lacks the experience to design truly effective
defenses, and proper equipment for arming the force is generally not
available at this time. To build an inadequate defensive force would
be worse than to build none, because it would invite the enemy to
attack and discredit the efforts of the team. External forces will still
be needed for some time to provide security to hamlets in which the
tanks are working and to complete hamlets. Finally, there was a
general failure to organize people's groups to counter similar efforts
by the enemy. Until such grassroots organizations are functioning on
a basis equal or superior to that of the enemy, it cannot truly be
said that the PTT has actual political control. Such organizations are
necessary in a politically immature country to provide the vehicle by
which popular aspirations and grievances are determined and through
which discontent is channeled into useful outlets. Major faults of the
1967 program were a late start and lack of experience of the cadre.
Early budget approvals and the movement of teams before the TLT season
to their first semester hamlets have assured an earlier start on the
1968 program. The quality of the cadre improved during the year due
to increased experience and the weeding-out of some misfits. Candidates
are more carefully selected and screened now before being trained at
Vung Tau. In all, most cadre today display a commendable spirit, and
leadership, while still inadequate, is improving. The 1968 program
calls for the completion of 307 hamlets (a 45% increase) with the
greatest increase in Gia Dinh, Tay Ninh, Long An, Bao Binh, and Long
Khanh provinces.

b. Enemy activity during the quarter against the civilian
population showed a marked increase. Prominent actions were attacks
upon district and province capitals, assassinations and kidnappings.
The enemy has begun to make a decided effort to discredit the govern-
ment with the populace and to bring about a desire to negotiate a
settlement which would include a coalition government. Under the
present enemy threat, the active cooperation with or support of their
government by the people is unlikely and may be impossible. In spite
of the great military successes of the last year, no real progress is
possible until the enemy political infrastructure has been eliminated.
The individual Vietnamese cannot and will not actively support the
government or inform upon the enemy so long as infrastructure members
are present in his hamlet and village. The discovery of such activities
is a major mission of infrastructure members, and once suspicion is
sufficient cause for immediate retribution by local guerrillas or for
elimination by main-force units when they next control the hamlet.

c. With the recent capture by friendly forces of large
caches of food and weapons and the corresponding indications of
critical shortages in enemy units of some items of equipment, an
adequate resources control program becomes more desirable than ever.
The current resource control program is very unpopular with the Vietnamese populace, as such programs always are everywhere, but even in its fledgling state this last year was responsible for the capture of numerous known VC, VC suspects, deserters, and illegal residents, as well as the seizure of quantities of food and medical supplies. The program in the past six months has been improved by the increased utilization of combined patrols and a greater reliance on mobile checkpoints, but is still inconsistent and limited to major highways and other fairly secure areas. Increased emphasis is needed to provide a systematic and selective program which can seriously tax the enemy's already overstrained supply line.

7. (U) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIL AFFAIRS
      (1) The II Field Force effort during the reporting period was devoted to the support of tactical operations and the Tet Chieu Dong Campaign. A total of 3,045 sorties were flown by U.S./South Vietnamese Army and Air Force aircraft in support of PJT this quarter. In accordance with the II Field Force Commander's desire to reach optimum levels of effectiveness the dissemination of leaflets from aircraft was cut back to 400 million this quarter as compared with 572 million in the previous quarter. At the same time, the number of hours of aerial loudspeaker broadcasts was more than doubled (from 1,063 in the previous quarter to 2,196).
      (2) Special Operations.
         (a) An extensive program to improve the overall quality of PSYOP leaflets was initiated by II Field Force G5/J5 officers throughout III Corps. A Propaganda Development Center was established within the 6th PSO Battalion to provide a technical review of all leaflets developed by OPCU units. Subsequent to this review, leaflets, with the exception of the quick reaction type, are sent to the 4th PSO Group for evaluation. In addition, leaflets are submitted to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Political Warfare of III Corps for coordination prior to final approval by G5, II Field Force. By this procedure of review, evaluation, and coordination the quality of propoganda in III Corps has been upgraded and has become more responsive to tactical requirements.
         (b) To improve area coverage and lessen the man hours formerly required to disseminate leaflets from UH-1 helicopters, II Field Force has developed a portable leaflet disseminator. Named the "Hurricane Hustler," this disseminator was specifically designed for UH-1 aircraft. It can be installed in 25 seconds and enables the operator to deliver leaflets with exceptional accuracy on any type of target. The device is most effective for delivering rapid reaction
leaves in one dissemination 500,000 leaflets per sortie. An inner
printing of the Hustler have been distributed to MACV and to 200
units so that each unit can manufacture additional "Hurricane Hustlers"
to support aerial delivery operations. (Inclosure 6)

b. Significant Civil Affairs Activities.

(1) The 2d Civil Affairs Company continued to support
II Field Force 1096 units with 10 air generalist platoons. Platoons have
been attached to each division headquarters and the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment. In addition, seven 10
generalist teams have been organized and deployed to support seven
province senior advisors in III CTZ (Da Nang, Bien Hoa, Hau Nghia,
Kon Tum, Binh Chuan, Tay Ninh, and Phuoc Tuy). These teams are
area-oriented and are under the direct supervision and control of the
Province Senior Advisors.

(2) Military civic action projects increased significantly
during the reporting period. The number of patients treated through
NURSING units 343,662, an increase of almost 4,000 over the last reporting
period. Major construction and repair projects increased 56 percent.
The most significant increase in Military Civic Action activities was
the construction and/or repair of 799 kilometers of road throughout the
II Field Force area of operations as compared to 253 kilometers for
the previous quarter.

(3) Attitude surveys taken during the quarter indicate
that the Medical Civic Action Program and improvement of lines of com-
munication continue to be the most popular programs with the Vietnamese
people.

(4) Operation Friendship continued to produce increasing
tangible results. This is evidenced by a continued participation and
response on the part of the civilian population and their elected and
appointed officials. The II Field Force Friendship Platoon, a civic
action team which operates under the direct supervision of the II
Corps LV
05, concentrated its efforts on developing educational institutions,
distribution of commodities and encouragement of local self-help projects
to improve overall US/Vietnamese relations. Operation Friendship proved
to be a particularly valuable asset for population control during VC/NVA
attacks throughout III Corps Tactical Zone on 31 January 1968. The loyal
and willing cooperation of hamlet and village officials in areas supported
by Operation Friendship made the task of restoring order much easier.

(5) During the concentrated attack by VC/NVA forces on the
Bien Hoa Long Binh complex on 31 January 1968 many civilian homes were
damaged or destroyed. Some 50 civilians were killed and approximately
200 were injured. In addition, 10,000 people were ... generally displaced
from their homes in hamlets and villages adjacent to II Field Force

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iterative Friendship Teams provide immediate relief and assistance in the form of medical care for the wounded and homeless, identification of the dead, and distribution of food and water. Four civil affairs Friendship Teams were utilized under the direct supervision of the II Field Force G-5 as an immediate reaction force. At the close of the reporting period the intensified civic action program was continuing, to alleviate suffering and to provide care for the homeless. By 1800 hours on 31 January 1968 much had been done to restore order in those hamlets directly affected by the war.

8. (c) SIGNALS:

a. Communications activities in general have increased considerably over the last quarter with the arrival of the 101st Airborne Division and the commencement of several large operations within the III CTZ, to include LAC VUNG TURA, FUCI, and ARNOLD, and several other smaller and continuing operations. Increased communications activity was also attributed to the realignment of area responsibilities of some of the III Field Force tactical units requiring new systems and numerous circuit changes. Circuit changes alone show an increase of 53% when compared to the same period of last year.

b. Tactical communications requirements have increased considerably this past quarter. The 53d Signal Battalion (Corps) has been taxed to maximum capability during multiple operations conducted simultaneously. Additionally, the Signal Battalion was required to establish communications facilities not normally provided. For example, the 101st Airborne Division has only 4-channel VHF radio relay equipment. In order for the Division to perform its mission, the Corps Signal Battalion augmented the Division Signal Battalion by providing internal divisional VHF systems as well as the normal Corps to Division system. Another recent example required the Corps Signal Battalion to provide communications for a forward command post of the 1st Australian Task Force in addition to maintaining present communications with their base camp location. During this same period, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was employed as a covering force over an extended area in Ia Drang "C". The Corps Signal Battalion augmented the limited capabilities of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in providing communications internally between the squadrons as well as regimental headquarters to corps headquarters. To meet these challenges, excellent cooperation exists among all the tactical signal battalions; for example, to establish radio relay to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 125th Signal Battalion, 2d Infantry Division, provided an AN/PRC-54 radio relay on Vung Rua Air Base for the corps system to regimental headquarters. Another method not uncommon as all signal units work together to meet many unusual situations found in Vietnam.

c. Improvement of base camp communications, physical facilities, and operating procedures have continued and include an extensive program of rehabilitation of existing facilities. Installation of a dial central
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office at Plantation, II FFORC'AV improved telephone service considerably by permitting faster and more accurate service, as well as a direct dial to MACV, Tiger, Lynx, Tan Son Nhat, Bearcat, and Long Binh.

d. Development of radio relay sites in support of II FFORC'AV operations has progressed extremely well and has proven its worth in extending communications to distant points. Improvement of defenses and expansion of radio facilities on Hill 837 (Nui Cha Chan) continues. In addition to providing a radio relay point for tactical operations, it now provides a radio retransmission capability for CORAV to Province, District, Village, and Hamlet level. This hill also is used as a radio retransmission site for the RVN National Police and USAID. FM radio retransmission facilities at Hill 986 (Nui Ba Den) have proven their worth in extending the FM capability to the most distant CIDG camps in III CTZ. Army Signal Brigade units have been placed on Hill 722 (Nui Ba Rau) and development and expansion of this mountain is progressing rapidly and will further assist in extending VUH and FM radio systems in support of tactical operations in the Northeastern region of III CTZ.

e. Construction of a new II FFORC'AV photo facility was started on 8 October 1967. Two Pasco prefabricated steel buildings were obtained to replace the inadequate photo facility formerly housed in two frame supported G1 tents. This facility was constructed by the 53d Signal Battalion and will greatly improve the photographic support rendered to this headquarters and OPCUS units. The new photo facility became operational on 31 January 1968.

f. UJARV approved the request of this headquarters for local promulgation of address indicating groups. The Address Indicating Group was added to II FFORC'AV Regulation 105-1 effective 30 November 1967. An Address Indicating Group is a form of address designation representing a predetermined list of specific and frequently combinations of action and/or information addresses. Address Indicating Groups reduce the size of message headings and increase the speed of teletype traffic handling. A considerable amount of circuit time will be conserved since lengthy address groups are often longer than the message text.

g. At 0300 hours, 31 January 1966, HQ II FFORC'AV came under attack by rockets followed at 0430 hours by a ground attack which lasted throughout most of the day. The II FFORC'AV Signal Office/53d Signal Battalion 3d office was damaged by rocket and small arms fire. Several major aerial cable systems within the base camp as well as interconnecting cable systems between Bien Hoa Army, III Corps Headquarters, CORDS, and the Honour-Smith Compound were damaged by the attacks with the loss of many key circuits. Quick reaction on the part of cable repair teams restored most of the base camp circuits in minimum time. Due to constant small arms fire, Army Signal Brigade cable teams were unable to repair immediately the interconnecting cable cable between units of III corps,
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Hien (a.) army, Plantation - Ht II FFGOV, 1994th Infantry Brigade, 12th Infantry Group, on the 20th Engineer Group headquarters. Consequently, emergency Field Force VIE systems were moved into location at some of these organizations; to provide required communications. FM radio and the use of RFI proved again to be a quick and excellent emergency means of communications during this situation. The results of this emergency situation not only pointed out some weaknesses in our emergency preparedness, but also proved again a high degree of flexibility and the superior state of training the 53d Signal Battalion has exhibited to perform an outstanding job.

9. (U) STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE.

a. During the period 2 December 1967 through 2 January 1968, classes on the provisions of the Geneva Convention were given to members of all II Field Force Vietnam units based on the Plantation Compound.

b. On 6 November 1967 the construction of the II Field Force Vietnam General Courtroom was completed with self-help.

c. The 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light) (UIC PERI) per CC 6447, USARV, 19 December 1967, effective 1 January 1968 was attached to II FFGOV for administration of military justice, including the exercise of general court-martial jurisdiction.
LOGISTIC SUPPORT CAPABILITY OF AN AIRBORNE DIVISION AND AN ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT.

DISCUSSION: Neither the Airborne Division nor the Armored Cavalry Regiment have sufficient organic support capability to support sustained combat operations. They require substantial maintenance, supply and services support from an outside agency.

OBSERVATION: Force level and operational planners must recognize this lack of organic capability and take appropriate steps to provide the additional logistic support required.

SUPPLY CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY OF THE COMMAND.

DISCUSSION: During this quarter, an Airborne Division arrived from CONUS. The impact of equipping this unit with selected items of equipment did not seriously affect the combat readiness of this command; however, it had considerable effect on logistical operations at all levels as the unit had to be supplied equipment already in short supply in Vietnam.

OBSERVATION: The supply system must have maximum lead time to obtain equipment for units arriving from CONUS. If an item is in short supply in Vietnam and the unit has it on hand at its home station, the unit should be authorized to deploy with the equipment. This would eliminate redistribution of available in-country assets needed by tactical units already committed to combat.

16A1 RIFLE.

DISCUSSION: The M16A1 Rifle has been and still is the subject for command attention. Changes to the rifle such as the new cyclic buffer and chrome chamber have been required. This rifle requires substantially more individual maintenance than the M14 rifle. USARV has published USARV Pamphlet No 750-30 covering care and maintenance of the M16A1 rifle. Individuals must be furnished required cleaning materials and impressed with their responsibility for maintenance.

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DISCUSSION: The II Field Force/III Corps Psychological Warfare Coordinating Committee was established to coordinate the PSYOP resources of all agencies and to insure a coordinated PSYOP effort within III CTZ. This committee, headed by the II Field Force G5 and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Political Warfare of III Corps is composed of representatives from all PSYOP support agencies within III CTZ. In addition to the regular members of the committee G5/35 officers of II Field Force OPCON units are invited to attend committee meetings from time to time in order to discuss problem areas and tactical PSYOP requirements.

OBSERVATIONS: Establishment of the PSYWAR Coordinating Committee at Field Force/Corps level has proven to be an effective device for coordinating all PSYOP assets available within III CTZ.

DISCUSSION: The increasing number of atrocities perpetrated by VC/NVA forces within III CTZ have been promptly exploited with quick reaction leaflets to reveal the wanton attacks on non-combatants, especially women and children. A PSYOP Exploitation Team has been formed from local sources to exploit VC/NVA atrocities on a quick reaction basis.

OBSERVATION: The timely exploitation of VC/NVA atrocities with quick reaction leaflets has done much to create a favorable psychological impact in an important area of operations. These leaflets, depicting Vietnamese women in medical personnel providing medical care to the innocent victims of VC terrorism, have done much to gain the respect and confidence of the local population in the areas involved. Upon return to their villages, these victims who have survived VC/NVA attacks will give added credence to the theme, "Vietnamese and US personnel are working together to help the people, while the VC/NVA terrorize the people and destroy."

DISCUSSION: Model 35 quick reaction presses and AEH-13-4 aerial loudspeaker systems for added flexibility in psychological operations. Presses are located at division and separate brigade level. The loudspeaker systems are located at brigade level.

OBSERVATION: The added capability provided by these items has increased flexibility in exploiting tactical operations with verbal and printed media on a quick reaction basis. The availability of loudspeakers which can be mounted in helicopters has greatly improved II Field Force psychological operations during the hours of darkness. Darkness has proven to be a period when VC/NVA personnel are most receptive to psychological messages. The US Air Force has been unable to provide aircraft for night loudspeaker missions.
PROTECTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES

The rubber industry in Vietnam at present accounts for 98% of the foreign exchange earned by the Government for South Vietnam. When peace is restored it is estimated that natural rubber will account for 50% of the total export income, rice 50% percent, and other commodities the remaining 20%. More than 95% of all rubber plantations in South Vietnam are located within the III Corps Tactical Zone. Over 100,000 people derive their livelihood from these plantations. During recent combat operations, II Field Force was required by tactical necessity to locate base camps in or adjacent to rubber plantations and to conduct road clearing operations to enhance the security of lines of communication. During these operations II Field Force established close liaison and coordination with Province Senior Advisors, Province Chiefs, plantation managers, and tactical commanders to assure that the absolute minimum number of rubber trees would be cut. As an example, during a road clearing operation through a rubber plantation, an on-the-spot survey revealed that only 50 meters of rubber would have to be cut on both sides of the road as opposed to 100 to 200 meters as previously recommended, provided brush and jungle growth could be kept cleared by the plantation management. This cooperation assured both air and ground visibility and permitted sufficient off-the-road maneuverability for military convoys in the event of an attack or ambush. At the same time, a minimum amount of rubber was cut in accomplishment of the commander's mission.

The natural rubber industry is a key to South Vietnam's present and future economic posture. Using the process of selective cutting during tactical operations provides tactical security while at the same time preserving the most productive stands of rubber trees.

COMMUNICATIONS

Telephone poles (75 to 90 feet in height) were installed at the CH-53 camps at Da Nang, Loc Ninh, and the Son Loc air strip to elevate the VHF and UHF antennas.

Interconnection of pre-stressed and spliced telephone poles are transported and placed rapidly by CH-47 aircraft. A VHF system, malfunction due to distance (75 miles) to Blockhorse Forward at Loc Ninh experienced few outages after the antennas were placed on the pole on 21 December 1967. This increased the antenna height 15 feet and made the difference between no system and an excellent system. The range and reliability of SC nets has increased significantly upon elevation of the MCI antenna above jungle and rubber vegetation.

The utilization of telephone poles to mount antennas has increased communications effectiveness and has shown two advantages over construction of a fixed tower, AB-216: (1) Decreased installation time. (2) The pole can be abandoned upon unit movement.

Interconnect cables between Long Binh Plantation, Bien Hoa were installed and cut over.

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A 600 pair cable was installed between Long Binh and Planta-
Six in January with a 300 pair cutout to Bien Hoa and a 100 pair cutout
to Dearcat. The Dearcat cutout is scheduled for completion in March 1968.
Both loaded and non-loaded pairs are being installed.

Observation: Two 20 channel VHF systems from 20 channel to Bien Hoa
have been cut over to cable releasing critical radio relay equipment
for tactical operations. The two systems presently installed to Dearcat
may be eliminated on completion of this leg. Better telephone service
should result to these two critical locations.

Toll: The movement of the 101st Airborne Division Forward to Song Be
resulted in the development of Nui Ba Be as a major communications site.

Discussion: The 50th Signal Battalion cleared the top of Nui Ba Be
mountain and established a 24 channel tropospheric scatter system to
Long Binh, a 12 channel system to Phuoc Vinh, and three 12 channel systems
to Song Be airfield from the mountain. A 78' tower was installed adjacent
to the airfield and an area switchboard and communications center were
placed in operation.

Observation: The communications flexibility of the Army Signal Brigade
was illustrated by the rapid establishment of the Song Be communications com-
plex, in conjunction with the 53rd Signal Battalion and the 501st Air-
borne Signal Battalion.

Toll: A 4 channel VHF system was established by 21 January
between the 101st Airborne Division Main CP at Bien Hoa and the 1st
Brigade, 101st Airborne Division at Chon Thanh. A four channel VHF sys-
tem was also established between Chon Thanh and Quan Loi. A total of
36 channels were brought into the 101st Airborne Division Advance CP
at Song Be by the 34 Signal Group. One 12 channel VHF system was in-
stalled between Loc Ninh and Quan Loi to provide fire direction facilities
for the 175mm artillery battery at Loc Ninh.

Discussion: Internal division communications are normally provided by
organic equipment. Self sufficiency of the 101st Airborne Division in
this respect is lacking. This division is severely limited with four
channel VHF radio relay equipment, not only in the number of channels
but in range. The equipment is highly subject to FM interference.

Observation: Deployment of the 101st Airborne Division to dispersed
locations similar to the deployment of the normal infantry divisions
in Vietnam requires communications augmentation by Corps and Army Signal
Battalions. Otherwise, the 501st Signal Battalion requires augmentation
of 12 channel equipment and additional personnel to its TCS to properly
perform its mission.
A0750-R-01
Suje: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period
Ending 31 January 1962 (ROD 6/POE-62) (J-ABF-20-A) (U)

TIC: Commander's Recommendations.

63
AVHGC-DST (21 Feb 68) 1st Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968 (RCS CSPOR-65) (W-DHO-TO-A) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 3 MAR 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 from Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam (DHOA).

2. Pertinent comment follows: Reference item concerning logistic support capability of an airborne division and an armored cavalry regiment, page 59: Concur. The 67th Maintenance Company (DS) (Div) has been designated to provide back up support maintenance for 101st Airborne Division and the 551st Light Maintenance Company is providing support for the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The supply and services support for these organizations are under constant review by appropriate staff agencies and necessary support provided within current capabilities.

3. A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Copy furnished:
HQ, II FFV

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General
GPOP-DT (21 Feb 68) (U) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968 from HQ, II Fld Force Vn (UIC: WDHOAA) (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 28 MAR 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]
K. F. OSBOURN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG
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# VIETNAM TROOP LIST

**II FIELD FORCE: VIETNAM TROOP LIST**

**1 Nov 67 - 31 Jan 68**

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<td>1st ATP</td>
<td>Jun 66</td>
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<td>RIVN</td>
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<td>26 Sep 66</td>
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<td>23d Arty Gp</td>
<td>15 Mar 66</td>
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<td>54th Arty Gp</td>
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**TENANT UNIT**

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**UNIT ASSIGNED**

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*246th PSYOP Co redesignated 6th PSYOP Bn*

Incl 5

**DECLASSIFIED AT 1 YEAR INTERVALS:**

**DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS**

**DOD DIR 5200.10**

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**CONFIDENTIAL**
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<td>HHR, 8th TAB, 25th arty</td>
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<td>2 Co</td>
<td>7 Dec 66</td>
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<td>9th Trans Co (CAR)</td>
<td>23 Aug 66</td>
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<td>44th APU</td>
<td>1 Oct 66</td>
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<td>552d NP Co</td>
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**UNIT ATTACHED**

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**CONFIDENTIAL**
## STRATEGIC SUMMARY
### TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT
1 Nov 67 - 31 Jan 68

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<td>VNAF 2,570</td>
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<td>2. Number sorties flown by US support of ARVN:</td>
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<td>3. Number sorties flown by VNAF support of ARVN:</td>
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<td>4. Total sorties flown in support of ARVN:</td>
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<td>5. Number sorties flown by US aircraft in support of US Forces:</td>
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<td>6. Number sorties flown by VNAF aircraft in support of US Forces:</td>
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<td>7. Total sorties flown in support of US Forces:</td>
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<td>8. Number COMBAT SKY SPOT missions flown in support of ARVN:</td>
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<td>9. Number COMBAT SKY SPOT missions flown in support of US:</td>
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**DOWNGRADED AT 5 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS**

**CONFIDENTIAL**
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam (U)**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 67-31 Jan 1968

CG, II Field Force Vietnam

**7. REPORT DATE**

21 February 1968

**9. PROJECT NO.**

N/A

**10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT**

N/A

**11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES**

N/A

**12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY**

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

**13. ABSTRACT**

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 67-31 Jan 1968

CG, II Field Force Vietnam

**2. REPORT TITLE**

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam (U)

**4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 67-31 Jan 1968

CG, II Field Force Vietnam

**3. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)**

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

**5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)**

CG, II Field Force Vietnam

**6. REPORT DATE**

21 February 1968

**7A. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES**

79

**9B. NO. OF REFs**

21

**10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT**

N/A

**11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES**

N/A

**12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY**

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310