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**AUTHORITY**

30 Sep 1978 per Group-4 document marking; Adjutant General’s Office [Army] ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980
SECURITY MARKING

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

AGM-P (M) (18 Mar 67) FOR OT

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation John Paul Jones,
1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division

27 March 1967

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is a Combat Operations After Action
Report, Operational John Paul Jones, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne
Division dated 28 September 1966. Information contained in this report
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of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19.
Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT
within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the
future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted
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[Signature]

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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(Continued on page 2)
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COMBAT OPERATIONS
AFTER ACTION REPORT

OPERATION JOHN PAUL JONES

1st BRIGADE
101st
AIRBORNE DIVISION

DIPLOMATS
AND

DDC WARRIORS

RECEIVED
APR 5 1958

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 20 YEARS.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 96347

"28 September 1966

AVBD-C

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation JOHN PAUL JONES
(RCS: MACV J3-32) (U)

THRU: Commanding General
I Field Force Vietnam
APO 96240

TO: Commanding General
US Military Assistance Command Vietnam
ATTN: J343
APO 96243

1. (U) Name of Operation: Operation JOHN PAUL JONES.
3. (U) Location: PHU YEN Province.
5. (U) Reporting Officer: Brigadier General Willard Pearson, Commanding General, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.
6. (C) Task Organization:

The task organization of the Brigade at the initiation of Operation JOHN PAUL JONES was as shown below. The only significant changes to this organization during the operation were as follows: The 2/8 Cav and the 1/22 Inf came under the OPCON of the Brigade on 16 August and 28 August, respectively; and during the period 16 through 30 August TF Bravo was composed of Co C 2/502 Inf and A 2/17 Cav.

1/327 Inf
1 Plat A 326 Engr
2/327 Inf
2/502 Inf
1/327 Inf
Bde Troops
Rde HHC (-)
A 2/17 Cav
A 326 Engr (-)
LARP
3 RRU
MF Plat (-)
1 Plat A 326 Engr
161 MI Det
20 Cal Det
TF 2/320 Arty
Tactical Air Control Party
101st Avn Sec
5/27 Arty
B 1/30 Arty

Spt Bn (-)

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation JOHN PAUL JONES (RCS: MACV J3-32) (U)

7. (C) Supporting Forces:
   a. 2/320 Arty: Employed in a direct support role.
   b. B 1/30 Arty (OPCON): Provided general support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.
   c. 5/27 Arty (-): Provided general supporting fires during the operation.
   d. 10th Army Avn Bn: Provided two light airmobile companies in general support and two flyable CH-47 helicopters.
   e. 183d Avn Co: Provided a total of four 0-1 aircraft for direct support.
   f. 5th Air Commando Squadron: Provided airlift support for Pay War Ops.
   g. 2/5th Pay Ops Co: Provided one loudspeaker leaflet dissemination team in direct support.
   h. 7th USAF: Flew 147 Tactical Air missions totalling 370 sorties; of these missions 52 were preplanned and 95 were immediate. The immediate strikes were requested through the Air Force Direct Air Request Net and the average response time from the initiation of the requests until time-over-target was 24 minutes. The results of these missions included 33 KBA (BO), 48 KBA (EST), 132 structures destroyed, and 78 structures damaged.
   i. Strategic Air Command, USAF: Flew three B-52 missions totalling 42 sorties in support of the operation. These missions resulted in 27 KBA (EST), 2 secondary explosions, and 7 structures destroyed.
   j. 45th Engr Gp: Provided general support along Highway 1.

8. (U) Intelligence: See Inclosure 1, Intelligence.

9. (C) Missions: Headquarters I Field Force, Vietnam directed the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to seize and hold vital terrain and installations in VUNG RO Pass and Highway 1 between VUNG RO Bay and the 2d Korean Marine Brigade Area, to provide protection for engineer work parties in the bay area along the line of communications, to relieve the 2d Korean Marine Brigade in the area south of TUY HOA, and to be prepared to exploit B-52 strikes. Later in the operation the mission was expanded to include conducting search and destroy operations between KY LO Valley and VUNG RO Bay and protecting civilians during the initial stages of the rice harvest at TUY AN.

10. (C) Concept of Operation: Operation JOHN PAUL JONES was conducted in three phases. See Inclosure 2, Operation Schematics.
   a. Phase I (21 July - 30 July): This phase consisted of airmobile and ground assaults by two battalions in the VUNG RO Bay/VUNG RO Pass area to seize vital terrain and installations, the conduct of saturation patrolling and the establishment of security for engineer work parties in the area.
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AVICD-C 26 September 1966
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation JOHN PAUL JONES (RG: MACV J3-32) (U)

b. Phase II (30 July - 15 August): This phase consisted of a one battalion exploitation of two B-52 strikes west of SCG CAU and a two battalion exploitation of four B-52 strikes west of D0CMG TRE. Following search and destroy operations in the area, the battalions were extracted leaving two reconnaissance platoons on stay behind forces. Also during this phase, one battalion continued providing security and conducting search and destroy operations in the VUNG RO Bay/VUNG RO Pass area.

c. Phase III (15 August - 5 September): This phase consisted of relieving the 2d ROK Marine Bde in the area south of TUY HOA with two battalions, continuing the mission in the VUNG RO Bay/VUNG RO Pass area, conducting search and destroy operations northwest of TUY HOA, and providing protection to the civilians in the initial stages of the rice harvest.

II. (C) Execution:
a. The Brigade began deployment on the DAK TO area by C-130 aircraft on 15 July and closed into TUY HOA on 21 July. A total of 181 sorties were utilized.
b. Phase I: On 21 July this phase commenced when one company conducted a night helicopter infiltration into two landing zones north of VUNG RO Bay. The company then moved outland to secure vital terrain objectives, the north end of a railroad tunnel and two proposed landing zones. At 0730 hours 23 June, the 2/502 Inf (-) made airmobile assaults on the two secured landing zones. Simultaneously, the 1/327 Inf conducted a ground assault seizing objectives in the northern portion of the area of operation, after making a ground approach march through the 2d ROK Marine Bde. All brigade objectives were secured when the two battalions linked up on Highway 1 at 1335 hours. During the period 23 through 30 July, the two battalions conducted search and destroy operations without significant enemy contact. On 30 July, the 2/327 Inf, which had been FFORCEN reserve, relieved the two battalions in the VUNG RO Pass area and assumed the mission of securing the LOC.

c. Phase II: At the beginning of this phase, the 1st Brigade, 101st Abn Div was alerted to be prepared to enter Operation EMMERSON under the OPCON of the 1st Cav Div; however, Operation EMMERSON was cancelled. At dawn on 2 August, two B-52 strikes, which were previously planned for Operation EMMERSON were executed west of SCG CAU. The 2/502 Inf conducted airmobile assaults directly into the strike area within twenty minutes following the completion of the B-52 strikes. The 2/502 Inf conducted search and destroy operations in the area with no significant enemy contact. On 3 August the 1st Brigade was designated FFORCEN reserve, resulting in the 2/502 Inf being extracted from the area of operation and returning to TUY HOA South. Brigade units conducted extensive training and refit in preparation for future combat operations until 8 August when the 1/327 Inf conducted an airmobile assault west of D0CMG TRE to exploit four B-52 strikes which took place between 1200 and 1255 hours. Again, within twenty minutes following the strikes, an airmobile assault was conducted directly into the northern portion of the strike area. The 1/327 Inf swept south with only light contact made with the enemy but there were indications that the enemy was moving west. In an attempt to block the enemy's western movement, on 9 August the 2/502 Inf conducted an airmobile assault to the west of the strike area and swept eastward and linked up with the 1/327 Inf. Both battalions continued search and destroy operations in the area until...
their extraction on 14 and 15 August. The reconnaissance platoons of each of the battalions remained in the area as stay behind forces to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance missions.

d. Phase III: On 16 August the 2/8 Cav came under the OPCON of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div and moved to DONO TRE. Between 16 and 18 August, the 1/327 Inf and the 2/502 Inf relieved the 25 ROK Marine Bde in place. On 17 August the 2/8 Cav conducted an airmobile assault and swept southeast toward DONO TRE. The mission of the 2/327 Inf in the VUNG RO Bay/VUNG RO Pass area was assumed by TF Bravo, which was composed of C 2/502 Inf and A 2/17 Cav. One company of the 2/327 Inf moved to DONO TRE as the Brigade immediate action force. On 18 August the 2/327 Inf (-) infiltrated by air to DONO TRE and began an overland covert movement to the east and southeast to sweep through the area toward TUY AN where it would perform the mission of protecting the rice harvest in that district. On 21 August, the third company of 2/327 Inf moved to DONO TRE. Having received no significant contacts in its AO on 22 August, the 2/8 Cav conducted an airmobile assault west of DONO TRE to exploit intelligence information received by the stay behind forces of the 1/327 Inf and 2/502 Inf. The assault was preceded by a three minute saturation CBt air strike in the vicinity of the objective area and napalm and strafing at H-Hour. No LZ prep was utilized. One company of the 2/8 Cav and the reconnaissance elements set up blocking positions while the 2/8 Cav (-) attacked northwest. There was little enemy contact during the operation, however, four VC/NVA were KIA (BC) and a cache of 100 hand grenades was located. On 24 August, C 1/327 Inf was deployed to NINH HOA as an I FFORCE immediate action force to assist in the defense of the base area and associated units of the 9th Inf Div (ROK A). On 3 September, a second company with a Tac CP element from the 1/327 Inf and an artillery battery (-) were moved by air to NINH HOA to reinforce due to increased enemy contact. The 2/327 Inf continued to sweep from DONO TRE toward TUY AN until 26 August when intelligence sources indicated an enemy concentration in an area between TUY AN and TUY HOA. The 2/8 Cav, 2/327 Inf, 1/17 Inf Regt (ARVN) and MIKE forces encircled the suspected enemy location by airmobile assaults and overland movement and closed on converging axes. This converging attack produced sporadic small unit enemy contact. On 27 August the 1/22 Inf came under the OPCON of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div and on 30 August relieved TF Bravo of securing the VUNG RO Bay/VUNG RO Pass area. On 30 and 31 August the 2/502 Inf (-) conducted airmobile assaults to join the converging attack from the southwest to cut off enemy routes of egress. Operation JOHN PAUL JONES ended on 5 September when the Brigade began Operation SEWARD to protect the TUY HOA Valley rice harvest.

12. (C) Results:

a. The 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div accomplished its mission of securing the VUNG RO Bay/VUNG RO Pass area and the LOC from VUNG RO Bay to TUY HOA, and conducting search and destroy operations in the TUY HOA and DONO TRE areas.

b. The following losses were inflicted on the enemy during the operation: 110 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 34 VC/NVA KIA (EST), 69 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 101 VC/NVA KIA (EST), 12 NVAC, 29 VCO, 35 VCS, and 2 ralliers. In addition, 56 individual and crew served weapons, ammunition and other equipment were captured.

c. Friendly losses during the operation were as follows: 23 KIA, 132 WIA.
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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation JOHN PAUL JONES

13. (U) Administrative Matters:
   b. Logistics: See Inclosure 1, Logistics.

14. (U) Special Equipment and Techniques:
   a. During the operation, several "Lightning bug" missions were conducted. Lightning bug operations are conducted during the hours of darkness utilizing an observer helicopter and gunships. The observer aircraft utilizing starlight devices scans an area of suspected VC/NVA activity. Upon sighting a target, the light system is directed at the target and the gunships attack the enemy position. It was found that utilizing starlight scopes on each side of the aircraft to scan an area of operation prior to employing the search light enhanced surprise and enabled the lightning bug crews to observe more ground activity. All missions were coordinated with the ground commander in the area of operation in which the mission was flown; personnel from the infantry unit operated the starlight scopes.
   b. In order to effectively employ CS agents or flamethrowers, teams were made available at Brigade level to be employed on an "on-call" basis. A helicopter rigged for CS employment and charged flamethrowers were maintained on a thirty minute standby.

15. (C) Commander's Analysis (Lessons Learned):
   a. In the exploitation of B-52 missions, elements of the Brigade conducted airmobile assaults directly into the strike areas within twenty minutes following the bombing. Thus method of exploiting strikes was effective and reduced the time required to get combat troops into the objective area. By conducting assaults in this manner, the dazed enemy is given little time to reorganize or evacuate the area.
   b. The employment of "stay behind" forces was used to capitalize on the enemy's tendency to return to the base areas after US forces have departed. Following the exploitation of B-52 strikes, the battalions were extracted from the area, leaving two reconnaissance platoons, with seven days rations, as "stay behind" forces. After three days, the platoons reported infiltration of small groups of enemy back into the area. The area was assaulted again by US forces, utilizing the "stay behind" forces to secure LZ's and block routes of exfiltration from the area.
   c. Since our basic problem is one of target acquisition we restricted routine use of fires primarily to induce the enemy to remain in our area of operations and secondarily to cut down on questionable ammunitions expenditure and exhaustion. It appears to be poor strategy to routinely use "hit and run" attacks as a defensive technique when the Brigade has superiority in force, reserves, mobility and ammunition. "Hit fire" should be used to interdict enemy ingress routes, known assembly areas and when the enemy forces outnumber ours and are prepared to attack.
   d. When too many troops become involved in the evacuation their MIA and KIA, tactical momentum can be lost. Casualties have been incurred as a result of soldiers attempting to aid their companions, only to become casualties themselves. The appropriate action is to continue attacking the enemy, driving him off, and clearing the field for casualty evacuation. Troops only slightly wounded should be required to continue
to perform their duties until the action is concluded and their services can be spared. The walking wounded should be used when possible to assist the seriously wounded until aid men are available.

f. Frequently, when reconnaissance elements make contact, enemy forces exfiltrate from the area as the air mobile immediate action force is being lifted into the area. When possible, a ground immediate action force should infiltrate into an area on foot at the same time the reconnaissance elements are injected into the area. This permits a ground force to be present to immediately exploit enemy contacts.

g. Booby traps have inflicted multiple casualties in cases where troops were "bunched up." The soldier must become an expert in detecting booby traps, and must be impressed with the fact that proper interval must be maintained in combat formations.

h. Clandestine entry into the battle area can be accomplished by moving elements during the hours of darkness. Units up to company size can effectively remain undetected until they have reached their destination or objective area.

16. (C) Recommendations:

a. That a minimum of four flyable CH-47 helicopters be provided to the Brigade when supporting artillery is to be moved by an air LOC and forward logistical supply points established where no land LOC is available.

b. That all medevac helicopters be provided a reliable winch or hoist capability for extracting wounded personnel from densely wooded or mountainous areas where landing zones are not available.

c. That LZ preparation not be habitually used, as it is an indication to the enemy that we are going to make a heliborne assault in the area and gives him an opportunity to prepare to assault US troops landing in the area or flee the location.

d. That the use of ARVN, CIDG and other indigenous para military forces (RF and FF units) in cooperation and coordination with US forces continue to be maximized to conserve or augment the forces available to a US unit commander as well as to improve training, aggressiveness and confidence of the Vietnamese units.

WILLARD PEARSON
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

Inclosures:
1 - Intelligence
2 - Operation Schematics
3 - Personnel and Administration
4 - Logistics
5 - Communications
6 - Civil Affairs
7 - Psy War
8 - Artillery
Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation JOHN PAUL JONES

1. (U) Weather and Terrain:

a. The weather over the operational area was not what was expected. It rained heavily on approximately 15 days, whereas only 8-10 days of rain were expected. Winds were much stronger than the 10 knots anticipated. On eight days winds gusted over 25 knots. Flying weather also did not come up to expectations with the expected 40 good days for the operation only materializing to approximately 33. Even the temperature was not expected. On 3 days the low was in the 60's whereas a low of 72° was predicted. These unexpected changes in the weather, although potential hindrances to our operations, had a minimum effect. However, it did provide the VC with more hours of concealment than anticipated.

b. The terrain was as expected. Open rice paddies near Tuy Hoa ran into mountains and thick forests to the south and west. These conditions aided the VC in concealing large rest camps and base areas. The terrain was not as much of an obstacle to us as anticipated. We succeeded in uncovering numerous base camps and rest areas.

2. (C) Analysis:

a. The Ky Lo Valley and District Headquarters between Tuy Hoa are major VC/. NVA base areas. The NVA forces continually return to these established areas. Periodic sweeps of US Forces, NVA forces move from base area to base area along established routes. When we sweep through their areas they break down into small groups, both to avoid detection and because of becoming fragmented and disorganized by our forces.

b. The VC continually tax the local farmers and conduct their own clandestine harvesting throughout the TACR.

c. All indications are that NVA and VC forces intend to conduct both coordinated and independent operations during the coming rice harvest in order to assure this vital commodity.

d. VC forces in the area have begun and will undoubtedly intensify efforts to interfere with the upcominng elections.

e. NVA and VC forces suffer from lack of food and adequate medical facilities. They are particularly vulnerable to malaria. Arms, equipment and ammunition are adequate for the type of warfare they wage, bearing in mind they have no intent to engage in sustained combat.

3. (C) Lessons Learned:

a. The tactics of forces in the TACR were to avoid decisive contact at all times. This necessitated committing large numbers of troops to encircle the enemy in an effort to destroy him. Meeting contacts produced the largest number of enemy losses.

b. Photo Missions:

(1) During the operation 17 photo missions were received which were applicable to the area. There were 18 Red River missions flown and 22 visual reconnaissance reports submitted which reflected positive intelligence.

(2) Substantial intelligence was received from the 55th MI Det (Nha Trang) in the form of trail, LZ, and defensive studies. This unit is presently maintaining these studies for the entire II Corps area on a continuous basis.

(3) The limitations of photo intelligence were apparent in that photography of base camp areas did not reveal any signs of their presence. A survey of the items reported by photo interpretation reports shows that the vast majority of sightings were in relatively open areas while sightings in areas of heavy tree canopy were rare and uncertain as to identification.

(4) Red River has partially offset the limitations imposed by the tree canopy, but the scarcity of significant sightings coupled with reports from
POW's indicates that enemy units are probably aware of our efforts and have restricted the use of fires to counter our detection efforts. The last four Red Haze missions have been scheduled in order to coincide with reported cooking times of the units, but the results to date are inconclusive.

(5) Where photographic coverage was not available, visual reconnaissance was able to fill in the gap. Here again this reconnaissance effort was restricted by the heavy tree canopy.

(6) In order to provide for the timely acquisition of basic photographic coverage it is necessary to plan and request photo coverage well in advance of moving into an area. The limitations imposed by the current availability of aircraft and facilities require a lead time in excess of seven days in order to obtain photography of a new area.

c. The immediate deployment of IPW teams to the point of enemy capture has proven to be a valuable tactical asset; however, units must take care to insure that prisoners are at the designated point for interrogation. Wasted time only deprives other units of the brigade of this capability.

d. The use of daily liaison visits to CIDG Camps and District Headquarters within the TAOR has done much toward supplementing the intelligence picture.

e. Contact was frequently established by employing patrol teams into their areas based on reports from reliable sources. Exploiting the contacts gained requires improvement.

4. (C) COMSEC:

a. Organic COMSEC: A total of 9,955 transmissions were monitored. During JOHN PAUL JONES, 4 nets were monitored: Bde Op/Intel, Admin/Log, and Bde Command nets. During this period there was a vast improvement in the field of communication security within the Brigade nets.

b. Attached COMSEC: A total of 3,617 transmissions were monitored by an attached COMSEC team from the 313th Radio Research Bn. Of this total, 792 transmissions were covered on the command nets of 1/327, 2/327, and 2/502 Inf, and 534 transmissions (90 hours) were covered on the Bde switchboard.

5. (U) The following is a breakout of enemy weapons and materiel losses during Operation JOHN PAUL JONES:

a. Weapons Captured:

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b. Ammunition:

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Inclosure 1 to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation JOHN PAUL JONES.

1. (U) VC/NVA Initial Order of Battle within Brigade TAOR: VC/NVA dispositions at the beginning of Operation JOHN PAUL JONES were as indicated below:

a. The 95th and 18B Regiments were confirmed as being present in PHU YEN Province in July. The 18B was believed to be deployed in the eastern portion of the province, with the 95th further to the west.

b. The 95th Battalion, 68th Arty Regt, NVA was confirmed in the province in July.

c. The 85th VC Local Force Battalion was believed to be located in the area of Song Cau.

d. Nine district and local force companies were believed to be located in the province, with a strength of 70 per company.

2. (O) Order of Battle Findings and Summary in Operational Area:

a. Summary:

1. As a result of exploitation of B-52 strikes, and sweeps through known VC base areas within the operational area contact with elements of the 561st (95th) Arty Bn was made in the Ky Lo Valley, and an NVA captain assigned to the 5th Division was captured. Sweeps of the area to the east of Dong Tre and Dung Son forced the VC to disperse into small elements to avoid contact. Scattered contacts with VC and NVA forces were made during the sweep.

2. Units identified by prisoners and agents as being in the Brigade area of operation were the 561st Arty Bn and 5th Division, both located in the Ky Lo Valley.

3. Constant resistance on a small scale was met by the Brigade in Tuy An District, along the Cai River, where a large amount of rice is grown, indicating that the VC are in need of the rice in this area, and are trying to obtain it despite US forces.

b. OB Findings: Inclosure 2 (Order of Battle Findings) to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence).

c. Final Viet Cong/NVA dispositions at termination of Operation JOHN PAUL JONES: Inclosure 5 (Final Order of Battle) to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence).
1. (C) Order of Battle findings on the 561st (95th) NVA Arty Bn, 68th Regt. (See Inclosure 3 - Order of Battle Findings 561st (95th) Arty Bn).

2. The base camp of the 18B NVA Regimental Headquarters is usually moved every 4-6 days. The Regiment transports all equipment by means of back packs. The Regimental headquarters is not usually located near populated areas. Members of the 18B Regt receive about 550 grams of rice per day. Each company has one cook.

3. (C) The CO, 95th NVA Regt is Lt Col NGUYEN QUANG. Other officers of the Regiment are as follows:

- Political Officer - Maj VN
- 11th (4th) Bn CO - Capt SUNG
- 13th (6th) Bn CO - Capt LUU
- 20th Co CO - Capt MDN
- 43rd Co CO - Lt NGO

The following personnel and equipment breakdown of the regiment is given as of 15 May 1966:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>ADDITIONAL INFO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11th Bn</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>4-75mm RR, 4-57mm RR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th Bn</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>60mm mortar, 3-60mm mortars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th Bn</td>
<td>350</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th Hvy Wpn Co</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Mortar Co</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th Commo Co</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th Engr Co</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th Med Co</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Recon Co</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22nd Hvy MG Co</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>6-12.7mm LA MG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd S&amp;T Co</td>
<td>84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>1479</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 23rd S&T Co operated a rear base area at E888524.

4. (C) The 96th NVA Arty Bn has composition similar to that of the 561st (see Inclosure 3). It contains the 7th and 8th companies with 77 and 78 men respectively. The 7th Company has 4-120mm mortars. The 8th Company has 6-75mm recoilless rifles. The Bn was last located via B0700245. The total strength of the Battalion is 300 men. Each company has a signals section with 2 radios. Personalities of the Battalion are listed below:

- Bn CO - Capt PHUC
- IDD - Capt HUAN
- Bn Political Officer - Capt THUOC
- Deputy Political Officer - Capt TEHM
- 8th Co CO - 1/Lt KIMH
- XO - w/Lt TUYEN
- Co Political Officer - 1/Lt THUOC
- Deputy Political Officer - 2/Lt KIEU

5. (C) The VC DK-7 Company was located via of North N寂静 District in Aug 1966. The 1st platoon contains 39 men, 3 BAR’s, 21 Russian rifles, 5 carbines and 2 Thompson submachineguns. Personalities of the company are listed below:

- Co CO - 2/Lt KY
- Co XO - VC HUEN
- Political Officer - 1/Lt MDN
- Asst Political Officer - w/Sgt VC CONG KANH

The company usually cooked rice once a day approx 2000 in houses or underground. The company usually does not fire on recon planes, but takes cover. The company selects campsites near streams and usually remains in place for 2-3 days.
6. (C) The 213 VC Local Force Bn was formed in An Linh Village, Phu Yen Province. The Bn has a strength of 300 and consists of 3 companies. Equipment of the Bn includes 3-60mm mortars, 1-40mm, 18-AR's, and small arms (assorted). Personalities of the Bn are listed below:

   Bn CO - CHI
   Bn XO - HOC
   3rd Co CO - Y LE (Montagnard)
   3rd Co XO - DAT

7. (C) The Son Hoa District Company has a strength of 90 men broken into three Platoons. The company has 1-60mm mortar. Company personalities are listed below:

   Co CO - NGUYEN CAN
   Co XO - PHAT
   Political Officer - LUC
   1st Plt CO - TRAN VAN LUYEN
   2nd Plt CO - HA
   3rd Plt CO - Y MO

   Approximately 65% of the company personnel have malaria. The company is short of provisions.

8. The headquarters of the 5th Division is believed to be in the Ky Le Valley. Both the 18th and 95th NVA Regiments are part of this division, as well as the 561st Arty Bn.
Inclosure 3 (Order of Battle Findings, 561st Arty Bn) to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation JOHN PAUL JONES.

1. (C) The 561st NVA Arty Bn, also known as the 95th NVA Arty Bn, is composed of the 7th, 8th and H-14 companies. The present strength of the battalion is approximately 127.

2. (C) Sources for this report:

   (POW) Nguyen Thanh L-p - H-14 Co
   (POW) Tran Xuan Duc - 7th Co
   (POW) Nguyen Van Ty - 7th Co
   (POW) Trinh Duy Thanh - H-14 Co
   (POW) Nguyen Van - 7th Co
   (POW) Nguyen B. Soen - 7th Co
   (POW) Nhu Hang Bien - 7th Co

3. (C) The Bn left SVN in Feb 1966 from Tanh Voon Province and entered Laos. The Bn was led by local guides in Laos. The Bn entered SVN through either Kontum or Binh Dinh Province and moved to Minh Dinh where they stayed for one month. The Bn moved to Phu Yen in July. The Bn entered the province minus two 120mm mortars of the 4 assigned.

4. (C) The Bn was located in the Ky Lo Valley on 8 August. The morale of the Bn is low due to sickness (malaria) and poor diet. This is evidenced by the strength of the battalion at 127 as opposed to a TO&E of 400. Medical supplies were depleted about 3 months ago.

5. (C) Personalities of the Battalion are:

   Bn CO - Capt. NGUYEN PHUC THUOC
   Bn XO & FO - Capt. TRAN PHUC
   CO, 7th Co - 1/Lt PHAN V.N
   CO, 8th Co - 1/Lt TRAN KHANH
   Bn Ops Officer - 2/Lt TRAN H.L.

6. (C) Telephone communication is used within the companies. Communications above company use back pack radios. The Bn used 7 radios, type 71-B. 4 of the radios are in 7th Co, and 3 are in the Bn Hqs.

7. (C) The cover designations used by the 561st are listed below:

   7th Co - V-2
   8th Co - V-3
   H-14 Co - V-1

H-14 Company is called a company, however it is actually a platoon, possibly a headquarters platoon.
Based on triangular organization of NV. Inf Div. No unit has been identified as a third regiment.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7th Inf Div</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th Fin Regt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th Inf Regt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Inf, 12th Inf Regt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Inf, 183 Regt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Inf, 183 Regt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95th Inf, 58th NVA Arty Regt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95th Inf, 58th NVA Arty Regt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Co (377), 85th VO LF BN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Co (220), 85th VO LF BN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Co (377), 85th VO LF BN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Co (650), 85th VO LF BN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>213th LF BN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>313th Co</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310th Co</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310th VO BN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310th NVA Arty Co</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310th VO Co</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310th VO Co</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recon Section, 13th Inf Regt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Co, 13th Inf Regt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Co, 13th Inf Regt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Song Cuu District Co</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Date: 15
Inclosure 2 (Operation Schematics) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation JOHN PAUL JONES

Operation schematics for the three phases of the operation are attached as follows:

TAB A = Phase I (21-30 July)
TAB B = Phase II (30 July - 15 August)
TAB C = Phase III (16 August - 5 September)
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1ST BDE, 101ST ABN DIV
OPERATION JOHN PAUL JONES
PHASE I 21-30 JUL 66

[Map showing operations and movements with arrows and labels]

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1ST BDE, 101ST ABN DIV
OPERATION JOHN PAUL JONES
PHASE III 10 AUG - 5 SEP 66

TAB C  CONFIDENTIAL
UNIT STRENGTHS

a. Beginning of Operation John Paul Jones

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Operation JOHN PAUL JONES were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized Augmented (MTCE)</th>
<th>1490</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>5519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present for Duty</td>
<td>4291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airhead - Tuy Hoa</td>
<td>(2840)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Camp - Phan Rang</td>
<td>(1551)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Present for Duty</td>
<td>1158</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The assigned strength was 125% of authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 98% of the authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength; 214 were hospitalized; 672 were in transit, 170 were on TDY status, 57 on leave, 13 in confinement, and 2 AWOL.

b. Conclusion of Operation JOHN PAUL JONES.

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation JOHN PAUL JONES were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized Augmented (MTCE)</th>
<th>1490</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>5888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present for Duty</td>
<td>4335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airhead - Tuy Hoa</td>
<td>(3350)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Camp - Phan Rang</td>
<td>(1002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Present for Duty</td>
<td>1153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The assigned strength was 122% of the augmented authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 97% of the augmented authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength; 110 were hospitalized; 603 were in transit, 237 were on TDY status, 67 on leave, 22 in confinement, and 11 AWOL.

(4) Additional personnel were obtained by the end of the operation by reducing the Base Camp strength to the minimum and the receipt of replacements.

2 (c) Casualties:

a. Casualties for the operation were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC-LRRP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/327</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/327</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/302</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 2/17 C-v</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 326 Engr</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Total Casualties to date:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>291</td>
<td>1544</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 0
3. (U) Personnel Programs:

a. Strong command emphasis was placed on the Brigade Savings Bond program. An immediate goal of 90% and ultimate goal of 100% participation was the basis for this program.

b. A Red Cross representative was brought forward from the Brigade base camp at Phan Rang, enabling the Brigade to have full time Red Cross coverage in the forward area.

c. A plaster exchange point was located in the city of Tuy Hoa as a convenience to members of the Brigade.

d. A driver safety campaign was launched to reduce the number of traffic accidents. The program consisted of lectures, posting of speed limit signs, and driver safety classes.

e. Emphasis was placed upon improving the Brigade participation in USAFI program.

f. Emphasis was placed upon the Soldier Voting Program.

g. An Enlisted Warrior of the Week program was initiated whereby one enlisted man is chosen weekly for outstanding performance in combat. This individual spends 24 hours at the Brigade Command Post as a guest of the Commanding General.

4. (U) Personnel Planning: Planning during the period involved the following areas:

a. A table of distribution has been organized for the Base Camp at Phan Rang which will ensure a much more effective utilization and efficient operation of current and proposed facilities.

b. Because of a critical shortage of cooks, a Brigade cook's school was conducted. A class was conducted in the base camp area for a period of three weeks graduating 21 personnel.

c. Coordination was made with USARV to spread the planned rotation of 2100 personnel in December from 7 November to 21 December.
Inclosure 4 (Logistical) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation JAHN PAUL JONES.

1. (C) LOGISTIC SUPPORT:

a. Support Battalion:

(1) Headquarters Detachment: Provided the command and control of Support Battalion (Forward). It was organized into command, operations, communications, and movement control sections.

(2) Supply Detachment: Was responsible for the receipt, storage, and issue of all classes of supply. It also provided an Aerial Delivery section.

(3) Maintenance Detachment: Provided a repair capability for small arms, artillery, engineer, automotive, signal and quartermaster equipment. It was organized into a shop office, a recovery section and contact teams.

(4) Medical Company (-): Was organized into a company headquarters section, a surgical section, a holding section, a medical evacuation section, an emergency treatment section, and dental section.

b. Supporting Forces:

(1) Tuy Hoa Sub Area Support Command provided logistical support to the Brigade and attached units. It received and stocked Class I, III and V for the Brigade, and issued Class IIIA to supporting aviation units.

(2) 10th Aviation Battalion provided 2 airmobile companies to support tactical and logistical operations. Aircraft sorties allocated were not sufficient to support logistical requirements in all instances. This was primarily due to the lower aircraft availability rate.

(3) 135th Aviation Company provided CV-2 aircraft to transport supplies, repair parts, and personnel to and from the forward area.

(4) CH-47 Helicopter support was primarily provided by the 1st Cavalry Division. The 179th Aviation Company provided some support during the last three weeks of the operation.

2. (C) MATERIAL AND SERVICES:

a. Supply:

(1) Class I: A total of 339 short tons of B rations and 41 tons of C rations were issued during the operation. A total of 109 A ration supplements were also received. However, fresh vegetables were unavailable for the first five weeks of the operation. Fresh fruit was available only twice.

(2) Class II and IV: With the exception of barrier material, all Class II and IV was issued through the Brigade's Phan Rang supply facility. 1st Log Command (Tuy Hoa Sub Area Support Command) furnished barrier material. A total of 97 short tons of Class II and IV items were issued.

(3) Class III: 451 short tons of Class III and IIIA were issued during the operation (excluding JP 4), to include 81,245 gallons of AVGAS, 21,993 gallons of DIESEL, and 12,825 gallons of NAPAS.

(4) Class V: 952.3 short tons of Class V were issued during the operation. This includes 42 short tons of Class V stockpiled at Dong Tre for future operations. One lot of 105mm ammunition was suspended.
Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation JOHN PAUL JONES.

Water: A 1500 gallon erdaator remained operational at TUY
HoA North Airfield throughout the operation. A 600 gallon erdaator
was utilized at Dong Tre.

b. Maintenance: The Support Battalion maintenance detachment
received 172 automotive, 283 armament, 86 instrument, 407 signal, and
5k engineer job orders. Of these, all but 3 automotive, 13 armament, 2
instrument, 36 signal and 8 engineer jobs were completed. A total of 128
service requests were made, of which all but 4 were completed and 27 recovery
missions were received and completed. One 3/4 ton truck, 1 M102 howitzer,
6 M-16 rifles, 1 shotgun, 6 M-14 quadrants, 1 PRC 25 radio, and 4 HJ38/4
handsets were non repairable combat losses.

c. Ground Transportation: A total of five hundred and forty-
three truck requirements were filled during the operation.

d. Air Transportation:

(1) Fixed Wing:

(a) CV-2: 284 sorties were flown carrying a total of
3186 passengers and 300 short tons of cargo.

(b) C-123: 116 sorties were flown carrying a total of
422 passengers and 406.2 short tons of cargo.

(c) C-130: 37 sorties were flown for a total of 110
passengers and 175 short tons of cargo.

(2) Rotary Wing: CH-47 Helicopters again proved invaluable,
especially in resupply of artillery ammunition and Class III. They made
possible a rapid logistical buildup at Dong Tre.

e. Other Services:

(1) Graves Registration: was provided by a team from the
148th Quartermaster Company.
(2) 226th Quartermaster Company provided Bath and Laundry service.

3. (C) MEDICAL

a. Two Medical Evacuation Helicopters were available to support the
Brigade. Only one helicopter had a winch capability installed when the opera-
tion ended.

b. Patients Treated.

(1) WIA 145
(2) Non Battle Injury 72
(3) Disease 543

TOTAL: TREATED 780

c. Returned to Duty 249

d. Evacuated to Hospital 503

e. Remain in Holding 28

TOTAL: disposition 780

23
4. (U) SUMMARY:

a. The Brigade continued to make extensive use of the CH-47 helicopter for resupply of artillery ammunition. Additionally, JP4 bladders were externally carried to the Dong Tre vicinity by CH-47. This eliminated the necessity for UH-1 helicopters to return to Tuy Hoa South Airfield for refueling.

b. Few helicopter medical evacuation requests occurred in dense, forested terrain however, the non-availability of hoist equipped helicopters for medical evacuation could be a serious problem in future operations.

5. (U) CONCLUSIONS

a. CH-47 helicopters continue to be invaluable for movement of large quantities of Class III and V.

b. All medevac helicopters should have a winch capability to extract wounded personnel from heavily forested areas.
Inclosure 5 (Signal) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation JOHN PAUL JONES

1. (U) Background:

The 1st Brigade Headquarters Company Communications Platoon and the 1st FASCP had the joint mission of continuing the communications at Dak To to complete Operation BEAUREGARD, displace to Tuy Hoa North, and establish communications for operations JOHN PAUL JONES.

2. (C) Operations:

a. VHF Section - Provided communications between Brigade CP and Battalion Base Camps at Tuy Hoa South.

b. Comm Center Section - Provided secure teletype service to I FFORCEV and motor messenger service within the Brigade.

c. Switchboard/Wire Section - Established the new CP wire system and terminated 75 circuits in Strike Switchboard. They also extended wire circuits from the VHF Terminals at Tuy Hoa South to the TO&E or attached Battalions. Approximately 30 miles of wire was installed.

d. FM Radio Section - Provided FM Radio Nets within the Brigade extending Retrans Stations to Chap Chai and Relay Stations at Dong Tre and Vung Ro Bay Area.

e. AM Radio Section continued to operate a secure RTT Net between Tuy Hoa and Phan Rang with service extended to Support Battalion Area at Tuy Hoa South.

f. Maintenance Section continued to provide maintenance support for Brigade Headquarters & Headquarters Company and attachments.

g. Corps Signal Support - 54th Signal Battalion provided circuits into the Corps Area System and secure RTT to I FFORCEV and operate a Single Sideband Phone Patch at Tuy Hoa, Phan Rang and Nha Trang.

3. Problem Areas:

a. Equipment shortages - 12 3rd AC generators were requisitioned on "O2" priority in November 1965 and requisitioned on 23 Aug 66 as a replacement for the PE75 generators, which have proved unreliable.

b. TT-4 teletypewriters continue to be a critical maintenance problem. Insufficient floats are available to maintain a continuously operational machine.

c. T195 transmitters continue to be a critical maintenance problem. Insufficient floats are available to maintain a continuously operational net or system, even though all AM Radios are consolidated under Brigade control.

d. FM Radio net discipline is poor, with many procedural violations and transmissions bordering on security violations.

e. Typhoon and strike rear telephone circuits continues to be marginal and unsatisfactory due to the distances over which the circuits traverse and the over worked equipment.
Inclosure: (Civil Affairs) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation JOHN PAUL JONES

1. (U) Civil Affairs activities during Operation John Paul Jones included:
   a. Maintaining price control measures, which were in effect prior to the entry of the bulk of the Brigade into the Operational Area.
   b. Effecting coordination with local, Phu Yen Province and District, GVN Officials and their military and civilian advisors.
   c. Expediting the return of 1,354 refugees to GVN Control.

2. (U) Civic Action activities during Operation John Paul Jones included:
   a. Providing medical treatment to 4,366 Vietnamese civilians.
   b. Opening, repairing, and clearing the road from Tuy Hoa to Tuy An on a daily basis from 15 Aug to 5 Sept 66.
   c. Providing transportation to 68 refugees from the Tuy Hoa Refugee Center back to their home districts.
   d. Hiring an average of 150 laborers, per day, thus providing local refugees with a source of livelihood.
   e. Extracting 80 cows and 10 horses from areas under VC domination and returning those to GVN controlled areas, where they were redistributed to the people by the District Chief.
   f. Conducting two "Medicine Show" operations.
   g. Distributing the following commodities, through local GVN officials, to needy persons and refugees:
      - Soap: 364 bars
      - Bulgar wheat: 2 bags
      - Cooking sets: 56 each
      - Clothing: 800 pounds
      - Cooking oil: 25 gallons
      - Powdered milk: 64 packages
      - Tooth brushes and Tooth paste: 300 sets
      - Blankets: 120 each
   h. Assisting the Vietnamese by replacing the roofs of 25 classrooms. These roofs had been blown away during a windstorm on 25 July 1966.
   i. Assisting in the care of the orphans at the Catholic and Buddhist orphanages in Tuy Hoa.

3. (U) Problem areas encountered in the Civil Affairs - Civic Action field included:
   a. In some cases a great number of refugees were generated by units operating in the field. This overloads Vietnamese refugee handling resources and works at cross purposes with the GVN "Back to the Village" campaign. Instructions have been issued to all units to prevent this from recurring.
   b. In some cases, there may have been indiscriminate destruction of Vietnamese property. Instructions have been issued to all units to preclude this from happening in the future.
   c. Sling slings for heli-lifting horses and cattle proved difficult.
Inclosure 6 (Civil Affairs) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation JOHN PAUL JONES

to obtain on short notice. S-3 will requisition and keep on hand some slings for this purpose.

d. In extracting refugees, cattle, and rice from the remote areas in which they are often encountered, a strain is placed on the already heavily taxed, supporting air transportation units. Although no simple solution, short of providing more aircraft, seems feasible, through close coordination between the Brigade Aviation Officer and personnel of the S-3 Section this problem has been minimized.
Inclosure 7 (Psychological Warfare) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation JOHN PAUL JONES (U)

1. (U) Psychological Objective: Psychological Warfare activities were oriented and directed toward enemy units and friendly civilians in the operational area.

2. (C) Operation JOHN PAUL JONES:
   a. Leaflets: A total of 9,063,000 leaflets were dropped during the operation.
   b. Loudspeaker: A total of 58 hours of loudspeaker appeals were delivered by USAF U-20 aircraft and the Ground Speaker Team. The themes used in the appeals were CHIHI-NOI, Demoralization and Rice Harvest. A total of six special tapes were made during the operation.
   c. Summary: Eight personalized, specialized, and localized leaflets and six special tapes were directed toward enemy units and friendly rice harvest areas in the operational area. It is believed that psychological operations, together with the violent offensive nature of the tactical situation contributed extensively to the demoralization of surviving enemy personnel. By the closing date of the operation, a total of two ralliers had surrendered themselves to Brigade personnel.

   d. Lessons Learned:

   (1) When new leaflets are produced, particularly special leaflets, at least 200 copies of the translation should be included, as a matter of course, these copies will be used as handouts to VIP visitors.

   (2) Leaflet boxes should be coated with some water resistant substance i.e., plastic, wax, etc and more securely bound as a greater precaution against inclement weather.

   (3) An example of contents should be clearly displayed on the outside of all leaflet boxes along with the amount and general classification.

   (4) An augmentation to the Brigade of one Psy War school trained officer and two EM has been approved and personnel should be requisitioned and assigned on an expedited basis.

   (5) There is a definite need for one interpreter to be available to work with the Psy War team on operations.

   (6) A Psy War request form is needed for use by the battalions to request Psy War support.

   (7) A bull horn portable speaker is needed for use by the Ground Speaker Team.


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Inclosure 8 (Artillery) to CoBat Operations After Action Report, Operation JOHN PAUL JONES (J)


2. (c) Execution: 20 to 21 July: All units were placed on standby alert. Units continued to maintain equipment.

a. 21 - 29 July: On 21 July at 1100 hrs 3/2/30th Arty displaced to CQ21325 in general support of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div. Unit closed at 1945 hrs. On 22 July, B/2/320th Arty displaced to CQ27325, reinforcing the fires of A/2/320th Arty and C/2/320th Arty. Unit closed at 1030 hrs. C/2/320th Arty displaced to CQ27326 in direct support of the 1/502d Inf. Unit closed at 1500 hrs. A/2/320th Arty displaced to CQ22325 in direct support of the 1/327th Inf. Unit closed at 1630 hrs. On 30 July all elements closed back to CQ21921 except 5/1/30th Arty which occupied a position at CQ135520.

b. 30 - 31 July: On 30 July C/2/320th Arty displaced to CQ13528 in support of the L/7th Arty Regt and to prepare an LZ for the purpose of moving to support the 2/502d Inf. On 31 July at 0752 hrs one platoon (2 pieces) from A/2/320th Arty displaced to CQ22325 to fire a preparation on an LZ. The operation was diversionary in nature. Upon completion of the firing, the element returned to base camp coord CQ21921 JY FOA. Unit closed at 212200 hrs.

c. 2 - 3 August: On 2 August C/2/320th Arty moved by CH-L7's (3 ea) in direct support of the 2/502d Inf to B052579. Btry began moving at 020615 hrs and closed at 0700 hrs. They were resupplied in the afternoon by (2) CH-L7's. B/2/320th Arty departed base camp on 020630 hrs to occupy CQ21325 in support of the 2/502d Inf. Btry closed at 020730 hrs, no missions fired. Unit closed at 020730 hrs in base camp. On 3 August C/2/320th Arty began displacing at 030730 hrs back to base camp by CH-L7's (2 ea).

d. 5 - 9 August: On 5 August B/2/320th Arty displaced to CQ223238 with 4 tubes to fire service practice to train arty FO's and Inf personnel in arty adjustment procedures. On 7 August C/2/320th Arty displaced to CQ223216 in support of combined training exercise. Unit closed at 071055 hrs. Unit fired coordinated preparations at for combined forces demonstration and training exercise. Unit returned to base camp at 071730 hrs. B/2/320th Arty displaced to CQ21325 in support of 1st Brigade Headquarters. Unit closed at 072145 hrs. No activity reported during the night. On 8 August 1/2/320th Arty displaced to CQ275003 in support of 1/327th Inf. Move was made by (5) CH-L7's. Unit closed at 081630 hrs. C/2/320th Arty moved to CQ913706 by C-123 to reinforce A/2/320th Arty. Unit closed at 081850 hrs. B/1/30th Arty displaced by road to CQ13528 to reinforce B/2/320th Arty. Unit closed at 081830 hrs. On 8 August C/2/320th Arty displaced to CQ719672 in support of 2/502d Inf. Move was made by CH-L7.

e. 15 - 16 August C/2/320th Arty displaced to BQ08704 in support of the 2/502d Inf. Unit closed at 151530 hrs. On 16 August B/2/320th Arty displaced to CQ79316 in support of 1/327th Inf. Unit closed at 161200 hrs.

f. 20 - 26 August: On 20 August A/2/320th Arty displaced by CH-L7's to BQ95751 in support of the 2/8th Inf, 1st Cav Div. Unit closed at 201900 hrs. On 26 August A/2/320th Arty displaced by CH-L7's to
G. 3 - 4. September: On 3 September B/2/320th Arty displaced by CV-2 and G-47's to BP27622 in direct support of the 1/327th Inf (-). Four 1(l) howitzers were displaced for this contingency. On 4 September A/2/320th Arty displaced to CG21511. On 5 September two (2) howitzers from A/2/320th Arty were displaced to CG27617 and joined the remaining two (2) howitzers from B/2/320th Arty forming B/2/320th Arty (Provisional) with the mission of direct support of 30 A/3/327th Inf. A/2/320th Arty (-) had mission of reinforcing B/2/320th Arty (Provisional).

3. (C) Problem Areas:

a. Shooting at topographical crests when slopes on reverse side away from observers may be occupied by our forces should be avoided. In adjustment of fire, a round could clear the crest and travel several thousand more meters on its natural trajectory, thereby possibly landing in a friendly AO. Extreme caution should be emphasized when shooting near topographical crests.

b. Executives minimum QZ should be computed with care. The range to mask should be checked against the map to insure that the elevation for the actual range to mask is used and not the estimated range. Especially in deep valleys of mountainous areas, the executive should make a more diligent examination of the terrain around his position.

4. (C) Comments:

a. On 21 August a coordinated chemical and Arty attack was conducted on the enemy at QI60329. Results: The firing by the VC weapons were silenced and allowed the unit to disengage to allow evacuation of friendly wounded.

b. A CIDG company from Mai Lanh (Advisors Captain J. Zachary and Sergeant M. B. Dooley) had the mission of securing A/2/320th Arty via EQ8/806 from 9 - 16 August. The military discipline and espirit displayed by this unit was exceptional. They initiated aggressive patrolling and ambush operations which resulted in the capture of 1 VC, losing one VC R/4 (A/2/320th Inf) and retrieved several documents of tactical value. One element and its advisor always remained with the battery while the other went on patrols and ambushes. In contrast to the other 3 CIDG elements who had the same mission, this company displayed a definite desire and willingness to patrol and aggressively pursue the enemy.

c. The artillery liaison section and forward observers sections with the 2/8th Inf, 1st Cav Div, were extremely professional and most cooperative during the operation.

5. (C) Recommendations: That a minimum of four flyable CV-47's be attached/assigned to the brigade to support operations. Movement of artillery could be more smoothly accomplished if organic aircraft were used. Additionally in most instances the aircraft would be more responsive.