<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNCLASSIFIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD NUMBER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD388846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLASSIFICATION CHANGES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIMITATION CHANGES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD Controlling Organization: Department of the Army, Office of the Adjutant General, Washington, DC 20310.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**AUTHORITY**

11 Nov 1979 per DoDD 5200.10 document marking; Adjutant General’s Office [Army] ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (6 Mar 68) FOR OT RD-674164 8 March 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 12th Combat Aviation Group, Period Ending 31 October 1967 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to AGSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl as

DISTRIBUTION
Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command

Commandants
US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Adjutant General School
US Army Air Defense School
US Army Armor School
US Army Artillery and Missile School
US Army Aviation School
US Army Chemical School
US Army Civil Affairs School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Intelligence School

Regarded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL
DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)
US Army Medical Field Service School
US Army Military Police School
US Army Missile and Munitions School
US Army Ordnance School
US Army Quartermaster School
US Army Security Agency School
US Army Signal School
US Army Southeastern Signal School
US Army Special Warfare School
US Army Transportation School

Copies furnished:
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
The Surgeon General
The Provost Marshal General
Research Analysis Corporation (Library)
Dr. Martin J. Bailey, OSD(SA)
Defense Documentation Center
Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
Commanding Generals
US Army Weapons Command
US Army Flight Training Center
Commanding Officers
US Army Aviation Test Activity
12th Combat Aviation Group
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (CELI) (RCS CSFOR-65) for Quarterly Period ending 31 October 1967 (UIC CYPA)

TO: See Distribution

A. GENERAL:

1. (C) The 12th Combat Aviation Group continued to furnish outstanding support to units in the II Field Force Vietnam area. Units within the group continued to exceed the established flying hour program in order to support the heavy operational commitments. During the quarter there was a marked increase in the use of CH-47 aircraft by ground units. One assault helicopter company was TDY the entire period supporting the 173rd Airborne Brigade within II Field Force Vietnam area. Another assault helicopter company was placed on TDY at the end of September to support the III Marine Amphibious Force in I CTZ. During this quarter several units arrived in the group. One assault helicopter command and one assault support helicopter company became operational in September. The following units arrived during the month of October and will become fully operational early in the next reporting period: Three assault helicopter companies, one Corps aviation company, and one air cavalry squadron. Support of ARVN units was increased during the middle of the reporting period to such a point the daily combat assaults were now possible by these units. The Headquarters of 12th Combat Aviation Group satisfactorily completed its Annual General Inspection in September.
CONFIDENTIAL

3. MISSION:

1. (U) 12th Combat Aviation Group provides Army Aviation support to Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam/Senior Advisor, III Army Republic of Vietnam Corps and at the direction of the Commanding General II Field Force Vietnam, provides aviation support to United States, Republic of Vietnam, and Free World Military Assistance Forces in III Corps Tactical Zone.

2. (U) Provides Army aviation support as directed by COMUSMACV for support of United States, Republic of Vietnam, and Free World Military Assistance Forces in IV Corps Tactical Zone.

3. (U) Commands (less OPCON where specified) and administers assigned and attached Army aviation and support units.

C. ORGANIZATION:

1. (C) Organization of the 12th Combat Aviation Group during the reporting period included the following units with headquarters located as indicated:
   a. 12th Combat Aviation Group - Long Binh
   b. 11th Combat Aviation Battalion - Phu Le
   c. 145th Combat Aviation Battalion - Bien Hoa
   d. 214th Combat Aviation Battalion - Bear Cat
   e. 222d Combat Support Aviation Battalion - Vung Tau
   f. 269th Combat Aviation Battalion - Cu Chi
   g. 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry - Di An
   h. 25th Aviation Company (Corps) - Long Binh

In addition, these units had elements stationed at Phouc Vinh, Lai Khe, Dau Tieng, Tay Ninh West, as well as field positions as called for by the tactical situation.

CONFIDENTIAL
2. (C) See Annex A and B.

D. COMMAND:

1. (C) On 7 August 1967, LTC John A. Todd assumed command of the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion, replacing Colonel Howard V. Moore.

2. (C) On 1 August 1967, LTC William L. Denend assumed command of the 222d Combat Support Aviation Battalion, replacing LTC Thomas E. Thompson.

E. PERSONNEL:

1. (C) Organizational Changes: During the past quarter the authorized and assigned strength of the group has been subject to frequent changes resulting from change in status of units in the group. The following units with authorized strengths as indicated were assigned to 12th Combat Aviation Group during the past quarter:

   New Units Arriving and Authorized Strengths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>AGG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17th Avn Co (AFL) (UH-1)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>613th Trans Det</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>722d Sig Det</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135th Avn Co (AFL) (UH-1)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>614th Trans Det</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68th Sig Det</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>190th Avn Co (AFL) (UH-1)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>605th Trans Det</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Sig Det</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>520th Med Det</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 2. (C) Organization of New Units: The 190th and 135th Aviation Companies are organized under MTOE 1-77G USCONARC 3/67, the same as the 188th, 191st, and 240th Aviation Companies. The 17th and 195th Aviation Companies are organized under MTOE 1-77G, USCONARC 4/67. One company, the 187th Aviation Company, was changed from MTOE 1-77G USCONARC 3/67 to MTOE 1-77G USARFORC 1/67 which is how the original 12th Group UH-1 companies are organized (one more LT and one less WD). The 242nd VM Co is organized under TOE 1-258F, the same as the 200th and 209th Aviation Companies. The 25th Aviation Company (Corps) is organized under TOE 1-127D (with change 8). The 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry is organized under TOE 17-95T. Its troops are organized under the following TOE's: HQ&HQ Troop, TOE 17-96T, USCONARC 1/67; Troop A, B, & C, TOE 17-98T, USCONARC 1/67; Troop D, TOE 17-99T, USCONARC 1/67.
3. (C) Personnel Strengths:
   a. Officer: The following table depicts the officer and warrant officer strength during the past quarter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UTH</th>
<th>ASC(Incl Atch Excl Intransits)</th>
<th>PDY(Incl Atch)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>1313</td>
<td>1165 (89%)</td>
<td>1105 (84%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>1425</td>
<td>1234 (87%)</td>
<td>1182 (83%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>1432</td>
<td>1246 (87%)</td>
<td>1175 (82%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>1842</td>
<td>1612 (87%)</td>
<td>1531 (83%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   b. Aviator: Relative aviator strength during this period has declined from slightly below manning level to about 4% under manning level strength. Officer aviator assigned vs warrant officer aviator assigned changed from 49% : 51% to 43% : 57%, thus continuing the trend toward the proper balance of commissioned and warrant officer aviators. The ratio of majors assigned to majors authorized dropped slightly from 3.1 : 2.9 : 1. During the reporting period there have been no shortages of particular officer skills.

   c. Enlisted:
      (i) The following table depicts the enlisted strength of the group during the past quarter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UTH</th>
<th>ASC(Incl Atch Excl Intransits)</th>
<th>PDY(Incl Atch)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>5978</td>
<td>5648 (113%)</td>
<td>5327 (107%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>5447</td>
<td>6038 (111%)</td>
<td>5708 (105%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>5512</td>
<td>5934 (108%)</td>
<td>5582 (101%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>6931</td>
<td>7321 (106%)</td>
<td>6982 (101%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

(2) A shortage exists in the following MOS's:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>LATH</th>
<th>ASG</th>
<th>% SHORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11F40</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26G20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26K20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67B20</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68A10</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58G20</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35C20</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. (C) Casualties:

a. Casualties sustained by the units of the 12th Combat Aviation Group during the period 1 Aug 1967 - 31 Oct 1967 are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dead not as a result of hostile action:</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed in action:</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seriously injured in non-hostile accidents:</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded in action:</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injured non seriously in non-hostile accidents:</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Monthly Totals:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. During August, 6 members of the 12th Combat Aviation Group were lost in an aircraft and are being carried in missing status. One individual is being carried in missing status from an aircraft that disappeared in September. In addition, two personnel that disappeared on 9 June 1965 are still being carried as missing.

5. (U) Reenlistment:

Reenlistment statistics for the quarterly report period are:

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st Term</th>
<th>Career</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>ER/NG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elig Reenl %</td>
<td>Elig Reenl %</td>
<td>Elig Reenl %</td>
<td>Elig Reenl %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. (U) Awards and Decorations:

a. During this period 11,753 recommendations for awards were submitted and 10,347 awards were received. The following is a breakdown of the recommendations submitted and awards received:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBMITTED</th>
<th>RECEIVED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NOR</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSC</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSM</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOH</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFC</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SW</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN</td>
<td>10543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCF</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PH</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Accuracy is being emphasized at company level. This has resulted in very few awards being returned for missing or incorrect information. With the new system for award of Air Medals far fewer individuals are returning to CONUS without the awards they deserve.

7. (U) Education:

During this period the Long Binh Post Education Center has expended its facilities and is offering approximately twice as many University of Maryland courses. These courses, along with professional counseling, have received a very enthusiastic response from members of this command.

CONFIDENTIAL
8. (U) R & R:

a. The R & R utilization rate for this quarter is 96.1%.
   Aug: 92.6%
   Sep: 97.5%
   Oct: 98.2%

b. Because of the recent command emphasis on the R & R program, the utilization rate has risen significantly.

c. Australia was recently opened as the 10th R & R site and indications are that it is one of the best.

d. A survey was recently taken regarding the desirability of Seoul, Korea as an R & R site without a favorable response by personnel within the group.

9. (U) Special Services: The Special Services Supply Depot in Saigon is making a genuine effort to obtain much needed Day Room furnishings. All other Special Services items are plentiful and the group is fully stocked at this time.

10. (U) Information Program:

a. During the reporting period the following printed material and pictorial releases were submitted:
   
   HOMETOWN NEWS RELEASES \hspace{1 cm} 812
   HOMETOWN PHOTOS \hspace{1 cm} 189
   NEWS RELEASES \hspace{1 cm} 107
   NEWS PHOTOS \hspace{1 cm} 60

b. 18 newsmen were supported during the reporting period. These included UPI newsmen and hometown newsmen who were in Vietnam to do stories on soldiers from their respective areas. There

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

was one formal press interview conducted by 12th Combat Aviation
Group personnel during the period.

c. During the reporting period 12th Combat
Aviation Group units continued to participate in the USAF Daily Sum-
mary program by reporting the unit's significant events on a daily
basis. This participation has enhanced the information program tremen-
dously. Although the administrative requirement is increased, the
results justify the effort.

d. The group's Command Information Program con-
tinued to receive emphasis. A Command Information Fact Sheet is pre-
pared and disseminated to subordinate units on a weekly basis. This
fact sheet is used to supplement information received from higher
headquarters. Numerous posters were received from higher headquarters
during the reporting period and these in turn were distributed to
subordinate units within 12th Group. At the present time, written in-
formation is the best means available for the dissemination of Command
Information to the individual soldier at company level. This head-
quartes continues to prepare and distribute a weekly bulletin to all
12th Group units. Four subordinate units, the 11th, 222d, 214th, and 269th
publish unit newspapers. The 12th Group Information Office published
the first two issues of the "BLACKJACK PLEXI" newspaper during this
reporting period. This newspaper will continue to be published on
a monthly basis.

11. (U) Civic Action:

a. During the reporting period all 12th Group
units were engaged in Civic Action activities. The Group sponsored 33
projects on a continuing basis which represent an increase of four additional projects for this quarter.

b. Progress made in three areas:

(1) Construction: Construction efforts on roads and churches in the vicinity of Lai Khe continued and is proving to be a valuable tool in development of the area Civic Action Program. The "Chieu Hoi" hamlet scheduled for Vung Tau is still in the planning stage and the completion date of December will probably not be met. However, it is anticipated that construction will commence.

(2) Commodity Distribution: Commodity distribution continued to be used effectively to augment existing local resources. Voluntary contributions were disbursed to local villages which enhanced the US-Vietnamese relationships needed to obtain the objectives of the Civic Action Program.

(3) The group MEDCAP efforts continued to be well received. Although the Vietnamese National Elections curtailed the MEDCAP visits for a short period, two thousand one hundred and fifty Vietnamese received medical treatment during the reporting period.

c. Particular emphasis on assistance to the young and innocent victims of the conflict is being used in the attempt to gain long term goodwill with the up-coming generation. English instruction to Vietnamese students increased over the last reporting period. One hundred and ninety-two Vietnamese students received English instruction on a weekly basis,
12. (U) Civilian Personnel:

The 12th Combat Aviation Group is presently authorized 400 spaces for the direct hire of local nationals. This is a decrease of 14 spaces from the last quarter. The total spaces are further allocated to 33 companies within the command. In keeping with MACV and USMARV guidelines for civilian personnel, this command is reviewing local national hiring policies. Hiring has been limited to essential positions.

13. (U) Sundry Funds, Clubs, and Fessies:

The 12th Combat Aviation Group has a total of 30 Sundry Fund Clubs authorized and operating throughout the command. The gross income of these funds for the quarter ending 30 September 1967 was approximately $345,000. The average gross income per month per club was $3,722. There has been increased emphasis on placing qualified personnel in management positions. This has been reflected in an increase in gross income for these clubs. The overall average gross income was lower for this quarter due to an addition of 5 new clubs.

14. (U) Chaplain Activities:

a. Emphasis this quarter has been on troop visitation and contact by the Chaplains. Replacement and rotating personnel are interviewed by the Chaplains and necessary counseling has been provided as required. Troop duty and day rooms are regularly visited. Office hours for counseling are scheduled, and appointments are made as required.

b. Worship Services are conducted in battalion and isolated company areas. The Chaplains also provide area coverage in
Services for other units. Services are conducted in conference rooms, libraries, day rooms and mess halls, as well as in Chapels. The 269th Combat Aviation Battalion recently completed the remodeling of part of a building to provide a combination Chapel-Briefing Room. Increased opportunities in religious education have been provided by additional study groups and the showing of religious films.

c. The Group Chaplain has frequently visited the Battalion Chaplains and all battalion and company areas to provide supervision, coordination, and support for Chaplain activities. A Character Guidance Briefing and Training Conference in which all the Chaplains participate is held by the Group Chaplain each month.

d. Chaplain activities provided in group this quarter were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>OCCASIONS</th>
<th>CHANGE FROM LAST QTR</th>
<th>ATTENDANCE</th>
<th>CHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group Worship</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>+28%</td>
<td>4,369</td>
<td>+5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Education</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>+43%</td>
<td>2,112</td>
<td>+69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pastoral Visits (Includes Counseling)</td>
<td>2,620</td>
<td>+111%</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character Guidance</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>+24%</td>
<td>7,663</td>
<td>+50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Action</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>+41%</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F. INTELLIGENCE:

1. (C) Security:

a. The S-2 Section continued in its capacity as the focal point of command guidance throughout the Group for matters pertaining to personnel security and safeguarding of classified material.

b. During the period 25-29 September 1967, the Headquarters underwent its annual IG Inspection by the USARV IG team.
The S-2 Section received an outstanding rating.

c. The Group headquarters continues to maintain a very good security posture. Security posters were displayed in all staff sections, and no security violations were noted during the reporting period. The S-2 Section conducted CI inspections of all staff sections, noting only minor deficiencies. These deficiencies were corrected on the spot. The section itself received no CI inspection other than the inspection by the IG.

d. On 4 September, Mr. Powers, Special Agent, 219th MI, conducted an inspection of the S-2 office to determine the possibility of open storage of classified information. Meeting the requirements set forth in para 11, II Field Force Vietnam Regulation 380-5, and section 4, USARV Regulation 380-5, open storage of CONFIDENTIAL material was granted. The open storage was requested to facilitate the posting of Combat Intelligence on a Situation Map.

e. Upon arrival of a new Assistant S-2, several control positions were changed within the headquarters. The Assistant S-2 assumed control of all classified documents, thus becoming the Custodian of Classified Documents and the TOP SECRET Control Officer.

f. Upon completion of the IG inspection, the Section received the M-4 destruction kits requisitioned through supply channels. After opening the crates, it was discovered that the material has received water damage and could not be used. As a result, the kits were returned to supply for disposal. It was noted that the kits were large and cumbersome and took up valuable space in the security containers.
Headquarters, rescinding USARV Regulation 380-9, and informing addressees of the revision of regulation 380-5. To date, the new regulation has not been received.

h. Instructions were also received from USARV that major subordinate commanders were authorized to grant SECRET clearances. In addition, permission was received to sub-delegate this authority to lower echelons of command if desired. The group is in the process of publishing a regulation 604-5 in which this authority will be delegated to the Battalion CO's.

2. (c) Statistics:

a. The classified repository and distribution facility operated by the S-2 Section processed approximately 16,345 incoming and outgoing pieces of classified material and reviewed the files for the destruction and downgrading of all classified documents on two separate occasions. As a result, over 101 NSRB documents were destroyed. The repository contained 101 S.NSIT documents at the close of the period.

b. Also during the period, a total of 279 security clearances were validated throughout the group.

c. Tap processing continued to be an S-2 function which received considerable emphasis. A total of 30,258 maps were processed and passed on to subordinate levels. In addition, the section maintains a stockage level of approximately 10 copies per each map sheet of the entire III CTZ plus portions of the western IV CTZ, and Eastern II CTZ. These maps are maintained in both

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

1:50,000 and 1:250,000 scale; also a limited number of photo maps and 1:2,500,000 scale maps are kept for special projects.

d. The section continued to maintain a spot intelligence net and a total of 61 reports were received from in-flight aircraft during the period.

3. (c) Lost SOI's:

f. Six SOI's were lost within the group during the last three months. Losses were attributed to several causes:

(1) Failure to comply with unit Standing Operating Procedures,

(2) Failure to secure the SOI to the individual or a part of his clothing during flight operations.

(3) Aircraft lost or missing in action.

b. In all cases a formal investigation was required and conducted, resulting in long hours of work for the investigating officer. In a few instances, only a preliminary investigation was conducted to determine if a security violation had in fact occurred. After discovering that none had occurred, a formal investigation was not required. Conducting a preliminary investigation shortened considerably the required man-hours and still fulfilled the requirements of security regulations.

4. (c) Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance:

Effective 22 September 1957, the 73rd Ave Co (Aerial Surveillance) was released from operational control by MACV J-2 and is now being mission tasked by G-2 Air XX FFV. Its mission is to provide surveillance support to US, RVNAP, and Free World military Assistance Forces in III CTZ.

CONFIDENTIAL
5. (U) Personal Changes:

Early in August, the group received a new assistant S-2, and a new escape and evasion Officer. In addition, a new classified repository clerk was received.

6. (U) Staff Visits and Liaison:

a. On a weekly basis, representative times of the section continued to conduct staff visits to the subordinate battalions. These visits continued to provide the battalion S-2's with guidance and assistance pertaining to intelligence matters. In addition, mutual problems were discussed, often resulting in changes in established policies and procedures.

b. The section made frequent liaison visits to USARV, II FFV, and 1st Aviation Brigade headquarters. During these visits, briefings were often attended and in many cases individual briefings were received.

7. (U) Initial Orientation Folder:

a. To assist with the processing of newly arriving personnel into the group, the S-2 Section published an orientation folder (Annex C). This folder contained such information as:

1) Glossary of terms in common usage.
2) Highlights of the political and military situations.
3) VCATVA unit organization.
4) War trophy registration procedures.
5) The SHADO program.

CONFIDENTIAL.
(CONFIDENTIAL)

7. Enemy situation in the III CTZ.

8. Escape and Evasion program.
   a. This folder was given out to help supplement the S-2 SARDA/security program as well as provide information on the highlights of the political and military situation.

8. (C) Order of Battle Map.

An order of Battle Map was developed to depict the current disposition of enemy units. The map was designed for use by the headquarters personnel and staff as a supplement to the weekly intelligence briefing. Additionally, a small OB card was printed and included in the group SOI for use by the aviators and to assist in-flight identification of enemy units on the ground.

9. (C) Escape and Evasion:
   a. During the month of September CPT Brownlee was assigned as the group Escape and Evasion Officer.
   b. During the week of 25-29 September, the E & E Program was inspected by LTC Nelson, a member of the USARV IG team. The program received an outstanding rating.
   c. For the reporting period, the E & E Officer conducted staff visits with the subordinate battalions. The visits provided the battalion E & E Officers with guidance and assistance as pertains to Survival, Escape and Evasion, lessons learned, and quotas for the survival schools in the Philippines and Okinawa.
   d. During October, the group E & E Officer made a Liaison Visit, as a representative of Headquarters, USARV, to the Naval Survival School, at Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines, in order to obtain additional quotas to the Naval Survival School. The visit
was successful and resulted in a 50% increase of quotas beginning
1 November 1967.

e. In the last three months the 12th Group has
sent 28 men to the Naval Survival School, and 15 men to the Sea Survival
School. These quotas are insufficient to meet the minimal requirements
of the 12th Combat Aviation Group. This minimal requirement is based
on the necessity of providing four school trained individuals per
aviation company. These individuals then conduct platoon survival
training.

10. (U) The War Trophy Program: The IG team inspected the
war trophy registration procedures in this headquarters. No discrepancies
were noted. The inspecting officer also inspected the subordinate bat-
talion registration program finding no discrepancies. On 16 October 1967,
representatives of the group S-2 procured a number of war trophies from
1st Brigade, 9th US Infantry Division. These trophies will be displayed
in the BLACKJACK Museum. Description of the weapons are as follows:

a. CHICOM 75mm Recoilless Rifle, Model 52.
b. CHICOM 60mm Mortar, Type 31.
c. CHICOM Heavy MG, 12.7mm.
d. CHICOM Light MG, 7.62mm, Type 51
e. German MG, MG 34, 7.92mm.
f. US Browning water-cooled, Heavy MG, M-1917A1, 
   .30 cal, w/tripod.
g. CHICOM, Heavy MG, Type 53, 7.62mm.
h. Soviet Submachinegun, PPSh 41, CHICOM Type 50, 7.62mm.
G. OPERATIONS AND TRAINING:

1. (C) Group Combat Assault:

On 17 August 1967, the 12th Combat Aviation Group conducted a three (3) battalion combat assault into a pineapple plantation, South East of Duc Hoa. Three (3) landing zones were used to allow for simultaneous landings of approximately 70 lift ships. Three lifts were completed in less than one hour and put over 1200 troops on the ground. Maximum utilization was made of Air Force pre-strike and artillery preparation which was followed by a landing zone preparation by gunships. All phases of the operation were controlled by the group commander and the ground commander airborne in the group command and control helicopter. The assault was completed without the loss of an aircraft or crewmember.

2. (C) Stationing: During the quarter the 12th Combat Aviation Group witnessed the arrival of the following units:

a. The 190th Assault Helicopter Company arrived on 9 August 1967, and became operational at Bien Hoa on 8 September 1967.

b. The 242nd Assault Support Helicopter Company arrived on 11 August 1967, and became operational at Bien Hoa on 15 September 1967.

c. The 17th Assault Helicopter Company arrived on 5 October 1967, and is stationed at Long Binh. This unit will be fully operational early in the next quarter.

d. The 135th Assault Helicopter Company arrived on 6 October 1967, and is stationed at Vung Tau. This unit will be fully operational early in the next quarter.
CONFIDENTIAL

e. The 195th Assault Helicopter Company arrived on 31 October 1967 and is stationed at Long Binh. This unit will become fully operational in the next quarter.

f. The 25th Aviation Company (Corps) arrived on 20 October 1967 and is stationed at Long Binh. This unit will become fully operational early in the next quarter.

g. The 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry arrived on 31 October 1967 and is stationed at Di An. This unit will become fully operational early in the next quarter.

3. (c) Training:

a. Unit Training: With the arrival of so many units during the quarter, the Group continued its complex but workable system of cross-training aviation personnel between battalions and companies within the group. Aviator personnel received fifteen (15) days of in-country individual training with experienced units before being returned to their parent unit.

b. New Equipment Training: The Cobra New Equipment Training Team arrived on 1 September 1967 to conduct pilot, mechanic, engine, and avionics training on the Cobra. The first of many classes to be conducted by this team commenced on 25 September 1967. The first pilots to complete transition returned to the 334th Armed Helicopter Company to conduct fire team and platoon training prior to becoming operational on 22 October 1967 with five (5) Cobras.

c. Maintenance Training: The AAMTP courses conducted at Vung Tau continues to be an invaluable assistance to the units of the 12th Combat Aviation Group. The demand for quotas still exceeds the number of quotas available.

CONFIDENTIAL
This quarter saw the graduation of seven VNAF aviators from UH-1D transition training conducted by the 12th Combat Aviation Group. The individual pilot averaged 250 hours of pilot time during their 90 day transition program. These aviators were returned to VNAF as well trained UH-1D pilots.

e. Standardization: An accelerated standardization program has been initiated. The emphasis being placed on new units arriving in-country that are assigned to the group. This is to ensure that the units are briefed on all aspects of the group standardization program and aviator training and orientation prior to becoming operational. Constant effort is being placed on IP and SIP training for in-country units and new arrivals.

H. LOGISTICS:

1. (C) Supply:

   a. Body Armor: Body armor remains an item of command interest and control. Only small quantities have been received through the supply distribution system during the past 90 days. Projected arrival date in-country for quantities on requisition remains unknown. Extreme shortages exist in the command, particularly within units recently arriving in-country and soon to become operational for combat missions.

   b. Aircrewman's Fragmentation Helmet (AFH-1): The "ballistic helmet" remains in critically short supply. No additional assets were received and existing assets are being reduced by operational losses. A helmet sizing problem was encountered which is delaying procurement of additional helmets. The expected arrival time of AFH-1 helmets in Vietnam is the second and fourth quarters of CY-1968. In an attempt to alleviate
some sizing problems and other faults, a helmet modification team with retrofit parts has arrived in-country. Application of the EWO will commence upon distribution of the retrofit parts. Retrofit parts include new sizing pads, chin pad, nape cord, visor housing screws, etc.

6. Command Distribution of Equipment: New items of equipment were received and distributed through Command Channels to user level without the accompanying equipment authorization. This created an increased administrative burden at unit level and caused confusion during preparation of Army Equipment Status Reports.

2. (c) Aircraft Maintenance:

a. A favorable trend for total flying hours per unit was established in the month of September when UH-1 units were held to 2800 flying hours per month or below. Previous months' experiences indicated some units flying 3400 hours which was stretching maintenance man-hours and logistics to the breaking point and affecting aircraft availability adversely. October statistics, which are not yet conclusive, may indicate some violations of the September trends. It has been established during this quarter that UH-1 units flying more than 2800 hours per month experienced adverse aircraft availability trends.

b. New CH-47 units were found to be experiencing difficulties in keeping an adequate flying hour spread in order to systematically conduct the 6th periodic inspection. The 6th periodic inspection is the PE in which major components are replaced. It was determined that CH-47 units should not be committed for more than six aircraft per day nor be programmed to fly more than a total of 800 hours for two to three months prior to the 6th PE. It was further re-learned that, although availability

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
**CONFIDENTIAL**

may be ten aircraft, the daily commitment should never exceed six aircraft at one time during the day except for tactical emergency requirements.

c. Overflying the prescribed flying hour program has not only strained the manpower capability of the command, but the supply system has been heavily taxed as well. For example, the CH-47 Servo-Actuator, FSN 1650-226-6273, has been completely exhausted from the supply system. New actuators are not presently being manufactured, but a repair capability exists in-country. Due to a heavy burden on supply personnel, these actuators (when found unserviceable) have not been returned to the system. The supply could have routed the actuators to the repair facility and returned them in serviceable condition to the operating elements. The lesson learned here should relate to all repairable supplies. When the supply system is heavily burdened as it is in this command, returning of repairables back into the supply system is essential.

I. SIGNAL

1. (C) Command Post Communications:

a. During the preceding reporting period the command post communications of the 12th Combat Aviation Group were enhanced with additional radio, teletype, and telephone capability. Additional AN/VSC-2's were received and sent to three battalions which have companies located remotely from the battalion base of operations. A total of 12 AN/VSC-2's are now assigned to the Group. The AN/TRC 146 SSB High Frequency Radio set was issued to those battalions operating from a fixed base location, i.e., 145th at Bien Hoa and 222d at Vung Tau. This action allowed more AN/VSC-2's to be issued or be available for issue to deploying companies, within Southeast Asia. With issuance of this new equipment, all AN/GRC-46's and AN/MSO-95's will be turned back in through supply channels. Daily operational checks are made by Group to organic battalions using the
b. Within the Long Binh/Plantation/12th Group Headquarters area, a changeover to the automatic dial system for telephones assisted greatly in reducing the traffic load on all local manual switchboards. All of the battalions are now on or anticipated to be on automatic dial telephone system within the next sixty days. Eventually, direct dial should be possible throughout the entire 12th Group (III Corps) area.

c. Looking ahead to the future, a distribution list for the KY-8's down to company level has been prepared and also a BOI for KY-28's (authorized for all aircraft) has been established. With the arrival of this new equipment a completely secure air-to-air and air-to-ground command/operational FK radio net will be possible within the 12th Combat Aviation Group.

2. (C) Air Traffic Control and Navigation Aids:

The 12th Group Signal Officer was appointed the II Field Forces Vietnam Air Traffic Control as an additional duty. Initial projects undertaken included the establishment of air traffic flow patterns within the Long Binh/Plantation area to meet the increasing density of aircraft caused by newly assigned units. The problem on the AN/TRN-25 beacon should be overcome with the arrival of the ECON team to modify discrepancies found by recent tactical use of the beacon. All AN/GRN-6 beacons are being returned to COMUS for rehabilitation and installation of air conditioning to assist in proper operation in Southeast Asia. Additional studies are being made by the ATC Officer and the Safety Officer on the proper utilization of Air Traffic Controllers (MOS 93B) throughout III Corps to insure that more effective control of air traffic is instituted at divisional base airfields.
3. (U) NOTAK and Weather Service:

NOTAK service continues to be run effectively throughout the III Corps Tactical Zone of operations. Weather service available from the 12th Group has been reduced somewhat due to the establishment of local weather facilities in battalion areas of operation.

4. (C) SOI:

The 12th Group SOI's have continued to be used most effectively throughout the area by many tactical units. Distribution has now surpassed the one thousand level within III Corps.

5. (C) Avionics:

a. The Signal Detachments (RL) and TC Detachments (AB) continue to be deployed with shortages of test equipment and float. These critical shortages severely impair the maintenance capability and make meeting the scheduled operational dates very difficult. These problems are largely solved by redistribution of in-country assets. Also the combining of several detachments to support all aircraft on an area basis has proven very satisfactory.

b. Command consoles (AN/ASC-10 and AN/ASC-11) continued to be received and installed in the C & C aircraft throughout the Group. These sets contribute greatly to the expansion of command and control capabilities of commanders by providing additional communication equipment.

J. AVIATION SAFETY:

1. (U) General:

Again, as in the last quarter, an overall reduction in the accident rate of the Group has been realized. The accident rate was reduced from 32.9 in the previous quarter to 26.0 in this reporting period.
2. (U) Summary of Significant Cause Factors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tail Rotor Strike</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material Failure</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engine Failure</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lost RPM (downwind)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground Loop</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practice Autorotations</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weather Associated</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (U) Discussion of Factors:

a. Of the recurring cause factors two are most noteworthy - Tail Rotor Strike and Loss of RPM.

   (1) Tail Rotor Strike: Of the 6 mishaps, 4 occurred during formation operations in which the pilot at the controls flared the aircraft excessively in a water filled rice paddy, or in an LZ cluttered with obstacles. Increased flight discipline by the flight leader is being pursued to produce a better and safer formation by eliminating the need for a large flare at the termination of approach.

   (2) Loss of RPM: These seven mishaps in September were attributed to aircraft overloaded for conditions. Three aviators attempted a downwind take-off, and four occurred during downwind assaults into landing zones. As noted, there were no mishaps of this nature in October primarily due to a reevaluation of our methods of operation and command emphasis.

b. Ground Loop:

The reduction in the total O-1 flying hours given to
students at the Aviation School has required this command to provide additional cross wind training for new fixed-wing aviators when they arrive.

K. MEDICAL:

1. (C) Summary of medical activities:

a. Aspirations for increasing the Aviation Medical Officer strength have come true at the end of this quarter. Recent arrivals now provide the 12th Combat Aviation Group with eighteen physicians (Flight Surgeons). EM strength to fill vacant slots in the respective medical detachments has also improved. Resources have been distributed evenly throughout the command and consideration given to supporting those units on TDY.

b. Staff visits have been made throughout the command. The health of the command remains excellent and a successful preventive medicine program is in evidence throughout. The last 12th Group Flight Surgeon's meeting was well attended. All of the rotating surgeons summarized their efforts during their tour for the edification of the newly arrived flight surgeons.

c. The ballistic helmet survey team representing Natick Laboratories recently conducted a seminar on the use of a modification kit which will assist in correcting deficiencies which are now present in the ballistic helmet. A demonstration was given and a general discussion with a question and answer period was held for the group surgeons. These kits will be available throughout the command through S-4 channels at the beginning of November.

d. An active immunization program is being adopted into MEDCAP. Assistance is being given by the provincial public health officer.
and is further available to the surgeons through the command. Vaccines and the assistance of a Korean preventive medicine team are also available.

e. With the arrival of new aviation units into the command two new dispensaries are being proposed for construction. One at Long Binh (93rd Medical Detachment, 214th Aviation Battalion) behind the 12th Group headquarters, which will serve the 17th Assault Helicopter Co, the 25th Aviation Co (Corps), in addition to general support for the Long Binh/Plantation area. The other dispensary (540th Med Det, 269th Avn Bn) in the planning stages will be located at Tay Ninh.

f. All mess halls within the group are cooperating to meet standards prescribed. The 12th Combat Aviation Group Hp, mess hall recently received the outstanding mess hall award from II Field Forces, Vietnam.

g. The preventive medicine immunization program throughout the command is receiving one hundred percent cooperation in maintaining up-to-date shot records. Influenza vaccine is being given at the present time.
COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

PART I

OBSERVATIONS (LESSONS LEARNED)

A. PERSONNEL: None
B. OPERATIONS: None
C. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION:
   1. (U) Item: Shortage of Instructor Pilots

Discussion: There remains a critical shortage of personnel qualified to fill the requirement of instructor pilot in the assault helicopter companies. Presently, the aviators who are qualified are aviators in command positions or other critical positions and are unable to perform IP duties. There is a constant requirement for IP's due to the quantity of newly rated aviators in proportion to the number of experienced aviators being assigned. This condition requires that some newly rated aviators be trained for IP duties. This takes considerable time because of mission requirements of aircraft. Units are now training aviators for units newly arrived in-country, requiring an even heavier load on the few IP's available. New in-country aviators require at least one IP ride.

Observation: More emphasis should be placed on increased IP training at Ft Rucker due to the facilities and environment available. Strong consideration should be given to sending individuals returning for a second tour to IP school enroute and assigning them to assault helicopter units. This would insure some instructor pilot experience, other than those in command positions.
D. INTELLIGENCE:

1. (C) Item: Requirement for organic Military Intelligence support.

Discussion:

a. The six battalions and two separate companies assigned to the 12th Combat Aviation Group have a total strength of approximately 1600 officers and warrant officers and 7000 enlisted personnel. As is readily discernable, this organization possesses more officers than a ROAD division, operates more aircraft than an airmobile division, and provides support to units normally found in a type Field Army.

b. Because of their inherent mobility the units of this group, although co-located at base camps with other major organizations whom they generally support, must also be responsible to support operations conducted throughout the III CTZ and on occasion in other Corps Tactical Zones as well.

c. The intelligence positions authorized aviation units by TCE/MTOE are insufficient to provide their respective commanders with the full scope of the intelligence IEI required for evaluating courses of action.

d. The requirement for Combat Intelligence and security support peculiar to Army Aviation needs is currently being partially fulfilled by Military Intelligence Detachments in support of divisions or major commands within the Field Force organization. These detachments cannot allocate sufficient effort to meet aviation requirements without degrading their responsiveness to the organization which they primarily support.
Current concepts do not visualize the need for a detachment to support a combat aviation group based on the premise that aviation does not have a primary tactical role or tactical mission. In other words, Army Aviation is considered to be in a combat support type role. However, the conduct of Combat Assaults, Eagle Flights, and separate employment of helicopter fire teams indicates that Army Aviation in Vietnam is, in fact, directly engaged in combat operations. The following information relative to enemy losses directly attributable to Army Aviation activities in III Corps Tactical Zone is indicative that in a counter-insurgency environment Army Aviation not only provides mobility but is also a highly effective offensive force:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed KBA</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated KBA</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed WIA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated WIA</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures Damaged</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures Destroyed</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampans Damaged</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampans Destroyed</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/J's Captured</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Army Aviation operations in Vietnam have expanded, it is quite evident that consideration should be given to forming an MI Detachment to be placed in direct support of a Combat Aviation Group. The type MI Detachment required would be one which could supply the Group Commander and subordinate Battalion Commanders with the combat.
CONFIDENTIAL

intelligence, security, and counter-intelligence needs peculiar to a
for ranging widespread offensive organization.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that consideration be given
towards the development and assignment of an Army Aviation oriented MI
Detachment to each Combat Aviation Group.

E. LOGISTICS:

1. (C) Item: Common Hardware Conex Containers.

Discussion: New units (190th & 188th) have arrived in-
country without hardware Conex containers.

Observation: One new unit had its aircraft hardware
containers received by Consolidated Supply, Ft Campbell, Ky. After the
unit received movement orders, supply transactions were terminated. The
consolidated supply agency "agreed" to forward the hardware Conex to
Vietnam. As of this date the container has not arrived. All depots in
the Saigon/Long Binh area have been checked with negative results. The
34th General Support Group is aware of the problem and is working on a
solution.

2. (C) Item: AH-1G arrived in-country without complete arm-
ament sub-systems.

Discussion: The AH-1G aircraft were to arrive in-country
with complete armament sub-systems. However, when the aircraft arrived,
the sub-systems were not included and they did not arrive until some time
later.

Observation: The problem of the weapons not being in-
stalled on the AH-1G was caused by an apparent breakdown in coordination
between WBCOM and AVCOM. When it was decided to speed up the shipment

32

CONFIDENTIAL
of the aircraft to Vietnam. MACOM did not have weapon systems available for shipment. Much time and effort was expended in getting the weapons systems married-up with the AH-1G in-country. Closer planning and coordination in CONUS would prevent undue diversions from the combat effort in Vietnam.

3. (U) Item: New units are arriving in-country with a high percent of RVN returnees.

Discussion: Units arriving with RVN returnees have a great advantage over units with very few or no RVN returnees.

Observation: It has been noted that units arriving with RVN returnees in command positions are better equipped, have higher morale, and fewer problems. From the maintenance standpoint these units are better equipped to maintain their assigned aircraft once they become operational.

4. (U) Item: Dust suppression of helicopter areas.

Discussion: Aviation units have no organic means to cope with the dust problems encountered in Vietnam during the dry season, except by requesting dust suppression treatment from local installation assets. At virtually all stations the equipment is in short supply and in heavy demand. In some areas it is non-existent. It is imperative that helicopter landing, refueling, and parking areas be treated adequately and repeatedly for two reasons; first, for flight safety and second, for maintenance. Small dispensers have been programmed by the 1st Aviation Brigade for local fabrication, and some units have been experimenting on their own. These small items will greatly assist in suppressing dust in small areas but will not be adequate to treat the overall helicopter complex.
Recommendation: Additional asphalt distributors should be issued to each installation to augment present Engineer and/or PA&E resources. Top priority must be directed to provide application of asphalt or pavement to helicopter landing areas.

F. SIGNAL:

1. (C) Item: AN/VSC-2

Discussion: The Radio Set AN/VSC-2 is being assigned to battalion headquarters and remotely located companies. This facility provides secure command/operations RATT nets as a back up to the sole-user telephone circuits. It is also used for the rapid dissemination of perishable information.

Observation: Additional training for operators and maintenance personnel down to company level is required to effectively use this equipment.

2. (C) Item: Radio Beacon AN/GRN-6 and AN/TRN-25.

Discussion: The portable radio beacon AN/TRN-25 was not a satisfactory replacement for the AN/GRN-6.

Observation: The rehabilitation of the AN/GRN-6 beacons by the CONUS Depot will give tactical aviation units the much needed navaid required at remotely located airfields. The deployment to RVN of a team to modify the AN/TRN-25 may correct the problems with this equipment.

3. (C) Item: Avionics Equipment Shortages

Discussion: Signal Detachments (RL) and Transportation Detachments (AB) continue to arrive in-country with shortages of test equipment and float items. Some equipment is obtained from in-country
resources. However, the float items continue to be the biggest problem area.

OBSERVATION: The mission essential equipment and float items must be provided Signal Detachments (SL) and Transportation Detachments (AB) before deployment to RVN.

G. MEDICAL

1. (U) Item: Preventative measures against malaria.

   a. Malaria is a parasitic disease carried by the bite of the mosquito which permits the injection of microscopic organisms (parasites) to enter the bloodstream and inhibit the red corpuscles. Treatment can be very involved, lengthy and discouraging. Many times the disease is fatal.

   b. Preventive measures such as mosquito nets, insect repellent (aerosol and locally applied), and the required taking of the weekly anti-malarial pill should be faithfully followed by all individuals, and mosquito breeding grounds should be eliminated.

   Observation: In general the use of the above preventive measures is excellent; however, there is a small percentage who do not cooperate, thus exposing and endangering the life of the ignoring individual and those of his colleagues. It is this small percentage which presents the stumbling block for the complete eradication of the disease. It is important to note the necessary precautions on return to the U.S., since failure to do so only threatens the health of their families. The antimalarial pill must be taken weekly for a period of eight weeks upon return to CONUS.
PART II
RECOMMENDATIONS

A. PERSONNEL: None

B. OPERATIONS: None

C. TRAINING-ORGANIZATION:

1. (U) Recommend that experienced warrant officer aviators returning to Vietnam attend an IP course in the UH-1.

D. INTELLIGENCE:

1. (C) Recommend that an Army Aviation orientated MI Detachment be assigned to each combat aviation group. This is vitally needed in light of the intelligence gathering role of the air cavalry squadron assigned to the group.

E. LOGISTICS:

1. (U) Recommend that additional asphalt distributors be assigned to each installation that supports aviation units.

F. SIGNAL:

1. (U) Recommend emphasis be placed on training requirements of personnel being deployed to RVN on the AN/VSC-2 and other new equipment being issued to aviation units.

2. (U) Recommend that continued testing be done on the AN/TRN-25 radio beacon to provide a reliable navaid for tactical aviation units.

3. (C) Recommend action be taken in CONUS to preclude Signal Detachments (RL) and Transportation Detachments (AB) from being deployed without sufficient float and mission essential TOE equipment. This should include work shelters and power units.

CONFIDENTIAL
G. MEDICAL:

It is noted that there have been varied complaints for generalized recurring skin rashes throughout the command. It is felt that persistent everprevalent fungal organisms are contributing greatly to the cause. It is recommended that when possible potable water should be used in the shower systems. All laundry that comes in contact with human skin must be thoroughly washed with sufficient soap, rinsed, and dried, preferably sun-dried. Hootch maids must be instructed on proper washing and thorough rinsing procedures. Those individuals who have a resistant problem are advised to use detergent and bleach mixture to wash underclothes. In most cases such treatment is successful. Supervisory measures should be instituted wherever the laundries on the local economy are used.

NICHOLAS G. PASKI
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

ANNEXES: A - 12th Combat Aviation Group Structure
B - 12th Combat Aviation Group Troop List
Withdrawn, Hqs, C - 12th Combat Aviation Group Orientation Folder
DA
D - 12th Combat Aviation Group Statistics

DISTRIBUTION:
1 Copy thru Channels to ACSFOR
2 Copies thru II FFORCEV to ACSFOR
2 Copies to CG, USARPAC
3 Copies DCG, USAHV
1 Copy to CG, II FFORCEV
1 Copy to CG, 1st Avn Bde
1 Copy to CG, USAAVNS
1 Copy to CO, 11th Cbt Avn Bn
1 Copy to CO, 145th Cbt Avn Bn
1 Copy to CO, 214th Cbt Avn Bn
1 Copy to CO, 222d Cbt Spt Avn Bn
1 Copy to CO, 269th Cbt Avn Bn
1 Copy to CO, 3/17 Air Cav
AVFBG—BE—H (11 Nov 67) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1967 (RCS/GSFOR-65) (UTC-WMFU TO)

DA HQ III FFORGEV, APO San Francisco 96266 30 Nov 1967

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBA-C, APO 96307

Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC-DH, APO 96375

Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This command has reviewed the attached report and concurs with
the comments and recommendations with the following exception:

Section II, p(30), para(D, 1), Requirement for organic Military
Intelligence support. The requirement for a corps level combat aviation
group to have an organic or attached Military Intelligence Detachment
is not considered valid. The 219 MI Det attached to this headquarters
produces, collates and disseminates to all organic, assigned and attached
units the intelligence required for mission accomplishment. The 12th
Combat Aviation Group is informed daily and by periodic summary of the
intelligence situation in III CTZ.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

R. E. WAMSBERGER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

38
AVBA-C (11 Nov 67) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (OEI) (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (ULC CYPA) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, ATTN: AVBA-C, APO 96384
THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVIGC-DST, APO 96375
Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-CT, APO 96558
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army
(ACSFOR DA), Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report of the 12th Combat Aviation Group and considers it to be adequate as indorsed and concurs with the contents except as noted below.

2. (C) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

   a. Reference Section I, paragraph F9e, page 18: Intelligence. It is recognized that the 12th Group school quotas for the Navy Jungle Environmental Survival Training School (JEST) are insufficient to meet minimal requirements. Only a limited number of school quotas are received by 1st Aviation Brigade and these quotas must be divided equitably between two combat aviation groups and two separate battalions. This headquarters has initiated action to obtain additional quotas. Upon receipt of these quotas the 12th Combat Aviation Group will receive their fair share.

   b. Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph D, page 30: Intelligence. Nonconcur. Insufficient justification has been established to warrant the development and assignment of an Army aviation oriented MI detachment to each combat aviation group. It is assumed that the concept of employment would be to utilize the detachment intact at group headquarters. Strength requirements to provide adequate combat intelligence and security support for the group headquarters and each battalion at widely separated locations would be prohibitive. If the detachment were employed intact at group headquarters, it would not be immediately responsive to individual battalion requirements. Because of the fact that few operations are planned and controlled by group headquarters, the existence of a MI detachment at group headquarters cannot be justified. Additionally, the most current combat intelligence about a particular area of operations can be obtained from the supported unit and from the major units collocated at the base camp with the aviation battalion.

   c. Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph E4, page 33: Small peprime dispensers referred to were received, and issued to all assault helicopter units, for repair of peneprized areas.


39

Dowgraded at 3 years intervals;
Unclassified after 12 years.
DOD Dir 5200.10
CONFIDENTIAL
DEC 7 1967

AVFA-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (GRIL) (RCS CSFOK-65) for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (U)

e. Reference Section II, Part II, paragraph 3, page 36: Reference HQ USARV unclassified message AVHGC-DST 85103, DTG 170224Z Nov 67, subject: Penemine Distributors (ENSURE 176). 36 each bituminous distributors were issued to all divisions. The 1st Aviation Brigade did not receive any of these distributors. Concur that additional distributors should be issued to installations supporting brigade aviation units.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

JAMES H. GOLDMAN
Lt. Adj.
Asst Adjutant General

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHG-DST (11 Nov 67)  3d Ind (C)
SUBJECT:  Operational Report-Lessons Learned (ORLL) (RCS GSPOR-65)
for Quarterly Period ending 31 October 1967 (UIC CYPA)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375
26 JAN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons
Learned for the period ending 31 October 1967 from Headquarters, 12th Combat
Aviation Group (CYPA) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning survival school, page 18, paragraph F9e; and 2d
      Indorsement, paragraph 2a: Concur with 2d Indorsement. Survival
      school quotas received by USARV are inadequate to meet command requirements.
      However, PACAF has agreed to provide twenty spaces per month to their Air
      Crew Survival Course in the Philippines. This will alleviate this situation
      to some degree. 1st Aviation Brigade will have equitable access to these
      spaces.

   b. Reference item concerning dust suppression of helicopter areas,
      page 33, paragraph E4; page 36, paragraph E1; and 2d Indorsement, paragraph
      2e: Concur. The following action has been taken to improve the problems
      encountered by aviation units in Vietnam:

      (1) In June 1966, Engineer Command was issued 20 trailer-mounted
      distributors in addition to those authorized by the TOE. Currently these
      distributors are located throughout Vietnam in support of all units.

      (2) In February 1967, USARV initiated an ENSURE requirement for
      36 additional distributors for the divisional engineer battalions, and sepa-
      rate brigade engineer companies. The allocation of these distributors was
      coordinated with USARV Aviation, who concurred in the proposed distribution.

      (3) Ten distributors have arrived in-country and the remaining
      26 are scheduled to arrive before 31 January 1968.

   c. Reference item concerning avionics equipment shortages, page 34,
      paragraph F3; and page 36, paragraph F3: Concur. Units scheduled for deploy-
      ment to RVN should not be delayed because of maintenance float or mission
      essential TOE equipment shortages. Detachment size units will requisition
      maintenance float and TOE equipment shortages upon arrival in Vietnam. Recom-
      mend that CONUS supply activities make every effort to insure that deploying

41  Downgraded at 3 year Intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 8200.10

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (11 Nov 67)
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned (ORLL) (RCS CSFOR-65)
for Quarterly Period ending 31 October 1967 (UIC CYPA)

units do not have equipment shortages.

d. Reference item concerning training and organization, page 36, paragraph 1: Nonconcur. Requirements for UH-1 instructor pilots in RVN are not great enough to warrant the additional time and expense of a blanket training program. Should a requirement for an instructor pilot exist, the experienced returnee aviator can be trained in-country with a minimum of instruction.

e. Reference item concerning AN/VSC-2, page 36, paragraph F1: Concur. The AN/VSC-2 and AN/GRC-106 maintenance and operator training has been incorporated into the Southeast Asia Signal School since September 1967. Additionally, there are two factory representatives and two ECOM representatives in-country who are trained on these two items of equipment. If remedial training is required, requests should be submitted to the USARV ACoS, CE.

f. Reference item concerning the AN/THN-25, page 36, paragraph F2: Concur. Continued testing is being conducted by the laboratories of ECOM. At the present time, work is being performed on brushless motors to alleviate the problems we have experienced with short brush life and motor burn-out. This fix should be fielded soon and the sets will be further modified at that time.

3. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

furn:
Hq, 12th Combat Avn Gp
Hq, 1st Avn Bde

CONFIDENTIAL
42
GPOP-DT(11 Nov 67) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period
Ending 31 Oct 67 from Hq, 12th Cbt Avn Gp
(UIC: WCYPAA) (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, AFO San Francisco 96558 27 FEB 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and
forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as
indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

K. F. OSBOURN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG
Annex A

(Corps) 12

25

11

145

214

222

269

3

17

184

RAC

74

APC

17

MAC

54

RAC

21

HQHQ

.3

17

128

AHQ

68

APC

191

MAC

73

AHQ

116

4/3

17

162

AHQ

118

APC

195

AHQ

135

AHQ

187

B/3

17

173

AHQ

190

AHQ

200

AHQ

147

AHQ

188

C/3

17

205

AHQ

334

AHQ

240

AHQ

242

D/3

17

213

AHQ

335

17
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>APO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12th Combat Aviation Group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ &amp; HQ Co</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>96266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>338th Avn Det (OF)</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>96266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>340th Avn Det (OF)</td>
<td>5th Inf Div</td>
<td>96266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>341st Avn Det (TF)</td>
<td>5th Inf Div</td>
<td>96266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>390th CM Det (FT/FLR)</td>
<td>5th Artillery Grp</td>
<td>96266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>391st CM Det (FT/FLR)</td>
<td>1st Inf Div</td>
<td>96266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th SC Det (RL)</td>
<td>11th ACR</td>
<td>96266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Avn Co (Corps)</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>96266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Combat Avn BN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ &amp; HQ Co</td>
<td>Phu Loi</td>
<td>96289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128th Aslt Hel Co</td>
<td>Phu Loi</td>
<td>96289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>393rd TC Det (KD)</td>
<td>Phu Loi</td>
<td>96289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>285th SC Det (RL)</td>
<td>Phu Loi</td>
<td>96289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>432nd Med Det (OA)</td>
<td>Phu Loi</td>
<td>96289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>162nd Aslt Hel Co</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>96289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>407th TC Det (KD)</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>96289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>450th SC Det (RL)</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>96289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>758th Med Det (OA)</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>96289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173rd Aslt Hel Co</td>
<td>Lai Khe</td>
<td>96289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>408th TC Det (KD)</td>
<td>Lai Khe</td>
<td>96289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>451st SC Det (RL)</td>
<td>Lai Khe</td>
<td>96289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>759th Med Det (OA)</td>
<td>Lai Khe</td>
<td>96289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>184th Recon Apl Co</td>
<td>Phu Loi</td>
<td>96289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>243rd SC Det (RL)</td>
<td>Phu Loi</td>
<td>96289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205th Aslt Spt Hel Co</td>
<td>Phu Loi</td>
<td>96289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>612th TC Det (AB)</td>
<td>Phu Loi</td>
<td>96289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>213th Aslt Spt Hel Co</td>
<td>Phu Loi</td>
<td>96289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>329th TC Det (AB)</td>
<td>Phu Loi</td>
<td>96289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>145th Combat Avn BN</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>96227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ &amp; HQ Co</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>96227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>145th Ser. Flat</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>96227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68th Aslt Hel Co</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>96227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>391st TC Det (KD)</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>96227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>282nd SC Det (RL)</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>96227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>430th Med Det (OA)</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>96227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Annex B**

45
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>AIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>74th Recon ApI Co</td>
<td>Phu Loi</td>
<td>96289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>563rd TC Det (KD)</td>
<td>Phu Loi</td>
<td>96289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118th Aslt Hel Co</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>96227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>573rd TC Det (KD)</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>96227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>198th SC Det (RL)</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>96227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>190th Aslt Hel Co</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>96227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>605th TC Det (KD)</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>96227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>520th Med Det (OA)</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>96227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>334th Aslt Hel Co</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>96227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>571st TC Det (KD)</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>96227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>320th SC Det (RL)</td>
<td>Phu Loi</td>
<td>96289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>335th Aslt Hel Co</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>96227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>166th TC Det (KD)</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>96227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>234th SC Det (RL)</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>96227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Med Det (OA)</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>96227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>214TH COMBAT AVN BN HQ &amp; HQ Co</td>
<td>Bear Cat</td>
<td>96370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>772nd Med Det (OA)</td>
<td>Bear Cat</td>
<td>96370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Aslt Hel Co</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>95266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>613th TC Det (KD)</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>95266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>722nd SC Det (RL)</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>95266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93rd Med Det (AO)</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>95266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>191st Aslt Hel Co</td>
<td>Bear Cat</td>
<td>96370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>606th TC Det (KD)</td>
<td>Bear Cat</td>
<td>96370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th SC Det (RL)</td>
<td>Bear Cat</td>
<td>96370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>195th Aslt Hel Co</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>95266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>609th TC Det (KD)</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>95266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>366th SC Det (RL)</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>95266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200th Aslt Spt Hel Co</td>
<td>Bear Cat</td>
<td>95370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>611th TC Det (AS)</td>
<td>Bear Cat</td>
<td>95370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>240th Aslt Hel Co</td>
<td>Bear Cat</td>
<td>95370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>619th TC Det (KD)</td>
<td>Bear Cat</td>
<td>95370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>932nd SC Det (RL)</td>
<td>Bear Cat</td>
<td>95370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIT</td>
<td>LOCATION</td>
<td>APO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>22nd COMBAT SPT AVN BN</strong></td>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>96291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ &amp; HHC Co</td>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>96291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85th Med Det (OA)</td>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>96291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54th Util Ap Co</td>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>96291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>255th TC Det (KD)</td>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>96291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73rd Surv Ap Co</td>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>96291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135th Aslt Hel Co</td>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>96291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>614th TC Det (KD)</td>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>96291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68th SC Det (RL)</td>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>96291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>147th Aslt Spt Hel Co</td>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>96291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>171st TC Det (AB)</td>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>96291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>269th COMBAT TAVN BN</strong></td>
<td>Cu Chi</td>
<td>96353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ &amp; HHC Co</td>
<td>Cu Chi</td>
<td>96353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Recon Ap Co</td>
<td>Tay Minh</td>
<td>96256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62nd SC Det (KJ)</td>
<td>Tay Minh</td>
<td>96256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116th Aslt Hel Co</td>
<td>Cu Chi</td>
<td>96353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>392nd TC Det (KD)</td>
<td>Cu Chi</td>
<td>96353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>283rd SC Det (RL)</td>
<td>Cu Chi</td>
<td>96353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>431st Med Det (OA)</td>
<td>Cu Chi</td>
<td>96353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>187th Aslt Hel Co</td>
<td>Tay Minh</td>
<td>96255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>602nd TC Det (KD)</td>
<td>Tay Minh</td>
<td>96255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st SC Det (RL)</td>
<td>Tay Minh</td>
<td>96255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>541st Med Det (OA)</td>
<td>Tay Minh</td>
<td>96255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>188th Aslt Hel Co</td>
<td>Dau Tieng</td>
<td>96268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>603rd TC Det (KD)</td>
<td>Dau Tieng</td>
<td>96268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th SC Det (RL)</td>
<td>Dau Tieng</td>
<td>96268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>154th Med Det (OA)</td>
<td>Dau Tieng</td>
<td>96268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>242nd Aslt Spt Hel Co</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>96227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>621st TC Det (AB)</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>96227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3rd Sqdn 17th Air Cavalry</strong></td>
<td>Di An</td>
<td>96345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ &amp; HHC TROOP</td>
<td>Di An</td>
<td>96345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Troop</td>
<td>Di An</td>
<td>96345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Troop</td>
<td>Di An</td>
<td>96345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Troop</td>
<td>Di An</td>
<td>96345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Troop</td>
<td>Di An</td>
<td>96345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>399th TC Det</td>
<td>Di An</td>
<td>96345</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**12TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP STATISTICS**

**OPERATIONAL HOURS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RW</th>
<th>FW</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>106,425</td>
<td>34,053</td>
<td>140,478</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SORTIES FLOWN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RW</th>
<th>FW</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>317,709</td>
<td>29,071</td>
<td>346,780</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**COMBAT SORTIES FLOWN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RW</th>
<th>FW</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>169,768</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>169,768</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PASSENGERS CARRIED**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RW</th>
<th>FW</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>672,191</td>
<td>18,935</td>
<td>691,126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CARGO TRANSPORTED (TONS)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RW</th>
<th>FW</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>96,706</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>97,439</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**A/0 HIT BY GROUND FIRE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RW</th>
<th>FW</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**COMBAT LOSSES (A/CFT)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RW</th>
<th>FW</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**AMMUNITION EXPENDED**

| 7.62mm | 40mm   | 2.75" | 50 CAL. | 12,246,614 | 125,981 | 54,778 | 46,774 |

**ANNEX D**

D-1

48
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA (Body Count)</td>
<td>764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA (Estimated)</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC Captured</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures Destroyed</td>
<td>974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampans Destroyed/Sunk</td>
<td>861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampans Damaged</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties Medically Evacuated (ARVN &amp; US)</td>
<td>1197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties (12th CBT AVN GP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 12th Combat Aviation Group (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 1967

CO, 12th Combat Aviation Group

Report Date: 11 November 1967

50 total pages

N/A project number

N/A other report numbers

N/A distribution statement

N/A supplementary notes

N/A abstract

Sponsoring Military Activity: OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

Confidential security classification