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AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (8 Mar 68) FOR OT RD-T674249 13 March 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Brigade,
101st Airborne Division, Period Ending 31 October 1967 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 96347

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

TO: See Distribution.


SECTION I

(C) Significant Unit Activities: Elements of the Brigade were involved in combat operations during the entire reporting period with the exception of 20 August - 2 September 1967 when the Brigade moved from CHU LAI to DUC THO and 9-11 September 1967 when the Brigade moved from DUC PHO to DUC LAI. Training was conducted concurrent with combat operations and during period when units were refitting and preparing for future operations.

A/Combat Operations: A summary of the concept and execution of each of the Brigade operations is given below:

1(C) Operation MAJEUR


b. Mission: To conduct search and destroy operations against VC/NVA forces in QUANG NGAI Province.

c. Location: QUANG NGAI Province, Republic of Vietnam.

d. Commander: Brigadier General Salve H. Matheson.

e. Forces involved:

(1) US: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and one platoon, Company C, 34th Armor (GFCON).

(2) Other: CIDG companies from BA TO, MINH LONG and GIA VC Special Forces Camps.

f. Concept and execution:


(2) Operation LAKE, a one battalion task force operation conducted concurrently with Operation MAJEUR, was previously reported in the Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. A copy of the after action report for Operation LAKE is inclosed as Inclosure 4 (Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation LAKE).

2(C) Operation HOOD RIVER


b. Mission: To conduct operations to find, fix and destroy VC/NVA forces and to neutralize VC/NVA base camps in Base Area 121 in coordination with ARVN, ROK and CIDG forces.

c. Location: QUANG NGAI Province, Republic of Vietnam.

d. Commander: Brigadier General Salve H. Matheson.

e. Forces involved:

Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD 5200.20

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Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

(1) US: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division

(1) Other: Two CIDG companies from HA THANH Special Forces Camp; two Nike Force companies from Company C, 5th Special Forces (DA NANG); one platoon of National Police Field Forces from QUANG NAI Province; two infantry battalions and two ranger battalions from the 2d ARVN Division; and two battalions of RO(VN). Exemptions:


3. Operation EIGHT:


b. Mission: To conduct operations to find, fix and destroy VC/NVA forces and to neutralize VC/NVA base camps in and around Base Area 117.

c. Location: QUANG BIN Province, Republic of Vietnam.

d. Commander: Brigadier General Salve H. Matheson.

e. Forces involved:

(1) US: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

(2) Other: Two CIDG companies from TIEN PHUOC Special Forces Camp and two Nike Force companies from Company C, 5th Special Forces (DA NANG).


4. Operation STRIKE FORCE:


b. Mission: One infantry battalion conducts airmobile raids on 31 August 1967 at LANG DI (BS 125113) and QUIET THANG (BS 316155) to liberate US and Vietnamese PWs held captive.

c. Location: QUANG NAI Province, Republic of Vietnam.

d. Commander: Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Puckett, Jr.

e. Forces involved:

(1) US: 2D Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry.

(2) Other: None.


5. Operation COOK:


b. Mission: To conduct operations to find, fix and destroy VC/NVA forces and to neutralize VC/NVA base camps in and around Base Area 121 and northern portion of the SONG IV Valley.

c. Location: QUANG NAI province, Republic of Vietnam; Map sheets, Vietnam, 1:50,000, series L70L4, sheets 66361, 665'7, 673511, 673611.

d. Commander: Brigadier General Salve H. Matheson.

e. Forces involved:
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(1) US: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

(2) Other: Two OTDG companies from HA-TWCH Special Forces
Camp and one Mike Force company from Company C, 5th Special Forces (U-
LAUG),

f. Concept of operation: On 2 September 1967, the 2d Battalion
(Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted airmobile assaults into the SONG VE
Valley area and commenced search and destroy operations in zone. On 4 and 5
September 1967, the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion
(Airborne), 502d Infantry respectively, displaced by air to QUANG NGAI air-
field, conducted airmobile assaults into landing zones west of the SONG VE
Valley and commenced search and destroy operations in zone. Two OTDG companies
and one Mike Force Company established blocking positions to the north of the
Brigade area of operation.

g. Execution: The operation was conducted as planned and all
infantry battalions conducted extensive saturation patrolling throughout their
areas of operation. The operation, previously thought to be a two to three
week operation, was terminated prematurely by higher headquarters and the Bri-

gade was ordered to move all elements to CHU IAI and establish a base camp in
preparation for future operations. All elements were extracted from the field on 8-9
September 1967. No significant actions took place during Operation COOK. For a detailed account of Operation COOK, see Brigade G3 Journals.

(c) Operation WESKER

a. Dates: 11 September 1967 - continuing at close of reporting
period.

b. Mission: To conduct operations northwest of TAN KY (870627)
to find, fix and destroy VC/NVA forces and to neutralize VC/NVA base camps.

c. Location: QUANG TIN Province, Republic of Vietnam; Map
sheets, Vietnam, 1:50,000, series L704A, sheets 66391, IV, 66401, III, 67391, IV, 67401 I.

d. Commander: Brigadier General Salve H. Matheson.

e. Forces involved:

(1) US: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division; 1st Battalion,
14th Infantry (OPCON U-24 September 1967); 2d Battalion, 35th
Infantry (OPCON 4 October 1967 - continuing at close of reporting period).

(2) Other: One Mobile Strike Force Company from Company C,
5th Special Forces (DA-NAFO) (11 September - 2 October 1967); one Camp Strike
Force Company from TIEN PHUOC Special Forces Camp (11 September - 17 October
1967); and one 2d ARVN Division Reconnaissance Company (28 September - 7 Octo-
ber 1967).

f. Concept of operation: On 11000 September 1967, the 1st Bat-
talion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted airmobile assaults into landing
zones west of TAN KY, followed by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry
and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry with one Mobile Strike Force Com-
pny on 12 September 1967. All battalions commenced search and destroy
operations with the objective of blocking likely enemy routes of escape and
Destroying any enemy base camps that were found. The Camp Strike Force Com-
pny from TIEN PHUOC screened likely routes of escape to the southwest of the
Brigade area of operation. The 1st Battalion, 101st Infantry, OPDIS to the
Brigade, was given an on-order mission to conduct search and destroy opera-
tions within its assigned area of operation. Engineer LZ clearing and demol-
tion teams and scout dog teams were attached to the infantry battalion. The
2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery (105mm Howitzers) collocated one
battery with each of the infantry battalion tactical command posts.

g. Execution:

(1) Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry was placed
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under operational control of the 2d Squadron, 11th AHC... and later under the 502d Infantry, 1st Armored Cavalry, and 11th AHC. Assigned in Operation WHEELER.

(c) The Brigade commenced Operation WHEELER on 11 September 1967 as planned. All battalions conducted airborne assaults into selected landing zones. The 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry, was employed at 1430 11 September 1967 to the south of the Brigade. The terrain in the area of operation consisted of jungle covered hills, rolling hills with elephant grass and flat, cultivated lowlands with rice paddies. Tactics employed by the Brigade included extensive saturation patrolling, day and night ambushes and small unit surprise behind patrols. The initial phase of Operation WHEELER (11-25 September 1967) produced no large size significant enemy contacts nor any information to suggest large size enemy forces had operated in the area. Daily enemy killed (by rough count) however, averaged fifteen per day. The 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry, was released from Brigade control on 26 September 1967.

(3) Intelligence reports began to indicate that large size enemy forces, to include the 26 NVA Division Headquarters, were located approximately seventeen kilometers to the west of the Brigade's area of operation (AT9324). The Brigade developed a new concept of operation designed to block enemy routes of egress in all directions and slowly close in on the encircled enemy.

(4) The second phase of Operation WHEELER was initiated on 26 September 1967, by air assaulting the 1st and 2d Battalions (Airborne), 327th Infantry into landing zones to the south and west of the suspected enemy locations. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry, east of the enemy locations, commenced search and destroy operations to the west on multiple axes. To block northern routes of egress, one ARVN Reconnaissance Company was air assaulted into blocking positions and operated with the Brigade from 28 September 1967 to 7 October 1967. A Marine reconnaissance team from the 5th Marine Regiment assisted in screening areas west of the ARVN company. One Camp Strike Force Company from TF-37 PHUOC Special Forces Camp assisted in securing the Brigade fire base which consisted of one battery each of 105mm and 155mm howitzers.

(5) The battalions began to close on and patrol nearer the suspected enemy division headquarters. Numerous small contacts were made daily with the enemy. Significant contacts are listed below.

(a) The tactical command post of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (AT9324) at 0300 hours, 27 September 1967, received an enemy mortar, hand grenade and small arms attack for approximately fifteen minutes. Results: 7 US wounded (medevac). Interrogation of a NVA (AK-47) directed on the attacking enemy and broke up the attack. Indications were that the attack had been well coordinated but poorly executed.

(b) At 211645 September 1967, Company A, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry, engaged a dug in enemy force that employed 60mm mortars, automatic weapons and rockets. Weather at the time prevented the use of air strikes and gunfire. The contact lasted into the night, resulting in 2 US killed, 6 wounded (medevac), 1 NVA KIA (C) and 1 SRS captured.

(c) Company G, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry at 290827 September 1967 near AT9324 had contact with a company size enemy force. Heavy contact developed with artillery, gunships and air strikes in support. Contact was broken at 1835 hours. Results: 3 US killed, 15 wounded (medevac), 9 NVA, KIA (C); 3 AK-47, 1 RPG, 1 NAB rocket launcher, 2 60mm mortar base plate and bipod captured.

(d) The ARVN company, blocking routes of egress to the north, ambushed an NVA platoon at 302350 September 1967 near AT985272 killing 13 NVA and capturing 3 AK-47 and 2 carbines.

(e) At 021145 October 1967, Company A, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry near AT923293 received heavy fire from an unknown size force employing 75mm mortars, automatic weapons and .50 caliber machine gun.

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OPERATION AWARENESS

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October (ROG 0269-65) (U)

Company A maneuvered throughout the afternoon employing artillery, air strikes and gunships. Results were 7 US killed and 17 wounded (medevaced). Enemy losses were unknown.

(f) Battery C, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery was subjected to a 50-60 round mortar and recoilless rifle attack at 0215 October 1967 near BT 7225. Results were 11 US wounded (medevaced).

(6) Visual reconnaissance missions flown over the Brigade's original area of operation reported numerous sightings of enemy activity. To exploit this intelligence, the Brigade requested a fourth infantry battalion be placed under operational control of the Brigade. The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, part of the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division at DUC PHC, was inserted on 4 October 1967 to the east of the Brigade area of operations. The battalion conducted airmobile assaults on 5 October 1967 into the northern portion of the Brigade's original area of operation and commenced search and destroy operations.

(7) Numerous contacts with the enemy continued and the Brigade employed large numbers of air strikes throughout the area of operations on known and suspected enemy locations. Weather throughout the area of operation hampered operations, and when numerous companies were sighted to the west (rear), moving, what was believed to be elements of the enemy division headquarters, action other than combat eye spots could not be taken.

(8) Three significant enemy contacts were made until the battalions swept over all suspected enemy locations.

(a) Company A, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (BT 0/6235), occupying a defensive perimeter while resupplying and refitting on 7 October 1967, was attacked at 0225 hours by an estimated NVA company employing mortars, machine guns and automatic weapons. Artillery, gunships and flareships supported the company. Contact was broken at 0600 hours with the enemy withdrawing southeast. Air strikes were employed on the withdrawing enemy. Results were 7 US killed, 6 wounded (medevaced), 18 NVA KIA (C), 1 RPD, 2 RPGs, 12 AK-47s and 1 flame thrower captured.

(b) At 081340 October 1967 near AT 940270, Company A, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry made contact with an estimated NVA company employing mortars, machine guns and automatic weapons. Artillery, machine guns and flareships supported the company. Contact was broken at 0930 hours when the enemy broke contact and withdrew north. Air strikes were employed on the withdrawing enemy. Results were 4 US killed, 6 wounded (medevaced), 21 NVA KIA (C) and 3 RPGs captured.

(c) Company A, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry at BT 1830 October 1967 made contact with an NVA company near BT 110225. Company A, supported by artillery and guns, engaged the enemy. Hand to hand combat ensued. Company B and the Reconnaissance Platoon of the battalion maneuvered against the enemy caught the withdrawing enemy by surprise and assaulted. Results of the contact were 17 US killed, 3 wounded (medevaced), 60 NVA KIA (C), 21 small arms weapons and 1 RPG captured.

(9) With the present area of operation searched and weather restricting operations and resupply of units, the Brigade, starting on 5 October 1967, reoriented itself back to the original area of operation where the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry was making daily contacts with the enemy. Simultaneously with reorienting units, the Brigade began rotating company BNs to the Brigade base camp at BM 11A for stand-down. The last company in for stand-down was reinserted into the area of operation on 27 October 1967.

(10) Numerous small contacts with the enemy continued. Significant enemy contacts up to the close of the reporting period are as follows:

(a) At 150315 October 1967, Battery A, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery located adjacent to the tactical command post of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (BT 0/6235) was subjected to a...
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(RCS GSPR-61) (U)

The operations of the 101st Airborne Division began with a mortar and ground attack. One Camp Strike Force company from Tien Phuoc Special Forces Camp was assisting in the security of the battery. The enemy, 30-40 personnel, managed to disarm all early warning devices and move past the outside perimeter. They attacked using automatic weapons, grenades and early charges. At one point, the artillery's inner perimeter was penetrated. Bad weather precluded the use of air strikes and gunships. Counter mortar units, positioned near the battery, located the enemy mortars which were immediately engaged. Contact was broken at 0530 hours. Results were 6 US killed, 22 wounded (medevaced), 6 SF killed, 4 wounded (medevaced), 6 FIV KIA (C), 1 AK-47 and 1 9mm pistol captured.

(b) On 22 October 1967 at 1630 hours, the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry made contact with an estimated NVA battalion (BT379210). Company B of the battalion maneuvered to reinforce the reconnaissance platoon. Heavy contact ensued and the enemy assaulted the LZ positions using hand grenades and automatic weapons. Company C was air assaulted into a blocking position at 1805 hours to the southeast of the contact. "Spooky" was able to contact and arrived at 1630 hours. Contact continued until 1835 hours when the enemy withdrew. Results were 2 US killed, 13 wounded (medevaced), 6 FIV KIA (C).

(c) On the same day at 1825 hours, the tactical command post of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 102d Infantry (BT238126) received 26 rounds of 81mm mortar fire followed by six rounds of rocket fire (estimated 60 rockets). Results were 6 US wounded (medevaced).

(d) Company B, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry made contact with a well entrenched enemy at BT091296 on 27 October 1967. Approximately ten minutes after landing on an LZ, two platoons, while sweeping west from the LZ at 1215 hours, became engaged with an estimated NVA company firing automatic weapons. The company maneuvered and employed gunships, artillery and air strikes. At 1607 hours, Company A of the battalion air assaulted into blocking positions at BT160904. Contact with the enemy continued until 1835 hours when the enemy withdrew to the west. Results were 11 US killed and 18 wounded (medevaced). Enemy losses were unknown.

(11) Results of Operation WHEEKIN at the close of the reporting period are:

(a) 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division:
103 Killed Hostile Action
314 Wounded Hostile Action (medevaced)
61 Wounded Hostile Action (minor)

(b) 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry
16 Killed Hostile Action
59 Wounded Hostile Action (medevaced)
0 Wounded Hostile Action (minor)

(c) Enemy losses:
261 NVA KIA (body count)
582 VC KIA (body count)
23 Captured
26 VC/NVA KIA (probable)
153 Small Arms weapons captured
28 Crew served weapons captured
139.6 Tons of rice captured

B. Tactics and Techniques.

11(c) The missions assigned the Brigade during the reporting period were search and destroy missions against VC and NVA forces. To accomplish these missions and effectively defeat the guerrillas in his environment, the Brigade continued to assume a semi-guerrilla posture and to modify its methods of operation. The tactics employed while in a semi-guerrilla posture were designed to offset some of the advantages the guerrillas have when operating in terrain he knows; however, once the Brigade established contact with the enemy, the cloak of the semi-guerrilla was removed and all available firepower was placed on the enemy. Some of the tactics and techniques used while in this

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period 1-3-65 to 31-3-65

posture are discussed below.

4. Tactics: The tactics employed included saturation patrolling, ambushes, stay behind patrols and raids.

(1) Saturation patrolling: Because of the very nature of the enemy, specific or "hard" intelligence of the enemy's disposition, strength and methods of operation are difficult to obtain. Normally only the general location (several grid squares) of an enemy unit is known. To compensate for this, all units of the Brigade conducted extensive saturation patrolling. Companies were air assaulted into multiple landing zones, and once on the ground, they began patrolling on three or four axes with a platoon size force on each axis. All platoons were normally kept within supporting or main visual distance of each other (normally thirty minutes marching time). As patrols searched along their axes, they periodically sent fire teams or squad size patrols to the flanks. This technique allowed a large area to be searched in detail, decreased the enemy's ability to determine the size of the unit in the area, and general direction of movement, and gave the company flexibility to reinforce, attack or encircle an enemy force once an enemy made contact.

(2) Ambushes: With a search and destroy mission assigned, units of the Brigade seldom moved at night unless there was a justifiable reason. Movement through the jungle and detailed search of an area at night are difficult. To deny the enemy complete freedom of movement at night, companies normally ambushed trails found during the day's search. If none had been found, likely routes of movement such as stream beds and ridgelines were evaluated. Periodically, when a well used trail was located during the day, a unit would immediately set up an ambush for one or two hours. If no enemy used the trail, the unit continued in its search.

(3) Stay behind patrols: the enemy frequently returns to the battle area or to known bivouac sites of US units. To exploit this tendency, units of the Brigade positioned platoon or larger size forces in concealed bivouac sites. An immediate reaction force was designated to reinforce or to set up behind patrol if necessary. The length of time a patrol remained behind depended on many factors to include the higher unit's overall mission and the type of operation, terrain, and size of stay behind force.

(4) Raids: When specific or "hard" intelligence of an area or to known bivouac sites of US units. To exploit this tendency, units of the Brigade positioned platoon or larger size forces in concealed bivouac sites. An immediate reaction force was designated to reinforce or to set up behind patrol if necessary. The length of time a patrol remained behind depended on many factors to include the higher unit's overall mission and the type of operation, terrain, and size of stay behind force.

b. Techniques: With twenty-seven months in Vietnam, the enemy has developed certain techniques. Techniques employed during the reporting period are discussed below.

(1) Large area of operations: Areas of operation (AO) are normally cleared with ARVN forces and are, therefore, subject to being compromised. When only AO's large enough for a unit to operate in are requested, and assuming the information is obtained by the enemy, the location of possible landing zones, fire bases, etc., can be surmised by the enemy. To counter this possibility, the Brigade requested AO's several times the size it could operate in effectively at one time. In addition to adding a degree of security, a large AO provided the commander with sufficient room to maneuver and exploit intelligence from long range patrols and aerial visual reconnaissance.

(2) Deploying with 3-5 days rations: The Brigade normally deployed into an AO with 3-5 days rations, and at times with seven days, and then resupplied units in the field every 3-5 days. This allowed companies to fade into the jungle and prevented their locations from being compromised by the helicopter bringing in a daily resupply. Only for emergency situations were helicopters allowed to land at the unit's location.

(3) Movement from high to low ground: The terrain in Vietnam particularly dense, jungle covered mountainous terrain, gives the enemy a
distinct advantage over friendly units. To decrease this disadvantage, units conducted search and destroy operations by moving from higher to lower ground where ever possible.

(4) Allocating artillery battery with battalion tactical command post: To provide close and continuous fire support and to assure maximum coordination between the artillery and infantry, one battery from the direct support artillery battalion was collocated with the infantry battalion tactical command post.

C. Training. Most of the reporting period was spent in the conduct of combat operations. During brief periods of refitting and preparing for future operations, training was oriented towards areas needing improvement noted during previous operations, with emphasis on small unit tactics. The following additional training was conducted by the Brigade:

1. All incoming personnel, regardless of rank or MOS, continued to be processed through the Brigade Replacement Detachment in PHU BANG. Each individual attended the Brigade’s six day Proficiency Training Course consisting of small unit tactics to include patrolling and ambushes, adjustment of supporting fires, land navigation, mines and booby traps, first aid, and physical conditioning. The training also served as an acclimatizing period for the personnel.

2(V) At the Brigade base camps, CARENTAN and later LOS BURB, live fire ranges were established to zero weapons and conduct other live fire exercises with all weapons during stand-down periods.

3(V) A total of ten personnel from the Brigade were sent to the MACV Recondo School conducted at PHU CHONG.

4(V) Due to a high turnover of personnel and battle casualties during the reporting period, the Combat Leader’s Course (conducted once a week) and the Sniper School (conducted semi-annually) were not conducted to allow maximum effort in training replacements.

D. OP Plans and OPORDS: The following operation plans and orders were published during the reporting period:

1(C) OPORD 32-67 (BONTON) (U) dated 091800 August 1967. The order was published to implement verbal orders from Task Force OREGON directing the Brigade to conduct operations on 13 August 1967 to find, fix and destroy VC/NVA forces and to neutralize VC/NVA base camps in and around Base Area 137.

2(C) OPORD 33-67 (COOK) (U) dated 311200 August 1967. The order was published to implement verbal orders from Task Force BONNIE directing the Brigade to conduct operations on 2 September 1967 to find, fix and destroy VC/NVA forces and to neutralize VC/NVA base camps in and around Base Area 122 and northern portion of the SONG VE Valley.

3(C) OPORD 34-67 (WHEELER) (U) dated 091800 September 1967. The order was published to implement written orders from Task Force OREGON directing the Brigade to conduct operations on 11 September 1967 northwest of Dak E (211027) to find, fix and destroy VC/NVA forces and to neutralize VC/NVA base camps.

E. Organization: The Brigade organization is as shown in Enclosure 1 (Brigade Organizational Chart). Two units were assigned or attached to the Brigade during the reporting period and changes in the organization of the artillery battalion and engineer company were made.

11/V/3d Battalion (Airborne), 506 Infantry: The battalion was assigned to the Brigade effective 23 October 1967 by Department of the Army with a mission of closing with and killing or capturing the enemy.

2(V) 1st Combat Tracker Team (Provisional): The team was attached to the Brigade on 16 September 1967 by Department of the Army with the station of
ASSISTING UNITS IN REESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY THROUGH TRACKING METHODS.

3(U) A fourth battery of 105mm howitzers was organized from currently assigned personnel and equipment by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery. The battery was organized to provide direct support artillery to the newly assigned 3d Battalion (Airborne), 506th Infantry.

4(U) A fourth engineer platoon was organized from currently assigned personnel and equipment by Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion (Airborne) to support the new infantry battalion.

F. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS.

1(U) General: During the reporting period, 19,086,000 leaflets were disseminated and 165.6 hours of loudspeaker broadcasts were made in support of Brigade combat operations. Desumoralization and CHIEU HUI themes were utilized against both VC and NVA audiences. Population control appeals targeted against the civilians in the combat area stressed support of GVN, curfew instructions and information reward themes.

2(C) Operations:

a. PSYOPS for operations HOOD RIVER, BENTON and COOK were conducted using standard tape and leaflet appeals. The exceptions to this were two leaflets used during Operation BENTON. One leaflet, hand delivered by US troops, informed the civilian recipients that US forces would evacuate them to a GVN secure area if they desired evacuation and status as refugees. The second leaflet was distributed throughout the AO immediately following the termination of the operation and publicized enemy losses inflicted during the operation.

b. During Operation WHEELER, several PSYOP programs have been conducted which utilize both standard and special leaflet and loudspeaker appeals:

   1) Program 1: Program 1 is a leaflet program which is being conducted in three phases. During the first phase primary emphasis is given to population control and VC/NVA desumoralization themes. The second phase continues emphasis on phase 1 themes but adds support of GVN and CHIEU HUI themes. The final phase involves the distribution of a special leaflet which announces to all audiences the cumulative enemy losses incurred during the operation.

   2) Program 2: Program 2 is a loudspeaker program in which the daily and cumulative body count and a Province Chief HUI appeal are broadcasted over as much of the AO as possible.

   3) Program 3: Program 3 is a leaflet and loudspeaker program targeted against the VC infrastructure. VC personalities are identified by detainees; the names of these VC are then mentioned in loudspeaker appeals made to their followers. Safe Conduct passes and rallier instruction leaflets are disseminated in the target area in conjunction with the broadcasts.

c. During the reporting period a special leaflet was developed to generate refugees on a very limited scale since province accommodations for large numbers of refugees were not available. The leaflet was printed both in English and Vietnamese to assure the soldier's understanding of what action was desired of the Vietnamese. These leaflets were utilized during Operations HEN- TON and WHEELER where large numbers of civilians were located in the combat area.

d. During the Brigade overland displacement from CHU Le to DUC PHO following Operation HOOD RIVER, a loudspeaker message was broadcast exploiting the opening of Route 1 between CHU IAI and DUC PHO emphasizing the benefits accruing to the citizens.
AVO-Hist
SUBJECT: Operational Report for General Period Ending 31 October 1965 (RCS OAH-10) (U)

a. During the month of October, visual reconnaissance flights, supervised by the Brigade S-2, carried Delayed Opening Leaflet Bundles (DOL) prepared by Brigade PSYOP to determine which areas were affected by leaflets. Each bundle contained 200-250 CHRM MOI, Safe Conduct, Rallying Instruction and Demoralization leaflets for a total of 800 to 1000 leaflets per bundle.

b. During the latter portion of the reporting period, high winds adversely affected the audibility of loudspeaker broadcasts in the area of operation. During minor weather, however, the messages were completely understandable when broadcast from an altitude of 3,000 feet.

30Support:

a. During the reporting period the Brigade was supported by the 244th Psychological Operations Company and 'A' Flight, 9th Air Commando Squadron located in Da Nang.

b. The two-man ground loudspeaker team from the 244th PSYOP Company attached to the Brigade and conducted four ground missions in support of combat operations. The majority of the team's effort was devoted to broadcasts made to the civilian population adjacent to the Brigade base camp in support of civil affairs and revolutionary development. Following the national elections, loudspeaker broadcasts were also broadcast to disseminate the election results to the populace.

c. During the reporting period the 9th Air Commandos flew 187 loudspeaker and 63 leaflet missions in support of Brigade operations in both C-47 and O-28 aircraft.

d. Support received by Brigade PSYOP was less than satisfactory. Printing reaction times on special leaflet requests were excessive. Two Priority 3 (highest priority) leaflet requests required eleven days to fill (request to receipt time). Though night loudspeaker missions were requested on a continuing basis, no such missions were flown during the reporting period. Daylight aerial loudspeaker support was inadequate to cover the requested target areas effectively. This resulted in a backlog of exploitable targets awaiting missions to be flown. (Of twenty-nine Priority 3 (Infrastructure) missions requested since1 October only six had been conducted by 26 October).

•. Leaflets printed by the 244th PSYOP Company lack a professional look. Picture reproduction is unsatisfactory on many leaflets. Most special leaflets look like "rush jobs" when in fact, the delay in procurement was also excessive.

f. During the conduct of O-28 loudspeaker missions in the Brigade operational areas, control of the aircraft is nonexistent. The aircraft periodically interfere with artillery fire missions supporting troops in contact, which results in considerable time lost trying to contact the aircraft to get it to leave the area. Attempts have been made by Brigade PSYOP to originate a control system for these aircraft through American Division PSYOP with no results. A system of constant control of PSYOP aircraft by the using unit is essential to the smooth conduct of tactical operations by the ground combat elements.

4(c) Analysis of Operations:

a. During the reporting period the following numbers of MOI QUANG NAM reported to the SVN in the Brigade's area of interest (numbers in parenthesis indicate increase or decrease by number shown for same period last year - July shown for comparison purposes only):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>QUANG TIN (P)</th>
<th>QUANG NAM (P)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>0 (-13)</td>
<td>78 (+38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>24 (+19)</td>
<td>103 (+65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>24 (-2)</td>
<td>20 (-33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>31 (+6)</td>
<td>44 (-100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Oct "74" (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

1) Operations MOOD RIVER and HENTON were conducted in QUANG TIN Province during the month of August. The number of HOI CHANH who rallied in QUANG TIN during August represent a distinct increase over the previous month of July and over the number who rallied in August of last year. Brigade combat operations, exploited by PSYOP, would appear to be the primary reason for the August upturn in QUANG TIN. The continued increase in QUANG NAM Province is credited to the continued operations of the 3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div and the 1st Air Cav Division, the latter continuing operations in the area given up by the 1st Bde, 101st Airborne Division.

2) Operations DOOK and WHEELER were conducted in September in QUANG NAM and QUANG TIN Provinces, respectively. The downturn in both provinces was forecast by JUSPAO as the natural result of the uncertainty following the Vietnamese national elections.

3) During October Operation WHEELER continued in QUANG NAM Province while allied combat operations diminished in the QUANG NAM area. The 3rd Bde, 1st Cav Div also shifted operations to northern QUANG TIN Province which further increased the tactical pressure against VC/VA forces in the area.

4) Interrogation of HOI CHANH and detainees failed in all cases to pinpoint a particular appeal which had been or could be effective. The Brigade can not present tactical evidence to claim credit for any HOI CHANH who rallied during the reporting period. However, it would appear that the conduct of sustained combat operations in an area by US units favorably affects the number of HOI CHANH who rally to the government.

5.(U) Training:
   a. During the reporting period, one man from A/2-17 Cav and one man from the Brigade S-3 drafting section attended the three day III AF PSTOP Orientation Course conducted at DA NANG. The S-3 draftsman remained with the III AF PSTOP Company and received two days additional instruction on the operation of the Light Mobile Printing Set Platemaker in preparation for the arrival of that piece of equipment which is expected shortly.
   b. A PSTOP orientation of 30 minutes duration has been prepared by Brigade PSTOP for presentation to the members of the newly arrived 3rd Battalion (Airborne), 506th Infantry. The class will be presented at PHAN RANG in conjunction with F-Training for the battalion.

6.(U) Equipment:
   a. The Multithith Printing Press and Paper Cutter have not yet been uncrated. Brigade printing is not planned to commence until after the arrival of the platemaker, equipment of which was delayed.
   b. Notification has been given the Brigade PSTOP Officer by the S-4 that the Brigade is soon to receive the remaining two AEM-AB-4 loudspeaker systems and two AEM-PD-155 tape recorders. Action has been taken through supply channels to expedite the issuance of this equipment to the Brigade.

7.(C) Plans: Future PSTOPS include the establishment of three new programs and one special operation in addition to continuation of programs already in operation. The three new programs will point out to innocent civilians and refugees the lies of the VC regarding ill-treatment to be expected at the hands of allied forces, lies of the VC regarding ill-treatment of POW's and quick reaction appeals exploiting information obtained from apprehended detainees. The special operation involves the exploitation of improved enemy detection techniques made available to the Brigade during this past reporting period.

8.(C) Problem Areas:
   a. Lack of adequate resources (both organic and supporting) continues to pose difficulties in conducting PSTOPS in the Brigade operational area. There exist many more exploitable situations than the current level of personnel and equipment can cope with. Mission priorities are established
AVBD-His
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

Based on a "guess estimate" of relative program effectiveness since no concrete indications are available, this relatively arbitrary establishment of priorities is unsatisfactory notwithstanding the fact that it is the only method currently available. Information concerning the effectiveness of various programs is all but nonexistent. Until this situation can be remedied, the practical solution from strictly a PSYOP viewpoint is to raise the level of personnel and equipment resources to a point at which all exploitable situations encountered can be exploited, thereby ensuring maximum effectiveness (assuming that all programs implemented will produce some positive results).

b. Lack of PSYOP intelligence continues to cause delays in the establishment of programs in new areas into which the Brigade moves. This lack of intelligence necessitates the use of general appeals in conducting PSYOP programs. In order to progress to a more specific appeal, concrete evidence must be presented to confirm the existence of a specific vulnerability. In most cases the first indication of a specific vulnerability (obtained primarily through interrogation of detainees, POW's, HO CHINH, etc.) constitutes all the evidence the psychological operator will get concerning it. The decision to exploit the intelligence must take into account the possibility of compromising credibility. In this situation, the decision, in most cases, is not to exploit with the hope that further verification can be obtained. This necessary practice delays the exploitation of the vulnerability and once further evidence is procured, often results in a request for a special leaflet on short notice to make up for lost time, which further disrupts the planned use of the limited PSYOP resources available. This situation could be relieved in a large part, by a greater consciousness of PSYOP intelligence requirements on the part of all agencies currently involved in procuring and disseminating tactical intelligence. In recognizing, collecting and disseminating PSYOP intelligence, these agencies would provide a valuable assistant to PSYOP by making more effective programs possible.

(1) Coordination: During the reporting period coordination was continued with the 244th PSYOP Company through the American Division S-5, PSYOP Officer. Additionally, direct coordination was established with the G-3, PSYOP, I FFRICV and the CO 245th PSYOPS Company in NHA TRANG.

c. Intelligence:

1. The enemy force disposition prior to each operation is listed below:

a. Operation HOOD RIVER: Most of the contacts were with small units, the largest of which was 15 men. The weapons captured were various but mostly semi-automatic types such as carbines and very few automatic weapons. The foregoing items coupled with the lack of significant contact lead us to believe the area's enemy forces consists of guerrillas and local force units. Prisoner of War interrogation reports and documents captured revealed little with regard to unit locations and strength. In general, intelligence gathered was insignificant.

b. Operation BENTON: The largest known unit operating in the area was the 21st Regiment NVA of the 2d NVA Division. Other units operating in the AO were the 70th Battalion of the 1st VC Regiment, the 70th Company of the 409th Engineer (Sapper) Battalion and the 72d Local Force Battalion. The 21st Regiment is a strong NVA troop representation. They will fight when fired upon and attack when they think they can annihilate the enemy. They use good tactics and deploy their support well. Though the 1st Brigade as well as other Allied/ARVN forces have fought and defeated them in several engagements, they still remain marginally combat effective. Their morale is low due to lack of supplies and rest. Their replacements are slackening off due to the monsoon season and slow replacement capability. The operation has shown, with constant pressure, the NVA/VC will breakdown and give up easily. The results of this operation were successful dispersion of the regiment.

c. Operation COOK: There was no significant contact during this operation. Captured documents revealed the possibility of the 2d VC Regiment in conjunction with the 38 LF En, would initiate pre-election operation within

12
the NGHIA HAN - MU UOC areas. This could not be substantiated as the operation terminated prior to the proposed enemy operation. Due to the insignificant contact it can only be ascertained that only local units operate in this area.

d. Operation WHEELER: The largest known unit operating in the Tactical Areas of Operation (TAOR) were elements of the 2d NVA Division including 21st NVA Regiment, 91st NVA Regiment and 1st VC Main Force Regiment. Along with the NVA/VC forces, the Provincial units are still operating in this area at a reduced strength because of Operation HENTON. The strength of committed forces in this TAOR is approximately 7,200 enemy. All of the regiments of the 2d NVA Division have been reduced and broken down by the Free World Forces since the beginning of operations in this area of the country. Due to Chieu Hoi's and document readouts, several of the battalions are numbered less than 250 persons. Though hard hit and at a reduced strength, they remain combat effective because they seem to get replacements from the north more readily than in the southern areas of South Vietnam. Though there is a large confirmed body count the weapons count is still low. In contrast to previous experiences the weapons are salvaged from the battle area and enemy bodies are left behind. The returnees have given us valuable information on unit locations, strength, capabilities and morale. Morale is low because the Allies keep pressing and making the enemy troops move often. Their food supply comes mainly from the people but the people are becoming uncooperative with the enemy. They do not want trouble in their areas so they try to keep the enemy out. Documents recovered reveal low morale because the soldiers are sick of war and bad food. They want to stop and return to North Vietnam. The enemy has shown in this area that though they are defeated they will withdraw, regroup, and fight again in a short time. Their tactics and weapons deployment is improving. Their use of support and artillery, transportation and anti-aircraft fire have proved effective in this operation. Although Operation WHEELER is still continuing, it has already surpassed any other Brigade operation total enemy losses.

3. The following is a statement of enemy losses by operation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>HOOD RIVER</th>
<th>HENTON</th>
<th>COOK</th>
<th>WHEELER</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VC/NVA KIA (C)</td>
<td>63/0</td>
<td>203/0</td>
<td>54/0</td>
<td>582/261</td>
<td>1002/261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC/NVA KIA (P)</td>
<td>11/0</td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>26/0</td>
<td>38/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCC/NVAC</td>
<td>13/0</td>
<td>13/2</td>
<td>5/0</td>
<td>20/1</td>
<td>51/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>2/0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detainees</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**WEAPONS**

| Individual | 37 | 74 | 11 | 134 | 256 |
| Individual (Cache) | 0 | 19 | 2 | 22 | 75 |
| Crew Served | 5 | 3 | 0 | 19 | 34 |
| Crew Served (Cache) | 0 | 5 | 0 | 9 | 14 |
| Grenades | 23 | 123 | 3 | 54 | 253 |


4. Problem Areas

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (RCS CSFCil.-65) (U)

a. Problem: Aviation support has not been adequate and has not fulfilled the daily requirements for aircraft to support People Sniffer and VR operations. When the OIE aircraft allocated for the Brigade's use was down for maintenance or repair, no replacement aircraft was scheduled. The Brigade required OIE aircraft be allocated on a daily basis to support VR operations. This requirement was not met and UH-1D back up for other aviation requirements originally designated for People Sniffer operations were usually committed to higher priority missions. This resulted in an inadequate coverage of suspected enemy movement.

Discussion: People Sniffer operations have aided in locating concentrations of enemy forces and, when flown on a daily basis, establishes a pattern of movement or exact locations of enemy which cannot be seen below the jungle canopy. Visual Reconnaissance (VR) is used to determine what units are being used or improved by the enemy and to observe the general flow of enemy movement. The more frequent the flights, the more detailed the analysis.

Solution: The Americal Division Artillery has eight OIE's to be used in support of Division Artillery and attached artillery units. The primary duty is to register the batteries daily and conduct limited reconnaissance. Additional OIE aircraft are required when the Brigade is in continuous contact. Artillery AO's should pass visual sightings to the Brigade TOC and actively contribute to intelligence collection.

b. Problem: The secure mode of transmission for battalion in the field was operational less than 50% of the time since it became available. Reports received at this section indicate equipment malfunction as the main problem.

Discussion: The only method by which certain intelligence received at the Brigade can be transmitted in detail to the battalions in the field is by secure communication.

Solution: Recommend excess equipment presently on hand be kept at both Brigade and battalion level to insure continuous secure capability.

c. Problem: To insure suspicious civilians and civil defendants are properly screened and accounted for after release to Vietnamese authorities.

Discussion: Detainees classified as civil defendants or as suspicious innocent civilians by the 181st Det were returned to their original district and placed in the custody of the District Chief for appropriate civil action. A follow up check at TIEN PHUOC and THANG BINH districts showed that District Chiefs had little or no records indicating the disposition of personnel previously released to their custody, and could not account for them. Since no civil records were maintained the assumption can be made that the people in question were released without action. DAKR District is capable of handling civil defendants and has a system to record their disposition, but only has a limited capability to impound personnel until their final disposition was decided.

Solution: Until an adequate government administration is established at each district all detainees classified as suspicious innocent civilians or Civil Defendants should be released to provincial control where the administration is able to screen properly and make a final determination of status. This course of action was followed in QUANG TIN Province and is working quite well.

d. Problem: There has been several instances where battalion direct support IPW teams were left with line companies for excessive periods, rather than being returned to the battalion CP after a specific mission. This denied their use by the other companies and hindered proper handling of individuals who should be screened and classified prior to being turned over to brigade IPW for formal interrogation.

Discussion: Interrogation of Prisoners of War (IPW) teams are being utilized at battalion level. This preliminary interrogation aids the IPW team at brigade as it weeds out Innocent Civilians (IC) or those personnel who
would be classified refugees. It also gives the IPW team at brigade a starting point for their formal interrogation by providing complete factual data concerning the circumstances of capture and other information usually found on the capture tag.

Solution: IPW teams may be sent to companies but they should only be used to screen large groups of people or for periods less than 24 hours to exploit known intelligence of immediate tactical value.

e. Problem: Incomplete or no capture tag means the Brigade IPW Section must start from scratch on their interrogation. If the detainee feels there is no reason to disbelieve him when data is not available, documents and weapons that could be used to confront the individual with factual evidence were separated from the detainee.

Discussion: Recently many POW's were received at Brigade IPW without or with incomplete capture tags. Some capture tags indicate the POW was apprehended with documents and/or a weapon but they did accompany the individual to the Brigade IPW Section and was not identified with a particular detainee.

Solution: Battalion S-2's must utilize their BS IPW teams and make the companies provide complete capture tags and data. They must also ensure that documents and/or weapons captured on POW's accompany them to the Brigade IPW Section.

f. Problem: Detainees, if not properly received and handled, can rid themselves of incriminating evidence, endangering US lives, and observe friendly unit disposition and fortifications.

Discussion: Detainees have been received at Brigade IPW Section improperly secured, and not properly searched. There has been one instance of a POW carrying the documents captured on him to the rear and another who had two M-26 grenades on his person.

Solution: Company commanders and battalion S-2's must insure that at detainee's are weaponless and bound to include restricted vision. Documents must accompany but should be given to the helicopter crew if no one from the capturing unit is available to accompany the detainee.

H. Personnel

C) Unit Strength:

a. Brigade personnel strength at the end of the reporting period, minus attached units, was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized Augmented (MTOE)</th>
<th>4920</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>5252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present for Duty</td>
<td>4883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Present for Duty</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. The assigned strength was 107 percent of the authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 99 percent of the authorized strength.

c. 1st Brigade unit assigned strengths as of 31 October 1967:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Off</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>Lt</th>
<th>Lt+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn (Abn), 327th Inf</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>716</td>
<td>734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn (Abn), 227th Inf</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn (Abn), 502d Inf</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn (Abn), 506th Inf</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn (Abn), 320th Arty</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 1st Brigade</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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AVBD-Hist
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

Spt Bn, (Incl Repl Det) 68 0 59 73
Co A, 326th Engr Bn 6 0 201 207
Trp A, 2/17th Cav 2 0 137 139

TOTAL 96 16 501 617

Of the "Not Present for Duty" strength, 32 were intrasat, 126 were on R&R and TDY/5D, 9 were AMCL, 7 were in confinement, 1% were on leave, and 1 was missing.

2(C) Attached Strength:

a. Personnel strengths of units attached to the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division at the conclusion of the reporting period were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Assigned</th>
<th>Present for Duty</th>
<th>Not Present for Duty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Base Camp - Phan Rang</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101 MP Det</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>406 BMD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45th AFU</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45th P.I. Det</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23d Military History Det</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50lst Sig Det</td>
<td>122</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>181 M Det</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th Chem Det</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>338</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. The assigned strength was 126 percent of the authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 125 percent of the authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 95 percent of the assigned strength.

c. Of the not present for duty strength, 6 were on W/T and 4 on leave.

d. Assigned strength of attached units as of 31 October 1967 were as follows:

| 101 MP Det | 74 |
| 406 BMD | 56 |
| 45th AFU | 9 |
| 4th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) | 36 |
| 45th P.I. Det | 4 |
| 23d Military History Det | 2 |
| 50lst Sig Det | 122 |
| 181 M Det | 24 |
| 20th Chem Det | 4 |
| TOTAL | 338 |

a. Casualties as a result of hostile action for the period (1 Aug thru 31 Oct 67) were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MO</th>
<th>RIV</th>
<th>BENTON</th>
<th>COOK</th>
<th>WHEELER</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Total casualties as a result of hostile action from 29 July 65 to date are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>640</td>
<td>3408</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Total casualties as a result of non-hostile actions for the period (1 Aug thru 31 Oct 67) were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KILLED</th>
<th>INJURED</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Total casualties as a result of non-hostile actions from
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

29 July 1965 to 31 October 1967 are as follows:

KILLED  INJURED  TOTAL
85       575      660

**15 personnel died of wounds after being evacuated from this command.

4(C) Personnel Programs: The following programs were initiated or continued during this period:

a. To provide artillery and engineer support for the 3d Battalion, 506th Infantry, Battery D (Prov), 2/320th Artillery and the 4th Platoon, 6th Engineer Battalion, were activated; the Artillery Battery was activated 00 2049, dti 30 Sep 67; the Engineer Platoon was organized from present engineer overstrength, resulting in change in MCE under which the Brigade was operating.

b. The advance party of the 3d Battalion, 506th Infantry, arrived at Phan Rang on 26 October 1967. The battalion received in-country briefings and orientation by brigade staff personnel. Commanders, staff personnel, and first sergeants, were briefed by the brigade staff sections.

c. USARV requires the reporting of twice wounded personnel for reassignment, unless the individual signs a waiver to remain with the unit. The brigade policy has been to reassign these personnel from line units to TOE positions in the Support Battalion and Brigade Headquarters Company, where these personnel can be assigned to duties for which they are qualified by virtue of their grade and MOS. This policy is to be continued so long as vacancies in the Support Battalion or Headquarters Company exist.

d. USARV has directed units to eliminate overstrength; however, an enlisted strength of 105% for infantry battalions, 100% for officers and warrant officers, and 90% for aviators will be authorized. This requirement will require the elimination and/or reduction of personnel working in battalion clubs, beach facilities, base area security platoon, Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols, Post Exchange and other such activities. A study is now being conducted to analyze overstrength in certain brigade units with a view of seeking additional personnel authorizations to continue these activities more prevalent in the base area at Phan Rang than elsewhere.

e. Headquarters USARV directed IFPV to activate a Long Range Reconnaissance Company NLT 15 October 1967. The brigade was given the responsibility to provide 221 personnel from its personal resources to meet the requirement NLT 1 October 1967. Personnel were interviewed and selected by officers assigned to the Long Range Reconnaissance Company. By 15 October 1967 all personnel had reported; the LRRC moved out of Phan Rang on 22 October 1967.

f. On 1 September 1967, a commercial show, consisting of a four-man band and two Korean exotic dancers, entertained units on stand down at Duc Pho. On 14 October 1967, personnel of the brigade attended the Martha Raye Show at the Marine Amphitheater at Chu Lai.

g. Awards and Decorations:

(1) Suspense loss rosters are prepared NLT the 15th day of each month and submitted to each battalion and separate company for personnel scheduled to rotate during the second subsequent month. These rosters are forwarded to unit commanders to assist and serve a dual purpose. First, to verify rotation dates; and second, to remind commanders of their responsibility to initiate recommendation for meritorious awards for deserving personnel to allow sufficient time for processing so the individual can be presented his award prior to departure.

(2) The following awards and decorations were approved during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DSC</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>IOM</th>
<th>DPC</th>
<th>SH</th>
<th>BS(V)</th>
<th>BCM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(AOG CSHW-61) (6)

1. The Brigade received 127 Vietnamese Awards for participation in Operation HOOD RIVER. Recount of awards are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>w/GOLD STAR</th>
<th>w/SILVER STAR</th>
<th>w/BRONZE STAR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/127 Inf</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/302 Inf</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/320 Artv</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USRP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/326 Sgtr</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sp En</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2/327 Inf gave one Silver Star to their arty FO from 2/320.

Thirty personnel were presented awards, personally by Premier Ly and General Thieu, Republic of Vietnam, at QUANG TIN Province Headquarters, TAM KY, on 12 September 1967.

h. An ID Card production capability is being established by the Brigade AG Section to provide complete photo and laminating service.

i. A handball court and a basketball court were completed and are in use in the rear base area at PHAN RANG.

j. To facilitate rapid breakdown and improved mail service, the Army Post Office was expanded by the addition of a new building. This gives new mail sorting storage area, and will assist in meeting the expected Christmas mail peak period.

k. Members of the AG Section attended the USAV Infusion conference and were briefed on the infusion plans outlined in USAV Reg 634-9 and procedures necessary to implement the program. At present, the brigade is capable of solving its own rotational hump problems, by readjusting personnel resources.

l. Reception of the 3d Battalion, 506th Infantry was accomplished. All personnel records were given a thorough review and checked for accuracy of vital information. The battalion has been integrated into the Brigade's administrative system.

m. Records Check: A 100% records audit was performed by the AG Records Branch and Brigade Finance for all units during stand down on 31 August 1967 at DUC PHO.

n. Administrative personnel from the AG Section accompanied the Brigade IO Team giving forward and base camp units a pre-inspection and assisted in correcting deficiencies on the spot.

o. A document was published that depicts the T&E, CO, and MME tables affecting the brigade since its arrival overseas for the convenience of commanders and staff. This gives them a comprehensive working tool and a picture of the authorized strength changes affecting their units.

p. Enlisted Promotions: During the reporting period, this command utilized the following number of enlisted promotion allocations:

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Postal Activities

(1) During this period the postal section handled an average of a ton and a quarter of mail daily. Average time for first class mail to fly from CONUS to the brigade was five days; space available mail (SAM) averaged 12 days.

(2) Money orders sales averaged $6,104,339.59 monthly during the reporting period. Money stamp sales averaged $6,645.00.

Personnel Planning: A data processing system is presently under study, whereby punched cards can be maintained on all members of the Brigade and used to produce machine prepared reports. At present, it is anticipated that the Air Force Data Processing Center in Phan Rang will assist us in this endeavor. The lack of this capability is the greatest single weakness in the Brigade's administrative support system. The hand manipulating and counting of records required to support the Brigade's management system is a time consuming effort that if replaced by a data processing capability, will save many valuable man-hours.

Brigade Organizational Changes:

(1) General Order 2049, HQ 1st ABn, 101st Abn Div, 30 Sep 67, was published to organize a Provisional Battery "D" in the 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery.

(2) General Order 1836, HQ 1st ABn, 101st Abn Div, 9 Sep 67, was published to organize a Provisional Signal Company within the Brigade. Personnel spaces were derived from HHC Brigade and the 501st Signal Platoon.

(3) A Combat Tracker Team (Provisional) was assigned to the Brigade per General Order 1428, HQ USAFR, 5 Sep 67. Auth 1 officer and 9 EM.

(4) The 204th Military Intelligence Detachment was attached to the Brigade, per General Order 5021, HQ USAFR, 2 Oct 67. Auth 1 officer and 3 EM.

Red Cross:

a. The Red Cross made a total of 3 clubmobile visits to the forward deployed units at DUC PHO and CHU IAI during the reporting period.

b. Average attendance at Red Cross activities was 8027 monthly.

c. The Red Cross provided outstanding service in the area of personal problems.

Morale: Morale remained "Excellent" throughout the period.

Medical:

a. Organic medical support continued to be provided by "D" Company, 326th Medical Battalion. A clearing station with minor surgery section, emergency treatment section, dental section, evacuation section and a 40 bed holding section was established in the area of operations.

b. Non organic support was supplied by elements of the 55th Medical Group, I.A., 57th and 58th Evacuation Hospitals (C3I BN), 3d Surgical Hospital (CHU IAI), 556th Medical Company (DUC PHO), 4th Medical Company (Helicopter Ambulance) (C3I BN), and the 5th Medical (Helicopter Ambulance) Detachment (CHU IAI).
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(c) Significant Diseases:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scrub Typhus</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gastroenteritis</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hepatitis</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychiatric Observation</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pneumonia</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respiratory Infections</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skin Disease</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot Problems</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venereal Disease</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Health of the Command:

1. Health of the Command is overall excellent. Stand down time has been quite minimal this quarter averaging out to approximately 10 days total spanning four separate operations. However, no specific disease trends have been elicited which can be attributed to increased physical or emotional fatigue per se.

2. Although malaria rates have fallen to approximately one half that experienced during the previous quarter, malaria continues to head the list in the morbidity statistics of the command. Tactical effectiveness must be weighed against the increased malaria hazard known to exist during night operations, under unsophisticated living conditions, in highly endemic areas.

(e) Environmental Sanitation:

1. No major problems have developed in this area. One outbreak of minor gastro-intestinal upset in the area of operations was attributed to hot meals delivered on a company resupply mission. Meal sanitation has been re-emphasized and deficiencies corrected.

2. Insect and rodent control has been adequate in the base camp situation but no effective insect control measures have been employed in the area of operations.

3. Waste disposal problems become accentuated during monsoon conditions. Burn out latrines and soakage pit urinals continue to be utilized.

(f) Army Level Medical Support

1. Air ambulance support was initially provided by the 498th Medical Company (Air Ambulance), until arrival of the 54th Medical Detachment (Helicopter Ambulance) in mid-September.

2. Quick response to requests for patient evacuation have been the rule. Although deteriorating weather conditions have caused occasional delays in location of pickup sites, no instance has yet occurred where an urgent extraction was impossible due to weather conditions alone.

8. Commanders and Principal Staff:

a. Brigade Headquarters:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Designation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>Salm H. Metheson</td>
<td>RDC O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>John W. Collins III</td>
<td>DCD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Ralph Puckett Jr.</td>
<td>XO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Elliott P. Sydor</td>
<td>S-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Richard A. Kupau</td>
<td>S-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Edwin P. Gessey</td>
<td>S-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Robert M. Elton</td>
<td>S-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Wayne J. Frodkup</td>
<td>S-5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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b. Battalion Commanders:

LTC Gerald E. Morse, CO, 1st Bn (Abn), 327th Inf
LTC Robert G. Yorks, CO, 2d Bn (Abn), 327th Inf
LTC Howard H. Danford, CO, 2d Bn (Abn), 502d Inf
LTC John P. Geraci, CO, 3d Bn (Abn), 502d Inf
LTC Andrew S. Bolcar, CO, 3d Bn (Abn), 320th Arty
LTC Quinton P. Sunday, CO, Spt Bn

Separate Companies:

CPT James R. Harding, CO, A Tp, 2d Sqdn (Abn), 17th Cav
CPT Michael Ward, CO, Co A, 326th Engr Bat
CPT Leroy G. Stevens, CO, MED, 1st Bn

LTC Ralph Puckett Jr., commanded 2d Bn (Abn), 502d Inf. from 31 July 1967 to 27 September 1967, was reassigned as Brigade Executive Officer because of wounds received in action. LTC Danford assumed command of the 2d Bn (Abn), 502d Inf.

LTC Harold P. Austin, who previously commanded the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, was replaced by LTC Gerald E. Morse on 9 August 1967.

LTC Edmond P. Abed, who previously commanded the 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry, was replaced by LTC Robert G. Yorks on 29 August 1967.

Major Richard Horton, who was previously the Brigade S-4, was replaced by Major Gessey on 4 September 1967.

Major Benjamin R. Schlapak assumed duties as Brigade Engineer on 21 August 1967. Captain Ward assumed command of Co A, 326th Engineer Battalion.

I. Logistic

A. Concept of Support.

The general concept of logistic support of the Brigade was provided by the 15th Support Brigade, Americal Division and 80th General Support Group, while operational in the Chu Lai area; a Forward Support Area (FSA) provided by QUS, General Logistical Command while operational in the Duc Pho area, and PHAN RANG Subarea Command for base camp elements located at PHAN RANG. Internal logistical support was provided by the Brigade's organic support battalion.

b. Field Trains. All classes of supply and services were provided to the headquarters and maneuver elements by the field trains consisting of a Forward Support Element of the Support Battalion and battalion trains elements. The Forward Support Element provided all classes of supply to the collocated battalion trains who in turn supplied the rifle companies exclusively by air LOC direct from the field trains location.

c. Combat Trains. During the greater part of the reporting period, all resupply was accomplished directly from the field trains to the rifle companies without establishment of a combat trains element by any of the Brigade units. This resupply directly to the using unit required an average of 30 minutes flight time one way. During the latter part of the reporting period, bad monsoon weather required units to establish combat trains at their fire bases -_TAC CP areas. Due to the unpredictable nature of the weather it became extremely difficult to effect resupply from the field trains area. When the weather became clear enough to effect resupply to the rifle companies, utilization of combat trains cut down the helicopter flight time by one quarter of that required to fly from the field trains area.

d. Forward Supply Points

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1. General. Forward Supply Points were established whenever a secure area was available that could be readily resupplied. These were established in an attempt to shorten LOC and thereby cut down to minimum the air time of any rotary wing resupply missions. To be effective, the FSP had to be capable of storing stockage of only the essentials - Class I, III, V, water, and fast moving II & IV.

2. QUANG NGOI. During Operations HODD RIVER and COOK the Brigade was supported by an FSP established at QUANG NGOI by 15th Support Brigade. This FSP was resupplied by vehicle convoy from CHU LAI with back up by C130 aircraft. Due to its capability of being resupplied by both road convoy and air, it was relatively easy to maintain and very effective. It contained a 40-day stockage level of Class V, 3 day stockage of Class I, fast moving II & IV, and a helicopter 60,000 gallon refuel and refueling point. The bulk of the personnel came from 15th Support Brigade with a small coordinating element from the Support Battalion (FSE). Representing the three infantry battalions and the artillery battalions were collocated with the FSP to receive requests from forward units, prepare sling loads and load resupply aircraft.

3. CHU LAI. During Operation HUTCHIN an FSP was established by the Forward Support Element of the Support Battalion on CHU LAI post. This FSP was very limited in nature consisting mainly of coordinating personnel for the various classes of supply to provide a link between the battalions and the support facilities maintained by 15th Support Brigade and 80th General Support Group also located on CHU LAI post. A skeleton battalion staff transit element from the three infantry battalions plus artillery battalions collocated with the FSE to receive all requests from forward units, prepare sling loads and load resupply aircraft.

4. TIEN PHUOC. During Operation WHEELER the Forward Support Element of the Support Battalion established an FSP at TIEN PHUOC Special Forces Camp. This FSP contained Class V (without artillery ammunition), Class I, fast moving II & IV, engineer water point, and a limited 6000 gallon helicopter fuel and repair point. Resupply of the FSP was accomplished by C130 and C7A aircraft over air LOC. Problems were encountered in maintaining the FSP due to lack of space, nonavailability of aircraft, and bad weather which damaged the airfield and limited the number of aircraft sorties. Attempts were made to stock the FSP by C7A helicopter but they were unsuccessful due to low priority and the limited number of aircraft available. Finally, it was decided to change the concept of the FSP from one of 6 days supply to one for emergency resupply only. Weather improved the last week of October permitting the stockage to be again built up through C7A sorties.

5. TAM KY. An FSP was established at TAM KY by 25th Support Brigade to effect resupply of the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry and the 24th Battalion, 320th Artillery's firing batteries. Due to the large number of rounds and weight of ammunition required to resupply the batteries, and because of limited aircraft, resupply of TIEN PHUOC with artillery ammunition was impossible. Hence, TAM KY was resupplied by truck convoy. Subsequent airlift from that location cut the air time to battery positions to half of that required to resupply directly from CHU LAI. The FSP was effective until the arrival of the monsoon season when flooding prevented further stockage of artillery ammunition. This problem was solved by sending a convoy to TAM KY every morning and lifting the previously sling ammunition right from the SLP trailer to the "airbags" by CHU7 helicopter.

210. Organization for Support. A Forward Support Element (FSE) was provided by the support battalion to sustain the combat elements. The support battalion (-) provided support for elements located at PHU4 XA and support for the FSE. The FSE included the following elements:

a. Headquarters Detachment provided command and control and was organized into command, operations, communication, and movement control sub elements.

b. Administrative Detachment provided personnel actions, mail services, and pay services.
c. Supply Detachment received, stored, and issued all classes of supply and provided a limited rigging capability.

d. Maintenance Detachment provided a repair capability for artillery, small arms, signal, automotive, engineering, and quartermaster equipment. The detachment was organized into a shop office and recovery and contact teams.

3. (c) Material and Services

a. Supply

(1) Class I: "C" rations continued to form the bulk of all Class 1 consumed during the period. Consumption of LRP rations increased to 500 to 800 cases for the brigade. "A" ration supplements were served when possible. There were no significant Class I shortages during the reporting period. Vegetables and potable ice were adequate throughout the period; however, fresh fruit was seldom received.

(2) Class II & IV: The Support Battalion drew the bulk of II & IV supplies from Cam Ranh Bay or Phan Rang Sub Area and sent such supplies to the FSE in the forward area. The FSE also drew a large portion of II & IV through the FSA (TF Gallagher, TF McDonald) while the Brigade operated in the DUC PHO area, and later in the quarter through the 64th Supply and Service Battalion of the 15th Support Brigade. Heavy mortar attacks created additional requirements for Battalion TOC building material. Significant II & IV shortages included fatigues in small sizes, mine sweeper batteries, poncho liners and rucksacks.

(3) Class III: Class III supplies were drawn from TF Gallagher in the SAVI area of the reporting period and from the 221st Supply and Service Company, 15th Support Brigade during the latter part of the reporting period. There were no shortages of any Class III products.

(4) Class V: Class V support furnished by TF Gallagher, TF McDonald and 221st Ammunition Platoon of the 80th General Support Group has been adequate with no major shortages. On several occasions the Brigade did experience shortages of 105 ASP; however, emergency shipments brought the stockage level back up at the 221st ASP before the situation became critical. A total of 580.59 short tons of Class V was issued during the reporting period.

(b) Services

(1) Laundry & Bath: Adequate services were provided by the FSA (TF Gallagher, TF McDonald) and by the 80th General Support Group throughout the reporting period.

(2) Grome Registration: Adequate services were provided by the 80th General Support Group while the unit operated in the CHU IAI area, and the FSA (TF Gallagher, TF McDonald) in the DUC PHO area.

(3) Maintenance: Direct support maintenance was provided by a detachment of B Co, 501st MP Battalion attached to TF FSE. While operating out of CHU IAI, direct support services were provided through B Co, 801st MP BN by 186th MP BN, 15th Support Brigade. The only significant problem developed in the replacement of parts for the Artillery radar generators (400 cycle, 12.5 kv, 120 volt). Two new generators were eventually secured.

(4) Transportation

(a) Land: Truck transportation was utilized extensively in resupplying the QUAG IAI and TAM AF Forward Supply Points. In addition,
a total of four brigade convoys were run between DUC PHO and CHU IAI.

(b) Sea. During the reporting period one sealift was conducted from DUC PHO to CHU IAI. The move required 6 vessels (5 LST, 1 LCU), to move 174.2 short tons and 4,788.7 measurement tons of cargo. The move was conducted in conjunction with an airlift and convoy and did not include the entire brigade.

(c) Air. USAF C7a, C123 and C130 flew most Class II & IV supplies, mail, and transient personnel between the field trains area and base camp. Additionally, unit moves were conducted by C130 aircraft from DUC PHO to CHU IAI, from CHU IAI to DUC PHO, and DUC PHO to QUANG NGAI. C7a aircraft provided resupply missions to the FSP at TIEN PHUOC. Sorties flown in support of the brigade during the period were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Cargo Short Tons</th>
<th>Passengers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>756,602</td>
<td>6,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>510,069</td>
<td>2,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>594,983</td>
<td>3,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>1,861,654</td>
<td>11,760</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3(c) Problem Areas: The major problem that occurred during the reporting period was the inability of units to resupply their rifle companies due to bad weather. The monsoon rains rendered air lines of communication tenuous at best. Attempts were made to shorten LOC by stocking the TAC CP areas, but no completely satisfactory solution was found. At the end of the reporting period units were pulled back to areas of operation close to the TAM KY FSP and this greatly alleviated the problem.

J. Civil Affairs.

1(U) General: During the reporting period the brigade was involved in four operations conducted in two provinces. Operation HOOD RIVER and Operation COOK were conducted 2 - 12 August and 3 - 9 September, respectively, in QUANG NGAI Province. Operations REYNARD and WHEELER were conducted in QUANG TIN Province. Operation REYNARD lasted from 13 thru 29 August. Operation WHEELER began on 11 September and continues to date. Civil affairs work was tailored to support the tactical elements of the brigade. The three principal civil affairs activities were refugee control, food extractions and the return of innocent civilians.

2(U) Civil Affairs:

a. Operation HOOD RIVER centered in the districts of TU NGHIA, TRA BONG, SON HA and SON TINH. During the operation a total of 1179 refugees were moved and relocated to the headquarters of the district in which they were found. All food caches discovered were extracted and totaled 36.5 tons. The food was returned to OWN control.

b. Operation REYNARD was conducted in the districts of TIEN PHUOC, LI TIN, HAU DUC and TAM KY. This operation required the movement of 701 refugees. All persons were taken to the Province headquarters at TAM KY. Frequent enemy contact combined with very rugged terrain resulted in all food caches being destroyed.

c. Operation COOK was a very short operation which was conducted in SON HA, TU NGHIA, NGHA BANH, HO DUC, and MNGH LONG districts. Forty-four (44) refugees were moved to government control. No food caches were extracted.

d. Operation WHEELER encompassed the districts of TIEN PHUOC, TAM KY, HAU DUC, HIEP DUC and THANG BINH. Three hundred eighty six (386) refugees were extracted from the area of operations and taken to TAM KY Province Head-
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quarters. Caches totaling 245 tons of food were extracted and returned to GVN control. One hundred ninety six (196) innocent civilians were returned to their resident districts.

e. Quarterly Recapitulation

(1) Refugees moved 2310 persons
(2) Food extracted 61 tons
(3) Innocent Civilians returned 301 persons

3. Civic Action:

a. Operation HOOD RIVER: The only civic action during this operation were MEDCAPS. 333 persons and 157 domestic animals received medical treatment under the program.

b. Operation ENTON: MEDCAPS treated 22 persons during this operation. Additionally, 10 domestic animals received medical treatment.

c. Operation COOK: MEDCAPS were performed treating a total of 546 persons.

d. Operation WHEELER: Based upon previous experience in QUANG TIN Province the brigade coordinated with units responsible for civic action areas close to the Brigade Tactical Command Post at CHU LAI. By acquiring areas readily accessible to the brigade it was reasoned that a more effective civic action program could be initiated. Coordination was effected with the 196th Light Infantry Brigade and 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, toward this end. The areas procured were located in LY TIN District in the hamlets of LY TRA, LONG BINH, and TICH DONG. MEDCAPS were begun in these hamlets and were conducted three times weekly. One battalion was assigned to each hamlet for MEDCAP purposes. The remaining battalion began MEDCAP operations in TIEN PHUOC Special Forces Camp. Additionally, medical treatment was administered in the Area of Operations and the Brigade Forward Base Camp. A total of 7554 persons were treated during MEDCAPS. The Brigade Civil Affairs section undertook several civic action projects in LY TRA Refugee Hamlet. The hamlet was in need of an adequate drainage system, roofing for its school, fresh water wells, facilities for personal hygiene, and furniture for classrooms. During the reporting period, the school roof was completed, one fresh water well was dug, a water tower was constructed with a 532 gallon water tank, shower facilities were built, work was begun to correct permanently the hamlet drainage problem, and lumber was provided to construct school furniture.

e. Support Battalion: Throughout the quarter the Support Battalion of this Brigade has maintained an effective Civic Action Program in the Rear Base Camp at PHAN RANG. The results of this program are considered separately since this static situation presents opportunities seldom enjoyed by the tactical maneuver elements. Support Battalion treated 214 persons medically during the period. Other civic action projects include: construction of two market places, repaired one bridge, installed a pedestrian walkway adjacent to the bridge, constructed on culvert, installed permanent electrical facilities at the PHAN RANG recreation area, and renovated an old garage for nurses living quarters.

4. Civic Action Recapitulation:

a. Health and Sanitation.

(1) A total of 43 MEDCAPS were conducted by US treating 7195 persons and 51 MEDCAPS were conducted by US/VN treating 3466 persons. MEDCAP figures include 61 persons treated in area of operations, 28 barbers given physical examinations, and 93 Vietnamese that received dental treatment.

(2) 32 classes on personal hygiene were conducted during MEDCAPS.

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3) Local VN nurses and midwives of the PHAN RANG area were trained by working with MEDCAPS teams.

4) 53 homes were sprayed by US/VN during MEDCAPS.

5) One hundred and sixty-seven (167) domestic animals received medical treatment by US.

b. Public Works: Construction of, or repairs to the following were completed:

1-Bridge repaired with pedestrian walkway
1-Living quarters constructed
3-Electrical facilities installed
1-Road repaired (400 ft)
1-School yard landscaped
2-Culverts constructed
1-Water well constructed
1-Exterior school walls cemented

1-332 gal water tank installed
1-School roof constructed
10-Benches constructed for school
2-Market places constructed
23-Class room doors repaired
1-Drainage ditch dug (400 ft)
1-Public shower installed

Transportation: The brigade provided transportation for evacuating 1971 refugees, returning 301 innocent civilians to the district from which they were apprehended, 51,810 lbs of cement, 23,200 lbs of tin, and extracting 43,000 lbs of unpolished rice, 39,000 lbs of polished rice, and 40,000 lbs of salt. Vehicles transported the daily hire laborers twice daily except Sundays and national holidays.

d. Labor: The forward brigade elements employed 4,990 laborers on a temporary daily hire basis. The payroll was 399,2000 VN for an average of 0.80 per laborer per day.

e. Education and Training:

1) Daily English classes were taught by a brigade member, for an average of 56 teaching hours per week, to an average of 3350 students monthly.

2) On 11 August 1967, an Elementary School Sponsorship Program was initiated in PHAN RANG, by Support Battalion. The purpose of the program is to enhance the educational standards through films and provide materials to repair and improve existing facilities.

3) On 3 October a High School Scholarship Program was initiated by Support Battalion for 125 Vietnamese Students.

f. Distribution of Commodities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food</th>
<th>8,805 lbs</th>
<th>Water Pumps 4½ HP</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Powdered Milk</td>
<td>100 gals</td>
<td>Door Lock assemblies</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruit</td>
<td>44 crates</td>
<td>Crushed rock</td>
<td>22.5 cu yds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>260 lbs</td>
<td>Screen wire</td>
<td>2,400 sq ft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candy</td>
<td>1,915 lbs</td>
<td>Barbed wire</td>
<td>4,000 ft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toothpaste</td>
<td>75 tubes</td>
<td>Engineer stakes</td>
<td>4.25 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soap</td>
<td>2,899 lbs</td>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>51,810 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>1,613 lbs</td>
<td>Lumber</td>
<td>56,476 bd ft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>47 lbs</td>
<td>Paint</td>
<td>43 gals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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(RGS CSFOR-65) (U)

Corrugated Culverts 18x38' 18,656
Sand bags 3,904
Student Care Kits 2,656

Corrugated Culverts

Rice bags 10 boxes 8,077
Educational Toys 1 box

School supplies 3 boxes

Chalkboards 1 box

Rice bags 3,904

Student Care Kits 2,696

g. Recovered Goods Returned to GVN:

Unpolished Rice 43,000 lbs
Polished Rice 39,000 lbs
Salt 40,000 lbs

h. Voluntary Contributions:

62,000.00 VN was donated to the Thap Chan High School
Phan Rang, for school construction costs.

84,500.00 VN was contributed to the high school
Scholarship Program, Phan Rang, for 125 VN students.

i. Efforts not otherwise mentioned above:

Seven soccer and two volleyball games between US/VN teams were
played during the period.

The Brigade S5 and Section Sergeant attended the III Corps
Action Course in DA NANG, RVN.

The Brigade S5 and Battalion S5, 2/327 Infantry, attended the
MACV Advisors Orientation Course in Saigon, RVN.

The Support Battalion sponsored the Free World Friendship
Council Luncheon in October.

Seven entertainment activities were conducted for Vietnamese
children. A musical combo played once and American movies were shown on six
occasions.

The QUANG TIN Province Chief presented an RVN flag to the
Brigade. A joint flag raising ceremony was conducted commemorating the event.

X. Artillery

14C Operation HOOD RIVER (1 - 13 August 1967)

a. Mission: The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery supported
the 1st Brigade, 1st Airborne Division. Battery C, 2d Battalion (155mm Towed),
11th Artillery was placed under the OPCON of the Battalion and provided reinforcing fires. Battery C, 3d Battalion (155mm Towed), 1st Artillery and
Battery B, 3d Battalion (105/175mm SP), 10th Artillery provided general support
to the Brigade. Fire from a battery of 155mm guns and a battery of 8" howitzers
of the 5th Marines were also available.

b. Summary of Operations: The three organic batteries of the 2d
Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery provided support for their normally attached infantry battalions from firing positions in the vicinity of the infantry TAC OPs. The radar was not employed in the area of operations and remained in
support of the 2d ARVN Division and the 1st Korean Marine Brigade. The FSCG was established at Muong Khau area in the vicinity of QUANG NGI on 1 August and functioned until 9 August. The purpose of the facility was to coordinate fires within close proximity of boundaries and to provide additional fires to Free World Military Forces as requested. Additionally, the battalion operated an air traffic control station to all FNVN aircraft operating in the area of Operation HOOD RIVER. Once established the FSCG functioned smoothly and the flow of artillery information between the participating forces was timely and effective.

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(RCS GSFOR-65) (I)

202 Operation TONIC (13 - 29 August 1967)

a. Mission: The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 300th Artillery supported the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. Battery C, 3d Battalion (155mm Towed), 16th Artillery was placed under the OPCON of the Battalion and provided reinforcing fires.

b. Summary of Operations: The three organic batteries of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery provided support for their normally associated infantry battalions from firing positions in the vicinity of the infantry TAC CPs. The radar was not employed in the area of operations; however, it was displaced from DUC PHO to CHU IAI on 16 August for a period of seven days. On the afternoon of 13 August, a grass fire ignited by an unknown source burned over the firing position of Battery B, and the 2d CP of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 317th Infantry. Exploding ammunition forced evacuation of the position and precluded movement of hikers and equipment. After a night under enemy mortar and small arms fire, the battery who extracted to CHU IAI Base and began refitting operations. Battery C, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery, assumed the missions of Direct Support, 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry (vicinity Battery B), until reconstitution of Battery B was complete, and the battery was displaced back into the area of operations on 16 August.

302 Operation COOK (2 - 9 September 1967)

a. Mission: The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery supported the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. A Battery, 2d Battalion (155mm Towed), 11th Artillery was placed under the OPCON of the Battalion and provided reinforcing fires.

b. Summary of Operations: The three organic batteries of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery provided support for their normally associated infantry battalions from firing positions in the vicinity of the infantry TAC CPs. The radar was not employed in the area of operations and remained in support of the CHU IAI Base Camp area. Battery A, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery was located at a firing position within the 1st Battalion and provided reinforcing fires.

402 Operation WHEELER (11 September - 31 October, continuing)

a. Mission: The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery continues to support the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. Battery C, 3d Battalion (155mm Towed), 16th Artillery was assigned the mission to provide reinforcing fires. From 11 to 24 September, Battery B, 2d Battalion (155mm Towed), 9th Artillery was placed under the OPCON of the Battalion and provided reinforcing fires for the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry. On 4 October, Battery A, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery was placed under the OPCON of the Battalion and continues to provide support of the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry.

b. Summary of Operations to date: The three organic batteries of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th artillery continue to provide support for their normally associated infantry battalions from firing positions in the vicinity of the infantry TAC CPs. On 26 September, a firebase was established in the vicinity of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry. Battery C, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery conducted an airmobile displacement from VUNG Special Forces Camp to the firebase to be collocated with Battery A, 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery. The radar was placed under the OPCON of the Americal Division on 11 September and remained in the CHU IAI area. On 3 October the radar section terminated OPCON of the Division and conducted an airmobile displacement to the firebase. On 15 October, Battery A was subjected to a heavy mortar and ground attack that resulted in 6 friendly KIA and 29 WIA (21 medevaced). The following morning Battery A was extracted to TAC BMOC Base and the recently formed Battery B assumed their mission. Upon extraction from the firebase, the radar section conducted an airmobile displacement on 17 October to the TAC CP of the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry (BT 132282), and Battery C, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery returned to the firing position at VUNG Special Forces Camp (BT 109142).
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5. The following internal training has been conducted during the reporting period:

a. During Operation HENNY, the 3d Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer (FADAC) was issued to the Battalion. The basis of issue was one per firing battery and one to battalion FDC. Issue was made at the completion of a five-day course conducted by a New Equipment Training Team attended by two personnel per battery sized unit. Each unit currently has two trained operators while the battalion communications section has two personnel qualified as maintenance technicians.

b. Due to the requirement to provide an additional firing battery, upon the arrival of the 3d Battalion (Airborne), 504th Infantry, Battery D (Provisional), 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery was organized on 20 October 1967. Personnel and equipment were gathered from existing resources within the Battalion. Each existing firing battery supplied one complete howitzer section while two float howitzers were acquired from Support Battalion. Fire direction classes were conducted by the Battalion FDC section, while firing battery classes were conducted on the howitzers. On 6 October, Battery D displaced by road to a firing position at BT 523035 and conducted a live fire exercise. On 12 October the personnel of Battery D made an air mobile displacement from LOS BANOS Base to the Battery C position and assumed the C battery mission for three days. Subsequently, the personnel of Battery D relieved Battery A personnel for seven days and Battery B personnel for three days. On 1 November Battery D will displace by LST to PHAN RANG and commence support of the 3d Battalion (Airborne), 504th Infantry.

c. On the morning of 15 October, Battery A was subjected to a heavy mortar and ground attack that resulted in 6 KIA and 29 WIA to battery personnel. The remaining personnel were extracted to LOS BANOS Base for a standdown and retraining. Within three days the Battery received 17 replacements, 2 of them being infantrymen. On 19 October the battery was reorganized and received training in maintenance, nomenclature and laying of the M102 Howitzer. The following day was devoted to other firing battery techniques. The new battery FDC personnel received training from battalion FDC personnel for two days. On 21 October, the reformed battery made an air mobile displacement from LOS BANOS Base to a firing position at BT 523035 and fired over 200 rounds at known and suspected enemy locations. In the afternoon, the battery received training on air mobile displacement and displaced the howitzers to LOS BANOS Base by CH-47 helicopter. On 22 October, Battery A returned to the area of operations and resumed support of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

The following problem areas have been encountered during the reporting period:

1a. Lack of readily available supply parts, and Technical Assistance Representatives for the Battalion Counter mortar Radar (AH/AvQ-4).

a. In order to become completely effective, the radar section must be provided with a readily available supply of critical parts. At present, most parts in the critical category are available on a loan status only and are almost impossible to obtain through normal requisition channels. Repair parts previously requisitioned for as long as 210 days on 0-2 priority requisitions have still not been received. Furthermore, on-the-spot repair of the radar is greatly hindered due to the authorization to stock only running spares.

b. Technical Assistance Representatives for the AH/AvQ-4 radar should be located in critical areas in order to be available for immediate requests. In the case of this battalion, when technical assistance is required, a minimum of two days are required for transportation of personnel to the base camp area and at least one day for trouble shooting. In addition, it is recommended that Technical Support Radar Technicians, who are trained through and including support echelon levels of maintenance, be authorized to repair and stock critical parts to meet the tactical situation. At present, the radar section is authorized two generators, the PU-107-m-9 (diesel mounted) and the PU-276X (mounted in a 3/4 ton trailer). If these generator power supplies were replaced by military standard engines, the immediate procurement of repair parts would be facilitated.
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20. Replacement of Combat Loss Howitzers, 105mm, Towed, MK2.

a. During the reporting period, a total of five 105mm howitzers, MK2, were damaged beyond repair due to combat operations. Of the five howitzers, four had the corresponding fire control and section equipment destroyed simultaneously. Appropriate requisitions and "combat losses" were submitted immediately, resulting in the receipt of four howitzers minus fire control and necessary section equipment. With the acceptance of the four howitzers, minus equipment, this unit reportedly cancelled the request for four howitzers with equipment, even though the initial request was for four complete howitzers. The fifth combat loss was requisitioned for the howitzer minus equipment, and was received as such. Recent information received by this unit indicates that the majority of replacement howitzers in country are without fire control and section equipment. It has been the experience of this unit that, when a howitzer is damaged beyond repair, the accompanying fire control equipment is also destroyed. The fire control equipment is vital to the weapon since it cannot be fired without it.

b. The necessary fire control and section equipment to operate the howitzers was obtained from the Brigade Support Battalion and/or requisitioned from within the Battalion. This reduced the overall efficiency of the battalion but did not hinder the mission of the Battalion. Requisitions for each single missing item were processed immediately. However, as of this date, such of the equipment has still not been received. This problem could re-occur if sufficient complete howitzers are not available in country.

L. Engineers.

a. The following data is submitted concerning Operational Report.

Lessons learned for the quarterly reporting period ending 31 October 1967.


a. During the reporting period the primary engineer mission was direct combat support to infantry maneuver battalions in the field. This support included, but was not limited to, landing zones and Maginot line clearances, tunnel and bunker destruction, detection and neutralization of US and enemy land mines and booby traps, construction of the "safe zone" and fighting as infantry. In addition to combat activity in the area of operations, engineer effort accounted for construction of the Brigade Base Camp forward. This work included building an extensive road net, laying sixteen 35 foot culverts, installing three one-half kilometers of triple concertina protective fence, construction of approximately thirty tent frames and ten tent frames and general ground preparation for tent sites. Other engineer effort for the period was solicited by the Marine Corps and by civil affairs. This unit expended approximately 100 dump truck hours assisting the Marines in route improvement of QL 1 between CHU AI and DA NANG, and provided sweep teams on call for clearing this stretch of road. Other engineer effort for the period was solicited by the Marine Corps and by civil affairs. This unit expended approximately 100 dump truck hours assisting the Marines in route improvement of QL 1 between CHU AI and DA NANG, and provided sweep teams on call for clearing this stretch of road. In the area of civil affairs, this unit constructed a complete drainage system for the refugee hamlet of LY TRA, assisted the villagers in the construction of a new school house, and put in approximately 400 cubic yards of fill.

b. A fourth line platoon was organized and trained in August to provide combat engineer support for the 3d Battalion (Airborne), 506th Infantry in November 1967. The platoon trained in demolition techniques, mine clearing methods and helicopter LZ construction. The platoon operated in September and October in support of 1st Battalion, 25th Infantry and 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, both of which were CPSCM to the brigade at the time.

c. Training conducted during the period consisted primarily of refresher demolition classes and training on new demolition materials and the destruction of US mines and enemy mines and booby traps. This training is necessary to keep all men current on demolition practices, overcome carelessness and familiarization with new equipment and techniques the enemy may employ.

d. Problem Area.

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Problem area: The major problem area concerning the engineer capability is in the maintenance field on engineer equipment. Spare parts and replacement for chain saws, grader and 1.5 KW DC generators have been consistently critical.

(2) Discussion: This problem came about primarily because the chain saws and airborne grader are not Army standard equipment. Because of this, it is impossible to requisition parts. For example, the primary cause for breakdown on the chain saw is magneto malfunction. The majority of the saws are Wright brand name and there is no replacement magneto in the Army supply system to replace them. The grader is affected by the same circumstances. As a non-standard piece of equipment, repair parts cannot be requisitioned. In the case of the DC generators, apparently motors for 1.5 KW generators are in short supply throughout the theater.

(3) Action taken: In order to solve the problems of maintenance for these particular pieces of equipment, the items are being turned in for salvage when they break down and standard equipment is being requested as replacement.

MU Provost Marshal.

1. The Brigade Provost Marshal supports the tactical elements of the Brigade in the following manner:
   a. Convoy escort and security.
   b. PW escort and security.
   c. Check point and traffic control operations.
   d. Escorting and security of mine-sweep operations.
   e. Escorting and security of MEDCAPS.
   f. Escorting and search of villages and hamlets, accomplished with a platoon of National Police Forces, recently attached.
   g. Route reconnaissance prior to and during Brigade displacements.

2. A general breakdown of support rendered during this period is as follows:
   a. Security and escort of twelve motor marches of 50 miles or farther.
   b. Secured and processed over 400 detainees/PW's.
   c. Escorted sixteen MEDCAP operations.
   d. Normal personnel and traffic control functions.
   e. Normal daily mine-sweep operations until the Brigade left the DUC PHO area.
   f. Extensive village and hamlet cordon and search operations during July, August and part of September, in conjunction with the National Police Field Forces.
   g. Road reconnaissance conducted prior to all motor marches.

3. Problem Areas.
   (1) Discussion: General employment of National Police Field Forces will generate operational problems unless commanders employing this
agency are properly educated concerning the capabilities of these individuals. Utilization of lead elements exposes these personnel to unnecessary hazards, thus often minimizing their effectiveness when needed in other areas. Their primary mission is population and resources control and are best utilized in conjunction with operation in heavily populated areas and on check points used for traffic control.

(2) Recommendations: That definite guidelines should be established for employment of National Police Field Forces.

Navy Aviation.

1. General concept of operations during the reported period remained unchanged from the previous quarter. The type terrain remained the same, the principal objectives paralleled those of the previous quarter. The two OH-1D aircraft provided the required vehicle to command and control the Brigade elements by the Commander and the Deputy Commander. The OH-23 type helicopters provided limited command and control vehicles as well as a suitable means of transporting other Staff and Liaison Officers, as necessary, to accomplish the mission assigned. The U-6A aircraft, when available, permitted suitable transport between the forward area and the base complex located some 200 miles away. The aircraft was not available for a period of approximately 30 days for installation of a more desirable avionics system.

The 176th Aviation Company remained in direct support to this Brigade and the 11th Aviation Battalion provided general support from the 161st Aviation Company, and the 178th Aviation Company. Specific support provided by each is best reflected in the individual supporting unit OPREP 5 report.

2. Signal.

1. General. During the period the Brigade Signal Section planned and supervised the communications support for the Brigade during all phases of the operation.

2(U) Signal Assets. The communications were provided during the first half of the period by the organic communications platoon from headquarters and headquarters company and the attached forward support platoon from Company B, 507th Signal Battalion. On 15 September 1967, both platoons were functionally combined into a provisional signal company. The General Order used as authority for this organization is attached as Incl 1.

3. Means of Communications. During the period the means of communications available to the Brigade were used as follows:

a. Radio.

(1) FM Radio. FM radio continued to be the principal command and control communications means. Utilizing the AN/PRC-25 at company and platoon level and the AN/VRC-46 (dismounted) at battalion and brigade level, the Brigade maintained continuous and positive contact with all elements of the command. The new squad radio (AN/TRT-4 and AN/PRL-9) was introduced at and below company level during the last two weeks of the period; however, its impact on low level command control communications cannot be stated at this time.

(2) FM Radio with KY-68EC Equipment. During the period heavy emphasis was placed on the use of secure FM voice between the battalion TAC CP's and the SHOC. The use of this capability simplified the transmission of classified information by limiting the requirement to use complicated codes. The secure capability also permitted extensive and detailed coordination between adjacent units.

(3) AM Radio. The use of AM radio was considerably upgraded during the period. Three new SSB rigs (AN/VSC-2) were received to replace three of the old, obsolete and worn-out AN/VSC-1 equipment. Two AN/VSC-2's
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were employed to provide secure RATT between the Support Battalion in PHAN RANG and the Forward Supply Element (FSE) at Brigade Main CP. When the supply system extended itself to a forward location (FSP) the third rig was employed thus providing secure RATT at all echelons of the brigade's supply system. Notification has been received from USARV that four more AN/VSC-2's are ready for issue. These will replace all but one of the brigade's AN/VSC-1's and provide the secure RATT capability at battalion level.

b. Tactical Wire. The brigade continued to use tactical wire systems extensively in the brigade CP and in the battalions' rear CP's. Limited use was made of tactical wire at TAC CP's principally for perimeter defense nets. In each of three principal brigade CP's during the period the Brigade averaged 15 miles of wire in its operation.

c. Land Line Teletype. Land line teletype (secure) was used to terminate one circuit from higher headquarters and one circuit between the brigade Main and Rear CP's. Additional use was made of the Main/Rear circuit by the use of TEL/TO service. This service permitted passing of bulky routine administrative traffic in a timely and efficient manner.

d. VHF. VHF was the only means of communications available to the brigade which was not used during the period. The principal reason for not using it was the failure to include it in the concept of operation. Future communications plans will include the VHF utilization recommendations.

4. External Signal Support. The brigade was supported by higher headquarters communications as follows:

a. VHF. The Americal Division provided VHF to the brigade, providing both voice and teletype access to higher and adjacent units.

b. DCA Support. The Defense Communications Agency provided two low quality circuits between Main and Rear. One was for voice; one was for teletype.

5. Chemical.

a. Portable Flamethrower Training: During the months of August and September two (2) individuals from each rifle company in the infantry battalions and ten (10) individuals from the Security Platoon and A/326 Engineers received training in the maintenance, operations and employment of the M2A7 portable flamethrower. All personnel trained had a six (6) month reliability in the brigade.

b. In September four (4) personnel from the 20th Chemical Detachment and the Brigade Chemical Officer received seven (7) days of training in the care and maintenance and employment of the Manpack Personnel Detector (Airborne Mode). The training was conducted by Mr. Weis of General Electric Company.

b. Operations: A brief summary of chemical operations during the period are as follows:

a. CS Grenade drops: A total of 3,168 M7A3 CS grenades were dropped in support of infantry troops during the period. 2,608 were dropped in support of troops conducting Operation WHEELER west of PHAN THI. Targets consisted of enemy snipers, fortified defensive positions and fortified VC/NVA/
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controlled hamlets. on 19 september a cs grenade drop was integrated with a
smoke grenade drop to support an attack of a fortified hamlet. the purpose of
this mission was quick incapacitation by the cs and screening of friendly
elements assaulting across a rice paddy. the operation was successful intro-
ducing a new type of chemical support to the brigade.

b. cs persistent bag drops: 2,140 pounds of persistent cs-1 was
dropped on enemy defensive positions, base camps, hospital sites and routes of
egress. the primary purpose of these missions was to deny the enemy use of
these areas and restrict his movement.

c. rice/salt destruction: during the period 141 tons of enemy
rice was destroyed utilizing 1850 pounds of bulk cs-1. in addition to seeding
the cache with cs-1, an additional 1880 pounds of cs-1 was air dropped in the
immediate area surrounding each cache.

d. napack personnel detector - "people sniffer": "people sniffer"
operations commenced in september 1967. as of the close of this reporting
period 35 missions had been conducted. significant readings were recorded on
23 of these missions. in each instance, this information was immediately
relayed to the battalion s-2’s and the brigade fsc. an artillery concentration
was fired in all areas which were supported by other intelligence sources.
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SECTION 2

Commander Observations and Recommendations

Part I: Observations (Lessons Learned)

A. Operations

1. Item: Construction of landing zones.
   a. Discussion: When units are operating in densely vegetated jungles, areas suitable for helicopter landing zones for emergency medical evacuation and resupply are difficult to find and construct.
   b. Observation: Maximum use should be made of planned air strikes and Combat Skyspot using large size bombs forward of advancing troops to insure that emergency landing zones are available if needed.

2. Item: Tunnel denial
   a. Discussion: Many tunnel complexes are too large to destroy them easily to prevent the enemy from using them again.
   b. Observation: Denying the enemy the use of a large tunnel can be accomplished effectively by contaminating the tunnel with persistent CS. Bags of CS are placed three meters apart within the tunnel and all entrances are closed using demolitions.

3. Item: Bunker destruction
   a. Discussion: Large overheaded bunkers are difficult to destroy completely without using large amounts of explosives.
   b. Observation: One efficient method of denying the bunker to the enemy without completely destroying the bunker is to seed the bunker with persistent CS. Then, with only a small amount of explosives, collapse the overhead covering.

4. Item: Air to ground radio nets
   a. Discussion: Air Force forward air controller radios mounted in the O-1E aircraft do not have the capability to transmit and receive on the half megacycle. In addition, the radio’s highest frequency is 51.9 megacycles while the AN/PRC-25 radio used by the Army has a frequency up to 75.95 megacycles. The result is insufficient air-to-ground frequency to supply all maneuver units.
   b. Observation: Priority of frequencies with whole megacycles must be allocated to maneuver units to insure adequate air-to-ground communications.

5. Item: Debriefing of Pilots
   a. Discussion: All available sources of intelligence information must be sought. Pilots of the daily command and control, utility and "slick" helicopters fly over the area of operation each day and become familiar with the terrain.
   b. Observation: All pilots should be debriefed after every mission to ascertain any possible intelligence information.

   a. Discussion: Fires become a potential hazard when battalion tactical command posts and fire bases are established on hills covered with tall elephant grass. In one instance, a fire started at the base of a hill by an unknown source swept over the artillery fire base and rendered the artillery battery ineffective for several days.
b. Observation: The grass on the hill should be burned off prior to establishing a fire base. White phosphorus rockets or napalm placed on the hill prior to establishing the base will help in eliminating fire hazards.

7(b) Item: Communications during monsoons

a. Discussion: Monsoon weather greatly decreases the range and efficiency of the FM radios currently assigned to infantry units.

b. Observation: In addition to protecting the radio from the rain, plans should be made to establish radio relay stations so that in the event communications problems develop, the relay station can be rapidly established and maintain the required communications.

8(a) Item: Evacuation of downed aircraft

a. Discussion: Helicopters downed in enemy territory because of mechanical failure or ground fire must be evacuated as rapidly as possible. Without prompt evacuation, a maneuver unit is required to secure the downed aircraft which, in turn, jeopardizes the accomplishment of the mission and allows time for the enemy to maneuver and attack.

b. Observation: Plans must be made and recovery aircraft on call to insure that downed aircraft are evacuated promptly.

9(f) Item: Compromise of Unit location by helicopters

a. Discussion: The presence of helicopters resupplying a unit, extracting wounded or injured personnel or command and control helicopter landing for a conference between commanders, while necessary, compromises a unit’s location. This, in turn, allows the enemy to fix the unit’s location and attack with ground forces or with indirect fire weapons.

b. Observation: To minimize the vulnerability of a unit and reduce the enemy’s capability of pinpointing the location, a unit should immediately move away from the landing zone. Another effective method of guarding against a possible mortar attack is to displace a short distance (200-400 meters) after dark.

11) Intelligence:

1. Item: The Use of Province Reconnaissance Units (PRU)

a. Discussion: The employment of PRU’s with line companies and reconnaissance elements of the battalion has proven successful especially in populated areas. Since they are usually from the area in which they were used, they know the area and the people. One unit was employed with a HU CHAI who provided general information concerning the location of a cache. The PRU’s were then able to detect the exact spot and point out several known VC.

b. Observation: The continued use of PRU’s and similar indigenous groups is recommended.

2. Item: Joint Use of Aircraft and People Sniffer:

a. Discussion: Recent use of the People Sniffer in conjunction with the VR aircraft has shown that each complements information gained by the other. Often, the People Sniffer will find concentrations of enemy, who then try to evade. With the VR aircraft in an adjacent area, the direction of movement and the accurate size of the enemy force can be determined.

b. Observation: When aircraft are available or when a priority mission exists, the People Sniffer and VR aircraft should be flown jointly thereby doubling the capability to gather intelligence.
C. Engineer

1. Item: Tunnel destruction

a. Discussion: During operations in Uden AO in I Corps, enemy tunnels were discovered which were extremely sophisticated and extensive in design. Denial of future use by the enemy of these fortifications has proved to be a considerable problem. Tunnels discovered indicated that the systems were constructed over a long period of time without interference from friendly forces. Some complexes found were estimated to have been emplaced and improved over a period of ten years. In one case, a 100 meter long tunnel complex lined with concrete and tile was discovered. Entrance upon over period of ten years.

b. Some complexes foeid were estimated to have been emplaced and improved over a long period to deny to enemy attack when stationary, few unit commanders desire, to stay available to the unit. Tunnel destruction den, ouflaged and lined with concrete and tile was discovered. Entrenceb upon over period of ten years.

(1) Considering these factors, complete destruction is frequently not feasible under the limitations of time and demolition materials available to the unit. Tunnel destruction demolitions available include C-4, TNT, cratering charges, shaped charges and acetylene destruct kits. The acetylene kits do not work effectively when overburden exceeds 7 feet and have not been used for tunnel destruction in Uden AO. The amount of standard demolition needed to completely destroy the type of tunnels found in the zone would require a special supply ship to come to the tunnel site. Since a unit is vulnerable to enemy attack when stationary, few unit commanders desire to stay in one place too long. Therefore, the general accepted means of denial of a tunnel is to seal the tunnel with chemicals and close the entrance. Although this is by no means a permanent measure, such action will deny immediate reoccupation. If the allied forces operate in the area, the enemy will not have the freedom of movement to reopen the tunnel.

(2) A request for a new tunnel destruction system which uses the new explosive "ASTROLITE G" which has 5 times the power of C-4 has been submitted. Command emphasis dictates whether enough time can be taken to properly destroy tunnels.

b. Observation: The following method of sealing entrances has been developed. Upon discovery of a tunnel, the length is explored and air vents and escape holes are plugged as using brush and dirt, making the tunnel as air tight as possible. An average thickness of overburden is determined and a 15 pound shaped charge is set in the ceiling of the tunnel. One charge is located the same distance in from the tunnel entrance as the thickness of the overburden in feet. The shaped charge blows a hole suitable for the placing of a cratering charge or a TNT charge. If TNT is used, the amount of explosive required is calculated by PDEO. The main charge is placed in the hole created by the shaped charge, tamped and propped in place. The tunnel is then seeded with cans of crystalline CS and the whole packet is blown. This method has proven to be effective for tunnel denial.

2. Item: Landing Zone Clearing Operation

a. Discussion: Landing zone clearances for a combat assault were often subjected to enemy fire, both sniper and automatic weapons. The resulting casualties received when personnel leaped from the helicopters and hit anti-personnel mines had considerable effect upon the morale of men going into a combat assault and upon the time involved in getting off the LZ. Therefore, a procedure had to be developed to insure that at least the assault troops be provided with mine free terrain on which to land, and a safe path off the LZ.

(1) In Uden AO most LZ sites were obvious to the enemy, and it was imperative to prepare the LZ's with anti-helicopter puntl stakes and anti-personnel mines. In most cases, the 40 mines were of the "Bouncing Betty" type. The primary advantage of a combat assault, the LZ's are prepared from the air just prior to the assault. Due to the time limitations on the LZ and the fact that the LZ's are often subject to enemy fire, engineers cannot clear LZ from the ground either prior to the infantry at-
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967
(RUC GSPU-63) (U)

assault or during the assault. This necessitated development of a fast and efficient means of clearing a LZ or landing space for troops and pathways off the LZ during the assault. An approach to the solution is described below.

(2) The first problem solved was that of providing the helicopters with a safe place to discharge troops. To this end the LZ is prepared to receive three ships simultaneously. The "daisy cutter" was developed for this purpose. The bomb is a standard 500 pound bomb with a three foot length of pipe attached to the detonator. The bomb explodes 15 feet from the ground and clears an area approximately 20 feet in radius of punji stakes. AP mines within 9 feet of the point of detonation are exploded by sympathetic detonation. A three ship LZ is prepared by a minimum hit on the LZ of six 500 pound bombs and six daisy cutters. This gives at least 12 locations where a ship can discharge troops safely. The next problem was to get troops off the LZ without detonating anti-personnel mines. The solution to this problem was the MK-2 Projected Charge. This charge comes complete in a package weighing 52 pounds. It consists of 170 feet of detonation cable which is 38 times as powerful as normal det cord. The cable is fired over the LZ by means of a small rocket motor. When the cable explodes, it clears a path one foot in width and exposes any mines one foot on either side of the path. Set up and detonation can be accomplished by two engineers in less than four minutes. To employ this method, each of the first three helicopters in the assault carry two engineers with one projected charge and four infantrymen. The ships discharged the troops over a crater made by a 500 pound bomb. The engineers set up the projected charge on the lip of the crater nearest the LZ edge. Infantry provided security from the crater. The charge is set and blown and a clearly visible path is produced. If the LZ is abnormally large, a series of charges are used between craters until there is a path off the LZ.

b. Observation: A safe landing zone can be constructed with lanes to move off the LZ without exposing troops to mine and punji stake obstacles.

Part II: RECOMMENDATIONS.

A(U)When operating in dense jungle covered mountains where landing zones are difficult to find or prepare, resupply of units and evacuation of non-critically wounded/injured or killed in hostile action becomes a serious problem. Medevac helicopters are not authorized to winch non-critically wounded and killed personnel in hostile action. Units must, on their assigned mission to find or prepare a landing zone to accomplish resupply of evacuation. Recommend that all assault helicopter companies have organic to their unit two winches for evacuation and resupply of units in areas where landing zones are not available.

B(U)That "ASTIMULITE C" explosive be procured under the ENSURE program for field evaluation.

C(U)The need for this Brigade to operate 6 LOH type helicopters, 2 UH-1D helicopters, and one U-6A fixed-wing aircraft has been recognized by higher headquarters. The 9 aircraft assigned requires a minimum of 11 pilots; in addition this Brigade must have an Aviation Officer to coordinate the support of other than organic aviation. Present staffing level is based on authorized personnel strength and not assigned aircraft. Therefore two officers and non-commissioned officers are currently authorized. A Bravo-wide 90 percent factor has been applied to the seven pilots. This further reduced the manning level to six aviators to fulfill the need to occupy the 12 aircraft seats and 1 Staff Aviation Officer position. The operational requirements of this Brigade are not in anyway reduced accordingly so the need which normally would be fulfilled by organic aircraft must then be handled by the already over-taxed direct support aviation company which seriously affects the efforts of the combat elements. It is recommended that aviators be authorized based upon the need which has been recognized. Considering the Army-wide shortage of aviator personnel, the 90 percent factor applied to the 12 aviators required would be acceptable.

U(U)During the past quarter we have operated in the Chu Lai area where the only army level medical facility has been the 2d Surgical Hospital. During the
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(RC CUSSH-65) (U)

quarter, in addition to sustaining over 600 battle casualties, we have evacuated over 1000 medical patients. Approximately 70% of these patients return to duty within 30 days. Since the 28 Surgical Hospital has an average stay of only 2.5 days, it follows that the majority of patients return to evacuation hospitals (the closest being 125 miles south). The lack of a nearby facility with longer holding capacity causes undue delay in returning troops to duty. An additional disadvantage experienced is due to the problem involved in obtaining outpatient consulta and laboratory work. Due to the troop and casualty density of the Chu Lai area, recommend that additional medical facilities be placed in this area.

E(I) The policy of forwarding all requests for registration of war trophies to the Headquarters Area Command Provost Marshal in Saigon is an extreme inconvenience to personnel assigned to tactical organizations far removed from the Saigon area. USARV Reg 643-20 directs that the completed DU Form 603, along with the authenticated DD Form 603-1 be forwarded to the PH Registration Section, AD, APD 962D. It often takes in-country mail in excess of seven days to reach Saigon from this location. Troopers anticipating EMON often only have four or five days to travel to the rear base camp area and clear prior to departing for OODS. Experience has proven that the majority of soldiers in this brigade do not get around to thinking about registering war trophies until it's too late. This does not allow time for registering war trophies by mail, and necessitates a personal trip to Saigon on behalf of the owner. This means a full day in travel getting to Saigon and the same returning. Additionally, once in Saigon it is extremely difficult for troops to find transportation, etc. The regulation seems to be written for those people in the Saigon area. Recommend that Field and area Provost Marshals be authorized to register war trophies.

Section,

 commanders in this brigade continue to experience the need for an additional Installation Stockade in the central or North Central area of South Vietnam. The distance and time factors presently involved are so great that they influence legal proceedings within this brigade. Recommend that, if planning efforts have not been initiated for a second USARV Installation Stockade, consideration be given to same.

The shortage of cable installation kits for the KT-8/TS/EC equipment places a serious limitation on the use of secure PH voice. The brigade has on hand thirteen KT-8's but only five L-mode cables. The only limit of the equipment to three battalions and brigade headquarters. The fifth cable is used for a running spare. The lack of L-mode cables precludes the use of secure PH voice by the artillery battalion. Priority 2 requisitions have been placed for the KT-8/TS/EC installation kits. The requisitions are now nearing 90 days duration despite the continual follow-up by supply personnel. In view of the unique being placed on secure communications by higher headquarters, recommend action be taken to ensure that adequate KT-8/TS/EC installation kits (581G-670-1558) are available within the supply system.

H(U) The two circuits provided between main and rear by Defense Communications Agency were of marginal quality and the outage time was excessive. Both the telegraph and voice circuits between main and rear experienced 15% and 36% outage respectively during the period. The voice circuit was out for a total of 72 hours at one time on numerous occasions, and the teletype circuit experienced up to 120 hours of continuous outage. The circuit quality for both circuits has been consistently marginal at best. This brigade is noted for its frequent and varied movements throughout Vietnam, resulting in frequent reliance upon DCA for communications between main and rear CP's. Recommend higher headquarters study the DCA system to determine why it is not responsive to tactical requirements.
A. Survey Information (Reference USARV message AVHC-033 80043)

1. Augmentation of Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Units

   a. Organization & Training: The Brigade Long Range Reconnaissance Detachment is composed of sixty-one personnel, comprising eight six-man patrol teams, two radio base-stations, and a Detachment Headquarters section. Members are recruited from existing brigade assets and the replacement stream, with emphasis on Ranger qualified, Special Forces, or Recondo trained personnel. Allocations are filled for the MACV Recondo School and several teams attended the 1st Marine Recon School in CHU LAI. The reconnaissance elements have only recently been organized as a Detachment, and appropriate T&Es and SOPs are in the development stage. More demanding missions are in the planning stage and the detachment's capabilities capitalized more fully. It is felt that two officers are required: one involved with the planning, training, and tactical employment of patrols and another officer to supervise training, coordinate with adjacent units, and fulfill administrative requirements of the detachment. A detachment debriefing report or after action report will be initiated to better evaluate the employment and training of the unit.

   It was determined that further training, after completion of Recondo School or 1st Marine Recondo School, was needed in the areas of TAC Air employment and adjustment of artillery. This training was accomplished within the brigade and has proved invaluable in recent operations.

   b. Techniques of Employment: In the past the detachment has frequently been employed as an additional maneuver element under the operational control of one of the rifle battalions and has seen few legitimate "Long Range" missions; however, this has proved effective and is an indication of the versatility of the unit.

   No mobile Long Range Reconnaissance, in the technical sense, has been employed by the brigade. The most often used method of employment has been as an immobile surveillance - observation post. A brief discussion of one such operation follows: The units were employed as a stationary observation post, establishing a radio base-station at an adjacent battalion command post, and maintaining one radio base-station at the brigade forward area in CHU LAX. Approximately twenty men occupied the tops of prominent terrain features previously used for the same type of mission by Recon teams of the 1st Marine Recon Battalion. They made helicopter assaults on the chosen LZs after extensive artillery and TAC Air Preps, necessitated by previous incidents of mining and ambushing of lucrative LZs within the area by the enemy. The mission was to maintain surveillance on natural routes of infiltration and communication. Since insertion was not clandestine, defensive facilities not normally used by a reconnaissance element were employed. For example: bunkers with overhead cover were constructed, sandbags were brought in by helicopter, and concertina wire laid around the perimeter. Effective employment of TAC Air and artillery greatly reduced the enemy's daylight movement and well-planned artillery program undoubtedly hindered enemy operations at night.

   In enemy base areas containing large concentrations of enemy forces, clandestine entry of Long Range Patrols by helicopter is impractical and insecure. The method of clandestine entry into the proposed area of operation, from an adjacent unit perimeter, usually a battalion TAC CP or artillery fire base, has proved more secure; however, it is possible only when the LRRP area of operation is within a practical distance of an adjacent unit. Due to the lack of an uncommitted unit of platoon or company size to act as an immediate reaction force for the reconnaissance detachment, the brigade has hesitated to commit patrols in areas far beyond direct support artillery fires and has usually employed them within a portion of the periphery of the brigade area of operation.

   c. Problem Area: Training has been affected by the lack of Long Range missions; employment only as a reconnaissance element should be emphasized to all sections and commanders controlling the detachment's employment.

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Employment as a rifle platoon or on other than legitimate recon missions contributes little to the mission training of the LRRP's; in addition, this is not their primary mission, and their TO&E is not designed for engagement (e.g., no LAG carried).

A problem presently confronting operations is the lack of one officer. If one officer conducts the operation in the field, no one is available to handle administrative action and control operations from the rear. Close coordination with the Brigade S-2 is essential even during the operation, therefore an XO or training officer is required. The need for a commander as opposed to a platoon leader is obvious. As more long range patrolling is implemented further advance planning will be necessitated.

Inclosures:
1. Organizational Chart
2. General Order 702
   September 1967
   Withdrawn, Hqs, DA
4. After Action Report, Operation Malham
   Withdrawn, Hqs, DA; pub as CAAR 67X047
5. After Action Report, Operation Line
   Withdrawn, Hqs, DA; pub as CAAR 67X047
6. After Action Report, Operation Hooch
   Withdrawn, Hqs, DA; pub as CAAR 67X047
7. After Action Report, Operation Brown
   Withdrawn, Hqs, DA; pub as CAAR 67X047
8. After Action Report, Operation Desert Force
   Withdrawn, Hqs, DA; pub as CAAR 67X047

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - CG, Americal Division
2 - Adj Corps for Force Development, Da, Washington D.C. 20310 (thru channels)
2 - CINCUSAPO, ATTN: GPH-AD AO 96555
2 - DCG, USAV, ATTN: AVO-LOG-DH APO 96375
1 - CG, 101st Abn Div, Fort Campbell, Ky.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (AER-CSPR-65)(U)

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

1. (U) Forwarded herewith is the subject report of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

2. (C) The following comments are made concerning the referenced paragraph of the basic communication.

   a. Reference: Section I, para 106g(10)(a), pg 5. The mortar and ground attack on Battery A, 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery illustrated two additional points which merit mention.

      (1) The defensive perimeter of an artillery battery must be established so that the enemy can not penetrate the outside perimeter without being detected. When allied forces are used to man the perimeter, personnel from the battery must be integrated into the defense to insure that standard U.S. policies are adhered to. Frequent checks of the perimeter by the battery commander or his representative should insure that all personnel are alert.

      (2) The AN/MPS-4A Countermortar Radar was successfully used to guide evacuation helicopters into the position when darkness and weather conditions prevented visual flight control. This technique, while not new, should be disseminated so that other units having the AN/MPS-4A are aware of this capability.

   b. Reference: Section I, para 103, pg 9, and 104, pg 17. Although the 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery formed a fourth howitzer battery from battalion resources while remaining operational, it is not recommended that other artillery battalions be required to do so. The four firing batteries were considerably reduced in strength and, although the battalion continued to operate effectively, a dangerous situation could have developed. Reduction of the strength of an artillery battery in combat hampers the responsiveness and/or accuracy of supporting fires.

   c. Reference: Section I, para 103A(1), pg 31; Employment of National Police Field Forces. Concur. The American Division Provost Marshal has provided guidelines to the command for utilization of these forces.

   d. Reference: Section II, Part I, para 44, pg 35; Air to Ground Radio Sets. Concur. Insufficient number of PM frequencies available is due to the use of the AN/FRC-10 by FJAF and the AN/ARC-44 utilized in O-1 aircraft. Although only a limited number of air-ground frequencies (30.0 - 51.9 MHz) are issued, American Division J-3, MAF, each infantry

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Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10
and artillery battalion is furnished at least one air-ground frequency enabling that unit to communicate with 0-1 aircraft. Upon conversion to 0-2 aircraft, the problem will be alleviated due to the wider frequency range of 0-2 radios.

For The Commander:

[Signature]

RANURO KABABA
Capt., Adj.
Adjutant General
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1967 from Headquarters, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (AABA) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning winches for evacuation, page 38, paragraph A: Concur. Internal rescue hoists have been developed for use with the UH-1 helicopter. These hoists are presently in short supply and have been issued only to Air Evacuation Medical Units. When adequate stocks become available, they will be issued to Assault Helicopter Companies on a basis of two per company.

b. Reference item concerning Astrolite G be procured under the ENSURE program for field evaluation, page 38, paragraph A: Nonconcur. A request for a more acceptable tunnel destruction system has been submitted based on an evaluation of the XM-69 system. In addition, R&D has been requested to develop a liquid explosive which can be employed to destroy tunnel complexes.

c. Reference item concerning medical facilities, page 38, paragraph D: Concur. Additional medical facilities have been programmed for the Chu Lai area and should be operational in the near future.

d. Reference item concerning registration of war trophies, page 39, paragraph E: Nonconcur. A Vietnamese export license must be obtained prior to exporting war trophy firearms from Vietnam. Since the export license is issued only through the US Embassy in Saigon, the Provost Marshal, Headquarters Area Command is designated to act in behalf of the Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam for the registration of war trophy firearms. USARV Regulation 643-20 indicates that application for export license should be initiated 60 days prior to DEROS and makes provision for issue of temporary export licenses.

e. Reference item concerning need for an additional stockade, page 39, paragraph F: Concur. Action has been initiated by this headquarters to establish an additional USARV Stockade in the north central area of South Vietnam.
f. Reference item concerning shortage of cable installation kits, page 39, paragraph G: Concur. The X-mode cables have been placed on requisition. A small quantity of cables has been allocated to the units. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, is scheduled to receive four. This should relieve the problem until such time as the total quantity of cables is received.

g. Reference item concerning DCA system, page 39, paragraph H. More information has been requested to enable this headquarters to identify problem circuits. 1st Signal Brigade and 21st Signal Group have been contacted, but no information is available from these sources to identify subject circuits. Circuit designations or points of termination of circuits are required in order to evaluate the problem.

3. (U) A copy of this endorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

C.S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copy Furnished:

HQ, 1st Bn, 101st Abn Div
HQ, Americal Div

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GPOP-DT(undtd) (U) 3d Ind

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 2 MAR 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

K. F. OSBOURN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG
TO: Commanding General
1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division

ATTN: Historian
APO US Forces 96347

SECTI0N I (C)

Significant activities: During the period 1 August 1967 to 31 October 1967, Support Battalion provided close and continuous combat service support to the Brigade in its counterguerrilla operations against the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army. Support Battalion acted as sponsor to the 3/506 who arrived in country on 25 October 1967. Replacement training continued. Basic airborne training was conducted for non airborne qualified personnel assigned/attached to the Brigade and a limited number of other special category personnel. Support Battalion continued to operate the Installation Coordination Center for all United States and Free World Military Armed Forces in the Phan Rang Area.

A. Operations supported:

1. Operation Malheur II
   b. Location: Quang Ngai Province.
   c. Commanders:
      (1) Support Battalion: LTC Quinton P. Sunday
      (2) Forward Support Element: Maj John A Chambers.

2. Operation Hood River:
   b. Location: Quang Ngai Province.
   c. Commanders:
      (1) Support Battalion: LTC Quinton P. Sunday
      (2) Forward Support Element: Maj John A Chambers.
3. Operation Zenton:
   b. Location: Quang Tin Province.
   c. Commanders:
      (1) Support Battalion: LTC Quinton P. Sunday.
      (2) Forward Support Element: Maj John A. Chambers.

4. Operation Cooks:
   b. Location: Quang Ngai Province.
   c. Commanders:
      (1) Support Battalion: LTC Quinton P. Sunday.
      (2) Forward Support Element: Maj John A. Chambers.

5. Operation Wheeler:
   b. Location: Quang Tin Province.
   c. Commanders:
      (1) Support Battalion: LTC Quinton P. Sunday.
      (2) Forward Support Element: Maj John A. Chambers.

B. Training:

1. Replacement Training Company (Provisional) continued its training activities to include proficiency training.
   a. There were twenty-seven (27) proficiency training classes conducted during the reporting period. Seventy-five (75) officers, two hundred and thirty-nine (239) NCO's and 1,100 IM received this training.
   b. The combat leaders course was not conducted during this quarter in compliance with Brigade directive to discontinue the course until further notice.
   c. Training facilities were improved. An electric mines and booby trap course was constructed to enable students to become fully aware of the inherent dangers and the proper handling of mines and booby traps.
A booby trapped village was also constructed to facilitate this training. A repelling tower was constructed to give the students the opportunity to practice proper repelling techniques. General improvements were made on all training courses and firing ranges to accommodate a greater number of trainees.

d. Additional subjects were introduced into the proficiency training program. Classes on Code of Conduct, Combat Intelligence, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations were initiated.

2. Normal unit level training was conducted to increase the unit's capability to provide combat service support, strengthen security of the base camp and the FSE, and increase weapons proficiency.

3. Support Battalion conducted jump training for selected non airborne qualified personnel during the period 14 to 21 August 1967. Forty-three (43) students completed the training and made the five qualifying jumps. Including previously airborne qualified FSE personnel there were a total of 573 jumps without injury or significant difficulties. All drops were made on Bu Gia drop zone (BN 727890).

C. Out Processing: During the period 1 August 1967 to 31 October 1967 the out processing section of the replacement training company processed the following number of personnel:

1. DEROS 673
2. R&R 624
3. Ordinary Leave 230
4. Emergency Leave 44
5. Hospital Returnees 919
6. Other Absences 577
7. Total Processed 3,067

D. Logistical Operations:

1. Concept: All combat service support was provided directly to unit field trains located in Carenton Base Camp, Duc Pho, and Los Banes Base Camp, Chu Lai. Americal Division, First Logistical Command, 15th Support Bde and the 80th General Support Group provided the necessary support for the conduct of all operations during this report period. The 2nd Surgical Hospital (Chu Lai) provided medical support. The tactical situation dictated the establishment of FSP's at Quang Ngai and Minh Long during Operation Hood River (2 Aug 67 to 13 Aug 67) and at Tien Phuoc during Operation Wheeler (11 September to Present). Those FSP's were operated by personnel from the FSE and provided all classes of supply to include water.

3. Maintenance:

a. General: The Brigade Maintenance Company continued its mission of providing direct support maintenance and Class VI repair parts to the Brigade. Due to the tactical deployment of the Brigade, a forward support element was established to provide immediate response to the needs of the Brigade Units.

b. Organization: B Company remained under the present modified TOE and was divided into two elements; a forward support element and the base camp element. The forward support element consists of 44 men and was adapted to the maintenance requirements of the brigade tactical units.

c. Logistical Operation:

(1) Maintenance: During the period 1 August 1967 to 31 October 1967, the company performed the following job order requests:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Received</th>
<th>Repaired</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the Forward Element:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Received</th>
<th>Repaired</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>1,417</td>
<td>1,360</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the end of the reporting period, B Company had the following open maintenance work requests:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Requests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(2) Tech supply continued its mission of Class VI repair parts requisitioning, stockage, and issue to the Brigade and installation units. Zero balance on the authorized stockage list rose to 48%. The following are the Tech Supply activities for this reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total request received</td>
<td>14,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ASL</td>
<td>9,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ASL Issued</td>
<td>5,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Fringe Issued</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Receipts</td>
<td>3,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Due-out Releases</td>
<td>3,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Passing Orders</td>
<td>3,997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Replenishment</td>
<td>2,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouse Refusals</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Transactions</td>
<td>20,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Demand Satisfaction</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Demand fill</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The maintenance standdown was conducted from 29 August to 2 September 1967; it revealed 30% of ammunition, 33% of Signal, and 50% of artillery repair parts were within the operation/organizational maintenance capability.

The most significant maintenance problem encountered during the period was the shortage of M-113 Pantol Sights for the M-102 Howitzer. Repair parts for the M-113 were also in a shortage.

4. Supply:
   a. Concept of Logistical Operations:

   (1) Operation Hood River commenced on 2 August 1967 and concluded on 13 August 1967. Logistical support for the Brigade was provided by Support Battalion (Fwd) FSE through facilities at Duc Pho and by the 15th Support Brigade, Americal Division FSE through our FSE at Quang Ngai. All classes of supply except class II & IV were obtained by the FSE from the 1st Logistical Command FSA, Task Force McDonald. Emergency class I, II & IV, III and V including water were supplied through the FSE at Minh Long. The Minh Long FSP was resupplied from Duc Pho Support Battalion (Fwd) FSE by fixed wing aircraft as required to maintain a 3 day level of selected items.

   (2) Operation Benton commenced on 13 August 1967 and concluded on 28 August 1967. Logistical support for the Brigade was provided by the
Support Battalion (Fwd) FSE at Duc Pho on a limited basis only. The FSP which was established at Chu Lai provided the principal support. The Chu Lai FSP was supported by the 15th Spt Bde and the 80th General Support Group for all classes of supply and maintenance. 2nd Surgical Hospital provided medical support.

(3) Operation Cook commenced 2 September 1967 and concluded on 7 September 1967. The same logistical concept as was employed during Operation Hood River was in effect, however the 15th Spt Bde FSP at Quang Ngai was excluded from the support plan.

(4) Operation Wheeler commenced 11 September 1967 and is still in progress at the conclusion of the reporting period. Logistical support is being provided to the Brigade by the Spt Bn (Fwd) FSE at Chu Lai. The FSE is re-supplied by fixed wing aircraft from the Spt Bn (Fwd) FSE, as required to maintain a 4-5 day safety level (6-8 day safety level as the monsoon season approaches). The Spt Bn FSE is supported by the Americal Division, 15th Spt Bde, and 80th General Support Group's to include all classes of supply (Limited Class II & IV), maintenance and medical (2nd Surgical Hospital).

b. Statistics. (Short Tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>CLASS I</th>
<th>CLASS II &amp; IV</th>
<th>CLASS III</th>
<th>CLASS V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malheur II (16 Aug)</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hood River</td>
<td>132.0</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>150.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benton</td>
<td>196.4</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>214.6</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook</td>
<td>166.9</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>185.0</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheeler</td>
<td>716.8</td>
<td>285.8</td>
<td>695.0</td>
<td>1,488.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,245.4</td>
<td>640.0</td>
<td>1,275.5</td>
<td>1,528.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Transportation.

a. During this quarter air, sea, and land transportation were utilized.

b. Tactical Moves. The forward support element and some command elements moved by air and vehicle to Chu Lai in support of Operation Benton. Upon completion of Benton these elements returned to Duc Pho by vehicle convoy. The Brigade moved to the Los Banos Base Camp in Chu Lai by vehicle convoy, air and LST for Operation Wheeler.

c. USAF support consisted primarily of C-123 and C-130 aircraft. These aircraft were used to shuttle personnel, fast moving class II & IV items, APO and PX items, and miscellaneous equipment between Phan Rang and the area of Operation. During this period 670 sorties moved 11,781 passengers and 1,026.3 short tons of cargo.
E. Installation Coordination.

1. General: The Brigade responsibilities for installation coordination were discharged by support battalion through the Installation Coordination Center. Daily and weekly meetings with representatives of all the Free World Forces in the Phan Rang area were conducted. TPFV letter dated 16 September 1967 designated CG 1/101st as the Phan Rang Installation Defense Commander. The OFW for the defense of the Phan Rang installation was rewritten and submitted to TPFV for approval. Monthly Friendship Council Meetings were held to insure a continuation of the excellent relations enjoyed between allied forces and the Vietnamese people.

2. Security: During the period 1 August to 31 October 1967, two installation wide practice alerts were held to insure a constant state of readiness. On three occasions base reaction forces were deployed to provide reinforcement for threatened areas. ICC coordinated 5 Spooky missions, 1 flareship mission, 1 gunship mission, and 2 medevacs. An airstrike was requested and directed by ICC. The ICC has continued to act as the coordinating agency for artillery and mortar fires. The bulk of local artillery support is supplied by the ROKA 52nd FA. Two of the ZEUS 23 searchlights from Battery B, 29th Artillery were taken from the Phan Rang area. However, due to the ideal terrain features, the remaining two lights are capable of illuminating the majority of the perimeter. On 7 September 1967 ICC coordinated the recovery of a 101st 3/4 Ton vehicle that had been ambushed via BIP 688556. The two occupants had executed a wrong turn and had both been wounded in the ambush that resulted. They were evacuated by the MACV C&C. A task force composed of 101st and ARVN personnel recovered the vehicle with no problems encountered.

3. Friendship Council Activities: During the reporting period, 3 friendship council meeting were held. The October council meeting was hosted by the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div. Thap Cham, Phan Rang, Strip and surrounding areas were placed off limits, from 020600 Sep to 040600 Sep (during the national election) for security reasons. These areas were also placed off limits during the lower house elections for a period 210600 Oct to 240700 Oct. In addition 6 bars and two iceplants were declared off limits to US forces for an indefinite period of time.

F. Civil Affairs

1. During the period 1 Aug to 31 Oct the civil affairs activities of the Support Battalion in Phan Rang were concentrated in the following areas:

a. Construction: The accomplishments of the civil affairs personnel in the field of construction were considerable during this reporting period. A 40' x 10' market place was constructed for the people of Tuong Cong hamlet, Binh Son district. $62,000 VN from the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div civic action fund was donated to the Thap Cham high school for the completion of construction of a new 4 classroom school. A combined 101st and Vietnamese effort was made to rebuild the 523 foot bridge connecting Binh Son and An Phuoc districts. The S5 section of Support Battalion provided the transportation, tools, building materials, and engineer technology for this project. Route 804 in An Phuoc district was reopened as a result of repairs made by the Spt En civic action team. A permanent electrical
facility was constructed at the Phan Rang recreational area. A joint Support Battalion and USAF project team renovated an old garage in Phan Rang to provide suitable living quarters for the hospital staff of Ninh Thuan Province hospital. In October a 50x10 feet market place was constructed for the people of Ninh Chiu hamlet.

b. Health and Sanitation: Forty two (42) MEDCAP's were conducted treating 2,045 Vietnamese. Twenty nine (29) classes on sanitation and personal hygiene were held in an effort to bring up the standards of the people.

c. Education: Daily English classes are taught by a representative of Spt Bn S5 in the Phan Rang High School and the Ninh Thuan Province Hospital. A total of 56 hours of instruction is given to over 1,900 Vietnamese each week. A high school scholarship program was initiated for 125 VN students. The program involves monthly contributions to deserving students in order to enable them to continue their education. The money distributed is from the voluntary contributions of the officers and men of Spt Bn.

d. Commodity Distribution: Necessities, primarily soaps, food and clothing were distributed in conjunction with MEDCAP and hygiene classes. During this quarter 319 pounds of soap, 8,165 pounds of food and 1,325 pounds of clothing were distributed.

e. Recreation: American movies were shown on nine Saturday evenings at the Phan Rang recreational area to local VN children. On two occasions an Army combo performed for the entertainment of the Vietnamese people. Seven soccer and two volleyball games were played with VN teams.

2. There is no doubt that the effect of the Spt Bn Civil Affairs program has been substantial. The fine US Vietnamese relationship in the Phan Rang area is due in no small part to the community relations program. The training, development and welfare programs have had a great impact on the living standards of the local people. A sense of pride and increased self-sufficiency can be noted in the hamlets affected by the Spt Bn Civil Affairs Program.

G. Base Camp Development:

1. General: A directive from USARV dated 12 September 1967 has just about brought the 1st Brigade Base Development to a complete halt. It directed all construction in the Phan Rang Army area to cease. Overall reasons and alternate actions have not yet been defined. Only necessary and minimum construction requirements are being met at this time.

2. Training: On the job training in carpentry and concrete laying is given to non-engineer military supervisors and to non-skilled Vietnamese labors.

3. Construction: Construction projects have been limited in compliance with the 12 September USARV directive. The projects completed included 17 concrete forms constructed, 15 concrete pads poured, 38
Buildings constructed. In addition 370,000 square feet of land was cleared and leveled for the following areas; Recreational Field, 3/506th Inf Motor Pool, 406 NRD Motor Pool, and the Brigade Helipad. Miscellaneous work included the cutting of access road across Bu Gia Drop Zone, improvement of containment area roads and the general refinement of existing facilities.

H. Activities of Base Camp Service Company (Company E (Prov) Support Battalion).

1. General. Co E (Prov) continues to exist under Brigade GO 475 with no change in mission. The following officer commanded the unit during this period; Major James L Mossey Jr, 30 June - Present.

2. Security Operations:
   a. Security Platoon continued to provide security for the base camp and a reaction force for the Phan Rang Installation.
   b. An element from security platoon continues to provide security for a fresh water well site located 3,000 meters SW of the base camp.

3. Maintenance and Holding Teams:
   a. The maintenance and holding teams continued the maintenance and storage of equipment and personal property not required in the area of operations.
   b. Maintenance and Holding Teams coordinated the movement of necessary TOE equipment and supplies to the area of operations.

SECTION 2 (C)

A. General:

Support Battalion provided combat service support throughout the period with outstanding support by Qui Nhon Support Command's Forward Support area. Support provided by the 94th Supply and Service Company and the 188th maintenance Company at Chu Lai was outstanding. The air log, between the Brigade permanent Base and the AO even through over 200 miles in length, was still within the Support Battalion Capability.

B. Training:

During this period all personnel received familiarization firing of individual and crew served weapons. Driver training was conducted throughout the quarter. Normal OJT continued throughout the period to fill shortage MOS's.

C. Problems:

There were no major problem encountered during this quarter.

Confidential
that affected the combat service support mission of the Battalion.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

SCOTT A GRAVES
CPT, Inf
Adjutant
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 1967

Acting Commander, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division

undated / 58 / N/A / T674249 / OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

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