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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Operation Attleboro, 2D Brigade
25th Infantry Division 1-25 November 1966

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is a Combat After Action Report for
Operation Attleboro. Operation Attleboro was conducted by the 2D Brigade
25th Infantry Division during the period 1-25 November 1966. Information
contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in
the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be
adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General
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TO: Commanding General
3ID
ATTN: AVOCP
APO US PAKC 96225

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (RCS/23/32)

1. Operation ATTLEBORO (OPORD 40-66)

2. MOONI. Nov 66-25US 400 November 66.


5. Reporting Officer: Colonel Thomas E. Turner.

6. Task Organizations and Commanders:

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<th>Commanders</th>
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<tr>
<td>3/4 CO (3ID VICTOR P. HARE, Cdt)</td>
<td>2d Plt, Co B, 45th Eng, En</td>
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<tr>
<td>1/3 (Ml) Helicopter</td>
<td>VMF Det, 1204th Sig Hq</td>
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<tr>
<td>1/27 Inf (MKv 3d Bn, Major III, Cdt)</td>
<td>3d Sqdrm, 16th Cav</td>
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<td>1/27 Inf Helicopter</td>
<td>25th HCC (Second Det) Plt</td>
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<td>2/27 Inf Helicopter</td>
<td>9th Weather Squadron</td>
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<td>2/16 Inf (4ID William B. Davis, Cdt)</td>
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<td>2/14 Inf Helicopter</td>
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<td>4/22 CO (4ID Richard M. Clark, Cdt)</td>
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<td>2/22 (M) Helicopter</td>
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<td>1/8 Arty (3ID James W. Clifton, Cdt)</td>
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7. Supporting

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a. Air Support:

(1) General: Both tactical fighter bombers and heavy bombers were used to support the operation. A total of 209 preplanned missions were used throughout the area of operation, fire of these being flown by VFR. Twenty-four immediate strikes were delivered with an average reaction time of 20 minutes after the request was submitted. Preplanned, as well as immediate strikes, were accurate and effective.

(2) All airstrikes were controlled by FAC's assigned to the 25th Infantry Division.

(3) Results: 3 KIA (EC), 62 KIA (POW), 33 structures destroyed, 3 structures damaged, 12 bunkers destroyed, 3 secondary explosions, 7 secondary fires, 3 tunnels destroyed, 1 cache destroyed, 1 bridge damaged.

b. Army Aviation:

(1) Supporting Aviation Units.

a. 25th Avn BN
   A Co
   B Co

b. 11th Avn BN
   116th Avn Co (Lr)
   147th Avn Co (Med)
   176th Avn Co (Med)

c. 12th Avn BN
   129th Avn Co (Lr)

d. 52d Avn BN
   117th Avn Co (Lr)

e. 143th Avn BN
   68th Avn Co (Lr)
   71st Avn Co (Lr)
   116th Avn Co (Lr)

(2) Airmobile support included resupply, gunships, airmobile combat assaults, and airlift of artillery vehicles, and heavy equipment. 523 HH-47 sorties and 5,660 HH-60 sorties were flown in support of 2d Bde.

(3) The 2d Bde, 25th Infantry Division, provided OH-58 helicopters for command and control, daily reconnaissance, artillery fire adjustment, and liaison.

c. Artillery Support:

(1) General: The extensive area of operation necessitated wide dispersal of fire batteries and frequent relocation of fire support bases to provide artillery support to the maneuver elements. Fire support bases were mutually supporting. An extensive II and I program was executed and a counter mortar plan, established for each fire support base.

(2) Organisation for Combat

(a) 1/8 Arty DB 2nd Bde
(b) Btry A, 2/13 Arty attached 1/8 Arty (15 Nov-23 Nov)
(c) Btry A, 2/17 Arty attached 1/8 Arty (22 Nov-24 Nov)
(d) Btry B, 3/13 Arty attached 1/8 Arty (5 Nov)
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On 1 November with the mission to reinforce the fire of 3rd Bn, 82nd Artillery. On 2 November it became attached to the 3rd Bn, 82nd Artillery and on 3 November was further attached to the 1st Infantry Div Arty participating in operation ATTLEBORO. Battery A rejoined the 1st Bn, 8th Arty on 12 November when it was airlifted from DAU TINH to TRA IX (X115794). When the 2nd Brigade operation commenced on 12 November, Battery A was positioned at (X127786) and remained in that location until 24 November when it was airlifted to TAY NINH. On 25 November, Battery A returned to base camp with the 1st Bn, 8th Arty.

Battery B, 1st Bn, 8th Arty moved to DAO TINH (X127765) on 16 November to support the operation. That afternoon it was airlifted to (X126060) and remained in that location until 23 November 1966. On 25 November Battery B was airlifted to TAY NINH and was attached to the 3rd Bn, 82nd Arty.

Battery C, 1st Bn, 8th Arty began the operation at (X279780) located in Brigade Fire Support Base 1. It remained there until 27 November. Battery C was extracted to TAY NINH and returned to 51st CHI base camp on 25 November 66.

Battery A, 2nd Bn, 13th Arty began operation ATTLEBORO under battalion control on 5 November when it moved to S 30 DM (X172352) from TAY NINH. At 0540 on 7 November it was attached to the 1st 1st Div Arty. On 15 November Battery A was moved to Fire Support Base 2 (X126666) where it remained until 23 November when it was airlifted to TAY NINH base camp and returned to battalion control.

Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 77th Arty became attached to the 1st Bn, 8th Arty on 22 November when it was airlifted into Fire Support Base 1 (X127786). It was detached on 24 November when it was airlifted to S 30 DM.

Battery E, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty was attached to the battalion for operation ATTLEBORO on 5 November 1966. It was detached from the 1st Bn, 8th Arty and attached to the 1st Infantry Div Arty at 0540 on November 1966.

Artillery fire was used primarily for:

(a) Suppression of sniper fire
(b) Softening areas in front of advancing infantry
(c) Firing false preparations to mislead the Viet Cong as to intended or possible landing zones.
(d) Locating units on the ground during the hours of darkness.
(e) H & I Fires.
(f) Landing zone preparation and suppressive fires during extractions.

Total missions and rounds fired by Types:
(a) Missions: 23 Registrations; 417 Support; 3,660 H & I; for a total of 4,305.
(b) Ammunition Expended: 23,520 HR; 655 WP; 9 ILL; 24,168 total rounds.
(c) Results: 39 KIA (MO), 174 KIA (Posb).

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6. FIRE COORDINATION

(a) Daily coordination meetings enabled MAC Air, Army Aviation, and artillery to deliver timely and effective fire support throughout the operation.

(b) Closely coordinated flight corridors allowed uninterrupted air, artillery, and armed helicopter fire during air mobile operations.

(c) Fire support coordination during this operation was outstanding.

8. INTELLIGENCE

a. Enemy situation prior to the operation.

(1) The capture of large quantities of food supplies via (XU136) by elements of the 196th Inf Bde during 30-31 Oct 1966 and subsequent heavy contact with VC forces of the 9th VC Division from 2-6 Nov 1966 initiated the pursuit operation by the 1st Inf Div, and 2nd Bde, 29th Inf Div.

(2) For the first time in several months, the VC elected to defend against US Forces, and results of fierce contact left an estimated 1,000 VC KIA in TAY NINH Province.

(3) Intelligence reports from documents and captured VC indicated the contact was made with battalions of the 271st, 272nd, and 273rd Bdes of the 9th VC Division, as well as the 101st NVA Regt, and that the VC would probably withdraw to safe haven areas in WAR ZONE C.

(4) Intelligence sources reported the 271st Bde, the 272nd Bde, the 273rd Bde, the 101st NVA Regt, and the 272nd NVA Regt via (XU136).

b. Enemy situation during operation.

(1) During the period 10-25 Nov, VC activity in the 2d Bde area were limited to sporadic fire and mine incidents. On only two occasions the VC indicated an attempt to defend by fire from bunkers and trenches.

(a) On 19 Nov, the 2/22 Inf engaged an estimated VC company via (XU228), resulting in 6 VC KIA (KIA), and the destruction of a tunnel complex and capture of a rifle, a pair of binoculars, 300 lbs of rice and miscellaneous documents which were identified with a medical company of the 271st Bde.

(b) On 19 Nov, via (XU268996), the 1/5 Inf engaged an unknown number of VC resulting in 11 VC KIA (KIA), the capture of A automatic weapons, and a 60mm mortar complete with ammunition.

(2) Several caches and base camps were located during the operation. Caches appeared to be unguarded, and for the most part only sniper fire was observed from these sites. Although no resistance was noted from the area of the base camps, there was evidence of recent use, such as fresh food and vegetables in the immediate area, signs of recent repairs on bunkers, and the presence of many booby traps.

(a) Caches were located in the following locations:

- 11 Nov (XU270755) 1 ton rice, 14 hand grenades, 250 lbs of canned foods.
- 12 Nov (XU268777) 20 tons rice in heavily booby trapped area.
- 22 Nov (XU268783) 13 tons rice in shed 30 x 80 ft.
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(a) Nine camps were located in the following areas:

- 11 Nov (XZ2680) 22 sq mil; rice, rice milling machine, area showed signs of recent habitation.
- 17-18 Nov (X22890) 2 classrooms, 3 huts, 3 bunker.
- 21 Nov (X229900) Base camp large enough for 200-400 VC, with shelter, latrine, fresh food, 400 lbs rice, 169 lbs salt, 500 lbs peas, and 9 hand grenades.

(b) During the course of the operation, numerous documents captured were identified with the 70th Regt, OCSN, a medical and transportation company of the 271st Regt, 9th VC Division.

(c) Trafficability, terrain, and weather report.

See Annex A

9. Mission: 3d Bde conducts reconnaissance in force in northern TAI KHM Province commencing 100600 Nov 66 to locate and destroy VC forces, supplies and base camps.

10. Concepts of operation: 3d Bde Task Force, with two Mech, and 3 Inf Bn's conducted search and destroy, airmobile, and ground assaults, combat patrols and mechanized reconnaissance in force operations in WAR ZONE C to locate and destroy VC forces, base camps, and supply bases. The penetration of WAR ZONE C was accomplished by use of a series of fire support bases positioned along the axis of advance. These bases were established and "dug up" as advance north progressed while operational bases were mutually supporting. Operations were characterized by airmobile combat assaults, mechanized thrusts and effective foot patrols. Maximum use was made of close air support, B-52 strikes and artillery fires.

a. 10 Nov-11 Nov: The 3d Bde Task Force established an initial fire support base at the former FRENCH FORT (XZ2850) on 10 Nov. Extensive search and destroy and airmobile operations were conducted to establish contact with elements of the 9th VC Division.

b. 15-25 Nov: The 3d Bde Task Force conducted reconnaissance in force along axis R (X272777) — FRENCH (X272950) — SJ (X272950) to locate VC base camps, probe test enemy defenses, check crossing sites on the Cambodian border and keep VC forces off balance.

(1) Maneuver: Bde TF, with two mechanized and three infantry battalions, conducted reconnaissance in force along TL 4 and TL 265. Initially 1/5 (10) secured fire support base FSB 2 (X22986) (13 Nov) for airlifting of 2/27 Inf and two arty bns. 1/3 (1) then conducted extensive reconnaissance operations in AO Red. Upon relief by 2/22 (10, 1/3 (10) secured FSB 3 (X23350) for airlifting of 1/27 Inf and two additional arty bns (16 Nov). Subsequent operations involved reconnaissance/SAR operations in AO White, 2/22 (10) conducts ops in AO Red.

(2) Fire Support Bases:

(a) FRENCH FORT (X272950)
(b) FSB 1 (X272950)
(c) FSB 2 (X22986)
(d) FSB 3 (X23350)
(e) FSB 6 (X22986)

(3) Fires: Maximum use of B-52 strikes, TAC Air, armed helicopter, and arty throughout the operation. Arty and TAC Air preps were used on FSB area, LZ's and key terrain features along routes of advance.

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11. ...cum 12th CP was established at the FRENCH FORT (TX296469).

10 Nov 1966

11th BN, 3rd Inf

Reconnaissance, and ( Disclosure - Overlay for 10 Nov)

...s to secure the B50 forward combat base at (TX296469). Local SAS operations were conducted in the base area. Co G located and destroyed four VC structures and three bunkers at (TX296469).

12th BN, 27th Infantry

En continued preparation for airlift to forward combat base commencing 110000 Nov 66.

2nd BN, 15th Infantry

Bn was airlifted to B50 forward combat base (TX296469). All elements closed 1625 hrs.

11 Nov 66

2nd Bde forward combat base is located at the FRENCH FORT.

1st BN, 3rd Inf

Bn conducted reconnaissance in force/SAS opns along the road between (TX296469) and (TX296727), commencing at 0700 hrs. Co A located and destroyed 8 ex carts at 0819 hrs at (TX296727). One Shell keg, one potato, fifteen rice bags, and five bales were destroyed by Co A (TX296727) at 0905 hrs. Two steel containers of acid (Type unknown) and miscellaneous clothing were located at 1200 hrs (TX296727). Five China grenades, 200 lbs of rice, and 50 containers of acid were located in the same area. All material was destroyed with the exception of a sample of acid. Co A destroyed five bunkers at 1200 hrs (TX296727). At 1300 hrs, one Claymore Mine was destroyed (TX296727). Five China grenades, one concrete bunker, and 240 lbs of ammo were destroyed at 1330 hrs (TX296727). At 1710 hrs, Co C destroyed one bunker complex (TX268737). Co B had negative contact. Co A established a combat base at (TX296727). At the close of the reporting period Co B and Co C were returning to the B50 FOB combat base.

1st BN, 27th Infantry

Bn was airlifted to the FRENCH FORT commencing at 1000 hrs. All elements closed at 1200 hrs. Co B commenced SAS operations (TX285999) at 1330 hrs. The company returned at 1530 hrs with negative contact. Bn prepared defensive positions on the B50 forward combat base perimeter.

2nd BN, 15th Infantry

...SAS opns between (TX296469) and (TX291548), and established a combat base at (TX291548) at 1330 hrs. Co A secured at the B50 FOB combat base and continued in the defense.

12 Nov 66

2nd Bde forward combat base is located at the FRENCH FORT.

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1st BN (Neish) 5th Infantry

On 5th Nov an IZ (122757876) for the 1/27 inf airlift at 1840 hrs.
Co A conducted reconnaissance operations commencing at 0750 hrs (122757876).
Co B located and destroyed 7 bunkers (122757876) and 2 SA tanks (122757796) at 1900 hrs.
Co C destroyed 12 CRU tanks at 1930 hrs (122757796). Co A returned to the BN base at 1900 hrs. BN (-) established a fuel combat base at FOB 1.

1st BN 5th Infantry

Em was airlifted to (122757876) at 0317 hrs. BN operations resulted in 20 tons of rice destroyed (122757777). At 1630 hrs, a combat base was established at (122757777).

2nd BN 5th Infantry

Em was airlifted into FRESH FOREST at 0510 hrs. Defensive positions were prepared and preparations made for future operations.

2nd BN 14th Infantry

Enclosure J Overage for 11-12 Nov

Em conducted reconnaissance in force/MD operations from (122715691) to (122735697). At 1120 hrs Co B located and destroyed 1400 lb bomb (122735691). A fuel combat base was established at (122735697).

11 Nov 66

2nd BN fuel combat base is located at FRESH FOREST.

Enclosure (Neish) 1st Infantry

Enclosure J Overage for 13 November

Co A & Co B exploited airlifts (1227477) commencing 0918 hrs. At 0928 hrs Co B located a roadblock (122747768) consisting of one large tree. During a search of the area, a Claymore mine was detonated resulting in one KIA. Three additional mines were located and destroyed by Co B (122747768). Co A destroyed 5 VC structures (122757762). An APC struck an AT mine at 1547 hrs resulting in extensive damage to the APC and 1 KIA.

1st BN 5th Infantry

Em conducted "Cleaver" operations from the BN combat base (122757768). At 1030 hrs Co B engaged 3 VC with 3A and mort fire resulting in 2 VC KIA (Total). All elements were extracted and closed into 1/5 Co forward base (122757787) at 1650 hrs.

2nd BN 5th Infantry

Em conducted patrols and defended sector of 2d BN fuel combat base.

2nd BN 14th Infantry

Em conducted night combat patrols from BN fuel combat base (122756641). Extraction of all units to BN combat base was completed at 2200 hrs.

11 Nov 66

2d BN fuel combat base is located at FRESH FOREST.

1st BN (Neish) 5th Infantry

Em conducted reconnaissance patrols southwest of FOB 2. to (122757761, 12275381, and 12273506). Co A located and destroyed 3,500 lbs of rice, 1 VC structure, and 1 VC killing machine at 11:16 hrs (122757797). At 0950 hrs Co B found 300 lbs of BA ammo (122735796), twenty kgs of polished rice were destroyed at 10:40 hrs (122735797). An APC from the Neish Platoon hit an AT Mine resulting in 2 KIA and extensive damage to vehicle.

(7)

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1st BN, 27th Infantry

BN conducted "CLOVERLEAF" operations east and northeast of FSB 2. At 1600 hrs, Co A engaged 3 VC (X2735701) with 2A and arty resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and one SIG captured. All elements closed FSB 2 at 1740 hrs.

24 BN, 27th Infantry

BN continued aggressive combat patrolling and defense of 2d Bde fwd combat base.

2d BN, 11th Infantry

BN conducted night combat patrols from Bde fwd combat base.

2d BN (Mech), 22nd Infantry

Attached effective 141200 hrs. BN completed movement from GO DA HA to SOULI DA (X235575) at 1600 hrs.

15 Nov 65

Bde Tac CP was airlifted to FSB 2.

1st BN (Mech), 26th Infantry

(Isolusor 5-Overlay for 15 Nov)

BN moved from FSB 1 to FSB 2 to secure ID for Bde CP. A Btry, 2/13 Arty, B Btry, 1/5 Arty, and 2/27 Infantry.

1st BN, 27th Infantry

BN remained at FSB 1 to continue reconnaissance patrolling.

24 BN, 27th Infantry

BN was airlifted into FSB 2. All elements closed at 1330 hrs.

2d BN, 11th Infantry

BN remained at former combat base (X273468) to conduct reconnaissance patrolling and to secure Btry 3/13 Arty.

2d BN (Mech), 22nd Infantry

(Isolusor 5-Overlay for 15 Nov)

BN conducted road march to FSB 1 commencing at 0745 hrs. At 1 00 hrs Co C engaged 2 VC (X2735702) resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 rocket launcher, and 1 AT rounds captured. Co A (+), Bn Recon Platoon, and the end group closed FSB 1 at 2100 hrs. Co B & Co C remained at (X273478)

16 Nov 66

2d Bde CP is located at FSB 2. LRRP engaged 2 VC at 1640 hrs (X2734912) and (X2734923) resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC).

1st BN (Mech), 5th Infantry

BN conducted reconnaissance patrolling 3,000 meters from FSB 2. At 0904 hrs, Co C destroyed 12 bunkers (X2734924). Bn Recon Platoon conducted reconnaissance for route trafficability from FSB 2 along probable routes for future operations. All elements closed into FSB 2 at 1600 hrs.

1st BN, 27th Infantry

BN conducted patrolling from FSB 1 and secured perimeter of 2/22 (A).

2d BN, 27th Infantry

BN conducted reconnaissance patrolling from FSB 2 with negative contact.

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2nd Bn, 14th Infantry

En conducted patrolling and secured A btry 3/13 arty at (AT274668). At 1230 hrs Co B engaged an estimated VC squad resulting in 1 VC KIA (EC) (AT28966A).

2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Infantry

All elements closed FSB 1 at 1225 hrs.

17 Nov 66

2nd bmp CP is located at FSB 2.

2nd Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry

En (-) conducted route reconnaissance operations northeast of FSB 2 to (AT279964), (AT277662). Co C conducted local LDO operations; 29 VC ID replacements were destroyed by Co C (AT285841). At 1046 hrs, recon plat destroyed 3 VC structures, 3 bunkers, and 1 large classroom (AT285897). At 1105 hrs, 4 KIA were sustained when the unit came under VC mortar fire (AT285897). All elements returned to FSB 2 at 1700 hrs.

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

En conducted reconnaissance patrolling vicinity of FSB 1 with negative contact.

2nd Bn, 27th Infantry

En conducted reconnaissance patrolling west of FSB 2 to (AT265654) with negative contact.

2nd Bn, 14th Infantry

En moved by convoy and airlift to Tay Minh base camp to remain on standby alert for 2nd Bde.

2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Infantry

En conducted reconnaissance in force opns to north and west of FSB 1 to (AT270764), (AT277662). Co B conducted local LDO operations; 29 VC ID replacements were destroyed by Co C (AT285841). At 1046 hrs Co B engaged an unknown number of VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (EC) and 3 US WIA (AT278908). Co B also found protective mask and 1 first aid packet in the area of contact. Rpted for the night at (AT285925).

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

En was airlifted to FSB 2 at 0900 hrs. All elements closed FSB 2 at 1140 hrs.

2nd Bn, 27th Infantry

En defended FSB 2. Co A remained on a 30 min stand by alert and the bn on a 1 hr alert.

2nd Bn, 14th Infantry

En remained at Tay Minh base camp on stand by alert for 2nd Bde.
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2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Inf

The Bn continued to conduct reconnaissance patrols in the vicinity of FSB 1. Co B engaged an estimated VC (AT274833) at 1343 hrs resulting in 2 US KIA.

19 Nov 66

2nd Bde CP remained at FSB 2.

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry

(Inclusion 9-Overlay for 18-22 Nov)

The Bn commenced ops at 0755 hrs, moving with all elements toward OBJ (AT274962). The move progressed without contact until 1311 hrs. At this time, Co A engaged a VC force of unknown size (AT274956) resulting in 2 VC KIA (KIA), 2 BAR's and 2 Chicom assault rifles were captured. Co A sustained 3 WIA's. At 1350 hrs Co A engaged 2 more VC (AT274956) resulting in 2 VC KIA (KIA) and 1 82mm mortar captured. At 1615 hrs the Bn CP was established at (AT274962). Co C captured 2 VC (AT277984) at 1850 hrs.

2nd Bn, 11th Infantry

The Bn continued on one hour alert at Tay Ninh base camp until 1626 hrs when the Bn was airlifted to FSB 1.

2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Infantry

(Inclusion 8-Overlay for 17-20 Nov)

The Bn commenced a search of (AT225915) with Co A and Co C at 0746 hrs. At 1045 hrs Co C located a booby trapped bunker-tunnel complex at (AT225914). At 1243 three KIA were sustained during a search of the tunnel when a booby trap was detonated. Another tunnel was located by Co C containing 16 N-79 rds (AT225894). At 1240 hrs, Co C discovered a cache (AT225814) containing 84 small arms grenades, one homemade rifle, 300 lbs of rice, one pair of binoculars, and miscellaneous documents. At 1245 hrs Co A and Co C engaged an estimated VC platoon at (AT225901) and (AT225811). As the units deployed against the VC, six air strikes were directed upon the enemy. At 1555 hrs at (AT225813) Co A located 5 huts and 2 VC bodies, (AT225813) and destroyed one VC structure. At 1730 hrs Co A located miscellaneous documents (AT225813). All units returned to the combat base camp established at (AT225894).

1st Bn, 37th Infantry

The Bn conducted patrols via FSB 1 at 1125 hrs, a patrol from Co C located and destroyed a bunker and 2 foxholes (AT225834). All elements closed into FSB 2 at 1555 hrs.

2nd Bn, 27th Infantry

The Bn conducted patrols via FSB 1. All patrols reported negative contact throughout the day.

20 Nov 66

2nd Bde CP remained at FSB 2.

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry

(Inclusion 9-Overlay for 18-22 Nov)

The Bn conducted reconnaissance in force to FSB 3 commencing at 0900 hrs. All elements closed FSB 3 by 1450 hrs.

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

The Bn continued to defend FSB 2 and improve defensive positions. Bn was on 30 min stand by alert for 2/3A Inf and 2-22 (K) open.

2nd Bn, 27th Infantry

The Bn continued to defend FSB 2. Patrols from Co C destroyed a VC structure and French radio transmitter (AT274879) at 1320 hrs.

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2nd Bn, 14th Infantry

In an air mobile combat assault into (X210080) commencing at 0945 hrs. Two VC were engaged with Arty at 1330 hrs resulting in 2 VC KIA (pos). At 1400 hrs Co B engaged an unknown number of VC (.2060612) resulting in 4 US WIA and 1 US KIA. An immediate search of a bunker was conducted resulting in 1 VC KIA (pos) and 2 VC KIA (pos). Extraction to FSB 1 was completed at 1805 hrs.

2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Infantry

(Inclusion 8-Overlay for 18-20 Nov)

In an attack on obj (.2200080) at 0745 hrs. At 1700 hrs 3 VC were engaged by Co B resulting in 1 VC KIA (pos) and one automatic rifle captured. All elements returned to FSB 1.

21 Nov 66

2nd Bn CP is located at FSB 2.

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry

(Inclusion 9-Overlay for 18-21 Nov)

In a conducted local security and reconnaissance operations via FSB 3 with Co A and Co C. Co B secured FSB 3. At 1318 hrs, Co A located a VC base camp, 2 AT mines, and 2 GRS (X259938). At 1415 hrs one APC was hit by an AT rd resulting in 2 WIA (X359937). At 1539 hrs, Co C located 2 bunkers (X359904) containing 9 choc plates, 50 lbs of rice, 100 lbs of peas, and 50 lbs of salt. All elements closed base camp at 1735 hrs.

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

In an air mobile combat assault into (X2200277) in response to a special intelligence report. Co A attacked obj (X2200266). Co C secured the objective. No contact was made and the im commenced extraction at 1531 hrs to FSB 2 closing at 1630 hrs.

2nd Bn, 27th Infantry

In a conducted local patrols via FSB 2 throughout the day with no contact.

2nd Bn 24th Infantry

In an conducted air mobile assault into (X275955) to secure an arty fire support base for 1/3 (B) cn. Bn C 1/3 Arty was moved into position at 0800 hrs. Bn 1/3 hrs, the Arty arty had been extracted back to FSB 3. At 1320 hrs, the Bn had commenced extraction to FSB 2. By 1800 hrs, the Bn had returned to Tay Ninh base camp where it went on a one hour stand by alert.

2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Infantry

In an conducted patrols via FSB 1, commencing at 1050 hrs, with no contact.

22 Nov 66

2nd Bn CP is located at FSB 2.

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry

(Inclusion 9-Overlay for 18-22 Nov)

In a commenced reconnaissance in forco from FSB 3 southeast to (X359931) at 0800 hrs. At 1045 hrs, Co C sustained 1 KIA from sniper fire (X359938). Small arms and Arty were returned with unknown results. At 1330 hrs, an APC from Co A detonated an AT mine resulting in a WIA and moderate vehicle damage. Co C found 3 bunkers(X359938) with wires leading to 1-60 lb bomb and 1 arty rd in a tree. All elements closed FSB 3 at 1625 hrs.

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

In a secured FSB 2 and conducted security patrolling.

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2nd Bn, 27th Infantry

Bn conducted an airborne assault into (XT16856) at 0645 hrs. Co C destroyed 900 lbs of rice (XT369956) at 1031 hrs. Recon patrol patrolled south of FSB 2 with negative contact. All elements returned to FSB 2 prior to 1800 hrs.

2nd Bn, 11th Infantry

Bn remained on stand by alert at Tay Minh base camp.

2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Infantry

Bn conducted reconnaissance patrolling west of FSB 1 commencing at 0626 hrs. At 1225 hrs, Co A sustained 1 KIA and 5 WIA from two Claymore Mines. At 1435 hrs, Co B engaged 3 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BE) and 1 chimc SMA captured. All units closed into FSB 1 at 1715 hrs.

23 Nov 66

2nd Bn CP remained at FSB 2.

1st Bn (Mech), 37th Infantry

(Inclusion 10-Overlay for 23 Nov)

At 0733 hrs, Bn commenced a roasrarch from FSB 3 to FSB 1. APC from Recon Flat hit an AT mine (XT329852) resulting in moderate damage. At 1505 hrs, another Recon Flat APC hit an AT mine resulting in extensive vehicle damage. All elements closed into FSB 1 prior to 1800 hrs.

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

Bn conducted an airborne combat assault (XT168667) at 0900 hrs. Negative contact was made and all elements were extracted to FSB 2 at 1218 hrs.

2nd Bn, 27th Infantry

Bn secured FSB 2 and conducted reconnaissance patrolling in sector.

2nd Bn, 11th Infantry

Bn (-) conducted SMO opas (XT26836). Co C was prepositioned at FSB 1 as a reaction force. All elements were extracted back to Tay Minh base camp at 1545 hrs.

2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Infantry

Bn conducted reconnaissance patrolling to southeast of FSB 1.

24 Nov 66

2nd Bn CP relocated at 196th Bde Base Camp at Tay Minh.

1st Bn (Mech), 37th Infantry

Bn moved from FSB 1 to FSB 0. At 0820 hrs, 2 APC's hit AT mines (XT18760) and (XT18765), resulting in 1 KIA and 1 APC moderately damaged. At 0830 hrs Co C destroyed 1 AT mine (XT18765). All elements closed into FSB 0 prior to 1800 hrs.

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

Bn conducted an airborne extraction from FSB 2, closing Tay Minh base camp at 0905 hrs. Bn then moved by convoy to Cu Chi, closing at 0915 hrs.

2nd Bn, 27th Infantry

Bn commenced airborne extraction from FSB 2 at 1215 hrs. Elements were
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First lifted to Tay Ninh and then to Cu Chi, closing at 1742 hrs.

2nd Bn. 14th Infantry

Bn moved to Cu Chi by convoy, closing at 1505 hrs.

2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Infantry

Bn returned to Div control at 0800 hrs.

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry

Bn conducted reconnaissance patrolling via FSB 0, and south to (XT1669). At 1425 hrs, an APC from the heavy mortar platoon hit an AT mine resulting in 3 WIA and extensive vehicle damage. The Bn established a night combat base at (XT146687).

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

Bn assumed responsibility for Cu Chi base camp sector at 1200 hrs.

2nd Bn, 27th Infantry

Bn assumed responsibility for Cu Chi base camp sector at 1200 hrs.

OPERATION ATTLEBORO TERMINATED

252400 NOVEMBER 66

(Reference Map, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheets 62321, II, III, IV for all overlays included in this report.)

(13)

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12. Results
   a. Enemy Losses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VG KIA (IC)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>SA Ammunition</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VG KIA (POSS)</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>Documents</td>
<td>33 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VG</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Canned Foods</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VGS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>240 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>475 tons</td>
<td>Rice Milling Machine</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>60mm Mortar</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mts</td>
<td>47</td>
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<td>100 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbers</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>100 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mt Mines</td>
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<td>Fدل Expedient Rocket Launcher</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claymore</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12-75mm MG Barrel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hand Grenades</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>RPG-2 RDS</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle Grenades</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>M-79 RDS</td>
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   b. Friendly Losses

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOW</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APO M 113 Combat Loss</td>
<td>4</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS
   a. SUPPLY: All classes of supply were available in sufficient quantities to meet operational demands. Elements of the 1st Logistic Command provided supplies from their facilities at Tay Ninh. 29th Division Support Command provided a complete staff to meet all logistic requirements of the 2nd Bde. task force.

   b. MAINTENANCE: Co. G, 725th Maintenance Bn. provided direct support during the operation. No unusual problems were encountered.

   c. SERVICES: Laundry service provided by quartermaster facilities was adequate. Contractual services were provided but were arranged for too late in the operation to be used.

   d. TRANSPORTATION: Convoys from Cu Chi did not arrive daily in sufficient time to effect resupply of ice and mail to forward units. Although scheduled to arrive at approximately 0800 hours daily, arrivals at times were later than 1700 and delivery of these items could not be made until the following day.

   (2) Troop haul requirements for infantry battalions were met by Support Command upon request.

   (3) With the exception of 2 convoys to the Brigade Forward Base on 13 and 14 Nov all resupply was accomplished by helicopter. A total of 1,239 HU 1D sorties and 26 CS 47 sorties were flown in resupplying forward elements of the Brigade during the period 12 thru 24 Nov 66.

Greater use of chain saws was made to include cutting brush clearance for arty and mortars, bunker material, clearing areas for head-
quarters and indirect fire weapons, and cutting wood for cord-
duroying roads. For planning purposes, 3 saws/manueler battalion
are required.

15. Commander's Analysis.

a. Alternate LZs must be prepared during the conduct of an
airmobile assault. This action provides a certain amount of
deception and also insures adequate preparation of alternate
LZs if the primary LZ is found to be "HOT".

b. The judicious use of tac air and arty during airmobile combat
assaults is the key to the rapid imobilization of an infantry
force in a combat posture. This support must continue during
the actual landings and extraction. Sufficient time must be
allocated for detailed coordination between all support agencies
involved, i.e., the inf unit making the assault, tac air, army
air, and arty.

c. As maneuver battalions are extended from forward supply
bases to areas not serviced by roads, the resulting turn
around time for helicopter resupply quickly becomes unaccep-
table. Planning must include positioning of supply bases on
usable roads as far forward as possible.

d. Engineer support for Mech elements operating in WAR ZONE C
is absolutely essential. Aerial recon does not give an accurate
picture of soil trafficability. Many streams require prepara-
tion (corduroying) before crossings can be made. Chain saw
teams are a necessity and provisions must be made for immediate
replacement when saws become non-operational.

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e.  Mired or disabled vehicles present a major problem to Mech movement. It can be expected that there will be an increased mixing - in the future operations in WAR ZONE C. Planning must include provisions for security, repair, evacuation and destruction.

f.  Mechanized infantry can operate in most heavily wooded areas in WAR ZONE C to a limited degree. Capabilities include provisions for rapid movement to secure forward bases, probing, and reinforcement.

g.  All helicopter support must be controlled by the Task Force headquarters. This system permits rapid change of priorities as the tactical situation develops. Planning must include adequate areas in the rear for the brigade trains to include a loading area for helicopters.

h.  Planning for extended operations must include provisions for direct exchange of Class III items.

i.  Major component replacement for disabled mech vehicles is essential. Planning must include provisions for immediate replacement and maintenance assistance from division forward support bases.

j.  It appears that the VC do not desire to engage large US Forces in WAR ZONE C.


Where possible, aviation support units should station liaison officers at the brigade trains and the brigade tactical command post. These representatives greatly assist in the initial planning of an operation and provide the commander with detailed information concerning the missions as they are performed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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(16)
1. General. The terrain exploited by the 2d Bde Task Force in WAR ZONE C was characterized by dense jungle and open marsh marshlands. Elevation ranged between 10 meters (XT2260) and 80 meters (XTl173), with the general average of 35-40 meters in the area of operations. Relatively little land was cultivated; the majority of agricultural efforts were small or individual garden plots.

2. Roads and Trails. Roads through the area reflect lack of care and maintenance. Portions of the major roads have been cratered by bombing and mines and subsequent erosion has occurred. Fallen trees in a few areas have blocked roadways making detours necessary. The major road network from (XT284619) to KATUM (XT333898) to BO TUC (XT380857) were subjected to thorough air reconnaissance. Road use of approximately 46 kilometers proved it to be adequate for tracked vehicles. Major obstacles were found at (XT327893) where steep banks had to be levelled by demolitions to accommodate crossing. Even after levelling had been accomplished, crossing was still reported to be difficult. At (XT325886), craters and muddy conditions made trafficability extremely difficult.

Trails and footpaths were observed throughout the entire area. They appeared to occur at random, leading into dense jungles. LRRP reported that two trails (XT213879) were blocked at irregular intervals by cut trees and foliage. The purpose of these blocks is unknown. LRRP also reported seeing several observation platforms built high in the trees at irregular intervals. The patrol was unable to pinpoint the locations of these platforms.

3. Bunkers and Fortifications. In the area of operations, elements of the 2d Bde Task Force encountered relatively few bunkers and trenches as compared with other areas, ie. the HO BO WOODS, the BOI LOI WOODS, other known VC strongholds. Bunkers which were manned and defended by fire were located at (XT284619) and (XT227813). Other bunkers, as depicted in Appendix I, were deserted, although most of them showed signs of recent repair.

4. Base Camps. There were nine base camp sites reported in the entire area of operations. For the most part, the typical base camp found in WAR ZONE C consisted of several protective bunkers, a few small huts, a small cache of rice, garden plots, and evidence of recent use. Base areas found during the operation are depicted in Appendix I, and are listed below:

- (XT303777) Heavily booby trapped area with 20 tons of rice
- (XT243800) Campsite for estimated 100 VC
- (XT278828) Campsite apparently used by 25-30 VC
- (XT265757) Campsite with 2500 lbs rice and a rice milling machine
- (XT344919) A series of cultivated garden plots and small huts
- (XT353896) Campsite with shower, latrine, and recently repaired bunkers
- (XT224810) Five huts and extensive tunnel system; defended briefly by VC
5. Cross Country Trafficability. The axis of advance of the mechanised infantry battalions, the 1/5(N) and the 2/22(N), are depicted in Appendix 2.

Although there were nine incidents experienced, the greatest barriers were caused by the terrain, specifically, jungle and lowland marshes. Generally, movement cross country was slow, with the daily average advance of 10 kilometers. Lead elements of the mechanised infantry normally required an average of one hour to penetrate 300–500 meters of dense jungle. Difficulties for trail elements were encountered in low spots; at elevations of less than 35 meters the earth cut by lead elements became too muddy and consequently impassable to trail elements, necessitating the cutting of new routes through the jungle.

Marshlands provided the greatest single obstacle to progress of tracked vehicles. Soft mud predominated in open areas at elevations of 35 meters or less continually bogged down vehicles.

6. Landing Zones. Areas suitable for helicopter landing zones are depicted in Appendix 3.

7. Weather. Weather facilities were available to the 2d Bde during the period 18–23 Nov. During this period, the following data were compiled:

- Average maximum temperature: 89
- Absolute maximum temperature: 92
- Average minimum temperature: 78
- Absolute minimum temperature: 70
- Total precipitation: 32 inches

Except for occasional early morning fog and evening showers, weather did not materially affect air or ground operations.
Legend

- Impassable
- Cratered and extremely muddy
- Small pond; No crossing difficulty

Appendix 2 to Annex A
(Part 3)
Legend

1. Hasty log bridge installed
2. Water level two feet; no difficulty crossing
3. Detour to north was made without difficulty
4. Shallow pond; no difficulty
5. Bridge required for crossing
6. Steep banks necessitated leveling to permit crossing

Impassable

[Diagram with numbered points and measurements 97' + 25' and 33' + 97']

Appendix 2 to Annex A
(Part 4)
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WHITE

FSB 3

35

90

Inclusion 1 - Area of Operations Overlay
(Part 2)

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Inclusion 2 - Operations Overlay 10 Nov
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[Diagram with arrows and dates: 12 Nov, 11 Nov, 12 Nov, 2/14, 1/2, 6/6, 2/7, 33 + 78, 1/5(M)]

Inslosure 3 - Operations Overlay 11-12 Nov

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Innsbruck 5 - Operations Overlay 15 Nov

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Inclusion 8 - Operations Overlay 19-20 Nov

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19 Nov

18 Nov

FSB 2

20 Nov

Incloure 9 - Operations Overlay 10-22 Nov