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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEPARATE)
APO San Francisco 96250

30 December 1966

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff
For Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington D.C. 20310

The following report is submitted in accordance with MACV Directive number 335-8. (RCS Exempt)

1. General: Operation ATTLEBORO initiated on 14 September 1966 by the 196th Infantry Brigade (LT) (Sep). It was a wide range operation designed to destroy VC bases, supplies and units in TAY NINH Province. The operation continued through October with the area of interest shifting west of the SAIGON River in DAU TIENG area. On 4 November 1966, the 1st Infantry Division was ordered into the area of operation (AO) with operational control (OPCON) of all US Forces. The reason for this decision was a North Vietnamese Regiment had elected to fight, massing his regiment against the US Brigade. On 6 November 1966, the Commanding General II FFORCEV assumed OPCON of all US Forces in the area. He immediately made the decision to commit elements of the 25th Infantry Division, 3d Brigade 4th Infantry Division, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate). On 7 November 1966, the Brigade was alerted to deploy one battalion to the AO to conduct surveillance of likely crossing sites along the SAIGON River in zone, destroy VC forces moving to the east across the SAIGON River in zone and to maintain one battalion at BIEN HOA as II FFORCEV reserve. The CG 173d Abn Bde (Sep) elected the 2/503d Inf for deployment to the AO MINH THANH and the 1/503d Inf to act as II FFORCEV reserve in the BIEN HOA area. Within a few hours, the 2/503d Inf and A/3/319th Arty was air landed in the AO in the vicinity of MINH THANH.

2. Name of Operation: Operation ATTLEBORO (formerly OPLAN MERIDAN)

3. Reference: Maps of Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L 7014, Sheets 6231 I, 6332 II & III, 6331 IV


5. Type of Operation: II FFORCEV Reserve, Surveillance, Search and Destroy

6. Location: Vicinity of MINH THANH and east along the SAIGON River
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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

7. Command Headquarters: II FFORCEN

8. Reporting Officer: Brigadier General Paul F. Smith

9. Task Organization: The initial task organization remained the same throughout the operation, however, upon termination of Operation ATTLESBoro, the organization was altered for movement back to BIEN HOA.

TF SUTTON - MAJ SUTTON, Commanding

E/17th Cav
D/16th Armor

TF RANGER

33d ARVN Ranger Battalion
35th ARVN Ranger Battalion

2/503d Inf - LTC SIGOLTZ, Commanding

2/503d Inf
1 Squad Engr
1 Squad MP
3 Scout Dog Teams

Brigade Control

3/319th Arty (-) (DS)
HHC (-)

10. Supporting Forces:

a. 3/319th Artillery

(1) Size of Force: 2 batteries of 105mm (towed)

(2) How and When Employed:

(a) Preparation of LZ's

(b) On call missions

(c) Harassing and Interdictory (H&I) fire

(d) Quick reaction fire on VC locations established by intelligence estimate

(e) Suppressive fire on LZ's after extraction

(3) Results: The 3/319th Arty fired 719 missions expending 4,597 rounds during the period 9 - 19 November 1966 in support of Operation ATTLESBoro. Fire was timely and accurate, however, its effectiveness could not be determined due to heavy foliage and high canopy restricted observation both from the ground and from the air.
SUBJECT: Corijat Operations After Action Report

b. United States Air Force:

(1) Size of Force:
   (a) 7th Air Force
      1. 3d TFW (Tactical Fighter Wing)
      2. 8th TFW
      3. 12th TFW
      4. 31st TFW
      5. 35th TFW
   (b) 19th TFW Air Support Squadron of the 504th Tactical Control Group

   (2) How and When Employed: 39 TAC sorties, 14 FAC sorties and 30 VR escort, dropping a total of 44.8 tons of ordnance, were flown in support of the operation. USAF airlifts supplied 174 sorties including resupply. No USMC aviation was used during the operation. There were actually 54 TAC preplanned sorties.

   (3) Results: All sorties provided were effectively used for the requested missions. All sorties provided arrived within a usable time period.

   (4) Air Request Net Used: There were no requests for immediate air support. Therefore the direct air request net was not used.

c. Army Aviation: (335th AMCL)

(1) Size of Force:
   (a) 21 UH-1D aircraft
   (b) 7 UH-1B (A) aircraft
   (c) 1 UH-1B aircraft

(2) How and When Employed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>SORTIES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat Assault (troop lift)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aerial Observer</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command &amp; Liaison</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Evacuation</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial Reconnaissance</td>
<td>196</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

Resupply ............... 716
Miscellaneous ............. 498
TOTAL SORTIES ........ 3,008
Total Hours Flown ........... 973
Total Passengers Carried ........ 4,119
Total Cargo Hauled (tons) ......... 94
Casualties Evacuated ......... 12

Ammunition Evacuated:
7.62mm Rounds ............. 88,100
2.75 Inch Rockets ............. 506
40mm Rounds ............. 2,100
81mm Rounds ............. 125

d. Company D/16th Armor

(1) Size of Force:
   (a) Hqs Section
   (b) 3 Platoons

(2) How and When Employed:
   (a) On 9 November 1966, D/16th Armor was alerted to be prepared to participate in Operation ATTLEBOBO in accordance with OPLAN MERIDAN, redesignated Operation ATTLEBORG, as infantry elements attached to E/17th Cav
   (b) At 1535 hours, 11 November 1966, the order was received to load trucks and proceed to BIEN HOA Air Base. By 1535 hours, the trucks were loaded and the company was on route to the air base. Two loads, 15 men including the first platoon and headquarters elements, departed on C-130's for the base of operations while the remainder of the company returned to base camp.
   (c) At 1630 hours, the first load arrived at MINH THANH Airfield (IT 6367) and proceeded to locate the company's area of responsibility on the Bde perimeter. At 1830 hours, the second load arrived at MINH THANH Airfield. By 1850 hours, a temporary CP and perimeter was established.
   (d) At 1020 hours, 12 Nov 66, the remainder of the company departed BIEN HOA Airfield on C-130's. By 1045 hours, the company was rejoined and a perimeter defense was established. The CP was located at IT 640670.
   (e) At 1106 hours, 13 Nov 66, a platoon size patrol was dispatched to the southern area of the rubber plantation (IT 6265). At 1340 hours, the patrol returned with negative contact.
At 0730 hours, 14 Nov 66, the first platoon departed with E/17th Cav to clear road leading south from MINH THANH. Two six man squads were provided to E/17th Cav to maintain perimeter security in their area.

At 0930 hours, 15 Nov 66, the third platoon was dispatched to the southern edge of the rubber plantation to patrol further into the area patrolled on 13 Nov 66. No contact was made and the patrol returned at 1155 hours.

At 0930 hours, 16 Nov 66, the fourth platoon departed to patrol the area SW of the rubber plantation (XT 6265). At 1055 hours, a camp site was found at XT 611654. The camp contained 20 cooking sites and an abandoned bayonet scabbard. The camp was established to have been used one day prior. At 1120 hours, a two platoon size camp site was located at XT 618649, also estimated to have been used one day prior. At 1330 hours, the patrol returned.

At 0730 hours, 20 Nov 66, D/16th Armor struck camp and positioned itself around the MINH THANH Airfield to provide security while the Brigade departed for BIEN HOA. At 0800 hours, the convoy departed and D/16th Armor completed positioning around the airfield. By 1600 hours all material had been loaded and flown out by C-130's and D/16th Armor boarded the last two aircraft, to depart for BIEN HOA ending Operation ATTLEBORO.

e. 173d Engineer Company:

(1) Size of Force:

(a) One Demolition Squad to 2/503d Inf
(b) One Engr Recon Team
(c) One Water Point to HHC Brigade

(2) How and When Employed:

(a) One 8 km section of road was repaired, vic (630641) to (658578), involving one Bg Dozer and unskilled labor from D/16th Armor to place logs and rubble into the potholes.

(b) Approximately 5,000 gallons a day of potable water was produced and distributed from a well located in the Special Forces Compound east of the Brigade Headquarters Forward, vic (646668).

(3) Results: The minimum amount of Engr support to the Brigade on Operation ATTLEBORO was sufficient. The 173d Engr Co lost no personnel, equipment or material, and participated in no significant action or contacts with the enemy. Civic Action and Psychological Warfare was not conducted.

11. Intelligence:

a. Enemy Situation Before Operation: Route 13, which extends from SAIGON to the Cambodian Border, a distance of 171 km, is bordered on both sides along the eastern edge of the Brigade's AO by areas in which guerrilla units of squad, platoon, and company size were known to have operated. The 1st Inf Div had contacted the 271st, 272d, and the 273d Main Force Regiments of the 9th VC MF Division on Route 13 during June of 1966. During contact with the 1st Inf Div, the 9th VC Div sustained heavy casualties. The 272d VC MF Regt has been...
known to operate, refit, and train its elements within the 173d Abn Bde's AO for Operation ATTLEBORO. In the area where Route 13 traverses BINH DUONG Province, the following enemy units have operated in the past year: C-61 BEN CAT Co, C-62 CHAN THON Co, C-63 LAI THIEU Co, and C-301 PHU QIAO Co. The PHU LOI Battalion and the Provincial Battalion of BINH DUONG also have operated along Route 13.

b. Enemy Situation During Operation: During Operation ATTLEBORO, thirty-three enemy contacts were made with enemy forces, 27 of which were VC initiated. The largest single enemy force encountered was an estimated 50 VC (181035H Nov at XT 631516). Documents captured (171136H Nov at XT 607546) at a VC base camp contained the following letter box numbers:

<table>
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<th>SENDER</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HT61/300VT</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>HT61/320VT</td>
<td>HT/652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HT61/320VT</td>
<td>Village D-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HT130/3665A</td>
<td>Civilian named BA LUAN (He resides at Hamlet #3, BEN SUC, Village THANH TUYEN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HT130/3665A</td>
<td>HT1960B</td>
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<tr>
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<td>HT800U5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>HT130D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

COMMENT: Elements represented by numbers 61/300VT to 61/399VT are located within BIEN DUONG Province. Number 1950B is the Rear Service Section for the LONG NGUYEN Secret Zone. Number 800U5 is the TAY NING Province Party Committee.

US aircraft in support of the three-battalion (1 US Bn, 2 ARVN Bn) size operations flew a total of 27 visual recon missions, receiving ground fire on 7 occasions.

c. Area of Operations:

(1) The climate within the AO was typical of tropic zones affected by monsoons. Winds were gentle to moderate, with some strong gusts during periods of heavy rain. Rainfall was normal for the time of year, occurring mainly during the afternoon and evening hours. Visibility was generally poor prior to 0700 hours, due to morning fog. Ceilings were approximately 2500 feet between 0800 - 1700 hours, lowering to 500 - 600 feet during heavy rains.

(2) Terrain: Between SAIGON and CHON THONH, the terrain along Route 13 is typical delta lowland which gradually changes from level to gently rolling. North of CHON THONH, the route extends through plateau like terrain with long and gradual slopes. Elevation, above sea level, is graduated from 100 to 150 meters. Vegetation changes from rice fields in the south to rubber plantations to open forests, as one proceeds north along Route 13. Route 13 is 12 to 16 feet wide, has a bituminous surface and all bridges are intact or have been repaired recently.

12. Mission: The 173d Abn Bde (Sep) (-) conducted surveillance of likely enemy crossing sites along the SAIGON River in zone, destroy VC forces moving to the east across the SAIGON River in zone and maintain one battalion at BIEN HOA as II FFORCEV reserve.
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AVBE-SC
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

30 December 1966

13. Concept of Operation: The mission of the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) (-) was accomplished in 3 phases:

Phase I (Assembly of forces 7 Nov to 11 Nov 66):
This phase also included local patrolling by the forces already in the AO. By the end of this phase, the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) forces included 2/503d Inf, 3/319th Arty, E/17th Cav, D/16th Armor and TF Ranger composed of the 33d and 35th Ranger Battalions.

Phase II (Conduct Search and Destroy Operations in AO 11 - 18 Nov 66):
During Phase II, air assaults, Eagle Flights, ground sweeps and roadrunner operations were conducted as outlined in OPORD 23-66 Operation ATTLEBORO dtd 11 Nov 66, in Frag Order 1 dtd 13 Nov 66 and in Frag Order 2 dtd 14 Nov 66. In addition, Frag Order 2 directed the Bde to conduct a Feint Airmobile assault operation.

Phase III (The Extraction of the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) from AO on 18 Nov 66):
This phase was directed by Frag Order 3 dtd 18 November 1966.

14. Execution:

D - Day (7 November 1966)
Operational Summary: The 173d Abn Bde (Sep) initiated Operation ATTLEBORO (formerly OPLAN MERIDAN). At 1502 hours, 2/503d Inf and A/3/319th Arty responded to an alert and moved by C-130 and C-123 aircraft to MINH THANH, closing at 1915 hours with supplies and equipment continuing to be air landed at MINH THANH throughout the night. The 2/503d Inf established a perimeter adjacent to the CIDC camp and was operational at approximately 1800 hours.

D + 1 (8 November 1966)
Operational Summary: Operation ATTLEBORO continued in the vic of MINH THANH. The 2/503d Inf (II ForceV Reserve) completed deployment to MINH THANH from BIEN HOA closing at 0230 hours. 39 sorties of C-130 and C-123 aircraft were used to complete the move. The 2/503d Inf conducted patrolling operations west of MINH THANH without contact. The Bn CP was positioned at XT 642670. The Brigade (-) prepared for deployment to MINH THANH on order.

D + 2 (9 November 1966)
Operational Summary: Operation ATTLEBORO continued in the vic of MINH THANH. The 2/503d Inf patrolled in its assigned AO without contact. At 0900 hours, elements of 3/319th Arty aerial observer sighted a VC sampan on the SAIGON River. The sampan was fired upon resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC) and complete destruction of the sampan. No other significant contact resulted.

D + 3 (10 November 1966)
Operational Summary: Operation ATTLEBORO continued in the MINH THANH area with the 2/503d Inf conducting an air assault. Co B and the recon platoon from 2/503d Inf landed on LZ (XT 571687) west of MINH THANH at 1048 hours and remained in the area overnight. The Brigade (-) moved to MINH THANH and the Brigade CP became operational at 1700 hours at XT 641671.
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AVBE-SC

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

30 December 1966

TF Ranger air assaulted into the vic of MINH THANH on LZ located at XT 572628. The 33d Ranger Bn conducted its air assault at 1337 hours and the 35th Ranger Bn conducted its air assault at 1445 hours. The 35th Ranger Bn made contact with 2 VC at XT 572628 with negative results. The 33d Ranger Bn made contact and killed one VC at the vic of XT 583613 at 1720 hours. In addition, they captured one M-1 rifle.

The following increases in the task organization were made:

a. 3/319th Arty (-) closed at 1700 hours
b. The Brigade CP became operational at 1700 hours
c. TF Ranger, under the OPCON of the Brigade consisted of the 33d and 35th Ranger Battalions
d. E/17th Cav began movement into the AO at 2231 hours

D + 4 (11 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Operation ATTLEBORO (formerly MERIDAN) was officially named Operation ATTLEBORO, with the 2/503d Inf, 3/319th Arty (-), E/17th Cav, D/17th Armor, 173d Engr Co and HHQ Brigade (-) in the AO.

The 2/503d Inf continued to operate in AO 3. The Bn (-) moved from Pan PANTHER (XT 642670) to Pan TIGER (XT 658734) by heliborne assault. Co B and the recon platoon extracted from an LZ in the vic of XT 571687 and closed on Pan TIGER at 1224 hours.

E/17th Cav closed on Pan PANTHER at 1500 hours. TF Ranger initiated operations in AO 4. At 1140 hours, the 33d Ranger Bn made contact with 5 VC resulting in one ARVN WIA. VC losses are unknown.

D + 5 (12 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Operation ATTLEBORO continued. The 2/503d Inf (-) conducted search and destroy operations in AO 3 in the vic of MINH THANH. Co A conducted a heliborne assault into the LZ in the vic of XT 629742 at 0840 hours, and patrolled east closing back into the Bn area at Pan TIGER.

E/17th Cav conducted a roadrunner operation NE from MINH THANH along Route 245 to the boundary of AO 3 and returned to Pan PANTHER at 1445 hours. There were negative casualties during this period.

TF Ranger continued search and destroy operations in AO 4 in the vic of XT 569609 and XT 568650 respectively without contact.

D + 6 (13 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Operation ATTLEBORO continued in the vic of MINH THANH without incident. The 2/503d Inf conducted search and destroy operations in AO 3. E/17th Cav conducted a route recon along Hwy 242 to the southern boundary of AO 1 (XT 6560).

TF Ranger continued search and destroy operations in AO 4.
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AVB-E-SC

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

30 December 1966

D + 7 (14 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Operation ATTLEBORO continued in the vic of MINH THANH (XT 657504). The 2/503d Inf conducted heliborne assaults in to LZ's ANN (XT 667506) and MARY (XT 661577) at 1100 hours. Co A engaged 3 VC in the vic of XT 668533. The VC broke contact and fled NE with no friendly casualties and unknown VC casualties. Co B located and destroyed an old VC workshop in the vic of XT 667513 containing 3 huts, 24 rifle stocks and one frag grenade. At 1740 hours, Co A located a possible VC training area with an obstacle course in the vic of XT 664530. In addition, they located and destroyed a VC base camp in the vic of XT 664537 at 1820 hours.

E/17th Cav escorted A/3/319th Arty from Pan TIGER (XT 657733) to Pan MARY (XT 658587). D/16th Armor located a VC bivouac site (XT 648633) large enough to support 15 to 20 personnel.

D + 8 (15 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Operation ATTLEBORO continued in the vic of MINH THANH. The 2/503d Inf conducted search and destroy operations with Co B locating 5 boobytrapped bunkers and an L shaped trench in the vic of XT 655532. The trench and boobytraps were destroyed at 1000 hours. At 1100 hours, Co B located a company size base camp (XT 655533) that had been occupied approximately 30 minute prior to moving into the area. At 1246 hours, Co A located another base camp which was old and had not been used for quite a while.

E/17th Cav conducted route recon from Pan PANTHER (XT 64672) south along Route 13 and Route 242 to Pan MARY (XT 660677), closing back into Pan PANTHER at 1030 hours.

The 335th AMLC attached to the Brigade and conducted an airlifted feint on LZ ANNETTE (XT 567855) employing 2 lifts (8 UH-1D's) following TAC air and armed helicopter preparations. The feint was completed at 0830 hours.

D + 9 (16 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Operation ATTLEBORO continued in the vic of MINH THANH. The 2/503d Inf continued search and destroy operations. Co's B and C and the recon platoon deployed of foot at 0855 hours from Pan MARY (XT 660577) to the vic of LZ JAN (XT 613525). Co A conducted a heliborne assault on LZ JAN at 0933 hours. Co A engaged an estimated 8 VC (vic XT 617521) at 1046 hours. The VC detonated one claymore and fired an estimated 30 small arms rounds before breaking contact. The friendly casualties were 1 US KIA and 2 US WIA with unknown VC casualties. At 1407 hours, Co A was engaged by a claymore and light s/a fire in the vic of XT 616614 resulting in 2 US WIA. Again at 1526 hours, Co A engaged 3 VC (XT 632510) resulting in 1 US KIA and unknown VC casualties.

E/17th Cav secured Engr work parties repairing Route 242 between Ps PANTHER (XT 6467) and Pan MARY (XT 5766). The 3/319th Arty continued to support the Bde operation with one battery at Pan PANTHER and one battery at Pan MARY.
AVBSC

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

30 December 1966

Operational Summary: Operation ATTLEBORO continued without significant contact. The 2/503d Inf cleared the village of XA THI TINH (XT 6252) and relocated the people to BEN CAT. Co C located and destroyed 2 VC mess halls containing 30 bowls and cooking utensils (vic XT607546). Co B located two rice caches in the vic of XT 638523 and XT 645515.

E/17th Cav conducted a 20 man raid on a suspected VC base camp in the western portion of AO 3 at 0735 hours. TF Ranger continued search and destroy operations without enemy contact.

Operational Summary: Operation ATTLEBORO continued in the vic of MINH THANH. The 2/503d Inf continued search and destroy operations in the vicinity of THI TINH (XT 6052). At 1030 hours, Co B located 15 tons of rice (vic XT 631516) and 22 tons of rice (vic XT 626514). Elements of the Company supported by artillery and gun ships engaged a VC platoon in the vicinity of XT 631516. The VC broke contact at 1226 hours resulting in 1 US KIA and 4 US WIA with unknown VC casualties. At 1745 hours, Co B became engaged with an unknown sized VC force. The VC broke contact and fled northeast resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).

E/17th Cav conducted combat patrols in AO 3 and were extracted back to Pen PANTHER by helicopter at 1644 hours with negative contact.

TF Ranger continued operations with the 35th Ranger Bn securing Pen MARY. The 35th Ranger Bn deployed by foot from XT 693615 to XT 673699. One company was airlifted from XA THI TINH to Pen PANTHER at 0940 hours with no significant contact.

Operational Summary: Operation ATTLEBORO continued in the vic of MINH THANH. The 2/503d Inf was airlifted from LZ JAN (XT 614525) at 0935 hours and closed into Pen PANTHER at 1029 hours. Co B closed into Pen MARY (XT 660577) at 1012 hours and assumed responsibility for security of A/3/319th Arty. Co B and A/3/319th Arty deployed overland along Routes 242 and 14 from Pen MARY to Pen PANTHER (XT 640673) closing at 1400 hours.

The 33d Ranger Bn closed into Pen PANTHER by foot march at 1030 hours. The 35th Ranger Bn was airlifted from Pen MARY at 1019 hours and closed to Pen PANTHER at 1445 hours. E/17th Cav patrolled SW and west and closed on Pen PANTHER at 1445 hours.

D + 13 (20 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Operation ATTLEBORO terminated at 1905 hours. The 2/503d Inf, 3/319th Arty, E/17th Cav and HHC Bde moved by road convoy from MINH THANH (XT 64687) beginning at 0600 hours. The 1/11th ACR transported the 2/503d Inf from MINH THANH to the vic of TAN KHANK (XT 906136) and was released from the Brigade OPCON at 1524 hours.
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AVBE-SC

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

30 December 1966

The 2/503d Inf entrucked at the point and completed movement to BIEN HOA.
At 1205 hours, an APC of 1/11th ACR was damaged by a command detonated mine in the
vic of XT 7822. Personnel tracing the wire from the command detonated mine activated a boobytrap. No VC were sighted and the 1/11th ACR received 10 WIA.

D/16th Armor moved by C-130 aircraft from MINH THANH closing in BIEN HOA at 1905 hours.

15. Civic Action and Psychological Operations:

a. During Operation ATTLEBORO, the S5 section centered its activities in the following areas:

XA THI THINH ................ XT 518618
XA MINH HOA ................ XT 676635
AP HOA MY ................ XT 680610

b. The following are totals of S5 activities:

(1) MEDCAP

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<td>XT 518618</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Nov 66</td>
<td>XA MINH HOA</td>
<td>XT 676635</td>
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<td>19 Nov 66</td>
<td>AP HOA MY</td>
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TOTAL ........ 105

(2) Psychological Operations

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<tr>
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<td>Speaker</td>
<td>&quot;Identification of the VC&quot;</td>
<td>30 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Nov 66</td>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>&quot;VC are Enemy of the People&quot;</td>
<td>30 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Nov 66</td>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>&quot;Rally Now&quot;</td>
<td>90 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Nov 66</td>
<td>Leaflet</td>
<td>&quot;Safe Conduct&quot;</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Nov 66</td>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>&quot;VC Destroy, We Build&quot;</td>
<td>52,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Nov 66</td>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>&quot;Surrender Now&quot;</td>
<td>90 minutes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Leaflets Dropped ............. 114,000
Total Leaflet Missions ............. 2
Total Speaker Missions ............. 4

11
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AVBE-SC

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

30 December 1966

(3) Distribution

Polished Rice (pound bags) 1,000
Paddy Rice (pounds) 225
Soup Base (cases) 10
Milk (cases) 14
Cigarettes (cartons) 5
Soap (bars) 2,000
Soap Powder (cases) 4
Oil (gallons) 48
Toothpaste (tubes) 50

Psychological Operations Leaflets and Posters

c. On 17 November 1966, in coordination with American and GVN officials in the BEN CAT District, 93 Vietnamese from XA THI THINH were evacuated to BEN CAT District. Foodstuffs, medicine, soap and milk were distributed to the Vietnamese refugees.

16. Administration and Logistics: To support Operation ATTLEBORO, a Brigade Supply Office (BSO) liaison team was established at the MINH THANH airstrip and two days later a Brigade Support Operations Center (BSOC) was established in the same general location. Security for the BSOC was provided by D/16th Armor and unit resources.

a. Supply and Transportation: Resupply of the Brigade was accomplished daily by Air Force airlift from BIEN HOA. The 173d Spt Bn furnished all classes of supply. Resupply of the forward elements of the Brigade was accomplished by UH-1 and CH-47 utilising a total of 152 and 20 sorties respectively for the entire operation. A total of 475.8 ST of supplies were handled during the operation. Breakdown by class of supply follows:

Class I 62.3
Class II & IV 29.0
Class III & IIIA 206.0
Class V 178.5

A graves registration team was attached to the Brigade and provided grave registration coverage.

b. Maintenance: A contact team from Co "D" Maintenance, 173d Spt Bn provided direct support maintenance employing one officer and eight EM. Back up support was provided via air from BIEN HOA. A total of 40 jobs were received during the operation. A detailed breakdown follows:
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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report
SECTION: Mechanical Maintenance

JOBS RECEIVED | JOBS COMPLETED | JOBS INCOMPLETED
---|---|---
2 | 2 | 0
5 | 4 | 1
33 | 33 | 0

c. Medical: Co "B" Medical provided medical support employing four officers and thirty-eight EM offering full surgical, medical and dental support. The clearing station served as the primary evacuation facility for casualties. A 20 bed holding facility was maintained for minor wounds, injuries and illnesses. Back-up support was provided by 3d MASH, 7th Surgical Hospital and 93d Evacuation Hospital. Dustoff was provided by the 254th Dustoff Detachment. A total of 79 patients/casualties were treated during the entire operation.

d. Communications: Communications difficulties experienced during this operation can be broken down into two groups: Routine difficulties and non routine difficulties.

(1) Routine: Transmission range cut down by dense canopy and particularly by the rubber canopy in the plantation area. Local overriding of frequencies.

These difficulties were overcome by separating the antennas as much as possible (the use of GRA-39-reeds) and by getting the antennas as high as possible (preferably above the canopy).

(2) Non-routine: The suddenness of the operation resulted in equipment being left behind by some of the staff sections. This had to be brought out on resupply. Because of the change in personnel, some equipment was sent in as not being needed during the convoy back. By doubling up, the use of equipment and control was maintained.

17. Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. The 2/503d Inf used nylon ropes on several occasions to assist in their stream crossings. They were effectively employed across streams, giving personnel support and an item/object to grasp for assistance in maintaining balance in the swift stream.

b. In addition, the 2/503d Inf employed life guards downstream during the crossing, providing additional security. On one occasion, this extra security saved the life of a soldier. The soldier had been swept downstream during a crossing. A positioned life guard moved to the mouth of the running stream and thus pulled the soldier to safety.

18. Results of Operation ATTLEBORO:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>US FORCES</th>
<th>ARVN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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AVBE-SC

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

30 December 1966

b. Enemy Losses

Personnel
KIA (BC) ........................................... 7
KIA (Foes) .......................................... 8
VCC ................................................... 0
VCG ................................................... 0

Weapons
Small Arms .......................................... 2
US Carbine .......................................... 1

Ammunition
Small Arms (rounds) .............................. 240
Mortar (rounds) ..................................... 1
M-79 (rounds) ....................................... 1
Grenades ............................................ 11

Foodstuffs (pounds) .............................. 248,800

Equipment Destroyed
Bicycles ............................................. 2
Sampans ............................................ 6
Rifle Stocks ........................................ 24

Installations
Huts .................................................. 20

19. Lessons Learned and Commander's Analysis:

a. Lessons Learned:

(1) Item: Rapid Deployment

Discussion: The rapid deployment of the 2/503d Inf to MINH THANH indicates that a unit, even while in a base camp situation, can be rapidly dispatched to a trouble zone. The coordination necessary for a Bn size movement was quickly and efficiently expedited. In addition, the troops were prepared, assembled an in-transit within 4 hours after the initial alert.
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AVBE-SC

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

Observation: Units must remain prepared for rapid deployment at all times.

(2) Item: Forces Operating in Close Proximity

Discussion: Although all forces must be mutually supported during an operation, if two or more forces are allowed to operate in close proximity to one another, confusion in activity could result in friendly forces firing on one another. This may occur when a VC unit is situated between two friendly units, resulting in friendly forces indirectly firing upon one another. This is due, in part, to the limited vision in jungle areas, friendly forces being unaware of each other's location(s). Artillery fired may also be accidentally misdirected upon friendly forces.

Observation: Commanders must insure that units under their control do not operate in AO's other than their own, unless called in for support of another unit. This measure will reduce the possibility of friendly forces accidentally firing on one another.

(3) Item: Mortar Aerial Delivery (MAD) System

Discussion: The MAD system basically is a modification on a UH-1B helicopter which enables the airship to deliver either 81mm mortar rounds or 20 pound fragmentary bombs. The utilization of the MAD system is limited however, owing to its need for smoke, and ground units not always being oriented on the use of aerial mortar support. In addition, it is necessary to cease ground artillery and TAC Air fire when helicopters are in the area of contact.

Observation: The limitations as well as the advantages of the MAD system must be thoroughly understood to insure its proper employment. It should be utilised when artillery and/or TAC Air are not available, or upon the decision of the Unit Commander based upon the tactical situation involved.

b. Commander's Analysis: The mission of the three battalion size forces participating in Operation ATTLEBORO under this Brigade was successfully accomplished. Extensive use was made of the six man long range reconnaissance patrols, reinforced squad size combat patrols, and elements between the SAIGON River and Route 13 within the AO. Contact was light and sporadic, consisting primarily of sniper fire and fire fights with VC elements between squad and platoon size.

The most significant enemy activities were detected in an area immediately northeast of the Michelin Rubber Plantation. Several recently abandoned company and platoon size base camps were found, several of which contained recently cooked rice which was still warm. It is believed that the enemy will continue to move east and west across the SAIGON River to transport supplies and food when US and ARVN Military units are located in the area.

E. B. ROBERSON
CPT, AGO
Asst AG

15 CONFIDENTIAL
OPN ATTLEBORO
7 NOV TO 20 NOV 66