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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (12 Jan 68) FOR OT RD-670607 18 January 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 14th Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 July 1967 (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH C. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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CG, US Army Weapons Command
CO, 14th Combat Aviation Battalion
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 14TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96374

AVGD-SC

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal

THRU: Commanding Officer
17th Combat Aviation Group
APPH-AVGD-SC
APO San Francisco 96240

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Washington DC, 20310

11 August 1967


2. Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosures.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

NORMAN H. HOLT JR.
Captain Arty
Adjutant

This report received at Hqs, Department of the Army without indorsements. To preclude further delay in benefits gained from the lessons learned herein, this report is published without complete indorsements.
AVGD-SC 11 August 1967
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 July 1967 (RCS-LS FOR 65)

TO: See Distribution

Section I: Significant Organizational Activities

1. (C) General

a. The mission of the 14th CAB is to provide timely direct and general aviation support to the elements of Task Force Oregon and selected units within I CTZ and to maintain a Provisional Aviation Battalion Headquarters to provide command, control, administration and logistics for separate aviation units assigned to the Task Force.

b. Major organizational changes during this quarter were:


(3) The 534th Medical Detachment was assigned to the 14th CAB effective 1 July 1967.

c. The 534th Medical Detachment closed at Chu Lai on 1 July 1967, and began immediate operations under control of the Battalion Surgeon.

d. Aircraft assets and their location at the close of this reporting period are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>HEADQUARTERS LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHD, 14th CAB</td>
<td>1 UH-60</td>
<td>Chu Lai, RVN (BT 572 039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th Sec Flt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>348th Avn Det</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>534th Med Det</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71st Avn Co</td>
<td>21 UH-1D, 7 UH-1C</td>
<td>Chu Lai, RVN (BT 541 064)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Downgraded at 3 year Intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 6800.10
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**AVGD-BC**

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 July 1967 (RCS-CS FOR 65)

**UNIT** | **NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT** | **HEADQUARTERS LOCATION**
--- | --- | ---
94th Sig Det | | |
151st TC Det | | |
161st Avn Co | 21 UH-1D, 7 UH-1B | Chu Lai, RVN (BT 575 033)
406th TC Det | | |
449th Sig Det | | |
756th Med Det (-) | | |
174th Avn Co | 20 UH-1D, 8 UH-1C | Duc Pho, RVN (BS 812 382)
409th TC Det | | |
452nd Sig Det | | |
756th Med Det (-) | | |
176th Avn Co | 20 UH-1D, 8 UH-1C | Duc Pho, RVN (BS 845 370)
411th TC Det | | |
454th Sig Det | | |
178th Avn Co | 16 CH-47A, 1 UH-1C, 2 OH-23G | Chu Lai, RVN (BT 547 057)
400th TC Det | | |

e. Transportation and Signal Detachments continue to remain attached to each Aviation Company to facilitate aircraft and avionics maintenance support.

f. Medical support assets have been divided to afford aviation medical support at both Chu Lai and Duc Pho.

g. Command

(1) During this period the battalion was commanded by LTC William R. Ponder, 070473, Armor.


(4) Major Douglaston W. Phillips, 0842540, Artillery, assumed...
AVG-WC 11 August 1967
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 July 1967 (RCS-CS FOR 65)

command of the 176th Avn Co on 1 June 1967.


2. (C) Intelligence and Counterintelligence

a. During the period 1 May - 31 July 1967 the 14th Combat Aviation Battalion had 142 aircraft hit by hostile fire. This represents an increase of over 400% from the preceding quarter. 2

b. Analysis of the hostile fire report to determine the number of aircraft hit by altitude and aircraft action reveals the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ALT</th>
<th>ON GROUND</th>
<th>T/O</th>
<th>L/LD</th>
<th>F/NR</th>
<th>TARGET ATTACK</th>
<th>TOTAL BY ALTITUDE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>700</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>800</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>900</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2300</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
d. Weather had a negligible impact on operations during this quarter.

e. Units of the Battalion have contributed to the psychological warfare effort by dropping several hundred thousand leaflets per day and flying loudspeaker teams on numerous broadcasting missions.

3. (c) Operations and Training Activities:

a. Plans

   (1) A new plan for alert procedures, aircraft evacuation and dispersal was written. The plan provides for:

   (a) Integration of Battalion Units into local defense plans and alert nets.

   (b) Dispersal of aircraft based on area alert conditions.

   (c) Aircraft evacuation procedures.

   (d) Aircraft revetments.

   (e) Guidance for gunship/flareship standby.

   (2) Plans were completed for employment of a haliborne reaction force to counter any threat to the Chu Lai area.

   (3) Unit loading and movement plans were reviewed.

   (4) Continuous planning and coordination were accomplished with ground commanders in preparation for and conduct of operations outlined below.

b. Operations

   (1) This battalion was engaged in combat or combat support operations every day of the reported period.

   (2) Aviation companies of the Battalion participated in the
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AVGDL-EC
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 July 1967 (RCS-CS FOR 65)

11 August 1967

following major operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>SUPPORTED UNIT</th>
<th>DATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malheur I</td>
<td>1/101st Infantry Brigade</td>
<td>11 May - June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malheur II</td>
<td>1/101st Infantry Brigade</td>
<td>8 June - July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prairie Fire</td>
<td>5th Special Forces Group</td>
<td>12 - 31 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18 June - Present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) In order to give the best possible combat support, units of the battalion were disposed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AVN UNIT</th>
<th>UNIT SUPPORTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>71st Aviation Company</td>
<td>DS to 196th Light Infantry Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161st Aviation Company</td>
<td>GS to Task Force Oregon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>174th Aviation Company</td>
<td>DS to 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>176th Aviation Company</td>
<td>DS to 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>178th Aviation Company</td>
<td>GS to Task Force Oregon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) The 1/101st Infantry Brigade has been employed as the primary maneuver brigade of Task Force Oregon, thus the two indicated major operations. All brigades have, however, conducted daily airmobile combat assaults, extractions and resupply. Assault missions are normally controlled by a DS company reinforced when necessary by the 161st and on occasion other DS aviation units. Assaults involving 13 or more lift ships were habitually planned and controlled by the battalion.

(5) During the period 1 - 10 May battalion units conducted daily combat assaults, extractions and resupply missions as the ground units maneuvered to "learn" the operational area. Ground to air fire was intense throughout the TAOR.

(6) The 176th was relieved of committments at Lane AHP on 6 May and proceeded by air and convoy to their base camp at Phu Hiep to prepare for their scheduled move North. The advance party arrived at Duc Pho (Eagles Nest) on 9 May to finalize coordination for the company move and initial support of the 1/101st Brigade. The company with all attachments closed Duc Pho on 11 May 1967. From 6 - 11 May, flareship, gunship standby and C&C missions were performed.

(7) The first major airmobile assault of Task Force Oregon units was completed on 11 May when 23 UH-1D's, 13 gunships and 9 OH-47's...
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 July 1967 (RCS-CS FOR 65)

lifted 1220 combat troops of the 1/327th and 2/502nd Airborne Battalion plus two batteries of supporting artillery. In addition, regular support of other Task Force Units was maintained. Four-hundred-twenty-three (423) hours were flown to begin Operation Malheur I.

(8) On 15 May, aircraft of the 176th Avn Co were called upon to extract casualties for the 1/101st Airborne Brigade. The initial pick up ship, on landing, was hit by a mortar round and totally destroyed. In the subsequent action to extract wounded, a total of 11 UH-1D’s and 7 UH-1C/B’s from the 176th and 161st Aviation Companies were committed. Eight of the slicks and all gunships were hit by intense ground fire. Five crewmembers were WIA. With the exception of the first ship, all reached secure areas before being forced to land. Five required extraction by CH-47. A total of 22 U.S. wounded were evacuated in the operation. Total casualties in the 14th Battalion this day were 19 aircraft hit and 7 crewmembers WIA. This was by far the worst day ever suffered by the Battalion.

(9) On 19 May the 161st Aviation Company began construction of aircraft revetments in their new area VIC BS 575 033. Work progressed rapidly and the company closed there on 13 June. No loss in combat effectiveness was experienced during the move.

(10) During the periods 12 - 31 May and 18 June - 31 July the 161st Aviation Company provided 2 UH-1B gunships for a classified mission in support of Operation Prairie Fire.

(11) On 26 May the maintenance base of the 174th Aviation Company closed the Due Pho area, greatly increasing the capability of the company. Previously maintenance had been located at Lane AHF and English Field due to the tactical situation at Due Pho.

(12) During most of May, the Task Force Oregon Psyops section conducted extensive operations in the Northern sections of the TAOR to inform RVN nationals that a curfew had been imposed on all waterways between the hours of 2100 - 0500. On 29 May the 71st Aviation Company launched the first Firefly mission in the AO. Section advisors and/or Province Chiefs rode in the O2C ship of the team. The team has been very successful. In one night alone they destroyed 148 sampans, 13 structures and were credited with 14 VC killed.

(13) On 240555 June, a hostile mortar attack was initiated against the Due Pho airfield complex. In a five minute span, 7 rounds landed in the 174th Aviation Company area. One round hit a troop tent killing 2 and wounding 36 personnel. Three UH-1D’s and one UH-1C, located in “W” shaped revetments, were damaged. Most casualties were from the company’s 459th Maintenance Detachment. Temporary replacements from other battalion assets were flown in to keep satisfactory maintenance support available.

(14) The 174th participated in a combat assault at 0700 on 3 July 1967 during which all aviators and crew members were required to wear gas masks. Prior to the combat assault Air Force A-1H’s dropped a large concentration of CS gas into the area of operations. The combat assault and ground
AVGILBC
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 July 1967 (RCI.CS FOR 65)

operation proved very successful and similar operations will very likely be
conducted in the future.

(15) On 150020 July, two gunships and a flareship from the
71st Aviation Company were scrambled to attack a North Vietnamese Trawler
driven shoreward by the Navy near the mouth of the RIVIERE DE SA KY (BS 7882).
They were relieved on station at 0130 by ships of the 161st Aviation Company.
At 0300 coordination was effected with the ROK MC Brigade to air assault 492
ROK Marines into LZ’s to secure and capture the ship. By 0930 all troops
were on the ground and the ship and cargo of arms and ammunition were in
friendly hands.

(16) On 24 July, HHD, 14th Aviation Battalion began the move
to a new CP location next to the 161st Aviation Company (BT 572 035). Personnel moved from tents into temporary buildings. The unit closed 26 July.

(17) The Artillery Warning Control Center at Chu Lai was
augmented with a station at Duc Pho to provide friendly fire clearance in-
formation to aircraft throughout the AO.

(18) Throughout this quarter, units of the 14th Battalion have
been called upon to perform many types of missions, day and night, in good
weather and bad. In all cases the challenge was met in an outstanding manner
and many kudos received from supported ground units.

(19) During the quarter the 14th Aviation Battalion accompl-
ished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hours</td>
<td>9047</td>
<td>9501</td>
<td>10750</td>
<td>29258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>50462</td>
<td>53946</td>
<td>64264</td>
<td>168672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo tons</td>
<td>7997</td>
<td>8578</td>
<td>7693</td>
<td>24268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorties</td>
<td>33485</td>
<td>39212</td>
<td>41665</td>
<td>114362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med evacs</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC KIA (Conf)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC Captured</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures destroyed</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampans destroyed</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 July 1967 (RCS-CS FOR65)

Ammunition expended:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.62mm</td>
<td>887,000</td>
<td>983,300</td>
<td>1,262,100</td>
<td>3,132,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40mm</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>4,600</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>18,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.50 cal</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>5,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.75&quot; rockets</td>
<td>7,700</td>
<td>6,700</td>
<td>8,400</td>
<td>22,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Companies flew a total of 694 hours at night performing insertions, extractions, med evac, resupply and armed helicopter missions.

The 178th Assault Support Helicopter Company evacuated 22 UH-1D's, 1 UH-1B, 2 OH-13's, 4 OH-23's and 10 -1 during this three month period.

c. Training

(1) All units conducted familiarization firing of individual and crew served weapons.

(2) Training of replacement crew members continued to require an extensive OJT program for gunners and crew chiefs and a closely coordinated standardization program for new aviators. Both programs progressed smoothly throughout the quarter.

(3) Training memorandums and circulars were revised and updated to conform with changing requirements.

(4) The Battalion continued to utilize maximum quotas for AAMTAP courses.

d. Other: None.

4. (C) Logistics

a. General: During the early part of the reporting period, some areas of logistics support were inadequate. As the Task Force support activities became fully operational, no critical shortages of any significance or duration occurred.

For the first few weeks of the reporting period, aircraft parts, lubricants and pentolite were in short supply. JP-4 refueling points were not completely adequate, though a six point facility was installed when the equipment became available.

b. Class I - no significant events or problems.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 July 1967 (RCS-CS FOR 65)

o. Class II and IV:

(1) Emergency Resupply of tents to 174th: On 24 June 1967, the 174th Avn Co at Duc Pho requested immediate resupply of 3 GP large tents, 2 GP medium tents, 30 cots and some tent repair kits. These were to replace and repair items damaged or destroyed in the mortar attack of the night before. Four GP medium tents were immediately released by 94th S & S Bn (no large GP tents available) and 2 large GP tents were transferred from the 161st Aviation Company to the 174th Aviation Company. Though some cots were available, it was found that only four or five were unrepairable and these were replaced from company stocks. Tent repair kits were obtained from the FSA at Duc Pho. All tents were shipped south on a CH-47 reserved for this purpose. All damaged items were repaired or replaced within 18 hours after the attack.

d. Class III:

(1) 8 May 67 - JP-4 refueling area completed and operational in Duc Pho area. This facility has 7 UH-1 refuel points and 1 CH-47 refuel point. It was installed by POL personnel of 1st Log Cmd at Duc Pho using their equipment. Nine UH-1 helicopters or seven UH-1's and one CH-47 can refuel simultaneously at this facility.

(2) 18 May 67 - The multi-point refueling facility for the 71st Assault Helicopter Company was moved from the East-West runway to the West parking ramp at Chu Lai. The elements of the system, consisting of two 10,000 gallon bladders and a 350 GPM pump, were moved by the 94th S & S Bn in two days. The 1200 gallon tankers organic to the 71st provided JP-4 to the helicopters during the move.

(3) 21 May 67 - A ten point refueling facility was put into operation on the beach at Duc Pho. This facility is operated by FSA Gallagher and supplies JP-4 to the helicopters from a bladder farm nearby. Small tanker ships supply fuel to the bladders through 4" hoses. The 12" discharge hoses were all furnished by the 176th Aviation Company at Duc Pho.

(4) 15 June 1967 - The 94th S & S Bn completed the installation of an eight point JP-4 refueling facility in the 161st Avn Co new area. The 4 hose miniport reel was provided by the 161st Avn Co. All other equipment, including a 350 GPM pump, two 10,000 gallon bladders and connecting hoses were supplied by the 94th S & S Battalion.

e. Class V - No significant events or problems.

f. Base Development:

(1) Chu Lai Area: Construction of cantonment areas, parking ramps, heliports, and improvement of unit roads was accomplished by assigned engineer support or by self-help. In April 1967 a letter was forwarded to Task Force Oregon Engineer requesting a heliport, cantonment areas, and parking ramps be constructed. This request was approved and a work order was
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 July 1967 (RCS-CS FOR 65)

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given to MCB 71, Seabees, for execution of the programmed construction. The 161st Aviation Company's heliport contains 32 parking pads, an 8 point refueling area, and 140,000 square feet of M8A1 matting for the maintenance ramp. The parking ramps for the 71st and 178th Aviation Companies required more than 140,000 square feet of M8A1 matting. The cantonment areas of the 161st Aviation Company and Headquarters Detachment were constructed by the 9th Marine Engineer Battalion.

A total of 89 "strong backs" (tent frames with floors - 16' x 32') were built of which 26 were covered with corrugated tin roofs. The Marine Engineers constructed required latrines, showers, water towers, and service roads in the cantonment area. Approximately 15 buildings (formally occupied by Marine units) were assigned to each the 178th and the 71st Aviation Companies. The remainder of each company is housed in floored tents without frames. A letter request was submitted to secure lumber, screenwire, nails and fixtures to construct frames on the existing tent floors for both companies prior to monsoon season. The request is under study at this time.

(2) "Eagles Nest": Construction at "Eagles Nest" was approached from a temporary point of view, therefore, only minimum construction was accomplished. Construction of showers, tent floors, operational facilities and revetments, were the extent of vertical development. This work was performed by self-help means. An immediate parking ramp and taxi lane were constructed by a local supporting engineer unit. These areas were pavedprized for dust control.

Request for monsoon construction materials was disapproved by Task Force Oregon G-4 for this area, therefore, confirming the temporary nature of this site.

(3) Duo Pho: This site proved to be of a more permanent nature and accordingly greater effort and preparation was undertaken to develop it into a highly functional area. Engineer effort was secured to level, peneprime, and lay matting for a maintenance ramp.

Request for "strongbacks" was approved for this unit, but this type of structure did not satisfy the unit commander's requirements. Re-design of these structures are under study at this time.

g. Several problem areas were encountered in base development. Basic construction materials were in extremely short supply. Adequate engineer support for road maintenance and aircraft revetments was not available. An extensive self-help program was utilized in all areas. Prefabricated maintenance hangars for inclement weather operations are not available but have been requested through Task Force Oregon G-4 channels.

h. Maintenance

(1) Two major problems were encountered during this reporting
period. A major maintenance backlog resulted from combat damage sustained on 15 May 67 when 19 battalion aircraft received hits. Approximately 45 days were required to repair three of 19 aircraft. Extensive sheet metal repairs and requisition of "fringe" repair parts were the major cause for the delay. The second significant problem encountered was the low availability of mission ready gunships. Gunships of the battalion fired over 3,000,000 rounds in close ground support of Task Force Oregon Units in this three month period. During the previous six months a total of only 2,000,000 has been fired by battalion units. Demand data was not available to support this tremendous increase in rounds expended and armament repair parts were not available.

(2) During the mortar attack on the 174th Avn Co, 26 June, approximately 35 personnel from the aircraft maintenance unit of the company were wounded. Emergency requisitions for personnel were submitted to 17th Avn Group and Army. Temporary replacements were selected from other maintenance unit within the battalion, and the direct support Transportation Company, and placed on TDY with the 174th Aviation Company until replacements arrived. The fast reaction time in placing appropriate personnel on TDY with the 174th Aviation Company enabled routine support to continue without any difficulty.

(3) Aircraft availability during this quarter was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UH-1D</th>
<th>UH-1B/C (armed)</th>
<th>CH-47</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>74.1%</td>
<td>71.0%</td>
<td>77.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>72.6%</td>
<td>70.9%</td>
<td>69.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>78.7%</td>
<td>78.0%</td>
<td>74.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Aircraft mission ready, availability during the 3 month period was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UH-1D</th>
<th>UH-1B/C (armed)</th>
<th>CH-47</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>62.2%</td>
<td>58.7%</td>
<td>56.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>63.8%</td>
<td>46.4%</td>
<td>53.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>73.4%</td>
<td>53.2%</td>
<td>56.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. (C) Civil Affairs:

a. During this period units of the Battalion hauled many tons of rice and salt from field locations to storage areas from which it will later be distributed to refugees throughout the Task Force Oregon AO.

b. Several thousand refugees have been moved from major contact areas to refugee centers.
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a. Battalion units, particularly the 174th Aviation Company in the Dau Pho area, have donated soap and candy to orphanages and, when possible, building materials and tools to assist in the construction of refugee centers.

d. Battalion doctors participated in the MEDCAP program in conjunction with Task Force Oregon ground units.

6. (C) Personnel

a. Some minor problems were experienced during the first two months of the quarter when the battalion was responsible to two headquarters. Each headquarters required either administrative control or review authority. This caused "double" administration requiring action copies to be sent to one headquarters and an information copy to the other. This was essentially resolved 1 July when we became attached to Task Force Oregon for all administration except promotion authority. A continuing problem exists in that each headquarters, Task Force Oregon and 17th Aviation Group, maintains authority to levy this organization for enlisted personnel E-6 and below.

b. The following is an analysis of the battalion strength for the quarter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSOLIDATED BATTALION STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUTHORIZED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 May 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jul 67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following is a breakdown of the authorized and assigned rated and non-rated personnel during the quarter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RATED</th>
<th>NON-RATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUTH</td>
<td>ACT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>WM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 May 67</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jul 67</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. The following is a listing of critical MOS shortages that have existed throughout the quarter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>AUTHORIZED</th>
<th>ACTUAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26030</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(1) During the period of this report, the battalion experienced nine (9) major Army Aircraft Accidents involving helicopters. Six of the accidents were a result of pilot error, one resulted from loss of tail rotor and one resulted from loss of engine on short final. The other was the result of fire encountered in flight.

(2) Four (4) of the nine helicopters suffered repairable damage and five (5) were total losses.

(3) Four (4) fatalities occurred as a result of aircraft accidents.

(4) For the reporting period the battalion flew 29,268 hours compared to 23,015 hours for the previous quarter, this represents a deviation of +27.1%. An accident rate of 30.6 per 100,000 flying hours was accrued compared to 26.2 for the previously reported period, a deviation of +17.5%.

Section II Commander's Observations and Recommendations Part I, Observations (Lessons Learned).

1. (C) Personnel

   a. Item: Control of medical evacuees beyond the parent unit.

   Discussion: Parent units are not provided sufficient information to trace personnel through medical channels. This has generally occurred when injured personnel have been immediately transferred to facilities that provide higher levels of services. In the transfer process insufficient information is recorded on the individual to allow the parent unit to trace the
injured through evacuation channels. Generally, once the service member has reached a point of stabilized treatment at one facility, this situation is corrected. In the interim, a period of several days to several weeks, the parent unit is unable to fulfill its residual responsibilities to the service member. This has necessitated the organization of a search system. This system requires a weekly "Status of Personnel" report from each sub-unit of this organization. A copy of this report listing all personnel in medical facilities or in medical channels, location unknown, is provided to the Battalion Surgeon, Battalion Chaplain, and the Battalion Adjutant. Medical facilities are then visited in an effort to confirm the location of members of this command and to provide them care and comfort.

Observation: Adequate documentation of admission and disposition of medical evacuees would facilitate the parent unit’s exercise of control and responsibility for personnel in medical channels.

b. Item: Reports of CID investigations travel too slowly in mail channels.

Discussion: The report of CID investigation is often the basis for military discipline. An alleged offender, as in a case in this organization may be apprehended and returned to his parent organization to be held pending outcome of the investigation. The lapse between apprehension and completion of investigation has been as much as three months. Specifically one service member was arrested in March 1967; the investigation wasn't completed until 6 June 1967, and it wasn't received in the organization until 29 June 1967.

Observation: Unusually long time periods between arrest and trial is not consistent with the right to a "fair and speedy trial". It also places the burden of restraint on the parent organization during the time it takes to complete the investigation.

c. Item: Personnel arriving in-country without military personnel records.

Discussion: Reference is made to change 1, AR 640-10, dated 30 June 1967, which states the military personnel records jacket of unaccompanied male personnel in enlisted grades E-1 through E-8, Warrant Officers in grades WO-1 through CW3, and Commissioned Officers in grades 01 through 03 who are assigned to a CONUS U.S. Army overseas replacement station for further assignment and are authorized leave on route to the station will be forwarded by registered regular mail to the appropriate USACSREPLSTA. Since this change approximately twenty-five (25) personnel have reported to this headquarters within the last six weeks without their personnel records. This has caused extra time during in-processing of personnel due to the fact temporary records have to be initiated.

Observation: Personnel records must be available at the gaining unit when in-processing takes place.
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Item: Crew Chief flight physicals

Discussion: Individual replacement personnel with maintenance MOS's are naturally subject to assignment as crew chiefs. These personnel normally do not have current flight physicals when they report to the Battalion. Widely separated units and scattered medical facilities make this a time consuming task to accomplish at battalion level.

Observation: In order to insure timely qualification for flight status and eliminate unnecessary in-processing delays all potential enlisted crew chiefs should be given flight physicals 90 days or less prior to rotating to Vietnam.

2. (C) Operations

a. Item: Firing weapons and throwing objects from aircraft.

Discussion: On at least two recent occasions passengers have, without warning, fired individual weapons or thrown grenades from helicopters in flight.

Observation: This practice is, at best, a danger to the crew, passengers and the aircraft itself. The Aircraft Commander must have knowledge of any proposed act of this type and must be the approving authority for same. Ground Commanders must realize this fact.

b. Item: Request for helicopter support.

Discussion: Supported units frequently request more helicopters than needed in order to have "back up" ships on standby.

Observation: Requesting commanders and staffs should be abreast of the tactical requirement of other major units and assist in holding their own requests to the necessary minimum. This will stop establishing a demand base for assets that are neither needed nor utilized properly.

c. Item: Control of pickup zones.

Discussion: It has been the experience of this battalion that when aviator personnel are not present to control pick up zone operations, the ground units are not properly organized for pick up nor are junior commanders knowledgeable in this field.

Observation: Almost all military schooling now includes instructions in airmobile planning. The emphasis on this type of operations should be a sufficient indicator to cause commanders to become proficient in all phases of their planning and execution. The shortage of aviators and lack of pathfinder personnel preclude performance of this function on a continual basis.
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d. Item: Suppressive fires by supported ground units.

Discussion: Resupply and medical evacuation missions are frequently flown into "hot" areas without benefit of gunship support. Although radio contact is maintained with the ground unit, suppressive fires from ground troops is often neither requested nor offered.

Observation: When aircraft landings are opposed by hostile fire, all means available must be used to suppress that fire or destroy its source. Lack of gunship support should indicate the necessity of the ground unit fire base assuming the suppressive roll. When possible, fire should be directed by the pilot in coordination with the Ground Commander.

e. Item: Heavy packs carried by assault troops.

Discussion: While supporting two U.S. Brigades, this battalion has observed two glaringly dissimilar methods of operation. One brigade habitually assaults troops carrying only necessary ammunition, weapons and water and relies on resupply by air or extraction at the end of the day. The other brigade assaults troops carrying packs weighing at least 60 pounds. This may be necessary for some extended operations where aerial resupply is impossible.

Observation: Serious consideration should be given to reducing the load carried by assaulting troops. Water is habitually dropped by air, daily. By reducing man carried loads, unit effectiveness can be greatly increased.

f. Item: Night extraction of LRP.

Discussion: The following method for night extraction of LRP's has been successfully used by the 14th Battalion. Upon receipt of notification to extract, the aircraft proceeds immediately to the location of the LRP. On arrival in the area positive radio communication with the patrol leader must be established. After communications are established, the pilot will identify his aircraft by placing his position lights on the "flash bright" setting. Once positive aircraft identification has been established the pilot requests the best landing direction into the pickup zone. If, for example, the direction is South, the pilot will then instruct the patrol leader as follows: "I am turning to a North heading and changing my lights to steady bright. On my command, give me a left or right turn until my aircraft is facing you. You can identify me as facing you when you see a rectangle of four lights; two green and two red. Stop my turn at that time and identify your position with a flare, flashlight, etc". When the LRP is identified the aircraft descends immediately to make the pick up.

Observation: This is only one method that might be used, and has proven extremely successful.

g. Item: External loads, CH-47.
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Discussion: Movement of cargo by external sling on the CH-47 greatly reduces the time required to complete a resupply mission. Many supported units do not have or fail to maintain adequate sling equipment.

Observation: Commanders must be made aware of this time saving procedure and insure that necessary equipment is on hand and in good condition. Aviation units can easily teach rigging procedures and inspect equipment on request.

h. Item: Need for leg guards on crew chief and gunner on gunships.

Discussion: On two occasions during this quarter the crew chief of a gunship was wounded in the lower leg when 2.75" FPAE firing squibs malfunctioned during a rocket firing run and imbedded themselves in the crew chief's legs. So far no determination has been made as to the cause of the malfunction.

Observation: To preclude future incidents of a similar nature shin guards have been locally fabricated from sheet aluminum and gunship crewmembers are required to wear them on all flights. This precaution in addition to the chest protector and helmet visor should prevent any future injuries of this nature.

i. Item: Need for accurate reporting of enemy targets to gunships.

Discussion: On numerous combat assaults recently, gunship fire-team leaders have experienced considerable difficulty in locating enemy targets which have been reported by liftship pilots. In their haste to report a target, many pilots make gross errors in azimuth and range estimates.

Observation: Increased emphasis and training on the importance of accurate target reporting has significantly reduced these errors on the part of aviators in this unit.

j. Item: Enemy "baiting" aircraft to land in ambush area.

Discussion: During a recent combat assault, a unit was airlifted into two landing zones. A short time later an observer in an OH-23 reconnaissance aircraft spotted several weapons lying in an open field in the general area of the LZ's but too far for the troops to react on the ground. Two aircraft were then sent to pick up approximately 10 troops to recover the weapons. Upon landing in the field near the weapons, the two aircraft and the troops were brought under heavy fire. One aircraft was lost, one aircraft was damaged and several personnel were killed or wounded.

Observation: The weapons had obviously been placed where they would attract the attention of an aerial observer, as bait for an ambush. When a situation like this is encountered, full artillery and air support should be used to cover the recovery of enemy equipment and/or personnel.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 July 1967 (ROS-CLS FOR 65)

k. Item: Defoliation in AO.

Discussion: During our support of the 1st Bde, 101st Airborne, numerous contacts have been made with what appeared to be a large sized enemy force. In most cases reinforcement was impossible or unfeasible due to inaccessibility afforded by terrain. Consequently the contact was broken and usually not made again. This problem is due in large part to the presence of well concealed and well established tunnel and bunker complexes that are further fortified by the presence of triple canopied foliage.

Observation: A full scale defoliation program should be executed in an effort to reveal escape routes and hiding places which are now concealed and inaccessible to large forces.

l. Item: One of the most significant problems encountered during this period was the lack of planning by the user units prior to air movement by the CH-47 helicopter.

Discussion: Many times the loads were improperly rigged, the load exceeded the 7000 lb. ACL, or the loads were better suited to the UH-1 aircraft. Additionally, sling equipment required for external loads was short supply or in such poor condition that it was unusable. LZ and PZ radio frequencies were different from those on the mission sheets and many times radios were unmonitored. During one artillery insertion the engineers were blasting craters while the CH-47's were on approach. One CH-47 sustained moderate skin damage because of the blast. This is an extremely hazardous condition that should be monitored by the LZ control officer.

Observation: Most of the problems encountered when moving by the CH-47 can be resolved by the supported units placing emphasis on planning and preparation prior to movement. Blasting or cratering should be strictly controlled by the LZ/PZ Control Officer and performed only when helicopters are not in danger of being struck by flying debris. The 178th ASHC is prepared to assist the supported unit with technical advice on CH-47 operations by means of liaison visits or a mobile training team. A booklet on CH-47 Employment and Utilization is also available from the 178th ASHC, and will be furnished on request.

m. Item: Gunship support for CH-47 operations.

Discussion: Gunship escorts for CH-47 helicopters during the early stages of the reporting period presented a definite problem. Battalion gunship resources were usually committed in support of other operations and not readily available for CH-47 escort. Most CH-47 missions are single ship, which compunds the burden of furnishing gunship escort. It has been found through operational experience that a greater number of hits are taken at twilight than during any other period of the day. Gunship escort during this time period is desirable and planning for twilight operations should be based on gunship availability.
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Observation: More thought should be given in the planning of gunship assets when CH-47's are being utilized in extremely hot areas or during twilight operations. The most efficient method for gunship escort is obtained when the gunships orbit either the PZ or LZ and wait for the CH-47's to arrive. The gunships, one on each side, make the approach with the CH-47 and then continue to orbit while the CH-47 loads or unloads. When ready to depart the gunships escort the CH-47 to altitude then wait for the arrival of the next CH-47.

n. Item: Troop extractions or insertions during twilight.

Discussion: Although positioning of troops is tactical in nature, the 178th ASNC becomes involved as the prime means of transport for the maneuver units. As mentioned in paragraph 5 above, enemy activity increases during the twilight hours. If a CH-47 aircraft should be forced down at dusk, extra troops would be necessary to secure the area. Inserting a security force at night is quite involved and much more hazardous when compared to a daylight operation. Whether or not these factors are taken into consideration by the tactical units is unknown, however, it should be part of the contingency plan.

Observation: Insertion or extraction of troops should be accomplished at least one hour prior to darkness and appropriate plans should be made for area security should a CH-47 be forced down.

o. Item: Separation of CH-47 and UH-1 resupply areas.

Discussion: Because of the terrific winds generated by the CH-47, it is desirable to have a separate area from which the CH-47 can perform its resupply mission. The UH-1's, when working the same area as the CH-47, are subjected to hazards such as turbulence, blown debris and blown sand. Two incidents of blade flexes against UH-1 tail booms came as a result of CH-47's using the same resupply area as the UH-1's.

Observation: Separate areas are of vital necessity for both safe and efficient operation of all helicopters performing resupply missions.

p. Item: "Firefly" Operations;

Discussion: The 71st Aviation Company introduced "Firefly" operations into the Central Highlands during this reporting period. The terrain and waterways formations are such that a revision of techniques was desirable. An aerial flare capability was added to the team. Missions were highly successful.

Observation: The additional aerial flare capability to the light ship of the "Firefly" team allowed minute search capability over water, islands, intersecting valley passes and parallel streams and strips of land. Combinations of two flare drops from 2500 feet absolute, has proven to be the best application. High and low ship techniques remain the same.

4. (c) Intelligence
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Item: During this reporting period the unit has continued to have a problem with aviators not reporting unusual activities which they detect during daily flight operations.

Discussion: An effective intelligence program at the company level requires that all aviators report any unusual incidents which they observe while flying their daily missions. Additionally, many aviators fail to report incidents which their aircraft received hostile fire. When a valuable sighting has been recorded it is often discovered that other aviators have noted the same indications but have considered it unimportant.

Observation: Increased emphasis should be placed on importance of reporting all incidents of possible intelligence value. All aviators should be strongly urged to utilize the remarks section of the after mission report, and they should report all details no matter how insignificant they may seem.

5. (c) Logistics

a. Item: There still exists a shortage of serviceable rigging equipment in many of the supported units.

Discussion: On several occasions, external loads have been dropped because of faulty rigging equipment or improper utilization of rigging equipment. This valuable war material could have been effectively utilized if a periodic inspection and rigging replacement program had been in effect. Rigging equipment requires proper care, cleaning and frequent inspections. There are no hard and fast rules governing how many times a sling can be utilized for an external load, therefore it is imperative that the equipment be inspected prior to each lift. When frays or burns appear, the sling should be rendered unserviceable by some distinctive mark or by cutting.

Observation: Temporary authority for requisitioning slings and cargo nets is granted by USARV Message AVGD-BG 34750 dated 100832Z November 1966. Sling equipment and replacement slings should be requisitioned well in advance of anticipated air movement. Command emphasis should be placed on the care, cleaning and inspection of the unit's rigging equipment.

b. Maintenance

(1) Item: Availability of Float Helicopters in Transportation Companies for issue as replacement of combat damaged aircraft.

Discussion: On two occasions units of this battalion have experienced both battle damage and structural damage to helicopters during routine combat operations. On 15 May 67, 19 aircraft of the battalion sustained battle damage. Five of the damaged aircraft required evacuation by CH-47 to the direct support Transportation Company. Three UH-1D's remained in direct maintenance for approximately 45 days for extensive sheet metal repairs and awaiting repair parts. On another occasion UH-1C gunships from the 174th Aviation Company experienced roof, firewall and engine deck separation. Six of the eight UH-1C gunships were turned in to the direct support maintenance for repair. No mission ready float gunships were available to issue for the six in support maintenance.
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Observation: The loss of five and six UH-1D and UH-1C helicopters without immediate replacement floats or assigned aircraft seriously reduced the mission capability of the battalion. The assignment of float aircraft to support operations of this nature is desirable and would insures the combat posture of the aviation battalion is not impaired.

(2) Item: Replacement of CH-47's with 1000 hours flying time with new or overhauled aircraft.

Discussion: Experience within the battalion revealed that CH-47 aircraft with a total of 1000 flying hours or more, require excessive maintenance man hours. Approximately 85 percent of the flying hours are conducted under maximum load conditions. The flying hours to maintenance man hours ratio becomes excessive and continues to rise unproportionally beyond the 1000 flying hour mark, thus creating a maintenance backlog. In order to reduce the backlog, extended work hours or personnel augmentation is required. Under combat conditions neither is readily available.

Observation: A program to replace CH-47's that accumulate 1000 combat flying hours with new/overhauled aircraft would significantly contribute to material readiness of CH-47 units.

(3) Item: Positioning of aircraft repair parts for Task Force or similar type operations.

Discussion: This battalion was selected as an element of Task Force Oregon in April 67. Prior to selection and move to the Task Force Oregon Area of Operations, the battalion received transportation air supply support from a Transportation Company (DS) located in the old location. This Transportation Company had supported the battalion for a year or more, consequently supply support was adequate. Upon arriving in the Task Force area of operations, another Transportation Company (DS) provided aviation supply support. During the first four weeks of operation, experience revealed that the Transportation Company's ASL was inadequate to support the battalion units. The support company's ASL did not contain repair parts for the CH-47 Aviation Company nor sufficient repair parts to sustain battalion UH-1 Units. During the first four weeks battalion units almost depleted their PLL's and ASL's in order to maintain a moderate aircraft availability status. Emergency command action and Air Force resupply was required to establish and replenish the nearly exhausted PLL's and ASL's.

Observation: Upon selection of aviation units for Task Force Operations, ASL's for all Aviation Companies within the battalion should be screened by the 34th General Support Group. All repair parts appearing on the battalion unit's ASL should be incorporated into the Task Force Transportation Company's ASL. Depot stock could be pulled and shipped to arrive in the area of operation simultaneously with the Task Force supporting units. This action would preclude critical supply shortages during initial weeks of operations.

(4) Item: The unit's gunships continue to have numerous
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problems with their XM-21 weapons system.

Discussion: The XM-21 system was issued to this unit in February of 1967. From February to the present date the systems have malfunctioned time and time again. The reasons for the malfunctions were parts wear and deterioration of the guns. Parts were virtually unobtainable through normal supply channels. The "mini-gun" system is cleaned and preventive maintenance is pulled on each gun at the termination of each flight. A technical representative from the Rock Island Depot was at this unit 22 and 23 July 1967. He stated that our present systems are worn out and are not expected to function.

Observation: Neither the technical representative nor the direct support maintenance for the battalion has a satisfactory answer to the problem.

5. Item: Non-compatibility of CH-47 Rotor Blades

Discussion: Severe lateral vibration problems encountered in the unit's helicopters have been traced to dissimilar blade wear between installed rotor blades. On several occasions a single rotor blade has been rendered unserviceable as a result of enemy ground fire. Replacement of this blade with a new like item resulted in severe lateral vibrations. The cause has been traced to variances in weight, due to blade wear, between the newly installed blade and the remaining two blades. This problem, in itself, has not been insurmountable but it has raised the question among the unit's maintenance personnel and pilots as to the effect this apparent high degree of wear has or will have on the structural strength and integrity of the rotor blades.

Observation: Practical experience has shown this unit that rotor blade time must be within 100 hours for compatibility. This locally established guide has, on occasion, necessitated change of all 3 rotor blades when one is declared unserviceable. The serviceable blades are retained in stock and used when the established time spread permits. It is believed that the unit's geographical location and operational areas have contributed to the accelerated blade wear situation. Heavy sand concentrations characterize a majority of the unit's "working" areas. Shipment has been made of a worn rotor blade to the factory for examination and evaluation. This should answer the unit's questions regarding structural strength and integrity.

C. Construction

1. Item: Use of burlap to cover sandy areas vicinity of helicopter parking pads.

Discussion: Penetprime and other common dust palliatives have no satisfactory effect on sand. Sandy areas first covered with burlap and then penetprimed remain relatively dust free for long periods of time. This is
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a must in helicopter maintenance and parking areas.

Observation: Use of this suggested method would eliminate the necessity of monthly application of palliative and present a considerable savings.

6. (C) Other

a. Signal:

(1) Item: The present aviation battalion TOE authorizes one (1) switchboard SB-22/PT for telephone communications.

Discussion: One SB-22/PT does not furnish the capability required for operation of a headquarters of battalion size. The capability of one such board is twelve (12) lines. A battalion headquarters with any degree of permanency will have more telephone requirements than the board capability. In addition to internal telephone communications additional lines are required to subordinate units and to security positions, therefore a greater capability is required than now furnished by the TOE. Also, in addition to lack of communications capability, the unit will have no displacement capability with only one switchboard.

Observation: The use of three (3) SB-22/PT switchboards will allow a unit to not only have needed communications with its headquarters and to subordinate units but will also provide a limited capability for communications with security elements around the camp. By reducing telephone requirements to an absolute minimum prior to unit displacement a capability for unit displacement with little or no loss of communications is possible.

(2) Item: The present aviation battalion TOE does not provide a power supply for operation of unit radios in a fixed or semi-fixed operation.

Discussion: During any semi-fixed operation of a headquarters many of the authorized radios are connected to a power supply other than the vehicle on which they are mounted. This prevents excess wear on the vehicles and allows better location of radios. The present TOE does not provide for any power supply which can furnish enough steady power to operate all equipment requiring DC power.

Observation: The authorization and issue of a DC power supply such as the PP-1104 would provide enough steady power for operation of all equipment requiring DC power in a headquarters. This power would allow continuous operation of radio equipment without the added requirement of vehicle operation. With the capability available for operation without the vehicle the radios could be moved to a more convenient and useful location.

(3) Item: Present aviation battalion TOE does not authorize any method of remote operation of unit radios.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 July 1967 (RCS-CS FOR 65)

11 August 1967

DISCUSSION: Several individuals within a headquarters are often required to monitor a single frequency. If these individuals are not located within the same area an additional radio is required to allow frequency monitoring.

Observation: The authorization and issue of remote facilities for unit FM radios would allow one radio to be monitored by persons in different locations therefore reducing the radio requirements within a unit. The ability to operate a radio from a remote position will allow the placement of radios in the best location for transmission while allowing operation from another and more secure position.

Part II, Recommendations:

1. (C) Personnel

   Recommendation: Replace the "log book" system used in many medical facilities to record admission and disposition with a card file system using the service members identification tag as an addressograph plate. In addition to the normal information imprinted on the I.D. tag, add the parent unit's battalion level "unit identification code". The card would be the manifold type in sufficient copies to send one to the battalion organization on admission, maintain one for the medical facility file, and send a card to the battalion organization on disposition. The cards would indicate location of facility, treatment, anticipated duration of admission or if further evacuated and to which facility.

   b. Reference: Section II, Part I, para 1b.

   Recommendation: That electronic communications means be utilized to transmit completed reports of investigation back to individual's parent unit.

   c. Reference: Section II, Part I, para 1c.

   Recommendation: That all personnel hand carry personnel records.

   d. Reference: Section II, Part I, para 1d.

   Recommendation: That all individual replacements in the aircraft maintenance field be given flight physicals within 90 days of their rotation to Vietnam.

2. (C) Operations
   a. Reference: Section II, Part I, para 2c.

   Recommendation: That additional emphasis be placed in training
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 July 1967 (RCS-CS FOR 65)

ground commanders in the organization and control of helicopter pick up zones.

b. Reference: Section II, Part I, para 2g.

Recommendation: That all ground units be required to obtain and maintain external sling equipment. All aviation units stand ready to advise on rigging and employment procedures.

3. (U) Training and Organization: None.
4. (U) Intelligence: None.
5. (U) Logistics: None.
6. (D) Other

a. Signal: It is realized that the following recommendations would not normally fall within the scope of this report. Since a moratorium does now exist on MTUE submission, follow up paperwork cannot be forwarded at this time. A MTUE has been prepared for submission at the proper time.

(1) Reference: Section II, Part I, para 6a, (1).

Recommendation: That additional switchboards be approved and equipment issued to units at the earliest possible date and that the requirement for additional switchboards be considered in future publications of aviation battalion TOE's.

(2) Reference: Section II, Part I, para 6a, (2).

Recommendation: That DC power supply be approved and equipment issued to units requiring this equipment and that the requirements be included in future TOE publications.

(3) Reference: Section II, Part I, para 6a (3).

Recommendation: That remote capability be approved and equipment be issued to using units and that the requirement for remote radio operation be included in future TOE publications.

CARROLL G. ISAACS
LTC, Armor
Commanding

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1 copy thru: 17th CAG
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CONFIDENTIAL
AVGD-SC (11 Aug 67) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jul 67
UIC WAX2AAK, RCS CSFOR 65.

HEADQUARTERS, 17TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP, APO 96240 25 August 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff For Force Development, Washington D.C. 20310

1. (U) The 14th CAB Operational Report for quarterly period ending 31 Jul 67 is forwarded for information and action as necessary.

2. (U) The headquarters has received this ORLL and concurs with the report as modified herein.

3. (C) Reference Section I, para 4d. The large capacity, multi-point refueling systems were, for the most part, provided by Log Command units, which in effect put them in the retail business. This further points up the need for similar type equipment to be authorized the Aviation Units either as separate equipment or as part of KD team equipment.

4. (C) Reference Section II, Part I. Observations.
   a. Reference para 2h. Although most personnel found leg armor to be uncomfortable and tiring to wear, the unit possibly should give some consideration to obtaining leg armor rather than locally fabricating shin-guards.
   b. Reference para 5b(1). Contact with 14th Trans Bn (AM&S) has revealed that float assets available to that unit are equally distributed between DS units of the 14th Battalion. The majority of available assets are immediately hand-receipted to supported units as soon as they become flyable. No attempt is made to consolidate floats as large numbers of aircraft within one unit. The present method of utilization of floats is considered to be more beneficial to the overall aviation effort within RVN. Availability of armament system modification kits precludes installation of gun kits before assignment of float or permanent aircraft to using unit. It is considered that this action would be extremely desirable and should be taken as soon as modification kit availability permits.
   c. Reference para 5b(5) contingency plans could be drawn up by 54th GS Op (AM&S) to cover a variety of possible aircraft mixes and anticipated flying programs, these contingency plans would permit rapid pulling of stocks and force issue of tailored support packages as required.
d. Reference para 5b(4) XM-21 "Push Package" containing spare parts for XM-21 system was received by 14th Avn Bn's supporting DSU (335th TC Co (ADS) in early August. Continual strong emphasis should be placed on preventative maintenance, cleaning and inspection of these weapons systems.

e. Reference para 5c. This method has been adopted by the engineer whenever possible to aid in dust and sand suppression.

5. (C) Reference Section II, part II, Recommendations.

a. Reference para 1b. Discussion with CID officials indicates that they have an extremely heavy workload and their back log of incomplel cases will probably continue.

b. Reference para 1c. The problem has been largely solved with recent change in DA policy permitting all but the lower grade EM authority to carry their records.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

A. R. ZENZ
LTC, CE
Adjutant
AYFP-21 (21 August 1967) 1st Ind.
SUBJ: Operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 July 1967 (PCS-6SFPR-65)


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army
(AG67IN, 21), Washington, D.C. 20315

1. (U) Forwarded herewith are two copies of subject report from the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion.

2. (U) Reference Section II, Part II, para 1a. The recommended "card system" is in effect as a, in that a card system is maintained by each hospital registrar, and announcements relative to admissions and dispositions are published daily in the hospital's Admission & Disposition (A&D) Sheet. The "log book" system is used for outpatient visits by all medical facilities of the army. Conversely, the "card system" is used for inpatients, or personnel admitted for treatment and hospitalization. The follow-on section of the card system is the hospital admission and disposition sheet which is published on a daily basis. Normally, army hospitals distribute copies of their A&D Sheet to the patient's parent unit. The purpose of the A&D Sheet is to announce the admissions and dispositions of patients being treated by the hospital. It is felt that any delay experienced by a unit in receiving information of their hospitalized personnel is not a result of the system currently in effect.

3. (U) Reference Section II, Part II, para 1b. A new Department of the Army policy as stated in DA message 223167, dated 12 July 1967, allows all personnel to hand carry their records to and from overseas duty sections.

4. (U) Reference Section II, Part II, para 2b. All ground units have been instructed to submit requisitions for sling and net equipment.

5. (U) Reference Section II, Part II, para 6. It is the understanding of this headquarters that only that equipment needed for mission accomplishment, i.e. of an emergency nature, will be favorably considered when submitted in a RTCE. The unit has been advised that provisions of current regulations allow emergency requests, by letter or message, to be submitted for equipment so urgently needed that is cannot await preparation and approval of an RTCE.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

O. A. GARNER
CPT, AG
Asst Adj Gen
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 14th Combat Aviation Battalion

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May - 31 July 1967

CO, 14th Combat Aviation Battalion

11 August 1967

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