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AUTHORITY

AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980; AGO 29 Apr 1980

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Best Available Copy
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned. Headquarters, 519th Transportation Battalion (Truck)

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 519th Transportation Battalion (Truck) for quarterly period ending 30 April 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraphs 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACOFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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THLC-GSC

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
(RCS C3FOR-65)

THRU: Channels

TO: C3FOR
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

SECTION I - Significant Organization and Unit Activities

1. (U) Task Organization and Stationing:

   a. At the beginning of the reporting period this Battalion consisted of the Headquarters Detachment, the 260th Transportation Company (Mdm Trk-Petrl), the 313th Transportation Company (Mdm Trk-Refrigerator) and the 505th Transportation Company (Mdm Trk-Cargo). Since then the task organization has been increased by two medium truck-cargo companies. (See Inclosure 1)

   b. The 291st Transportation Company deployed from Fort Meade, Maryland. The main body arrived at Korat AB on 27 February 1967 via C-141, and the unit impedimenta arrived at Sattahip via sealift on 5 March 1967. This company shuttled its equipment from the port to its home station at Camp Friendship.

   c. The 53rd Transportation Company deployed from Fort Buckner, Okinawa, where it was performing port clearance, local haul, and depot support missions. The advanced party arrived at Don Muang AFB on 6 April 1967, the main body followed on 9 April 1967, arriving at U-Tapao AFB, and the unit impedimenta arrived aboard the American Scientist and discharged at Sattahip on 16 April. This unit is stationed at Camp Vayama in the Sattahip area. It was organized under TOE 55-18F at full strength but was directed to deploy from Okinawa as a Type B unit under the G series TOEs without a reorganization being directed by a General Order. This administrative omission is being investigated and steps are being taken to correct the situation.
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SIC-293
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
(AGS 20FGR-65)

d. The Battalion Headquarters moved from Phanom Saralcham to Camp Friendship (Norat, Thailand) and established itself into more permanent facilities. This displacement was accomplished between 30 January and 4 February 1967. Since this move, the communication problem encountered at Phanom Saralcham has been significantly reduced.

e. The 313th Transportation Company (minus) also displaced from Phanom Saralcham to facilities at Camp Friendship, closing on 10 March 1967, while the remaining reinforced platoon was placed on TDY to Bangkok on 15 March 1967.

f. The 260th Transportation Company vacated the tents at Camp Vayama (Sattahip) and moved to Phanom Saralcham between 6 and 7 March 1967 to assume its secondary mission as a provisional dump truck company.

2. (C) Missions:

a. (U) The 260th Transportation Company (ADM TRK-LRFR) received 38 more 5-ton dump trucks for a total of 60 dump trucks, and five each 5-ton tractors with 5,000 gallon semitrailer tankers. This unit is now in direct support of the 809th Engineer Battalion (Construction), which is building the Inland Road between Sattahip and the Bangkok Bypass Highway, which is often identified as Route 25. During the current reporting period this unit hauled 80,210 cubic meters of earth and drove a total of 321,613 miles.

b. (U) The 313th Transportation Company (ADM TRK-LRFR) has assumed full responsibility for distribution of perishable Class I supplies to ration breakdown points, clubs and messes at major U.S. military installations throughout Thailand, except Ubon, Phitsanulok, and Chiang Rai which are supplied by air. The perishable cargo originates in Bangkok aboard refrigerators. The platoon placed on TDY to Bangkok with augmentation was required from the company (minus) at Camp Friendship. Personnel placed on TDY to Bangkok will be rotated periodically. During the current reporting period this unit carried 2,364 short tons of perishable Class I supplies and drove a total of 202,179 miles.

c. (C) The 505th Transportation Company (ADM TRK-CARGO), less a rear detachment, was placed on TDY to Udorn to execute a rail-to-truck transfer and line haul mission from the Udorn railhead to Nakhon Phanom AF3 carrying aluminum and steel runway matting. The commitment began with a limitation of 20 vehicles on 30 January 1967. As the situation developed with a need for an early required delivery date, this limitation was increased to 50 tractors.
and 60 semitrailers. Later, ten trailers were returned to Jattahip for use in port clearance. By organizing the drivers into two shifts the company was able to make the 300 mile round trip in one day using between 20 and 30 vehicles per day. Extremely rough roads caused extensive damage to the truck bodies and components and required a concerted maintenance effort to keep deadlines to a minimum. The convoys experienced between 20 and 40 flat tires each way. Several instances were noted where nails and other hardware were deliberately placed in the roadway by unknown persons to cause flat tires. Laborers were hired, temporarily, to keep up with the tire repair workload. Tie-down materials and devices were obtained by the Battalion 34 and additional laborers were hired to secure the cargo to the bed of each semitrailer prior to movement. Loading of trucks was accomplished at night by a commercial contractor whose laborers caused some damage to the cargo and broke considerable banding material. The truck company performed some of the rebanding with troop labor in an effort to expedite shipment. The company also prepared its own Transportation Control Movement Documents (TCMD's) providing tie-down devices, labor for lashing and banding, and preparation of the TCMD's is normally the responsibility of the consignor rather than the carrier. However, the truck unit, functioning as the carrier, performed these functions as there is no in-country military transportation terminal transfer capability (AGS 55-118), nor did the origin consignor have the capability to fully support the rail-to-truck transfer and the commercial Thai Express Transportation Organization assumed responsibility only for load transfer at the railhead in Udorn. The mission was completed on 10 April 1967 after moving 14,100 short tons over 156,303 loaded miles and a total of 301,415 miles. The 505th Transportation Company encountered in darkness several unidentified groups of armed personnel on route during this mission. One of these groups attempted to wave down the drivers, but these groups were treated with suspicion and the drivers did not stop. This unit has now returned to its home station to rehabilitate its equipment, conduct further training of local national drivers, and prepare for a line haul mission from Jattahip to Ta Khili, Chachoengsao and Korat.

d. (U) The 53rd Transportation Company is in the process of becoming established in Thailand and conducting local national driver training in anticipation of receiving a port clearance - local haul mission in the Sattahip-U-Tapao AFB area.

e. (U) The 291st is still undergoing local national driver training in preparation for a line haul mission from Korat to destinations in Northeast Thailand. This unit has executed some line haul missions between Sattahip, Ta Khili and Korat while the 505th was at Udorn. Also, the 291st has been tasked to assume responsibility for a small camp a few miles north of Khan Kaen which will be used as a rest and service stop for task vehicles.
3. (U) Personnel:

   a. The status of fill of LN personnel for Type B units as of 30 April is as follows: (Key: authorized/assigned)

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<td>Driver Supv.</td>
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b. (U) During this reporting period the 260th Transportation Company experienced a large turn-over of local nationals. In the original hiring program many people from Korat were hired and sent to Phanom Sarakham. These people caused trouble with the local populace and created several disturbances. As a result, many of the people originally hired either quit or were terminated. With the assistance of local government authorities in Phanom Sarakham, a hiring program was conducted there and the unit has now replaced all the local nationals it lost. Hiring for all units is now done in the area in which the units are stationed, as far as possible.

c. A new system of testing has been adopted because of the high percentage of potential drivers who failed the written test and never took the road test. The road test is now administered first. All personnel who can drive the 5 ton tractor with 12 ton trailer, or who show sufficient aptitude to indicate they can be trained to drive, are hired. During the initial training program they are taught road signs and driving rules and given the written test. Upon successful completion of the written test and an additional road test, a license is issued. Using the old testing procedure, the percentage of people accepted was about 30 to 33 percent. Using the new procedure,
Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

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(BCS C5FOR-65)

the acceptance is about 50 to 60 percent without a lowering of standards. Since it is more difficult to train a man to drive than to teach him road signs and driving rules, giving the road test first and accepting all those who can drive, regardless of whether or not they can pass a written test immediately, is a better procedure. It was found that of the potential drivers interviewed, between 30 to 35 percent failed the written test. Of those getting to the road test about 30 to 35 percent failed it.

d. During this reporting period, a turnover of about 15 local nationals per month has been experienced. This excludes the large one-time turn-over in the 260th Transportation Company. In view of this, an additional 8 drivers for the line-haul units (291st Transportation Company, 313th Transportation Company, and 505th Transportation Company) have been requested. With these additional drivers the line-haul units, who must use two drivers on each truck, should be able to keep enough drivers available to meet their commitments.

4. (U) Training:

a. The headquarters and subordinate units have conducted 116 hours of formal training for U.S. personnel in which the following subjects were stressed:

(1) Character Guidance.
(2) Command Information.
(3) Day-Night Training.
(4) Law of Land Warfare.
(5) Map Reading and Examination.
(6) Materiel Readiness and Maintenance Training.
(8) Safeguarding Defense Information.
(9) Safety.
(10) Survival, Escape and Evasion.
b. A Program of Instruction (POI) has been prepared by the Battalion for local national driver training in Type 3 units. This POI outlines 156 hours of conference, demonstration, practical exercise, and examination type classes. The press of operational requirements has caused some interruption in this formal training. However, once the LN driver is qualified to drive he gains equally as valuable an experience from fulfilling actual commitments as he would from other practical exercises, but he does not gain the understanding of automotive theory and maintenance. The latter is an area of continuing concern and education.

c. The emphasis on safety training and safe driving practices has assisted the Battalion in achieving an accident rate of 1.52 for the 3rd quarter FY 1967 which is below USARMAPTHAI's average of 1.55 and also further below the accident rate of all other USARMAPTHAI units which combined had an accident rate of 1.56. These rates were computed on the basis of the number of recordable accidents per hundred thousand miles.

5. (U) Facilities and Logistics:

a. The Battalion was given the mission to operate a consolidated mess hall at Camp Friendship for its own subordinate units as well as other units comprising approximately 700 personnel. The responsibility for the mess hall was further delegated to the 313th Transportation Company. The mess hall is exceptionally well equipped; however, frequent power failures have increased the threat of refrigerated food spoilage. A request has been submitted for a generator to provide emergency electrical power. This mess hall, as well as near by permanent troop billets, offices, and motor pool, all experience a significant dust control problem. The surrounding area has been denuded of nearly all vegetation and dirt roads in the area carry heavy traffic. The prevailing winds pick up the dust and carry it for some distance into these well-ventilated buildings creating the need for repeated clean-up throughout the day. Sod has been placed around the mess hall and a water tanker operates to keep the roads moist. These actions reduced but have not solved the problem.

b. The Battalion acquired the responsibility for a small installation north of Khon Kaen, Thailand, which was formerly a Signal unit site. Operation of this facility has been assigned to the 291st Transportation Company. The immediate plans for this installation are to use it as a rest and service stop. The installation suffers from a shortage of potable water. Water is obtained from the local community through a Blanket Purchase Agreement. This water requires further purification before it can be used for drinking and cooking. A request for a water purification unit has been submitted to ALPAC at Udorn.
c. Motor pools in the Battalion are generally crowded and lacking in facilities necessary to insure high quality maintenance. At Camp Vayama the 53rd and 505th Transportation Companies share a small unsurfaced motor pool area without a grease rack or covered and lighted bays for round-the-clock, all weather maintenance. The 291st and 313th Transportation Companies share a small motor pool at Camp Friendship. This site also lacks a grease rack and has only enough covered bays for one company. The trailers of the 291st must be parked at another location for lack of space. The platoon of the 313th Transportation Company, which is TDY in Bangkok, has been using the Property Disposal Office yard which is located on the opposite side of the city from their billets and the cold storage facilities. In each instance plans are being made to provide adequate motor pool facilities; however, immediate solutions to these motor pool problems are remote.

d. The 53rd Transportation Company is currently living in tents at Camp Vayama (Sattahip area). Better billeting facilities are not expected to become available for another 30 to 45 days when an Engineer Company vacates their facilities.

6. (U) Maintenance:

a. The 313th Transportation Company received 37 refrigerator semi-trailers after arriving in Thailand. These semitrailers were equipped with Dunham-Bush refrigeration units which were defective in design. The supporting frames cracked and the components were lost or damaged from severe vibration. USAEC was notified by a priority message which requested assistance. In the meantime the company submitted an Equipment Improvement (EIR) and applied a field fix to reinforce the frames. The reinforcement alleviated some of the cracking, but internal vibration continued to cause damage to components. Some repair kits in the form of gussets were air-shipped to be used for reinforcing the frames but they proved to be less effective than the field fix designed by the company. Twenty-one (21) Thermo-King refrigeration units were shipped to the company as replacements for some of the defective Dunham-Bush units. The Thermo-King units have proven to be much more dependable. USAEC sent technical representatives to Thailand in an attempt to solve the problems with the Dunham-Bush units. One repaired unit is currently being road tested.

b. Several problems have been encountered with the L522 5-ton tractors and dump trucks in that the multifold engines and the injection pumps have proven defective. Some replacement engines have been received and installed but the modification kits for the turbochargers were not available, therefore the tractors are still not operating. Direct support maintenance units had been obtaining rebuilt injector pumps through a local contractor until the local contractor also ran out of repair parts.
d. The 53rd Transportation Company is equipped with commercial type International Harvester tractors which saw previous service in Viet Nam and Okinawa. The unit has discovered the frames are cracking at the front mounting of the fifth wheel. Also the shifting levers have been breaking inside the transmission cover. EIRs have been submitted and the defects have been welded and reinforced. Prior to deployment, the unit had only 45 percent fill on its 90 day level of repair parts for the commercial tractor. It is anticipated that some problems will arise in procuring or requisitioning replacement repair parts for the International Harvester tractors because of the need to use GSA and commercial channels to obtain parts support.
SECTION 2: Part I Commander's Observations

1. (U) Personnel:

a. Although the Battalion and its units were only recently deployed, the return of military personnel to the United States for reassignment, retirements, and FTS has begun. The loss of personnel should begin to peak with the 53d Transportation Company which will lose a majority of key personnel by August as some personnel arrived in country with credit for short tour duty on Okinawa. Retirements and resignations of key personnel in other units have also begun. Since the subordinate truck units are organised as Type B units, they do not have the depth to absorb extensive personnel losses without a loss of operational effectiveness. Anticipated battalion wide losses for the next 90 days are 3 officers and 17 enlisted men. Currently the Battalion is short 3 officers and 17 enlisted men.

b. The turn-over and absenteeism of local national personnel is much less predictable than that of the U.S. military personnel. Moreover, the only disciplinary sanctions against violations of unit rules is suspension or dismissal. For these reasons the local national driver availability is less constant than the U.S. drivers. Under conditions of full commitment this situation could result in reduced capability. In an attempt to prevent personnel strength fluctuations from reducing motor transport capability, eight additional driver positions have been approved for the 291st, 313th, and 505th Transportation Companies. Similar action is planned for the 53d and 260th Transportation Companies.

c. As yet, the Battalion and subordinate units do not have their TOE Personnel Administration Augmentation. These functions are currently being performed by personnel who have been taken from their TOE assigned duties and trained for personnel work. MTQEs have been submitted for all units; however, the 53rd Transportation Company MTQE, submitted in Okinawa, did not include the Personnel Administration Augmentation. This will be corrected by submission of a supplementary MTQE as soon as their reorganisation General Order is received.

2. (U) Operations:

a. U.S. military highway transport capability, other than the refrigerated vans, is used primarily to supplement the Thai government transportation monopoly, Express Transportation Organization (ETO). Therefore, military trucks must be on call to respond quickly whenever and wherever ETO lacks the vehicles to meet requirements. In order to provide quick military highway response under these conditions our concept is to organize U.S. and local national truck drivers in the cargo truck companies into a two shift operation to provide 24 hour service as required. This
organization when used, will reduce the units' capability if a shift comes to work but is not committed. No other alternative exists as long as the local national drivers are in a civilian pay status and not, therefore, subject to 24 hour call as are the U.S. personnel who must load and supervise them. This situation does not lend itself to long-range efficient utilization of the military highway transport capability but is the best solution at the present time to provide round-the-clock coverage. Also, to facilitate quick military response when TMQ cannot provide the required vehicles, action has been taken to temporarily decentralize to truck units acceptance authority for cargo offerings for shipment originating at the Sattahip port. Follow-up is made to Battalion after the fact.

b. There is a need for more advanced and timely transportation planning to establish and develop transportation capability versus requirements for incoming and retrograde cargo. When this planning is not accomplished, the burden of rapid response is placed upon the carrier, particularly the military carrier. Such rapid response is sometimes accomplished at the expense of efficient operations and maintenance. This problem has been further aggravated by heavily trafficked telephone communications lines wherein the Transportation Movement Office (TMO) has had difficulty placing requirements on the Battalion Headquarters. As an expediency during the interim period until communications are adequate, it has been decided that the TMO in Sattahip should place the requirement directly on the truck unit in the TMO’s area. This procedure accomplishes acceptance of offerings in a rapid manner but places an additional administrative burden on the companies without relieving the Battalion Headquarters of also maintaining its records.

c. Several instances have occurred which indicate the need for continuing education of customers on the proper utilization of military highway transport capability. On some occasions the cargo was not safely loaded and secured and would have resulted in damage to the cargo and the vehicle had the truck driver been negligent enough to accept the load. On other occasions the cargo movement was not documented or was improperly documented, and on several other occasions the loaded trucks were dispatched to arrive at destination in greater numbers than the destination installation had the capability to unload within a reasonable time.

3. (U) Training and Organization:

a. The language barrier between the Thai and US personnel continues to effect operational efficiency and, more particularly, the maintenance proficiency. The Thai language does not have equivalent words for some of our mechanical terms and equipment. To assist in overcoming this problem a glossary of frequently used terms was published in English and Thai. We are putting greater emphasis on maintenance to instill knowledge, attitudes, skills, and habits which meet US standards.
b. Plans are being made within the Battalion to be prepared for an increased workload in line haul operations. Assignments have been given to the 305th Transportation Company to establish an origin line-haul truck terminal at Sattahip and to the 291st Transportation Company to establish a truck terminal - trailer transfer point at Korat. Truck terminal and trailer transfer teams are provided by TOS 55-500 R, with changes. Our subordinate units have been given these missions as an interim measure to assist in the establishment of a complete military highway transportation service until the proper teams can be authorized and staffed. These teams will require additional billets, office and maintenance space, and parking area adjacent to the truck company motor pools. Trailer transfer points at Phanom Sarakham and Khon Kaen may be required in the future. A facility is already available at Khon Kaen under control of this Battalion, and it is believed that an appropriate facility (real estate) can be acquired from the 809th Engineer Battalion at Phanom Sarakham.

4. (U) Intelligence: Currently, intelligence summaries are distributed bimonthly and are somewhat dated by the time they reach this headquarters. In addition to current intelligence information, this Battalion could profit significantly from the CONARC Lessons Learned in Viet Nam which were on automatic distribution to CONUS units.

5. (U) Logistics:

a. Inadequacy of motor pool facilities has an adverse effect on maintenance efficiency and upon the morale of personnel responsible for maintenance. In the long run, this situation will have a similarly adverse effect on operations through an increased requirement for maintenance time to keep the vehicles in an operating condition.

b. Each subordinate unit has submitted an MTOE 55-18F requesting authorization of additional maintenance equipment.

(1) A hydraulic dolly-type jack, 10 ton capacity (LIN: L08724) is needed since it is often necessary to elevate an entire axel assembly. Currently authorized jacks are too small to accomplish this.

(2) The manual tire changing tools which are components of the organizational maintenance tool set have proven too weak and too slow to keep up with the number of flat tires experienced on unimproved roads. A pneumatic tire mounter and demounter (LIN: M76101) was borrowed from the US Air Force and proved so successful in keeping up with the workload that it should be authorized as part of the MTOE.

(3) An impact wrench, 5/8 inch, (LIN: Y66519) is also needed to expedite tire changing.
Because of the vast highway distances which must be covered by a single truck company and because of the sparseness of military installations with recovery capability, it is essential that each unit be authorized additional equipment for recovery. Only one tow bar (LIN: 769520) is currently authorized. Two additional tow bars should be sufficient to give each platoon its own recovery capability, leaving the wrecker to work in the Maintenance Section.

A trestle, motor vehicle maintenance, 7 ton, adjustable, (LIN: X27726) is needed to accomplish off-the-ground maintenance as a mobile substitute for a grease rack which units at fixed and semi-fixed installations usually should have for efficient maintenance.

The extreme stress on vehicle bodies resulting from the rough unimproved roads in Thailand causes frequent and extensive cracks and broken welds. The currently authorized oxygen-acetylene cutting and welding set cannot produce a sufficiently sturdy weld. Only the weld from an arc welding machine (LIN: Y43740) is capable of withstanding the stress to which the bodies would be subjected.

Maintenance: ADQ and USAREUC have given commendable support in solving the problems of the refrigerator semi-trailers. Their efforts have enabled the 313th Transportation Company to assume its mission on schedule. Maintenance emphasis must now be shifted to solving the problems of repair parts for the International Harvester tractors and the fuel injector pumps for the K52A2 5-ton tractor.

SECTION 2 Part II - Commanders Recommendations.

1. (U) That every effort be made to keep Type B units up to authorized strength.

2. (U) That early action be taken to approve and provide the MTCE Personnel Administration Augmentation.

3. (U) That continued command emphasis be placed on advanced transportation planning and that 210 be influenced through persuasion and good relations to provide accurate truck availability data as normally required from military highway transport units in order to balance availability of motor transport resources against requirements.

4. (U) That command emphasis be placed on proper utilization of all highway transport capability to include loading, unloading, documentation, and unloading.

5. (U) That early consideration be given to provide Transportation Detachments (Team CP) (702 55-5000) needed for efficient development of the military highway transport system in Thailand.
UNCLASSIFIED

THC-330
SUBLJCT: Operational report for quarterly period ending 30 April 1967

6. (U) That the distribution of LSRPs be expedited down to battalion level and that CCHRC published Lessons learned in Vietnam be distributed to overseas units.

7. (U) That decisive action be taken at the earliest possible time to provide adequate motor pool facilities for units in Sattahip, Bangkok and Korat.

8. (U) That the approval of LRTP's submitted by this Battalion and its subordinate units be given expedited processing and approval with the earliest possible provision of personnel and equipment.

9. (U) That action be taken to insure adequate supply of International Harvester tractor repair parts and replacements or repair parts for the fuel injector pump on the 15242 multifuel engine.

Harry F. Middleton
Lieutenant Colonel, TC
Commanding
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

RCS CSFOR-65

DA, Headquarters, 9th Logistical Command, ATTN: DSPO, APO 96233, 10 May 1967

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Support Thailand, ATTN: 5th Military History Detachment, APO 96233

1. Reference paragraph 5b, Section 1:

   Investigation of the problem revealed that the on-site storage tank contained algae due to continued use and improper maintenance by former occupants. The storage tank was replaced. At the present time the source of water will continue to be Udorn.

2. Reference paragraph 5c, Section 1, and paragraph 7, Section 2, Part II:

   a. On or about 10 May, 16,100 square yards of hardstand will be completed at Korat for use as a consolidated motor pool. Fencing and maintenance buildings will be added at a later date when construction effort is available.

   b. An adequate fenced hardstand is presently available in Bangkok and action has been initiated to extend the lease through FY 68. OICC has also been requested to negotiate with the owner for construction of an adequate maintenance building.

   c. Real estate under U.S. control is limited in Camp Vayama. Some internal rearrangement has been made. Permanent solutions will be dependent upon deployment of units from Camp Vayama to the new port area in Sattahip. This in turn depends upon the completion of facilities in the new port area.

3. Reference paragraph 6b, Section 1:

   U.S. Army Tank and Automotive Command shipped 63 each, 5-ton multifuel engines to this command on a special airlift. These were provided to remove 5-ton vehicles from deadline. A problem developed in that these engines were of a newer model than those presently installed, requiring a modified exhaust system. Immediate assistance was requested from 2d Logistical Command and action was taken by them to ship 60 fabricated modified exhaust systems. All unserviceable engines are to be air-shipped directly to Red River Arsenal, Texarkana, Texas, for rebuilding.
4. Reference paragraph 6d, Section I:

Action is currently being taken to establish a source of spare parts supply for the commercial tractors of the 53d Transportation Company. If present plans materialize, a local Thai firm will establish a parts and service depot in Sattahip.

5. Reference paragraph 2b, Section I, and paragraph 3, Section II:

Command emphasis has been placed on advanced transportation planning to include utilization of the commercial truck contractor. New and urgent support requirements that are not programmed occasionally interfere with prepared plans. Maximum effort is being applied for the commercial line haul contractor to provide correct data as to truck availability. Commercial truck availability is influenced by commercial requirements, including harvest hauls, in addition to military requirements. Formal classes have been conducted by Movement Control personnel to provide transportation technical advice, and training for the truck contractor. Recently, approval was obtained from the Thai Government for utilization of military cargo trucks to augment the commercial truck contractor (except in the city of Bangkok), when the contractor could not provide adequate support. Under these conditions the employment of military trucks will often require short notification and rapid response to meet commitments at distant locations. In order to provide maximum planning time, direct liaison has been established with the truck contractor at his main office in Bangkok, and at up-country destinations. In addition, plans have been initiated to co-locate truck rest stops for commercial and military trucks at three locations along the LOC.

6. Reference paragraph 2c, Section I, and paragraph 4, Section II:

The utilization of military trucks in Thailand recently became effective. This new capability has generated the requirement to train customer personnel in documentation procedures. In some instances it has been necessary for the carrier to perform functions normally the responsibility of the consigner and consignee. Documentation preparation will continue to be a process of education for our customers. Movement Control Teams are sent periodically to up-country bases to train personnel in the proper documentation procedures.

7. Reference paragraph 5, Section II:
THLC-DO
1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
RCS CSPOR-65

It is planned that a Transportation Detachment (GF) as organised under TOE 55-500R be included in future requirements.

FRED B. PROCTOR
Colonel, CE
Commanding
THQG (4 May 67) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period
  Ending 30 April 1967 (AGS CSFOR - 65)

HQ, US ARMY SUPPORT, THAILAND, APO 96233 27 MAY 67

TO: Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GFOR-OT, APO 96558

Concur in the comments and recommendations of the Commanding Officer,
519th TC Battalion, and the explanatory indorsement of the Commanding Officer,
9th Logistical Command (B).

EDWIN F. BLACK
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding
UNCLASSIFIED

GPOP-DT (4 May 67) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65), HQ 519th Trans Bn (Trk)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 20 JUL 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

HEAVRIN SNYDER
CPT, AG
Asst AG