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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 11th Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 July 1967

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 11TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96289

1 August 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFOR-67) for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SECTION I

Significant Unit Activities

A. COMMAND

1. (U) General: The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion made substantial gains in all areas of performance during this reporting period. 76% of the Battalion effort during this period was in support of U.S. Forces. The majority of Army Aviation support provided was oriented toward the 1st Infantry Division on Operations Dallas, Bluefield and Billings. UH-1s of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion averaged 188% of the programmed flying hours for the quarter. CH-47s of the two assigned Assault Support Helicopter Companies averaged 122% of the programmed flying hours for the quarter. The O-1s of the assigned Reconnaissance Airplane Company averaged 179% of the programmed flying hours for the quarter. The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion underwent the Annual General Inspection 5-9 June 1967. All areas inspected received a satisfactory rating. Several areas inspected were rated as outstanding or noteworthy.

(1) Downgraded at 3 year Intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10
2. (U) Mission: The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion provides:
   a. Tactical army aviation support as directed by the 12th Combat Aviation Group, to elements of U.S., ARVN, and Free World Military Assistance Forces within the III Corps Tactical Zone.
   b. Command, control, administration and communications to units assigned to the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion.

3. (C) Organization
   a. Current organization of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion is shown in Annex A.
   b. Organization of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion during this reporting period is shown below:

   HQ and HQ Detachment, 11th Combat Aviation Battalion - Phu Loi
   128th Assault Helicopter Company - Phu Loi
   162nd Assault Helicopter Company - Phuoc Vinh
   173rd Assault Helicopter Company - Lai Khe
   *178th Assault Support Helicopter Company - Chu Lai
   184th Reconnaissance Airplane Company - Phu Loi
   **205th Assault Support Helicopter Company - Phu Loi
   213th Assault Support Helicopter Company - Phu Loi

   *178th Assault Support Helicopter Company was placed under operational control of the 14th Combat Aviation Battalion at Chu Lai on 21 April 1967 and transferred to the 14th Combat Aviation Battalion on 8 June 67.
   **205th Assault Support Helicopter Company was assigned to the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion and stationed at Phu Loi on 1 June 1967.

4. (C) Command and Staff Structure:
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a. Current command and staff structure is shown in Annex B.

b. Significant changes in the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion Command and staff structure during this reporting period are shown below:

(1) On 7 May 1967 LTC Leo E. Soucek assumed Command of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion from LTC Joseph B. Starker.


(3) On 26 June 1967 Major Clyde F. Klick was appointed Battalion S1 replacing Major William Giese.

B. PERSONNEL, MORALE, DISCIPLINE, CIVIC ACTION, AND INFORMATION

1. (U) Personnel:

a. The personnel section maintained support of approximately 1800 records during this reporting period.

b. The records of the 178th Assault Support Helicopter Company were transferred to the 14th Combat Aviation Battalion on 15 June 1967.

c. The inprocessing of the 205th Assault Support Helicopter Company was completed 1 July 1967.

d. The final phase of the planned infusion of the 213th Assault Support Helicopter Company was completed 1 June 1967.

e. The initial phase of the planned infusion of the 205th Assault Support Helicopter Company was completed 15 July 1967.

f. The personnel section processed 80 requests for foreign service tour extensions during this reporting period.
2. (U) Morale:

The following awards and decorations were recommended and approved during this reporting period:

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b. Special Services:

A miniature golf course and a golf driving range were constructed in the battalion area during this reporting period. 4 USO Special Services shows provided entertainment to members of the battalion during this reporting period. Continued emphasis on securing, distributing and maintaining special service equipment was instrumental in keeping morale in the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion at a high level.

3. (U) Discipline:

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4. (U) Civic Action:

a. The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion civic action program continued to expand during this reporting period. The enrollment of the Lai Khe school has risen to 94 students. Paint for the school rooms and shoes for the students were distributed in May 1967. Two parties for the school children at Phu Loi and Lai Khe were given during July 1967. The 128th Assault Helicopter Company adopted a 10 year old orphan boy in June 1967 and are presently sending him to the Catholic School in Phu Cuong.

b. The following is a statistical summary of civic action projects:

   - rice - 26,000 lbs
   - cooking oil - 16 cases
   - peanuts - 50 kilos
   - milk - 15 cases
   - shoes - 50 pairs
   - flour - 150 kilos
   - cheese - 30 kilos
   - paint - 20 gallons

   Medcap visits:
   - Vinh Son - 9 (302 patients treated)
   - Lai Khe - 7 (168 patients treated)
   - La Trang - 11 (435 patients treated)

5. (U) Information

The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion Information Section has...
been working two 12 hour shifts daily to increase efficiency. 92
daily information summaries were submitted during this reporting period,
156 hometown news releases have been submitted and 23 feature stories
have been submitted during this reporting period. Continued liaison
with outside news media has given the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion
greater recognition in radio, television and newspaper coverage.

C. (C) INTELLIGENCE

1. (U) Significant Activities

a. During the first week of April the S2 completely revised
the OPLAN for defense and security to include the addition of a counter
attack plan and a disaster plan. Principal changes were directed
toward providing more comprehensive guidance to the units on what to
do in case of enemy attack. The counter attack plan was designed to
repel a penetration anywhere within the Phu Loi perimeter.

b. A summary of normal S2 actions for the past three months
is as follows:

(1) Number of clearances validated 13
(2) Number of requests for NAG 12
(3) Number of clearances granted 22
(4) Number of requests for record checks 39
(5) Number of individual debriefings 9
(6) Daily Intsums written 26
(7) Weekly Intsums written 12
(8) Kit reports recorded and forwarded to 7 AF 139
(9) Perint reps written 12
(10) Order of battle map VP datings 13

(6)
2. (U) Escape and Evasion
   a. Two hundred fifty of the new survival, escape and evasion
      kits were received and distributed to 11th CAB units.
   b. During this period (10) officers were sent to the Navy
      Jungle Survival School (Cubi Point, Republic of the Phillipines).
      Three of these were company E&E officers and seven were O-1 pilots.
3. (C) Security
   a. Work continued on the 11th CAB section of the base camp
      perimeter with seven new bunkers being completed.
   b. The companies continued work on their internal personnel
      bunkers. This effort paid great dividends during the mortar/rocket
      attack the morning of 29 July.
   c. The Battalion experienced no security violations during
      the period requiring investigation under the provisions of para 72,
      AR 380-5. No administrative violations were received.
   d. From 15 to 22 June the 303rd Radio Research Bn conducted
      a transmission security analysis on the 11th CAB. During this period,
      621 radio-telephone transmissions were monitored in 52 hours of
      coverage and 187 conventional telephone conversations were monitored
      in 53 hours of coverage. In the period of monitoring, no transmission
      security violations were noted and virtually no information of
      intelligence value was disclosed. The 303rd commended the 11th CAB
      on its high degree of COMSEC awareness and training.

   (7)
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4. (C) Intelligence and Counter Intelligence Reports: The daily and weekly intelligence summaries and bi-weekly perintrep were continued throughout this period.

D. PLANS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

1. (C) Plans:

   a. During this reporting period the concept of planning airmobile operations continued to be centralized planning and decentralized execution.

   b. Planning of airmobile combat assaults, extractions and major resupply efforts is conducted within the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion operations complex. Execution of airmobile combat assaults or extractions involving 20 UH-1s or less are decentralized to company level by designating one company commander as air mission commander for the operation. Execution of airmobile combat assaults, extractions or major resupply efforts involving more than 20 UH-1s or UH-1s integrated with CH-47s is controlled by the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion Commander from his Airborne Command Post.

   c. Coordination of aviation support is effected by the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion operations complex.

   d. Liaison requirements are ascertained by the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion operations complex and liaison with the supported unit is conducted by the designated air mission commander.

   e. During this reporting period, this method of planning, coordinating and liaisoning aviation support has proven very effective. By continuous repetition of planning, coordinating and liaisoning missions, standard procedures with supported units have evolved, and

   (8)
command relationships with supported units are firmly cemented.

2. (C) Operations:

a. Increased emphasis on management of available aviation resources and better communications with higher headquarters and subordinate units has increased the capability of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion operations complex to tactically tailor aviation assets to meet and fulfill mission requirements.

b. The establishment of a secure voice net with the AAE at FFIIV has accelerated mission response time and eliminated the time consuming requirement to encode and decode missions and operational reports.

c. Use of Integral Smoke Generators: During this reporting period the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion has experimented with new ways of using the Integral Smoke Generator to support combat assaults and extractions. The Smoke Pot, Floating Type, FSN 1365-598-5220, K867, has been used effectively to generate a long lasting (12-15 minute) smoke screen to mask one flank of a landing or pickup zone from enemy observation and fire. Further discussion on the use of the smoke pot, floating type can be found in Section II, Part 1, B, 2 of this report.

d. Evaluation of the Manpacked Personnel Detector in the aerial role: On 16 June 1967 the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion was issued two modified manpacked personnel detectors for evaluation for use in helicopters. The detectors were mounted in 1 UH-1B and performed operational missions on 20, 21, 24, 26, 28 and 29 June 1967.
The system proved to be reliable and appears to have a great potential. Further discussion on the manpacked personnel detector (MPD) can be found in Section II, Part I, B, 1 of this report.

e. Area saturation of CS gas by CH-47: During this reporting period the 213th Assault Support Helicopter Company performed 22 Operational missions in support of the Chemical Section, 1st Infantry Division. These missions involved dropping fuzed, 55 gallon drums of CS gas from 3500 feet into specific target areas. The results of these missions have been very rewarding. Target areas saturated by CS gas dropped from CH-47s have been denied to the Viet Cong for 90-120 days. Further discussion of the techniques involved in the dropping of CS gas by CH-47 can be found in Section II, Part I, B, 3 of this report.

f. Operation Manhattan 23 April – 10 May 1967: The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion augmented at times by A Company, 1st Aviation Battalion, provided the O-1, UH-1 and CH-47 support to the 1st Infantry Division during all phases of the operation. UH-1 and CH-47 support was also provided to the 25th Infantry Division during the operation. Data pertaining to the period 23 April to 30 April was reported in the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion ORLL 1 Feb – 30 Apr 1967. The period 1 May to 10 May 1967, was primarily in support of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division as is summarized below:

1-2 May 1967, the 128th and 173rd Assault Helicopter Companies conducted eagle flights in support of the 2/28th Infantry Battalion
víc coord XT5833.

8 May 1967, 5 UH-1Ds from the 162nd Assault Helicopter Company and 5 UH-1Ds from the 173rd Assault Helicopter Company extracted the 2/28th Infantry Battalion from vic coord XT565341 to Lai Khe in one hour forty minutes without incident.

9 May 1967, the 162nd and 173rd Assault Helicopter Company extracted the 1/2nd Infantry Battalion from vic coord XT565358 to Lai Khe. The 213th Assault Support Helicopter Company moved two batteries of artillery from FSB N vic coord XT5845 to Lai Khe.

10 May 1967, 11th Combat Aviation Battalion commitment to Operation Manhattan ended. Operation Manhattan statistical summary:

- Total Sorties - 6547
- Total passengers transported - 9405
- Total cargo transported - 3785.6 tons
- Total hours flown - 1803.5

g. Operation Dallas 17 May - 25 May 1967: The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion conducted two battalion sized airmobile combat assaults on 17 May 67 using UH-1Ds from the 128th, 162nd, and 173rd Assault Helicopter Companies to insert the 1/18th Infantry Division in an LZ vic coord YT027267 and the 1/26th Infantry Battalion in an LZ vic coord XT928313. Both LZs were prepared by two hours of artillery and air strikes and no enemy resistance was encountered.

5 CH-47s from the 213th Assault Support Helicopter Company moved two batteries of artillery from Phuoc Vinh to FSB B vic coord XT9832. Seven battalion sized combat extraction - assaults were conducted.
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during Operation Dallas. On 22 May 1967 the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion moved 4 Infantry Battalions and two batteries of artillery from Phuoc Vinh and Lai Khe to open the road from Phuoc Vinh to Dian. All lifts were conducted without incident. Operation Dallas terminated with the movement of troops and artillery to open the portion of Route 16 from Tan Uyen to Phuoc Vinh.

Operation Dallas statistical summary:

Total sorties - 4198
Total passengers transported - 6785
Total cargo transported - 3049.7 tons
Total hours flown - 1607.6 h.

Operation Bluefield 5 June - 10 June 1967: The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion conducted two battalion sized combat assaults on 5 June 1967, moving from Lai Khe the 1/16th Infantry Battalion to an LZ vic coord XT875481 and the 2/28th Infantry Battalion to an LZ vic coord XT828479. Both LZs received two hours of artillery and air strikes before each assault and no enemy resistance was encountered. The 173rd Assault Helicopter Company provided support of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division throughout the operation. The 1/16th Infantry Battalion conducted one battalion sized combat assault from their original LZ across the Song Be River to an LZ vic coord XT960495. No enemy resistance was encountered on Operation Bluefield and the 1/16th and 2/28th Infantry Battalions were extracted from their field positions to Lai Khe on 10 June 1967 without incident.

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Operation Bluefield statistical summary:
Total sorties - 2206
Total passengers transported - 4393
Total cargo transported - 872.8 tons
Total hours flown - 534.9

1. Operation Billings 11 June 1967 - 23 June 1967: On 11 June the 1/28th and 1/26th Infantry Battalions were to conduct airmobile combat assaults into the operational area from Phuoc Vinh and the 1/2nd Infantry Battalion was to conduct a combat assault into the operational area from Quan Loi. Low ceilings and poor visibility from heavy rain cancelled all planned combat assaults on 11 June, however, the 1/2 Infantry Battalion was moved from Quan Loi to Phuoc Vinh to expedite insertion on 12 June 1967. On 12 June the 1/26th Infantry Battalion conducted a ground assault from Phuoc Vinh to establish FSB Gunner I vic coord XT971623. UH-1Ds from the 128th, 162nd and 173rd Assault Helicopter Companies conducted two airmobile combat assaults moving the 1/2nd Infantry Battalion from PV to LZ F vic coord XT9720 and the 1/28th Infantry Battalion from PV to LZ G vic coord XT9357. Both LZs received two hours of artillery and airstrikes and both assaults were conducted without incident. On 13 June the 162nd and 173rd Assault Helicopter Companies conducted a two battalion combat assault moving the 1/16th Infantry Battalion and 2/28th Infantry Battalion from LK to LZ Rufe vic coord XT952611. LZ Rufe received 2 hours of artillery and air strikes and the assault was conducted without incident. On 17 June the 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division declared a tactical emergency and the 128th Assault Helicopter Company moved the 2/18th
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Infantry Battalion from Lai Khe to reinforce the two battalions in LZ Rufe. On 18 June under the commanding officer of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion 30 UH-1Ds from the 128th, 162nd and 173rd Assault Helicopter Companies and 5 CH-47s from the 213th Assault Support Helicopter Company moved 2700 troops and 447 tons of cargo while moving units to influence the battle around LZ Rufe. Six battalion sized combat assaults and four combat extractions were conducted and the one administrative move of the 1/16th Infantry Battalion and recovery of two downed aircraft were accomplished. 18 June 1967 was one of the most productive days experienced in the history of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion. On 23 June the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion extracted 3 infantry battalions from two PZs vic coord XT9666 and XT9725 to Chi Linh in one hour and six minutes. This move was well planned, coordinated and conducted using 30 UH-1Ds in six flights of 5 UH-1Ds forming a "Sky Train". 1431 troops were moved in the 1 hour six minute extraction as each of the six flights performed their eight minute turn around schedule to perfection. Artillery and airstrikes were conducted all during the extraction. Flight corridors were planned into the Fire Support Plan and these three extractions ended the maneuver phase of Operation Billings.

Operation Billings statistical summary:
Total sorties - 5226
Total passengers transported - 10,610
Total cargo transported - 1217.8
Total hours flown - 1303

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3. Other significant activities 1 May - 31 July 1967:

3 May 1967 - 1st Infantry Division declared a tactical emergency vic coord XT952671 at 1700 hours. A Sigma element was surrounded by an estimated VC Regiment. 6 UH-1Ds from the 128th Assault Helicopter Company, 5 UH-1Ds from the 162nd Assault Helicopter Company, and 5 UH-1Ds from A Company, 1st Aviation Battalion responded under the command of the CO 128th Assault Helicopter Company. 13 KIAs and 40 WIA's were extracted to Phuoc Vinh. 170 troops were then extracted to Chi Linh. At 1900 hours a tactical emergency was declared by the 199th Light Infantry Brigade vic coords XT887012. 5 UH-1Ds each from the 128th and 162nd Assault Helicopter Companies responded under the command of the Commanding Officer 162nd Assault Helicopter Company. 130 troops were moved to an LZ vic coord YS0914.

Weather and darkness prevented further insertions. A light fire team from the 162nd Assault Helicopter Company received moderate small arms and automatic weapons fire vic coord XT950670. Both UH-1Cs were damaged. The source of fire was assaulted and silenced. 1 VC (DC) was confirmed by the ground commander.

11 May 1967 - 56 enemy mortar rounds landed in the 162nd Assault Helicopter Company area at Phuoc Vinh. Eight UH-1Ds and 2 UH-1Gs were severely damaged. 28 members of the 162nd Assault Helicopter Company were wounded in action.

12 May 1967 - III ARVN Corps declared a tactical emergency at 04:34. 10 UH-1Ds from the 173rd Assault Helicopter Company and 2 CH-47s from the 213th Assault Support Helicopter Company responded.

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512 troops and 30.5 tons of cargo were moved without incident from Binh Trang to Tan Uyen.

14 May 1967 - A tactical emergency was declared by the 109th Light Infantry Brigade at 0500 as an ARVN outpost south of Binh Chanh had been overrun. 11 UH-1Ds and 1 light fire team from the 128th Assault Helicopter Company responded. 731 passengers and 3 tons of cargo was moved in 3 combat assaults around the outpost. 1 UH-1B received 1 enemy hit, but, continued to fly. The source of fire was assaulted with unknown results.

19 May 1967 - Two UH-1Ds from the 162nd Assault Helicopter Company were shot down during the extraction of a Sigma team via coord XT96537. 7 UH-1Ds and 2 light fire teams from the 173rd Assault Helicopter Company came to the assistance of the 162nd Assault Helicopter Company by inserting a security force without incident. 8 UH-1Ds from the 162nd Assault Helicopter Company and 7 UH-1Ds from the 173rd Assault Helicopter Company inserted a second security force around the second downed UH-1D. 4 UH-1Ds received bullet damage from moderate small arms fire during the second insertion. Four ARVN troops and 2 US were wounded. Both downed UH-1Ds and the security force were then extracted without further incident.

25 May 1967 - At 1700 hours 2 UH-1Ds from the 173rd Assault Helicopter Company inserted a security force around a downed UH-1B from B Company, 25th Infantry Division via coord XT802098. At 1740 hours the downed aircraft was rigged for extraction and extracted by a CH-47 from the 213th Assault Support Helicopter Company.
On departure with the downed aircraft as a sling load the CH-47 and the recovery aircraft received intense small arms and automatic weapons fire. The co-pilot of the CH-47 was wounded and the aircraft commander of the recovery ship was wounded. The source of fire was assaulted and two UH-1B gunships received extensive bullet damage in the ensuing battle. At 1800 hours the 2 UH-1 Ds from the 173rd Assault Helicopter Company began the extraction of the security force from the downed aircraft site. As the 2 UH-1Ds prepared to take off the lead UH-1D was hit by 57mm recoiless rifle fire causing it to crash and burn. The second UH-1D was damaged by fragments from the 57mm fire and debris from the 1st UH-1D. The second UH-1D managed to fly 1000 meters to an ARVN command post. The crew of the destroyed UH-1D were not injured. The crew of the destroyed aircraft walked overland to the Saigon River and were extracted by boat. The crewchief of the second UH-1D was killed in action by small arms fire. The downed aircraft and crew were later extracted after dark without incident.

16 June 1967 - 11 UH-1Ds and heavy fire team from the 128th Assault Helicopter Company in support of the 3/39th Infantry Battalion, 9th Infantry Division moved 774 troops from PZs near Rach Kien to multiple LZs near XS6870. 1 UH-1D and 1 UH-1B sustained moderate bullet damage from automatic weapons fire. The source of fire was assaulted and 5 VC KIA (BC) were confirmed by the ground commander.

17 June 1967 - 1 CH-47 from the 213th Assault Support (17)
Helicopter Company received intense hostile fire from vic coord XT9566. The CH-47 sustained 8 hits and one crew member was wounded. The CH-47 made a forced landing in LZ Rufe vic coord XT9561. Repair parts were flown to LZ Rufe and the CH-47 was repaired and flown out 3 hours later.

24 June 1967 - 213th Assault Support Helicopter Company reports new battalion record for aircraft recoveries in one day. The old record was six and the new record is nine recoveries.

28 June 1967 - 5th Special Forces Group declared a tactical emergency near An Loc. 12 UH-1Ds and 1 heavy fire team from the 128th Assault Helicopter Company responded. The 128th moved 195 troops to an LZ vic coord XT608049 to reinforce a CIDG company in heavy contact. 19 ARVN WIA, 2 ARVN KIA, 2 US WIA and 1 US KIA were extracted from the LZ and flown to Quan Loi.

29 June 1967 - 1 O-1G from the 184th Recon Airplane Company sighted a VC platoon in the open in the Rung Sat Special Zone. The O-1G fired 4, 2.75" rockets into the platoon and opened fire with an M-16 rifle from the back seat. Artillery was called in on the platoon. 28 VC KIA (BC) was later confirmed by the 9th Infantry Division.

3 July 1967 - 11 UH-1Ds and a heavy fire team from the 162nd Assault Helicopter Company flew in support of the 2nd Brigade 25th Infantry Division near Duc Hoa. The 162nd conducted Eagle Flights for the 2/27 Infantry Battalion and were subjected to sniper fire throughout the day. 2 UH-1Ds received moderate bullet damage.
and were forced to land. 3 crewmembers were wounded. All damaged aircraft were recovered without incident.

8 July 1967 - 205th Assault Support Helicopter Company declared operational 13 days after arrival of their CH-47s in country.

27 July 1967 - 162nd Assault Helicopter Company reported that Phuoc Vinh was under heavy mortar and rocket attack at 0037 hours. Light fire teams from the 128th and 173rd Assault Helicopter Companies scrambled to Phuoc Vinh to assist the light fire team from the 162nd in their counter mortar defense operations. Two UH-1Ds from the 173rd Assault Helicopter Company evacuated the seriously wounded from Phuoc Vinh to the 93rd Evac Hospital at Long Binh. The mortar attack lasted 25 minutes and the 162nd Assault Helicopter Company reported the following damage and casualties.

KIA - 1
WIA - 17
Buildings damaged - 5
Buildings destroyed - 2
Aircraft damaged - 8

29 July 1967 - HQ 11th Combat Aviation Battalion, 128th Assault Helicopter Company, 184th Recon Airplane Company, 205th and 213th Assault Support Helicopter Companies came under a heavy mortar and rocket attack at 0040 hours. Light fire teams from the 128th Assault Helicopter Company and A Company, 1st Aviation Battalion scrambled to assist the artillery in counter mortar fires. 183 rounds of 82mm mortar and 122mm rockets landed in the Phu Loi area. The following is a list of casualties and damage:

(19)
KIA - 0
WIA - 23
UH-1 destroyed - 1
UH-1 damaged - 3
CH-47 damaged - 8
O-1s damaged - 11

Installation and TO&E property of all units under attack was damaged. All units continued to remain operational after the attack. Thorough training of all personnel in ground defense and passive defense against mortar attacks was a major contributing factor in the low casualty and damage rate.

QUARTERLY STATISTICAL SUMMARY MAY, JUNE AND JULY

1. Hours flown
   UH-1 - 23,413
   CH-47 - 3,871
   O-1 - 8,952
   Total 36,236

2. Sorties flown
   UH-1 - 74,417
   CH-47 - 12,066
   O-1 - 7,503
   Total 89,986

3. Passengers carried
   UH-1 - 143,114
   CH-47 - 34,634
   Total 177,748

4. Cargo tons transported
   UH-1 - 3,597
   CH-47 - 21,443
   Total 24,440

(20)

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5. Medical Evacuations - 461
6. Aircraft Recovered - 124
7. Ammunition expended:
   7.62mm - 2,560,763
   2.75mm - 14,608
   40mm - 61,655
8. Enemy Losses
   VC KIA (BC) 116
   VC KIA (EST) 38
   Structures destroyed 63
   Sampans sunk 30

9. Friendly losses:
   US WIA 58
   US KIA 3
   Aircraft hit 69
   Aircraft destroyed 14

3. (C) Training:
   a. Pathfinder Training: Two pathfinder training courses were conducted during this reporting period. The first course was conducted 1 - 12 May 1967, the second course was conducted 17 - 29 July 1967. 31 students from the 11th, 25th, 269th, 214th, and 222nd Combat Aviation Battalions attended the two courses which presented the basic requirements stated in USARV message AVHAV 26232. This training qualified the students to apply for permanent designation as a pathfinder upon completion of a six month on the job training program.
b. **Mobile Training Teams (MTT):** The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion Mobile Training Team from the 21st Assault Support Helicopter Company conducted 22 presentations to supported units during this reporting period. All supported units receive initial training upon arrival in country and refresher training as requested. The tons per hour ratio for CH-47s for this reporting period was 5.6 compared to 5.1 tons per hour during the previous reporting period and is a direct result of the efforts of the Mobile Training Team.

c. **AANTAP Courses:** 31 students from the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion attended classes at Vung Tau AAF conducted by the 765th Transportation Detachment. Attendance figures are shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Student Input</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UH-1 Airframe</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1 Engine (T53)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47 Airframe</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47 Engine (T55)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. **VNAF Aviator Training:** Four VNAF aviators were attached to the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion for transition and tactical training in the UH-1 on 15 May 1967. Two VNAF aviators were attached to the 128th Assault Helicopter Company (Phu Loi) and two were attached to the 162nd Assault Helicopter Company (Phuoc Vinh). Training of the VNAF aviators has progressed smoothly and as of the end of the reporting period all four VNAF aviators were proficient in all maneuvers in the UH-1D and were being utilized daily as operational pilots on all types of missions.
e. Incountry Flight Crew Training and Aviator Orientation

Training: During this reporting period, pilots and aircrews from Hq, 12th Combat Aviation Group, Hq, 214th Combat Aviation Battalion, 187th, 188th, 191st, 240th Assault Helicopter Companies, 200th Assault Support Helicopter Company and the 21st Recon Airplane Company received flight crew training and in country orientation with the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion. This training was conducted without incident in a very satisfactory manner.

f. Incountry Training of Newly Assigned Units: Incountry training of the 205th Assault Support Helicopter Company began 1 July 1967. The following subjects were taught in a five day period:

(1) Nine Rules to Remember
(2) Film "Unique War"
(3) Military courtesy, dress and appearance
(4) Currency conversion and piaster control
(5) Personal hygiene
(6) Tropical diseases
(7) First and self aid
(8) Field sanitation
(9) Malaria preventive measures
(10) Orientation on unit history, organization and mission
(11) Orientation on religious services
(12) Weapons safety and security
(13) Unit security, sentry duty and alert plans
(14) Mines and booby traps *
(15) Viet Cong tactics and techniques *

(23)
Driver training, driver safety and Vietnamese road signs.

Aviator orientation and standardization.

Door gunner training.

Weapons familiarization firing.

Gas mask fitting and gas chamber exercise.

Taught by 1st Infantry Division Recondo School Staff.

The unit training program was initiated and accomplished with efficiency and dispatch. The 205th Assault Support Helicopter Company was declared operational on 8 July 1967.

E. LOGISTICS

1. (C) Significant Activities: The major efforts of the S4 during this period have been directed toward:

   a. Improving administrative supply procedures.

   b. Assisting units in the fields of supply and logistics and related activities in preparation for the Annual General Inspection.

   c. Assisting the 178th Assault Helicopter Company in procuring and transporting equipment and supplies in conjunction with the unit's deployment to Chu Lai (Operation Oregon).

   d. Reception of the 205th Assault Support Helicopter Company.

   e. Assisting 524th Medical Detachment (detached from 205th ASHC) deployment to Chu Lai.

   f. Construction of cantonment area.

   g. Construction of aircraft revetments.
2. (U) Supply:

   a. Assistance visits for the purpose of determining unit's status, identifying weaknesses and assisting in detail to correct deficiencies in preparation for the Annual General Inspection proved significantly beneficial. The subsequent AGI found the supply posture of all units to be satisfactory.

   b. Local supply policies and procedures relating to the reception of new units were again successfully implemented during the 205th ASHC arrival, directly contributing to that units achieving operational status within the shortest possible time.

3. (U) Construction:

   a. Operational, administrative, mess and billet facility construction has continued under the self-help program. The final 50% of such construction has commenced under the planned base development program.

   b. The 554th Engineer Battalion (Construction) began construction of three (3) aircraft maintenance hangars for 11th Combat Aviation Battalion units during this period.

F. SIGNAL

   1. (U) Two 80 foot telephone poles have been installed and fitted with antennas behind the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion Communications Center. Antennas for FM, Secure FM, UHF and SSB radios have been mounted on top of these telephone poles and have given the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion multi-channel communications coverage of the entire III Corps Tactical Zone.
2. (C) A KY-8 Secure Speech Device has been installed in the Battalion Operations Complex and is now operating in the 12th Combat Aviation Group Command Net (FM).

3. (C) A Jeep mounted AN/VSC2 Radio Teletype/SSP has been received and is now in operation in the 12th Combat Aviation Group RTT Net.

4. (U) Work is in progress to expand the present 11th Combat Aviation Battalion Communications Center. The expanded facility will provide space for a secure area for Crypto storage and radio repair.

C. MAINTENANCE

1. (U) There has been a slight decline in the overall utilization of aircraft in the battalion, however, rates are comparable to the previous months period.

2. (U) During July the 205th Aslt Sp Hel Co became fully operational. A maintenance and supply package was assembled for the unit in CONUS and appears adequate for present operations.

3. (U) The battalion has received 15 UH-1D, 2 UH-1C, 2 UH-1B and 1 O-1C aircraft to replace losses. At the end of the period the 11th CMB is short 5 UH-1Ds, 1 UH-1C, and 1 O-1C. The 21 UH-1D level continues to be the goal for combat assault helicopter companies. Float aircraft provided by the supporting aircraft maintenance company have become available and are used extensively as temporary replacements for losses.

4. (U) Hangar facilities are under construction for three of the
six assigned companies which, when completed, will materially increase maintenance productivity during the rainy season.

5. (U) Two rebuilt UH-1B helicopters were received under the rebuild program. The aircraft were in good condition, however, they had not been wired for armament systems in use and had not been retrofitted with the ARC54 radios.

6. (U) Sufficient armament systems and repair parts for M-5, XM-16 and XM23 systems are not available to replace combat losses and worn out systems. The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion is short 1 XM16 and 11 XM23 weapons systems at the end of this reporting period. Repair parts for weapons systems are in short supply. Normal replacement time for repair parts, worn out or combat loss weapons systems often exceeds 60 days.

H. AVIATION SAFETY

1. (U) A marked reduction in the accident rate has been evidenced over the past ninety days. This has been due primarily to the command emphasis that has been placed on aviation safety. The rainy season has also aided in this reduction by eliminating the dust and high density altitude.

2. (U) There have been seven major accidents, one combat loss, nine incidents, eight precautionary landings, six forced landings, and one combat damage report during this period. All of the accidents and the one combat loss were in UH-1 aircraft.

3. (U) The following is a list of the accidents and incidents reported during this period:

(27)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACCIDENTS</th>
<th>CAUSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tail rotor struck object</td>
<td>Plane strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of RPM</td>
<td>Jeep antenna hit blade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engine failure</td>
<td>Rocket exploded leaving a/c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skid caught on PSP</td>
<td>Gasket failure, oil leak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wire strike</td>
<td>Servo failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tail rotor failure</td>
<td>Hit bridge, lost left gear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hit barbed wire, both gear flat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Friendly forces exploded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Claymore mine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. (U) The principal cause factor that required forced or precautionary landings to be made are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCED LANDINGS</th>
<th>PRECAUTIONARY LANDINGS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short shaft failure</td>
<td>Loss of oil pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo damage</td>
<td>Cargo door came off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolts missing in tail rotor</td>
<td>Servo failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main rotor blade split</td>
<td>Tail rotor failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engine failure</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I. SURGEON

The Headquarters Medical Section and the various Medical Detachments continue to provide medical support to the members of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion and to members of non-organic supporting maintenance units. This support involves routine medical care, specialized aeromedical care and surveillance, and preventive medicine—sanitation staff advice and recommendations. Active semi-weekly medical civic action projects are being provided for members of the villages of Vinh Son, Lai Khe, and La Trang.
Section II, Part I

Lessons Learned

A. Personnel: None

B. Operations:

1. (C) Item: Use of Manpacked Personnel Detector (MPD) in an aerial role.

Discussion: On 16 June 1967 two Man Packed Personnel Detectors MPD's ("People Sniffers") were issued to the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion. The MPD's were modified to run from a 28 volt DC power supply. Special wooden shock absorbing boxes were constructed to mount the devices in a UH-1B helicopter. The probes were mounted on the cross tubes of the helicopter. It was considered to be absolutely essential to employ the MPD's in pairs for systems reliability. On 20 June, the first "Bloodhound" mission was flown under the call sign "Old Blue" and was monitored by a representative from the chemical section of the 1st Infantry Division. "Old Blue" was found to be a reliable information source for the G2 Section, 1st Infantry Division. Operational missions were flown on 21, 24, 26, 28 and 29 June. On each of the 200 Sq km missions, artillery and air strikes were called in on areas that were confirmed by other information sources. The MPD is still being evaluated, however, preliminary observations indicate the MPD in the aerial role has great potential.

Observation: The Manpacked Personnel Detector in the aerial role is now a proven capability within the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion. Follow on systems specifically designed for
aerial personnel detection would afford a tremendous capability by detecting units hidden from other surveillance means. Possibilities are that an OV-1 with a large system capable of sampling large quantities of air rapidly, might be a very valuable asset to ground commanders.

2. (C) Item: Use of Smoke Pot, Floating Type, FSN 1365-5220-KP67 in conjunction with an Integral Smoke Generator to lay long lasting smoke screens by helicopter.

Discussion: The smoke pot, floating type FSN 1365-598-5220-KP67 has been used effectively by the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion in conjunction with an integral smoke generator mounted in a UH-1B to lay long lasting smoke screens to obscure combat assaults and extractions from enemy observation and fire. The fuze pin is attached to one of the tie down rings on the floor of the helicopter by 8 feet of heavy duty safety wire. As the UH-1B lays a smoke screen into the wind, along the downwind side of a landing or pickup zone, the smoke pots are thrown overboard at preplanned locations. The pots arm after leaving the aircraft and generate smoke for 12-15 minutes. By attaching the safety wire directly to the fuze pin, the safety wire acts as an 8 foot arming lanyard minimizing the possibility of the smoke pots going off inside the aircraft. Using this method, the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion now has the capability of laying a long lasting smoke screen with just one low level pass of a UH-1B.

Observation: This method of laying a smoke screen has
been proven effective. It generates a thick, long lasting screen on one low level pass and minimizes exposure of the smoke generating UH-1B. In six months of experimental smoke generator tests, the smoke ship has received hostile fire 3 times. To date, no troop carrier has sustained any bullet damage from the smoke protected flank on assaults or extractions.

3. (c) Item: Area saturation of CS Gas by CH-47.

Discussion: During this reporting period the 213th Assault Helicopter Company has flown 23 CS Gas drop missions in support of the chemical section, 1st Infantry Division, dropping 970 fuzed, 55 gallon drums of CS Gas in the 1st Division area. Normal procedure for conducting these missions is as follows. The CH-47 furnished by the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion, with a light fire team reports to Hq, 1st Infantry Division for briefing and loading. The CH-47 crew, the fire team leader and an Air Force Forward Air Controller receive a briefing on the target area from a representative of the chemical section 1st Infantry Division while personnel from the chemical section load 30 drums of CS Gas on the CH-47. The chemical section, 1st Infantry Division provides the CH-47 crew, fire team leader and FAC with maps of the target area. The FAC marks the target area for the CH-47 crew and provides current wind in the target area. Six personnel from the chemical section fly in the CH-47, set the fuzes on each drum, and provide the manpower to roll the CS Gas drums out of the tailgate of the CH-47. All personnel have protective masks in their possession and one pilot in the cockpit wears his protective mask at all times while

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The CS Gas is on board. The CH-47 crew is vectored over the target area by the Forward Air Controller. The CH-47 flies at 2600' or 3500' absolute altitude depending on weather conditions. Once the altitude has been determined, the aircraft commander of the CH-47 notifies the chemical section aboard the CH-47 so they can set the fuzes. The CH-47 aircraft commander aligns his aircraft on the target area by looking between his feet through the chin bubble. 20 seconds before the drop time, the CH-47 aircraft commander notifies the chemical personnel by turning on the red troop warning light. When the CH-47 aircraft commander gets the desired sight picture by sighting between his feet through the chin bubble, he turns on the green troop warning light and rings the troop alarm bell. The CS Gas drums are rolled off the tail gate. The fuzes are set to go off at 100' absolute altitude. The light fire team provides fire support and watches the drums throughout the drop. If any of the drums fail to go off, the fire team fires on them to detonate them. The accuracy of this method is dependent on wind conditions and the skill of the FAC and CH-47 Aircraft Commander. There is no sighting device installed in either aircraft. The sight picture used by most Aircraft Commanders has been to drop the CS Gas drums when the target area is sighted between the pedal controls. This method has been very effective as 85-90% of all drums dropped have landed in the target area. The target areas saturated by this method have been denied to the enemy for 90-120 days.

Observation: This application of imagination and aviation has given the Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division another
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weapon in his arsenal to deny specific areas to the enemy for sustained periods of time.

4. (C) Item: Selection and Use of Alternate Air Mission Commanders.

Discussion: During this reporting period the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion has made extensive use of Alternate Air Mission Commanders. Alternate Air Mission Commanders must have a thorough knowledge of the ground tactical plan and the operations plan of the airmobile force. The mission of the Alternate Air Mission Commander is to provide assistance to the Air Mission Commander by organizing and supervising activities in the pickup zone and refueling areas and to assume command of the army aviation elements assigned to the airmobile force in the event the air mission commander can no longer continue control of the army aviation elements because of hostile fire or maintenance difficulty. Twice during this reporting period, helicopters in the airmobile force have been forced to land because of maintenance difficulty or hostile fire. On both occasions the Air Mission Commander has assigned the task of extracting the downed crews and organizing and supervising the security and recovery of the downed aircraft to the Alternate Air Mission Commander. This allows the Air Mission Commander to continue with the primary mission of supporting the Airmobile Force Commander without interruption. The possibility exists that the Air Mission Commander could be forced to land because of maintenance or hostile fire and in such case the Alternate Air Mission Commander can assume command. The Alternate Air Mission Commander for battalion sized missions is usually the

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Battalion Executive Officer. The Alternate Air Mission Commander for one and two company movements is usually the senior platoon leader or other company commander. Alternate Air Mission Commanders are designated for each mission and have proven to be very low cost insurance against almost any eventuality.

Observation: The adoption of a standard procedure of designating an Alternate Air Mission Commander has paid dividends twice in recent history. This procedure provides continuity to any plan and gives the Air Mission Commander greater latitude in the accomplishment of his mission.

5. (c) Item: Illumination of Night Combat Assaults.

Discussion: Six times during this reporting period elements from the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion have participated in night combat assaults. Several variations of battlefield illumination have been used. The best use of battlefield illumination has been found to be flares, either air dropped or fired by artillery or mortars. There are two major considerations in the use of illumination. The first consideration is timing. The illumination must be properly timed during the assault to prevent compromise of the landing zone and still provide effective illumination during the landing phase. The best time to illuminate a landing zone is 2 minutes before touchdown of the assault helicopters. The second consideration is accuracy. It is absolutely essential that the flares be placed accurately. The best location for flares is on the downwind side of the landing zone on the side farthest from the fire support base in the case of mortars or artillery or on the
downwind end on one side in the case of air dropped flares. This places the illumination to the rear and to the side of the troop carriers who then are not blinded by the illumination and can use their shadows to judge height. Placing artillery and mortar flares on the side of the landing zone farthest from the fire support base allows the greatest safety factor. The projectiles pass high over the landing zone allowing the empty projectiles to fall well away from the landing zone after ejecting the flare cannister. Dropping flares downwind of the landing zone also introduces a safety feature. It puts the illumination in the optimum location and prevents the parachute flares from becoming hazards to flight.

Observation: Battlefield illumination during night combat assaults must be carefully planned. Ill timed or poorly placed illumination can negate all the planning of the operation and jeopardize the safe accomplishment of the mission.

6. (C) Item: Special Considerations for Night Combat Assaults.

Discussion: Night Combat Assaults introduce two special considerations that are not present during daylight assaults. The first consideration is marking of landing zones. If the battlefield illumination is properly placed and timed all pilots involved in the assault will know the approximate location of the landing zone. Green or yellow smoke will show up as a mark for the desired touchdown point very nicely. If the assault is conducted without illumination the landing zone can be marked by firing a flare pistol from an armed helicopter after the troop carriers have been vectored onto
final approach by the Air Mission Commander. The second special consideration for night combat assaults is notification of the troops to disembark. Troops must be cautioned to stay on the troop carriers until the aircraft commanders of each helicopter give them a signal to disembark. This is done to preclude having troops exit the helicopter prematurely while either still high above the ground or while hovering to clear obstacles such as dikes, ditches, streams or bomb craters.

Observation: Night Combat Assaults can be conducted on a routine basis if all the special planning considerations are evaluated. There can be no substitute for deliberate planning and deliberate execution of the final plan.

7. (C) Item: Tactical Evaluation of Armed Helicopter Crews.

Discussion: Due to the continuous requirement to train armed helicopter pilots and gunners, the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion has devised a method for continuous tactical evaluation of armed helicopter crews. The tactical evaluation includes all phases of armed helicopter employment, maintenance of equipment and accuracy of weapons systems. All uncommitted fire teams within the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion are placed on a 5 minute standby status each day from 0600-2200 and a 15 minute standby status from 2200-0600. The Battalion Commander of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion is the Chief Evaluator of the Tactical Evaluations. He secures a free fire zone from one of the tactical units within the III Corps tactical zone. He then calls the operations section of the unit to be evaluated with a mission to scramble a light fire team to the
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free fire area with instructions to contact him on arrival. In
the initial phase of the evaluation the fire team is rated on response
time, aircraft weapons systems maintenance and avionics maintenance.
Bonus points are awarded for quick response and cuts are assessed
for late response, maintenance malfunctions and avionics malfunctions.
The fire team is also evaluated on their navigation to the target
area. Upon arrival at the target area the fire team is evaluated
on: Positive identification of the supported unit, report of
ordnance available, time remaining on station, request of mark of
friendly front lines and request for a briefing on the tactical
situation. After the initial briefing on station the Chief Evaluator
identifies a target for the fire team. The fire team is then
evaluated on: target identification, selection and orientation of
attack, target neutralization, aggressive spirit and after mission
reporting to the Chief Evaluator. The Chief Evaluator then gives
the fire teams an oral debriefing and will forward a completed grade
sheet to the evaluated unit within 24 hours. Bonus points are awarded
for target neutralization on the first firing pass. Targets can
vary from pinpoint to area size. The chief evaluator will determine
when the target is neutralized.

Observation: Tactical evaluation of armed helicopter
crews has stimulated interest in the training of armed helicopter
crews and is rapidly standardizing armed helicopter crew training
within the battalion. This type of evaluation is a great deal more
comprehensive than earlier methods. Whenever possible, actual
hostile targets are used for evaluations.

(37)

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8. (C) Item: Restricted use of 4 legged sling Aero-Quip FSN 1617-823-5044.

Discussion: 80% of the loads dropped by the assigned CH-47 companies during this reporting period were rigged with the 4 legged sling, Aero-Quip FSN 1617-823-5044. Investigation of the problem area revealed that the 147th Assault Support Helicopter Company experienced similar malfunctions between August and December 1966. A letter from the Army Concept Team in Vietnam dated 25 Nov 66 Subject: Recommended Development Project, stated that the sling, 4 legged, Aero-Quip FSN 1617-823-5044 was being discontinued as an item of supply, and the sling, cargo, 40,000 pound capacity, multi-leg FSN 3940-902-3080 should be substituted for CH-47 use. A status sheet, inclosure 1 of the ACTIV letter, stated that the sling, 4 legged, FSN 1670-823-5044 was procured as a developmental item and appears to be unsatisfactory, undesirable, and is being discontinued as an item of issue. Based on experience and the ACTIV letter the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion requested Command Guidance, thru channels, on the use of the 4 legged sling and requested that if the sling were unsatisfactory the widest possible dissemination of that information be made to all units. As of the end of this reporting period there has not been a final determination made on the 4 legged sling. As a precautionary measure the use of the 4 legged sling has been restricted to tactical emergencies only, until final guidance is received.

Observation: Whenever the servicability of an item of aviation related equipment is questionable, or is discontinued from
supply channels after it has been determined to be unsatisfactory it should be immediately brought to the attention of all using units. Failure to notify all concerned will allow continued use of equipment that is no longer airworthy.

9. (C) Item: Use of Fixed Wing Utility Aircraft for Administrative Missions.

Discussion: Use of two fixed wing utility aircraft for administrative type missions would reduce the rotary wing aircraft flying hours per month 230 hours. Two U6A aircraft assigned to 11th Combat Aviation Battalion would significantly reduce the cost of present administrative missions and provide the following bonus effects:

a. Reduced maintenance man hours per flying hour.

b. Longer range potential.

c. Allow fixed wing pilots to maintain instrument proficiency while accomplishing administrative missions.

d. Allow the UH-1Ds presently used for administrative missions to be used for operational missions.

Observation: Assignment of 2 fixed wing utility aircraft to each combat aviation battalion would provide many benefits. Utilization of fixed wing utility aircraft for missions between fixed wing installations would substantially reduce the cost of administrative type missions to a tolerable level. The Battalion submitted a justified request for 2 ea U-6s on 20 June 1967. This request was returned from USARV on 7 July 1967 with the following comment: "Should a continuing requirement exist for fixed wing
aircraft in your unit, an appropriate MTOE with full justification should be submitted. It will be forwarded upon termination of the current DA moratorium on such actions."

C. Training and Organization: None

D. Intelligence: None

E. Logistics and Maintenance:

1. (U) Item: Supply Procedures for Reception of New Units.

Discussion: Procedures developed by this headquarters for receiving new units were once again thoroughly tested during this period. These procedures were formulated during the previous reception of the 213th ASHC and under the optimum condition of sufficient lead time permit:

   a. Detailed coordination, via correspondence, regarding the local situation and recommended items of supplies and equipment to accompany the unit.

   b. Submission, by the sponsoring headquarters on behalf of the new unit, of supply requests for installation type property.

   c. Coordination with supporting troop engineer, R&U and transportation agencies for required assistance. Implementation of these procedures on a modified basis upon receiving minimum forewarning of the arrival of the 205th ASHC reiterated the importance of having an organized plan for new unit reception. Transportation support from the supporting Director of Transportation was superlative and contributed directly to the timely movement of cargo from aerial and sea ports to the unit's home station.

(40)

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Observation: There is a continuing requirement for a workable precedent and procedures file for the reception of new units. Timely logistic assistance materially enhances minimum delay in attaining operational status.

2. (C) Item: Geographic Relocation of Aviation Units within the Republic of Vietnam.

Discussion: Recent relocation of an Assault Support Helicopter Company from the III Corps area to the I Corps area introduced a significant lesson learned during this reporting period. There were many problems that arose during the relocation of the unit, however, one particular problem area had the greatest impact on the unit's operational capability. The problem area involved repair parts for CH-47s. The unit had developed an authorized stockage list (ASL) of repair parts that was supported by demand data over a 15 month period. During this same 15 month period, the Direct Support Unit (DSU) had also developed an authorized stockage list (ASL) that was demand supported and contained an adequate number of line items each, with 15 months experience on percent of fill, fringe items and zero balance. Additionally, special management items (SMI) were controlled effectively to keep equipment deadlined for parts (EDP) at a low rate. When the unit displaced to the I Corps area it had to requisition repair parts through another DSU that had very little experience or demand data on CH-47 support. 15 months of valuable demand data experience developed between the unit and the old DSU were lost. When the unit started to requisition parts from the new DSU, the new DSU had little demand data on CH-47s support and therefore did not
have an approved demand supported ASL. The CH-47 EDP rate went up. Priority cargo space was secured on USAF transportation to fly in the needed parts, to help solve the problem. However, the priority space secured was insufficient to handle the large quantity of parts. There are really two lessons that have been learned.

First, when an aviation unit is to be relocated the maintenance unit headquarters that controls both the old and new DSUs should undertake a comprehensive, introspective study of the ASLs of both the old and new DSU to compare line items, percent of fill, fringe items and zero balance to ascertain the capability of the new DSU to support the relocated unit. The second lesson is that the maintenance unit headquarters that controls both old and new DSUs must take positive action to update the ASL in the new DSU, and compute the weight and cube of the repair parts to be shipped to the new DSU and immediately request adequate priority cargo space on USAF transportation to insure the repair parts arrive at the new DSU in time to provide smooth uninterrupted repair parts resupply to the relocated unit, before its operational capability is affected.

Observation: Preparing adequate ASLs in the receiving DSU is absolutely essential in the smooth geographic relocation of aviation units. Demand data is available at the losing DSU. It is unfortunate that this precious information garnered over long periods of time has been wasted. It is an expensive waste, in that man hours, machine hours, and effective combat support are wasted because the demand data from the losing DSU is not considered. It is important that once a lesson of this type is learned that the same mistake is not made again when an aviation unit is relocated.

F. Surgeon: None
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Section II, Part II

Recommendations

A. Personnel: None

B. Operations:
   1. None
   2. None
   3. None
   4. None
   5. None
   6. None
   7. None
   8. None

C. Training and Organization: None

D. Intelligence: None

E. Logistics and Maintenance:
   1. None
   2. None

F. Surgeon: None

LEO E. SCOTT
LTC, CE
Commanding

ANNEXES:  A - Organization Structure
   B - Command and Staff Structure Withdrawn, Hqs, DA

DISTRIBUTION:
1 copy to CO 12th Combat Aviation Group
1 copy to CG 1st Aviation Brigade
3 copies to DCG USARV
2 copies to CG USARPAC
2 copies thru CO 12th Combat Aviation Group
to ACSFOR
1 copy thru channels to ACSFOR

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (ORLL) for Period Ending 31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, 12th COMBAT AVIATION GROUP, APO 96266 27 August 1967

THRU: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310


2. Comments are included in observations and recommendations made by the battalion commander.

   a. Personnel: None.

   b. Operations: Reference Section II, Part I, page 29. Subsequent to the preparation of this report the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion has submitted a further evaluation of the Manpacked Personnel Detector (MPD). The final evaluation reveals that the basic principle is sound, however, the state of the art has not advanced to the point that the systems reliability is such that the results are conclusive enough to ensure the degree of dependability required. The evaluation recommends further research and development in this area. This device could best be employed in a specialized unit which has a primary function of intelligence gathering.

   c. Training and Organization: None.

   d. Intelligence: None.

   e. Logistics: None.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

s/James D. Patton
GPT, TC
Asst Adjutant
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 11th Combat Aviation Battalion, 31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 18 September 1967

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBA-G, APO 96307

Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC-DH, APO 96375


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This command concurs with the comments of the basic report and preceding indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

s/R. E. Wambsganss
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) for Period Ending 31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384 18 Oct 67

Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-MH, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army (ACSFOR DA), Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion, considers it to be adequate and concurs with the contents as indorsed.

2. (C) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

a. Reference Sect II, Part I, par B8, pg 38: The request by the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion for command guidance on the use of Aeroquip slings was forwarded to HQ USARV, ATTN: AVHAV-DST on 27 Jul 67. Attached inclosures indicated the faults of the Aero-Equip 4 legged sling, FSN 1617-823-5044. The indorsement recommended discontinuance of the Aero-Equip sling and requested dissemination of this information to all ground units. USARV message, confidential, AVHAV-MD 56576, DTG 201151Z Aug 67 to all Army Commands restricted the sling to 4000 lbs. Message, this headquarters, AVBA-C 100-C-67, DTG 310315Z Aug 67, repeated these instructions to all subordinate commands. Recommend that USARV reiterate the faults of the Aero-Equip sling, FSN 1617-823-5044 and discontinue its use by ground units. If allowed to remain in service, loads will exceed 4000 lbs and continue to be lost.

b. Reference Sect II, Part I, par B9, pg 39. Concur: This headquarters has allocated a limited number of U-6 aircraft to aviation groups, battalions and selected companies. The allocated aircraft will be distributed as they become available.

c. Reference Sect II, Part I, par E2, pg 41: Demand data established at the unit level is not lost by the unit's moving to another geographic location as the data remains valid and is easily obtained and verified by the gaining DSU. Demand data built up by the "old" DSU is not lost until continuing requisitions are no longer sufficient in numbers to justify the stockage of items in the volume enjoyed prior to the old unit's departure. The demand data is still retained at AMMC and merely results in a shifting of parts delivery to the gaining DSU. The cancelling of requisitions at the losing DSU does not lose the demand data to the system, as it is retained at AMMC assuming requisitions continue to justify the stockage lists. In the specific instance cited, the gaining DSU had not supported CH-47 helicopters in the past, thus shouldn't have had any demand data supported ASL.
AVBA-C
SUBJECT: ORLL

When a unit moves on an extended basis to a new area of operations, the moving unit should cancel outstanding requisitions with the old DSU and immediately requisition from the new DSU.

FOR THE COMMANDER

1 Incl

nc

t/JAMES M. GOLDMANN
ILT, AGC
Asst Adjutant General
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AVHGC-DST (1 Aug 67)  4th Ind
SUBJECT:  Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375  4 NOV 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons
Learned for the period ending 31 July 1967 from Headquarters, 11th Combat
Aviation Battalion (FAKA) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning relocation of aviation units in Viet-
   nam, page 41: Concur. An extract of this item will be forwarded to
   CO, 34th General Support Group for necessary action. The headquarters
   that controls both old and new DSU's must insure that positive action is
   taken to update the ASL in the new DSU.

   b. Reference item concerning restricted use of four-legged sling
   Aero-Quip FSN 1670-823-5044 (erroneously entered in ORLI as FSN 1617-823-5044),
   page 38, paragraph 8 and 3d Indorsement, paragraph 2a. Concur in the
   requirement to notify all users when the capability of a piece of equipment
   is modified. The subject sling, erroneously listed in the ORLI as 40,000
   pound capacity is in reality a 10,000 pound capacity sling which has been
   reduced to 4,000 pound capacity by USARV message (C) AVHGD-56576, dated 20
   Aug 67. A replacement sling, FSN 1670-992-3080, rated at 15,000 pounds
   capacity has been introduced. USARV message AVHGD-ND 5241 dated 0200222
   Sep 67, to all commands, advised of the availability of this replacement
   sling. The old sling, FSN 1670-823-5044 may be used as a 4,000 pound ca-
   pacity sling.

3. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be provided to the originating
unit.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, MC
Assistant Adjutant General

cc: HQ, 11th Combat Avn Bn
    HQ, 1st Avn Bde

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DOD DIR 5200.10
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jul 67 from HQ, 11th Cbt Avn Bn (UIC: WFAKAA) (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 6 DEC 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

HEAVRIN SNYDER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 11th Combat Aviation Battalion

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May - 31 July, 1967

Co, 11th Combat Aviation Battalion

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