

Military Support to Indirect Security and Stability Surge Operations (MISSS)

A Study



October 2007

JOINT STAFF/J7 COMMENT

This document was contracted by OSD/P (FT&R) as a study, but was written in the format of a Joint Integrating Concept (JIC) and submitted to OSD/(P) FT&R as a potential candidate for incorporation as a JIC within the Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) family of future joint concepts, managed by the Joint Staff/J7. In fact, the original title page of the study had all of the “trappings” of a fully vetted and Joint Staff-approved JIC. It is not a JIC however, having been neither vetted nor approved by the Joint Concept community, and OSD/P (FT&R) does not intend to submit it as a JIC.

Although it is not a JIC, the ideas described herein are approved for general distribution by OSD/P (FT&R). Therefore, the JS/J7 promotes the ideas as being suitable for consideration and reference by all JOpsC concept authors and those agencies conducting joint experiments and capability-based assessments on JOpsC concepts in general, with particular relevance to those concepts related to the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept.

Preface

In September 2006, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Transformation and Resources (FTR) tasked the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) to begin development of a family of irregular warfare (IW) “sub-concepts” to complement the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (IW JOC) then in development.

These sub-concepts were to be driven by the following research questions:

- *What capabilities, capacities, posture, and employment concepts are required to defeat a globally distributed, highly decentralized, transnational irregular adversary in a battlespace which principally comprises nations with which the United States is not at war?*
- *What capabilities, capacities, posture, and employment concepts are required to prevent state failure and collapse in critical GWOT states, including those possessing weapons of mass destruction?*
- *What capabilities, capacities, posture, and employment concepts are required for the United States to use irregular warfare as a strategic offensive weapon in the GWOT (i.e., unconventional warfare against a state sponsor of terrorism or a violent transnational terrorist group)?*

After a review of all existing Joint Operating Concepts and Joint Integrating Concepts as well as those in development, FTR directed CSBA to develop a sub-concept relating to the second research question dealing with preventing state failure or collapse. In support of the sub-concept’s development, CSBA held two wargames involving players from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, all of the Services, the Coast Guard, the Department of State, and the Intelligence Community. Both wargames explored the same scenario: the impending failure of a large, energy-producing state in West Africa beset by numerous internal and external security challenges, including widespread lawlessness, a criminally-inspired insurgency, and attacks from both domestic and foreign extremists intent on establishing an Islamic State under sharia law. During the games, players were asked to develop the concepts and identify the Joint Force capabilities and capacities necessary to avert the state’s complete collapse.

The game series led to the development of an operational concept described by game players as an *Indirect Security and Stability Surge*. The following paper presents this concept in the general form of a Joint Integrating Concept (JIC), minus several of its detailed appendices.

Should the concept be approved for further development and experimentation, these appendices would be developed more fully by Joint Force planners after additional analysis and wargaming.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The USG and Joint Force Problem

Weak and failing states define a hotly contested zone of operations where radical Islamist extremists, terrorists, and irregular adversaries will collide with U.S. and allied forces and the partners. The former want to exploit these states and to hasten their collapse in order to create operational sanctuaries and zones of barbarism and to lure American forces into protracted and costly interventions. The latter seek to deny radical extremists and their allies any physical sanctuary, either by preventing state failures by enhancing state capabilities and capacities, or, if necessary, by conducting counter-sanctuary and nation-building operations aimed at rebuilding functioning states capable of fighting the extremists on their own.

Obviously, the choice between saving a weak but functioning state from collapse and conducting a major, direct U.S. intervention to rebuild a functioning state from scratch is an easy one to make. Direct interventions and nation-building operations are enormously expensive under the best of circumstances (no armed opponents and a willing population); they can cost billions of dollars a week when actively opposed by irregular enemies. *To thwart the cost-imposing strategies of their irregular enemies, the USG and the Joint Force must become better at shoring up weak states and preventing their total collapse and avoiding protracted campaigns where the U.S. has the lead role and responsibility for nation-building.*

The Solution: Military Support to Indirect Security and Stability Surge Operations

Military Support to Indirect Security and Stability Surge Operations are defined as: the full range of tailored conventional, irregular warfare and stabilization, security, transition and reconstruction capabilities and capacities that the future Joint Force, along with early-arriving interagency and foreign partners, can rapidly bring to bear to help a weak but functioning state under severe stress avoid a complete collapse. ISSS operations are proactive in nature and have three key, complementary goals: effect the rapid augmentation and reinforcement of the host nation's government and security force capabilities and capacities in order to arrest the state's further slide toward failure; rapidly expand the host nation's government and security force capabilities and capacities so it can handle its internal challenges largely

on its own; and, while doing so, to maintain or enhance the host nation government's domestic credibility and legitimacy.

ISSS operations are a unique combination of conventional, irregular warfare (IW) and stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations with an emphasis on preventive, indirect action. Under ideal circumstances, ISSS operations will be highly integrated interagency operations involving the carefully coordinated deployment of military and civilian, public and private, and U.S. and international assets. Accordingly, this JIC adheres to National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, by recognizing that the Secretary of State is the designated lead of U.S. Government (USG) efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct SSTR activities.

However, as indicated above, ISSS operations are time urgent, focused on proactive and preventive action rather than reactive and remedial diagnosis and action. Moreover, they will normally occur under extremely uncertain or trying security conditions. Under these circumstances, the Joint Force would likely be the leading edge of any national "surge" designed to arrest a state's further deterioration and decline. At the very least, they would likely bring to bear the preponderance of USG capabilities and capacities, especially during the early stages of the operation. As a result, this JIC assumes Joint Force commanders (JFCs) will need to be fully prepared to direct some activities that would normally be performed by the Department of State (DOS), other government agencies (OGAs), or allied and international forces and agencies until those organizations arrive on the scene.

The Central Idea

Despite previous steady-state partner capacity building efforts, or perhaps due to the lack of them, the security situation in an important state begins to deteriorate (see Figure 1). Widespread civil unrest or lawlessness, factional or sectarian violence, or internal or externally-supported insurgencies begin to overwhelm the country's security forces and the government's ability to maintain a monopoly over the use of violence. Government services begin to break down as the security situation worsens. At some point, the situation becomes so dire that the host nation begins to lose its ability to deal effectively with the full range of problems, and the government begins to slide toward total collapse. At that time, the host nation government requests U.S. assistance and the U.S. approves, or the Chief of Mission, after consultation with Washington, offers U.S. support, and the host nation accepts. In either case, ISSS operations are supported by the host nation government—but not necessarily the entire host nation population.

In other words, the primary focus of U.S. policy in an Indirect Security and Stability Surge is on helping a severely stressed *but existing and functioning government* with inadequate capabilities and capacities to avoid a complete collapse. Under these circumstances, the host nation government is the “supported” agency, and all U.S. forces and agencies (as well as international agencies) are in a “supporting” role.




Figure 1: Concept for ISSS Operations

The final decision to launch an ISSS operation is made by the President, in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense. Once the decision is made to conduct an ISSS operation, the United States can perform in either a lead supporting role, or, better yet, as just one member of a broader international or regional effort launched under a mandate from the United Nations Security Council or other regional security organization. As its name implies, an *Indirect Security and Stability Surge* operation seeks to remove the United States and the Joint Force from the limelight and to focus all national attention on the host nation government.

In any case, however, ISSS operations involve the rapid infusion of Joint Force and USG capabilities and capacities to substitute for, or reinforce, the inadequate host nation government and security forces' capabilities and capacities, as well as provide the capabilities and capacities needed

to build up new indigenous capabilities and forces. All ISSS efforts are generally made in direct support of host nation government, law enforcement, military, and other security agencies. They are characterized by the widespread use of advisors, mobile training teams, and individual trainers. In most cases, but not all, the employment of U.S. capabilities will be directed by a host nation official or agency, guided by plans developed in conjunction with the U.S. Chief of Mission, the Joint Force, and U.S. officials and agencies. In some cases, U.S. forces may be called upon to execute direct tasks, especially with regard to establishing security. However, their actions are fully sanctioned and approved by the host nation government and U.S. COM.

During ISSS operations, any interaction with the host nation's population will therefore be with host nation agencies or officials in the lead, unless absolutely impractical. However well-intentioned, any ISSS operation involving U.S. military and interagency forces that undercuts the credibility and legitimacy of the host government may hasten the state's collapse, leading to mission failure. Accordingly, under no circumstances can the United States be seen as assuming overall responsibility for the operation.

Should they succeed, a key goal of any ISSS operation is to extricate most U.S. military forces—especially any conventional combat forces—as quickly as possible to transition rapidly to the status quo ante, typically defined by a persistent, low visibility U.S. diplomatic and military presence focused on the patient building-up of host nation capacity and capabilities over time. Any long-term, large-scale military presence would likely undercut the goal to strengthen the host nation's legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the country's population. Should the ISSS operations fail to arrest the state's slide toward failure or prevent the host nation government's complete collapse, ISSS operations would either cease altogether or transition to a full-scale IW and SSTR operation designed to create a “new normal”—a new functioning state.

Their proactive and preventive nature, the existence of a functioning (however weak) government, and the indirect application of U.S. capabilities and capacities are what distinguish ISSS operations from major SSTR operations designed to create or assist an entirely new national government in building a new domestic order following internal collapse or defeat in war.

Major Mission Elements

Major mission elements for ISSS operations are:

- Conduct strategic communication operations;
- Conduct indirect and direct operations to re-establish security and restore the host nation's monopoly on violence;
- Conduct rapid security assistance/foreign internal defense operations to build and expand host nation security capabilities and capacities;
- Perform appropriate indirect stability operations;
- Create a low visibility operational and logistics support structure; and
- Prepare for the rapid transition back to a persistent, low visibility host presence.

Supporting Ideas

Supporting ideas for ISSS operations are:

- Establishing embassies/country teams as the forward interagency command posts in the global, indirect IW campaign;
- The 21st century Military Group (MILGRP 21);
- Trust and cooperation cannot be surged;
- Achieving unity of purpose and effort;
- Expanding the role of General Purpose Forces to support and execute a global, indirect IW campaign;
- Indirect does not mean invisible;
- Building host nation capability and capacity and reducing the drivers of instability and conflict; and
- Expanding host nation policing, law enforcement and constabulary capabilities and capacities.

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1. Purpose

The purpose of the *Military Support to Indirect Security and Stability Surge (ISSS) Operations Joint Integrating Concept* [hereafter cited as the *ISSS Operations JIC*] is to describe one of several new operational concepts for waging a protracted, indirect, global irregular warfare (IW) campaign against violent Islamist extremists, terrorists, and other irregular adversaries in the 2014-2026 timeframe. The JIC will help stimulate and shape the development and integration of Department of Defense (DOD) military concepts, capabilities, and capacities needed to help a faltering foreign government, beset by numerous difficult internal security and stability challenges, avert a total state collapse or loss of control over wide swaths of its territory—without assuming primary responsibility for, or taking a direct lead over, operations in-country.

The *ISSS Operations JIC* will suggest the basis for further experimentation and exercises intended to influence subsequent concept and capability development for future ISSS operations. It will provide input to both the Guidance for the Development of the Force (GDF) and Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF). These documents may spur changes to Joint Force and Service doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development and education, and personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF). Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) and their Interagency (IA) and multinational partners will also use this JIC to assess potential integration challenges and opportunities in ISSS operations. **The overall desired end state is a Joint Force with the enhanced concepts, capabilities, and capacities to execute future ISSS operations.**

2. Scope

The *ISSS Operations JIC* broadly describes operational-level solutions for a very challenging future military problem: rapidly surging tailored Joint Force capabilities and capacities to prevent a weak but functioning state under severe stress from systemic breakdowns in governmental services and assaults on its social order from both internal and external threats from suffering a total collapse. Said another way, ISSS operations seek to bolster an *existing* government's ability to maintain overall control and responsibility for the country's governance, population, and security while maintaining its domestic and regional credibility and legitimacy.

ISSS operations are a unique combination of conventional, irregular warfare (IW) and stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations with an emphasis on preventive, indirect action. Under

ideal circumstances, ISSS operations will be highly integrated interagency operations involving the carefully coordinated deployment of military and civilian, public and private, and U.S. and international assets. Accordingly, this JIC adheres to National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, by recognizing that the Secretary of State is the designated lead of U.S. Government (USG) efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct SSTR activities.

However, as indicated above, ISSS operations are time urgent, focused on proactive and preventive action rather than reactive and remedial diagnosis and action. Moreover, they will normally occur under extremely uncertain or trying security conditions. Under these circumstances, the Joint Force would likely be the leading edge of any national “surge” designed to arrest a state’s further deterioration and decline. At the very least, they would likely bring to bear the preponderance of USG capabilities and capacities, especially during the early stages of the operation. As a result, this JIC assumes Joint Force commanders (JFCs) will need to be fully prepared to direct some activities that would normally be performed by the Department of State (DOS), other government agencies (OGAs), or allied and international forces and agencies until those organizations arrive on the scene.

2.a. Defining Military Support to ISSS Operations¹

Military Support to Indirect Security and Stability Surge Operations is defined as: the full range of tailored conventional, irregular warfare and stabilization, security, transition and reconstruction capabilities and capacities that the future Joint Force, along with early-arriving interagency and foreign partners, can rapidly bring to bear to help a weak but functioning state under severe stress avoid a complete collapse. ISSS operations are proactive in nature, and have three key, complementary goals: effect the rapid augmentation and reinforcement of the host nation’s government and security force capabilities and capacities in order to arrest the state’s further slide toward failure; rapidly expand the host nation’s government and security force capabilities and capacities so it can handle its internal challenges largely on its own; and, while doing so, to maintain or enhance the host nation government’s domestic credibility and legitimacy.

¹ Unless otherwise specified, definitions within this section are not doctrinal. These definitions provide a baseline for common terms within the *Military Support to ISSS Operations JIC*.

This latter goal explains why ISSS operations emphasize an indirect approach for planning and executing operations. Any perception that the United States is “calling the shots” or is pursuing its own interests over that of the host nation will likely undermine the host nation government’s legitimacy. At best, such an outcome would likely sow the seeds for future crises and subsequent ISSS operations. At worst, it would lead to the outright collapse of the government and compel a potentially much larger, direct U.S. SSTR effort. Neither outcome would be in the long-term strategic interests of the United States.

2.b. Operations and Activities that Comprise Military Support to ISSS Operations

ISSS operations are normally mounted within the context of a protracted, indirect, global IW campaign against violent Islamist extremists, terrorists, and other irregular adversaries. However, because they are military operations undertaken to prevent the collapse of a weak but functioning government with insufficient capabilities and capacities to cope with mounting internal threats or problems, ISSS operations may be executed under a number of circumstances outside the confines of a global IW campaign. ISSS operations may be undertaken to:

- Assist a host government with which the U.S. has a long-standing diplomatic and security relationship that is faltering due to serious and mounting internal stability and security challenges, which might include civil unrest, insurgency, terrorism and factional or sectarian conflict;
- Assist a beleaguered, democratically-elected government to address an unexpected and accelerating degradation in its ability to govern and to provide for its population in the face of mounting internal or external security challenges;
- Assist the government of a non-democratic but strategically important state (e.g., a major regional state; a major energy-producing state) to provide its population with security, essential public services, economic development, and governance in the face of a mounting internal or external security challenge; and
- Assist governments to restore order and governmental services after a major natural disaster.

Of course, an ability to surge ISSS capabilities and capacities would also be useful during the early stages of a major IW campaign or for SSTR operations mounted after a major combat operation (MCO).

The four central activities associated with ISSS operations are: immediate indirect security operations; rapid host nation security and governance enhancement operations; indirect stability operations; and transition operations. As used herein, **immediate indirect security operations** involve the rapid establishment, *under the lead of the host nation's security forces*, of a safe and secure environment for the local populace as well as for the host nation government, U.S. government (USG), and international and coalition agencies conducting ISSS-related operations.² Such activities may include routine patrolling and security operations, as well as counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and unconventional warfare operations.

Rapid host nation security and governance enhancement operations are activities taken by DOD, DOS, OGAs, and international partners to improve host nation security force and government capabilities and capacities rapidly. These activities may include expanded foreign internal defense activities, a rapid infusion of advisors and trainers, accelerated security assistance programs, law enforcement training and enhancement programs, and a variety of SSTR activities.

The *Stability Operations JOC* defines stability operations as imposing the security required to facilitate the transition to and reconstruction of a “new” normal once major combat operations cease. This definition is not conceptually congruent with ISSS operations, which seek to *avoid* a major combat operation. DOD Directive (DODD) 3000.05, *Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations*, defines stability operations as military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum of conflict to establish and maintain order in states. This definition comes closer to the mark, but still does not capture the full nature of ISSS stability operations. Accordingly, the *ISSS Operations JIC* subscribes to the following definition for **indirect stability operations**, which is a modified version of the one found in the *Military Support to SSTR Operations JOC*: activities undertaken through a host nation government to manage underlying tensions; prevent or halt the deterioration of security, economic, and/or political systems; create stability in the host nation (and region); reinforce the perception of security by the populace; and strengthen the supported government's credibility and legitimacy.³

² Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines security as “A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influence.”

³ The idea of reinforcing the perception of security by the populace was first outlined in the Joint Capability Area (JCA) for “Joint Stability Operations.”

In SSTR operations that follow major combat operations, especially those aimed at regime change, transition operations are those steps taken to shift the lead responsibility and authority for helping provide or foster security, essential services, humanitarian assistance, economic development, and political governance from the intervening military and civilian agencies to the host nation.⁴ In contrast, during ISSS operations, since one of the key goals is to enhance the host nation government's credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the national population, the host government retains the lead responsibility and authority for these activities throughout the operation. ISSS **transition operations** thus refer to the process of minimizing the U.S. military footprint and activities as quickly as possible, returning to the "old normal" of a relatively low visibility, but persistent U.S. partnership building posture.

In major SSTR operations associated with a collapsed or entirely new government, reconstruction operations involve rebuilding the degraded, damaged, or destroyed political, socio-economic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create the foundation for longer-term development and the "new normal."⁵ Moving to a major reconstruction effort is a key sign that an ISSS operation has failed and that the United States must take a much more direct and central role in rebuilding a new government and functioning state.

2.c. Relationship to Other Joint Operating Concepts and Documents

The Military Support to Indirect Security and Stability Surge Operations Joint Integrating Concept is a proposed addition to the Joint Operations Concept (JOpsC) family of joint concepts (see Figure 2). Like all JICs, this document describes a narrowly focused operation related to other concepts in the JOpsC family. The following section describes its relationship with several relevant JOCs and associated publications.

⁴ In some cases, there will be two leadership transitions, the first between external military forces and external civilian agencies, and the second between the external civilian agencies and the new host nation government. However, in other cases the military will be in support of a civilian lead and the first transition will hand off responsibility from civilian to host nation agencies and organizations.

⁵ The JCA "Joint Stability Operations" defines reconstruction as "the ability to rebuild the critical systems or infrastructure (i.e., physical, economic, justice, governance, societal) necessary to facilitate long-term security and the transition to legitimate local governance. It includes addressing the root cause of the conflict. Reconstruction is likely to be a civilian led effort."

2.c(i) Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO)⁶

The CCJO provides the overarching guidance for this and other JICs and JOCs in the Joint Operations Concept Family. The CCJO's central idea is that the Joint Force, in concert with other elements of national power and multinational power, will conduct integrated tempo-controlling actions in multiple domains concurrently to dominate any adversary and *help control any situation in support of strategic objectives*.




Figure 2: JOpsC Family of Concepts

ISSS operations occur within the new campaign framework developed in the CCJO. This new framework consists of six simultaneous lines of effort (LOEs)—*shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority* (see Figure 3). These LOEs do not necessarily need to occur serially. Indeed, the simultaneous execution of activities within each line of effort reinforces the need to continuously consider activities across all lines of effort during planning and execution. This approach also captures the varying levels of activity within each line of effort over time that may be required to achieve priority objectives.

⁶ This section is drawn from Department of Defense, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, version 2.0 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff (J-7), August 2005).

Importantly, however, the CCJO acknowledges that security and stability operations can occur *prior to*, during, and after combat operations *or as a stand-alone mission*. Ideally, ISSS operations are proactive stand-alone missions that aim to prevent a major U.S. intervention or U.S.-led major combat operation.




Figure 3: CCJO Lines of Effort

2.c.(ii) Joint Pub 3.0, *Joint Operations*⁷

Joint Pub 3.0, *Joint Operations*, designates the LOEs developed in the CCJO as distinct campaign phases (see Figure 4). Phasing helps JFCs and staffs to visualize and think through the entire operation or campaign and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. Each phase represents a natural subdivision of the campaign/ operation's intermediate objectives. As such, a phase represents a definitive stage during which a large portion of the forces and joint/ multinational capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities.

⁷ This section is drawn from Joint Publication 3.0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 September 2006).




Figure 4: Notional Campaign Phases

The primary benefit of phasing is that it assists commanders in systematically achieving military objectives that cannot be attained all at once by arranging smaller, related operations in a logical sequence. Phasing can be used to gain progressive advantages and assist in achieving objectives as quickly and effectively as possible. Phasing also provides a framework for assessing risk to portions of an operation or campaign, allowing development of plans to mitigate this risk.

According to Joint doctrine, phasing can be used across the range of military operations, including irregular warfare operations. The actual phases used will vary (compressed, expanded, or omitted entirely) with each joint operation or campaign. During planning, the JFC establishes conditions, objectives, or events for transitioning from one phase to another and plans sequels and branches for potential contingencies. Phases are designed and prosecuted sequentially, but some activities from a phase may continue into subsequent phases or actually begin during a previous phase. The JFC adjusts the phases to exploit opportunities presented by the adversary or the operational situation or to react to unforeseen conditions.

Military support to ISSS operations follows this general campaign framework, but in a unique ways. As will be discussed, ISSS operations most often occur within the context of a protracted, global, indirect IW campaign against radical Islamist extremists, terrorists, and their irregular allies. Most campaign activities are waged during Phase 0 or Shaping Operations, which as *Joint Operations* explains, consist of the day-to-day military, diplomatic, and civil support activities that occur at both the global and theater level to solidify U.S. relationships with friends and allies. They are executed continuously with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined military and national strategic objectives. Most of these operations occur in specific countries, where they are themselves shaped by local conditions and security conditions. Here they aim to build the security capabilities and capacities of a host nation's military and security forces to provide for the country's self-defense. These shaping activities, which benefit from persistent long-term relationships and activities, also improve information exchange and intelligence sharing with the host nation, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access. Phase 0 operations blend seamlessly into Phase 1, Deterrence Operations, because they help to deter irregular adversaries, who are often attracted to territories not under the control of a government or its armed forces, from seeking a physical operational sanctuary in the host nation.

Sometimes, despite persistent shaping operations—or because of the lack of them—the security situation in a partner nation begins to deteriorate past the point where the host nation is capable of coping with the situation or maintaining control. At this point, the U.S. may elect to move to Phase 2, Seizing the Initiative, and try to arrest the state's slide toward complete collapse. It does this by surging forward conventional, IW, and SSTR capabilities and capacities, transitioning directly into Phase 3/4 operations, which are about *indirectly* dominating irregular adversaries, while simultaneously stabilizing the government, *through a functioning host government and partner security forces*. The transition to Phase 5 operations is marked by a return to a persistent, steady-state U.S. shaping presence. ISSS operations can conceptually be viewed of as a “major shaping operation” designed to prevent a major combat operation or major direct U.S. intervention.

Transitioning through ISSS phases while maintaining or enhancing the government's credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the host nation population demands a knowledge-empowered Joint Force that is adaptable, resilient, and agile—the very characteristics identified in the CCJO. Moreover, ISSS operations demand the Joint Force have the skill sets, organizational behaviors, mental outlooks, and coordination

measures to deal with a wider range of other organizations such as OGAs, multinational partners, IGOs, and NGOs.

2.c.(iii) Joint Operating Concept (MCO JOC)⁸

The MCO JOC describes Joint Force actions within the context of a largely conventional theater conflict that includes a commitment to seize and hold former enemy territory, or more ambitiously, to drive the existing political regime from power. The latter mandates that MCO operations be inextricably linked with follow-on SSTR operations in a manner that is focused on expelling the adversary regime and “winning the peace” by helping a new host government create a “new normal”—a new domestic order.

This JIC describes operations that aim to *avoid* a major combat operation and to maintain the “old normal,” by indirectly empowering a weak but functioning government with inadequate security capabilities and capacities to overcome pressing internal and external threats to its continued existence.

2.c.(iv) Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (IW JOC)

Irregular warfare is the violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW focuses on the control or influence of populations, not on the control of an adversary’s forces or territory (see Figure 5). Said another way, IW is a political struggle with violent and non-violent components for control or influence over, and the support of, a relevant population. Adversaries, whether state or non-state, seek to undermine the legitimacy and credibility of their opponents and to isolate them from both the relevant population and their external supporters, physically as well as psychologically. At the same time, they also seek to bolster their own legitimacy and credibility to exercise authority over that same population.

The central idea of the IW JOC is that the Joint Force will conduct *protracted regional and global campaigns* against state and non-state adversaries to subvert, coerce, attrite, and exhaust adversaries rather than defeating them through direct conventional military confrontation. IW emphasizes winning the support of the relevant populations, promoting friendly political authority, and eroding adversary control, influence, and support. Unified action by the USG and its strategic

⁸ Department of Defense, *Major Combat Operations Joint Operating Concept*, version 2.0 (Suffolk, VA: Joint Forces Command, December 2006).

partners is essential to winning an irregular war or campaign. While the direct application of military power may not be the primary means of winning IW, Joint Forces will often be required to support non-military instruments of power and set the conditions for strategic success.

Contrasting Conventional & Irregular Warfare




Figure 5: Control or Influence Over Populations

The core list of IW operations and activities include insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN), terrorism and counterterrorism (CT), unconventional warfare (UW), and foreign internal defense (FID). While the IW JOC lists SSTR operations as an essential component of IW campaigns (especially COIN campaigns), it acknowledges that SSTR operations such as humanitarian or disaster relief operations can occur outside the context of IW and as part of MCOs. The IW JOC also acknowledges the important roles played by psychological operations (PSYOP), civil-military operations (CMO), strategic communications and information operations (IO), intelligence and counterintelligence activities, and law enforcement activities that counter irregular adversaries and the activities that support them (e.g., narco-trafficking, illicit arms dealing, and illegal financial transactions). Like SSTR, these operations can all occur in major combat operations. However, their role in IW is normally disproportionately greater because they all impact directly on the operational focus of IW—the relevant populations—in ways that combat operations do not.

This JIC proposes that ISSS operations be considered among the core list of IW operations and activities, and provides a general discussion of their unique nature. ISSS operations are normally, but not always, conducted as part of a protracted global campaign against non-state, transnational, and trans-dimensional irregular adversaries. They do not so much seek to *influence* an allied or friendly government, or the government of a strategically important state, as much as they aim to help a weak but functioning government to weather serious irregular challenges to its continued existence while at the same time enhancing its legitimacy in the eyes of the population. They are as difficult to execute, if not more so, than operations in which U.S. forces have the direct responsibility for both governance and security.

2.c.(v) Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operations Concept (SSTRO JOC)

As explained in the CCJO and the SSTRO JOC, SSTR operations are not restricted to Phase IV and V of a major theater campaign designed to drive an existing political regime from power. They focus on the full range of military support across the continuum from peace to crisis and conflict to assist a state or region that is under stress. The central idea of the SSTRO JOC is that during SSTR operations, the primary focus of U.S. policy will be on *helping a severely stressed government to avoid failure* or to recover from a devastating natural disaster, or on assisting an emerging host nation government to build a new domestic order following internal collapse or defeat in war.

SSTR operations—especially those associated with IW campaigns—are often best performed by indigenous institutions, U.S. OGAs, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Nevertheless, the SSTRO JOC envisions the requirement for the Joint Force to perform all SSTR tasks necessary to establish security, maintain civil order, and provide for good governance when agencies outside DOD either are unable or unwilling to do so. This JIC explains a specific type of IW operation where the burden for providing SSTR capabilities and capacities falls squarely on the Joint Force.

2.c.(vi) Shaping Operations Joint Operating Concept (Shaping Operations JOC, in development)

The Shaping Operations JOC is expected to describe the long-term, integrated joint force actions taken before or *during crisis* to build partnership capacity, influence non-partners and potential adversaries, and mitigate the underlying causes of conflict and extremism. The Shaping Operations JOC concentrates on pre-conflict and *preventative*

actions intended to avoid a major crises or direct U.S. involvement in the affairs of a foreign state. Shaping operations are also critical to gaining knowledge of the operational environment in allied, friendly, and strategically important states, providing the Joint Force with operational access, and preparing the operational environment for potential future U.S. operations.

Some types of shaping operations will require rapid action during the early stages of a brewing crisis. This JIC describes rapid, preventive operations taken to avert direct U.S. involvement in another state's affairs or a major deployment of U.S. Joint Force or government forces. As such, they are an important component of a protracted, global, population-focused IW campaign.

2.c.(vii) Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (DO JOC)⁹

The central idea of the DO JOC is to decisively influence an adversary's decision-making calculus in order to prevent hostile actions against US vital interests. Since an adversary's deterrence decision calculus focuses on their perception of the benefits of a course of action, the costs of a course of action, and the consequences of restraint (i.e., the costs and benefits of not taking the course of action the U.S. seeks to deter), Joint Force military operations and activities contribute to the "end" of deterrence by affecting the adversary's decision calculus elements in three "ways": by denying benefits; imposing costs on the adversary; and encouraging adversary restraint.

The joint force deters potential adversaries by the threat of cost imposition, the denial of the prospect of success, or the encouragement of adversary restraint. The idea of defeating an irregular enemy's cost-imposing strategy and imposing costs on the enemy is an important component of ISSS operations. This could be important factor in deterring external aggression against a weak state that is designed to provoke a major—and costly—U.S. intervention. Thus, a credible ISSS capability could possibly achieve deterrent effects consistent with the DO JOC.

In summary, then, the CCJO emphasizes that the Joint Force must be capable of successfully conducting security and stability operations *prior to*, during, and after combat operations *or as a stand-alone mission*. The IW JOC explains that the competition for contested populations within

⁹ Department of Defense, *Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept*, version 2.0 (Offutt AFB, NE: U.S. Strategic Command, December 2006).

weak and failing states is one of the key aspects of any irregular warfare campaign. The MCO JOC describes SSTRO primarily in terms of creating a new normal after a regime change operation. However, the Military Support to SSTR Operations JOC explains that SSTR operations can be used *proactively* to support a fragile national government that is faltering due to serious internal challenges, including civil unrest, insurgency, terrorism, and factional conflict (see Figure 6). The Shaping Operations JOC will explain the integrated Joint Force actions that can be taken before *or during* crises to build partner capacity, influence non-partners and potential adversaries, and mitigate the underlying causes of conflict and extremism. The Deterrence Operations JOC explains how defeating an adversary's cost-imposing strategy, and imposing costs on the adversary, may deter future enemy action. Together, these documents suggest the desirability of developing a Joint Force capability to surge the requisite IW and SSTR capabilities and capacities needed to help a faltering host government to overcome a security and governance crisis that outstrips its own available capabilities and capacities.




Figure 6: Relationship of ISSS Operations to Major JOCs

2.d. Timeframe

This concept broadly describes how the future Joint Force will be expected to conduct military support to ISSS operations in the 2014-

2026 timeframe in support of national strategic operatives. It envisions ISSS operations as being conducted primarily, but not exclusively, within the framework of a protracted, indirect global IW campaign against radical Islamist extremists, terrorists, and other irregular adversaries.

2.e. Assumptions

This *Military Support to Indirect Security and Stability Surge Operations JIC* is premised upon the following assumptions:

- The Department of Defense and Joint community will recognize ISSS operations as a core irregular warfare activity, of equal importance with insurgency and counterinsurgency, terrorism and counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, and foreign internal defense;
- The Department of Defense will have the funding and authorities to support and sustain U.S. commitments for protracted IW campaigns, and to develop surge IW and SSTR capabilities and capacities;
- USG departments and agencies beyond DOD will develop a core planning and rapidly deployable implementation capability with sufficient SSTR capacities to support ISSS operations. There is high risk that this assumption may prove false; therefore,
- The Joint Force will at times will be required to conduct nonconventional¹⁰ military operations in support of, or in place of, IA partners for an extended duration.

¹⁰ This concept uses the term “nonconventional” to mean any activity, operation, organization, capability, etc., for which the regular armed forces of the country, excluding designated SOF, do not have a broad-based requirement for the conduct of combat operations against the regular armed forces of another country. This term includes the employment of conventional forces and capabilities in nonstandard ways or for nonstandard purposes.

3. The Strategic Setting and the ISSS Military Problem

3.a. Fighting a Protracted, Indirect, Global IW Campaign¹¹

*Our enemies have fought relentlessly these past five years, and they have a record of their own. Bin Laden and his deputy Zawahiri are still in hiding. Al Qaeda has continued its campaign of terror with deadly attacks that have targeted the innocent, including large numbers of fellow Muslims. The terrorists and insurgents in Iraq have killed American troops and thousands of Iraqis. Syria and Iran have continued their support for terror and extremism. Hezbollah has taken innocent life in Israel, and succeeded briefly in undermining Lebanon's democratic government. Hamas is standing in the way of peace with Israel. And the extremists have led an aggressive propaganda campaign to spread lies about America and incite Muslim radicalism. **The enemies of freedom are skilled and sophisticated, and they are waging a long and determined war** (emphasis added).*

President George W. Bush, September 7, 2006¹²

In some ways the violent radicalism that is wracking the Muslim world today is nothing new. Since the death of Muhammad in 632, Islamic history has been punctuated by many periods in which various heterodox sects have emerged and clashed violently with mainstream Muslims, as well as with the West. Indeed, the ideological roots of today's Salafist-jihadi movement reach back to the Islamic scholar, Ibn Taymiyyah, who wrote at the dawn of the 14th Century. The practice of *takfir*—declaring fellow Muslims to be apostates deserving death for failing to adhere to specific interpretations of the Quran and *hadith*—is invoked by al Qaeda and other terrorist groups today in much the same way as it was by the kharijites in the late 7th Century.¹³

¹¹ This section is derived from Robert C. Martinage, *The Global War on Terror: An Assessment* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, forthcoming).

¹² President George W. Bush, "President Bush Discusses Progress in the Global War on Terror," Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, September 7, 2006.

¹³ Mary R. Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy—Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 175.

What makes contemporary violent Islamic radicalism threatening to the West is the following:

- Deep-seated, popular frustration across much of the Muslim world stemming from five centuries of civilizational decline fused with resentment and anger toward the West for its economic, scientific/technological, and military success, exacerbated by lingering hostility engendered by European colonization and exploitation of Muslim lands and, more recently, the creation and support of Israel;¹⁴
- Globalization of communications, transportation, and trade which, paradoxically, the jihadis view as both a perilous threat to the *ummah* (i.e., increased exposure to corrupting Western influences) and as a critical enabler of their own defensive *jihad* (i.e., making it possible to spread their radical ideology more quickly and widely than in the past); and

¹⁴ Assuming that Islamic radicalism is indeed fueled by frustration and anger stemming from the failure of the Islamic world to compete effectively against the West over the past half millennia, it is almost certain to remain a long-term problem because ongoing demographic and economic trends strongly suggest that the downward spiral of Islamic civilization relative to the West will continue, and may even accelerate in the decades ahead. Demographically, the Arab/Muslim world is in a difficult situation. The relative size of the current youth cohort is unprecedented—most are single urban males, almost half have not received a secondary education, and many are unemployed or underemployed. Over the next two decades, the largest proportional youth populations will be located in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Iraq. The sex ratio in several of these states is tilted heavily toward males. A large cohort of young, unemployed, single males has been linked to increased political instability in the past. This cohort also provides a convenient pool from which to recruit terrorist operatives. Economic growth has not kept pace with population growth over the last several decades in most of the Islamic world. As a result, real per capita income has fallen substantially and will likely continue to fall. According to the United Nations Development Program, the combined GNP of all Arab countries stood at \$531.2 billion in 1999, which is less than that of Spain. The average annual rate of growth since 1975 has been about 3.3 percent. However, that figure masks wide variations over time: from 8.6 percent in 1975-1980 during the oil boom to less than one percent in the 1980s. Throughout the 1990s, exports from the Arab region (over 70 percent of which were petroleum related) grew at only 1.5 percent per year, which is far below the global average of six percent. In short, barring a dramatic economic turn-around, the standard of living for the average Muslim in most Arab states will likely get worse before it gets better. As a result of anemic growth, unemployment has soared. At about 15 percent, average unemployment in Arab countries is among the highest in the developing world. Unemployment is more than 30 percent in Algeria and more than 50 percent in Gaza. As the CIA has concluded: “High structural unemployment at a time when the national age distribution is highly skewed in favor of 18-to-24-year-olds provides exceptional fodder for radical movements in many developing countries.” See UN Arab Development Report; and Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” *The Atlantic*, September 1990.

- The emergence and diffusion of technologies that make it possible for small groups to carry out mass-casualty and catastrophic attacks (e.g., chemical high explosives, fuel-laden jet aircraft, weapons of mass destruction).

Radical Islam's current war with the West began long before September 11, 2001. It started, by and large, with the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Key developments in this war include the taking and holding for 444 days of American hostages in Iran and the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979; the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981; the successful campaign of Hezbollah in Lebanon in the 1980s to drive out the United States (through the Beirut bombings, hostage taking, and the torture and murder of Americans)¹⁵; the rise of al Qaeda in the late 1990s and their sustained campaign of attacks against U.S. interests, including the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, as well as the small-boat attack on the USS *Cole* off Yemen on October 12, 2000;¹⁶ and Hezbollah's successful guerrilla campaign against Israeli forces in Southern Lebanon, forcing their ultimate withdrawal in 2000. Additionally, in 1996, Osama bin Laden declared war against "Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places" and in 1998, the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders issued a *fatwa* which ruled that killing "Americans and their allies—both civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim...."¹⁷

Until September 11, 2001, U.S. counter-terrorism policy was based principally on cooperative diplomacy and limited retaliatory responses. However, in hindsight, U.S. diplomacy suffered from a chronic inability to secure decisive international cooperation and U.S. military strikes against terrorists were neither decisive nor a deterrent against future terrorist action or state sponsorship of terrorism. More aggressive U.S. strategies were constrained by a Cold War-policy overhang that viewed

¹⁵ Islamic terrorists killed almost 600 people over the course of the 1980s, which is more than five times as many fatalities as caused by either the IRA or groups associated with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. More than half of the people who lost their lives to Islamic terrorists during this period were American. Owing in large measure to extensive support from Iran, the militant group Hezbollah grew rapidly in strength and conducted a string of high-profile, mass-casualty attacks against American targets between 1983 and 1984 (e.g., the truck bombing of the USMC barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, which killed 241 Americans on October 23, 1983).

¹⁶ Although radical Islam was generally on the ascendency in the 1990s, it did encounter several setbacks, including government crackdowns against the Islamic Group and Islamic Jihad in Egypt and against the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria.

¹⁷ World Islamic Front, "Jihad against Jews and Crusaders," February 23, 1998.

terrorism within a superpower, proxy war and crisis management context and as fundamentally a law-enforcement problem. As then National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice testified before the 9/11 Commission:

*The terrorists were at war with us, but we were not yet at war with them. For more than 20 years, the terrorist threat gathered, and America's response across several administrations of both parties was insufficient. Historically, democratic societies have been slow to react to gathering threats, tending instead to wait to confront threats until they are too dangerous to ignore or until it is too late.*¹⁸

The horrific attacks of September 11th therefore marked an important turning point in the war with radical Islamist terrorists in that the United States began to strike back against them in a meaningful way for the first time. The defeat of the Taliban government and the hounding of al Qaeda in Afghanistan was simply the first offensive in what is now often referred to as the Long War—a protracted campaign against radical Islamist extremists groups and their terrorist networks.¹⁹

This campaign will be global in scope and multi-faceted in nature. The campaign will focus on defeating two particular radical Islamist adversaries: heterodox Salafist-*jihadi* groups within the Sunni Muslim community and “Khomeinist” Shiite groups that strive to impose their brand of sharia justice on the entire world.²⁰ Al Qaeda is the key example of the former, while Iranian-backed Hezbollah is the archetype of the latter. There are radical Islamist insurgencies of varying stages underway

¹⁸ Dr. Condoleezza Rice, Opening Remarks to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Hart Senate Office Building, April 8, 2004. Available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/print/20040408.html>.

¹⁹ This JIC uses “protracted” to mean an operation, campaign, or war of such long duration that it requires multiple unit rotations for an indefinite period of time.

²⁰ “Jihad,” which literally means “struggle,” is often over-simplified as “holy war.” Actually, the term refers both to the internal struggle of all Muslims to live according to Quran and sunna (ways or customs) of Muhammad, which is considered the great jihad (*jihad al-akbar*), as well as an external struggle to spread the faith to unbelievers. The latter, which is considered the lesser jihad (*jihad al-asgar*), can be achieved in myriad ways, including: proselytizing, preaching sermons, conducting scholarly study, performing social work, and engaging in armed warfare. The term “Salafist” is derived from the word *Salaf*, which refers collectively to the companions of Muhammad, the early Muslims who followed them, and the first three generations of Islamic scholars. The terms “Salafist” and “jihadist” are often used almost interchangeably; this is no doubt because most jihadist groups advocate a return back to the practices of the early Islamic society of the *Salaf*, and many self-described Salafists believe that some form of *jihad* is needed to restore the original purity of Islam.

in nearly a score of countries around the globe—most notably in Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Lebanon. The operating environment spans developed Europe to the most underdeveloped parts of the world, and ranges from densely populated urban areas and megacities, to remote mountains, deserts and jungles. It encompasses permissive, semi-permissive, and non-permissive environments, as well as hostile or denied areas. Allied and partner capabilities and capacities in this campaign ranges from sophisticated to almost non-existent. However, even in the most capable allied or partner areas (i.e., Europe), Islamist terrorist cells have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to survive and operate.

While the United States and its partners in the Long War have made important strides in combating the radical Islamist groups worldwide since September 11th, they have not yet weakened either their will or their ability to inspire new recruits and regenerate. Indeed, the high-water mark for the United States in the war on terrorism was arguably reached by 2002-2003. By that time, the Taliban government had been overthrown and al Qaeda stripped of its sanctuary in Afghanistan; ten of al Qaeda's senior-most leaders had been captured or killed, including Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi bin al Shibh, and Khalid Sheik Mohammad; dozens of extremist and terrorist cells had been rolled up worldwide; actions had been taken to seize the vast majority of terrorist finances frozen to date; and several partner countries around the world had taken steps to enhance their counterterrorism capabilities.

Since 2002-2003, however, the most recent National Intelligence Estimate on "Trends in Global Terrorism," suggests the overall U.S. position in the Long War against radical extremists has likely slipped. To be sure, the United States has made considerable progress capturing or killing terrorist leaders and operatives, disrupting terrorist operations, seizing assets, and building partner counterterrorism capabilities. Those gains, however, have been offset by the metastasis of the al Qaeda organization into a global affiliated movement, the spread and intensification of both Salafist-*jihadi* and Khomeinist ideologies, and the growth in number and political influence of Islamist fundamentalist political parties throughout the world.²¹ In this regard, the continued presence of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan and Iraq has been a boon for the Islamist movement's propaganda effort and bolstered the

²¹ Examples include the Justice and Prosperity Party and the Mujaheddin Council (MMI) in Indonesia, the Party Islam in Malaysia, the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) and Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam faction led by Maulana Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F) in Pakistan, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Raphael Perl, "Trends in Terrorism: 2006," *CRS Report to Congress*, RL33555, July 21, 2006.

legitimacy of its call for defensive *jihad*. As the National Intelligence Estimate concluded: “a large body of all-source reporting indicates that [the number of] activists identifying themselves as *jihadists*, although a small percentage of Muslims, are increasing in both number and geographic dispersion.”²²

While the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have certainly contributed to radicalization within the Muslim world, they are by no means the only cause of it. The goals of the *jihadi* movement are much larger than evicting U.S. forces from the broader Middle East. The Salafist-*jihadi* branch seeks the overthrow of all apostate regimes in Muslim states, meaning all those that do not govern solely by the sharia; the creation of an Islamic “caliphate” ruling over all current and former Muslim lands, including Israel; and, in time, the conquest or conversion of all unbelievers. The constitutional charter of al Qaeda describes its strategic goal simply as “the victory of the mighty religion of Allah, the establishment of an Islamic Regime and the restoration of the Islamic caliphate, God willing.”²³ The long-term goals of the Khomeinists are no less limited. They are committed to spreading what they consider to be two universally applicable ideas: Islam is relevant to all aspects of life and alone provides a sufficient blueprint for living a just life on Earth.²⁴ While the initial goal is to unite and liberate “oppressed Muslims,” the ultimate objective is to bring all of humanity under the umbrella of a Shi’a version of Islamic justice.

3.b. Enemy Strategies and Lines of Operation

While there are no single authoritative documents that outline the strategies of either the Salafist-*jihadi* or Khomeinist brands of radical Islam, these strategies are discussed repeatedly—both individually and in various combinations—across a wide body of Islamist literature. The following two sections briefly describe these strategies.

3.b.(i) The Salafist-*jihadi* Movement

The primary Sunni extremist threat comes from the al Qaeda Associated Movement (AQAM). The centerpiece of AQAM’s strategy for the Long War

²² Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate “Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States” Dated April 2006, p. 1.

²³ DIA, translation of “Al-Qaida: Constitutional Charter, Rules, and Regulations,” Translation No. AFGT-2002-600175, August 2002, p. 2.

²⁴ “Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” *Middle East Journal*, Spring 1980, p. 185.

is exploiting Muslims' sense of individual religious obligation (*fard ayn*) by declaring a defensive *jihad* (*jihad al-daf*) against the West and apostate regimes. It is hoped that by "moving, inciting, and mobilizing" the *ummah* to this call, the Islamic nation will eventually reach a revolutionary "ignition point," at which time the faithful will join forces globally to pursue al Qaeda's core goals.²⁵ Al Qaeda leaders view the defensive jihad as a multi-generational struggle between "infidelity and Islam." In *The Management of Barbarism*, Abu Bakr Naji stresses that while today's mujahideen may not live long enough to see al Qaeda's vision fulfilled, they should find solace in the knowledge that future generations of Muslims will benefit from their actions.²⁶

To implement its long-term strategy, AQAM appears to be pursuing five major lines of operation. Three of these lines of operation are well recognized:

- Attacking the "far enemy," meaning the United States and its Western allies, directly, including carrying out high-profile, mass-casualty attacks within the U.S. homeland;
- Dividing the "Zionist-Crusader" alliance between the United States and Israel; and
- Waging a modern "media war" to win over the hearts and minds of the Muslim masses.

However, within the context of this JIC, the final two lines of operation are perhaps the most important. One is to regain an operational sanctuary by overthrowing apostate regimes in the Muslim world and creating enclaves of "barbarism" as a precursor to the establishment of a pan-Islamic caliphate. In the case of the former, AQAM continues its ongoing efforts to overthrow the apostate regimes in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan and to install Islamic regimes in their place. However, all states, especially weak ones, fall in the sights of AQAM leaders, who exhort the "groups and separate cells in every region of the Islamic world" to create zones of "barbarism" in which "savage

²⁵ "Bin Ladin Interviewed on Jihad Against U.S.," *Al Quds Al Arabi (London)*, November 27, 1996. See also: "Usama Bin Laden's Message to Iraq," *Al-Jazirah Television*, February 11, 2003.

²⁶ The identity of Abu Bakr Naji is not known with any certainty. Some commentators describe him as a Tunisian, while others claim he is a Jordanian. What is known, however, is that he has high standing within the Salafist-*jihadi* movement and his works have been published on *Sawt al-Jihad*, which is al Qaeda's authoritative Internet magazine.

chaos” reign as in pre-Taliban Afghanistan. During this stage of “vexation and frustration,” they advise *mujahideen* to attack tourist sites, oil facilities, and other relatively soft, high value facilities to compel states to pull a nation’s security forces out of remote areas and outlying cities, thereby creating exploitable security vacuums.

After AQAM groups and cells sow the seeds of chaos allow “barbarism” to take root, AQAM leaders would then send in specially-trained *jihadi* “administrators” to establish “sharia justice” and restore order. During this stage, aptly named “the administration of barbarism,” while providing food, medical treatment, and other basic services to a welcoming, desperate people, these administrators would secure the region from external enemies by “setting up defensive fortifications and developing fighting capabilities.” Once firm control over these individual regions is established, they could all be gradually stitched together into a caliphate during the “stage of establishment.”²⁷

Vexation and frustration operations complement AQAM’s final line of operation, which aims to exhaust the United States and its allies through a protracted global guerrilla campaign. There are, in essence, two elements to this campaign: bogging down large numbers of U.S. and allied military forces, where and when possible, in specific countries like Iraq and Afghanistan; and conducting attacks globally to force the “Zionist-Crusader alliance” to spread out its forces and expend tremendous energy and resources to protect soft, but highly valued targets. Al Qaeda leaders refer to this cost-imposing line of operation as the “1,000 wound policy.”²⁸ In a videotape broadcast on October 29, 2004, Osama bin Laden explicitly endorsed this line of operation by asserting that “we are continuing this policy in bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy.”²⁹

In addition to the cost-imposing effect that these sustained global “vexation operations” have on U.S. and allied military power, they are also repeatedly cited as an important ingredient of al Qaeda’s propaganda campaign. They are seen as critical, in particular, for maintaining the movement’s profile in the media and creating the perception of global reach (and relevance) in the eyes of the *ummah*. Al Muqrin stresses that a wider war is essential because “[there must be] no trace of doubt left on anybody’s minds that they [the *mujahideen*] are

²⁷ Naji, pp. 14-21, especially, p. 16. Brachman and McCants, pp. 8, 19.

²⁸ Scheuer, “Al Qaeda’s Insurgency Doctrine,” p. 5.

²⁹ *AlJazeera.net*, “News: Arab World—Full Text of bin Laden’s speech,” November 1, 2004.

present all over the land. This will prove the *mujahideen*'s power, rub the nose of the enemies in the dirt, and encourage young men to take up arms and face the enemy—Jews, Christians, and their collaborators.”³⁰

3.b.(ii) The “Khomeinist” Movement

Whereas the al Qaeda “brand” is a transnational movement, the Khomeinist brand is a state-sponsored movement guided by Iran. The Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, who provided the spiritual inspiration and name for the brand, believed that the divinely guided quest for a new Islamic world order was not limited to the Muslim world. He asserted in 1979 that: “Islam is not peculiar to a country, several countries, a group [of people or countries] or even the Muslims. Islam has come for humanity...Islam wishes to bring all of humanity under the umbrella of its justice.”³¹ Over the past quarter-century, the practical implementation of that policy has shifted back and forth between Iran serving as an inspirational-model for other Muslims and the more active propagation of the ideas underpinning 1979 Revolution, including the use of force.

The application of the “inspirational” strategy for exporting the revolution has, by necessity, changed form. In the past, the goal was to transform Iran into a compelling success story—a country with a booming economy, in which Islamic laws and values were protected, and where divinely rooted “justice” reigned. The reality, however, has been altogether different. Iran’s economy is beset with difficulties: growth is anemic, per capita GNP has fallen by more than fifty percent since the revolution, inflation is officially 16 percent but probably closer to 25 percent, unemployment within the “active” work force is around 14 percent (and much higher among youth), and 40 percent of the population lives below the poverty line.³² Indeed, the standard of living for the average Iranian has fallen precipitously since the Revolution. The denial of civil liberties under cleric-administered sharia law, moreover, has been a source of mounting popular discontent. Prostitution and drug use are both on the rise. With a track record of poor governance, corruption, and waning popular enthusiasm for the Revolution, the legitimacy of the regime is eroding. Today’s Iran is far from a paragon of success. Given that reality, the government is taking a cue from AQAM and is emphasizing an alternative theme worthy of admiration—and

³⁰ Scheuer, “Al Qaeda’s Insurgency Doctrine,” p. 6.

³¹ FBIS, Daily Reports—Middle East and North Africa, December 18, 1979.

³² CIA World Factbook.

thus, emulation, in the broader Muslim world: liberation of Muslim territory from “Zionist-Crusader” occupiers, including all of present-day Israel, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

This so-called “volcano strategy” drives Iran’s extensive support to Islamic “liberation movements,” including not only Hezbollah, but also HAMAS, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC).³³ While all these groups advocate the liberation of oppressed Muslims, and thus are deserving of support under Iran’s constitution, Hezbollah is a special case in that it explicitly calls for the creation of an Islamic state in Lebanon modeled on Iran, including direct clerical rule (*velayat-e faqih*). The active export of the revolution—through political action, lethal and non-lethal support to Shiite militias and gangs, and the direct use of force—is also underway in Iraq.

Guided by both the inspirational and volcano strategies, Iran is currently pursuing three lines of operations:

- Weakening the “Great Satan” financially and militarily, as well as limiting American strategic freedom of maneuver, particularly by tying down U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan;
- Deterring the United States and its allies from attacking the Islamic Republic by fielding long-range ballistic missiles and anti-navy capabilities, as well as by vigorously pursuing development of nuclear weapons and cultivating terrorist proxies (e.g., Hezbollah) with the ability to strike U.S. interests globally if Iran is threatened or attacked;
- Providing financial support, weapons and equipment, training, and other assistance to anti-Israel “liberation” movements—most notably, Hezbollah, operating primarily in Lebanon, Gaza, and the West Bank; and

They also appear to be granting the senior leadership of al Qaeda, as well as other terrorist groups, sanctuary within Iran.

Note that while the Khomeinist strategy also has a major cost-imposing element to it, it is at this point more geographically limited in scope than AQAM’s strategy. Also note that the strategy has an implicit fourth line of

³³ United States Department of State—Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2005* (Washington, DC: US Department of State, April 2006), p. 173.

operation: deterring U.S. intervention in states close to Iran by raising the potential costs of intervention, as demonstrated by Hezbollah's 2006 "divine victory" over Israel.

In sum, the global campaign being waged by both AQAM and Iran is, at its core, as much about a violent struggle **within Islam** for the identity, influence and control of the global Muslim community (*umma*) as it is about fighting the Great Satan and the West. On one side of this internal struggle, conservative Muslims embrace modern political and economic ideas and tolerance without abandoning their religious identity; while on the other, violent radical Islamist extremists embrace modern technologies but seek to eradicate all ideas and beliefs opposed to their extreme interpretation of Islam. These two interrelated struggles manifest themselves in a global irregular war involving competing information campaigns of ideas and beliefs, transnational subversion and terrorism, and regional insurgencies as each party to these intertwined struggles seeks to gain an advantage over adversaries. Whether it likes it or not, the United States is an active participant in this struggle, as it is viewed as an enemy and active combatant by one side, and because it has a vital national interest in helping conservative Muslims to win the struggle within Islam to prevent the religion's more widespread radicalization.

That said, the struggle within Islam will not be confined to Muslim nations. Especially for AQAM, *any* failing or failed state is an attractive area of operations, for two reasons. First, they may be converted into an operational sanctuary or zone of barbarism that can be ultimately assimilated into the Islamic caliphate. Second, operations of vexation and frustration in these states are part and parcel of a cost-imposing strategy designed to bleed the United States and its allies dry and to exhaust them over time.

3.c. U.S. Strategic Guidance

3.c.(i) The 2005 National Defense Strategy (2005 NDS)

The 2005 NDS explicitly acknowledged both the U.S. vital interest in the outcome of the internal struggle within Islam as well as the need to confront all forms of radical Islamist extremists and their terrorist allies globally. It categorized future national security threats as being either traditional (state adversaries), irregular (non-state and transnational adversaries), catastrophic (adversaries who seek to use weapons of mass destruction or disruption), or disruptive (adversaries who use technology to attack U.S. vulnerabilities or to upend U.S. ways of operations). It ordered a shift in the U.S. defense portfolio, which is heavily weighted toward traditional adversaries, toward meeting the challenges presented by IW, catastrophic, and disruptive challengers (see Figure 7).

With regard to IW, the 2005 NDS directed that the U.S. improve its proficiency in fighting irregular challengers, including greater use of general purpose forces (GPF) for this purpose. It acknowledged that the global campaign against terrorist extremists and other irregular forces would be a protracted one, requiring the U.S. to employ all elements of national power.




Figure 7: The Defense Portfolio Shift Envisioned by the 2005 NDS

3.c.(ii) The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (2006 QDR)

The aim of the 2006 QDR was first and foremost to operationalize the 2005 National Defense Strategy. A prominent theme in the 2006 QDR was to get the United States on the right side of cost-imposing strategies—to impose more costs on enemies than they impose on the U.S. In line with this thinking, the QDR recommended an *indirect* irregular warfare campaign:

*The long war against terrorist networks extends far beyond the borders of Iraq and Afghanistan and includes many operations characterized by irregular warfare—operations in which the enemy is not a regular military force of a nation-state. In recent years, U.S. forces have been engaged in many countries, fighting terrorists and helping partners to police and govern their nations. **To succeed in such operations, the United States must often take an indirect approach, building up and working with others.** This indirect*

approach seeks to unbalance adversaries physically and psychologically, rather than attacking them where they are strongest or in the manner they expect to be attacked. Taking the “line of least resistance” unbalances the enemy physically, exploiting subtle vulnerabilities and perceived weaknesses. Exploiting the “line of least expectation” unbalances the enemy psychologically, setting the conditions for the enemy’s subsequent defeat (emphasis added).

The 2006 QDR spoke of this indirect global IW campaign in terms of both steady-state and surge operations. Steady-state operations would consist of multiple, globally distributed IW operations of varying duration, involving both special operations forces (SOF) and GPF. These operations would interact continuously with allies, build partner capability, conduct long-duration counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and unconventional warfare operations, and deter irregular aggressors through forward presence. In the QDR lexicon, surge operations referred to large-scale and potentially long-duration IW campaigns, with large number of U.S. forces involved.

After a thorough review of the existing DOD portfolio and program, the 2006 QDR concluded that U.S. military forces were not as well organized, trained, educated, or equipped to conduct protracted IW on a global scale in either the current or envisioned future operational environments. It ordered a rebalancing of U.S. GPF to conduct IW, an increase in SOF capacity, and a variety of other initiatives designed to improve U.S. IW capabilities and capacities. These initiatives were captured in the *2006 QDR Execution Roadmap for Irregular Warfare*.³⁴

3.c.(iii) The 2006 National Security Strategy (2006 NSS)

One month after the QDR was published, the White House announced a new National Security Strategy that picked up on the indirect campaign. One of the key goals was to strengthen alliances in the global war on terror and to work to prevent attacks against the U.S. and its friends. As the 2006 NSS explained:

Defeating terrorism requires a long-term strategy and a break with old patterns. We are fighting a new enemy with global

³⁴ The QDR Execution Roadmap for IW aimed to implement the IW-related broad policy decisions of the QDR by directing development of a number of DOD IW capabilities. It also requires the development of a joint concept for IW. This JIC—and others developed in the future—is designed to describe “how we operate” in order to help tie together the application of many of the capabilities identified in the IW Execution Roadmap.

*reach. The United States can no longer simply rely on deterrence to keep the terrorists at bay or defensive measures to thwart them at the last moment. The fight must be taken to the enemy, to keep them on the run. **To succeed in our own efforts, we need the support and concerted action of friends and allies. We must join with others to deny the terrorists what they need to survive: safe haven, financial support, and the support and protection that certain nation-states historically have given them*** (emphasis added).

As part of this strategy, the U.S. would work to deny the terrorists control of any nation that they could use as a base and launching pad for terror. Again, in the words of the strategy, “The terrorists’ goal is to overthrow a rising democracy; claim a strategic country as a haven for terror; destabilize the Middle East; and strike America and other free nations with ever-increasing violence. This we can never allow. This is why success in Afghanistan and Iraq is vital, and *why we must prevent terrorists from exploiting ungoverned areas*” (emphasis added).

3.c.(iv) The 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2006 NSCT)

In September 2006, the new NSCT explained in more detail why it was important to prevent terrorists from gaining any type of safehaven—secure spaces that allowed them to plan, organize, train, and prepare for operations. Such safe havens were not restricted to physical sanctuaries. They could also include legal, cyberspace, and financial sanctuaries.

For the purposes of this JIC, the strategy explained that physical sanctuaries can stretch across an entire sovereign state, be limited to specific ungoverned or ill-governed areas in an otherwise functioning state, or cross national borders. It recognized that although many governments want to exercise greater effective sovereignty over their lands and maintain control within their borders, they often lack the necessary capabilities and capacities to do so. The strategy pledged to strengthen the capabilities and capacities of any state threatened by radical extremists or terrorists so that they could reclaim full control of its territory.

The strategy highlighted the irregular risks faced by failing states or states emerging from conflict, and the steps that the U.S. might take to help diminish them:

Spoilers can take advantage of instability to create conditions terrorists can exploit. We will continue to work with foreign partners and international organizations to help prevent

conflict and respond to state failure by building foreign capacity for peace operations, reconstruction, and stabilization so that countries in transition can reach a sustainable path to peace, democracy, and prosperity. Where physical havens cross national boundaries, we will continue to work with the affected countries to help establish effective cross-border control.

3.d Emerging U.S. Lines of Operation

Taken together, these documents support the notion that, for the foreseeable future, the U.S. will be fighting a protracted global IW campaign that aims to shape the strategic operational environment through a combination of direct and indirect actions. This campaign will undoubtedly see major direct combat operations, but it will more often be characterized by persistent operations that seek to avert the onset of major regional instabilities by the patient enhancement of the governance and security capabilities and capacities of friendly states.

This protracted global IW campaign will consist of several lines of operations, including:

- Sustained global counter-safe haven and counter-sanctuary operations against radical Islamic terrorists to include relentless manhunting operations; operations designed to disrupt terrorist activities, such as severing transnational financial links and impeding terrorist recruitment and training; and the persistent, steady-state build-up of allied and partner COIN, CT, law enforcement, justice, governance and economic capabilities and capacities. As their name suggests, the purpose of these operations would be to deny the enemy any physical, legal, cyber, or financial safe havens.
- Unconventional warfare and clandestine and covert action against state sponsors of terrorism and transnational terrorist groups globally.
- Defending and holding “key terrain,” like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
- Waging a persistent comprehensive information campaign that discredits Salafist-*jihadi* and “Khomeinist” ideology and covertly promotes credible, alternative Islamic voices (i.e., engage in the counter-*fatwa* war); isolates Islamic extremists from mainline, conservative Muslims; diffuses calls for defensive *jihad*; and creates and exploits divides within and among *jihadi* groups.

- And finally, maintaining a significant IW and SSTR “surge” capability for responding to failing state, failed state, or protracted COIN contingencies.

Importantly, since compelling the United States and its allies to spend disproportionately to defend against numerous threats across multiple theaters is an integral element of both al Qaeda’s “bleed-until-bankruptcy” strategy as well as Iran’s “volcano” strategy, all of these operations and activities—including clandestine and covert activities—should increasingly emphasize indirect approaches and operations through surrogates and partner states. By adopting an indirect approach, the Joint Force will help defeat the enemies’ cost-imposing strategies by helping to solve emerging problems before they become full scale crises, and helping to resolve brewing crises before they require full-scale, direct U.S. military interventions.

3.e. The USG Problem: Preventing State Failures

As can be inferred from the foregoing discussion, then, weak and failing states define a hotly contested zone of operations where radical Islamist extremists, terrorists, and irregular adversaries will collide with U.S. and allied forces and the partners. The former want to exploit these states and to hasten their collapse in order to create operational sanctuaries and zones of barbarism, and to lure American forces into protracted and costly interventions. The latter seek to deny radical extremists and their allies any physical sanctuary, either by preventing state failures by enhancing state capabilities and capacities, or, if necessary, by conducting counter-sanctuary operations and nation-building operations aimed at rebuilding functioning states capable of fighting the extremists on their own.

Obviously, the choice between saving a weak but functioning state from collapse and conducting a major, direct U.S. intervention to rebuild a functioning state is an easy one to make. Direct interventions are enormously expensive under the best of circumstances (no armed opponents and a willing population); they can cost billions of dollars *a week* when actively opposed by irregular enemies. To thwart the enemy’s cost-imposing strategies, the USG must become better at shoring up weak states and preventing their total collapse, and avoiding protracted campaigns where the U.S. has the lead role and responsibility for nation-building.

This will be far easier said than done. As is well described in the SSTRO JOC, if a national government is weak, corrupt, or incompetent, then an

unexpected shock—natural or man-made—can seriously exacerbate existing state weaknesses. This may produce widespread suffering, fan simmering popular grievances, and lead to civil unrest, all of which can be intensified by several interrelated factors:

- The absence of adequate internal security, essential public services, and other key government functions due to ineffective, often corrupt governance, or the absence of any governing authority;
- Widespread lawlessness in an atmosphere of anarchy as well as sectarian conflict among ethnic, tribal or religious groups or between the incumbent government and its violent opposition;
- Very poor economic performance due to internal disorder, eroded infrastructure, or the destruction of key economic assets; and
- Extensive unemployment and pronounced economic disparities within the populace that breed pervasive dissatisfaction and help generate recruits for opposition groups.

Once such difficult conditions emerge, the drivers of instability and conflict tend to reinforce one another, creating a degenerating cycle in which conditions continue to deteriorate and the feelings of insecurity and the grievances of the local population intensify (see Figure 8). Such a cycle can be greatly accelerated if internal or external irregular adversaries start to exploit or worsen the underlying conditions. *Without a countervailing force to break this cycle, these developments can eventually destabilize the interlinked political, economic and social systems that make up the fabric of a society.*

If properly planned and executed, proactive, preventive security and stability operations taken early may be one of the best ways to try to break the cycle of degeneration and failure and to preserve a functioning state. The attractiveness of such proactive, preventive operations is that they might obviate the need for a major SSTR operation designed to rebuild a “new normal” after a total state collapse, and to deny irregular adversaries a physical sanctuary. Importantly, however, if the U.S. intervenes directly, and “assumes control” of the situation, it is highly likely that the existing government will lose what little credibility and any sense of legitimacy it retains among its people, hastening its demise. Moreover, such an approach falls right into the cost-imposing strategy being pursued by U.S. adversaries.

Becoming more proficient at conducting prompt *indirect* conventional, IW, and SSTR operations designed to arrest a nation’s slide toward failure is thus a pressing USG requirement. Doing so could undermine the cost-imposing strategies being pursued by U.S. irregular adversaries, and deter their activities in certain theaters of operations.




Figure 8: Drivers of Instability and State Failure

3.f. The Joint Force Problem: How to Conduct Effective ISSS Operations

How can future JFCs, along with USG and international partners, employ conventional, IW, and SSTR capabilities and capacities to halt a state’s slide toward failure while at the same time preserving the government’s credibility and legitimacy? The Joint Force must determine how to:

- Develop a persistent relationship with key states aimed at building up their security and governance capacity and capabilities over time;
- Develop an early warning system for impending state failure;

- On warning, quickly surge the right conventional, IW, and SSTR capabilities and capacities to establish a stable security environment;
- On warning, quickly surge the capabilities and capacities needed to build host nation security and governance capabilities and capacities to the minimal level needed or the state to sustain itself; and
- Quickly transition back to a persistent, low visibility presence—all while simultaneously building up the host government’s confidence and enhancing its credibility and legitimacy in the eye’s of the host nation’s population.

3.f.(i) Factors That Compound the Joint Force Problem

Surging Joint Force and USG capabilities and capacities to a failing state while maintaining the host nation government’s credibility will be complicated by three key problems:

- **Irregular adversaries will actively attempt to compel the U.S. to assume direct control over the situation.** The enemy will do everything in its power to try to prompt the Joint Force to assume overall responsibility for solving the security and governmental crisis, thereby lowering the government’s legitimate claim for leadership and control over the population.
- **Irregular adversaries will use every means of communication available to convince the host population that Joint Force involvement is against their interests.** Any struggle for control over a relevant population will have an important information and image competition.
- **The USG is not structured, organized, or equipped to surge SSTR capabilities and capacities.** As a result, any surge will emphasize Joint Force capabilities, which will tend to reinforce the foregoing adversary goals and methods.

4. The Solution

4.a. The Central Idea

An ISSS operation involves the rapid bringing to bear of security and governance capabilities and capacities by the Joint Force, U.S. government and civilian agencies, and, in some cases, multinational partners, in order to help a foreign government under severe stress from internal or external threats, natural or man-made, avoid an irrevocable collapse or loss of control over its territory or population, while bolstering its confidence and maintaining or enhancing its credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the relevant population (see Figure 9).

In the 2006 QDR, the term IW “surge” implied large numbers of U.S. forces for major counterinsurgency or SSTR operations. For ISSS operations, the “surge” of U.S. military capability and capacities involves relative level of effort, not necessarily the sheer number or size of forces. Under normal circumstances, there would already be a persistent, steady-state presence in the host nation focused on building partnership capacity, under the general direction of the U.S. Chief of Mission (COM), the President’s on-scene diplomatic representative. An Indirect Security and Stability Surge is designed to rapidly reinforce the steady-state effort and host nation capacities and capabilities without triggering a major surge of U.S. combat forces.

Due to both the urgent nature of the situation (e.g., an impending collapse of a strategically important ally or state) and its large portfolio of ready conventional, IW and SSTR expeditionary capabilities, the Department of Defense would normally provide the preponderance of ISSS capabilities and capacities. However, because these capabilities would be used in direct support of the host nation’s government and security forces, the overall responsibility for, and direction of, ISSS operations would normally reside with the COM.

4.a.(i) The Concept

Despite previous steady-state partner capacity building efforts, or perhaps due to the lack of them, the security situation in an important state begins to deteriorate (see Figure 9). Widespread civil unrest or lawlessness, factional or sectarian violence, or internal or externally-supported insurgencies begin to overwhelm the country’s security forces and the government’s ability to maintain a monopoly over the use of violence. Government services begin to break down as the security situation worsens. At some point, the situation becomes so dire that the host nation begins to lose its ability to deal effectively with the full range of problems, and the government begins to slide toward total collapse. At that time, the host nation government requests U.S. assistance and the U.S. approves, or the Chief of Mission, after consultation with Washington, offers U.S. support, and the host nation accepts. In either

case, ISSS operations are supported by the host nation government—but not necessarily the entire host nation population.

In other words, the primary focus of U.S. policy in an Indirect Security and Stability Surge is on helping a severely stressed *but existing and functioning government* with inadequate capabilities and capacities to avoid a complete collapse. Under these circumstances, the host nation government is the “supported” agency, and all U.S. forces and agencies (as well as international agencies) are in a “supporting” role.




Figure 9: Concept for ISSS Operations

The final decision to launch an ISSS operation is made by the President, in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense. Once the decision is made to conduct an ISSS operation, the United States can perform in either a lead supporting role, or, better yet, as just one member of a broader international or regional effort launched under a mandate from the United Nations Security Council or other regional security organization. As its name implies, an *Indirect* Security and Stability Surge operation seeks to remove the United States and the Joint Force from the limelight and to focus all national attention on the host nation government.

In any case, however, ISSS operations involve the rapid infusion of Joint Force and USG capabilities and capacities to substitute for, or reinforce, the inadequate host nation government and security forces' capabilities and capacities, as well as provide the capabilities and capacities needed to build up new indigenous capabilities and forces. All ISSS efforts are generally made in direct support of host nation government, law enforcement, military, and other security agencies. They are characterized by the widespread use of advisors, mobile training teams, and individual trainers. In most cases, but not all, the employment of U.S. capabilities will be directed by a host nation official or agency, guided by plans developed in conjunction with the U.S. Chief of Mission, the Joint Force, and U.S. officials and agencies. In some cases, U.S. forces may be called upon to execute direct tasks, especially with regard to establishing security. However, their actions are fully sanctioned and approved by the host nation government and U.S. COM.

During ISSS operations, any interaction with the host nation's population will therefore be with host nation agencies or officials in the lead, unless absolutely impractical. However well-intentioned, any ISSS operation involving U.S. military and interagency forces that undercuts the credibility and legitimacy of the host government may hasten the state's collapse, leading to mission failure. Accordingly, under no circumstances can the United States be seen as assuming overall responsibility for the operation.

Should they succeed, a key goal of any ISSS operation is to extricate most U.S. military forces—especially any conventional combat forces—as quickly as possible to transition rapidly to the status quo ante, typically defined by a persistent, low visibility U.S. diplomatic and military presence focused on the patient building-up of host nation capacity and capabilities over time. Any long-term, large-scale military presence would likely undercut the goal to strengthen the host nation's legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the country's population. Should the ISSS operations fail to arrest the state's slide toward failure or prevent the host nation government's complete collapse, ISSS operations would either cease altogether or transition to a full-scale IW and SSTR operation designed to create a "new normal"—a new functioning state.

Their proactive and preventive nature, the existence of a functioning (however weak) government, and the indirect application of U.S. capabilities and capacities are what distinguish ISSS operations from major SSTR operations designed to create or assist an entirely new national government in building a new domestic order following internal collapse or defeat in war.

4.a.(ii). An Indirect Approach

A key feature of ISSS operations is their emphasis on indirect approaches. As discussed in the IW JOC, the term “indirect approach” has multiple applications within the context of irregular warfare. Three of them are particularly relevant to ISSS operations. They are:

- Focusing on addressing the underlying economic, political, cultural, or security conditions that fuel the grievances of the population, rather than on applying military power directly against the military and paramilitary forces of adversaries. *Both approaches are necessary, but the direct application of military power is unlikely to be decisive.*
- Attacking adversaries using a combination of conventional and nonconventional methods and means rather than relying only on conventional military forces. *Nonconventional methods and means might include clandestine or covert actions, operations in combination with irregular forces, or the nonconventional use of conventional capabilities.*
- *Subverting the power and influence of adversaries over the relevant populations by isolating them physically and psychologically from their local and international support through the use of psychological operations, public diplomacy and public affairs activities; security operations; population and resource control measures; and other means.*³⁵

Whereas a direct approach normally relies solely on physical force, the indirect approach exploits the cognitive, moral and psychological dimensions of conflict. Indeed, the essence of the indirect approach, whether in conventional or irregular conflict, is to exploit the psychological and moral dimensions of war in order to attack the enemy *from within and through others*. Indirect operations generally require far fewer troops than direct approaches, and emphasize boldness, creativity, maneuver, and adaptability.

Indirect approaches are every bit as effective as direct approaches, especially against irregular opponents. Perhaps one of the best examples of an indirect approach is found in the 1970s Dhofar Campaign, where a force of 700 British Special Air Service (SAS) personnel helped the Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF) quell a persistent insurgency. A full accounting of the campaign can be found in Annex C.

³⁵ IW JOC, p. 18.

4.a.(iii). A Reliance on Advisors and Trainers

Practically, an emphasis on indirect approaches would mean that most ISSS operations, like those in the Dhofar campaign, would rely more heavily on advisors and trainers than on conventional combat units—although the latter may well be required depending on the extent and nature of threats to security. However, ISSS operations differ greatly in their time horizon. Whereas the campaign in Dhofar took years to execute with a relatively few number of advisors and trainers, an Indirect Security and Stability Surge would normally take place over a much shorter period of time and involve a much larger number of advisors and trainers.

Generating large numbers of capable advisors and trainers in short order is one of the greatest Joint Force challenge associated with ISSS operations. Any ISSS operation is certain to include U.S. special operations forces which, like the British SAS used in the Dhofar campaign, are skilled at and comfortable with employing indirect approaches and methods. However, due to the demands of the ongoing, protracted global campaign against irregular adversaries, large numbers of special operations forces may be unavailable. Consequently, ISSS operations will normally rely on advisors and trainers drawn from the U.S. general purpose forces.

4.a.(iv) Major Mission Elements

An ISSS is composed of six key “major mission elements” (MMEs), or “lines of operation,” executed in a concurrent manner and integrated and tailored to the specific situation. These are:

Conduct strategic communication operations. USG and Joint Force personnel conduct intensive strategic communication operations in support of U.S. national and ISSS operational objectives. As defined in the *2006 QDR Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication*, the term “strategic communication” encompasses those USG processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences, to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with other elements of national power.³⁶

An ISSS strategic communication operation is different from a typical U.S. strategic communication operation in one key way: sustaining the legitimacy of the host nation government is *the* essential goal. The operation seeks to create, strengthen, or preserve the host nation

³⁶ *2006 QDR Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication*, paragraph 1.3, p. 3.

government's credibility in the eyes of the population. In this fight over the population's support for the government, the guiding caution of ISSS strategic communication operations is that "perception equals reality." Therefore, all U.S. leaders and forces must be ever wary that their actions might be perceived or portrayed as being guided more by U.S. rather than host nation interests. For this reason, strategic communication operations generally lead any ISSS operation. *Their aim is to explain and emphasize that the ISSS operation is being directed and led by the host nation government, with U.S. military and IA forces in support, and that U.S. forces will leave quickly once the emergency is resolved.*

The ISSS strategic communication message that the host nation government is in the lead and that the U.S. (and its allies and international partners) is in a supporting role cannot be empty rhetoric: in order to maintain credibility and trust with friends and foes alike, including American domestic audiences and coalition partners, all U.S. actions and activities must be made in support of the host nation government's interests.

The development of strategic communication messages in support of an ISSS operation must therefore take cultural sensitivities and perceptions into account. In order to facilitate this effort, DOD personnel expertise and capabilities should be enhanced with the appropriate linguistic, historical, and cultural training, and be embedded with host nation information agencies.

IO operations in support of ISSS missions also must anticipate the propaganda and images of those opposed to U.S. involvement, and resolutely and relentlessly counter them through multiple, well-coordinated means. This will require all three of the primary supporting capabilities of strategic communication—public affairs, information operations, and defense support to public diplomacy—to be continually coordinated and synchronized, both horizontally and vertically. An inability to counter adversary information operations with a consistent and well-coordinated information campaign could undermine the credibility and legitimacy of the host nation government and lead to mission failure.

Conduct indirect and direct operations to re-establish security and restore the host nation's monopoly on violence. U.S. conventional and special operations forces, as well as any special-purpose GPF units optimized for IW and SSTR operations, conduct operations *in conjunction with host nation security forces* to suppress irregular adversaries and quell disorder. The emphasis of U.S. operations is on indirect approaches, with a heavy emphasis on advisors guiding and supporting

the operations of host nation military, police, law enforcement, and constabulary units. Under the best of circumstances, the rapid introduction of advisors would be facilitated by a strong relationship of mutual trust established between Joint Force and host nation security personnel over a long period of time.

U.S. forces mount direct operations only when host nation security forces lack the capabilities and capacities to do so. The security activities most likely to require more direct Joint Force involvement are large-scale counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. Even for these operations, however, host nation officers should accompany U.S. units and be seen as actively participating in the operation. Moreover, these operations should be as low visibility as possible.

Conduct rapid security assistance/foreign internal defense operations to build and expand host nation security capabilities and capacities. The Joint Force works to build up and expand host nation capabilities and capacities for the long term, thereby diminishing the need for U.S. direct action and forces. During Phase 0, Shaping Operations, these activities fall under the rubric of *foreign internal defense*, defined as the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Within the context of ISSS operations, they focus on the rapid expansion of host nation security capabilities and capacities to a level adequate to meet all internal security challenges with only indirect U.S. support. In contrast, U.S. direct efforts to establish security are short-term efforts designed to reinforce and augment existing host nation capabilities and capacities, and substitute for them only in their absence.

These activities include helping the host nation to build new military or security force units from the ground up, by teaching basic marksmanship, drill, and tactics; establishing academies for non-commissioned officers and staff non-commissioned officers; and the like. It also includes helping the host nation military to build entirely new units with enhanced capabilities and capacities, such as special operations, counter-terrorism, or counterinsurgency units.

Whereas efforts to establish security in the host country emphasize the heavy use of advisors, this MME places relatively greater emphasis on trainers. There is a subtle but important difference between the two. Advisors are generally more mature and experienced, and provide advice and support across the full range of military operations. Trainers can be more focused on imparting a particular skill, such as tank gunnery or vehicle maintenance. Most importantly, however, while all advisors

qualify as trainers, the reverse is not true. For example, trainers are normally prohibited from participating in either indirect or direct combat operations. ISSS training operations can thus normally be provided by GPF units with modest modifications to their own training.

During ISSS operations, the Joint Force tailors the mix of advisors and trainers to the security situation and needs of the host nation's government and security forces.

Perform appropriate indirect stability operations. As a form of SSTR operations, an ISSS also focuses on building up and substituting for the capabilities and capacities of the host nation government. As such, the Joint Force delivers humanitarian assistance and medical support, reconstructs critical infrastructure, restores essential services, initiates and supports economic development, and advances effective governing mechanisms based on the rule of law—generally through or in direct support of host nation government agencies.

As in SSTR operations, ISSS stability operations would normally be directed by Field Advance Country Teams (FACTs), the smallest interagency unit in the new Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization.³⁷ The FACTs are micro-military/IA organizations responsible for reconstruction and stabilization operations. In post-conflict or other situations where an existing government has either been forcibly replaced or has failed, the FACTs substitute for and work to rebuild local governments and government services. In contrast, during an ISSS operation, the existing government is weak, but intact. Under these circumstances, the FACTs in essence would play the same role for a local government that a combat advisor plays in a military unit: providing advice and indirect support.

As mentioned earlier in this JIC, National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) tasks the Secretary of State and the DOS Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization to lead and coordinate integrated USG efforts for reconstruction and stabilization activities, and to ensure their harmonization with any planned or ongoing military operations. However, in any ISSS operation, the Joint Force will likely be the first reinforcing U.S. force to arrive in the host nation, and will likely provide the bulk of early-arriving SSTR capability and capacities. Accordingly, the Joint Force must be prepared to deploy enough "SSTR Advisors" to man the FACTs and provide indirect SSTR support to local governments until U.S. IA and international partners arrive on the scene.

³⁷ This system will be discussed in greater detail in paragraph 4.c.(iv).

Create a low visibility operational and logistics support structure.

The Joint Force, along with its host nation partner, rapidly erects and constructs the operational and logistics support structure necessary to support ongoing ISSS operations. This will not be a trivial endeavor. As one former Army advisor wrote:

...an increased advisory effort...will still require roughly the same kind of combat support as do ...conventional forces. Advisers are rarely effective simply by dint of winning personalities and superior education, nor can they be pushed as a cheaper and less manpower-intensive way to make war. As a rule, an advisor must be able to bring some tangible contribution to the host unit—firepower, better communications, logistics, medical support—that will give them credibility with their host and a leg up when they start offering ideas.

The “tangible contribution” that advisors bring to their host unit must be provided by some type of operational and support infrastructure. Depending on the security situation, this infrastructure might provide combat support aviation, fire support, logistics support, medical evacuation and support, and combat search and rescue (CSAR) support. A key component of any ISSS operation would thus be task-organized Combat Advisory Support Battalions (CASBs). This JIC proposes that the doctrine and TTP for such CASBs should be a subject for future Joint Force experimentation.

In addition to supporting combat advisors, the ISSS operational and logistics support infrastructure must also provide military support to both ISSS training and SSTR efforts. As the U.S. develops this infrastructure, it must guard against making it so large and visible that it supports the perception of a major U.S. occupation, as this image will undermine the entire ISSS operation. Steps that might be taken to minimize the footprint of U.S. support forces include designing CASBs as austere, expeditionary units that can be co-located and co-based with host nation forces, or blended into the host nation’s operational and support infrastructure. Another way to minimize the support structure in-country might be to base CASBs and other operational and logistics support units at sea or outside the host nation, across the border in a friendly country. However, this latter approach can have its own downsides, such as causing an unexpected rise in tensions in nearby countries. The point here is that any operational and logistics support structure developed to support a major ISSS operation must have as small a footprint as is practical.

Prepare for the rapid transition back to a persistent, low visibility presence. The Joint Force makes plans to transfer responsibility for capability and capacity expansion as quickly as practical to either the Department of State or United States Agency for International Development (USAID), or other government or non-government agencies and allied and international forces and agencies. The aim is to return as rapidly as possible to a persistent, low visibility Joint Force presence focused on the steady development of host nation security force capabilities and capacities, and on maintaining a strong relationship with the host nation security forces.

4.a.(v) ISSS Operations Across the Conflict Spectrum

Each ISSS operation will differ in the mix and application of the MMEs. At the “high end” of the spectrum are ISSS operations associated with a faltering government beset by an active insurgency, widespread lawlessness or terrorism, sectarian or fractional violence, or all of these things. In these cases, establishing security would be paramount, and the ISSS would likely see a relatively greater proportion of U.S. conventional combat units configured for more direct counter-terrorism or COIN operations. The entire Joint Force would also need to be prepared to provide for a high level of force protection not only for the military units dedicated to security assistance and stability operations, but also for USG, civil, and international agencies involved in stability missions.

A less challenging security environment might involve helping a government cope with the consequences of a devastating natural disaster that leads to a general breakdown in governmental services and civil order. Under these circumstances, the operation would be designed to help reestablish order and provide humanitarian assistance, and, in some cases, conduct initial reconstruction efforts, under the direction of the Chief of Mission.

In either case, the Joint Force will work alongside the other elements and agencies of the U.S. government and host nation agencies and organizations. In addition, the U.S. military will often help coordinate multinational relief organizations.

Throughout the conduct of ISSS operations, the Joint Force will implement a continuous learning process that incorporates lessons learned into ongoing and future operations. This continuous learning process will be conducted through constant observation of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); assessment of best practices; understanding how to implement best practices; and adapting TTPs.

4.b. Supporting Ideas

As a proactive, preventive form of IW and SSTR operations conducted as part of a protracted, global indirect IW campaign, many of the supporting ideas for ISSS operations mirror those found in the IW and SSTRO JOCs. This section thus expands on these supporting ideas as they pertain to ISSS operations, or proposes new ones.³⁸

4.b. (i) Establishing Embassies/Country Teams as the Forward Interagency Command Posts in the Global IW Campaign

As suggested in the 2006 QDR, 2006 NSS, and 2006 NSCT, the U.S. strategy for the Long War will likely shift away from a focus on reactive American interventions with large numbers of U.S. combat forces to one that focuses on building alliances and shoring up weak and failing states by building up their capabilities and capacities for security, governance, and economic development. This shift will place greater effort on non-military instruments of power. As a recent report to the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) states [note: a complete copy of this report can be found at Appendix D]:

*While finding, capturing, and eliminating individual terrorists and their support networks is an imperative in the war against terror, it is repairing and building alliances, pursuing resolutions to regional conflicts, fostering democracy and development, and defusing religious extremism worldwide that will overcome the terrorist threat in the long term.*³⁹

After reading the report, then-Chairman of the SFRC Senator Richard G. Lugar endorsed this view, urging that the United States fight the Long War with a thoroughly integrated diplomatic and military campaign. However, he implicitly argued that the campaign should have a diplomatic lead when he wrote: “We as a Congress [cannot] continue to undervalue the role of the civilian agencies if we want to ensure that our response to violent extremism is calibrated, supported by an appropriate mix of civilian and military tools.”⁴⁰

³⁸ Readers are encouraged to read all of the supporting ideas in both the IW and SSTRO JOCs.

³⁹ “Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign,” a Report to Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States, Senate, Richard G. Lugar, Chairman, One Hundred Ninth Congress, Second Session, December 15, 2006, p. 1.

⁴⁰ Letter of Transmittal, “Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign,” signed by Richard G. Lugar, Chairman.

One possible way to ensure the adequate calibration of civilian and military instruments of power is to shift maximum authorities and national capabilities forward to strong integrated country teams led by U.S. ambassadors and Chiefs of Mission.⁴¹ As one respected former ambassador wrote, “U.S. Embassy Staffs—our country teams—are ideally positioned as the first lines of engagement to face challenges to U.S. national interests.”⁴² The aforementioned report to the SFRC agreed, stating that “It is in embassies rather than in Washington where interagency differences on strategies and tactics and divisions of labor are increasingly adjudicated.”⁴³ Under these circumstances, U.S. Chiefs of Mission become key figures in the U.S. war against violent extremists:

*In the campaign against terror, the leadership qualities of the U.S. ambassador have become a determinative factor in victory or failure. It is imperative that the U.S. ambassador provide strong leadership, steady oversight, and a firm hand on the component parts of all counterterrorism activities in U.S. embassies overseas. This includes the authority to challenge and override directives from other government agencies in Washington to their resident and temporary staffs in the embassy.*⁴⁴

Giving COMs the authority to direct all USG activities in a foreign country will be critical if the U.S. has any hope of forging cohesive USG and IA solutions to complex foreign problems. Although the Presidential Letter to Ambassadors gives COMs overarching authority for USG activities in a country, it does not spell out the specific responsibilities of non-DOS agencies to the COMs. As a result, with over 30 government agencies now dispatching employees overseas,

⁴¹ The country team concept is an oft-used term that is not codified in law. It is an executive measure to grant ambassadors the means to coordinate all USG activities to maximize the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy in the country to which the ambassador is assigned. See Robert B. Oakley and Michael Casey, Jr., “The Country Team: Restructuring America’s First Line of Engagement,” Strategic Forum No. 227, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, September 2007, p. 3.

⁴² Oakley and Casey, Jr., “The Country Team: Restructuring America’s First Line of Engagement,” p. 1.

⁴³ “Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign,” p. 1.

⁴⁴ “Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign,” p. 2.

... effective interagency collaboration is often a hit-or-miss proposition, due to diluted authority, antiquated organizational structures, and insufficient resources.

The ambassador is not sufficiently empowered to act effectively as the country team's leader...Despite longstanding policy to the contrary, the Ambassador often is regarded not as the President's representative but as the State Department's envoy. Thus, personnel from other U.S. agencies tend to pursue their own lines of communication and operation, with inadequate coordination among them...

Given the critical challenges, it is time to reinvigorate the Country Team's role in achieving U.S. national security objectives. The [country team] must be reconfigured as a cross-functional entity with an empowered and recognized single leader for all agencies. The country team's makeover must be holistic—to include strategy and planning approaches, decision-making procedures, personnel training and incentives, and resource-allocation flexibility...

The signal mark of success for the new country team will be changing the way other members of the [team] perceive the ambassador. Instead of a [DOS] representative, the future ambassador must be, and be seen as, a national representative empowered to make tradeoffs among instruments of power and to develop clear strategies to advance U.S. national interests.⁴⁵

Making country teams into the primary interagency forward command posts for the Long War will require the best thinking of the legislative and executive branches of government, particularly the Department of State and Department of Defense. However, should this concept be pursued and implemented, DOD already has a good model for a Joint Force component for an empowered, cross-functional country team: a Military Group, or MILGRP, tailored to both the host nation and the ambassador's needs.

4.b.(ii) The 21st Century Military Group (MILGRP 21)

[This idea is consistent with the ideas of Establishing Persistent Presence for IW and Building Partner Nation Security Force Capacity on a Global Scale found in the IW JOC.]

⁴⁵ Oakley and Casey, Jr., "The Country Team: Restructuring America's First Line of Engagement," p. 1 and p. 12.

As part of a globally distributed, indirect interagency IW campaign against radical Islamist extremists, terrorists, and irregular adversaries, the Joint Force must establish a persistent presence in and across multiple regions that works through, by, and with state and non-state partners. As the IW JOC states, “The Joint Force will need a persistent global presence to understand and affect the operational environment and the adversaries, and to build partner capacity for IW. Periodic, short-duration, expeditionary employments to at-risk states will be an inadequate campaign approach, primarily because the results of these deployments can be quickly reversed by adversary countermeasures and by the inertia common in weak or failing states.”⁴⁶

More troubling, the aforementioned SFRC study concluded that:

*There is evidence that some host countries are questioning the increasingly military component of America’s profile overseas. Some foreign officials question what appears to them as a new emphasis on the United States on military approaches to problems that are not seen as lending themselves to military solutions. Host country militaries clearly welcome increased professional contact and interaction with the U.S. military. However, some host countries have elements in both government and general society who are highly suspicious of potential American coercion.*⁴⁷

In line with this thinking, this JIC endorses one of several concepts proposed in the IW JOC: that the persistent, global Joint Force presence be managed and executed through an expanded number of Military Groups (MILGRPs), each specially tailored to the needs of their host country. The term “Military Group” is a term used to describe any DOD element located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for performing Title 10 combat advisory, training, and other operational missions as well as Title 22 security assistance management functions. In practice, these elements may be called military missions and groups, military assistance advisory groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, or liaison groups.⁴⁸

These new MILGRPs could be organized and operated in at least two possible ways. The first would be to organize and operate MILGRPs as

⁴⁶ IW JOC, p. 22.

⁴⁷ “Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign,” p. 2.

⁴⁸ IW JOC, p. 25.

part of a standing Theater Security Cooperation under the operational direction of the appropriate Regional Combatant Commander (RCC). The second would be to assign them as part of each existing U.S. country team and to have them perform their duties under the operational direction of a U.S. ambassador or Chief of Mission.⁴⁹ Based on historical precedent, the contemporary operational environment, and the evolving Long War strategy, this JIC endorses the second of these two approaches.

Assigning MILGRPs to U.S. country teams under the operational control of the COM is not a new concept. Indeed, between 1947 and 1974, the United States organized and manned more than 60 MILGRP-type entities, then called Military Assistance and Advisory Groups. These organizations played a key role in America's persistent global campaign to contain communism. President John F. Kennedy gave U.S. COMs explicit authority over the MAAGs in their country, which were then integrated directly into the ambassador's country team. As such, the MAAGs became the DOD contribution to an indirect, bottom-up interagency approach to presence, security cooperation, and partnership building operations, focused on the particular needs of each individual country.⁵⁰

The idea behind this distributed interagency approach was that the frontline fighters against communist expansion were the governments and peoples most threatened by communist advances, especially governments in weak states where communist ideology appealed to populations with weak or poorly developed civil, social, and security networks. Over the long run, U.S. strategic success would depend on the emergence of secure states with a commitment to the rule of law and human rights, however imperfect it might be. To help shape the emergence of these states, the U.S. needed to bring to bear its own integrated military and diplomatic power to help nations solve their own problems and become stronger.⁵¹ This is the very same approach now being taken for the ongoing Long War, which ultimately seeks to deny

⁴⁹ This JIC uses the term "operational direction" to describe the authority over US military forces that the President will delegate to the chief of mission for a specific complex contingency operation for which the chief of mission has responsibility. Title 22, U.S. Code 3927 currently prohibits chiefs of mission from directing, coordinating, or supervising the activities or operations of military forces under the command of a US area military commander such as a geographic combatant commander.

⁵⁰ Colonel Robert B. Killebrew, U.S. Army (retired), "The Army and the Changing American Strategy," *Army*, August 2007, p. 30.

⁵¹ Killebrew, "The Army and the Changing American Strategy," p. 26.

radical extremist ideologies from gaining any sanctuaries or safe havens in weak or failing states around the world.

After Vietnam, however, many of the MAAGs were dismantled or severely reduced. Today, the defense attaché generally serves as the ambassador's advisor on military issues and as the primary contact with the host nation's military. Depending on the quantity of military assistance provided to a country, the embassy may also host an Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC), which serves as the in-country coordinator of programs like the foreign military financing (FMF) program, the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), and the international military education and training program (IMET)—all programs funded in the civilian foreign affairs budget, directed by the Secretary of State, and executed by DOD.⁵² The country may also host a Military Information Support Team (MIST).

Under the MILGRP 21 concept, the Joint Force would reconstitute permanent MILGRPs as part of the COM's country team in as many countries as would accept them. The MILGRP commander would become the ambassador's principal military advisor, and the defense attaché, ODC, and MIST would all become part of an expanded MILGRP. There would be no set MILGRP structure or manning requirement; the character of each MILGRP would vary, with each being named, organized, and staffed according to the needs of the COM and desires of the host country. The only common characteristic would be that the MILGRPs would be part of the COM's permanent country team, and would perform its missions under the operational direction of the COM (see Figure 10).

⁵² "Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign," pp. 6-7.




Figure 10: MILGRP 21 Concept

These MILGRPs would work to build host nation security force capabilities and capacities within the broader framework of the ambassador’s diplomatic efforts as well as USG efforts to help build a strong, functioning state. They would develop plans and recommendations for all military-related programs implemented in-country, including humanitarian and development assistance, security cooperation programs, and Section 1206 security assistance. Once approved by the COM, the MILGRP would direct these activities. Accordingly, they would be significantly different from current security cooperation organizations. In addition to their current Title 22 security assistance functions, they would have expanded Title 10 authorities compared to current security cooperation organizations, including the authority to conduct combat operations, arrange for U.S. combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) of partner forces, and support the IW activities of OGAs. They would also have enhanced authority to expend funds in direct support of the full range of IW activities.⁵³ A fuller discussion on expanding the responsibilities of the MILGRP, drawn directly from the IW JOC, is included in Appendix E.

The MILGRP commander would exercise operational control over all rotational and periodic Joint Force deployments to their countries made in support of the persistent, global, indirect IW campaign—such as Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) and Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) teams. In effect, these deployments would represent a temporary reinforcement of the host nation MILGRP, tailored to the demands of the host nation as jointly determined by the COM, the MILGRP commander, and the appropriate RCC.

⁵³ IW JOC, pp. 25-26.

The two key advantages of this approach would be that all military activities would be part of the COM's overall strategy to build a strong relationship between the U.S. and the host nation government, and be directed by a military organization tasked with developing the strongest possible relationship with the host nation's military and security forces. The approach would also help inculcate the notion that *all* supporting activities inside a host country in support of the global fight against radical extremism were part of an integrated interagency effort under the control of the President's senior representative in country, the COM.

The personnel making up the MILGRP would be instrumental in conducting both the IPE and OPE for any ISSS or any other U.S. military operations. Along with the other members of the country team, the MILGRP would serve as America's "listening posts" on the frontline of the global war on terror, providing early warning on deteriorating (or reports on improving) host nation security situations. Finally, their understanding of the country's relevant populations, cultures, political authorities, personalities, security forces, and terrain would be invaluable during both the planning and execution of any ISSS operation—or, for that matter, any U.S. military operation.

4.b.(iii) Trust and Cooperation Cannot be Surged

[This idea is consistent with the idea of Maintaining Strong Interpersonal Relationships in Strategic Countries, found in the IW JOC.]

An empowered country team with an embedded MILGRP would provide an invaluable foundation upon which to build and maintain strong interpersonal relationships in strategic countries around the world. ISSS operations, like all irregular warfare operations, are ultimately about gaining influence and legitimacy over relevant people and populations. In line with this thinking, the most critical determinant of success for any ISSS operation will be whether or not the operation strengthens or weakens *the host government's* legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the national population. This will require that the U.S. agencies and forces normally *work through* the host nation's government and security forces, supporting their roles as the leader of all ISSS operations and activities.

The basis for any ISSS operation is therefore a partnership in which the host nation is first among equals: the supported government must trust the U.S. to put the host nation's objectives first; the supporting U.S. forces and agencies must trust that the supported government will not ask U.S. forces and agencies to pursue policies or tasks that are not aligned with U.S. interests. Any partnership based on trust can be

immeasurably aided by the establishment and maintenance of strong interpersonal relationships between U.S. diplomatic and military personnel operating in strategic countries and their counterparts in foreign governments and security forces. Necessarily, time and continued engagement are critical to establishing good relations. These relationships forge the basis for trust and shared cooperative purpose in crises. By permanently assigning MILGRPs to strong country teams in strategic countries around the world, the Joint Force would gain far more than just acute cultural awareness and intelligence.

While the lack of a long-term diplomatic and security relationship or partnership between the United States and the host nation will not automatically preclude an ISSS operation, it certainly will make it more difficult. Mutual trust and cooperation are key requirements for any successful *indirect* operation. However, as the new Maritime Strategy for Cooperative 21st Century Seapower says, “although our forces can surge when necessary to respond to crises, *trust and cooperation cannot be surged*. Both must be built over time so that the strategic interests of the participants are continuously considered while mutual understanding and respect are promoted.”⁵⁴ A long-term relationship between the U.S. country team and MILGRP and the host nation characterized by a high level of trust and mutual understanding would be a powerful “force multiplier” for all U.S. military operations, ISSS operations included.

4.b.(iv) Achieving Unity of Purpose and Effort

[This idea is consistent with the idea of Creating Alternative Command and Control (C2) Mechanisms for Conducting and Supporting IW found in the IW JOC; and the idea of Mechanisms for Achieving Unified Action found in the SSTRO JOC.]

As the preceding three ideas suggest, fighting a protracted, global indirect IW campaign will require the Joint Force to conduct persistent, distributed IPE and OPE efforts, build the security and IW capabilities and capacities of state partners, and plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate their IW activities with those being conducted by U.S. interagency teams in U.S. missions around the world. However, as the IW JOC concluded, *the current use of Joint Task Forces (JTFs) reporting directly to geographic combatant commanders does not facilitate any of these critical IA and multinational IW activities*. It goes on to say that future combatant commanders will have to have alternative command

⁵⁴ Admiral Gary Roughead, USN, Chief of Naval Operations; General James T. Conway, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps; Admiral Thad W. Allen, Commandant of the Coast Guard, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, October 2007, p. 11.

and control mechanisms for conducting and supporting IW operations when a JTF is not required to conduct large-scale combat operations. Some of the alternatives will require changes to current authorities.⁵⁵

At the national level, the new Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization (IMS for R&S) is designed to assist Washington policymakers, COMs, and military commanders to manage complex R&S engagements by ensuring coordination among all USG stakeholders at the strategic, operational and tactical/field levels. These complex engagements represent high national and security priorities, involve widespread instability or breakdowns in security, may require military operations, and involve policy and programmatic responses from multiple USG agencies. The IMS for R&S aims to identify and implement coherent “whole of government” responses to such complex crises and engagements.⁵⁶

The IMS for R&S can be triggered for a number of reasons, among them imminent state failure, particularly where the host government is unable to respond, or upon the recommendation of a COM or an appropriate DOS Regional Assistant Secretary—reasons conceptually aligned with this JIC.⁵⁷ Should either of these two triggers occur, and if the President orders an ISSS operation, the following bodies would be formed⁵⁸:

- The **Country Reconstruction & Stability Group** (CRSG), a Washington-based decision-making body (Policy Coordinating Committee, or PCC, co-chaired by the appropriate DOS Regional Assistant Secretary and the DOS Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization) with a dedicated planning and operations staff. The CRSG would serve as the central coordinating body for the USG ISSS operation, preparing the whole-of-government strategic plan and managing supporting IA operations.
- An **Integration Planning Cell** (IPC), an IA planning staff deployed and co-located with the appropriate Regional Combatant

⁵⁵ IW JOC, p. 24.

⁵⁶ Overview of Interagency Management System for Reconstruction & Stabilization, undated point paper, p. 1.

⁵⁷ Triggering Mechanisms for “Whole-of-Government” Planning for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation (R&S PCC Approved), undated point paper, p. 3.

⁵⁸ Derived from the Overview of Interagency Management System for Reconstruction & Stabilization, undated point paper.

Command headquarters. The IPC would assist the RCC in harmonizing the civilian and military planning processes and operations for ISSS operations. In the case of a multinational-led ISSS operation, an IPC could also be deployed to its headquarters to offer advice and support as appropriate.

- An **Advance Civilian Team** (ACT), an R&S interagency general staff deployed to the host nation embassy, under COM authority. The ACT would, in essence, serve as the IA reinforcements necessary for the COM to coordinate and support the execution of an ISSS operation. The ACT would be assimilated within existing embassy and USAID mission structures as appropriate to support the COM's implementation of the USG ISSS operation. The COM's MILGRP would also be assimilated into the ACT for the duration of the ISSS operations, with the MILGRP commander normally acting as the ACT deputy for military operations. Depending on the overall security situation and the extent of Joint Force involvement in the ISSS operation, DOD may also reinforce the MILGRP.
- Finally, if the COM determines that IA field units are necessary to assist the host nation government at the state, territory, district or provincial level, the appropriate number of **Field Advance Civilian Agency Teams** (FACTs) would be sent. As Provincial Reconstruction Teams do now, FACTs would integrate with U.S. host nation, and international military forces to achieve the highest level of USG, host nation, and coalition unity of effort.

Since the intent of all ISSS operations is to work through a functioning government, the chain of command for ISSS operations needs to reflect the overall responsibility of the COM, but accommodate the fact that the majority of capabilities and capacities, especially during the critical early phases of the operation, will come from DOD. Especially if U.S. JTFs or Joint Special Operations Task Forces (JSOTFs) are formed, the COM's overall authority over military activities in-country should be made clear in a memorandum of understanding with the relevant RCC. Such authority would include approving any military mission, monitoring its implementation, and terminating it, if necessary. One possible option might be to designate the Deputy Combatant Commander as the temporary MILGRP commander, as well as Commander, U.S. Advisory Element and Joint Task Force Commander (if one is formed). This would ensure the highest level of integration between COM and RCC efforts.

4.b.(v) Expanding the Role of General Purpose Forces to Support and Execute a Global, Indirect IW Campaign

[This idea is consistent with the idea of Expanding the Role of GPF to Support and Execute IW found in the IW JOC.]

Supporting a global indirect IW campaign will present unique challenges for GPF, which are generally far more comfortable with and proficient at employing direct approaches—Joint Force led operations using well understood planning processes and tactics, techniques, and procedures. As a result, U.S. GPF have normally been content to leave indirect approaches, which are normally pursued through foreign forces trained to lower standards and far less sophisticated TTPs than the Joint Force, to the U.S. SOF community. However, as suggested throughout this JIC, given both the urgent nature of ISSS operations and the sheer numbers of advisors and trainers that may be required to help quickly shore up the host nation's capabilities and capacities, GPF will need to be as adept at planning and employing indirect approaches as are U.S. special operations forces.

U.S. GPF can and have been used effectively in indirect roles. One example is the Marine Corps Combined Action Platoon (CAP) program, developed during the Vietnam War. The CAP program placed carefully screened, enhanced-trained, combat-experienced rifle squads of Marine and Navy (corpsmen) volunteers in Vietnamese villages, where the Marines served as mentors, trainers, and advisors to the platoon of militia or Popular Force security troops which lived there. Although the CAP program was not fully resourced or appreciated at the time, it proved to be a very effective means of securing the local populace while simultaneously denying the Viet Cong any permanent sanctuary or means of support.⁵⁹ Indeed, the Marines planned to resurrect the concept in Iraq in 2004. The idea was for Marines to live among the Iraqi people, training together with their local police or National Guard unit, and conducting joint security patrols. However, the concept never really took root due to the major combat operations fought that year in Fallujah and Najaf.⁶⁰

With regard to ISSS operations, however, perhaps an even better example of the use of GPF personnel also comes from the Vietnam War, where

⁵⁹ For a discussion on CAPs in Vietnam, see Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), pp. 172-177; and Major Curtis L. Williamson, USMC, "The US Marine Corps Combined Action Program (CAP): A Proposed Alternative Strategy for Vietnam," Unpublished Master's Thesis, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 1999.

⁶⁰ For a recapitulation of U.S. Marine operations in Al Anbar province in 2004, see *Operations in Al Anbar, Iraq, 2004: An Irregular Warfare Case Study* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2007).

Army combat arms officers were used extensively as advisors to the South Vietnamese armed forces. In 1956, the newly formed U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) in South Vietnam numbered 740 Army advisors and personnel. In 1961, a decision was made to assign advisors to every South Vietnamese battalion, causing a jump in the overall requirement for advisors to over 3,400 personnel. In 1964, the MAAG was renamed the Field Advisory Element under Military Assistance Command Vietnam, the unified command for all U.S. forces in Vietnam. At the peak of the war in 1968, 9,430 Army personnel acted as advisors down to the district and battalion level. In other words, the Army advisory effort increased from 740 to over 9,400 personnel over a period of 12 years.

As mentioned earlier, one can easily imagine an ISSS operation designed to prevent a large state from failing requiring a far greater number of advisors over a much shorter time horizon. For example, one concept of operations for an ISSS operation developed during a recent wargame called for the immediate deployment of 12,650 combat arms advisors and trainers. Another 1,440 “SSTR Advisors”—civil military affairs officers, combat engineers, etc.—were assigned to Field Advance Civilian Teams. These numbers did not include six Combat Advisory Support Battalions formed to support and sustain this large advisory force in the field.

Being able to generate quickly such large numbers of advisors and trainers and the logistical and operational support structure to support and sustain them will require a substantial, standing Joint Force advisory and training effort. Two approaches toward this end were discussed at the aforementioned wargame: building a standing advisory training corps, and over-manning officers and senior non-commissioned officers in the GPF by 10 percent and assigning them to rotational advisory or training tours. While both approaches have merits and demerits, they provide reasonable ways to solve the problem of quickly generating large numbers of advisors and trainers. Joint Force experimentation would help to determine which way is more effective and sustainable, or if other approaches are superior.

The Joint Force generally considers the advisory and training function as being focused on improving the capabilities and capacities of foreign conventional combat units or special forces. Accordingly, combat advisors and trainers are normally combat arms or special operations officers and staff non-commissioned officers. However, as mentioned above, in ISSS operations, the focus of the advisory and training function may be far broader and encompass such tasks as advising and training law enforcement units and foreign government agencies—at least until such time as USG and international forces and units can be deployed.

For the purposes of this JIC, then, a **military advisor** is a member of the armed forces assigned to transfer military expertise to the military forces of a friendly country. Serving in an advisory capacity requires expertise in a military specialty, an ability to convey knowledge in a manner conducive to the mission, and a level of maturity that enables the advisor to represent the United States and his or her branch of service. Advisors may serve at every organizational level and under all conditions, from peacetime training to, when authorized, accompanying allied forces during combat operations. They may also be employed unconventionally, providing support to foreign governmental agencies, law enforcement, and other non-military units in the absence of IA personnel [proposed definition].

Guided by this definition, ISSS operations may require at least four different types of military advisors, including: combat arms advisors, special operations advisors, law enforcement advisors, and SSTR advisors. The number and mix of each type of advisors is highly dependent on the needs of the host government and the security situation in the host nation.

GPF support to ISSS operations will not be limited to advisory and training functions. Other specific GPF missions might include conducting COIN campaigns and counter-terrorism operations and providing interim military government or civil administration functions. GPF must also be adept at communicating the U.S. strategic message.

As this discussion suggests, then, executing a global indirect IW campaign characterized by persistent presence and partnership building operations and periodic ISSS operations will increasingly require GPF to perform missions that in the last few decades have been viewed primarily as the responsibility of special operations forces. Rebalancing GPF to conduct IW will expand Joint Force operational reach and enhance GPF versatility. The results will be improved capabilities to operate against adversaries who use IW and an expanded ability to use IW to achieve US strategic objectives. Accordingly, GPF personnel should receive cultural and language training for the operational areas to which they deploy.

4.b.(vi) Indirect Does Not Mean Invisible

Developing and implementing an indirect campaign approach does not mean that U.S. forces must be invisible to the host population. While the aforementioned CAP program is a perfect example of GPF forces being used indirectly, the specially trained squads were anything but invisible to the village populations they protected. The same reasoning would apply to an Army rifle squad assigned to be a quick reaction force for

district police force, or a Marine rifle company assigned as the tactical reserve for a provincial militia.

An ISSS operation of any size could involve large numbers of personnel, particularly in advisory and training roles, which would themselves require a substantial operational and logistics support infrastructure. Joint Force Commanders should be less concerned about making these forces invisible to the population and more concerned about emphasizing their supporting and indirect roles, and keeping host nation security forces front and center in the majority of operations.

That said, any Indirect Security and Stability Surge operation is likely to include some direct U.S. actions. For example, some adversaries, such as terrorists or insurgents fighting for a religious or tribal cause, may be so committed that they simply cannot be persuaded or coerced into laying down their arms. These individuals must be either killed or captured, and doing so may be beyond the ability of the host nation government. Accordingly, an ISSS operation can and will often include direct U.S. actions at the tactical level. Whenever possible, these actions should include host nation advisors or exchange officers; in all cases they should be low visibility operations.

Nevertheless, even when used indirectly, any sizeable ISSS operation will inevitably be noticed and seized upon by adversaries of the host government as proof the government is weak and incapable. That is why information operations must always lead ISSS operations, and why host nation agencies and forces must normally direct any operation, with U.S. agencies and forces in a clearly supporting role.

4.b.(vii). Building Host Nation Capability and Capacity and Reducing the Drivers of Instability and Conflict

[This idea is consistent with the idea of Building Host Nation Capability and Capacity and Reducing the Drivers of Instability and Conflict found in the SSTRO JOC.]

A key task of any ISSS operation is to perform stabilization activities, defined as activities undertaken to manage underlying tensions and drivers of instability and conflict and to prevent or halt the further deterioration of security, economic, and/or political systems. However, unlike stabilization operations that seek to establish the preconditions for larger-scale U.S. reconstruction efforts designed to help a state expand its capacities and capabilities to provide for good governance, adequate social services, and economic opportunity, ISSS stabilization operations seek only to set the preconditions for an immediate transition back to a steady-state, low visibility U.S. presence.

Normally, stabilization activities are undertaken by civilian organizations in permissive environments and by military organizations in contested environments. By their very nature, however, ISSS operations will normally take place in extremely unsettled security situations, including situations which involve armed opposition to U.S. and host nation efforts. Military organizations therefore must have the capability and capacity to conduct stability operations in areas wracked by violence, or be prepared to provide USG agencies responsible for these operations with force protection. At the same time, the IA must develop deployable “expeditionary” stability units capable of functioning in uncertain security environments.

4.b.(viii). Expanding Host Nation Policing, Law Enforcement and Constabulary Capabilities and Capacities

In Nigeria, the entire Nigerian armed forces include approximately 60,000 personnel. In contrast, the Nigerian National Police Force (NPF) is over five times as large, with more than 320,000 officers. This pattern is reflected in many developing nations, especially former colonies or countries with a history of military coups. As a consequence, host nation police and law enforcement, customs, and border security personnel are essential in helping to establish a safe and secure environment. For example, law enforcement activities account for 75 to 85 percent of all terrorists killed or captured. In contrast, only one to three percent are killed or captured as the result of SOF or other special unit direct action, while another eight to ten percent are neutralized by military combat operations.⁶¹

As a result, a global, indirect IW campaign must emphasize the patient building of partner civil and internal security capabilities and capacities as much as building military capabilities and capacities—if not more. The logical responsible USG agency for these efforts is the Department of State, with assistance from the Department of Justice (DOJ), Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), USAID, and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). A good model for such collaborative activities is the Pakistan Internal Security Enhancement Program, established in 2003, which sought to enhance Pakistan’s control over its border areas; counter the illicit movement of drugs and arms through the country; and

⁶¹ Joseph D. Celeski, Colonel, U.S. Army, retired, “Policing, Law Enforcement, and Constabulary Operations in COIN Environment,” an undated Joint Special Operations University PowerPoint briefing.

to institute police reforms, enhance police CT capabilities, and to professionalize police investigative techniques and capabilities.⁶²

Any ISSS operation should also have a plan for rapidly reinforcing, augmenting, and building up host nation policing, law enforcement, and constabulary capabilities and capacities. Accordingly, the USG must develop the means and ways to expand and advise national police, law enforcement, and security forces on a large scale, in short order. Barring the development of a large pool of expeditionary civil and internal security training and advisory teams inside DOS and DOJ, the Joint Force may be required to provide such support until such time as USG or international law enforcement agencies can arrive on scene. One way to do this might be to establish a Constabulary Training and Advisory Force with Title 14 law enforcement authorities like those assigned to the U.S. Coast Guard for maritime security missions. Constabulary forces are paramilitary or hybrid organizations like the Italian Carabinieri or French Gendarmerie which possess police and law enforcement powers and light infantry weapons and skills. They are normally under the control of a host nation's Ministry of the Interior (MOI).⁶³

Another possible Joint Force capability of great value might be specialized IW units that develop organized host nation teams which mirror or are disguised as one of the insurgent or terrorist forces operating in-country. Their purpose would be to infiltrate civilian communities or adversary operating areas in order to develop intelligence on enemy organizations for follow-on counter-organization law enforcement operations. Such pseudo operations require a great deal of ready money, as they rely on paid informants and rewards.

Under any circumstances, the Joint Force would likely be tasked to provide quick reaction force support to host nation police at the province, district, or state level. The point here is that both the USG and the Joint Force must work together to exploit the great potential of a host nation's civil and internal security forces.

Note: the primary purpose of this document is to develop an IW “sub-concept” that could become a part of the JOpsC family of concepts. Accordingly, the concept for Military Support to Indirect Security and Stability Surge Operations was written as a proposed

⁶² Celeski, Colonel, U.S. Army, retired, “Policing, Law Enforcement, and Constabulary Operations in COIN Environment.”

⁶³ Celeski, Colonel, U.S. Army, retired, “Policing, Law Enforcement, and Constabulary Operations in COIN Environment.”

Joint Integrating Concept. It explores in greater detail concepts proposed in the Irregular Warfare and Military Support to Stabilization, Security, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concepts. Further work will be required should this concept be approved as the basis for a new JIC. The remaining sections are placeholder designed to facilitate and guide further concept development work.

4.c. Vignette

Appendix F portrays a vignette used in two recent wargames to consider and study Military Support to Indirect Stability and Security Surge Operations. The vignette describes a fictional, oil-producing country in West Africa in the midst of a deteriorating security and governance situation, including the breakdown of urban social services, factional violence, a criminal-based insurgency, and a brewing religious insurgency. It is presented as a basis for further development of a Joint Force Table of Objectives, Operational effects and Capabilities for ISSS operations.

5. Capabilities

Effective ISSS operations require a range of functional and operational capabilities across the Joint Force, U.S. Government departments and agencies, and multinational organizations. Due to their nature, many ISSS MMEs require capabilities that reside outside of DOD. This provisional JIC identifies four ISSS functional capabilities and six operational capabilities.

Should this JIC be approved for further development, further analysis and experimentation would aim to identify critical and enabling capabilities for each of the functional and operational capabilities. Critical capabilities focus on the primary abilities that allow the force to accomplish a desired effect. Enabling capabilities support critical capabilities and allow a force to accomplish an important task that underpins the accomplishment of a desired effect.

5.a. Functional Capabilities

Functional capabilities are those that allow the Joint Force to perform tasks that occur across all aspects of an ISSS operation; thus, functional capabilities are required to successfully carry out each of the major mission elements throughout the campaign, e.g., creating shared

situational awareness among diverse stakeholders. The four functional capabilities are:

5.a.(i) Cultural awareness/understanding of the operational environment: the ability to develop a thorough understanding of the host nation’s culture, governmental capabilities and capacities, and security force capabilities and capacities, as well as the degree of population homogeneity or fragmentation, nature of internal and external security threats, and likely reaction of the population to U.S. intervention. Such knowledge is normally the result of long-term and persistent diplomatic and military relationships and partnerships. Without them, the government must rely on a superb and agile cultural intelligence apparatus.

5.a.(ii) U.S. Government rapid reaction: the ability to determine the host nation’s immediate needs, identify the best USG or DoD provider for required capabilities and capacities, and move these capabilities and capacities rapidly to the host nation. ISSS operations are, by definition, a crisis response operation; a strategically important country is on the verge of collapse. Being able to react rapidly to such failing state scenarios is a critical Joint Force capability.

5.a. (iii) Effective command, control, and coordination: the ability to effectively command, control, and coordinate the actions of all assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of ISSS missions, and to effectively coordinate and integrate efforts between elements of DOD, engaged U.S. Government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector. Achieving unified action in indirect operations is as important as it is in direct operations—if not more so. Forces or agencies that pursue their own agendas rather than the host nation’s agenda threaten the success of the entire operation.

5.a. (iv) Joint Force IW and SSTR surge capacity: the ability to surge forward personnel and units equipped, organized, and trained for irregular warfare and SSTRO operations, while sustaining a persistent, global, indirect IW campaign. This ability compels the Joint Force to develop an adequate pool of IW and SSTR personnel and units to allow the rapid generation of the “overwhelming” ISSS capabilities and capacities needed to ensure a Chief of Mission and Joint Force Commanders can fulfill ISSS objectives. *Ad hoc* GPF units cobbled together with little IW training greatly diminishes the likelihood of mission success.

5.b. Operational capabilities

Operational capabilities focus on those things needed to accomplish the desired end state for each major mission element within an ISSS operation. The six operational capabilities are:

5.b.(i) Conducting strategic communication operations: the ability to engage key local and foreign audiences in order to maintain the host government's national credibility and legitimacy, thereby creating the conditions necessary for the achievement of overall ISSS goals and objectives.

5.b.(ii) Conducting indirect and direct operations to re-establish security and to restore the host nation's monopoly on violence: the ability to defeat or suppress all internal and external security threats and restore the host nation government's monopoly on violence. These activities emphasize indirect approaches, and rely on combat arms and special operations advisors.

5.b.(iii) Conducting rapid security assistance/foreign internal defense operations to build host nation security capabilities: the ability to generate large numbers of trainers, equipment, and resources in order to create or expand a host nation's military, police, and security force capabilities and capacities.

5.b.(iv) Creating a low visibility operations and logistics support infrastructure: the ability to build up rapidly minimal footprint operations and support infrastructure for a large fielded combat advisor and SSTR advisor force, and a substantial security assistance/FID effort.

5.b.(iv) Performing appropriate indirect stability reconstruction operations: the ability to build up host nation governance capabilities and capacities in order to provide for the immediate provision of basic necessities (e.g., water, food, sanitation, public health, medical care) to the host nation population and to enhance the government's credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the population.

5.b.(vi) Preparing for the rapid transition to a persistent, low visibility presence: the ability to return rapidly to a steady-state, low visibility U.S. presence led by the COM and an empowered country team/MILGRP that aims for the continued patient expansion of host nation government and military capabilities and capacities.

6. Risks and Mitigation

The risks associated with ISSS operations are closely aligned with those identified for SSTR operations. These risks could hinder the conduct of an ISSS operation, or even cause it to fail. These risks include:

- **The American public and its elected representatives will not allow the United States to get involved in a major ISSS operation for fear that it will turn into a lengthy, costly SSTR or COIN campaign. (high risk)**

The recommended mitigation strategy focuses on having DOD and its IA partners develop the rapidly deployable and sustainable capabilities needed to quickly initiate effective operations within and across the MMEs of a major ISSS operation, and a standing Interagency Team trained to monitor and assess the effectiveness of ISSS operations. This standing IA Team would provide the President and Congress with regular recommendations on whether or not to continue operations. A state collapse would require an automatic review of U.S. strategy and intentions.

- **The U.S. interagency community will not develop sufficient amounts of the kinds of rapidly deployable civilian capabilities needed to conduct an ISSS operation. (high risk)**

The recommended mitigation strategy involves working with the National Security Council and Congress to build the support and resources necessary, to build an IW- and SSTR-related surge capacity in the interagency for use in ISSS operations.

- **DOD and DOS will not develop an effective command, control, and communications structure to ensure unified action in an ISSS operation. (medium risk)**

The recommended mitigation strategy is to assign an empowered Chief of Mission the responsibility and authority to direct and lead all ISSS operations not related to direct combat operations, and the authority to approve or disapprove all combat operations inside the borders of the host country.

- **Multiple external actors, including the U.S. military and interagency elements, will prove unable to integrate their efforts across the ISSS operation's multidimensional mission elements with those of the existing host nation government, and will therefore undermine the host nation's credibility and legitimacy, risking mission success. (medium risk)**

This is a variation of the previously identified risk. The recommended mitigation strategy is to give the empowered COM responsibility for writing the performance evaluation of all U.S.

government personnel in country, and the fitness reports of all military personnel assigned to the Country Team. Additionally, the COM would be given the authority to expel, without appeal, the personnel of any U.S. government agency deemed to be putting their own objectives above those of the host nation government.

- **DOD force structure and force management policies will not facilitate the recruitment, development, rotation, and sustainment of sufficient military personnel needed to fight a persistent global counterinsurgency campaign and to conduct periodic ISSS operations. (medium risk)**

The recommended mitigation strategy is to change the force planning and sizing construct to develop forces for *one* conventional, high-intensity combined arms campaign and *one* persistent global counterinsurgency marked by periodic indirect surges and less frequent direct campaigns.

- **In the coming years, the U.S. military will abandon attempts to expand IW forces well-trained for ISSS operations in favor of expanding “full spectrum” GPF forces and relying on ad hoc ISSS responses. (medium risk)**

This is a variation of the previously identified risk. The recommended mitigation strategy is for the Secretary of Defense to continue to highlight the importance of IW capabilities and to alter the force planning and sizing construct as outlined above.

7. Implications⁶⁴

This *Military Support to Indirect Security and Stability Surge Operations* JIC provides the basis for operational and force development as well as further joint concept development and experimentation, including various types of wargaming. While this Joint Integrating Concept identifies a series of key conceptual elements as well as many Joint Force capabilities that should play important roles in future ISSS operations, further analysis is needed to refine the concepts proposed herein, and to identify and develop the needed conventional, IW, and SSTR capabilities and capacities.

7.a. Operational and Force Development

⁶⁴ This section is derived from the implications section in the SSTRO JOC.

The vision of ISSS operations laid out in this JIC makes clear that the Joint Force must be appropriately trained, ready, and equipped to conduct and support these complex, indirect, interagency operations. Joint Force personnel at all levels need to internalize the concepts behind fighting a protracted global, indirect IW campaign that is as focused as much on influencing and controlling relevant populations as it is on destroying the enemy; conducting preventive and proactive operations to avert the collapse of allied, partner, and strategically important states; and substituting for IA partners in an indirect security and stability surge until these partners are able to arrive on the scene. As a special type of IW and SSTR operations, ISSS operations will be an essential “core” mission for the U.S. Armed Forces as they wage the Long War against radical extremists, terrorists, and other irregular adversaries.

The most important military capabilities needed to carry out effective ISSS operations are described throughout sections 4 and 5 above. Other capability development efforts should flow out of the completion of a capabilities-based assessment (CBA), derived from this proposed JIC.

7.b. Concept Development and Experimentation

As just suggested, the Joint Concept Development and Experimentation (JCD&E) Community, in accordance with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3010.02B, *Joint Operations Concept Development Process*, may consider adopting *Military Support to Indirect Security and Stability Surge Operations* as the basis for a formal Joint Integrating Concept and/or for additional follow-on experimentation.

If so, this proposed *Military Support to Indirect Security and Stability Surge Operations JIC* might serve as the basis for these follow-on efforts. At the very least, it could serve as a resource to assist designers of Title 10 and interagency wargames and other experiments in identifying both key problems and solutions to ISSS operations, as well as fruitful directions for further research and analysis, experiments, and wargames.

Future experiments and wargames should augment the two wargames used to inform the development of this proposed JIC, preferably with relevant modeling and simulation tools to develop and test potential ISSS courses of actions and assess potential outcomes of actions. These tools might also help to help identify ISSS gaps and shortfalls in the Joint Force conventional, IW, and SSTR portfolios. Identifying solution sets for the problems and Joint Force capability and capacity shortfalls associated with ISSS operations will be a continuous, ongoing process.

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Appendix B: Glossary and Acronyms

Unless otherwise stated, all definitions are taken from the *Dictionary of Military Terms*, Joint Pub 1-02 online version, <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict>, as amended through 8 August 2006.

adversary—A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged.

armed group—A group that employs force to achieve its objectives; is not within the formal military structure of any state, alliance of states, or intergovernmental organization; and is not under the control of the state(s) in which it operates. (Proposed)

attribute—A testable and measurable characteristic that describes an aspect of a capability. (CJCSI 3170.01C)

black propaganda—Propaganda that purports to emanate from a source other than the true one. See also propaganda.

capability—The ability to execute a specified course of action. (A capability may or may not be accompanied by an intention.) (JP 1-02) It is defined by an operational user and expressed in broad operational terms in the format of an initial capabilities document or a DOTMLPF change recommendation. In the case of materiel proposals, the definition will progressively evolve to DOTMLPF performance attributes identified in the CDD and the CPD. (CJCSI 3170.01) See also military capability.

civil administration—An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. Also called **CA**.

civil affairs activities—Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations. See also civil affairs; civil-military operations.

civil affairs—Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. See also civil affairs activities; civil-military operations.

civil engineering—Those combat support and combat service support activities that identify, design, construct, lease, or provide facilities, and which operate, maintain, and perform war damage repair and other engineering functions in support of military operations. See also civil engineering support plan; combat service support; combat support.

civil-military operations—The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called **CMO**. See also civil affairs; civil affairs activities. (JP 1.02)

clandestine operation—An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. A clandestine operation differs from a covert operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of the identity of the sponsor. In special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine and may focus equally on operational considerations and intelligence-related activities. (JP 1-02)

collateral damage—Unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time. Such damage is not unlawful so long as it is not excessive in light of the overall military advantage anticipated from the attack.

combating weapons of mass destruction. The integrated and dynamic activities of the Department of Defense across the full range of counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and consequence management efforts to counter WMD, their means of delivery, and related materials.

Also called **CWMD**. (National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NMS-CWMD), 13 February 2006)

conflict—An armed struggle or clash between organized groups within a nation or between nations in order to achieve limited political or military objectives. Although regular forces are often involved, irregular forces frequently predominate. Conflict often is protracted, confined to a restricted geographic area, and constrained in weaponry and level of violence. Within this state, military power in response to threats may be exercised in an indirect manner while supportive of other instruments of national power. Limited objectives may be achieved by the short, focused, and direct application of force. (JP 3-0)

consequence management—Actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, manmade, or terrorist incidents. Also called CM.

contested environment—An operational environment in which: (a) A friendly government or occupying power has authorized US military operations but does not have effective control of the territory and population in the operational area, or the capability or intent to assist the joint force effectively; or (b) A hostile government or occupying power is opposed to US military operations but does not have effective control of the territory and population in the operational area, or the capability or intent to oppose the joint force effectively. See also **operational environment**. (Proposed)

control—Physical or psychological pressures exerted with the intent to assure that an agent or group will respond as directed.

conventional forces—1. Those forces capable of conducting operations using non-nuclear weapons. 2. Those forces other than designated special operations forces. (JP 3-05)

conventional—Activities, operations, organizations, capabilities, etc., of the regular armed forces of a country, that are capable of conducting military operations using non-nuclear weapons, but excluding designated special operations forces. (Proposed)

coordinating authority—A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement.

In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations.

counterinsurgency—Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Also called **COIN**.

counterintelligence—Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called **CI**. See also counterespionage; countersabotage; countersubversion; security; security intelligence.

counterpropaganda operations—Those psychological operations activities that identify adversary propaganda, contribute to situational awareness, and serve to expose adversary attempts to influence friendly populations and military forces.

counterterrorism—Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. Also called **CT**. See also antiterrorism; combating terrorism; terrorism. (JP 1-02)

denied area—An operational area where a friendly or neutral government or occupying power is opposed to US military operations and has both effective control of the territory and population in the operational area, and the capability and intent to oppose the joint force effectively. (Proposed)

disabling—Making incapable or ineffective. [*Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary*, <http://www.m-w.com>, accessed 28 Aug 07]

doctrine—Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. See also multinational doctrine; joint doctrine; multi-Service doctrine.

enabling—1. Providing with the means or opportunity. 2. Making possible, practical, or easy. 3. Causing to operate. [*Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary*, <http://www.m-w.com>, accessed 28 Aug 07]

enemy combatant—Any person in an armed conflict who could be properly detained under the laws and customs of war. Also called EC.

facility—A real property entity consisting of one or more of the following: a building, a structure, a utility system, pavement, and underlying land.

foreign internal defense—Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called **FID**. (JP 1-02)

general purpose forces—The regular armed forces of a country, other than nuclear forces and special operations forces, that are organized, trained, and equipped to perform a broad range of missions across the range of military operations. Also called **GPF**. (Proposed)

grey propaganda—Propaganda that does not specifically identify any source. See also propaganda.

guerrilla warfare—Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. (JP 1-02)

guerrilla warfare—Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. Also called GW.

hostile environment—See operational environment.

hostile force—Any civilian, paramilitary, or military force or terrorist(s), with or without national designation, that have committed a hostile act, exhibited hostile intent, or have been declared hostile by appropriate US authority.

indirect methods (or means)—The term “indirect approach” has three distinct meanings within the context of IW: 1. Unbalance and dislocate adversaries by attacking them physically and psychologically where they are most vulnerable and unsuspecting, rather than where they are strongest or in the manner they expect to be attacked. 2. Empower, enable and leverage interagency and multinational strategic partners to attack adversaries militarily or non-militarily, rather than relying on direct and unilateral military confrontation by US joint forces. 3. Take actions with or against other states or armed groups in order to influence adversaries, rather than taking actions to influence adversaries directly. (Proposed)

information operations—The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. Also called **IO**. See also computer network operations; electronic warfare; military deception; operations security; psychological operations.

information—1. Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. 2. The meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation.

infrastructure—The stock of basic facilities and capital equipment needed for the functioning of an area.

insurgency—1. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02) 2. An organized, armed political struggle whose goal may be the seizure of power through revolutionary takeover and replacement of the existing government. However, insurgencies' goals may be more limited. Insurgencies generally follow a revolutionary doctrine and use armed force as an instrument of policy. (FM 100-20, 1990) 3. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of an established government or societal structure, or the expulsion of a foreign military presence, through the use of subversion and armed conflict. (Proposed by US Special Operations Command)

intelligence activities—The collection, production, and dissemination of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence by agencies within the Intelligence Community. (Derived from Executive Order 12333 and DOD Directive 5240.1)

intelligence collection operations—The use of sensors, including human assets, to detect and monitor both physical and non-physical objects and events in all domains (i.e., physical – maritime, air, space, land; virtual – cyber and information; human – social, moral and cognitive). Observation and collection include the gathering of pertinent environmental factors that can influence operations throughout the domains. (Derived from JCA Comment Resolution Conference – 28 April 05; modified from JP 2-01)

intelligence preparation of the environment—Tactical intelligence activities conducted to gain understanding of the physical, military, and civil characteristics of potential operational areas. Also called **IPE**. (Proposed)

intelligence—1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding.

irregular forces—Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces.

irregular warfare—A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Also called **IW**. (Proposed)

irregular—Activities, operations, organizations, capabilities, etc., in which significant numbers of combatants engage in insurgency and other nonconventional military and paramilitary operations without being members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces of any country. See also **conventional, nonconventional**. (Proposed)

Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System. The Department of Defense system for identifying, assessing, and prioritizing joint military capability needs. Also called **JCIDS**. (Proposed)

joint force—A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander. See also joint force commander.

joint operations—A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not establish joint forces.

joint urban operations—All joint operations planned and conducted across the range of military operations on or against objectives on a topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain where manmade construction or the density of noncombatants are the dominant features. Also called **JUOs**. See also joint operations.

line of operation—1. A logical line that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective(s). 2. A physical line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s). Also called **LOO**.

logistics—The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations that deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services.

low-intensity conflict—Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are localized generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications. Also called **LIC**. (JP 1-02 before term and its definition were deleted)

maneuver—1. A movement to place ships, aircraft, or land forces in a position of advantage over the enemy. 2. A tactical exercise carried out at sea, in the air, on the ground, or on a map in imitation of war. 3. The operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle, to cause it to perform desired movements. 4. Employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission.

materiel—All items (including ships, tanks, self-propelled weapons, aircraft, etc., and related spares, repair parts, and support equipment, but excluding real property, installations, and utilities) necessary to equip, operate, maintain, and support military activities without distinction as to its application for administrative or combat purposes. See also equipment; personal property.

military advisor—A member of the armed forces assigned to transfer military expertise to the military forces of a friendly country. Serving in an advisory capacity requires expertise in a military specialty, an ability to convey knowledge in a manner conducive to the mission, and a level of maturity that enables the advisor to represent the United States and his or her branch of service. Advisors may serve at every organizational level and under all conditions, from peacetime training to, when authorized, accompanying allied forces during combat operations. They may also be employed unconventionally, providing support to foreign governmental agencies, law enforcement, and other non-military units in the absence of IA personnel [**proposed definition**].

military capability—The ability to achieve a specified wartime objective (win a war or battle, destroy a target set). It includes four major components: force structure, modernization, readiness, and sustainability. a. Force Structure - Numbers, size, and composition of the units that comprise our defense forces; e.g., divisions, ships, air wings. b. Modernization - Technical sophistication of forces, units, weapon systems, and equipment. c. Unit Readiness - The ability to provide capabilities required by the combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed. d. Sustainability - The ability to maintain the necessary level and duration of operational activity to achieve military objectives. Sustainability is a function of providing for and maintaining those levels of ready forces, materiel, and consumables necessary to support military effort. (JP 1-02)

military support to security, stability, transition, and reconstruction—Department of Defense activities that support US Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing US interests. (DOD Directive 3000.05)

mobility—A quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission.

nation assistance—Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other US Code Title 10 (DOD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by federal agencies or international organizations. (JP 3-57)

national strategic level of war. See strategic level of war.

nonconventional—Activities, operations, organizations, capabilities, etc., for which the regular armed forces of a country, excluding designated special operations forces, do not have a broad-based requirement for the conduct of combat operations against the regular armed forces of another country. This term includes the employment of conventional forces and capabilities in nonstandard ways or for nonstandard purposes. See also **conventional, irregular.** (Proposed)

non-state actor—A group or organization that is not within the formal structure of any state, not limited by any state boundary, and operates beyond the control of any state and without loyalty to any state.

Examples include international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, private volunteer organizations, political parties, labor unions, commercial trade associations, criminal enterprises, and armed groups such as insurgent and terrorist organizations, informal armed militias, and private military companies. See also armed group, international organization, nongovernmental organization. (Proposed)

objective—The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed. 2. The specific target of the action taken (for example, a definite terrain feature, the seizure or holding of which is essential to the commander's plan, or an enemy force or capability without regard to terrain features). See also target.

operation—A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. 2. The process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.

operational design—The conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or major operation plan and its subsequent execution. See also campaign; major operation.

operational direction—The authority over US military forces that the President delegates to a Chief of Mission for a specific complex contingency operation for which the Chief of Mission has responsibility. Operational direction normally includes the authority to assign tasks, designate objectives, synchronize and integrate actions, and give authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. (Proposed)

operational environment—A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander. Some examples are as follows: a. permissive environment – Operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct. b. uncertain environment – Operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area. c. hostile environment – Operational environment in which hostile forces have control as well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct. (JP 1-02)

operational level of war—The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve

strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to achieve the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. See also strategic level of war; tactical level of war.

operational mode—The degree of secrecy or concealment placed on an operation to limit exposure of those involved or their activities. See also clandestine operation; covert operation; low visibility operations; overt operation. (Proposed)

operational preparation of the environment—Activities conducted prior to d-day, h-hour, in likely or potential areas of operations to prepare and shape the environment to mitigate risk and facilitate success. Also called **OPE** (Proposed)

overt operation—An operation that is planned and executed without any effort to conceal the operation or the identity of the sponsor. (Proposed)

paramilitary forces—Forces or groups that are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. (JP 1-02)

paramilitary—Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., distinct from those of the regular armed forces of any country but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. (Proposed)

partisan warfare—Not to be used. See guerrilla warfare. (JP 1-02)

permissive area—An operational area in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct. (Proposed)

permissive environment—See operational environment.

personnel—Those individuals required in either a military or civilian capacity to accomplish the assigned mission.

propaganda—Any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly. See also black propaganda; grey propaganda; white propaganda.

psychological operations—Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called **PSYOP**. (JP 1-02)

range—1. The distance between any given point and an object or target. 2. Extent or distance limiting the operation or action of something, such as the range of an aircraft, ship, or gun. 3. The distance that can be covered over a hard surface by a ground vehicle, with its rated payload, using the fuel in its tank and its cans normally carried as part of the ground vehicle equipment. 4. Area equipped for practice in shooting at targets. In this meaning, also called target range.

reconstruction operations—Operations to establish or rebuild the critical political, social, and economic systems or infrastructure necessary to facilitate long-term security and the transition to legitimate local governance in an operational area. See also **stability operations**. (Derived from SSTR JOC)

sabotage—An act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war materiel, premises, or utilities, to include human and natural resources.

security forces—Police and constabulary forces, as well as military and paramilitary forces, that protect societies from criminal, terrorist, and other threats to public order. (Proposed)

special operations—Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called **SO**. (JP 3-05)

stability operations—1. An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 1-02) 2. Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions. (DOD Directive 3000.05)

strategic level of war—1. The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks of the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. (JP 1-02) 2. The level of war at which a state or non-state actor, often as a member of an alliance or coalition, determines strategic objectives and guidance, and develops and uses its resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish strategic military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks of the use of military and other instruments of power; develop global or theater plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. The strategic level of war is divided into two sublevels: a. **national strategic** - The President, Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and functional combatant commanders operate at the national strategic sublevel of war when establishing national and military strategic objectives; sequencing strategic initiatives; defining limits and assessing risks of the use of military and other instruments of national power; developing global strategic plans to achieve these objectives; and providing military forces and other capabilities in accordance with these strategic plans. b. **theater strategic** - Geographic combatant commanders normally operate at the theater strategic sublevel of war when developing theater plans to achieve national security or strategic military objectives and applying the military instrument of power in coordination with the other instruments of national power in their areas of responsibility to achieve the desired military end state within the strategic end state determined by national security or strategic military objectives and guidance. (Proposed)

systemic—Of or relating to a system. [*Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary*, <http://www.m-w.com>, accessed 28 Aug 07. Compared to: **systematic**—Characterized by order and planning.]

task—A discrete action performed by an individual or organization to accomplish a mission. Tasks specify what actions must be performed, not who will perform them, how they will be performed, or what means will be employed to perform them. (CJCSM 3500.04C)

terrorism—The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02) The calculated use or threat of unlawful political violence against noncombatants, intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies through fear. (Proposed)

terrorism—The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. See also antiterrorism; combating terrorism; counterterrorism; force protection condition; terrorist; terrorist groups.

terrorist group—Any number of terrorists who assemble together, have a unifying relationship, or are organized for the purpose of committing an act or acts of violence or threatens violence in pursuit of their political, religious, or ideological objectives. See also terrorism. (JP 1-02)

theater strategic level of war—See strategic level of war.

theater strategy—Concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and multinational policies and strategies through the synchronized and integrated employment of military forces and other instruments of national power. See also national military strategy; national security strategy; strategy.

uncertain environment—See operational environment.

unconventional warfare—A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. Also called **UW**. (JP 1-02)

ungoverned area—An operational area in which no effective government exists to control the territory and population, or over which the state government is unable to extend control. (Proposed)

ungoverned environment—An operational environment where no effective government exists to control the territory and population in the operational area or to assist or oppose the joint force. See **also operational environment**. (Proposed)

unified action—A broad generic term that describes the wide scope of actions (including the synchronization of activities with governmental and nongovernmental agencies) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands. See also **joint task force; subordinate unified command; unified command**. (JP 0-2)

urban system—A dynamic, living system occupying an urban area and characterized by various structures, processes and functions, including physical infrastructure, that have evolved to sustain concentrated human interaction in a confined space. [From the concept, p. 9.]

war—A violent clash of interests between or among organized groups characterized by the use of military force. (Derived from USMC *Warfighting*)

warfare—The use of military force and other forms of organized political violence in combination with other instruments of power and influence to achieve strategic objectives. (Proposed)

white propaganda—Propaganda disseminated and acknowledged by the sponsor or by an accredited agency thereof. See also propaganda.

AO	Area of Operations
ACT	Advance Country Team
CA	Civil Affairs
CBA	Capabilities-Based Assessment
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Program
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CMO	Civil-Military Operations
COCOM	Combatant Commander
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CRSG	Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group
CS	Combat Support
CSS	Combat Service Support
CT	Counterterrorism
DDR	Demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration
DIME	Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense Directive
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Education, Personnel, and Facilities
EW	Expeditionary Warfare
FACT	Field Advance Country Team
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
GPF	General Purpose Forces
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HOA	Horn of Africa
HUMINT	Human Intelligence

IA	Interagency
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IO	Information Operations
IPI	Indigenous Population and Institutions
ISSS	Indirect Security and Stability Surge
IW	Irregular Warfare
JCA	Joint Capability Area
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JIACG	Joint Interagency Coordination Group
JIC	Joint Integrating Concept
JOC	Joint Operation Concept
JP	Joint Publication
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MCO	Major Combat Operations
MME	Major Mission Element
MN	Multi-National
MSO	Military Source Organization
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCOE	Net-Centric Operational Environment
NEO	Noncombatant Evacuation Operation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OGA	Other Government Agency
OODA	Observe, Orient, Decide and Act
OPE	Operational Preparation of the Environment
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PME	Professional Military Education
PMESII	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
S/CRS	Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

SA	Security Assistance
SIB/R	Security Institution Building and Reform
SO	Special Operations
SO	Stability Operations
SSTR	Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction
SSTRO	Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations
TRADOC	United States Army Training and Doctrine Command
TTP	Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Aid
USG	United States Government
USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
USMC	United States Marine Corp
UW	Unconventional Warfare
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Appendix C: Britain’s “Secret War” in Oman: Exploiting the Indirect Approach

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Basil H. Liddell Hart, the highly regarded British veteran and historian, found that military and strategic success was rarely achieved through the attrition of symmetrically arrayed and conventionally armed forces in direct battles. Instead, he found that the Great Captains often sought to achieve the dislocation of the enemy’s psychological and physical balance as prelude to any victory. Success, Liddell Hart therefore argued, was often the result of what he called *the indirect approach*. Whereas a direct approach relies solely on physical force, the indirect approach also exploits the cognitive, moral and psychological dimensions of conflict. In particular, it emphasizes boldness, creativity, maneuver, and adaptability above all else.

An indirect approach can be applied both to conventional combat and irregular warfare. For example, a counterinsurgency campaign based upon an indirect approach would focus primarily on undermining the cohesion of insurgent groups rather than striking directly at the insurgents themselves. It would do so by first identifying the central grievances that drive an insurgency, and then using political, social, and economic development to address those grievances and rob the insurgency of its will to fight. This type of campaign is usually conducted through the host government and indigenous forces as opposed to foreign combat formations. The Dhofar campaign, discussed below, stands as a successful example of an indirect approach to counterinsurgency. In fact, Ian Beckett, a British counterinsurgency expert, concluded that “the Dhofar experience represents a model campaign in every way.”

Dhofar is also interesting because it demonstrates the drawbacks of a direct approach in addition to the benefits of an indirect one. The prosecution of the conflict from 1965 to 1970 emphasized military actions and sought to physically destroy the insurgency. The Omani leadership, relying largely upon outside aid, sought to crush the opposition without making any attempt to implement the political and socio-economic reforms needed to bring a conclusive end to the war. Not surprisingly given its historical record, this approach failed. In fact, the enemy’s strength rose appreciably.

By contrast, the government's subsequent and much more successful strategy attempted to address the political and socio-economic deficiencies that were driving the resistance in the first place. This strategy, employed by the new Sultan beginning in 1970, undercut the motivating factors driving his subjects into the enemy camp while also creating numerous incentives for them to return. Civil development and improved living conditions were the main lines of operation. Other keys to this effort were an effective intelligence network to report on rebel movements and developments; a program of amnesty; a civil action program that provided medical and veterinary assistance, education, and engineering help to formerly destitute areas; a rewards program for turning in weapons; an active psychological operations effort; and a program of education and training to develop the Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF) into a fighting force that could hold its own and provide the population with security against communist coercion.

The military components of the counterinsurgency campaign included the use of small, mobile forces (especially irregular units made up of former rebels, called *firqats*) to eradicate the offensive ability of the insurgents, and a blockade system to seal off the guerrillas' supply lines from Yemen. British advisors emphasized using ground and air forces sparingly and only against known targets. After the back of the insurgency was broken and the insurgents were pushed back into pockets where there was little or no civilian population, the campaign against them took on a more kinetic military character.

An information warfare program was also a critical element of the overall campaign. The goal here was to emphasize what the new Sultan was achieving for Dhofar and to exhort the rebels to return to their tribal areas for repatriation. The British designed and delivered leaflets to convince rebel fighters (also known as *adoos*) to defect back to their native areas, and offered a broad amnesty those that did. Detainment procedures were also indirect. The British did not immediately lock up or interrogate detainees, or what they called Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEPs). Instead, the SEPs were allowed to leave of their own accord and keep their weapons. Moreover, from interviews with the SEPs, the British discerned that the Marxist indoctrination of the jebelis was at odds with the deeply ingrained Muslim faith of the local population. The British then began their own radio broadcasts, focusing on this particular strain within the enemy camp in an effort to increase factionalism and decrease their cohesion.

Together, these developments undercut both the credibility and effectiveness of the insurgency, in large part by building up the capacity of Britain's indigenous partners. The conflict took ten long years, but the enemy's cohesion was steadily fragmented by political and social change,

and his forces were denied both the supplies and the will to continue on. Although Britain's indirect approach was characterized by building up the capacity of the SAF and working through the local government and tribal leadership, this does not mean that British assistance was invisible, or that it operated in a stand-off mode. Instead, it was continually present, even as the British strove to work through their indigenous partners and without publicity.

For modern American strategists and planners, this case study offers useful insights on how to address some of today's most urgent threats. Although the strategy and tactics described below cannot simply be imitated elsewhere without due consideration of and adaptation to local conditions, it nevertheless remains an excellent example of how the indirect approach can be successfully applied in a protracted and irregular conflict.

INTRODUCTION: THE INDIRECT APPROACH

In strategy the longest way round is often the shortest way there- a direct approach to the object exhausts the attacker and hardens the resistance by compression, whereas an indirect approach loosens the defender's hold by upsetting his balance.

Basil H. Liddell Hart

During his career as a military historian, theorist and journalist, Basil H. Liddell Hart cast a long shadow as one of the 20th century's foremost military strategists—a man some regard as the "Clausewitz of the 20th century."⁶⁵ Coming out of World War I, Liddell Hart devoted years investigating enduring trends in military history and strategic theory trying to divine a new type of strategy that would preclude the wasteful attrition and senseless slaughter of World War I battles like the Somme and Passchendaele.

Through his studies, Liddell Hart found that military and strategic success was rarely achieved through the attrition of symmetrically arrayed and conventionally armed forces in direct battles. Instead, he found that the Great Captains often sought to achieve the dislocation of the enemy's psychological and physical balance as prelude to any victory. Success, Liddell Hart therefore argued, was often the result of what he

⁶⁵ The latest of many to use this tag is Arnaud De Borchgrave, "Commentary: 21st Century's Clausewitz," *Washington UPI*, Jan. 18, 2006 accessed at www.spacewar.com/reports/Commentary_21st_Centurys_Clausewitz.html.

called *the indirect approach*. Whereas a direct approach relies solely on physical force, the indirect approach also exploits the cognitive, moral and psychological dimensions of conflict. In particular, it emphasizes boldness, creativity, maneuver, and adaptability above all else.

According to Liddell Hart, the essence of the indirect approach is “to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by battle is guaranteed to do so.”⁶⁶ To achieve such an advantageous strategic position, he stressed taking the line of least resistance and avoiding direct engagements. Using the line of least expectation—or appearing where the opponent least expects it—was thought to psychologically dislocate the enemy.

This indirect approach can occur at all three levels of war. For example, the German blitzkrieg is often identified with armor thrusts and combined arms maneuver, and it certainly includes a physical element at the point of the disruption of the enemy’s line. But that is only the tactical dimension of the blitzkrieg. The operational and strategic effects, which were so evident in the 1939 and 1940 German campaigns, were created by the deep thrusts into the communications zone of the Polish and French defenses. Although French forces had better equipment and a strong defensive line, the German attack came from an unexpected line, unhinged the French system, and dislocated their entire defensive schema at the operational and strategic level. Ultimately, their command and control (and intelligence) systems were psychologically dislocated from within.⁶⁷

This psychological element is central to the indirect approach. One biographer of Liddell Hart has even described the indirect approach as “more an attitude of mind than an arrow on the map.”⁶⁸ Likewise, although the U.S. Marines subscribe to the indirect approach in their principal doctrinal manual,⁶⁹ they refer to it as a warfighting philosophy as much as a doctrine, one which emphasizes thinking deeply, boldly,

⁶⁶ B. H. Liddell Hart, *Paris: The Decisive Wars of History*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1929. He revised his articulation of this approach in *Strategy: The Indirect Approach*, London: Faber, 1954.

⁶⁷ For criticism of Liddell Hart’s theory as it applies to blitzkrieg see John J. Mearsheimer, *Liddell Hart and the Weight of History*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989, pp. 88-98.

⁶⁸ Alex Danchev, *Alchemist of War: The Life of Basil Liddell Hart*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2003, p. 159.

⁶⁹ U.S. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, *Warfighting*, Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 20 June 1997.

and even counter-intuitively about a problem. By extension, the indirect approach also entails influencing the mindset of the opponent; it is an effort to create a sense of hopelessness and constant bewilderment, which will in turn lead to paralysis or an incoherent response.

While traditionally associated with modern armor theory and the development of German blitzkrieg concepts, the origins of the indirect approach are also rooted in the peculiar nature of irregular warfare. Liddell Hart was an admirer of T.E. Lawrence and drew upon the early chapters of the latter's posthumously published *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*—the autobiography that chronicled “Lawrence of Arabia's” role in the Arab Revolt during World War I—when developing his own ideas about the indirect approach.⁷⁰ Likewise, the operational theory of the late Colonel John Boyd, USAF is based upon the same antecedents and historical cases.⁷¹ This approach is also the essence of what the British call the “manoeuvrist approach.”⁷²

American strategists and military planners are not unaware of the indirect approach, although it cuts against the grain of U.S. strategic culture. The last major Pentagon strategic document—the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review—noted the benefits of the indirect approach when discussing the rising salience of irregular threats to American security interests, and cited the example of Lawrence's famous attack on the port of Aqaba in 1917.⁷³ Here Lawrence definitely took the line of

⁷⁰ Liddell Hart later published a biography of Lawrence. B. H. Liddell Hart, *Lawrence of Arabia*, New York: De Capo, 1989 paperback. On the connections between Lawrence and Liddell Hart, see Azar Gat, *A History of Military Thought, From the Enlightenment to the Cold War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 665-682.

⁷¹ For the best exposition of John Boyd's strategy theory see Frans P. B. Osinga, *Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic theory of John Boyd*, New York: Routledge, 2007.

⁷² The best delineation of the British perspective is Brigadier Gavin Bulloch, “Military Doctrine and Counterinsurgency: A British Perspective,” *Parameters*, Summer 1996, pp. 4-16. He describes this approach as placing “due emphasis on the intellectual and psychological aspects of operations, not simply the material. It emphasizes the focus on people and ideas, not only on ground. Insurgent cohesion is identified and attacked by applying concentrated yet discrete force against critical weaknesses. Surprise, tempo, and simultaneity are used to overwhelm and unhinge the insurgent, bringing about a complete collapse of will and ultimately helping to create the conditions for his political defeat. As in warfighting, force is applied selectively and its use is carefully measured and controlled; destruction is a means, not an end. All of this is directly applicable in counterinsurgency: a subtle approach to a subtle problem.”

⁷³ Donald Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Washington DC, 6 Feb 2006, p. 11.

least resistance—while the fortress-city's defenses were designed to protect against an attack from the sea, Lawrence and his band of Arab irregulars attacked from the landward side, advancing over 300 miles of desolate terrain before seizing a position of advantage outside the town.

But this is just a tactical perspective. Looking at the campaign in a broader context, Lawrence's entire Arab Revolt can be seen as a strategic application of the indirect approach. When applied to irregular warfare, this approach not only avoids pitting force on force in symmetric contests, it also relies heavily on the host government and indigenous forces as opposed to foreign combat formations. In the case of the Arab Revolt, Britain's provision of intelligence, funding, some heavy weapons and only a few astute advisors allowed Arab forces to undertake a number of successful raids against the Ottomans. These efforts, which tied up the much larger Ottoman forces, also illustrate another key feature of the indirect approach—the achievement of results that far outweigh the inputs made by the employing force.


In an era where irregular warfare is expected to be the most dominant if not the most frequent mode of human conflict, a modern historical study of the successful application of the indirect approach is certainly germane. To amplify further on how the indirect approach can be applied in modern irregular war, this case history studies the employment of the indirect approach by another generation of British practitioners in the Middle East. Here again, results were achieved that were completely disproportional to the effort expended and the risks taken by the employing nation. In this case, the focus of effort was through the host nation, involved a persistent but low-visibility presence, and eroded the enemy's will and cohesion from within. Also once again, the indirect approach included some application of military force, but only enough to produce the desired psychological effect on the enemy.

HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

This was one of the 'little wars' in which British servicemen have been engaged for centuries -and it was a model of its kind....Only those who have been to Dhofar can fully appreciate the severity of the conditions in which the polyglot force fought and flew; at times extreme heat; at others cold, wet, permanent cloud; and rugged terrain, the equal of which it would be hard to find anywhere.

Field Marshall M. Carver

Oman is the second largest nation on the Arabian Peninsula, with a population over one million. Its total land area is 122,000 square miles of mostly desert, with some significant mountainous areas and over 1,000 miles of coastline (see Map 1). It is roughly the size of the state of Kansas or Colorado. Formerly called Muscat and Oman, the country is



Map 1: Oman

strategically placed near the Horn of Africa adjacent to the critical chokepoint at the Strait of Hormuz. It is bordered to the west by Saudi Arabia, and to the southwest by the People's Republic of Yemen. The bulk of its population lives in the northern province, on the Batinah plain, facing the Gulf of Oman and overlooked by the mountains of Hajr. Thousands of years ago it was a trading country known best for its trade in frankincense. Now a significant portion of the developed world's energy passes through this area. It is this strategic location that has made the sultanate a vital concern to British and American interests over the years.

Geographic and Environmental Context

In order to appreciate both the nature and difficulty of the Oman counterinsurgency, it is necessary to understand the country's key geographic features and environmental conditions, which are quite diverse. Three quarters of Oman consists of desert and barren rock land. The northern coastal region near the capital of Muscat is hot, averaging 92 degrees in the summer, though seasonal winds can drive the temperature much higher. The area along the coastal plains is somewhat cooler, and in some of the mountainous areas like the al-Hajar range the temperature may even reach down into the 30s.


The province of Dhofar, which has approximately 50,000 residents, is located in the southwest of Oman, 500 miles south of the country's more heavily populated areas. Its largest city is Salalah, which is just six miles from a range of rugged coastal mountains (the Jabal al Qara) that begin north of the city and extend some 150 miles to Oman's border with Yemen. Along the coast there is a crescent shaped plain less than 40 miles long and no more than 10 miles deep. This section of the country has a unique summer monsoon period lasting from April until October, which will be critical to understanding the conduct of the war under study.

A number of small towns populate the area along the coastal plain, including Rakhuyt, Taqa and Mirbat. Beyond the plain is a mountainous hinterland called the *jebel*, which is ideal for guerrilla activity. The *jebel* dominates over the plain, rising 3,000 feet above sea level. It is accessible only by climbing through several valleys, or *wadis*, from the plain below, or via the Negd, a vast, rocky area to the north. At the time, the only land route from the north to Salalah was the Midway Road (heavily mined for most of this period), which led across the *jebel* from the town of Thumrait to the coast. The *jebel* itself was occupied by 10,000 mountain people known as *jebelis*. The *jebelis* were tribally organized and largely nomadic herders of cattle and goats who depended on what water and grass they could find on the *jebel*.

The monsoon noted above, also called the *khareef*, is created by winds from the Indian Ocean. It produces enough rainfall for the Dhofar coastal plain to appear almost tropical during the summer months, and enough grass for cattle to survive on. The *jebel* massif is intersected by numerous *wadis*, which slice steeply down from the massif to the plain below. These steep gashes capture much of the rainfall and runoff, and are thick with vegetation and pools of water. Their sides are steep and treacherous, however. Some *wadis* contain caves that were exploited by the guerrillas as sanctuaries and supply caches. The terrain along the border with Yemen is also characterized by a series of escarpments, ridges and *wadis* covered with thick grasses or camel bush. There is no distinct plateau, but the *wadis* are very sheer and have less cover than in the central region above Salalah.⁷⁴

Picture 1, a topographic composite picture, captures the geographic complexity of the region. The white area represents the gravel desert known as the Negd, and the Jebel mountain area is shown in green. The coastal plain area in the upper right is the Salalah and its surrounding developed area.

⁷⁴ For more detailed assessments of the geography of Oman from the eyes of a commander who fought there three times see Tony Jeapes, *SAS: Secret War: Operation Storm in the Middle East*, Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 2005, pp. 19-22.



Picture 1: Oman in Topographical Relief

Political Context

Britain's role in Oman dates back many years. Since the days of the East India Company, it provided both security assistance and other aid in support of its various commercial interests in the region. Over the decades Britain has held various formal as well as informal arrangements with the Sultanate, and Muscat and Oman eventually became a de facto British protectorate. A number of British officers were seconded to positions in the Sultanate's armed forces, and others were hired by contract.

In 1932, Said bin Taimur, the son of Sultan Al Bu Said, ascended to the throne. Taimur became notorious as a despotic ruler. Although he himself was well educated, well travelled and multi-lingual, he nevertheless wanted Oman to remain isolated and under-developed. During his rule Oman became a virtual island, and its trade and travel options were severely restricted. Taimur, who was determined to avoid anything that might introduce his population to the modern world, also refused to provide either education or medical care for his subjects. "Improper" Western influences such as music, radios, cigarettes, literature and pharmaceuticals were all prohibited. As a result, many leaders left the country to seek opportunities elsewhere.

Within Oman, the Dhofar province was considered merely a colony, and its residents were treated as second-class citizens. Although the Sultan himself enjoyed the coast near Salalah, he considered the Dhofaris themselves to be nothing more than "cattle thieves." The needs of the province and its people were thus largely ignored, and neither infrastructure development nor governmental assistance was provided to them. In the late 1950's, the British assisted in suppressing a rebellion against the Sultan. Religious leaders who controlled much of the country's interior and who had some degree of freedom saw Taimur as tyrannical because of his draconian rule. A brief insurgency flared in late 1957, but was crushed thanks to a daring nighttime mountain assault on the Jebel Akhdar (Green Mountain) in January 1959, in which 300 British troops (including the famed SAS) participated. Some of the rebel tribesmen were driven into Saudi Arabia and others into Yemen.⁷⁵

⁷⁵ For more of the famous assault on Green Mountain see Anthony Kemp, *The SAS: Savage Wars of Peace, 1947 to the Present*, New York: Penguin, 2001, pp. 43-52 and Tony Geraghty, *Who Dares Wins*, Glasgow, UK: Arms and Armour Press, 1980, pp. 107-116.

In the early 1960s, small groups of rebels began to harass commercial trucks working for the oil industry, as well as the occasional government patrol. The fiercely independent Dhofaris had built up their strength, a development made easier by their distance from the central government in the north. The Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF) formed at this time, and would eventually merge with other groups motivated by either pan-Arab nationalism or Marxism. In addition, the southern province's budding rebellion was no doubt fuelled by support from the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY).⁷⁶

The Insurgents

Initial hostilities actually began in the spring of 1963 when Musalim bin Nufl, founder of the DLF, ambushed several vehicles from an oil company doing development work in Dhofar, resulting in one fatality. The rebel DLF conducted a number of limited attacks against oil company personnel and vehicles through 1964. On August 14, 1964 a mine blew up a SAF vehicle. This caused the Sultan to believe he could no longer ignore the insurgent effort, and he had his intelligence arm begin to target known dissidents and apply pressure. Ultimately, the Sultan gathered up some 40 known members of the opposition in April and May of 1965, but this only galvanized the insurgency.

Aided by communist governments like Yemen, the Dhofar Liberation Front expanded, later merging with the Marxist-dominated Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf (PFLOAG). Their principal grievance remained the autocratic behavior and discriminatory policies of the Sultan, though the PFLOAG also had much grander ambitions to overthrow all of the traditional Arab Gulf regimes. In a meeting at Wadi at Kabir on June 1, 1965 (dubbed the "First Congress"), the DLF solidified their leadership, agreed on a plan for their campaign, and issued a proclamation demanding the liberation of Dhofar from "the rule of the despot." Eight days later the DLF formally launched their rebellion against the Sultan and his British mercenaries. Thus began a protracted and violent contest for the population of Oman.

Although the numerical strength of the insurgency varied overtime, at its height in 1971 the DLF and PFLOAG could field 2,000 armed guerrillas and another 4,000 part-time fighters and supporting personnel.⁷⁷ These guerrillas were a significant force; British veterans described them as

⁷⁶ A solid understanding of the political context can be found in Steven Cheney, *Counterinsurgency in Oman*, Quantico, VA, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1984. unpublished Master's thesis.

⁷⁷ By 1975, these forces had been diminished, largely through surrender, to an estimated 800 hard-core fighters and approximately 1,000 militia members.

“fierce, aggressive, courageous and independent people, born of a long tradition of fighting.”⁷⁸ Some British officers even found the rebels—known by the Arabic word *adoo*—to be not only capable warriors, but even admirable.⁷⁹ Guerrilla units were armed with modern equipment via Yemen. Their forces dominated the small towns in Dhofar, but were also able to disperse among the rugged hills of the province. In addition, the rebels were intimately familiar with the local terrain, were capable of employing their tactical weapons proficiently, and were inured to rugged operating conditions. One commander observed that the *adoo* were constantly moving, probing the SAF flanks, and using every dip and fold of the terrain to their advantage.⁸⁰ By contrast, the SAF had outdated weapons and could only conduct static defensive operations or large, company-sized patrols along roads. As a result, the *adoo* were initially quite effective against the poorly organized and equipped government security forces in Dhofar

The insurgents’ primary limitation, however, was operational and tactical command and control. They could not adapt to new conditions on the ground; once committed to an attack, they would press on regardless of British or Omani countermoves. Yet, if equally matched with SAF forces, they were quite capable thanks to their modern Chinese or Russian armaments. However, SAF and British indirect fires and air strikes almost always swung the balance of power in Oman’s favor.

The Sultan’s Armed Forces

The evolution of Oman’s security forces, or more accurately the Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF), depended upon British assistance. The Sultan recognized in the 1950’s that his ability to secure his own person, much less the entire country, was limited. Hence he began a formal effort to expand the size of Oman’s armed forces. The forming of the Muscat and Oman Field Force (MOFF) soon followed. The MOFF was created at the expense of the oil company that was doing development work in and for Oman, and which was therefore expected to benefit indirectly from increased stability in the kingdom. The MOFF helped disarm the Sultan’s internal opponents in the mid-1950s, but was later defeated in battle at Sayt and routed in the 1957 rebellion. It was then disbanded and reformed into what became known as the "Oman Regiment."⁸¹

⁷⁸ John Akehurst, *We Won A War*, Salisbury: Michael Russell, 1982, p. 24.

⁷⁹ Captain Ian Gardiner letter cited by Akehurst, p. 25.

⁸⁰ Jeapes, p. 24.

⁸¹ This section on friendly forces is based extensively on Akehurst, pp. 31-43.

The Sultan organized four different military or security forces—the Batinah Force, the Muscat Infantry, the Oman Regiment, and the Dhofar Force—which were created in 1955 and made up of mostly local *jebelis*. These forces were consolidated into the SAF in 1958 under Commander, SAF (CSAF) Colonel David Smiley, from Great Britain. A few years later, the Oman Gendarmerie was stood up. In 1965, the Desert Regiment was formed in order to increase border and internal security.

In order to respond to the announced insurrection in the Dhofar province in 1965, the Muscat Infantry and the Batinah Force (which became the Northern Frontier Regiment (NFR)) were deployed south to Dhofar to quell the rebellion. Until that point, the only armed force present was the local Dhofar Force, which was poorly armed and considered incapable of resisting any strong advances. Instead of building up this element, the Baluchi Southern Regiment, composed of Baluchis recruited from Pakistan, was raised. Considered far hardier soldiers, these battalions were a professional and trusted force, but their employment did little to generate support for the Sultan.

In 1971, the "Frontier Force" was created for service in Dhofar, and the Jebel Regiment was created in Nizwa. The SAF became more of a combined arms force, as the Artillery Regiment, Signal Regiment, Armored Car Squadron (Saladins with 76mm guns), and Engineers' Unit were all equipped and fielded. Finally, a Field Surgical Team (FST) was dispatched from Britain and rotated on four month tours to provide critical surgical treatment.

The Sultan's air force was also largely British supplied. Originally it was comprised of six Strikemasters, three Wessex helicopters for command and control, and several Skyvan planes for logistics support. The air component of the force was eventually enlarged, adding additional strike aircraft and a more robust rotary-wing capability to rapidly reinforce isolated posts and patrols, as well as to improve medical evacuation. Later in the war a robust air capability was available, including more advanced jet strike aircraft.

In addition to providing seconded officers to lead the various regiments and battalions of the SAF, the British also sent a Special Air Service (SAS) squadron in 1970. The SAS officers, some of who had served earlier in Aden, Borneo or in Oman itself during previous campaigns, were transferred from Malaya and from bases in the United Kingdom. It was the SAS that raised up and trained the first of the indigenous units, the *firqats*. These units were modeled on the pseudo-gangs employed against the Mau Mau in Kenya, which were designed by Major (later General) Frank Kitson. The SAS manned what became known as the

British Army Training Teams (BATT). These BATT elements are the historical predecessors of the training teams employed by the U.S. Army and Marines in Iraq today. The BATTs would live, train and operate with their *firqat* units, often eating the same rations, and always sharing the same dangers in the field. In addition to the BATTs, the British formed small four-man Civil Action Teams (CATs) to attend to early development, as well as medical and veterinary needs. The British attempted to put a low visibility cloak over their role in the country, and were especially determined to hide the presence of the SAS. The fact that the SAS was in country was kept out of the news both in Oman and in Europe, and even the public acknowledgement of awards and decorations for service in Oman were not made until 1976.

The *jebelis* who joined the *firqats* were largely surrendered *adoos*. Like the *adoo* they could be fierce fighters, but they were also highly temperamental if not outright unpredictable, and British officers found them very difficult to control:

Properly motivated, and with the prospect of financial or other gain, they could be splendid fighters, as good for us as they had been against us; but equally they could, if the mood took them, be intransigent and uncooperative, sometimes, aggressively so. {But} their knowledge of the ground and their influence with the civilians were indispensable, and worth all the time, trouble and money spent to secure and retain their goodwill and allegiance.⁸²

These units were trained by the British SAS starting in 1971. Initially, the British formed mixed groups of *adoos*, but later found that building units around a common tribal identity was far better. *Firqats* varied in size from 40 to 100 men, and by late 1974 over 18 of them existed with nearly 2,000 trained fighters. The success of the *firqats* bolstered the offensive power of the SAF; their creation was the final step in the growth of the military in Oman in response in the insurrection in Dhofar. The swelling of their ranks was also a strong indication that the rebellion was failing.⁸³

In sum, when the Sultan declared the war over on December 11, 1975, Oman's armed forces had matured into an efficient, combat hardened

⁸² Akehurst, p. 43.

⁸³ See Jeapes, pp. 34-56 for a detailed discussion on the training and equipping of the first *firqat*.

military organization of over 13,000 troops. This did not include the roughly 700 advisors and seconded officers supplied by the British.

THE COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN

Phase I: 1965 - 1969

The most important military component of the Long War will not be the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our allies to fight with us.⁸⁴

LTC John Nagl

The following analysis of the campaign has been split into three periods or phases: 1965-69, 1970-73, and 1974-6. This is due to the very different way in which the campaign was conducted prior to 1970 compared to its implementation thereafter.

In 1965 the DLF controlled much of the *jebel* and had both assets and sympathizers throughout the Salalah plain. Following a June 9th assault on a SAF patrol that marked the official beginning of the revolution, the DLF conducted a number of small raids and ambushes. Limited tactical actions also occurred at Taqa and Mirbat in the fall of that year as the DLF began to more vigorously press its case. The SAF, no doubt aware of its own limited tactical capability, focused primarily on denying the DLF access to the city and port of Salalah, and became engaged in firefights in Wadis Nahiz, Hardom, and Jarsis while trying to keep the insurgents from approaching the province's capital. The strength and confidence of the insurgents was growing, however; in July 1966 a company-sized assault at Raydat generated almost 60 SAF casualties. Also in 1966, an attempt on the Sultan's life by one of his bodyguards failed, leading him to increase pressure on Dhofar. Salalah was essentially cordoned off by the SAF, isolating the port from inland trade with the Dhofaris. This incensed not only the Dhofaris, however, but the inhabitants of Salalah as well, as it curtailed the livelihood of many shop owners and small businesses.

At that time, the SAF could only field two regiments, the Muscat and Northern Frontier Regiments, each of which was in reality no larger than a battalion. Stationed in northern Oman, these two regiments detached company-sized elements for duty in Dhofar on what was called a

⁸⁴ John A. Nagl, "Institutionalizing Innovation, It's Time for a Permanent Army Advisory Corps," Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, June 2007.

“roulement” or rotation system, which made it difficult to develop either close relationships with the local population or an intimate knowledge of the terrain and key leaders. By the end of 1966, Commander SAF (CSAF), then Colonel Lewis, assessed the situation as a stalemate. He did not have the military resources to defeat the rebels, and the Sultan would not adapt the country’s political, social or economic system to offset the evolving Marxist opposition. Lewis recognized that defeating insurrections required more than muscle, and that a counter-intuitive or indirect approach was far more likely to succeed. Nevertheless, convincing the Sultan that peace necessitated more than just a military solution proved impossible; he continued to approve the increasing use of force while rejecting any political accommodation, government incentives or pardons. Although the poor living conditions on the *jebel* remained the primary source of dissatisfaction among the insurgents, the Sultan refused to accept the idea that the opposition might have legitimate grievances or that his rule was unpopular. Thus no comprehensive strategy that incorporated civil as well as military remedies to the insurgency was designed.

Although the Sultan’s investment in improved military training and weapons was beginning to show positive effects—his forces no longer held bolt-action rifles, and they moved to re-establish control in the minor coastal towns of Dhofar—these gains were quickly erased following the declared independence of South Yemen (or the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), formerly known as Aden) in December 1967. Not only did the DLF gain a nearby sanctuary, it also acquired a source for Chinese and Soviet-bloc weapons that would significantly increase its capability over the less well-armed SAF. The SAF did attempt to push back the increasingly able DLF in 1967, as British advisors sought to gain control over key urban centers, attack concentrations of insurgents, and block off the flow of logistical support from the PDRY. Yet the SAF was rebuffed. By the fall of 1968 they had lost their defensive hold on Rakhyut and had withdrawn to their single major base in Salalah, where the British held an airfield and some artillery assets.

Emboldened, the DLF—which was now renamed the PFLOAG—began to shell Salalah and attempted to move additional forces into the eastern areas of the province. The Sultan’s heavy hand also continued to alienate the population, providing fresh recruits for the dissident side. This problem was only compounded by the increasing success of the PFLOAG. At this point, the PFLOAG appeared to be at its apex in terms of its popular appeal and the strength of its forces.

Even those tactical successes that were achieved by the British-led SAF forces failed to translate into operational or strategic gains. For example, in April 1968 Lieutenant Colonel Mike Harvey—a combat veteran in

Korea and an officer that had first-hand experience with unconventional operations in both Palestine and Aden—began aggressive operation in Dhofar. Concentrating on areas where the insurgents were infiltrating their supplies into the province, Harvey used small-scale attacks to compel the enemy to disperse his forces and conceal his movements. Yet, although his small unit tactics were successful, they still failed to diminish the insurgents' popular support among the local population. In short, the insurgency could only be defeated politically, not militarily, and this was beyond the capability of the SAF.

The insurgent movement itself also underwent significant changes in 1968, becoming both internally weaker yet militarily stronger at the same time. In the wake of the "Second Congress" held in September of that year, new divisions were emerging. The insurgency took a marked shift toward Marxism and violent revolutionary warfare, and a new leadership emerged that not only advocated greater violence, but also wanted to displace the existing tribal structure and Muslim religion of the Dhofaris. Local tribesmen lost their influence, and much of the original leadership was pushed out of power or took on less active roles in the rebellion. Despite these internal divisions, however, the establishment of ties with the regime in South Yemen allowed for more weapons and support to flow in from China, Iraq, and various radical Arab groups. Extensive education was also offered to the front's youth in South Yemen as well as Russia.

Harvey and his force rotated out in 1968, replaced by the fresh but untested Muscat Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Peter Thwaites. The new SAF unit found that "the enemy was better led, better trained, more active, and more confident" than ever.⁸⁵ Thwaites concluded he could not operate successfully in the western areas of the province and decided to form a defensive line. By the onset of the monsoon season the western sector had essentially been abandoned to the enemy, efforts to isolate Dhofar from the PDRY were effectively suspended, and the SAF was limited almost exclusively to protection tasks. As a result, the adoo gained greater freedom of maneuver, an increased ability to attack soft targets across the whole of the Salalah plain, and relatively secure supply lines back into Yemen. As 1969 approached, battalion-sized operations were needed to open the Midway Road, but the forces needed to conduct these operations were not readily available and could not be sustained in the field. Dhofar was now politically and logistically isolated from northern Oman.

⁸⁵ Major D. G. Robson, *The Dhofar Campaign*, Defence Research Paper, British Advanced Command and Staff Course, Number 2, July 1999, p. 17.

In March 1969 the PFLOAG attacked and briefly held the port town of Sudh. Then, on January 6, 1970, the rebels further escalated their war by attacking Taqa. The SAF was able to restore the situation, but several infiltrators got into the local mosque and refused to surrender. In response, the Sultan ordered the mosque destroyed, despite warnings from his military counsel that this would only serve to increase the population's resentment and thus their support for the adoo. The PFLOAG also continued stand-off attacks on Salalah, forcing the British to reinforce the all-important air field with security troops, artillery, and radar. Having lost the initiative to the insurgents, the SAF could not keep up with this string of attacks.

In March 1970 the Commanding Officer of 22 SAS, Lieutenant Colonel Johnny Watts, conducted a reconnaissance in Oman, primarily in search of an enlarged role for the Regiment, which had been under-employed since its withdrawal from Malaya. What he found surprised him. He reported:

I was horrified. The road was cut and the only resupply was by air or sometimes by sea ... There were no Dhofaris in SAF, which was virtually an army of occupation. Everybody on the jebel was with the enemy, some convinced, some out of boredom, some intimidated: SAF had only a few Jebali guides. It was crazy - we were on a hiding to nothing, fighting a people. There were signs of counter-revolution, with Muslim-Communist arguments. The latter were better armed and organised and ruthless, absorbing some Dhofaris and shooting others. A clash was coming and therefore the Government had a chance of getting some Dhofaris on their side.⁸⁶

The key result of this visit was a new operational design that reflected the indirect approach. Watts's experiences in Malaya and as the second-in-command of a battalion in Dhofar led him to believe that the offensive against the insurgents must be conducted in the following priority order:

- *Civil reorganization,*
- *Agricultural and economic development,*
- *Intelligence gathering,*
- *Psychological warfare and*

⁸⁶ Brigadier Johnny Watts cited in Major D. G. Robson, *The Dhafar Campaign*, p. 15.

- *Military operations including the training of local forces.*⁸⁷

Watts returned home to argue in favor of deploying the SAS and adopting his approach. At the tactical level, Watts envisioned organizing the SAS's contribution into teams along these five "fronts." These teams would be composed of an intelligence team, a Medical Officer supported by SAS medics, a vet, and training personnel to raise up Dhofari soldiers to fight for the Sultan. This fifth and final front was the product of considerable operational experience on the part of British, and had been key to other counterinsurgency campaigns.

Phase II: 1970 - 1972

On July 23, 1970, a bloodless coup displaced the longstanding Sultan Said bin Taimur and replaced him with his only son, Said bin Qaboos. Taimur abdicated his authority and retired to London, where he died two years later. The British government undoubtedly assisted or at least encouraged Qaboos to take the throne—he had been educated at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst; was commissioned as a subaltern in the Cameronians after his graduation; and completed a tour in Europe, where he was exposed to the mechanics of the modern state.

Within days, Qaboos went about implementing the very strategies that his father refused to undertake. He began with his own five-point plan to: offer general amnesty to all those of his subjects who had opposed his father; incorporate Dhofar formally into Oman as the "southern province"; provide effective military opposition to those rebels who did not accept the amnesty offer; start a vigorous nation-wide program of development; and start a diplomatic initiative with the aim of having Oman recognized as a genuine Arab state and isolate the PDRY.

To undermine the appeal of the Marxist-dominated insurgents and erode the Dhofaris' political will, Qaboos directed a disproportionate percentage of government revenues to the southern region. Between 1971 and 1975, almost 25 percent of the country's development budget went to Dhofar in order to improve transportation, education, rural health and religious facilities. The administration of new economic development programs was also based on existing tribal networks—centers were established which were headed by local representatives, usually minor tribal leaders elected by the population, and larger areas were run by major tribal sheiks who received a monthly stipend and other allowances

⁸⁷ Peter De La Billiere, *Looking For Trouble*, London: HarperCollins, 1994, p. 267; Jeapes, pp. 32-33. Tony Geraghty, *Who Dares Wins*, Glasgow, UK: Arms and Armour Press, 1980, p. 120.

from the government. Moreover, the government also demonstrated an increased willingness to share oil revenues and took steps to recall the nation's emigrated leadership and elite.

The new Sultan also offered amnesty to opponents of the previous regime. The amnesty program for the rebels included a cessation of operations by the Desert Regiment (DR) as well as an offer of financial help for those who came over to the government's side. Cash rewards were also given to those who helped identify sources of weapons or turned in their arms. Although these reforms led to the defection of a number of PFLOAG members, the group continued its stand-off attacks against the SAF.

There is little doubt, however, that these initiatives had an important psychological impact on both the general population and the insurgents. By addressing the very grievances that had originally motivated the DLF, the Sultan attacked the internal cohesion of the PFLOAG, which was already experiencing divisions between its communist leadership and its devoutly Muslim Dhofari members. As a result of these divisions and the government's new policies, some 200 adoo fighters left the DLF and surrendered to SAF units. Even more surprising, local tribesmen actually arrested 40 rebels and handed them over to the government. This precipitated a vicious backlash by the PFLOAG, including the creation of revolutionary courts and the use of terrorism, yet these coercive tactics further diminished the group's coherence and popular support. Even Musalim bin Nufl, the original leader of the DFL, declared that the group's aims had been achieved, and surrendered along with 16 of his followers.

Another of Qaboos's early actions was to request British assistance to help crush the rebellion, a request the British were willing to honor now that Qaboos was in power. The first British unit to arrive was an army medical team that began to establish a field hospital in RAF Salalah. By the end of September an SAS advance party was in place and ready to implement Watts's plan. This first group of SAS quickly had small Civil Action Teams (CATs) treating medical and veterinary problems at Taqa and Mirbat. They also began setting up a national information service and implementing a PSYOPS campaign by broadcasting from a small radio station, supplemented by the use of leaflets and notices.

The government offensive was resumed in early 1971 when the National Frontier and Muscat regiments rotated into Dhofar. At this time, the SAS also began the difficult and time-consuming task of training and fielding *firqats* under the leadership of Colonel Jeapes. The use of the Dhofari people in their own homeland was a critical part of Watts's strategy. Not only was it intended to help the government win the

“hearts and minds” of the local population and gain actionable intelligence, it also ensured that former *adoo* fighters could be reincorporated into Dhofari society.

Firqat operations began with the unit *Firqat Salahadin* retaking *Sudh* on February 23, 1971, which led to the surrender of 38 *adoo*.⁸⁸ Jeapes had picked a soft target for the first *firqat* operation in an effort to slowly build up the unit’s self-confidence and tactical leadership. This was followed in mid-March by a joint *firqat*/SAS operation onto the *jebel* ending at Tawi Attair. This operation was sustained for two weeks, demonstrating that the *firqat* would fight effectively against their former comrades.⁸⁹ At the same time, the National Frontier Regiment established a battalion position at Haluf, 20 miles north of Salalah, and began vigorous company-sized operations. Their aim was to attack the cohesion of the enemy and break them down into smaller, less effective and more defensive units. Meanwhile the Muscat Regiment launched operations into the *wadis* on the south side of the *jebel*.

The many facets of this combined political and military campaign began to wrest the initiative from the *adoo* and create the conditions for their defeat, both within their own minds as well as the minds of the population of Dhofar. The government’s civil reforms, the PSYOPS campaign, the use of CATs, and military operations conducted by *firqat* and traditional forces, when taken together, finally began to overwhelm and unhinge the *adoo* leadership.

The immediate post-coup military aims had largely been achieved by mid-monsoon 1971. The enemy in the central area of Dhofar had been fragmented and the fight was being taken to all parts of the *jebel*. The SAF was increasing in strength, aided by a growing number of SEPs who were being formed into *firqats*. Yet the military had not yet established a permanent presence on the *jebel*, something that was viewed as critical if the government was to gain the confidence of the Dhofaris. Such a presence would clearly demonstrate that the government was succeeding in its efforts against the rebels, and that it could protect the population against the increasingly ruthless *adoo*.

Toward this end, in October of 1971 the government launched Operation Jaguar in the hope of establishing a line across the *jebel* that would block the flow of supplies to the east. The aim was to divide Dhofar into sectors and clear each one by creating a series of strongpoints that would

⁸⁸ Colonel Tony Jeapes, pp. 71-82; Kemp. 95-96.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 82-97.

deny the enemy access to the area. The *firqat* force maneuvered onto the eastern portion of the *jebel*, north of the town of Mirbat, where it seized the city of Jibjat by surprise. It then swept through the wadi Darbat, facing stiff resistance and heavy fire. The objective area was chosen with great care—it was home to the strongest tribal *firqat*, the open terrain lent itself to long fields of fire, and the ground could be rapidly cleared for air zones. Of greater importance, however, was that the enemy's lines of communication were quite extended in the east as the rebel base across the border was 100 mile away in Hauf.

Watts personally led operations in the field, taking 2 SAS squadrons, 2 companies from the Muscat Regiment, and 300 *firqat* troops. The initial objective was an old airstrip called Lympne. The airfield was secured and then reinforced by helicopter. Because the terrain did not support a permanent and defensible site, however, Watts shifted his attack towards a base four miles west of Jibjat. After a sharp battle with an angry but surprised *adoo*, the *firqat* and SAS secured the better airstrip at Jibjat. Clearing the area of operations required several days of close fighting, after which the insurgents retired. The *firqats* had demonstrated their worth and secured a lodgment in the middle of their homeland. The base was nicknamed White City but became known by the Dhofaris as Medinat Al Haq—the “place of truth.” The Sultan's forces had established their first real presence on the *jebel*.⁹⁰

Simultaneous thrusts were also conducted into the west near Mughsayl to disrupt the enemy's flow of logistical support and fresh fighters in Operation Leopard. Immediately following this operation, the SAF moved out of Jibjat towards Tawi Attair in Operation Panther. The simultaneity of these thrusts confused the opposition leadership and overwhelmed their capacity to react. Each of the sectors of the *jebel* had now been subjected to an operation, and the enemy was now being forced to react to the feints and thrusts of the government's strategy.

In addition to their military role, the *firqat* also worked to persuade the local population to accept the government's protection. Yet, despite its successes, the government still had to demonstrate that it was capable of providing security as well as other necessary services. To do so, the government and its security forces together came up with the kind of integrated civil-military operation that is a hallmark of the indirect approach. The *jebelis* lived off the dairy products and profits of their cattle. To provide them proof of the economic benefits of the Oman government, the SAF assisted the *jebelis* in bringing a herd of bulls into Salalah for sale. Operation Taurus, as it was called, involved moving the

⁹⁰ Kemp, pp. 99-100, Jeapes, pp. 135-144.

cattle from a collection point at Qairoon Hairitti by ground lorry, and from Madinat al Haq by air. Jeapes and others thought they were conducting an American Wild-West drive to the Taqa-Mirbat road.⁹¹

Although seemingly unusual, this operation is completely consistent with the indirect approach, especially as espoused in the latest U.S. Army and Marine doctrine, which notes that one of the paradoxes of irregular war is that “some of the best weapons for counterinsurgency do not shoot.”⁹² A similar logic can be found in the British manoeuvrist approach, which calls for an “attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected, using initiative and seeking originality are combined with a ruthless determination to succeed.”⁹³

Writing a decade later, Col Jeapes had to reason to be satisfied with the progress made in 1971:

*It had been a momentous year. At the beginning of it, the Government could only claim to control effectively Salalah and part of the plain. By the end, the three coastal towns were totally under Government control, the plain was secure, although roads were still mined occasionally, over 700 Dhofaris were under arms fighting for the Sultan, the SAF presence in Dhofar had doubled, and the Government had two firm bases on the jebel itself. The foundation for medical services, an agricultural policy and an information department had been laid and good plans existed for the development of the province.*⁹⁴

Although Operation Jaguar appeared to be a success, maintaining a position on the *jebel* required too much reliance on the SAF's air superiority. The next step was to commence a similar excursion to the west and clear and hold that sector. On April 15, 1972, a company of Desert Regiment troops was airlifted into Safait, an escarpment close to the PDRY border, in Operation Simba. Unfortunately, this position was

⁹¹ Major General John Akehurst: *We Won a War*. Salisbury: Michael Russell, 1982, pp. 78-79.

⁹² FM 3-24, p. 1-27. On economic incentives as a form of political power see Montgomery McFate and Andrea V. Jackson, “The Object Beyond War: Counterinsurgency and the Four Tools of Political Competition,” *Military Review*, Jan./Feb. 2006, pp. 20-22.

⁹³ The British Military Doctrine p. 4 – 21, cited in Robson.

⁹⁴ Jeapes, pp. 143-144.

not as advantageous as it had appeared in maps and aerial photographs—it did not provide the commanding overwatch of the enemy supply line that the operation was meant to achieve. The insurgents decided to aggressively press on the encircled position, and a long siege began. Moreover, because Sarfait was so close to the PDRY border, its artillery was able to harass the defenders. Fortunately, the SAF had the benefit of brave and resourceful pilots who exploited their air superiority to good effect, and a base was ultimately established. Although that base was costly to support, lacked water, and was of questionable military value, the SAF now held positions throughout the monsoon on both the eastern and western *jebel*.

Realizing that the tide was turning against them, the PFLOAG decided to assume a significant risk by assembling a force of 250 fighters for a dramatic offensive against the eastern coastal town of Mirbat, less than 40 miles from Salalah. In addition to the large assault force, the insurgents also employed a number of recoilless rifles and mortars. This operation ended up being a significant fight in the campaign, and one not expected by the British contingent.

Early in the morning on July 19, the rebels attacked in force. They had carefully approached the town, taking advantage of a monsoon mist they hoped would prevent effective close air support. Under a barrage of rocket and mortar fire, the insurgents threw themselves into the town's defensive ditches and wire fences. The attack was a disaster, with at least 40 of the attackers killed. In some respects, however, the defense of Mirbat was miraculous. The SAF had only 100 defenders, including a BATT led by Captain Mike Kealy and 8 SAS troopers, 30 Askaris, a firqat of about 40 men, and 25 Gendarmeries. Luckily, the weather broke several times during the fight, allowing the Strikemasters to attack a large line of insurgents. At the same time, the SAS rapidly reinforced the town with fresh troops that were in the process of getting settled into Salalah. Many consider this battle to be the turning point of the entire campaign.⁹⁵

For two years, the Sultan and his advisors had employed the indirect approach and utilized the full range of counterinsurgency warfare techniques. The Battle of Mirbat reflected the increasing pressure on the insurgency to take risks in order to recapture the momentum it had lost. However, thanks to chance and no shortage of individual valor, the enemy suffered a great loss in both trained personnel and credibility.

⁹⁵ De la Billiere, p. 277, Kemp, pp. 103-107. Jeapes devotes an entire chapter to the battle for Mirbat, see pp. 145-161. Personal decorations for this battle, including a DSO for Kealey were not published until 1976.

The Sultan's local governor, the Wali, displayed the casualties from Mirbat to ensure that the defeat of the *adoo* was apparent to the local population.

Phase III: 1973-1976

The goal of the third and final phase of the campaign was to ensure the defeat of the insurgency and create stability throughout Oman.. In January 1973 the SAF was expanded by the formation of the Frontier Force (FF), and its combat power was enhanced with the arrival of Iranian Special Forces and helicopters. This allowed the new CSAF, Major General Tim Creasey, to increase both his reach and operational tempo.

Of course the enemy had plans too. In early March 1973 the security of the Salalah base area became threatened. The *adoo* had used rockets to damage 3 helicopters and 2 Strikemasters with accurate fire from the mouth of the Wadi Jarsis. This required the SAF to create and man well constructed defensive positions astride the Wadi, which became known as Dianas, to allow fighting patrols to drive the enemy out of range.

The campaign now focused on defeating the enemy in the east while building up the CATs in safe areas, a good example of using simultaneity to dislocate the enemy's plan. The SAF stood ready to employ a firm policy of holding what had been cleared and then slowly expanding. In January 1974 the SAF began construction of the fortified Hornbeam Line, which stretched inland 50 miles from Mughsayl on the coast and roughly 20 miles west. Its purpose was to limit movement of the enemy and his supplies from the west into the more fertile and relatively well-populated eastern area of the *jebel*. It was a remarkable feat of engineering and endurance to construct 30 miles of wire and mines in the heat and rough terrain of Dhofar. The result was highly effective. Camel trains were thoroughly stopped, but the *adoo* could still penetrate the line on foot with small loads. Thanks to the persistence of engineers, the flow of arms and ammunition was effectively stopped with a barrier line technique first used in the Boer war and later in Algeria.

During the 1974 monsoon all the SAF positions on the *jebel* were maintained for the entire season. Mobile operations were conducted in the central area of the *jebel* to identify and eliminate well-hidden cadres. By the summer, the PFLOAG's strength was seriously weakened, and they held another major conference. This time, they resolved to name themselves the Peoples' Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO), as the goal of heading a revolution throughout the Gulf no longer seemed relevant. By the end of 1974, the Hornbeam line, reinforced with

sensors, barbed wire, and mines, had limited PFLO activity in Dhofar to the western area. Meanwhile, the dependability of the *firqats*—which were now organized entirely by tribe—was improving. Some 18 *firqats* varying in size from 50 to 150 men were in the field, gathering actionable intelligence and ensuring that the government maintained a tight link to the tribal areas.

The SAS CATs, which had been created to help meet the population's needs and demonstrate the government's commitment to its welfare, were also having a positive effect. Once an area had been secured, schools and medical facilities would be constructed from prefabricated buildings, and a water supply and distribution system would be established. The CAT—which consisted of a leader, a teacher, a medical assistant, and a storekeeper—would be installed. Eventually the SAF or gendarmerie could depart, turning the location over to a local *firqat*. Although these sites were initially the targets of stand-off attacks by the ado, the creation of 20 government centers over the course of a year help shift the population away from the communists and over to the Sultan.⁹⁶ The combined effect of the CATs, the disruption of the enemy's supply lines and the provision of the fundamental resource of water allowed the government forces to create a link between the general population and the authorities. As a result, both support for the government on the *jebel* and the rate of enemy surrender increased almost daily.

In the fall of 1974 the SAF established themselves at Sarfait, and a joint operation was underway to recover Rakhyut. Brigadier John Akehurst took over the Dhofar brigade, and initially focused on clearing operations east of the Hornbeam line. His organization's mission, according to Akehurst, was "To secure Dhofar for civil development." In this mission he recognized "the paramount importance of military and civil policy marching together... bearing in mind the whole purpose of the campaign."⁹⁷ He therefore clearly articulated the military role in support of the desired political end-state, an essential element of a comprehensive approach to COIN operations.

In December 1974 a major offensive was initiated along two lines of operation. The untried Iranians moved towards the caves in Sherishitti and the town of Rakhyut. The advance toward the caves—which were believed to contain a major adoo supply depot—was slowed as a result of adoo counterfires and ambushes. Nevertheless, on January 5, 1975, the Iranian force was able to take Rakhyut despite suffering heavy

⁹⁶ Jeapes, pp. 176-7.

⁹⁷ Akehurst, p. 65.

casualties. Rakhyut was to serve as the basis for the next sector, and the Damavand Line was created as well. Its design and operation was virtually identical to the Hornbeam Line, and it was eventually just as successful.⁹⁸

Another thrust was quickly conceived to keep the insurgents on their heels. Operation Dharab combined SAS, *firqat* and the Jebel Regiment to attack the tenaciously defended Sherishitti in an effort to take some pressure off the Iranian defense. It also lost the element of surprise, however, because the *firqat* insisted on too visible a display of supporting fires to bolster their courage. Again the enemy reacted with unexpected fervor. A well-designed enemy ambush blocked the thrust, and the SAF lost 13 dead and 22 wounded when a company was caught in the open when crossing a *wadi*. The SAF could not dislodge the enemy from their strong positions, but they were able to lift in some artillery and recoilless rifles, preventing the *adoo* from using the caves.⁹⁹

The SAF began a final assault in Dhofar in the fall of 1975. The Iranians handled the coast while the SAF continued to attack remaining PFLO units in the west. There was surprisingly little opposition. More and more of the PFLO began to defect to the SAF, as the end was clearly in sight. There is no greater measure of effectiveness of an indirect approach than the dissipation of the insurgency by defection or surrender. Chart 1 below highlights the rapid disintegration of the Front's cohesion and will to fight. Ultimately, nearly 80 percent of the rebels—or 4,750 fighters—surrendered.¹⁰⁰ The PFLO became powerless to stop the counter-invasion, and by mid 1975 all but the far western sections of Dhofar had been retaken by the SAF.

⁹⁸ John Pimlott, in "The British Army: The Dhofar Campaign, 1970-1975," in Ian Beckett and John Pimlott, *Armed Forces and Modern Counter-insurgency*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985, pp. 40-41.

⁹⁹ See Kemp, pp. 108-109; Jeapes, pp. 196-207.

¹⁰⁰ Jeapes, p. 176.

Phase III SEP Totals

July 1975-April 1976




Chart 1: Phase II SEP Totals

The final major operation of the war, Operation Hadaf, started in mid-October 1975 after months of detailed planning. It began with a deception plan comprising two diversionary actions, with D-Day for the main attack set for October 21. The Muscat Regiment, based in Sarfait, spent two nights hand clearing mines in order to secure the Capstan feature, which they did without resistance on October 15. The second part of the deception consisted of an attack by the Imperial Iranian Battlegroup, which was launched on October 17. The aim was for the Iranians to attack west from Rakhyut to capture a ridge that overlooked the entrance to the Wadi Sayq and some of the routes up to the main enemy supply base in the caves at Sherishitti. The Iranians successfully occupied the position, but the enemy contested every minute of their presence there.

On October 15, Brigadier Akehurst flew in to Sarfait and surveyed the plateau below Capstan with the Commanding Officer of the Muscat Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Ian Christie. They could look down over the escarpment almost three miles to the ocean. The enemy had not reacted to their maneuver, apparently assuming that any attack moving out of the Sarfait position was a diversion and that the real attack was coming from elsewhere. They realized that an unexpected opportunity to completely cut off the adoo supply line was lying in front of them.

Akehurst set aside his carefully developed plan and chose to seize the opportunity that lay before him.. He provided the Muscat Regiment with two additional infantry companies and gave them orders to secure a line between Capstan and the coast. This was achieved during the night of October 16 with the creation of the new Simba line, which the enemy threw more than 1,000 artillery shells at (resulting in the Sultan's authorization for his air force to strike inside the PDRY). This operation demonstrates Akehurst's understanding of maneuver warfare and his adaptability.¹⁰¹ The enemy had been unbalanced and had left open a large gap and a wonderful opportunity to be exploited.¹⁰²

The Frontier Force cleared the heights north of the Wadi Sayq and pushed on to Sherishitti, eventually forcing the PLA and PDRY troops to pull back to the Darra ridge and on out of Dhofar. The Iranians cleared back through the caves and dug out the enemy's extensive arsenal. Over 100 tons of arms and ammunition were captured at Sherishitti; with the adoo supply line to the PDRY cut, operational success was now within reach. The town of Dhalqut was seized and one of the Frontier Force companies advanced along the Darra Ridge, the only rebel controlled territory left in Dhofar, to meet up with the Muscat Regiment. There was no longer a "liberated area" and no operational resistance within Dhofar. The war was over. By December all that remained was a scattered resistance. On December 11, 1975, Sultan Qaboos declared the Dhofar insurgency officially over.

By January 1976, PFLO guerrilla units had sought refuge in South Yemen, and there appeared to be no fight left in them. Their forays into Dhofar and artillery strikes stopped completely, virtually bringing hostilities against the SAF to an end. Although minor factions of the PFLO remained active in Yemen for years, the rebellion was over. Oman concluded a treaty with the PDRY later in 1976.

CONCLUSIONS

The first thing that must be apparent when contemplating the sort of action which a government facing an insurgency should take, is that there is no such thing as a purely military solution because the insurgency is not primarily a military

¹⁰¹ Geraghty quotes Akehurst, who observed that "in the next two minutes I threw seven months of planning and 40 pages of operations orders out of the metaphorical window." Geraghty, p. 136. See also Major General K Perkins, "Oman 1975: The Year of Decision," *RUSI Journal*, March 1979.

¹⁰² On Operation Hadaf, see Jeapes, pp. 225-232.

*activity. At the same time there is no such thing as a wholly political solution either, short of surrender, because the very fact that a state of insurgency exists implies that violence is involved which will have to be countered to some extent at least by the use of force.*¹⁰³

The essence of the indirect approach, whether in conventional or irregular conflict, is to exploit the psychological and moral dimensions of war in order to attack the enemy *from within* and *through others*. A counter-insurgency campaign based upon the indirect approach would focus primarily on undermining the cohesion of insurgent groups rather than striking directly at the insurgents themselves. It would do so by first identifying the central grievances that drive an insurgency, and then using political, social, and economic development to address those grievances and rob the insurgency of its will to fight. This type of campaign is usually conducted through the host government and indigenous forces as opposed to foreign combat formations. The Dhofar campaign stands as a successful example of an indirect approach to counterinsurgency. In fact, Ian Beckett, a British counterinsurgency expert, concluded that “the Dhofar experience represents a model campaign in every way.”¹⁰⁴

Throughout the course of the campaign, British officers successfully applied an overarching approach and supporting techniques that had been used to great effect in earlier conflicts.¹⁰⁵ Overall, the common “best practices” of integrated civil-military actions, the isolation of the insurgents in both physical and psychological domains, the selective and discriminate application of military force, and the use of specially trained indigenous personnel or former insurgents were all shown to be extremely useful.¹⁰⁶ Many of these techniques reflect the indirect approach, which the British and Omani leadership exploited in virtually every aspect of their efforts.

¹⁰³ General Sir Frank Kitson as quoted by Bruce Hoffman, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, Occasional Paper, June 2004, p. 7.

¹⁰⁴ Ian F. W. Beckett, *Counterinsurgency, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and Their Opponents Since 1750*, New York: Routledge, 2001, p. 230.

¹⁰⁵ John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005.

¹⁰⁶ Kalev I. Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” *Military Review*, May-June 2005, pp. 8-12.

This example is not unknown to American strategists. As early as 2004, Pentagon officials were stressing this same approach, years before the U.S. military had crafted the necessary doctrine or education and training programs to implement it. In testimony before the U.S. Congress in early 2004, just as the insurgency in Iraq was beginning, one U.S. Defense official articulated the essence of what would be needed to win:

*...one key to success in eliminating sanctuaries is building local capacity to shore up US friends and to extend governance and security into ungoverned areas. Unconventional warfare, civil affairs, and foreign internal defense activities are essential to build local capacity—the indirect approach.*¹⁰⁷

Dhofar is also interesting because it demonstrates the drawbacks of a direct approach in addition to the benefits of an indirect one. The prosecution of the conflict from 1965 to 1970 emphasized military actions and sought to physically destroy the insurgency. The Omani leadership, relying largely upon outside aid, sought to crush the opposition without making any attempt to implement the political and socio-economic reforms needed to bring a conclusive end to the war. Not surprisingly given its historical record, this approach failed. In fact, the enemy's strength rose appreciably.

British leaders, many of whom were veterans of long campaigns in Malaya or Aden, knew better. They realized that more than a military solution was called for, and that the solution would ultimately have to have an Omani face to it. Starting in 1970, they realized that it was possible to contain the violence in the coastal cities, but they also knew that they could not end that violence without advancing up into the *jebel* and addressing the needs of the population beyond physical security. Without locally raised units who knew the population and terrain, and without a credible and permanent presence on the *jebel*, winning the "hearts and minds" of the Dhofaris was impossible. Without such a capability, reaching the enemy's operational center of gravity was also impossible.

British leaders also came to realize the importance of information, particularly the need to counteract the enemy's message. Through their interviews with SEPs, the British learned that the Marxist indoctrination of the *jebelis* was at odds with the deeply ingrained Muslim faith of the

¹⁰⁷ Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, testimony to House Armed Services Committee, 10 August 2004.

local population. Focusing on this particular strain within the enemy camp, the British worked to increase factionalism and decrease cohesion within the insurgency. This suggests that the infusion of religion in irregular warfare can actually have two very different effects, not only functioning as a catalyst that exacerbates conflict, but also diffusing conflict by creating salient divisions within a movement—divisions that can be exploited. If “wars of faith and blood” are truly going to characterize the future, then this is something that modern campaign planners must consider.¹⁰⁸

Ultimately, however, the British succeeded because the leader of the client state understood and accepted their strategy. The efforts of Sultan Said bin Qaboos to accelerate the development of Oman in general and Dhofar in particular were very much rooted in the indirect approach. Each of the five major components of his plan represents what U.S. doctrine would call the campaign’s lines of operation.¹⁰⁹ These initiatives reflected classic techniques for disrupting insurgents and eroding their will and cohesion.

Nevertheless, the SAS also deserves significant credit for its contributions to the strategic approach taken by the British and Omani leadership. Their extensive experience in COIN operations in Malaya, Kenya, Borneo and Aden was immediately put to use, as they recognized that the Dhofar insurgency required a comprehensive approach, one that emphasized more than just military force. The SAS also exercised extraordinary patience in their training of the *firqats*; rather than attempt to mold these irregulars in their own image, they instead used the clay they had at hand to best advantage.¹¹⁰ The *firqat* program was perhaps the most successful part of the campaign and the most reflective of the indirect approach. It provided the counterinsurgency effort with both invaluable intelligence and actual combat support. The program was not aimed primarily at killing the enemy but at converting him to the government's cause, thus subtracting from the enemy and adding to the

¹⁰⁸ Ralph Peters, *Wars of Blood and Faith: The Conflicts that Will Shape the Twenty-First Century*, Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2007.

¹⁰⁹ FM 3-24, p. 5-3.

¹¹⁰ Something that American policy officials are fully aware of in Iraq. Ambassador Eric Edelman, speaking at a DoD/State Department co-sponsored conference promoting common approaches to counterinsurgency, noted in his remarks that “Working with the host nations in these states, we are not creating, nor have we attempted to create, a “mirror image” of our own military. Instead, we are helping to build forces that can counter their respective insurgencies and which can be sustained by the host nation.” Edelman’s Remarks, 28 Sept. 2006, transcript, accessed at <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3739>.

government's effort with the same stroke. The *firqat* was not organized as a regular military unit but as irregulars, and persuasion and consultation had to take the place of orders and a regular chain of command. This approach was necessary because of the nature of the local Arab character and leadership style, which the British adjusted to. Although it created headaches, the results of the extra effort were justified. The *firqat* became an effective instrument in combating the armed guerrilla formations and, even more important, in demonstrating to formerly remote or ignored areas that the government cared about them. Finally, the SAS can also be congratulated for its 'hearts and minds' approach on the *jebel*. The establishment of CATs were central to emphasizing the new government's renewed interest in the daily lives of the Dhofaris, which reinforced the information message.

In sum, the key components in the Oman counterinsurgency campaign were all used in support of a comprehensive strategy based upon the indirect approach. This conflict took ten long years, but its psychological aspects were most dominant, and the enemy was defeated from within. His cohesion was steadily fragmented by political and social change in the province, and his fielded forces were denied both the supplies and the will to continue on. The enemy was also defeated by changes within Oman—in its government, its security forces, and ultimately in the minds of the *jebelis* in Dhofar who chose to abandon the rebellion. As in most cases where the indirect approach is used, the results gained were disproportional to the effort expended.

For modern American strategists and planners, this case study offers useful insights on how to address some of today's most urgent threats. Although the strategy and tactics described below cannot simply be imitated elsewhere without due consideration of and adaptation to local conditions, it nevertheless remains an excellent example of how the indirect approach can be successfully applied in a protracted and irregular conflict.

Appendix D: Embassies as CP in the Anti-Terror Campaign

Appendix E: Expanding Role of the MILGRP in IW¹¹¹

While the following article was written to describe the potential role of the MILGRP activities to support the GWOT, it provides sufficient illustration of the vital role that US missions may play in coordinating and executing future IW operations. As such it is included in this JOC as an appendix to guide future experimentation and CONOPS development.

“As warfare moves into the shadows, it will become a deadly game of cat and mouse — something more akin to tough investigative and police work than traditional warfare. In this type of environment, command and control concepts tailored for the Cold War do not apply. Large joint task forces with multiple components, designed for divisional fire and movement against similarly equipped adversary forces are not appropriate for fighting irregular, small-scale conflicts where surrogate forces carry much of the burden.

For IW fought in the netherworld between real peace and all-out war, one command and control model has proven to be appropriate, effective and efficient over time. This is the US ambassador’s interagency country team and its tailored US military component working as an interagency team nearest the problem and closest to the principal actors in the host nation. The Defense Department contribution to the country team is a military organization ranging from a small Office of Defense Cooperation to a full US Military Group tailored to meet the ambassador’s needs for military coordination and support. This is a time-proven design that helps the host nation solve its own problems, designs information activities to best complement the overarching campaign, and guarantees cross-cultural understanding and overall success.

US Military Groups, when assisting a country with an active insurgency or as part of a wider IW effort, are designed to manage the provision of materiel and training packages, US military advisers and trainers, and intelligence assets within the context of political constraints. Despite the proven effectiveness of this formula, the need to fight IW simultaneously in many locations around the world over an extended time should prompt an overhaul of Military Group staffing and structure. Of particular importance is commander selection and preparation, with an eye toward his coordination chain outside an embassy. Intelligence linkages must also gain greater scope and definition, and make use of the latest technology. Release authorities and parameters for host nation partners, as well as


¹¹¹ Extract taken from a pending article “Group Dynamics -- How U.S. Military Groups support the War on Terrorism” by MG (Ret.) Geoffrey C. Lambert

the degree of interagency sharing, must also be clearly defined. Depth among staff members is critical, with emphasis on experience with counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, psychological operations, civil-military operations, security assistance, and logistics. Country-specific experience is vital as well.

As the “long war” enters its informational phase, US military forces will play a more pronounced role in coordinating civil-military operations. This implies the need to provide the Military Group with greater contracting and budget authority, strategic communications, and direct links to the geographic combatant commander. As US forces work closely with their non-US counterparts, the release of US technology, tactics, techniques and procedures must be monitored carefully.”

Appendix F: ISSS JIC Vignette

1. Overview. This vignette describes a notional, large-scale IW scenario that involves a country modeled on Nigeria. The scenario posits a future Africa Petro State (APS) (circa 2017) challenged by an array of problems, some entirely domestic in origin and others fomented by external actors. It offers a particularly rich experimental case, incorporating many planning factors and issues that might be relevant in other large irregular warfare/COIN contingencies – oil (Saudi Arabia), a large population (Pakistan, Indonesia), Islamic radicalization (much of the Middle East and several countries in Southeast Asia), a large Shia minority (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait), ethnic/tribal divisions, lawlessness/gangs, etc. This scenario is meant to present a complex, irregular warfare problem that is plausible and large enough to illustrate operational challenges that would stress the US military. In this scenario, APS must deal with a growing domestic insurgency, rampant corruption throughout the government and national police force, an antiquated civil infrastructure groaning under the weight of a very large population, and operational exploitation by Al Qaeda and associated Islamist movements (often referred to as AQAM). While it possesses vast oil wealth (both current and potential), the proceeds from years of oil



exploration have largely been wasted by a small, corrupt, elite segment of the population, while the APS people have been ignored and are now largely estranged from their central government. The APS government recognizes its own inability to unilaterally handle these

challenges and calls upon the US for assistance. Figure E-1 presents the geographic setting and general context for the array of security challenges.

Figure E-1

Defined Relationships. The following is provided to describe the elements used in the vignette:

- **Red Elements.** Identified primarily as adversaries of the central APS government, but also posing a threat to the US and its interests, both directly and indirectly.
- **Brown Elements.** Groups within APS sympathetic to, or supportive of, Red elements. Their level of opposition to US involvement is heavily influenced by their perception of APS government legitimacy and effectiveness and the extent to which US actions help or hurt reconciliation with the APS central government.
- **Green Elements.** Host nation forces/governmental elements and groups, sects, and clans predisposed to support APS actions and US intervention.
- **Blue Elements.** US forces and governmental entities.

2. Regional Situation/US National Objectives.

Situation.

With an estimated population of 140 million, APS has enormous human resources; it is the ninth most populous country in the world and the most populous in Africa (approximately one out of five Africans is an APS citizen). It remains the continent's largest oil producer (eighth largest exporter in the world), providing the government with a steady stream of hard cash. Not surprisingly, it is the economic powerhouse of West Africa. It is a leading player in the African Union and Commonwealth of Nations; the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD); and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). APS is also a regional military power, contributing to numerous African peacekeeping operations.

The country is also faced with enormous internal problems. The country has over 250 ethnic groups with numerous languages and tribes, which makes governance challenging even under the best of circumstances. Unfortunately, APS governance has a record of being quite poor.

Although \$500 billion in oil had been extracted from APS since 1970, the microeconomic policies of the government have never truly benefitted the APS population; the ruling party's policy implementation has been rife with corruption and mismanagement and payments have been used by powerful state governors to strengthen their hold on power, while an estimated 90 percent of the population lives on less than \$2 a day.

All of this has driven the country's numerous ethnic and tribal groups to express their frustrations more freely, with increasing violence. In the oil rich south, an umbrella separatist organization called the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has waged "resource war" against the government. In the predominantly Muslim north, dissatisfaction with the national government has prompted the 12 states located north of the Niger and Benue Rivers to adopt *Sharia Hadud* criminal laws, creating tension between the Muslim and Christian communities. Sectarian fault lines between Muslims (50 percent of the population) and Christians (40 percent) have been increasingly marked by violence and an estimated 10,000 Muslims and Christians have died as a result.

APS also finds itself on the front line of an expanding radicalized Islamist penetration into West Africa. "AQ Central" has reached out to militant Islamists in the Middle East, Africa, and Central and Southeast Asia with the hopes of creating franchises charged with carrying out attacks on Western targets. AQAM leaders accept that they have little chance of overthrowing established "apostate regimes" with good security services; instead, they have opted for a global campaign of "vexation and frustration" that focuses on taking advantage of, and operating from, ungoverned areas in weak, failed, or failing states. Their objective is to create "zones of barbarism" in which "savage chaos" reigns, as in pre-Taliban Afghanistan. Tactics include attacks on tourist sites, oil facilities, and other relatively soft, high value facilities to compel states to pull their security forces out of remote areas and outlying sites, thereby creating exploitable security vacuums. To further their strategic aims, AQAM encourages the development of autonomous, home-grown cells inspired by al Qaeda's violent jihadist ideology. Al Qaeda has moved to exploit the growing religious, sectarian, and tribal frictions in APS in hope of creating an operational sanctuary for itself, in which to recruit and train operatives and from which to launch attacks against the West.

On the upside, and in spite of rampant government corruption, the APS middle class has grown due to strong GDP growth (6 percent annually), creating an increasingly vocal and influential bloc of voters less and less dependent on the largess of the state. Leaders from the middle class have formed a new political party, the APS People's Party (APP), that espouses good governance, the rule of law, improved human rights, and

improved anti-corruption legislation – an approach that has led to the election of a President not beholden to the corrupt policies of the past and who is bent on implementing good governance practices and reasserting the appropriate control of the central government on the mechanisms of security and responsible wealth distribution.

While the President and his senior cabinet officials are intent on making improvements in responsible governance, their efforts in the oil-rich Delta region have been hampered by the ineffectiveness of the APS National Police Force (ANPF), which is corrupt and distrusted by the local communities. MEND has been able to arm itself, through funds obtained from oil piracy and black-market sales, with increasingly sophisticated equipment and weapons of all types. Infrastructure projects in the Delta, and even in the northern part of the country, have stalled due to graft and corruption. Life is especially hard for the growing urban population due to the breakdown of city infrastructure and the rise of criminal gangs who control much of the urban terrain.

Though the young APP government is determined to meet the APS population's high expectations for change, the array of problems a decade-and-a-half in the making – degrading national infrastructure; a collapse of social services in the cities; a persistent insurgency in the Delta; a brewing Muslim insurgency in the north; and sectarian violence between Christians and Muslims – make any progress extremely difficult.

Attacks by Al Qaeda on Saudi oil infrastructure, together with an increase in MEND attacks on APS production, has caused a major spike in crude oil prices and a corresponding precipitous decline in global stock markets, with world losses exceeding a trillion dollars. These attacks on global energy production have made stability of the APS market all the more important to the US (and global) economy.

APS military units in the south have their hands full keeping a lid on violence in the major cities, where citizens are protesting a lack of food and services, and key port facilities, where oil is loaded in waiting tankers.

The APS central government is rapidly becoming overwhelmed as the crisis spins out of control.

US National Objectives.

- To prevent the collapse of APS and assist in restoring it to a stable footing.
- To maintain the viability of the APS energy sector.

- To prevent the creation of an AQAM operational sanctuary.
- To improve the ability of the APS government to address its domestic security challenges.

3. ISSS Operational Concept

AFRICOM Mission. Combined forces conduct operations in APS and the surrounding region to support and foster effective governance, security, and economic development in APS, to include the restoration of civil order, expansion of governmental capacities, protection of critical infrastructure, and suppression of terrorist and criminal organizations/elements, in order to promote APS and regional stability.

Commander's Intent/Planning Guidance. I intend to conduct an "indirect campaign," meaning we will operate by, with, and through APS forces to help them address their security challenges, vice expecting that the US will solve their problems for them. I need to understand APS requirements and their desired framework for operations, and we will build our plans to support APS requirements. We will perform direct tasks as APS will lack some capabilities only the US can bring to bear; but we will always act in support of APS. Therefore, I want to quantify requirements and identify enablers for APS success. I want to create an operational architecture that accounts for APS concerns and ensures all US actions are complementary internally and externally. We are dealing with a complex, irregular warfare contingency composed of a combination of IW tasks (COIN, CT, FID, etc) that will support long-term security, stability, and reconstruction operations. Our operations will be divided among three general tasks: nation-wide stabilization and security operations in support of the APS government, with a heavy emphasis on the Lagos sector; COIN operations in the SE/Delta sector; and counter-sanctuary operations in Abuja (North) sector.

Commander AFRICOM is a supporting commander to the US Chief of Mission (COM) and the APS Military Chief of Staff (MCoS). All forces assigned, apportioned, or deployed to AFRICOM, to support this effort, will be subject to my focus on supporting accomplishment of US objectives. All USG civilian agencies, personnel, or organizations – likely to be deployed as part of an Interagency Task Force (IATF) – will be under the operational control of the COM. AFRICOM will coordinate with the IATF on operations appropriate to accomplish tasks directed by the COM. Supported and supporting relationships will be determined by me and the COM on a case by case basis, as appropriate to the mission. At AFRICOM's direction, a "Military Group" may be deployed as the best means to accomplish support to

the COM. If deployed, the MILGRP will be under the operational control of the COM.

Purpose. In conjunction with the full range of US national resources, and anticipated contributions from the international community, the US will ensure the stability of the APS government, the long-term viability of the APS energy sector, and the denial of an operational sanctuary for terrorist organizations.

Method. We will conduct an indirect campaign aimed at supporting the operational needs of the APS government and its military and security forces, to address three key challenges: weak, corrupt institutions and failing civil infrastructure; an insurgency that threatens the country's energy sector and its primary source of revenue; and nascent efforts by AQAM to establish an operational sanctuary within APS. This campaign will include the following focus areas:

- Combat, combat support, and civil security operations throughout the country, to help the APS government restore its “monopoly on violence.”
- Expansion and improvement of APS military and security forces.
- Development and improvement of essential civil service infrastructure (with specific focus on major urban population centers).
- Comprehensive information operations designed to support the enhancement of APS central government legitimacy, place US actions in the proper context of supporting the APS government and serving the security interests of APS as a whole, and invalidate the competing information campaign waged by the enemy (Red Elements).
- Expansion of “good governance” initiatives through improvements to the security environment.
- Improvement of the economy through increased stability, brought about by an improved security environment.

In nearly all cases, our operations will be in support of multiple US agencies. At all times, our actions will be coordinated with our IA partners to ensure unity of effort. US military forces will act in conjunction with guidance from the MILGRP and IATF, acting under the operational control of the US COM. Bear in mind that we will put

an “APS face” on all efforts; that our efforts will ultimately be part of a broader international effort to stabilize the region (from a security and economic perspective) and global energy markets; and that we need to help APS dominate the “strategic narrative” so that the citizens of APS fully understand what is at stake and that the APS government is making every effort to provide them a better way of life. To that end:

- While DoD will surge capabilities to address the most immediate security challenges threatening the continued viability of the APS state, every effort should be made to reduce the US level of effort and physical presence as quickly as possible, without compromising the long-term success of APS.
- The US focus of support will be on expansion and improvement of APS capabilities, but our forces need to be prepared to conduct some military tasks unilaterally, given APS shortfalls in some capability areas.
- Our military aim is to enable APS to create and preserve a security environment conducive to responsible governance.

End State. A functioning, stable APS capable of handling all internal security concerns.

4. Situation. The APS environment is quite complex and is impacted by the objectives and interests of a variety of groups, as listed below.

Red Elements. (enemy elements – AQAM, indigenous groups hostile to APS central government, MEND)

- Objective. To obtain and sustain autonomous control of areas of interest in order to support recruiting, training, and employment of forces against the West (AQAM), expand areas of control and influence (AQAM, MEND, and indigenous religious/ethnic sects), and to exploit the lucrative energy reserves of APS (MEND, local criminal elements, corrupt governmental officials).
- Concept. Disrupt and prevent APS forces from obtaining control of the security environment. Actions will include small unit/guerrilla actions, terrorism and intimidation of local population, sabotage and attacks on critical infrastructure, bribery of local officials and tribal/ethnic leaders, and establishment of alliances along common areas of interest/benefit.

Brown Elements. (tribal/ethnic/religious groups)

- Objective. Improve economic status, power, and influence of the group relative to competing groups; improve “security” of the group relative to potentially disruptive or hostile influences; and improve the status of the group relative to its interactions with the central government.
- Concept. Align with other, more powerful entities that can assist in the relative positioning of the group with respect to the long-term interests of that group. If the APS central government can ensure the protection and advancement of the group, the Brown element will make accommodations to cede some measure of authority to the government. But in cases where the APS government cannot protect the groups’ interests, the Brown element will align with and support stronger factions, be it AQAM, other indigenous tribal/ethnic entities, or local political power-brokers. Cooperation or resistance to US intervention is purely a function of the extent to which US actions further the interests of the group.

Green Elements. (APS government entities)

- Objective. Re-establish control of the internal security environment, regain control of APS borders, exercise formal management of the national economy (through stabilization and regulation of energy (oil) extraction and sale), and establish “good governance” practices (reduction/elimination of corruption, elimination of private militias and entrenched criminal elements) necessary to ensure the survival of APS and create a stable economic and political framework for its citizens.
- Concept. The APS government, with the assistance of US military forces, US civilian inter-agency elements, and contributions from the international community, will:
 - Improve the professionalization and discipline of APS military forces and national police,
 - Develop capabilities in deficient areas, and expand capacity in capability areas with critical shortfalls, and
 - Regain control of the domestic security situation,

. . . in order to create conditions necessary to implement economic and “good governance” initiatives. US support to APS central government initiatives will enable the APS government to deny operational space to Red Elements, increase the availability of funding (from the energy sector) critical to addressing decaying urban/civil infrastructure, and meet the needs of the APS citizenry. As APS capabilities improve, the presence of US forces and their level of involvement will correspondingly decline.

Blue Elements. (US)

- Mission. Combined forces conduct operations in APS and the surrounding region to support and foster effective governance, security, and economic development in APS, to include the restoration of civil order; expansion of governmental capacities; protection of critical infrastructure; and suppression of terrorist and criminal organizations/elements in order to promote APS and regional stability.
- Objectives.
 - To prevent the collapse of APS and assist in restoring it to a stable footing.
 - To maintain the viability of the APS energy sector.
 - To prevent the creation of an AQAM operational sanctuary.
 - To improve the ability of the APS government to its domestic security challenges.
- CONOPS.
 - Phase 1. Immediate deployment of senior advisory and trainer personnel to rapidly augment and expand the existing US military advisory and training teams resident in country. Initial efforts will focus on assessment and understanding of APS requirements to expand and improve both the capability and the capacity of APS military forces and national police to handle the security challenges confronting the country.
 - Phase 2. Based on the security assessment, execute a rapid deployment of the joint combat, combat support,

- Phase 3. Conduct military operations in support of APS and US objectives, focused on creating the improved security environment that will deny an operational sanctuary to terrorist organizations, resolve the grievances of the domestic insurgency, improve the ability of APS law enforcement forces to provide proper security for APS citizens, and quell the sectarian violence between religious, ethnic, and tribal entities.
- Phase 4. Drawdown of US military forces to pre-crisis levels, in conjunction with the successful introduction of international and US entities better suited to the long-term security and stability operations necessary to attain and sustain APS viability as an anchor state for the continent and contributor to the global energy market.

