Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Activity Concepts

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FOREWORD

The *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (CCJO) describes in broad terms my vision for how joint forces will operate in response to a wide variety of future security challenges. It is the overarching document that guides the family of joint concepts. The CCJO envisions a future operating environment characterized by complexity, uncertainty, and rapid change. Its central thesis is that future joint commanders will combine and subsequently adapt four basic categories of military activity -- combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction -- in accordance with the unique requirements of each operational situation.

In May 2009, U.S. Joint Forces Command subjected the CCJO to a comprehensive experiment, which applied the CCJO's ideas to three challenging scenarios. The experiment ultimately validated the broad ideas contained in the CCJO but identified the need for greater conceptual development of each of the four activities.

This document does that, combining distinct but interrelated concepts for combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction into a single volume. Like the CCJO itself, the purpose of these concepts is to guide force development by: establishing a common intellectual framework for military professionals, policymakers, and others interested in the development of the military force; establishing a conceptual foundation for subsequent joint and Service concepts; motivating and guiding the study, experimentation and evaluation of joint concepts and capabilities; and identifying the broad capabilities required to perform that activity.

Although the activity concepts look to the future, many of their ideas are timeless. As always, operational success will result from adapting such timeless ideas to meet emerging conditions and challenges. Hence, while acknowledging what is unchanged, these papers focus on what is new.

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INTRODUCTION TO THE FOUR CCJO ACTIVITY CONCEPTS

The *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (CCJO) describes in broad terms the Chairman's vision for how joint forces circa 2016-2028 will operate in response to a wide variety of challenges. The CCJO is the overarching concept for future joint operations. Its central thesis is that future joint force commanders will apply operational art to determine the appropriate blend of the four basic categories of military activity -- combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction -- over time and in accordance with the unique requirements of each situation. The CCJO Activity Concepts describe with greater specificity the conduct of these basic categories of military activity, the particular functions that joint forces must perform in the conduct of these activities, and the implications of adopting these concepts.

The CCJO and these activity concepts are informed by the *Joint Operating Environment* [JOE] *2010*, a companion document that forecasts potential challenges based on current trends. The JOE envisions a future operating environment characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and rapid change. The future operating environment emerges from a combination of enduring and emergent conditions. The central enduring condition is the unruly nature of the international political system: a universe of autonomous polities, each seeking to optimize its own wealth, security, opportunities, and influence. Others include the United States' status as a global power with global interests and the resulting requirement for joint forces to operate at global distances. Important emergent conditions include the rise of nontraditional powers (both states and non-states that could challenge the United States, at least regionally); the increasing lethality and availability of advanced weapons, including weapons of mass destruction; growing transparency and connectivity, which increase the influence of popular perceptions and attitudes on world events; spreading urbanization; and diminishing overseas access.

The conditions and trends of the future operating environment forecast five broad national security challenges likely to require the United States to employ joint forces in the future: winning the Nation's wars, deterring potential adversaries, developing cooperative security, defending the homeland, and responding to civil crises. Of these, winning the Nation's wars remains the preeminent challenge and primary justification for maintaining capable and credible military forces. In the future, as in the past, these wars may take a variety of forms.

As a solution to these conditions and challenges, the CCJO proposes an operational concept comprising three interrelated ideas:

- Address each situation on its own terms, in its unique political and strategic context, rather than attempting to fit the situation to a preferred template.
- Conduct and integrate a combination of *combat*, *security*, *engagement*, and *relief and reconstruction* activities according to a concept of operations designed to meet the unique circumstances of that situation.
- Conduct operations subject to a continuous assessment of results in relation to expectations, modifying both the understanding of the situation and subsequent operations accordingly.

Together these three ideas describe a generic process of operational adaptation designed expressly to cope with the complexity, uncertainty, and change that will define the future operating environment (see Fig. 1 below). This process applies to all joint operations even though the specific ends, ways, and means of those operations may vary widely according to the situation.



Figure 1. CCJO Central Thesis

The CCJO argues that combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction are the basic building blocks from which joint operations are constructed -- and therefore are required core competencies of the U.S. Armed Forces. Most joint operations will require some combination of two or more of these activities arranged and weighted to accomplish the mission.

Combat aims at defeating armed enemies -- regular, irregular or both -- through the organized application of force to kill, destroy or capture by all available means. It concludes successfully when those enemies capitulate or are destroyed, although it may be put to political uses short of those ends. It is the demonstration of credible combat power that primarily deters aggression.

Security activities seek to protect and control populations, territory and resources -- friendly, hostile or neutral -- during peacetime, crisis, or conflict. Although security activities may involve the use of force, unlike combat they seek ultimately to gain willing compliance rather than to compel it. Some security activities conclude when the joint force divests responsibility to host government or other security forces. Other security activities involve a constant, steady state effort without a specific endpoint (for example, monitoring and ensuring access to the global commons). Recent military experience has revitalized awareness of both the importance of security activities and the capabilities needed to conduct them effectively.

Engagement activities seek to improve the capabilities of or cooperation with allies and other partners, both military and civilian. The scope and nature of engagement activities can vary enormously, reflecting differing strategic relationships between the United States and partner nations. Each engagement effort will be unique and must be framed to accommodate both U.S. objectives and the concerns of and constraints on the potential partners. Conducted properly, engagement activities may help preclude the need for combat. Alternatively, they can establish the conditions to conduct combat more effectively should it become necessary. Engagement activities typically are long-duration undertakings, ending only when they have achieved their goals or when either the United States or its partner concludes that they have become unnecessary or unproductive.

Relief and reconstruction activities seek to provide, restore, or improve critical infrastructure and essential services in the wake of

combat, a breakdown of civil order, or a natural disaster.[1] Like security, these activities may be conducted in a variety of operating environments. Joint forces most often conduct relief and reconstruction concurrently with related efforts by a wide variety of other actors, including other U.S. Government departments and agencies and their implementing partners, international organizations, foreign security forces, NGOs, private sector entities, the host government, and indigenous populations and organizations. Whether conducted independently or as part of a wider effort, joint relief and reconstruction activities optimally conclude when host government or indigenous institutions effectively meet the basic needs of the population or when those other agencies assume full responsibility for the effort.

Together, these four categories of activity embrace virtually every mission the Nation could call on a joint force to accomplish. Successful joint operations will require proficiency in each of the four categories of activity and their effective integration. Joint force commanders must integrate combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction, often simultaneously. Assisting a friendly state to defeat an insurgency, for example, might require combat against organized insurgent forces, security to protect the population from intimidation and to deny insurgents access to that population, relief and reconstruction to restore or expand civil services, and engagement to train host-nation security forces. A more conventional conflict typically would require combat to defeat enemy forces, security activities to control captured areas, relief and reconstruction to restore essential services and critical infrastructure needed to continue to fight, and engagement to ensure effective cooperation with multinational partners. Stability operations likely would involve heavy emphasis on security activities to establish civil order, engagement and relief and reconstruction to restore civil institutions, and even some combat to defeat those disruptive elements that rise to the level of an armed enemy. Homeland defense could involve engagement to deprive non-state enemies of sanctuary overseas; security to detect and prevent attack by monitoring land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace access; combat to defeat an actual attack; and in the worst event, relief and reconstruction to mitigate the effects of a successful attack.

Deterrence is a special case because it typically requires the demonstration of capabilities rather than the actual performance of

[1] The CCJO makes a distinction between relief and reconstruction as a category of military activity and Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, which are coordinated U.S. Government operations in countries emerging from conflict or civil strife. The joint force contribution to a larger Stabilization and Reconstruction Operation likely will include relief and reconstruction activities, but may also include security, engagement and even combat.

activities. Deterrence requires the credible willingness to employ defensive and offensive combat capabilities to convince a potential aggressor that any attack would likely fail or would result in unacceptable retaliation. It can involve security activities that convince the potential aggressor that attack preparations likely would be detected. It can involve a variety of engagement activities to convince the potential adversary that it can achieve acceptable objectives without attacking. It can also involve engagement with partners to convince a potential aggressor that an attack would result in a multinational response. Finally, it can involve reconstruction capabilities that demonstrate that even a successful attack will not achieve its desired objective because the United States will recover effectively.

How a joint force will conduct each activity will vary with context. Combat in support of counterinsurgency will differ from combat to defeat cross-border aggression by the armed forces of a hostile state. Recovery from a natural disaster at home will differ from relief and reconstruction pursuant to combat. That said, the basic aims, means, and concepts associated with each of these activities will change little from case to case.

A week-long experiment conducted by U.S. Joint Forces Command in May 2009 and involving the combatant commands, Services, other U.S. agencies, and foreign partners validated the basic ideas contained in the CCJO but identified the need for additional specificity in describing the conduct of the four basic categories of activity. This finding led to the following four concepts:

- *Joint Combat Concept* (JCC)
- *Joint Security Concept* (JSC)
- *Joint Engagement Concept* (JEC)
- *Joint Relief and Reconstruction Concept* (JRRC)

These concepts are logical follow-ons to the CCJO, which remains in effect as the overarching concept for future joint operations. They are not joint operating concepts in that they do not describe the conduct of joint operations, most of which require the combination of two or more activities. Rather, each describes in greater detail than the CCJO the performance of a category of military activity and touches only lightly on the integration of those activities. That integration will be unique to each situation, an essential responsibility of command, through the exercise of operational art.

What is new about the four activity concepts?

Although developed from the common foundation provided by the

CCJO, the concepts each stand alone as self-contained arguments. Each describes those characteristics of the future operating environment forecast in the CCJO that bear uniquely on the activity in question. Each establishes its own unique military challenge and proposes a unique conceptual solution to that challenge. Finally, each identifies the unique implications and risks of adopting that solution.

The concepts avoid inventing terminology where possible, instead relying on doctrinal terms, but organizing those recognizable doctrinal elements into new constructs suited to emerging challenges and introducing new ideas where required. Although they reflect joint doctrine and successful current practices, these CCJO Activity Concepts reach beyond existing doctrine and practice to propose evolutionary changes based on emerging and anticipated future conditions and challenges in the operating environment. Once experience and experimentation confirm that these changes provide a valuable alternative to current doctrine, they should be transitioned expeditiously into doctrine through the established doctrinal change process.

The CCJO's four activities are an important departure from current doctrine, which instead describes joint operations as some combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations.[2] Combat, security, engagement and relief and reconstruction are not applied sequentially or discretely. Instead, the CCJO activities combine to form joint operations without reference to any predetermined phasing model, another important departure from current doctrine.[3]

Although combat remains the most important category of activity for the joint force given its unique warfighting mandate, the future operating environment will require a greater relative emphasis on the other three activities: security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction. Thus, the activity concepts reinforce the CCJO's central idea of shifting toward an approach to joint operations that more explicitly integrates and balances the four activities over time based on a continual assessment of the dynamic conditions of each specific situation.

Like the CCJO, each of the activity concepts recognizes the

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[2] U.S. Joint Staff, *Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations* (Washington: Department of Defense, 17Sep08, incorporating Ch. 2 of 22 March 2010), V-1 and V-2. (hereafter cited JP 3-0).

[3] See JP 3-0. Per the CCJO construct, offense and defense are merely subordinate forms of combat while stability operations correctly are a complex type of joint operation requiring the combination of combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction activities to restore stability to a destabilized situation. JP 3-0, IV-27 to IV-30, V-2.

importance of informational activities in an operating environment increasingly characterized by transparency and information saturation. By recognizing the doctrinal joint functions -- command and control, intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, protection, and sustainment -- each concept therefore proposes an information function appropriate to its activity. As commanders integrate the activities into joint operations, it is important that the conduct of the activities sends reinforcing, and not contradictory, messages.

Although the JCC accepts that the doctrinal joint functions, with the addition of information, are adequate to describe how joint forces apply combat power against an enemy, the JSC, JEC, and JRRC identify unique functions required to conduct their respective activities. Each accordingly proposes additional functions particular to its activity, building on the doctrinal joint functions as detailed in the JCC.

The following sections summarize additional departures from doctrine within each concept.

What is new in the Joint Combat Concept?

The JCC identifies the combination of increasingly well-armed enemies and increasing restrictions on U.S. use of force as the fundamental dilemma facing joint forces in future combat. It recognizes the increasing likelihood of having to fight for domain superiority -- even the possible requirement to operate without it for periods of time -- as a consequence of the emergence of those increasingly capable enemies. It also acknowledges the mounting impact of information transparency on domestic and international popular opinion and of the latter on operational freedom of action during combat.

The JCC proposes that the solution to that fundamental dilemma is the application of overwhelming yet discriminate force against key enemy elements. It recognizes that a key challenge for commanders at all levels will be reconciling the tension between the imperative to apply overwhelming forces and the imperative to minimize unintended collateral damage. It argues that a key prerequisite for reconciling that tension is to delegate the authority to control combat power to the commander best able to employ it with the necessary discrimination.

As mentioned above, the JCC adds information -- the intentional dissemination of data to affect the perceptions, attitudes, and ultimately the behavior of designated, external audiences -- to maneuver and fires as the functions by which joint forces apply combat power against an enemy. While accepting the need to combine disruption and attrition to defeat an enemy, it emphasizes disruption as the preferred defeat

mechanism. As a necessary adjunct to combat, it acknowledges the need to influence public perception to retain operational freedom of action. Finally, it recognizes cyberspace as a combat domain and acknowledges the increasing role of space operations to successful combat.

What is new in the Joint Security Concept?

The JSC establishes that security activities are distinct from combat and proceed from very different premises. The joint force conducts security during peacetime, crises, and conflict and these activities may likely represent the most dominant military activity in the future. As such, the *Joint Security Concept* describes how the future joint force conducts security activities through the overarching framework of prevention and de-escalation. *Prevention* focuses on mitigating threats before there is a deterioration of local or regional stability. *De-escalation* focuses on lowering levels of violence and lawlessness when an activity, presence, or threat creates an unstable environment that is beyond the capability of interim or host government security institutions to control or manage.

The Joint Security Concept also introduces security-specific functions of *regulation* and *intervention* that, respectively, reinforce systems and structures that provide order, while simultaneously removing threats and aggression. The JSC further emphasizes the critical function of *information* within the context of security activities, and how this function may enable (or conversely, inhibit) joint force operations in the context of the future operating environment. Finally, it recognizes the importance of developing comprehensive approaches and processes with interagency and international partners in the conduct of joint security activities.

The JSC goes on to recognize the tensions and mutual reinforcement between security and combat activities, as well as the reinforcing aspects with engagement and relief and reconstruction activities. Finally, it recognizes the importance of developing comprehensive approaches and processes for military support to providing law and order.

What is new in the Joint Engagement Concept?

The JEC recognizes that the emerging operating environment will require more joint engagement, in a timelier manner, with new and varied types of actors. It considers ad-hoc, purpose-built coalitions with new and non-traditional partners to be the norm in the future operating environment, exceeding in some cases formal alliances in both

importance and likelihood. It identifies the increasing importance of training foreign security forces as a joint force mission.

The JEC establishes a common logical framework for a variety of missions and types of actions that previously were not recognized as having a common purpose. Within that overarching framework, it identifies four engagement functions: confer and coordinate, exercise, train and advise, and equip. Although these functions are not themselves new, the JEC combines these previously disparate and supporting elements of joint doctrine within a single construct that recognizes they share a common logic, and allows the joint force to develop a tailored, blended approach for engagement. It suggests the need for more of a bottom-up approach to future engagement, with engagement activities pushed down to the lowest effective levels to facilitate the development of relationships built on trust.

It explicitly includes future joint engagement with adversaries as well as partners. Although extant joint doctrine addresses adversaries, it does so only within the construct of deterrence -- a logic of altering behavior based on a threat of retaliation. The JEC proposes an alternative construct to altering the adversarial nature of a relationship based on engagement -- a logic of cooperation toward common interests. Furthermore, the JEC identifies reconciliation as an outcome of engagement as well as combat, and asserts that such reconciliation can occur prior to demobilization and disarmament.

What is new in the Joint Relief and Reconstruction Concept?

The JRRC identifies legitimacy and effectiveness as two key criteria in designing, executing, and assessing relief and reconstruction activities. It further identifies legitimacy and effectiveness of a host nation as variable criteria that inform how a joint force must conduct relief and reconstruction activities. The JRRC identifies increased competition among a variety of disparate actors providing relief and reconstruction as a key characteristic of the future operating environment. It establishes a deliberate preference for enabling other actors rather than conducting relief and reconstruction activities directly.

To facilitate relief and reconstruction activities, the JRRC identifies unique joint force functions to provide, restore or improve critical infrastructure and essential services. It also asserts an additional function of communicating credibly with indigenous and international partners, reinforced by actions, as a critical part of successful relief and reconstruction activities.

Finally, the JRRC distinguishes between humanitarian assistance and "relief" -- the former governed by principles of humanity, neutrality, and impartiality, and the latter conducted to achieve political or strategic objectives, such as to gain access and influence in a region or to facilitate other joint forces activities.

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In addition to providing a vision of how future joint forces will conduct the respective activity, each Activity Concept derives potential implications of operating that way. In other words, it identifies the institutional changes that the Department of Defense and the Services will have to make to be able to implement the concept fully. The appendix links all those implications to existing Joint Capability Areas (JCAs) to inform the prioritization of future capability development.

PART I

JOINT COMBAT CONCEPT

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1. INTRODUCTION TO THE JOINT COMBAT CONCEPT

This *Joint Combat Concept* (JCC) envisions how a future joint force will conduct combat against a variety of enemies, in multiple domains, and under a variety of conditions, including combat against both regular and irregular enemies and combat involving the use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This concept applies to a combatant command or joint task force of any size or composition. It envisions that a joint force most often will conduct combat in conjunction with foreign military partners, although U.S. joint forces will be able to operate unilaterally in support of national interests if necessary.

The *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (CCJO) establishes that combat is the most important of the four basic categories of activity. Combat remains the distinguishing activity of war, the most difficult and dangerous military activity and thus the ultimate test of military adequacy.

The challenge for future joint forces in combat is to defeat increasingly well-armed enemies, who may contest domain superiority, in conditions in which joint forces are restricted in the use of lethal force while those enemies are not. Although such restraints on the American use of force will vary from situation to situation, sometimes greatly, they will always exist and in general are increasing. The combination of these trends presents the fundamental dilemma that U.S. joint forces -- and many foreign military partners -- will have to resolve in the coming years.

2. THE NATURE OF COMBAT

Combat is organized action to defeat an armed enemy through the application of force to kill, destroy, or capture by all available means.[4]

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[4] *Organized* here means that the actions are not random, but rather have some rational aim, involve some level of planning, are conducted by combat forces (though not necessarily regular forces) assembled specifically for that purpose, and are conducted according to some tactical system. *Defeat* is defined as: "A tactical mission task that occurs when an enemy force has temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight. The defeated force's commander is unwilling or unable to pursue his adopted course of action, thereby yielding to the friendly commander's will and can no longer interfere to a significant degree with the actions of friendly forces. Defeat can result from the use of force or the threat of its use." U.S. Army, *Field Manual 3-90, Tactics* (Washington: Department of the Army, 2001), Glossary-9.

Combat seeks to destroy an enemy or by threatening destruction to compel capitulation. In practice, however, combat can support a variety of political objectives short of that. Moreover, the mere demonstration of credible combat power may deter a potential aggressor. For U.S. joint forces, therefore, the first requirement of combat is that its conduct conforms to the strategic objectives. At the same time, an understanding of the requirements and limitations of combat as a strategic instrument should inform the political decision to resort to combat.

Combat can assume a variety of forms and occur in a variety of circumstances, both in war and during times of nominal peace. It may take place on land, on and under the seas, in the air, and increasingly in space and cyberspace.[5] It can range in scale and duration from limited, isolated strikes or raids lasting hours or days to major campaigns involving large land, naval, and air formations lasting months or years.[6] It can vary in form from brutal close combat at distances of mere meters using basic individual weapons, sometimes improvised, to standoff combat from distances of thousands of miles using advanced long-range weapons and platforms, often controlled remotely.

Even when conducted with advanced weaponry, combat remains ultimately an intensely human activity, taking a physical and

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The current version of JP 3-0 does not define combat or discuss its nature or dimensions, although it mentions the term frequently. Under the section titled "Nature of Warfare," it discusses "traditional warfare" and "irregular warfare," but it does not discuss a mixing of forms. The final draft revision of JP 3-0 dated 15 July 2010 incorporates the constructs, future environment and precepts from the CCJO, including a discussion of the four categories of activity. JP 3-0, I-5 to I-6; U.S. Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations Revision Final Coordination* (Washington: Department of Defense, July 15, 2010), I-20 to I-23.

[5] *Space*: "A medium like the land, sea, and air within which military activities shall be conducted to achieve U.S. national security objectives."

Cyberspace: "A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers." *Cyberspace operations*: "The employment of cyber capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. Such operations include computer network operations and activities to operate and defend the Global Information Grid." All definitions from U.S. Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary for Military and Associated Terms* (Washington: Department of Defense, 2010); available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/index.html. (Hereafter cited as JP 1-02.) U.S. Executive Branch, *National Security Strategy 2010* (Washington: White House, 2010), 22. (Hereafter cited as *NSS 2010*.)

[6] Examples of the former include Operation Urgent Fury, the U.S.-led intervention in Grenada from 25 October-2 November 1983, and Operation El Dorado Canyon, the punitive U.S. air strike against Libya on 15 April 1986. Examples of the latter include the campaigns of the Second World War, the Korean War and the Vietnam War.

psychological toll on those who experience it and requiring arguably greater stores of fortitude, stamina, and strength than any other human endeavor. Although the CCJO argues that joint forces must be adaptive in all situations, this is truest of combat, which entails competing with a hostile and intelligent enemy who also will adapt.

Combat power may be applied against various targets, including enemy fighting forces, the political leadership that directs those forces, the economic or other institutions that create and sustain them, or the population from which they are drawn. Combatants might restrict themselves, for moral, cultural, legal, or strategic reasons, from attacking certain targets in particular situations, but these are self-imposed restrictions not intrinsic to combat. For example, the United States and many other nations reject the targeting of noncombatants, whereas some combatants intentionally target civilians.[7]

Finally, combat may vary in the forces and fighting methods used. On one hand, it may be conducted by or against the regular military forces of a national government, who wear uniforms, are more or less regulated by law and custom, and are equipped and sustained by the national industrial base. Those representing modern states typically operate in identifiable combined-arms formations using advanced land, sea, and air-fighting platforms designed solely for that purpose. Increasingly, many also operate in space and cyberspace. Some possess air and maritime power-projection capabilities. All tend to employ dedicated military command-and-control and logistics systems that are distinguishable from their civilian counterparts.

On the other hand, combat may be conducted by or against irregular forces, whether paramilitaries in aid of a nation's regular military forces, the combatant arm of an insurrection, a terrorist organization, or outright criminals. Lacking ready access to a national industrial base and thus materially disadvantaged in relation to regular forces, irregular combatants tend to employ guerrilla warfare and terror tactics, often in violation of established laws and customs of warfare. Because they tend to blend into the larger population and subsist, at least in part, on the civilian infrastructure, attacking them may well risk collateral damage and increased popular disaffection.

As they have in the past, future combat challenges most likely will present a mix of these forms, whether involving an essentially irregular force enjoying some of the advanced capabilities of regular forces, such

[7] Note however that the United States has not always taken that view. In the latter stages of World War II, both the United States and Great Britain conducted massive bombing raids against populated areas intended to break German and Japanese morale.

as Lebanon's Hezbollah, or an essentially regular force that employs irregular combatants and methods to complement its regular operations, as the North Vietnamese did during the Vietnam War. Moreover, the form that combat takes in any prolonged military contest likely will change over time. Future joint forces must be able to defeat such evolving hybrid threats whatever their complexion.

3. COMBAT IN THE FUTURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

The *Joint Operating Environment 2010* envisions a future operating environment characterized by complexity, uncertainty and rapid change, all of which will influence future joint combat. In addition, two other particular trends in the operating environment promise to make future combat especially challenging for U.S. joint forces: (1) the accelerating global proliferation of advanced weapons and other technologies and (2) mounting sociopolitical, strategic and operational restrictions on the use of lethal force by the military forces of the United States and many of its allies and coalition partners.[8]

The first trend is the diffusion of combat-related technologies. For most of modern history, industrialized states have enjoyed an enormous advantage in combat because only they possessed the economic, scientific and regulatory resources to develop, field and maintain military forces equipped with and trained to employ modern technology. However, advanced weapons and other combat-relevant systems, many of which are indistinguishable from civilian technology, have become progressively more affordable, available and easy to use, and more states and belligerent groups can acquire them. In the coming years, an increasing number of potential combatants will possess advanced weaponry, and some may well deploy at least a few weapons of mass destruction,[9] whether or not married to advanced delivery systems. That expanded and potentially undisciplined ownership of massively destructive capabilities will complicate both deterrence and the actual conduct of combat. Moreover, many potential enemies possess not only improved weaponry, but also improved access to combat information about joint forces and the ability to share that information rapidly. Finally, joint forces confront not only proliferating advanced technologies, but also the innovative adaptation of commonplace, even crude, lethal

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[8]While this concept posits that these are the two trends that will most impact the conduct of future combat, joint doctrine does not address them as such.

[9] *Weapons of mass destruction*: "Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties and exclude [*sic*] the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part from the weapon. Also called WMD." JP 1-02.

weapons such as improvised explosive devices.[10] As a result, differences in the effective combat capabilities of modern states and those of other potential belligerents are narrowing.

For U.S. joint forces, moreover, which must continue to conduct and sustain operations at global distances, the potential proliferation of advanced weapons poses a threat to U.S. access to both the global commons[11] and distant operational areas. U.S. joint forces increasingly will find freedom of action challenged in the maritime and air domains as well as in cyberspace. Land is by nature a contested domain in war. Accordingly, future joint forces, like their predecessors many decades ago, may have to fight merely to reach a distant theater safely and then fight their way in once they arrive. Moreover, they may have to continue to fight in all domains to maintain long lines of communication throughout the campaign.

Similarly, broadening access to space technology and the emergence of anti-satellite and counter-space weapons will allow a currently small but growing list of potential enemies to challenge U.S. advantages in space. Meanwhile, accelerating improvements in information technology coupled with decreasing costs virtually guarantee that practically any future enemy will be able to conduct computer network operations,[12] often as a prelude to physical combat. Modern military command and control and the functioning of modern societies in general -- including financial, transportation, communications,

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[10] *Improvised explosive device*: "A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may incorporate military stores, but is normally devised from nonmilitary components. Also called IED." JP 1-02.

[11] Barry R. Posen defined global commons as areas of air, sea and space that "belong to no one state and that provide access to much of the globe." The same description can be applied to much of cyberspace, which provides access to much of the globe's information. Posen attributes the origin of the term to Alfred Thayer Mahan, who described the sea as "a wide common, over which men may pass in all directions." Barry R. Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony," *International Security* 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003): 5-46; Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History: 1660-1783.* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1890), 25.

[12] *Computer network operations*: "Comprised of computer network attack, computer network defense, and related computer network exploitation enabling operations." *Computer network attack*: "Actions taken through the use of computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves." *Computer network defense*: "Actions taken to protect, monitor, analyze, detect and respond to unauthorized activity within Department of Defense information systems and computer networks." *Computer network exploitation*: "Enabling operations and intelligence collection capabilities conducted through the use of computer networks to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks." JP 1-02.

governmental and energy distribution systems -- increasingly depend on digital networks that are vulnerable to computer network attack and exploitation, which are difficult, if not impossible, to trace.

Economics also may contribute to narrowing capability differences. The United States may no longer enjoy the luxury of responding to threats by fielding technologically superior, but also vastly more expensive, counters. Moreover, although no commander has ever enjoyed unlimited resources, recent decades have been ones of relative plenty for U.S. joint forces. That luxury will disappear as future military budgets shrink. As a result, economics could affect future operational decision-making by requiring commanders increasingly to husband limited resources such as precision-guided munitions or to limit the risk to critical platforms too expensive to replace. More generally, the United States may no longer be able to count in all cases on the traditional ability to overwhelm an enemy materially. Applying economy of force and disciplining operational priorities thus likely will become even more essential for future commanders than for their predecessors.[13]

The second main trend impacting future joint combat is increasing restraints on the use of lethal force. Even as the military challenge expands, the United States and its allies confront growing restrictions on the use of lethal force. These restrictions take the form of limits on acceptable levels of violence and on what are considered acceptable targets. U.S. military forces nearly always have acknowledged some such restrictions, which will vary with the situation. That said, restrictions will tend in the future to increase over historical norms, reflecting both a growing societal aversion to combat's human and material costs and the perceived effect that inflicting those costs will have on attitudes toward and support of the United States.

Two factors amplify this trend. Expanding urbanization increases the likelihood that future combat will occur in densely populated areas, increasing the pressure to avoid civil casualties and damage and the difficulties of applying combat power effectively while doing so -- especially when the enemy deliberately uses the population for concealment and cover. Meanwhile, due to pervasive electronic media and the growing ubiquity of personal communications devices, future combat will take place in a transparent information environment in which more people than ever before witness vividly the conduct and aftermath of combat. Both factors will increase the penalty of collateral damage and the potential impact of incidents that might have escaped public attention in decades past.

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[13] The *NSS 2010* states that the U.S. government has an obligation to make the best use of taxpayer money and to live within its means. *NSS 2010*, 34-35.

Besides its complicating effect on achieving military surprise, increased transparency also will tend to magnify the impact of public opinion on the conduct of combat. In democratic societies, groundswells of public opinion can easily limit or expand military options. Practically all future combat therefore will unfold in the context of a "battle of narratives" within which antagonists seek to influence domestic and international audiences through words, images, and actions. The behavior of the joint force can shape that narrative significantly. Critically, joint combat should not undermine the larger, national narrative, but rather should reinforce and even amplify it.

To make matters more difficult, none of these restraints on the use of combat power will apply uniformly to all combatants. Liberal societies, including the United States, which have made it a priority to diminish suffering in everyday life, also have become less tolerant of it in war. Whether for cultural or strategic reasons, however, many actual and potential enemies -- as well as some potential partners -- will not feel the same pressure to minimize casualties and avoid collateral damage.

To some extent, this problem is self-imposed. Politically, the United States sees and promotes itself as a benevolent power, which has implications for its military conduct. Technologically, the American military's pursuit of precision and certainty, and the sometimes over-optimistic claims associated with it, has fueled exaggerated expectations domestically and abroad that U.S. joint forces can conduct combat in a surgical, almost bloodless way. The inevitable failure to satisfy such expectations makes the task of retaining public support during combat that much more difficult.

The impact of this problem likely will change with the situation. The willingness to inflict and to absorb casualties and collateral damage will vary with the perceived stakes and other situational factors. In a counterinsurgency[14] campaign intended to gain the support of an indigenous population, for example, restrictions likely will be severe, while in a general war[15] they may be much less so. While the severity of those restrictions may be conditional, the problem is not, and future joint forces should expect routinely to be restricted in their application of combat power, even when their enemies are not. Although perhaps justified, such restraints, at some point, limit the utility of combat as a strategic instrument.

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[14] *Counterinsurgency*: "Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances." JP 1-02.

[15] *General war*: "Armed conflict between major powers in which the total resources of the belligerents are employed, and the national survival of a major belligerent is in jeopardy." JP 1-02.

4. THE CHALLENGE OF FUTURE COMBAT

Given the intrinsic nature of combat and the anticipated future circumstances in which it will have to be conducted, the central challenge for future joint forces is to be able to defeat a wide range of increasingly well-armed enemies who may contest domain superiority in conditions in which joint forces are restrained in the use of lethal force while their enemies are not.[16]

5. A CONCEPT FOR FUTURE JOINT COMBAT

To meet that challenge, future joint forces must combine maneuver, fires, and information in and across domains to focus overwhelming but discriminate combat power against critical objectives. The CCJO notes that one or both of two defeat mechanisms, *attrition* and *disruption*, have been employed in combat. The aim of disruption is to defeat an enemy's ability to fight as a cohesive and coordinated organization. The alternative is to destroy his material capabilities through attrition, which generally is more costly and time consuming. Although acknowledging that all successful combat involves both mechanisms, this concept conditionally favors disruption because it tends to be a more effective and efficient way of causing an enemy's defeat and the imperative for restraint generally precludes the alternative. The broad approach described here applies to all the combat situations discussed earlier, but its specific application will vary greatly from situation to situation.

To implement this concept effectively, joint forces must resolve the fundamental tension between applying overwhelming force, an enduring imperative of combat, and inflicting the minimum collateral damage, a mounting imperative of the evolving operating environment. Reconciling this tension will challenge commanders at every level. Because the challenge will manifest itself differently in each situation, commanders must adapt its resolution to each situation and over time.

To achieve overwhelming force, the concept envisions committing joint forces on land and sea and in the air, space, and cyberspace in complementary combinations, within the context of a single concept of operations, to achieve synergistic results greater than the sum of the

[16] JP 1 and JP 3-0 do not describe this as the fundamental challenge of future joint combat. U.S. Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, (Washington: Department of Defense, March 20, 2009).

individual domain actions.

Maneuver and fires are the traditional, mutually reinforcing functions through which an armed force overwhelms an enemy. To them this concept adds *information*, here referring to the intentional dissemination of data to influence the perceptions, attitudes, and ultimately the behavior of designated, external audiences.[17] That addition reflects the growing impact of transparency and the consequent need to integrate information with maneuver and fires in ways that are complementary rather than merely additive. For example, military information support operations,[18] reinforced by a demonstration of destructive fires against a neighboring unit, may convince an enemy force to remain in garrison through threats of destruction, thereby permitting a friendly maneuver force to bypass the original enemy. As another example, a forthcoming offensive operation might be announced in advance even at some cost in tactical surprise to encourage defenders to surrender or civilians to evacuate the target area.

Achieving overwhelming force need not preclude discrimination. This concept does not envision that joint forces will conduct combat with minimal violence applied with surgical precision based on exquisite knowledge about the enemy. Defeating determined enemies, even when seeking to do so through disruption, will require physical destruction, sometimes extensive. Moreover, identification of those components rarely will rest on flawless or even mostly accurate information, but typically on rough heuristics developed and refined by experience over time. Indeed, more often than not, commanders will learn about the enemy only by striking him, however ineffectively at first, and observing the reaction.

Although violence can be and usually should be overwhelming at the point of application, joint forces must limit the effects of that violence

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[17] *Information*: Current joint doctrine defines information as, "Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form." There are several basic types of information relevant to combat, each with a different purpose. Joint forces collect information about the environment as the basis for building situational awareness and making decisions. This is the function of intelligence. They distribute information, in the form of instructions and directives, to guide or coordinate action. This is a function of command and control. Finally, they output information for the express purpose of influencing an external target audience. This kind of information is an element of combat power designed to contribute directly to an enemy's defeat. It is this last case that is addressed here. JP 1-02.

[18] Formerly *psychological operations*: "Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP." JP 1-02.

as much as possible on its intended targets. Hence the ability to operate discriminately will depend on acquiring information as complete, precise and timely as the situation permits, even if that slows the pace of operations more than might otherwise be desirable. Similarly, commanders should understand that limiting collateral damage often encourages public support -- domestically, abroad, and among the local populace -- and they must be prepared to adapt the scale of lethal force and the means by which it is applied accordingly.

In that respect, this concept for joint combat conforms to the CCJO's central thesis, which prescribes a process of operational adaptation as the essential response to the complexity, uncertainty and rapid change expected to dominate the future operating environment. Because combat is conducted against an intelligent enemy who will adapt to the situation while attempting to remain inscrutable, the requirement to adapt arguably is greater in combat than in any of the other joint activities. And since battle fundamentally becomes an adaptive competition, all else equal, advantage nearly always will accrue to the combatant able to adapt and act more quickly and appropriately to the unfolding situation.

In combat, adapting requires understanding the enemy as well as the broader situation within which a joint force must operate, to include the nature and extent of any restraints on the use of force, and how to operate within those restraints or gain their relaxation when necessary.

Such an assessment will rely on intelligence to track progress toward assigned objectives, and perhaps even more importantly, to confirm or disprove the joint force's current understanding of the enemy and the larger situation as the basis for adapting its own concept of operations.

6. JOINT FUNCTIONS OF COMBAT

Joint doctrine identifies six joint functions: movement and maneuver, fires, command and control, intelligence, protection, and sustainment.[19] To that list, this concept adds a seventh: *information*. Although all of these functions are critical to success in combat, it is through maneuver, fires, and information that a joint force actually

[19] *Joint functions*: "Related capabilities and activities grouped together to help joint force commanders synchronize, integrate, and direct joint operations. Functions that are common to joint operations at all levels of war fall into six basic groups - command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment." JP 1-02.

applies combat power against an enemy. None of these functions is new,[20] but their application in future combat will pose new challenges.

- ***Movement and maneuver.***[21] Future joint forces will require agility and precision in movement, to diminish collateral damage, avoid undesired battle by decreasing the likelihood of unexpected contact, adapt quickly to fleeting opportunities and changing circumstances, and recover from surprise. In turn, achieving that agile and precise maneuver will require accurate and timely information, typically developed over time through a robust collection and assessment effort and intimate interaction with the enemy and the surrounding environment.

Both to satisfy the requirement for overwhelming yet discriminate force and for force protection, future joint forces must be able to concentrate and disperse quickly and fluidly as the situation changes. Moreover, they must be able to maneuver and operate in smaller land, sea and air formations able to concentrate combat power without physically aggregating into larger formations, and thus surrendering maneuverability and potentially increasing vulnerability.

To react globally despite the diminished access to overseas bases projected in the CCJO, as well as to deny enemy forces the opportunity to harden or reposition between a U.S. decision to commit joint forces and their arrival in theater, some joint forces must be able to maneuver from strategic distances directly into combat without the need for staging bases in the operational area -- possibly conducting forcible-entry operations[22] in the process against increasingly powerful enemies. This

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[20] While not included on the doctrinal list of functions, information actions to affect enemy morale and decision-making have long been a part of combat and are discussed in various doctrinal publications. While the JCC uses mostly doctrinal terms here and throughout, the substance of the discussion often departs from that contained in JP 3-0 and other doctrinal manuals, instead discussing the topics in relation to the specific challenge proposed in Sec. 4 and the overarching concept proposed in Sec. 5. U.S. Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations* (Washington: Department of Defense, February 13, 2006), I-2 to I-9, II-7, III-2 to III-4, V-6 to V-10, Appendix B. (Hereafter cited as JP 3-13.) U.S. Joint Staff, JP 3-13.2, *Psychological Operations* (Washington: Department of Defense, January 7, 2010), II-10 to II-12, IV-8 to IV-11, VI-1 to VI-5, VII-1 to VII-5. (Hereafter cited as JP 3-13.2.)

[21] *Maneuver*: "1. A movement to place ships, aircraft, or land forces in a position of advantage over the enemy. 4. Employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission." JP 1-02.

[22] *Forcible entry*: "Seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition. See also lodgment." Also *lodgment*: "A designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile operational area that, when seized and held, makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides maneuver space for subsequent operations." JP 1-02.

applies equally to land forces deploying by air or sea; self-deploying aircraft conducting strike, reconnaissance or other missions; or naval forces conducting a variety of missions.

Maneuver has an analogy in cyberspace where rather than physical movement to achieve positional advantage, it becomes actions in cyberspace designed to gain access to the target computer system to gather information, introduce malicious software, or take some other action. Such action may be time consuming, may require the use of specialists, and may not show immediate results.

- ***Fires.***[23] Future joint combat will rely on highly flexible, responsive and discriminate lethal and nonlethal fires that can support any requesting unit, regardless of echelon or Service. Although current joint fires capabilities provide some measure of flexibility, responsiveness and discrimination, this concept envisions a qualitative improvement in these attributes. Achieving this objective increases the need to adopt flexible procedures to request and approve fire support and to coordinate and clear it. Joint forces must be able to concentrate or distribute fires quickly as the situation requires based on the relative need for mass or coverage. Target acquisition must be rapid and accurate, and procedures developed to minimize the latency or delay between identification and engagement of potentially fleeting critical targets.

Although reliance on precision-guided munitions to attack selected targets will increase, the inventory of such munitions will remain finite, and joint forces often will lack the precise targeting information required to justify their expenditure. In addition, joint forces will continue to require the ability to apply area fires for tactical purposes ranging from neutralizing and suppressing targets to obscuring enemy observation for the purposes of preserving combat power and facilitating maneuver. Commanders at every echelon will need to reconcile the tension between the imperative for discrimination on one hand and limited precision resources, intrinsic uncertainty, and tactical mission requirements and friendly force protection on the other.

Future combat will see continuing adjustment of the balance between the firepower organic to land, sea and air formations and that provided by outside assets and thus requiring request of and approval by some other authority.[24] Organic weapons tend to be more responsive to

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[23] *Fires*: "The use of weapon systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target." Also: *joint fires*: "Fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action to produce desired effects in support of a common objective." JP 1-02.

[24] *Organic*: "Assigned to and forming an essential part of a military organization. Organic parts of a unit are those listed in its table of organization for the Army, Air

the owning units, but also increase their size and logistical footprint. They thus tend to diminish maneuverability. In contrast, pooling weapons with greater range and lethality at higher echelons increases their versatility but diminishes their responsiveness to subordinate formations.

Moreover, until recently, such supporting fires have paid for their added reach, versatility and lethality with diminished precision and increased latency. Precision-guided munitions ameliorate the first problem, but not necessarily the second. While command and control advancements have improved responsiveness, latencies still exist and should be addressed. In addition, because they typically carry larger payloads (although not always), weapons pooled at higher echelons often are unsuitable to attack some targets. Even a precision weapon can be indiscriminate if its radius of damage extends beyond the intended target. The more that latency and unwanted damage can be diminished by fielding weapons less sensitive to range and trajectory limitations, more rapidly tailorable to targets and targeting constraints, and operating through networks designed to interface across domains, the more effective future joint fires will be.

Once managed separately from lethal fires, traditional forms of electronic attack such as jamming are widely viewed today as producing complementary effects, and managed through the same fire support coordination systems. Still undetermined is whether and how joint forces should integrate computer network attack into those systems. Like jamming, the introduction of malicious software into enemy computer systems or the overwhelming of those systems with communication requests can disrupt enemy command-and-control.[25] But both the means and consequences of doing so are more complicated than for traditional electronic attack. A key consideration in this respect

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Force, and Marine Corps, and are assigned to the administrative organizations of the operating forces for the Navy." *Support*: "1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that helps another unit in battle." Also: *supporting arms*: "Weapons and weapons systems of all types employed to support forces by indirect or direct fire." JP 1-02.

[25] *Malicious software*: "Computer programs … designed to infect target computer systems. Malicious software may be grouped as follows: viruses, which hide themselves and replicate in computer file systems, Trojans, which masquerade as useful … software to be accepted by unsuspecting users, and worms, which propagate themselves across computer networks, attacking target systems without human intervention." Saturating a computer system with communication requests is a common form of *denial-of-service attack*, which is "an attempt to make a computer resource unavailable to its intended user." See: *Space and Electronic Warfare Lexicon* (accessed March 24, 2010); available from http://www.sew-lexicon.com/gloss_m.htm;. and "Denial-of-service attack," *Wikipedia* (accessed June 10, 2010); available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/denial-of-service-attack.

is the echelon at which the United States will conduct computer network attack. Although units at all levels currently practice computer network defense, the United States conducts computer network attack at strategic echelons, which again makes it less responsive to lower-level needs. The decision to conduct computer network attack has significant national policy and security implications and most likely will be made at the national level. Resolving that problem will be essential to future operations.

- ***Information.***[26] In this context, information denotes the intentional dissemination of data to influence the perceptions, attitudes and ultimately the behavior of a designated audience. Although that target audience may be the enemy, it may also be the civilian population in the operational area and/or an enemy's external allies. Joint forces must integrate various information efforts to ensure they are not working at cross purposes. Traditional examples of such actions in combat include military deception and military information support operations aimed at demoralizing enemy forces.[27]

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[26] While the use of information to influence audiences sometimes is classified as a form of nonlethal fires, the use described here differs enough in application and is gaining enough in importance to warrant separate consideration. The information function discussed here, which seeks to manipulate attitudes, perceptions and decisions, is qualitatively different from efforts to disrupt enemy command and control systems electronically through jamming or denial-of-service computer network attack, which qualify as nonlethal fires.

This topic is related to *information operations*: "The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations [now military information support operations], military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making while protecting our own. Also called IO." This concept breaks with the information operations construct by distinguishing between those actions designed to influence decision makers and those designed to attack or protect information and information systems. According to the JCC's construct, of the pillars of information operations, military deception and military information support operations would fall under the information function, electronic warfare and computer network attack would fall under fires, and computer network defense and operations security would fall under force protection.

This topic also is related to *strategic communication*: **"**Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power." JP 1-02.

[27] *Deception*: "Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the enemy's interests." *Propaganda*: "Any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes,

Because they use intangible means, information actions differ from physical actions that also affect perceptions, attitudes and behaviors. Whereas fires and maneuver may also exert psychological influence *in addition to* the physical effects they cause, the effects of information are entirely psychological or cognitive. The influence effects of a physical action usually are byproducts of its physical effects, although sometimes they may be its primary objective. In any event, understanding the target audience psychologically and culturally is critical to any successful influence effort.

Although directed at a target much like fires, information differs from fires in four important ways. First, information must compete for the attention of its intended target while fires have no such requirement. Second, although the target of fires has no choice about the effects to which it is subjected, the target of an information effort can choose what signals to heed or ignore. Third, although the effects of fires remain limited to targets within the designed radius of the ordnance, information effects can propagate well beyond the intended target, perhaps picking up strength and changing as they do so. In other words, information can be self-replicating if it resonates with the audience,[28] making it virtually impossible to control who receives any particular message, especially in a networked environment. Fourth, although the physical effects of fires are self-demonstrating, information signals must be interpreted by their audience, which does so according to its own frame of reference. Hence the message ultimately received may not be the one intended by the sender, and the message received by one audience may be different than the one received by another. For all these reasons, information can be much more difficult than fires to apply precisely or effectively. Understanding the audience will be critical to any success.

As with fires and maneuver, future combat will require joint forces to concentrate and distribute their information efforts based on the relative need for selective or wide coverage. Joint forces will need to adapt messages and presentations rapidly to the situation, striving to develop universal, self-propagating messages to reach wide audiences and more tailored messages to reach specific ones, exploiting electronic and other media relevant to that situation. To be successful, joint forces will have to produce information products that are resonant with and culturally attuned to the sensibilities of the intended audience. Even if the objective is to change attitudes and perceptions, it must do so with a message that somehow leverages those attitudes and perceptions.

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or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly." JP 1-02.

[28] In the marketing field, known as *viral marketing* or *viral advertising*.

- ***Command and control.***[29] Command and control are as critical to this concept as they are to the success of any military operation. Command underwrites the operational design through which the commander comes to understand the situation on its own terms and guides the operational adaptation that is central to the CCJO. Control integrates various Service and other capabilities to achieve joint synergy, and exercises the necessary discrimination that is fundamental to this concept.

To achieve the adaptability and discrimination required in future combat without penalty to operational coherence, this concept envisions decentralized command through the use of mission-type orders,[30] backed by a networked control system that verifies the consistency of action with the commander's intent without requiring burdensome reporting, and informs the commander in a timely way when these unacceptably diverge. Critical to this is a clearly articulated concept of operations to promote unity of effort. Applied in an environment of trust among commanders, such a decentralized approach enables subordinates to develop the situation, seize the initiative, create and exploit opportunities and cope with uncertainty. It will be especially important given that many future enemies will attempt to disrupt U.S. information systems through computer network attack and other means.

- ***Intelligence.***[31] Satisfying the CCJO's requirements to understand the situation in its own terms and assess results with an eye toward changing both that understanding and the resulting concept of operations will rely heavily on timely intelligence collection, processing and dissemination, as will the need to apply combat power discriminately without loss of effectiveness.

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[29] *Command and control*: "The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2." JP 1-02.

[30] *Mission-type order*: "1. An order issued to a lower unit that includes the accomplishment of the total mission assigned to the higher headquarters. 2. An order to a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished." Additionally, *mission*: "The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore." A mission therefore includes the task to be accomplished and the underlying intent behind the accomplishment of the task. JP 1-02.

[31] *Intelligence*: "The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity which results in the product and to the organizations engaged in such activity." JP 1-02.

Intelligence resources must be able to collect and produce intelligence on a wide range of potential enemies with vastly different attributes and signatures, requiring a mix of sensors and sources ranging from technological collection platforms to human intelligence sources. Especially when the enemy is embedded within a civil society, intelligence resources also must be able to collect and process a wide range of information about that broader environment. The mechanisms through which various agencies and commands disseminate that intelligence must permit users with widely varying information needs to access intelligence products in a timely way without wading through unneeded information or waiting on processing not germane to their requirements. Those mechanisms should permit commanders to establish information thresholds that alert them in a timely way to events and trends that threaten the current concept of operations, or that might adversely affect the friendly narrative.

Intelligence support to information efforts warrants special mention. Success in those efforts will require culturally-attuned understanding of the perceptions and attitudes of various potential audiences as well as of the communication methods they rely on. Moreover, determining which audiences (intended or not) have received a given message, how they are interpreting it, and how it affects them will be both critical and challenging.

Finally, emphasizing disruption as the preferred defeat mechanism demands understanding the enemy as an adaptive system. Especially with respect to irregular forces lacking a consistent and easily discernible operating pattern, that requirement will place a heavy burden on analysis and the cultural knowledge necessary to conduct it.

- ***Protection.***[32] Force protection has always been critical to combat success, but its importance has risen in recent years as a result of increased transparency and, for the U.S. and its allies, a growing public and political aversion to casualties. Meanwhile, the protection challenge will only expand in the future as enemies find new ways to attack U.S. forces and resources, from conventional attack with increasingly ubiquitous precision-guided weapons to terrorist attack and the growing threat associated with proliferating weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, although joint forces always have required protection against

[32] *Protection*: "Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area." Also *force protection*: "Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease." JP 1-02.

physical attack in the operational area, it has been many years since they required protection during deployment, but that problem is likely to resurface as future enemies challenge U.S. superiority in the global commons. Indeed, enemies increasingly may test force protection at home stations even before deployment, most likely by terrorist attack, potentially using chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons or agents.

In addition to traditional threats, computer network attack constitutes a new and increasingly demanding force protection challenge. The more joint forces rely on networked information and communication systems, the greater the risk that successful cyber attack could cripple joint operations. Likewise, since joint operations increasingly depend on the use of space-based systems, joint forces need to protect space assets against both cyber and physical attack. Meeting both challenges will require not only active cyber and space protection measures, but also robust and redundant capabilities to furnish the services they provide should an enemy disrupt them.

Finally, future force protection should consider psychological threats.[33] By itself, the need to insulate U.S. and allied personnel against hostile propaganda intended to undermine their morale and loyalties is not new. But the means of developing and disseminating that propaganda has never been so ubiquitous and insidious; and in an era of persistent conflict, the probability of frequent and repetitive deployments only heightens potential psychological vulnerabilities. Command attention and emphasis on unit cohesion, together with pro-active screening, counseling and training remain among the best protective measures.

- ***Sustainment.***[34] No battlefield function will be tested more severely in future combat operations than sustainment. Logistics

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[33] Joint doctrine does not discuss the psychological aspects of force protection.

[34] *Sustainment*: "The provision of logistics and personnel services required to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment." See also *logistics*: "Planning and executing the movement and support of forces. It includes those aspects of military operations that deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services." Similarly: *combat service support*: "The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels of war. Within the national and theater logistic systems, it includes but is not limited to that support rendered by service forces in ensuring the aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services required by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their missions in combat. Combat service support encompasses those activities at all levels of war that produce sustainment to all operating forces on the battlefield." JP 1-02.

repeatedly have proved armies' Achilles' heels, and the increasing complexity of the joint battlespace will only magnify that vulnerability. On land, the increasing reach and lethality of weaponry available even to irregular combatants will deprive logistical forces and facilities of the protection once afforded by distance from active combat zones, while the growing dispersal of smaller and increasingly multifunctional combat formations will complicate supply distribution, equipment repair and replacement, and casualty evacuation. At sea, any decrease in the logistical burden resulting from contraction in the number of capital ships will be more than offset by their increasing dispersal and complexity, and by growing uncertainty regarding their access to overseas port facilities. In the air, merely the proliferation of remotely-piloted aircraft and their associated sensors and munitions will aggravate an already complicated maintenance and resupply challenge.

Efforts to adapt quickly to changing battlefield requirements add their own logistical complications. Each new or modified item of equipment imposes a corresponding distribution and maintenance requirement. Merely managing the resulting inventory expansion will become more difficult. Although improved real-time tracking and visibility of supplies and materiel in the logistics pipeline can improve logistical awareness, it will not deliver a single item of equipment. Nor, given the intrinsic unpredictability and friction of armed combat, can we count routinely on practices such as just-in-time replenishment that have proved useful in the commercial world.

Given a continued requirement for joint forces to operate at global distances, any increased threat to U.S. operations in the global commons will have immediate logistical consequences. Hence future forces intended for early commitment should be organized from the outset with sufficient logistical self-reliance to endure interruptions in operational and strategic distribution.

Finally, the early deployment of both airfield- and seaport-opening capabilities, and the force structure required for the reception, staging, onward movement, and sustainment of forces once they arrive, is essential for any type of operation a joint force is called on to conduct.

No single organizational or programmatic change will magically resolve the joint logistical challenge, but several developments can simplify it. By far the most important are improvements that lessen and/or simplify supply demand. Candidates include alternative fuels, field-reconfigurable munitions and increased component commonality among fielded land, air and sea systems. Equally important will be packaging methods that simplify not only the tracking but also the loading, transport, mode transshipment and off-load burdens.

Finally, this concept urges a careful review of the extent to which joint forces can continue to rely on contract performance of essential sustainment tasks. As the dispersal and lethality of the joint battlespace increase, that dependence may become increasingly unsatisfactory, particularly for early committed forces. In all cases, joint forces must balance logistical economy against the need for rapid and responsive adaptation of the sustainment system to changing combat requirements.

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As important as it is to be effective in conducting each of these functions, it is equally important to combine them such that each enables and enhances the others. As mentioned, it is through the functions of fires, maneuver, and information that joint forces actually apply combat power against the enemy. The interdependent and mutually reinforcing relationship of the first two is well understood. As they always have, commanders in the future will need to use maneuver to facilitate fires and fires to facilitate maneuver. Introducing information into the equation can enhance the effects of all three as well as the overall result. Integrating information effectively with fires and maneuver at every level will require new knowledge and skills, and small unit leaders must understand that they can never assure its success. Perhaps the most important requirement is to recognize that contradictory information generated by maneuver and/or fires not only risks discrediting the immediate influence effort, but also is likely to have lingering impact on future efforts. Hence, the more critical the use of information to achieving the combat objective, the more essential it will be to factor information effects from the outset into the planning of maneuver and fires also.

The pinnacle of effective joint combat envisioned in this concept is the complementary employment of maneuver, fires and information, using each to create employment opportunities for the others within and across domains and creating fundamental dilemmas for the enemy in the process. Practically any combination is possible. The classic example is maneuver to lever an enemy out of prepared positions, thus exposing him to fires. In recent experience, during the Gulf War in 1991, coalition air forces maneuvered against Iraqi air defense systems to cause them to reveal themselves, thus exposing them to attack by surface and air fires. Likewise, information can set up maneuver and fires. A case in point is the Allied deception during the Second World War to convince the German High Command that the cross-channel invasion of 1944 would occur at Calais, where the Germans kept operational reserves in place even after the landings had occurred at Normandy. A more recent manifestation is the use of maneuver and fires to set up information, as

when an irregular provokes its enemy into an indiscriminate response for the express purpose of widely publicizing (and even exaggerating) the resulting civilian casualties and collateral damage for propaganda purposes.

7. COMBAT PRECEPTS

Regardless of its objectives, scale and nature of the enemy, successful future combat will tend to exhibit several common fundamentals. These interrelated fundamentals elaborate the basic approach to joint combat proposed above. Their specific application and their importance will vary with each situation.

These Combat Precepts are provisional and warrant experimentation and analysis. They are similar to the Principles of War in that both provide a set of maxims for the conduct of combat actions. However, although the content is overlapping in some cases, the specific advice is different. The JCC's Combat Precepts are more specific to the emerging operating environment. Moreover, they derive from the central idea proposed in Section 5, whereas the Principles of War are generic to all warfare.

- ***Provide maximum combat power to the commander best able to apply it with the necessary discrimination, regardless of echelon or Service affiliation.***[35] This precept is the basic means of reconciling the application of maximum combat power with maximum feasible discrimination. Pushing combat power to the commander best able to apply it discriminately usually will mean devolving authority to lower echelons, where commanders tend to have the clearest grasp of the local situation. The restraints imposed by the future operating environment thus will require joint forces to generate joint synergy in smaller packages controlled at lower echelons. In turn, that will place a growing premium on flexible command and control mechanisms able to integrate Service combat capabilities at increasingly lower levels.

Not all such joint integration will occur at lower echelons, however. The echelon that can most effectively manage a given capability will vary with the capability. Success will require striking the proper balance between the requirement for effective integration and the requirement for

[35] JP 3-0 does not include the idea of devolving maximum combat power to the commander best able to apply it with the necessary discrimination, whereas the JCC proposes that as the primary mechanism for achieving the discriminate application of combat power that is central to the concept.

discrimination based on an understanding of the particular situation.

- ***Concentrate, disperse and reassemble combat power quickly and fluidly in differing combinations as required.*** To provide the necessary combat power to the commander best able to employ it discriminately, committed forces must be able to configure and reconfigure themselves quickly and fluidly in response to the needs of the situation, unrestricted by functional or geographical boundaries. This ability to mix and match capabilities in unlimited ways, at any echelon and on any scale, is a critical factor in a joint force's ability to adapt quickly in combat. Achieving this kind of flexibility will have far-reaching implications for organization, training, materiel and procedures.

- ***Maximize discrimination through precision, scalable actions and informed judgment, while understanding the inherent limits to discrimination in combat.*** Discrimination is the ability to distinguish friends and noncombatants from foes and apply combat power in a way that affects only the latter, or at worst minimizes adverse effects on the first two. Achieving discrimination requires precision in the application of combat power, with respect not only to fires, but also to maneuver and information, which also can create unintended damage if applied carelessly. It thus places a significant burden on the information and intelligence underwriting the application of combat power.

The more closely the application of combat power matches its tactical purpose and the conditions in which combat takes place, the more discriminate it is likely to be. A precisely aimed weapon whose lethal or nonlethal effects extend beyond the intended target to cause collateral damage, for example, is no more discriminate than a weapon delivered imprecisely. As a result, joint forces in combat require capabilities rapidly tailorable in scale and effect to varying objectives.

Finally, even the ability to apply precise and scalable combat power will not replace discernment and judgment in its application. In this sense, discrimination ultimately is as much or more a product of careful decision-making than of technical weapon characteristics. Nor does this concept imply exclusive or even predominant reliance on precision-guided munitions, which will remain expensive and limited in quantity, and the use of which in any case will not alone guarantee discrimination. On the contrary, so-called "dumb" munitions may often be the weapons of choice, producing effects when properly employed as discriminate as those of precision weapons.

- ***Attack those objectives expected to cause the greatest disruption to the enemy's ability to operate cohesively.*** Achieving

defeat by disruption requires understanding the enemy as a system of interacting elements and functions and attacking those that are most crucial to its operational cohesion. Since few enemies will be vulnerable to defeat at a single point, usually this will require attacking some combination of elements, often in some necessary sequence. The process of selecting such key objectives will always remain a matter of judgment rather than exact calculation, and commanders should never expect to be completely correct in their estimates.

Although all combatants tend over time to develop repeating patterns of behavior, some are more inscrutable than others, and their operating patterns thus are less vulnerable to detection. Moreover, some operating patterns rely less heavily than others on systematic interactions, hence inherently are less vulnerable to disruption. To the extent that an enemy's behavior remains cryptic or random, there may be little choice but to wear him down through attrition. Indeed, since no enemy is completely knowable, any combat necessarily will require some level of attrition. In any case, over time, what the enemy himself considers critical will change as he responds to the unfolding situation, so the joint force commander should expect to adapt his operational objectives as part of the operational adaptation process.

Even when it is feasible, finally, a preference for defeat through disruption neither requires nor expects that future combat somehow will be elegant and humane. Even disruption must be achieved by killing, destroying or capturing -- and sometimes the associated civil damage will be severe. The benefit of successful disruption accrues less from any diminution in the absolute level of violence it requires than in helping to shorten the duration during which it must be applied.

- ***Fight to gain and maintain local domain superiority when and where needed, but be prepared to operate without it.*** Future U.S. joint forces may find it necessary to fight to gain and maintain domain superiority against enemies increasingly capable in those domains (which almost certainly will be true of cyberspace). In so doing, joint forces would have to dedicate larger portions of the force to that mission, deferring or diminishing support of other activities until they have achieved the necessary freedom of action.

Because of the relative emptiness of sea and air, combat in these domains incurs less risk of unintended collateral damage[36] than combat on land, especially urban combat. Accordingly, joint forces often will be

[36] Although operations in these domains will still require care, as the accidental downing of an Iranian airliner over the Strait of Hormuz by U.S. naval forces during the Iran-Iraq War in 1988 revealed.

able to apply combat power in those domains with fewer restrictions. However, gaining superiority in a given domain is not merely a function of combat within that domain. The cross-domain application of combat power can be essential to achieving superiority in most domains -- and a potentially significant advantage that joint forces should leverage.

Moreover, future joint forces should be prepared to operate temporarily without domain superiority, which will present difficult challenges. The threat of air and missile attack, for example, could dramatically alter the conduct and especially the pace of ground operations, requiring ground forces to disperse into smaller formations, limiting their freedom of movement and complicating sustainment and casualty management. Conversely, naval surface forces would find it necessary to concentrate major combatants and sustainment assets under dense local air and missile defense umbrellas, limiting their positioning flexibility and operational agility. In both domains, surface movement might find itself limited to protected routes at designated times, at once magnifying scheduling complications and diminishing versatility. Air support also would be affected, compelled to operate from more distant bases, reducing sortie rates, potentially drastically. In the extreme, joint forces in a contested air environment might find it necessary to rely almost exclusively on standoff surface fires and unmanned aerial systems, the latter of which would likewise operate at increased risk.

Similar challenges would arise from the requirement to operate in a degraded communications environment, whether resulting from kinetic, cyber or electronic attack. Loss of secure access to cyberspace would be particularly challenging to joint forces that yearly are becoming more heavily dependent on digital command and control systems. A key impact of this condition would be to decrease the tempo of joint operations, which in turn would increase risk to the force. One solution to this rapidly enlarging challenge is to field purposely-designed fallback systems for every critical digital capability, such as rapidly-installable fiber-optic cable to replace radio-frequency communications, or self-contained navigation devices not dependent on space systems. But the most important and reliable defense against enemy interference with command and control in all domains is constant training in the use of mission-type orders, empowerment of initiative and self-synchronization[37] by forces in each domain accustomed to working with counterparts in the other Services, and refurbishment of liaison capabilities and other direct interface techniques not dependent on electronic communications.

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[37] Cooperation between units achieved through lateral coordination and understanding of the broader situation with guidance from higher authority.

- ***Apply combat power across domains to create dilemmas for the enemy and accomplish the mission.*** Although gaining domain superiority is important, it is not an end in itself but merely a means to the ultimate end of accomplishing the mission. Once they have gained superiority in any domain, joint forces should exploit that advantage to apply combat power into other domains as well. It is not enough to gain maritime superiority, for example; joint forces should use that superiority to apply combat power onto the land and into air, space and cyberspace to accomplish joint force objectives.

This concept envisions routinely applying combat power across domains in complementary and mutually reinforcing ways that create fundamental dilemmas for the enemy and prevent the enemy from imposing similar dilemmas on the joint force. Future applications could include more tightly integrated cross-domain combat. Examples include land forces helping to protect air freedom of action and support naval forces along littorals; naval forces projecting fires, forces and information onto the land from the sea, air and space forces supporting operations on land and contributing to sea control, and cyber forces degrading enemy operations in all the other domains. Done correctly, this cross-domain application of combat power provides valuable asymmetric advantages over practically any enemy.

Operations in space and cyberspace already are indispensable to joint operations, and that interdependence will only increase in the future. Computer network attack especially will be more feasible for many future adversaries and far more attractive since it is relatively inexpensive, can be virtually untraceable, circumvents an enemy's traditional military might, and could achieve results as disruptive as a physically destructive attack without provoking the same public reprobation. Future joint forces must be prepared to defeat hostile computer network attack as well as attacks on the satellite constellations that underwrite essential command and control, surveillance and navigation capabilities. Moreover, joint forces also must be prepared to operate effectively despite interruptions in space and cyber services.

Computer network attack is just as attractive to the joint force as to an enemy, and for the same reasons. Targets could be both military and civil. The former would include navigational, logistical and command and control systems, for example, while the latter would include transportation systems, supply-chain management systems, financial systems, electrical grids and other energy distribution systems, and governmental systems. For any enemy as dependent on cyberspace as the United States, such attacks could have systemic results every bit as debilitating and enduring as physical attack.

In the end, the crucial contribution accruing from integration of actions across joint domains is its ability by actions in one domain to force an enemy to expose himself to disruption and attrition in another. Hence the aggregate impact of cross-domain operations is potentially much greater than a joint force could achieve separately in all domains.

- ***Strike in multiple domains from multiple directions in combination.*** One of the most important advantages of U.S. joint forces over almost any potential enemy is the ability to manage complexity, and one way to leverage this advantage is to drive up complexity for the enemy, pushing him beyond the point at which he can cope with it effectively. Striking critical targets from multiple directions in multiple domains (including cyberspace) can be an important way of overloading the enemy's capacity to cope, and therefore his ability to operate coherently.

In addition to degrading the enemy's ability to operate coherently, striking in multiple domains can be an effective way of seizing the initiative. Moreover, operating on multiple axes in multiple domains can prevent the enemy from anticipating the next attack, adding ambiguity that can be a source of surprise.

- ***Undermine enemy morale and decision-making.*** Since battle is ultimately a struggle of competing wills in which moral and psychological factors often weigh more heavily than physical ones, success urges attacking not only the enemy's physical capabilities, but also the will to employ those capabilities and the decision-making that controls them. Success here can contribute significantly to disrupting the enemy's cohesive functioning. Understanding the enemy's history and culture will be critical to that success. Arguably, the greater the restrictions on the physical violence that joint forces are permitted to apply, the greater the need for compensating efforts to exploit an enemy's moral and psychological vulnerabilities.

Examples of specific actions in this area include deception to mislead adversary decision makers, military information support operations to influence adversary attitudes and behaviors, and lethal and nonlethal attacks to degrade enemy command and control.

- ***Increase friendly freedom of action through information.***[38] Where the previous precept addresses degrading an enemy's ability to operate, this one addresses improving a joint force's. The joint

[38] While mentioning both strategic communication and information operations, JP 3-0 does not recognize the importance of the use of information as a critical adjunct to all combat to gain greater operational freedom of action.

commander's freedom of action in future combat may depend heavily on popular perceptions and attitudes. Commanders may be able to increase that freedom of action through information efforts designed to explain and build support for joint combat actions, occasionally even in advance of those operations. For example, such efforts might forthrightly explain the objectives and results of joint operations while countering enemy propaganda designed to turn key audiences against the joint force.

Moreover, just as combat actions routinely result in a battle damage assessment, so should they routinely produce an assessment of their effect on popular attitudes. Promptly explaining how civilian casualties and collateral damage occurred and demonstrating the enemy's responsibility for producing them might go far toward countering efforts to mischaracterize joint operations.

8. IMPLICATIONS OF ADOPTING THE JOINT COMBAT CONCEPT

Adopting this concept for joint combat has implications for how the Services organize, man, equip and train their forces. Some of these implications are already being implemented and require only continued emphasis. Some require little or no additional analysis and should be implemented immediately, while others will need to be explored, validated, and refined through further experimentation, analysis, and operational experience before being institutionalized into the joint force.

- ***Pursue precision capabilities in all forms.*** Precision in maneuver, fires, and information will be essential for the discriminate application of combat power.[39] Achieving that precision without penalty to the effective application of combat power will require improvement of intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination; doctrinal, materiel and training adjustments to enable smaller land, sea and air formations to operate more independently within the framework of a common operational scheme; and leader development efforts aimed at refining the ability of small unit commanders to apply combat power effectively in conditions limiting the use of lethal force. Although the pursuit of greater precision is a necessary implication of this concept, it is important to recognize that there are limits to the precision that joint forces actually can achieve in combat.

- ***Pursue weapon systems with scalable munitions effects.***

[39] The *NSS* states that the United States will be able to conduct the full range of military operations with the ability to bring precise, sustained and effective capabilities to bear against a wide range of military threats. *NSS 2010*, 14, 17, 21.

Further to that purpose, future weapons development should emphasize designs capable of furnishing scalable munitions effects that operators can tailor rapidly and on the fly to the nature of the target, its topographic and demographic surroundings and the quality of the targeting information -- whether accomplished by using a single weapon or multiple weapons in a single system. Reliable prediction of secondary weapons effects and their associated damage radii must accompany such scalability.

- ***Develop leaders with a heightened understanding of the restraints that will characterize future combat and operate discriminately within them.*** The concept's emphasis on the role various restrictions will play on future U.S. joint combat suggests that commanders at all levels must understand more completely the nature of those restrictions and how to operate successfully within them. Precision weapons and other precision capabilities will do no good if commanders cannot make discriminate decisions. Moreover, this concept implies that senior commanders especially must be able to communicate to political leaders the impact these restrictions have on combat effectiveness and must be able to gain relaxation of these restrictions when they imperil the mission. This has implications for leader development especially.

- ***Develop a balanced and flexible force able to defeat a wide range of potential enemies.*** The growing diversity of potential enemies, weapons and tactics will challenge the versatility of joint forces. Meeting that challenge will require both conventional forces organized, equipped and trained to fight any enemy in any conditions, and specialized forces optimized to conduct specific kinds of combat operations for more narrowly defined purposes. Balancing the force between these requirements may be the most difficult challenge of the concept.

- ***Adopt an operational design process that assists commanders in recognizing and exploiting the operating patterns of a wide variety of potential enemies in complex situations.*** Achieving disruption as the preferred defeat mechanism implies the need to be able to read and exploit the operating patterns of diverse enemies, including irregular combatants, and argues for adopting an operational design process that enables and encourages commanders and staffs to understand these patterns in complex situations.

- ***Develop the capabilities required to identify, characterize, locate and destroy chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats, including toxic industrial materials; to deter, defend against, respond to and manage the consequences of their***

employment or accidental release; and to operate effectively in a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear environment. The future joint force faces chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats from both the expanding list of actors with access to weapons of mass destruction, some of whom will not demonstrate traditional restraint with respect to the employment of those weapons, and the possibility of exposure to industrial hazards through release other than attack. As a result, future joint forces are more likely to find themselves operating in such an environment. Defenses against such threats once organic to conventional forces have atrophied since the end of the Cold War. In any case, they were in many respects unsuitable to the wider range of conditions and hazards anticipated by this concept. Future chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear warning, protection, and decontamination technology must be smaller and lighter, and should be operable by personnel without extensive specialized training. Doctrine and training similarly must incorporate battle drills designed to posture forces rapidly for operations in a contaminated environment without prolonged interruption of operational tempo. Additionally, both specialized and conventional units should be trained to deal with the increased challenges of toxic industrial materials.

- ***Develop the capabilities and capacity required to fight for domain superiority, including in space and cyberspace.*** The combat environment described in this concept may require future joint forces to fight for air, maritime, space and cyber superiority both within forward operating areas and to protect their strategic lines of communications.[40] The more that the force can conduct the fight jointly across domains, the less likely that it will divert domain-specific forces from other missions. A key prerequisite for achieving ground, air and maritime freedom of maneuver will be destroying, neutralizing or suppressing advanced air defense systems, which are becoming increasingly prevalent and lethal to aircraft. Defeating such systems will require integrating space-based sensors, remotely-piloted systems, and standoff precision fires from surface platforms and aircraft. Targeting air defense systems effectively also will continue to require prompting action by decoys and other means to compel those defenses to reveal themselves.

A similar challenge applies to the defeat of shore-based anti-ship systems, whose reach and lethality threaten to deny not only ship-to-shore maneuver but also near-shore support of deployed land and air forces. As with air defense suppression, defeating littoral anti-access capabilities will require a cross-domain effort in which enemy delivery systems may be the least important targets.

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[40] The *NSS* states that U.S. military forces must be able to fight and win in all domains (land, maritime, air, space and cyberspace. *NSS 2010*, 14, 22, 41.

Although fighting for domain superiority on land, at sea and in the air can be localized, the same does not apply to space and cyber domains, interference with which, for good or ill, is likely to affect the entire joint battlespace. Gaining and maintaining control of these domains unavoidably is a strategic challenge, made more so by the intimate connection in both domains between civil and military vulnerabilities. For the joint commander, the key implication of such a contest is the likely degradation of advanced sensor and networked communications capabilities, hence the need for well-rehearsed procedures to compensate for their loss or interruption.

- ***Improve the capabilities to apply adequate but discriminate combat power in populated urban settings.*** Coping with expanding urbanization and the increasing likelihood that future joint combat will occur in urban areas may be the greatest single challenge to a concept that requires melding overwhelming force with discrimination, especially confronting any enemy who relies partly or completely on indigenous irregular forces that are largely indistinguishable from and intermix with the population. Such environments pose myriad intelligence challenges -- not only distinguishing the enemy from the larger population, but understanding the interactions of the various economic, cultural, infrastructural, governmental and other subsystems that make up a functioning urban system.

Quite apart from the problem of collateral civil casualties and damage, urban combat always has presented a tactical challenge, from lethally short engagement ranges and difficult command and control to problems conducting resupply and casualty evacuation. Urban terrain also poses enormous problems for both surface and air-delivered supporting fires, which are challenged merely to avoid fratricide, never mind collateral damage.

Although no technology can altogether eliminate these hazards, some may be able to diminish them. Weapons with the penetrating power to defeat urban structures, but whose lethal radius is scalable, can help to limit unintended casualties and damage. Remotely piloted air and ground vehicles can help clear narrow and enclosed urban spaces without exposing their operators. Digital and voice communications not dependent on an unobstructed line-of-sight can significantly improve command and control. And no development would more radically alter the dynamics of urban combat than nonlethal weapons able to incapacitate with minimal risk of fatalities even over

large areas.[41]

One conclusion is inescapable: given current projections concerning future operating environments, no force is likely to be effective that relies solely on specialized capabilities to conduct urban combat. Instead, such combat must be considered a routine mission for conventional land and air forces.

- ***Improve the capabilities required to defeat advanced anti-access capabilities and to conduct forcible-entry operations.*** Given the combination of the United States' continuing global interests and the CCJO's projection of decreasing overseas basing, joint forces increasingly will find it necessary to project combat power into a hostile operational area from afar without the benefit of staging bases in the region. Joint forces therefore may find it increasingly necessary to defeat an enemy's anti-access measures, to include executing a forcible entry of land forces, as a prerequisite to accomplishing the assigned mission. Lacking the capabilities to conduct such operations, joint forces will be limited in their utility as strategic instrument. The capabilities required for such operations are specialized and will have broad implications for force development.

- ***Expand access at every echelon to purpose-filtered all-source intelligence.*** Joint forces in combat must be able to read the behavior of a wide range of potential enemies with vastly different attributes and likewise must be able to understand the broader situation within which they operate. Simply accumulating this information will require diverse collection capabilities from technological collection platforms to open and covert human sources. The very volume of the resulting information will present collation, interpretation, and analysis problems. The latter will be especially acute in contests involving culturally remote irregular combatants who are largely indistinguishable from civilians and lack, or deliberately reject, an easily discernible fighting pattern.

In these circumstances, an intelligence system that denies user access to raw and/or partially collated information and defers dissemination of processed intelligence until every item of information has been fully analyzed is an invitation to failure. Instead, future joint forces will require a system that assigns reliability and importance to information from the moment it is acquired, adjusts those criteria as the information is interpreted, and allows users at any point along the way to

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[41] *Nonlethal weapon*: "A weapon that is explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, an undesired damage to property and the environment." JP 1-02.

decide for themselves what level of intelligence precision they require based on their unique tactical and operational needs.

Recent experience suggests strongly that errors are more likely to reflect lack of awareness by operators that information material to their activities is in the system than misuse of that information. The more fluid and ambiguous the situation is, the more true that is likely to be. Modern automation has made rapid access to and filtration of information from a myriad of sources routine in civil society. It needs to become equally effortless and responsive in joint operations.

- ***Reconcile Service employment requirements with the requirements for flexible joint integration.*** The principle of putting maximum combat power promptly in the hands of the commander best able to employ it discriminately -- which often means at lower echelons -- implies continued doctrinal, organizational, procedural and technological changes in the way Services support one another. The last decade has seen significant progress in simplifying and accelerating tasking cycles, devising standard employment packages, and coordinating command and control, and these praiseworthy improvements need to continue. But historical biases and Service doctrinal habits continue to impede the achievement of true joint interdependence.

The most important requirement is to distinguish Service operating practices that reflect intrinsic domain imperatives and force protection requirements from others adopted over the years merely for operational or administrative convenience. The former must be accommodated, either by technological or procedural mechanisms. The latter should be abandoned wherever they clearly interfere with rapid and responsive cross-domain support. Above all, Service employment doctrines must be sufficiently flexible to adapt to the actual conditions of combat, rather than attempting to enforce rigid rules and procedures for which there may be no need. Achieving that flexibility will complicate education and training, but that complication is preferable to improvising cross-domain integration after combat has begun.

- ***Improve the ability to interoperate with foreign military partners, especially at lower echelons.*** What is true for joint integration also applies, although perhaps less forcefully, to multinational combat. (The same can be said for interagency coordination, although that will be less a factor in combat than in the other activities since combat is almost exclusively the province of military forces.) The difference is in the number of potential partners with whom joint forces might find themselves operating, which introduces legal, political, and security as well as doctrinal complexities.

Those complexities acknowledged, the more transparent to partners that joint force can make their operating practices, the more willing U.S. forces are to share information and technology, and the more prepared they are to furnish competent liaison personnel with direct access to joint capabilities, the more rapidly and completely the joint force will be able to rely on allied capabilities and vice versa.

That partnership has become increasingly essential at increasingly lower echelons, and with allies whose technical capabilities may not be the equal of U.S. forces. Conversely, those allies often enjoy a better understanding of the enemy and the environment than U.S. forces do, and operating practices that seem to us to be unsophisticated may in fact be better adapted to the fight than our own. Not the least important manifestation of the CCJO's injunction to understand the situation in its own terms is the need to exploit partners' understanding. The level of improvement that reasonably can be expected will vary with the situation and the partner.

- ***Develop joint proficiency at lower echelons and grades without sacrificing Service proficiency.*** The requirement to achieve joint synergy at increasingly lower echelons urges complementing Service training at every echelon with mission-appropriate joint training, to include wherever feasible actual field training as opposed to simulations. Doing so implies an unprecedented cross-Service effort to reconcile training calendars, and has implications for facilities, ranges and Service training plans. For the same purpose, leaders must begin to develop joint proficiency earlier in their careers, without unduly sacrificing proficiency in their own occupational specialties. Both objectives have resource implications, not least a sufficient personnel surplus beyond current operating requirements to permit personnel to train jointly without penalty to maintaining proficiencies in Service competencies.

- ***Dramatically improve the ability to employ information as a component of combat power.*** The mounting impact of public perceptions and attitudes on combat implies a need to improve joint forces' understanding of and ability to apply information as a component of combat power. Of particular importance, the principle of placing combat power in the hands of the commander best able to employ it discriminately applies equally to information. In turn, that implies delegating downward the authority to release various information products.

Because, as noted earlier, information is less easily confined in space and time than other elements of combat power, devolving its use

downward incurs certain risks, and will require both comprehensive communication of the higher commander's intent and restrictions, and careful monitoring of the impact of any information release at subordinate echelons, so that the commander can modify both intent and restrictions as the situation changes.

Moreover, since delegating release authority downward also will require integrating information with maneuver and fires at every echelon responsible, methods of doing so will need to be incorporated into doctrine, education and training.

- ***Design Service capabilities from the outset to operate in a joint context.*** Pushing jointness down to lower echelons implies that the Services develop all their combat capabilities within a joint context -- that is, designed to interoperate with other Services at the lowest expected level of employment rather than only within Service formations. Policy changes on the approval authorities for lower acquisition categories may result.

- ***Develop mechanisms for transitioning forces quickly and effectively between combat and other CCJO activities.*** A central implication of the CCJO is that joint conventional forces must be able to perform any of the four joint activities on short notice and without immediate augmentation by other governmental or allied partners. Doing so will require units to transition quickly between combat and those other activities, which are driven by quite different imperatives and impose different requirements and constraints. To facilitate and shorten that transition requires developing pre-packaged training and organizational reconfiguration programs, together with sufficient reserve stocks of activity-relevant equipment and consumables to preclude the need for procurement only after the transition becomes necessary.

- ***Reduce the logistical support required by joint forces in combat.*** Given increasing challenges to American use of the global commons, the requirement to sustain joint operations at global distances puts joint forces at risk. One way to mitigate this risk is to pursue solutions that reduce the logistical appetite of joint forces, especially their consumption of fossil fuels.

9. RISKS OF ADOPTING THE JOINT COMBAT CONCEPT

Adopting this approach to combat is not without risks.

- ***The most serious of these risks is that, in their efforts to achieve discrimination, joint forces could fail to apply sufficient combat power to accomplish the mission.*** Avoiding this risk is not entirely within the joint force commander's control. Even when applied judiciously, the violence required to accomplish the mission may simply be greater than policymakers or domestic or international publics will tolerate, and neither of these thresholds may be recognized until forces already have been committed. In fact, a clever enemy will seek to manipulate public opinion to create just that condition.

- ***Similarly, the concept's emphasis on precision may lead some to expect and impose ceilings on collateral casualties and damage that are unachievable given the inherent nature of combat.*** Where the information environment will not furnish that degree of certainty, such expectations risk mission failure. As with limitations on the application of combat power, if excessive expectations of precision result in restrictions that imperil accomplishment of the mission, the joint force commander must advise superiors accordingly and request to have those restraints relaxed.

- ***More broadly, and potentially more seriously, the concept's emphasis on minimizing collateral damage could intensify perceptions of U.S. reluctance to inflict the costs of combat, and thereby encourage future adversaries to test the United States in battle on the grounds that, even if defeated, they would not suffer unbearably.*** In other words, a doctrinal commitment to discriminate combat might convince potential adversaries that U.S. joint forces lack the necessary ruthlessness to win. The only way to mitigate this risk is to demonstrate credibly the willingness to conduct combat with the violence necessary to deter potential enemies.

- ***Additionally, the concept's conditional preference for disruption could lead commanders and staffs to waste valuable time and energy in search of precise disruption mechanisms even when the nature of the enemy or the conditions of combat preclude such a diagnosis.*** This risk misinterprets the concept, which acknowledges the danger of relying solely on disruption and instead affirms the need for whatever attrition may be required to defeat the enemy. Training in operational design must teach commanders and staffs to balance these defeat mechanisms based on sound appreciation of the combat environment and where attrition is required, to apply it to

greatest advantage.

- ***Finally, the concept's call for greater Service interdependence and its emphasis on the cross-domain application of combat power could be misread by resource allocators to suggest significantly less need for organic self-sufficiency.*** That could prove exceedingly dangerous were attacks on electronic communications seriously to degrade the ability of a joint force to conduct cross-domain support. Mitigating this risk requires maintaining a sensible balance between organic capabilities and those accessible only through external support, together with robust and redundant means of requesting and coordinating that support.

Nearly all of these risks reflect interpretations of the concept that drive one or another of its proposals to extremes, whether the need for discrimination, the preference for system disruption over cumulative attrition, or the argument for improving and expanding the cross-domain application of combat power. Hence the best way to reduce these risks is to ensure that military professionals and policymakers alike understand the concept, and recognize that no operating concept can entirely deprive armed combat of its brutal, destructive and unpredictable nature. Operational and tactical skill informed by judgment and applied to the best available technology can improve combat efficiency and effectiveness. In the end, however, more than any of these, success in battle will continue to depend, as it always has, on the courage of those doing the fighting and the resolve of those giving the orders.

10. JOINT COMBAT AND THE OTHER ACTIVITIES

In war, combat typically will be the dominant activity, with the others performed primarily to facilitate the fighting. This is true especially of combat in the global commons and on the territory and against the forces of a hostile state, where the attitudes and support of affected populations are not an immediate concern. Security activities maintain secure bases and lines of communication in captured territory for the performance of essential combat support and sustainment activities. Relief and reconstruction activities improve the infrastructure -- roads, bridges, ports, airfields and so on -- needed for continued combat. Engagement builds the cooperation needed for coalition combat by establishing command and support relationships, building trust and familiarity, and gaining access for joint and multinational forces.

Even where this is the case in the early stages of a conflict, however, it is unlikely to persist. Preventing the reemergence of threats

in territory already cleared of organized resistance will require the acquiescence, if not the outright support, of local populations. Popular support or acquiescence is still more crucial in counterinsurgencies, which tend to revolve directly around that issue. Gaining that support is likely to require a more balanced mix of all four activities. In most joint operations outside of war, of course, combat likely will play only a supporting role, if any. Even in those circumstances, however, limited combat may be necessary to create the security conditions that allow other activities to take place safely.

Moreover, combat may create conditions requiring the other activities, all of which often are natural sequels to combat -- security because the defeat of an enemy in battle often will leave a security vacuum, engagement because that defeat may require the rebuilding of indigenous civil institutions and security forces, and relief and reconstruction to restore infrastructure required for continued combat and to ameliorate civil damage and suffering for strategic or humanitarian reasons. In such circumstances, combat shapes the conditions with which other activities subsequently must deal. For that very reason, the expected requirements of those other activities can and should influence combat's planning and execution. For example, preservation of civil infrastructure may be desirable not only to permit its exploitation in support of continued combat operations, but also to facilitate relief and reconstruction aimed at avoiding a humanitarian disaster and further alienating local populations, either of which could compel the diversion of significant combat resources to security activities.

11. CONCLUSION TO THE JOINT COMBAT CONCEPT

This paper asserts that combat, the process of defeating armed enemies through the use of lethal force and other means, remains the essential and irreducible competency of U.S. joint forces. Objectives, enemies, environments, weapons and methods all may vary, and joint forces must be ready to conduct combat whatever the circumstances, but the essential nature of combat is constant. If the U.S. is to be successful in future combat operations, joint forces must be able to adapt their methods to political objectives and restrictions, and those who commit joint forces to battle must recognize the impact of those objectives and restrictions and frame their expectations accordingly.

Although U.S. joint forces have been unsurpassed in combat capability for decades, two emerging trends in the operating environment will present challenges in the future. The first trend is the accelerating

proliferation of advanced weapons and other combat-relevant technologies, the result of which is a narrowing of capability differences between the United States and many potential enemies and the growing ability of some of those enemies to challenge American superiority in the global commons. The second trend is mounting societal pressure on the United States and many of its allies to curtail the use of lethal force even against enemies who observe no such restraint, placing a premium on the discriminate application of combat power. Together, these two trends produce the fundamental dilemma with which future joint forces and those who commit them to battle must deal.

To address this dilemma, this concept proposes combining maneuver, fires and information from multiple domains in complementary ways to focus overwhelming but discriminate combat power, preferentially against those capabilities whose loss or damage is most likely to disrupt an enemy's cohesive functioning. While preferring disruption as a defeat mechanism, however, it by no means visualizes combat as sterile or bloodless, nor excludes the need for prolonged attrition when no other mean of imposing our will on an enemy will serve. It recognizes that combat remains a fundamentally brutal, inefficient and unpredictable enterprise, the outcome of which ultimately will be determined by the vagaries of human nature.

Some of the institutional implications of adopting this approach are potentially dramatic. Many seek to reconcile the tension between generating overwhelming force and achieving maximum discrimination. Absent a radical change in the operating environment, reconciling this tension will be essential if joint combat is to remain a useful instrument of national policy.

Part II

Joint Security Concept

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1. INTRODUCTION TO THE JOINT SECURITY CONCEPT

The *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (CCJO) establishes security as one of four basic categories of joint activity and an essential competency of the joint force. Security activities seek to protect and control populations, territories, and resources -- friendly, hostile, or neutral -- and are activities the joint force conducts during peacetime, crises, and conflict. Subsequently, security activities may likely represent the most dominant military activity in the near future. The *Joint Security Concept* (JSC) describes how the future joint force conducts security activities through the overarching framework of prevention and de-escalation. *Prevention* focuses on mitigating threats before there is a deterioration of local or regional stability. *De-escalation* focuses on lowering levels of violence and lawlessness when an activity, presence, or threat creates an unstable environment that is beyond the capability of interim or host government security institutions to control or manage. The joint force achieves prevention and de-escalation by conducting some combination of complementary *regulation* actions designed to maintain order and prevent disorder, and *intervention* actions designed to react to destabilizing events. Additionally, *information* actions undergird all security activities through the intentional dissemination of data to affect the perceptions, attitudes and often the behavior of target audiences: friendly, neutral, and hostile.

The conduct of security by U.S. forces is not new. The U.S. military has a long history of conducting a variety of security activities during and after major combat, postwar occupations, counterinsurgencies, and during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. Within the air, maritime, and space domains, security activities protect access and freedom of movement. In cyberspace, the joint force protects Department of Defense (DOD) information and network access and in the future may be called on to secure broader interests in this relatively new and global domain. In support of homeland security, the joint force performs missions that include counternarcotics operations, border patrol, protection of U.S. airspace and sea frontiers, and, when necessary, defense support of civil authorities.

What is new or re-affirmed is that security activities represent an intrinsic aspect of joint force operations, not an ancillary activity that can be relegated to other U.S. Government agencies. Security activities provide a framework for parallel military and civilian activities by establishing and/or maintaining a safe and secure environment. As such, security activities contribute to the creation and maintenance of a broader condition of security.

2. THE NATURE OF SECURITY

The Nation's interests are intrinsically linked to a stable, just, and prosperous international order. Joint force security efforts reinforce international stability by mitigating and managing crises and threats, and by helping reduce violence and lawlessness to levels manageable by international structures, indigenous security institutions, or interim[42] security forces. Accordingly, joint security encompasses those activities the joint force undertakes to protect and control populations, territories and resources.[43] Ultimately, joint force security activities aim to create a safe and secure environment that sets the conditions for political, economic, military, and humanitarian developments.

A safe and secure environment encompasses both the physical and psychological aspects of the way people live in a society, the freedom they exercise over their many choices, the access they have to market and social opportunities, and whether they live in conflict or in peace.[44] In essence, a safe and secure environment embodies two reinforcing elements: A *safe environment* is one that does not pose a threat to the health of the population and that allows for the provision of basic human needs (e.g., food, clean water, health care, and shelter); a *secure environment* is one that reduces the threat of human violence and lawlessness to a manageable level. Maintaining or re-establishing a safe and secure environment involves a combination of reinforcing systems and structures that provide order, while simultaneously removing threats and aggression. Joint force security activities, however, are only one aspect of providing a comprehensive safe, secure environment. Security activities provide a framework that enables parallel activities such as combat, relief and reconstruction, and engagement to develop and achieve their objectives.

Security activities create the framework for a safe and secure environment in a variety of contexts and environments, to include:

- Controlling civil violence to enable offensive and defensive momentum during combat;
- Defeating or supporting an insurgency;

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[42] Interim security forces include international peacekeeping forces, transitional authorities, or other entities that conduct primary security responsibilities for a temporary period.

[43] The *Joint Security Concept* expands on the CCJO definition of security by including resources.

[44] United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994*. New York: UNDP, 1994. (New York: UNDP, 1994); U.S. Embassy Kabul and U.S. Forces Afghanistan *United States Government Integrated Civilian – Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan* (Kabul: U.S. Government, August 10, 2009).

- Protecting military and civilian relief and reconstruction efforts in the wake of a disaster;
- Providing population and area security during a stability operation;
- Eliminating explosive hazards from an area of operation;
- Participating in international peace operations;[45]
- Facilitating international commerce and enabling freedom of navigation in international waters and airspace;
- Protecting access to space and cyberspace;
- Disrupting and dismantling transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and illegal trafficking of persons, drugs and arms; and
- Supporting the restoration of civil order by providing defense support of civil authorities within the United States or providing support to civil administrations abroad.

Joint force security activities enable policymakers to shape or change the broader security condition and provide political leaders a wider range of competencies than just dominance in combat.[46] Joint force security activities offer a set of actions that enable policymakers to shape or change the broader security condition. However, security activities rarely succeed alone. The joint force should integrate security activities into a comprehensive approach with U.S. Government civilian departments and agencies, international organizations, partner governments,[47] NGOs, and private sector partners. Depending on circumstances, the joint force may lead the national or multinational effort or it may support other agencies, usually by creating the security conditions that allow non-military entities and individuals to safely carry out their tasks and missions.

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[45] Peace operations include peacekeeping operations, peace building post-conflict actions, peacemaking processes, conflict prevention, and military peace enforcement operations. See U.S. Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 3-07.3, Peace Operations,* (Washington: Department of Defense, October 17, 2007), vii. (Hereafter cited as JP 3-07.3.)

[46] U.S. Joint Staff, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations v 3.0* (Washington: Department of Defense, January 15, 2009), 1. (Hereafter cited as *CCJO.*)

[47] By "host government" and "partner government" this concept means not only the central government of a state, but also sub-state provincial, district, and local governments; state and local governments within the United States; transitional authorities and military governments established by occupying powers under international law; United Nations trusteeships and other forms of government established by international organizations; tribal assemblies and other traditional forms of governance that supplement or substitute for central governance; and "shadow governments" established by insurgent groups or resistance movements.

Whether leading or supporting the effort, the joint force must foster unified action[48] among military and civilian entities to ensure commonality of purpose, continuity of effort, and avoidance of gaps or seams across efforts. In some cases, however, the joint force may conduct security activities independently, because civilian agencies or partner nations are unwilling or unable to integrate their knowledge, skills, and resources. For example, in the wake of combat, the joint force may be the primary -- or only -- entity involved in re-establishing and enforcing security until interim or host nation security forces can assume security responsibilities.

The *Joint Security Concept* focuses on joint force security activities that protect and control populations, territories, and resources, as well as how these activities contribute to establishing or maintaining a safe and secure environment.[49] For the purposes of this concept, *protection* involves activities that ensure safety of populations or access to vital areas and resources. *Control* involves tactical activities the joint force or others undertake to manage public spaces, which can involve physical security (e.g., securing borders, critical infrastructure) or regulatory actions (e.g., curfews, traffic regulation). *Population* means those groups that the joint force must protect, influence, or control through security activities. *Territory* is an expansive term that includes the air, land, maritime, space and cyberspace domains.[50] *Resources* include critical infrastructure, natural resources (e.g., timber, oil, minerals, and water), and goods, supplies and materiel. Resources, such as critical infrastructure and natural resources, contribute directly to the economic health of a region. Consequently, the protection and control of resources help set the conditions for a safe and secure environment. In keeping with the intent

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[48] Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. U.S. Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, (Washington: Department of Defense, March 20, 2009), xii. (Hereafter cited as JP 1.)

[49] The *Joint Security Concept* expands on the CCJO definition of security by including resources. The concept also expands on the current joint definitions of security which has three definitions for security: 1. Measures taken by a military unit, activity, or installation to protect itself against all acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness. 2. A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensures a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences. 3. With respect to classified matter, the condition that prevents unauthorized persons from having access to official information that is safeguarded in the interests of national security. JP 1-02.

[50] The *Joint Security Concept* uses an expanded version of the term "territory" to ensure that it addresses security activities in the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. While no single entity protects, controls, or owns any domain entirely, the joint force can protect and control small areas or territories within individual domains. Additionally, the concept treats each domain in a unique manner, according to its specific issues, challenges, and attributes.

and scope of the CCJO definition of security, force protection is outside the scope of this concept and is discussed in the *Joint Combat Concept*.

3. SECURITY IN THE FUTURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

Conflicts and struggles in the 21st century will increasingly involve regular and irregular threats,[51] as well as threats short of war that require security activities to protect, influence, and control populations, territories, and resources. The *Joint Operating Environment 2010*[52] describes a variety of challenges and trends that will negatively impact the preservation and creation of safe and secure environments. These challenges and trends will therefore affect the frequency, nature, and conduct of joint force security activities over the next quarter century to include: the increasing potential for violence, criminality, and lawlessness across multiple domains; increasing agility and lethality of adversaries; and increasing importance of the "battle of narratives." Although these trends and challenges will impact all four categories of joint force activities, the future operating environment -- as forecasted in the *Joint Operating Environment 2010* -- will require a new and far greater emphasis on joint force security activities if DOD is to continue to ensure safe and secure environments in accordance with USG policy.

Increasing potential for violence, criminality, and lawlessness across multiple domains

The potential for increasing violence, criminality, and lawlessness that could threaten U.S. interests will occur within multiple domains and require the joint force to conduct security activities across various contexts and environments from dense megacities to international waters and to space and cyberspace.

Increasing migration to urban centers has the potential to unsettle local or regional stability and require the joint force to conduct security activities within densely populated environments. By 2030, five billion of the world's eight billion people will live in cities, with a majority centered in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Moreover, many urban mega-cities will lie in littoral environments.[53] Large migrations to city centers will decrease

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[51] The CCJO posits that "[w]arfare against the regular forces of a sovereign state using orthodox means and methods can be called *conventional* or *regular warfare*, while warfare against predominantly irregular forces can be called *irregular warfare*." *CCJO*, 8.

[52] U.S. Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2010,* (Suffolk: US Joint Forces Command, 2010).

[53]Ibid, 57.

the homogeneity of local populations, increase competition for natural resources (e.g., food, water, arable land, oil, minerals), and could overwhelm the opportunities for employment. Pressures generated by urbanization may exacerbate underlying causes of instability and conflict, such as: gaps in governance and basic services; socio-economic inequalities; unregulated criminal activity; and religious and ethnic conflicts, which can also lead to rising levels of violence and lawlessness. Local governments that are unwilling or unable to address these urbanization challenges will likely face significant outbursts of civil unrest. If governments do not confront internal disruptions quickly, local violence may escalate into wider instability and conflict that may threaten the safety and security of the local, regional, or the global environment.

The joint force will also face increasing security threats within the global commons -- geographical areas that are beyond the jurisdiction of any nation (e.g., international waters, space, cyberspace).[54] The United States and the international community rely increasingly on access to the global commons to conduct and enable military operations, logistics, command and control, and all manner of civilian commercial and private activities. The maritime domain alone is the conduit through which an estimated ninety percent of goods and services flow, making it an attractive and effective avenue for criminal or destabilizing activity.[55] Traditional challenges from adversary states as well as transnational, failed states and non-state threats (e.g., terrorism, piracy, drug and human trafficking) could threaten or impede access and movement within these domains. Moreover, security threats will often cross multijurisdictional boundaries where joint force authorities may be limited in their ability to respond. For example, international organized crime networks, supported by illicit financing and arms, can blur the line between criminal acts of violence that are civilian law enforcement issues and "acts of war" that violate international law and may require a military response.[56]

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[54]The *Quadrennial Defense Review 2010 Terms of Reference Fact Sheet* refers to global commons as "air, sea, space, cyberspace." *The Quadrennial Defense Review 2010 Terms of Reference Fact Sheet* (accessed August 30, 2010); available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news.d20090429gdr.pdf; Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Directive 6050.7 Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Department of Defense Actions* (Washington: Department of Defense, March 31, 1979; Certified Current March 5, 2004). (Hereafter cited as DODD 6057.7.)

[55] For example, a majority of cyberspace data travels via fiber optic, undersea cables. Frank W. Lacroix, Robert W. Button, Stuart E. Johnson, John R. Wise, A Concept of Operations for a New Deep-Diving Submarine (Santa Monica: RAND Corp, 2001) 2; Department of the Navy, *The U.S. Navy's Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges,* January 2010(accessed August 30, 2010); available from www.navy.mil/features/iwob.pdf., 5.

[56] Joseph Celeski, *Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN – the Thick Blue Line* (accessed August 20, 2010); available from http://jsoupublic.socom.mil/publications/jsoupubs_2009.php.

Space and cyberspace also present unique security challenges, as more nations and other actors gain access and develop satellite and network technologies permitting disproportionate influence in these global domains. Increasing competition within space and cyberspace also poses a threat to the access and freedom of action within these physical and global domains. State and non-state actors increasingly have easy access to commercial cyber and space capabilities that are inexpensive, ubiquitous, and difficult to trace. Because of its increasing dependence on space and cyber capabilities, the joint force's vulnerability will increase as these threats emerge and mature. This comes at a time when joint force command and control systems are becoming more reliant on digital communications, relying on a near-instantaneous transfer of information to exploit fleeting opportunities on the battlefield.

Increasing agility and lethality of adversaries

When conducting security activities, the joint force will increasingly face highly networked and decentralized adversaries, who operate in small formations and are able to carry out multiple, simultaneous "swarm" attacks.[57] Compounding these challenges is an adversarial mindset that often includes an attitude toward risk that is more acceptant of casualties, a greater reliance on trial and error, and a relatively high tolerance for failure. Moreover, conflicts within the 21st century will be characterized increasingly by hybrid threats where adversaries blend regular and irregular tactics in new and innovative ways.[58] Advances in technology (e.g., precision munitions linked to space-based, and commercially-enabled targeting systems) will also decrease the capability gap between the joint force and adversaries and will complicate the ability of the joint force to achieve security through the protection of populations, territories, and resources, as well as itself.

Increasing importance of the "battle of narratives"

A key element of the future operating environment that will heavily impact joint force security activities will be the "battle of narratives," which involves competing information campaigns by the joint force and adversaries, as well as other key stakeholders (such as the international media). This competition of messages will take place in the perceptions of the relevant populations, rather than within the traditional physical

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[57] John Arquilla, *The New Rules of War* (accessed July 30, 2010), available from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/the_new_rules_of_war.

[58] Evans, Alex, Bruce Jones, and David Steven, *Confronting the Long Crisis of Globalization: Risk, Resilience and International Order* (accessed July 30, 2010; available from http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2010/0126_globalization_jones.aspx) 19.

battlespace and will shape the viability and effectiveness of joint force security activities.[59] For example, security activities will be affected -- both positively and negatively -- by the increasing density and proliferating types of communications technologies such as blogs, social network sites, and personal digital devices enable adversaries and populations to disseminate information and disinformation quickly and often without attribution. Often these messages can be more disruptive than lethal actions or direct attacks. The joint force will conduct its activities under the continuous scrutiny of the media, which can turn a tactical mistake into a strategic setback almost immediately. Increasingly sophisticated adversary information campaigns that transmit messages across a variety of media sources will pose a constant challenge to the joint force and will make the "battle of narratives" critical to mission success.

4. THE CHALLENGE OF SECURITY FOR THE FUTURE JOINT FORCE

The future operating environment presents the potential for increasing violence, criminality, and lawlessness in and across multiple domains that will raise the demand for the joint force to create a safe and secure environment by protecting, influencing, and controlling populations, territories, and resources. Compounding this challenge is the need to operate across multiple civil-military jurisdictions to counter increasingly agile and lethal adversaries. In addition, the joint force will operate in a transparent environment in which the "battle of narratives" requires a constant process of countering adversary messages and influencing friendly and neutral populations.

5. A CONCEPT FOR FUTURE JOINT SECURITY

To protect, influence, and control populations, territories, and resources, the joint force will conduct security activities, in support of U.S. Government interests, by applying the prevention and de-escalation framework.[60] Through this framework, the joint force will reduce violence, criminality, and lawlessness and provide a safe and secure environment during peacetime, crisis, and conflict.

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[59] *JOE 2010*, 58.

[60] The *Joint Security Concept* uses many familiar terms such as *prevention* and *de-escalation* in ways that are different from how they are applied in joint doctrine. As a concept, the *JSC* uses these terms to frame a new model for applying security activities.

Prevention focuses on mitigating and deterring violence and lawlessness before there is a deterioration of local or regional stability. *De-escalation* focuses on lowering levels of violence and lawlessness after a threat or activity creates an unstable environment that is beyond the capability of host government security institutions to control or manage. Within the prevention and de-escalation framework, security activities will have various conclusion points. Some security activities will conclude when the joint force divests responsibility to interim or host government security forces. Other security activities will involve a constant, steady state[61] effort without a specific endpoint (e.g., monitoring and ensuring access to the global commons). The *transition* of security activities between prevention and de-escalation may take various forms. One of the most difficult transitions will involve divestiture of joint force security responsibilities to nascent or newly constituted security forces and deserves special consideration.

The joint force will apply the prevention and de-escalation framework by implementing three reinforcing functions: intervention, regulation, and information. *Interventional* actions aim to remove destabilizing threats and activities. Simultaneously, *regulatory* actions aim to reinforce the systems and structures that maintain order. Both intervention and regulation are enforcement mechanisms and require varying levels of the use of force. *Information* actions reinforce all security activities by disseminating positive narratives and messages that support (and are supported by) joint force security activities, as well as counter adversary information campaigns.

The Prevention and De-Escalation Framework

Neither prevention nor de-escalation will be successful if undertaken independently or unilaterally by the joint force. Rather, the joint force must develop cooperative partnerships with U.S. Government civilian departments and agencies, host and partner governments, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. Partnerships require on-going planning, dialogue, and collaboration to develop improved understanding of the larger systemic security environment, the relevant legal authorities, local security concerns, and the interests and equities of each partner. To enable unified action, integrated civil-military teams will work together to develop multidomain, multiagency assessments of the political, economic, law enforcement, social, legal, and cultural dimensions of threats and conflicts. These assessments will enable the joint force to

[61] For the purposes of this concept, "steady state" refers to environments that do not change substantially over time, and include the routine employment of force, infrastructure, and agreements as defined in the Global Defense Posture. It may include peacetime and contingency environments.

understand how its role fluctuates between leading and supporting its partners in the overall security effort.

- ***Prevention*** focuses on safeguarding local and regional stability by mitigating and managing crises and threats before they create larger security concerns. Under the prevention mode, joint force security activities focus on averting conflicts because "avoiding war is usually preferable to fighting it."[62] Therefore, prevention will require the following: continuous, steady state activities; persistent monitoring and surveillance; early identification of potential causes of conflict; and pro-active actions to mitigate conflict, or, when required, respond quickly to emerging challenges and threats.

When prevention efforts do not successfully mitigate crises, and violence and lawlessness cross an intolerable threshold,[63] the joint force will transition to a de-escalation posture and will focus on reducing violence and lawlessness back to a manageable level. However, a transition from prevention to de-escalation is not inevitable. If prevention efforts are successful, then the joint force should not have to shift to a de-escalation posture. In some cases, however, to remain in a prevention posture, the joint force will take escalatory measures (e.g., show of force) to contain or deter rising violence and lawlessness, or to prepare for combat activities.

Prevention efforts will require a global and continuous effort across the joint force. A large military presence will not always be in the U.S. interest, nor will it always be in the desires of the host government and population. Where possible, the joint force should design prevention efforts with a focus on conducting combined security activities with partner nations. In these cases, the joint force will "lead from the side" by augmenting and supporting the partner nation. These combined operations represent an overlap between security and engagement activities because they serve dual purposes: to address immediate security concerns, as well as to train and assist host nation security forces in assuming responsibilities for its own internal security (e.g., combined anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa; combined interdictions with Pacific Island Nations to protect their exclusive economic zones).

- ***De-escalation*** focuses on responding to a significant deterioration of local or regional stability by lowering levels of violence and lawlessness.

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[62] The other joint activities of combat, engagement, and relief and reconstruction also play a central role in deterring potential adversaries and competitors; however, this concept focuses on security activities. *CCJO*, 9.

[63] Criteria for an "intolerable threshold" will vary for each situation, and, will involve a consultative civil-military dialogue to understand the necessary steps to be taken to shift from a prevention-focused to a de-escalation-focused posture.

De-escalation requires a tailored increase in force presence, and often requires an initial concentrated use of force to show joint force credibility and resolve. The resources and measures applied will depend largely on the level of organized resistance. Ultimately, de-escalation aims to reduce violence, criminality and lawlessness to a level manageable by interim or local security structures.

De-escalation efforts will transition as violence declines. When the local population can increasingly conduct its day-to-day political, commercial, and private activities in a safe and orderly manner, it is an indicator that the de-escalation process is working. In these cases, transitions can involve returning to the prevention mode, in which the joint force, either alone or with partners, monitors and protects local and regional stability. Transition may involve returning the responsibility of security activities back to civil authorities, who may have been temporarily overwhelmed by a natural or manmade disaster.

In some cases, transitioning out of the de-escalation mode will involve a long-term timeline because the joint force will need to support the re-establishment or re-constitution of indigenous security forces to ensure their viability and sustainability. This long-term transition process represents one of the most difficult transitions. In these cases, the transition process focuses on shifting the joint force from a primary leading role to a supporting and enabling role, and, ultimately, phasing out of security efforts entirely. The joint force may also remain temporarily as part of a multilateral or bilateral arrangement to ensure viability and sustainment of security gains. This is especially critical when the joint force divests security responsibilities to newly constituted or re-constituted security forces of a host government or to nascent regional security organizations with member forces who have not worked together and/or who have capacity limitations.

The longer transitions will likely involve jointly planning and conducting security tasks (such as patrols) with these nascent forces, perhaps using embedded advisors and trainers. Joint forces should not overlook supporting the development of institutional best practices (e.g., leadership continuity, addressing retention problems, overcoming the pressures of corruption) so that indigenous security forces become viable and capable of providing sustainable security after U.S. and international forces withdraw.[64] Finally, conditions-based judgments made through a collective process involving actors such as the host government, U.S. Government civil departments and agencies, non-governmental

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[64] Anthony H. Cordesman, *Afghan National Security Forces: Shaping Host Country Forces as Part of Armed Nation Building* (accessed June 30, 2010); available from http://csis.org/publication/afghan-national-security-forces-0, iii-v.

organizations, and regional leaders will guide the timing and phasing of transitions. It is also important for the joint force to develop and assess each transition plan in terms of local laws, customs, and capabilities. Many of these transition activities overlap with the joint force engagement activities, as discussed in the *Joint Engagement Concept*.

Security Functions: Intervention, Regulation, and Information

Intervention and regulation are enforcement mechanisms and will require varying levels of the use of force. Together, regulation and intervention actions establish or maintain a safe and secure environment, albeit through different means. *Interventional* actions protect an environment by disrupting or removing destabilizing threats and activities. Therefore, interventional activities will often require the joint force to overwhelm the adversary and involve episodic and high intensity actions that can be escalatory in nature (e.g., raids, interdictions). *Regulatory* actions reinforce the systems and structures that maintain order, and, therefore, require an operating tempo that enables continuous monitoring and interaction with local actors and stakeholders. Regulatory activities will generally require higher levels of restraint when using force because interaction tends to focus on friendly and neutral populations. *Information*[65] is a security function that undergirds all security activities. In this concept, information actions will involve the intentional dissemination of data to affect the perceptions, attitudes and often the behavior of relevant audiences (e.g., international audiences or local populations). Additionally, joint force information actions will involve deliberate actions to counter adversary messages, delivery systems and information networks.

Figure JSC-1 provides an overview of the concept for future joint security, outlining the prevention and de-escalation framework and its supporting security functions of intervention, regulation, and information.

[65] The Joint Security Concept will define the function information in the same way it is defined in the Joint Combat Concept, referring to the intentional dissemination of data to affect the perceptions, attitudes and ultimately the behavior of designated, external audiences. It differs from Information Operations in that it is not solely adversary-focused but is also focused on positively persuading and influencing friendly and neutral audiences. Information Operations are…"the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making while protecting our own." *JP 3-13,* ix.



Figure JSC-1. A Concept for Future Joint Security

Prevention and de-escalation provide the framework for joint force security activities to create a safe and secure environment and to protect, influence, and control populations, territories, and resources.

6. FUNCTIONS OF JOINT SECURITY

The JSC builds on the traditional joint functions -- command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment -- by introducing intervention, regulation, and information as key functions of joint security activities. As described in the previous section, the joint force will carry out prevention and de-escalation by a combination of intervention and regulation that respectively aim to reduce violence or its manifestations or establish and maintain order. The joint force will likely conduct intervention and regulation actions simultaneously; however, the emphasis and proportion of activities will be based on extant security conditions and threats. Whether conducting intervention or regulation actions, the joint force must also have the flexibility and scalability to insert and withdraw the requisite force at the

appropriate time to respond and adapt to dispersed and decentralized adversaries.

Within the prevention mode, the combination of intervention and regulation actions will be weighted primarily toward regulatory actions, focused on protecting the integrity of local, regional, or global systems and structures. However, to help mitigate crises and maintain order, regulation actions may also be escalatory in nature. For example, recently the U.S. military and military elements of the Republic of Korea announced joint military exercises in the Yellow Sea to put pressure on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) for sinking the South Korean warship *Choenan*.[66] This move was meant to deter similar actions from the DPRK through escalatory, yet non-kinetic measures. Preventive security can involve interventional actions that apply the lethal force necessary to effect behavioral change, or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority.[67]

Within de-escalation, the balance of intervention and regulation actions may tend toward interventional actions, at least initially. To de-escalate a situation, however, the joint force must also conduct regulatory activities that re-establish order. If the de-escalation process is successful, then over time the proportion of interventional activities will generally decrease, while the proportion of regulatory activities will increase.

Information provides a reinforcing function that will underpin all security activities by disseminating positive narratives and messages that support (and are supported) by joint force security actions, and will also counter adversary information campaigns. Accordingly, intervention, regulation, and information embody related capabilities and actions that help joint force commanders integrate, synchronize, and direct joint security activities.

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[66] David Sanger and Thom Shanker, "Pentagon and U.N. Chief Put New Pressure on N. Korea," *New York Times,* May 24, 2010.

[67] U.S. Army, *The Army Capstone Concept: Operational Adaptability – Operating under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict*, Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet (TRADOC Pam) 525-3-0, (accessed June 30, 2010); available from www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-3-0.pdf, 20.

Figure JSC-2 provides an overview of the joint security functions.

Security Functions		
Intervention	**Information**	**Regulation**
Disrupting or removing destabilizing threats or activities Involves: • Episodic occurrences • Overwhelming an adversary • Higher levels of the use of force	Reinforcing systems and structures that maintain order Involves: • Continuous monitoring • High levels of interaction with local actors and stakeholders • Higher levels of restraint	Influencing the perceptions, attitudes and often the behavior of friendly or neutral populations Involves: • Proactive dissemination of data that reinforces security activities • Deliberate actions to counter adversary messages, delivery systems and information networks

JSC-2 Security Functions

Intervention

Intervention aims to disrupt or remove destabilizing threats and activities. Therefore, intervention actions will involve coercive and confrontational actions that often require the application of overwhelming force to deter, disrupt, or dismantle adversaries' illicit activities. Figure JSC-3 provides an example of types of intervention actions.

Intercept and dismantle violent and illicit actors and networks. This set of actions involves targeting, intercepting, and neutralizing individuals and small groups, as well as

Intervention
Intercept and dismantle violent and illicit actors and networks: Pursuits; raids; arrests; interceptions; detention, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; WMD counter proliferation **Protect Critical Infrastructure and Resources:** Protect vital infrastructure and lines of communication, designation of off-limits areas, perimeter security, counter attack against cyber and space assets

Figure JSC-3 Exemplary Intervention Activities

larger, systematic networks. Many actions tend to involve the traditional military activities such as raids, pursuits, assaults, and other types of interdictions.

The joint force will continue to pursue and interdict violent actors and their networks on a day-to-day basis within the global commons, operating within the complex rubric of international law and national laws and customs. For example, in the maritime domain, the joint force may intercept suspect vessels to determine if they are transporting prohibited goods or persons. Different authorities apply to how the joint force will conduct maritime interdictions in international waters, exclusive economic zones, contiguous zones, and the littorals. If a maritime interception occurs within the territorial waters or exclusive economic zone of a foreign country, then the joint force must operate under the local laws, authorities and customs in accordance with pre-established bi-lateral agreements. The joint force may not always have the requisite authorities to conduct law enforcement maritime interdictions and will therefore need to partner with host government forces, the U.S. Coast Guard, or other law enforcement organizations which possess the necessary authorities.

During conflicts and crises, the joint force will primarily pursue violent actors and their networks in foreign countries, and will often operate under local civilian laws and authorities. For example, before the joint force can conduct a raid or arrest, it may require a warrant issued from a local judicial institution. Preferably, the joint force will conduct arrests in partnership with local security forces. When conducting actions that have a significant law enforcement focus, the joint force should integrate and embed experienced civilian law enforcement advisors, drawn from private contracts, interagency partnerships, reservists, and military police units. Embedded law enforcement advisors can assist the joint force commander and his staff in adapting operations by embracing law enforcement tactics, techniques, and procedures; thus expanding the range of available military options. In the absence of a functioning civilian authority (e.g., military occupation following combat), the joint force must have the ability to independently conduct raids and arrests in accordance with governing legal structures.

Neutralizing individuals or small groups, however, will not always have a lasting effect. The joint force must also seek to dismantle violent and illicit networks (e.g., dismantling terrorist networks, countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction). Violent actors and their networks often operate in complex organizations that will operate across multiple domains. Therefore, the joint force must establish its own networks to defeat adversary networks. The joint force must work with interagency departments and organizations to develop tailored, regional

assessments and operational plans that organize and prioritize comprehensive and integrated actions.

During or post-conflict the joint force may help dampen rising violence and lawlessness by disarming, demobilizing, and supporting the reintegration of violent actors back into society. Primary joint force tasks in this context will include weapons collection, inventory control, transport and storage of arms, reissue or destruction of arms.[68] The joint force will often be a partner to the security forces and institutions of international organizations or host or partner governments in such actions. Understanding local laws and customs is an essential aspect of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process. For example, in many countries the pervasiveness of guns within a society is a key aspect of the culture and way of life. Overly ambitious efforts to eliminate weapons may have a negative effect on friendly and neutral populations. Although the majority of reintegration actions may be conducted by civilian organizations (e.g., United Nations, NGOs), it is vital to the success of DDR actions. Where possible, the joint force should work to support reintegration processes (e.g., identifying and securing viable alternatives for reintegration such as job opportunities for demobilized combatants).

- ***Protect critical infrastructure and resources.*** These actions include proactive measures to protect critical infrastructure and resources, which involves the management, control, and protection of infrastructure, as well as the protection and control of essential systems and materials that contribute directly to the economic health of the region. Many joint force actions in this category (e.g., designation of off-limit areas and perimeter security) also fall under area and border security, which is detailed in the next section. In addition, the growing need to protect space and cyberspace infrastructures will be a grave concern for future security activities.

All security activities relying on cyberspace for execution will be at risk should the joint force be denied use of the domain, either intentionally by adversary design or unintentionally through manmade or natural

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[68] *Disarmament* is the collection, documentation, control, and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons of former insurgents and the population. *Demobilization* is the process of transitioning a conflict or wartime military establishment and defense-based civilian economy to a peacetime configuration while maintaining national security and economic vitality. *Reintegration* is the process through which former combatants, belligerents, and displaced civilians receive amnesty, reenter civil society, gain sustainable employment, and become contributing members of the local population." U.S. Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations* (Washington: Department of Defense, October 5, 2009), VI-19 and VI-20. (Hereafter cited as JP 3-24.)

causes. The joint force should assume that the domain is always at risk and must understand the implications of a degraded cyberspace environment on security tasks. Accordingly, the joint force must be able to operate in a degraded cyberspace environment and ensure continuity of operations for itself, and – if necessary – host governments. Therefore, a key part of many security activities will involve the development of a cyber protection and management program that monitors networks; conducts information assurance, establishes network defenses such as firewalls and other technological barriers, and provides indications and warnings of potential cyber incidents. This program should also include procedures and training that will permit the execution of mission-essential tasks under conditions of degraded or denied digital support.

Inherent in unified action is the ability to share a common perspective of the areas of instability and hostility, as well as the ability to react quickly and decisively. Cyber threats can cross rapidly between military and civilian networks, and, subsequently, cyber security requires the joint force to coordinate closely with civil and intelligence agencies and departments (e.g., Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, National Security Agency), as well as with private industry to develop reinforcing efforts for threat and vulnerability reduction, deterrence, international engagement, incident response, and resiliency and recovery efforts.[69]

Joint force actions to protect and control space include space support (space lift operations, satellite operations, and reconstitution of space forces); space force enhancement (satellite communications, positioning, navigation, and timing, intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance, missile warning, environmental monitoring), space force application, offensive and defensive space control, and space situational awareness. In the future security environment, the assets within the space domain represent critical infrastructure for both military and civilian purposes. Although the space domain is becoming increasingly congested, it is still a vast expanse with operating areas and orbits that range from hundreds to thousands of miles apart. Identifying the origin, course, and intent of the numerous satellites in orbit is an arduous, but necessary, facet of space situational awareness. The joint force must possess the ability to detect and assign responsibility for attacks and/or accidents in

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[69] James A. Lewis, *Securing Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency: A Report of the CSIS Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency* (accessed June 30, 2010); available from *csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081208_securingcyberspace_44.pdf* , 70; U.S. Strategic Command, *USSTRATCOM Posture Statement 2009*, http://www.stratcom.mil/posture/; White House, *Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and Communication Infrastructure,* (accessed June 30, 2010; available from *www.whitehouse.gov/assets/.../Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf,* iii.

space, which in turn provides a level of deterrence to entities that would cause disruption or harm if there was little threat to being discovered.

Regulation

Regulation aims to reinforce the systems and structures that maintain order. Therefore, regulatory actions will involve high levels of interactions with local actors and stakeholder and generally require higher levels of restraint. Figure JSC-4 provides examples of types of regulation actions.

- ***Provide area and border security.*** These actions will involve providing for safe movement and passages of friendly or neutral populations, as well as protecting key areas across and within each of the domains. Actions may focus on both local area security such as separating certain elements of the population or regional security such as in Operation Northern Watch and Operation Southern Watch, during which multinational air patrols regulated the "no fly" zones in northern and southern Iraq, respectively, from circa 1991-2003. As another example, the role of the U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf since 1989 has been to ensure access to the global commons and the security of the resources that flow through them. Forward deployed forces across the globe also support combat, engagement, and relief and reconstruction, with the ability to arrive quickly on the scene in the crucial early stages of a natural disaster, conflict, or escalating violence.

Regulation
Provide Area and Border Security: Designation of off-limits areas (e.g., barriers, perimeters); establishment and enforcement of checkpoints and curfews; transit control; customs enforcement; port security; perimeter security; explosive hazard elimination; traffic regulation; maintenance of airspace; census procedures; elimination of explosive hazards; removal of chemical, biological, radioactive, and nuclear threats
Support Civil Order and the Rule of Law: Policing; detainee operations; court/counsel creation; case filing; arraignment; trial and adjudication procedures; conducting investigations; incarceration; sentencing; dispute mediation; evidence storage

Figure JSC-4 Exemplary Regulation Actions

A key aspect of area and border security will involve controlling and regulating the movement and trafficking of people, equipment, and supplies and will require a constant patrolling and surveillance effort. However,

many threats do not respect borders or sovereignty; therefore, area and border security will often involve establishing regional partnerships and agreements to assist with monitoring, intelligence and information sharing, and interdiction of illicit activities. For example, Joint Task Force North (JTF-N) and Joint Interagency Task Force East (JIATF-E) work closely with federal law enforcement agencies such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to identify and interdict suspected transnational threats within and along the U.S. borders. Such partnerships between military and law enforcement agencies are vital to protecting areas and borders from threats such as terrorism, narco- and human-trafficking, and smuggling of weapons of mass destruction.

- ***Support civil order and the rule of law.*** Joint force support for the establishment and maintenance of civil order is essential to setting conditions for political, economic, social, and humanitarian developments that underpin a safe and secure environment.

Maintaining civil order involves developing a better understanding of the local environment and its security needs through continual surveillance and monitoring. This involves patrolling and policing through a "community policing" model, which focuses on fostering community partnerships to address conditions that give rise to public safety issues.[70] By identifying and approaching problems with integrated solutions, the joint force will be more likely to build trust and legitimacy with the populations. Therefore, patrols should be an integrated, locally focused approach that involves frequent interaction with key local and regional political, economic, and social leaders and authority figures. Achieving this and proving legitimacy of friendly force activities may require that joint force elements be distributed among local populations. Over time, the joint force must evaluate its presence and posture and may look to support indigenous forces as the leading element and "face" on monitoring and patrolling efforts.

Supporting the administration of law and order, especially the establishment of a detention review process, will be vital to facilitating the rule of law and enabling a sustainable, safe, secure environment. Actions involve a combination of military, police, judicial, and penal jurisdictions. Therefore, the joint force will need to closely coordinate and collaborate across a number of jurisdictional seams, from intelligence to legal evidence to detainee operations.

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[70] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing, *Community Policing Defined,* (accessed June 30, 2010); available from http://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/ResourceDetail.aspx?RID=513, 3.

To ensure the joint force can support the maintenance of law and order and the administration of justice, joint force commanders should seek assistance from the Department of Justice and other law enforcement agencies in the form of advisors to provide technical advice, assistance, and on-scene training in functions to include, but not limited to: urban patrolling techniques; detection of concealed weapons and contraband; community engagement techniques and programs; community requests for assistance and crime prevention; and evidence collection and processing.

Information

Information is a security function that undergirds all security activities. In this concept, information actions involve the intentional dissemination of data to affect the perceptions, attitudes and often the behavior of friendly or neutral populations (e.g., international audiences, local populations). Additionally, information actions involve deliberate actions to counter adversary messages, delivery systems and information networks. Intrinsic to all joint force information actions is the need to rapidly and proactively provide truthful information and evidence, since altering perceptions once created is difficult.[71]

Actions -- not words -- are the foundation for successful information actions. To gain traction in the "battle of narratives," target audiences must perceive joint force activities to be legally and culturally responsible and credible. Information actions must also be believable: the joint force must have the ability and resolve to carry out what it discusses in its narrative. Therefore, the joint force must align actions and words to convey a consistent message. Ultimately, information actions cannot only focus on traditional communications activities (e.g., the media, messaging) but must also involve active listening and sustained interaction with relevant audiences and stakeholders.

7. EXAMPLES OF CONCEPT APPLICATION

The joint force will be required to engage in an increasing number of security operations in support of U.S. national interests in the future operating environment. This section of the JSC explores key instances of joint force security operations aimed at establishing, maintaining, and restoring safe and secure environments. To demonstrate the applicability of the security concept model, this section discusses a series of joint force actions that have focused on *prevention* and *de-escalation* in the context of

[71] U.S. Joint Staff, *Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept v2.0*, (Washington: Department of Defense, 2010), 30.

security operations. The prevention example focuses primarily on maritime security activities, whereas the de-escalation example focuses on security activities during a counterinsurgency operation.

Prevention–Focused Security Actions

Under the prevention mode, joint security activities will be primarily characterized by regulation activities that focus on reinforcing the systems and structures that provide order. Activities will resemble many of the current prevention-focused security activities, such as the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP) -- a part of the Africa Partnership Station -- through which the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard monitor and patrol with Sierra Leone's Navy to provide better monitoring and policing of its territorial waters. The actions in support of AMLEP seek to fulfill two objectives -- the *engagement*-focused partnering with a host nation (Sierra Leone) and the *security*-focused monitoring and policing of territorial waters to maintain a safe and secure environment in that area.

Under the prevention framework, the joint force will also conduct persistent monitoring and surveillance with maritime partners to provide a clear domain awareness (e.g., movement of vessels and craft, as well as the cargo, crews and passengers that travel in them) to respond quickly and appropriately to unfolding disruptions and threats. Moreover, the joint force will monitor and develop maritime domain awareness through a network of maritime partnerships and regional networks with foreign navies and coast guards, national, international, and private sector partners.

On a day-to-day basis, the U.S. military will also continue to deter threats by maintaining presence in a number of places across the globe. The joint force will continue to operate in the maritime domain in regions such as the Persian Gulf, the Horn of Africa, and the Taiwan Straits to provide a security presence in the global commons and to be prepared to conduct security activities on land, if required. Combined with other civilian and military efforts, these forces will represent an integral part of a comprehensive cooperative security effort to reassure allies, dissuade potential adversaries, and maintain regional stability. The presence of forces offshore will also minimize the "antibody effect" of awakening nationalist or anti-U.S. sentiments that can occur when U.S. forces are based on land.

To mitigate crises and threats, the joint force will also conduct episodic interventional action to intercept violent and illicit actors and networks. Therefore, even when the joint force is in a prevention posture, it will conduct periodic escalatory activities to include anti-piracy operations,

pursuing groups that breach exclusive economic zones, and conducting pursuits of suspicious vessels.

When pursuing violent and illicit actors, the joint force may lack the organic authorities to conduct law enforcement maritime interdictions and will operate in combination with other entities to leverage their capabilities and authorities. In these cases, the joint force will partner with host government forces or other law enforcement organizations, such as the U.S. Coast Guard. For example, under Title 14 of the U.S. Code, the U.S. Coast Guard is a federal law enforcement agency with the legal authorities to conduct inquiries, inspections, searches, seizures and arrests.[72] In many cases, partnering with the U.S. Coast Guard provides a complementary capability to other maritime Services by combining law enforcement capabilities with traditional military responses. Additionally, if a maritime security incident occurs within the jurisdiction of U.S. domestic law, under Title 14, the U.S. Coast Guard is not subject to *Posse Comitatus* limitations.

De-Escalation-Focused Security Activities

Security activities will continue to be critical components of counterinsurgency campaigns. Joint force de-escalation efforts will focus on dampening violence and lawlessness (intervention) and provide or restore order (regulation). Each situation is unique and must be evaluated on its merits since the initial response is crucial to setting the tone for the security effort. If an insurgency is well advanced and adversary forces are massing to attack the population or government, a concerted application of force will likely be required as part of the response.

In general, the host government or indigenous forces should be the preferred lead within a counterinsurgency, but the joint force may be required to intervene in a significant manner to prevent defeat of the host government if its forces are too weak or small to combat the threat. The joint force may be required to devote a large contingent to security activities. At the same time, an effective counterinsurgency campaign will require that the joint force be prepared to shift among all CCJO activities, as security, relief and reconstruction, and engagement are all vital aspects to any counterinsurgency campaign. At times, the same unit may be required to accomplish more than one of the activities simultaneously and may operate from a distributed posture. In this context, security serves as the necessary enabler to the other activities.

Population security is a central focus in counterinsurgency, since the population will ultimately decide whether to back the insurgency or the government and because insurgents hide among and draw support (willing

[72]United States Code Title 14, section 89.

or unwillingly) from the population. Population security involves active measures to protect civilians, identify adversaries and deny them access to the population, key resources and safe havens. Initial measures may be highly restrictive to protect the population and isolate the insurgents and their safe havens. Movement control actions include: establishing and enforcing checkpoints and curfews; separating and/or registering certain elements of the population; setting up barriers such as fences, walls, and other perimeters; and other measures to regulate the flow of people and resources and access to areas and infrastructure. Other regulation actions will focus on re-establishing and maintaining public order to counter subversive elements in their nascent stages. The establishment and maintenance of civil order will be essential to setting conditions for further political, economic, social, and humanitarian developments.

Intervention actions such as raids that are focused on intercepting and neutralizing violent actors will provide the necessary means to quickly dampen violence levels and protect populations from intimidation and threats, but accurate intelligence will be essential for successful intervention. The joint force will monitor and patrol not only to protect the population and deny resources to the insurgency but also to gain greater awareness and understanding of the political, economic, and psychological dimensions of the conflict. They will also gain human intelligence that is essential to identifying insurgents who blend into the population. Therefore, patrols should be an integrated, district-focused approach that involves frequent interaction with key local and regional political, economic, and social leaders and authority figures. Over time, the joint force must evaluate its presence and posture and may look to support indigenous forces to be the leading face of monitoring and patrolling efforts.

Joint security forces may also need to help close a “law and order gap” by supporting the administration of law and order through actions such as: court/counsel creation, case filing, arraignment, trial and adjudication procedures, conducting investigations, property disposition, incarceration, sentencing, dispute mediation, and evidence storage. Ensuring law and order in a post-combat environment must become a core competency of the joint force, as it is essential for the overall strategic success of the mission.

8. SECURITY PRECEPTS

The following precepts provide guiding instructions and fundamentals for planning and conducting security activities.

- ***Achieve unity of effort by conducting security planning and activities with partners so as to enhance the effectiveness of security activities.*** The CCJO states that the joint force must achieve and maintain unity of effort within the joint force, as well as between the U.S. Government, international and other partners.[73] Building on the CCJO, the JSC recognizes that the variety of conditions and environments under which the joint force will conduct security activities requires the U.S. Government and international partners to work closely together in task forces and coalitions. Conducting security activities in the face of hybrid threats that cross multiple domains and jurisdictions will require the joint force to develop and sustain a variety of partnerships. For example, U.S. Africa Command's Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara (OEF-TS) provides security-focused military support to the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) program, which is a Department of State-led interagency initiative.[74] Private security contractors are another type of security-focused partnerships that will likely increase in the future and the joint force will need to have the mechanisms to properly integrate and regulate them. All security partnerships should aim to enable relevant prioritization of joint force and partner activities, information sharing, unity of purpose and unity of effort. Planning and coordinating as part of a comprehensive government security effort will ensure that the joint force enables -- rather than detracts from -- achieving larger security objectives.

- ***Develop multidomain, multiagency understanding and situational awareness.*** The prevention and de-escalation framework will require a clear understanding of each situation on its own terms, within the unique political and strategic context.[75] Accordingly, security activities will require a comprehensive understanding of potential adversaries, as well as the political, economic, and social activities that impact the security environment. Future security activities will require a multidomain and multiagency understanding at a systemic and local level. At the systemic level, the joint force must develop an integrated understanding that provides the contextual framework of the security space (e.g., cultural, regional, historical aspects, interconnections with other systems). At the local level, the joint force must understand the immediate security threats, challenges, and opportunities that will impact its efforts. Given the complexities of the future operating environment, joint force situational assessments will require robust intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) support to conduct the requisite intelligence preparation of the environment (IPE). In order to optimize the IPE involved with security activities, joint force situational assessments must also

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[73] *CCJO,* 21-22.

[74] *Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara -- Program Overview,* (accessed June 30, 2010); available from http://www.africom.mil/oef-ts.asp.

[75] *CCJO*, 12.

integrate information and intelligence from multiple domains and agencies. Together multidomain and cross-institutional assessments will enable the joint force to understand the systemic and subtle changes that continually take place and develop appropriate, effective, focused, and comprehensive responses.

- ***Balance application and emphasis of intervention, regulation and information actions in support of security activities.*** The CCJO posits that the joint force must "combine joint capabilities to maximize complementary rather than merely additive effects."[76] Accordingly, the emphasis on intervention and regulation actions must be balanced and complementary to achieve a viable and sustainable security environment. For example, if there are more arrests of criminals than the system can safely detain, adjudicate, prosecute, and imprison, then the intervention and regulation actions are not working in a complementary and coherent manner. This is because the emphasis on the removal of threats outweighs the ability to reinforce those systems and structures that help provide order. A thorough understanding of evolving security challenges and threats must guide the combination and application of the two approaches.

Information actions that explain the joint force's intent and actions should complement and reinforce all joint security actions. Information actions should be guided by an adaptive, decentralized process that seeks to understand selected audiences and factor their perceptions into operations at every level. Information actions also must be integrated with planning of all security actions -- from the beginning to the end of a security effort -- to consider the potential communication impacts of both interventional and regulatory actions and their likely impact on the perceptions of key audiences and stakeholders.

- ***Emphasize legitimacy of joint force security activities through incorporation of appropriate ruling frameworks (local; national; international) into operational planning.*** The joint force will often conduct security activities under a variety of legal frameworks that govern, and often limit, its actions. From the onset of security activities, the joint force must understand how to work across the seams of overlapping (and often conflicting) authorities. In some instances, the joint force must learn and apply local laws and customs. What works in an American legal system may not translate in foreign environments. Addressing the legal authorities will not be solely a military activity; rather, it will require a concentrated collaborative effort with participation from multijurisdictional agencies (e.g., intelligence, law enforcement professionals, linguists, forensic specialists). This network of organizations and agencies must work collaboratively with a shared understanding throughout the conduct

[76] Ibid, 24.

of security activities. Moreover, security activities must resonate with and be culturally legitimate in the eyes of the local populace. This will involve the moral and social judgments made by the groups of people affected by joint force security activities.

- ***Enable flexibility and adaptability through decentralized action.*** Drawing on the CCJO, which advocates driving "synergy to the lowest echelon at which it can be managed effectively,"[77] the joint force should plan security activities that empower decision making and freedom of action at the lowest practical level to protect the relevant populations, territories and resources. In urban environments, security activities can only enhance safety and stability through responsiveness to the daily dynamics of the population. In international waters and airspace, the dynamics of the environment demand real time decisions. In space and cyberspace, security activities often need to respond at machine -- not human -- speeds. Consequently, security activities will require a responsive command and control structure reliant on mission type orders. This decentralized structure should streamline reporting chains and push assets and authorities down to smaller units and junior officers.[78] The delegation of the authorities to the lowest level possible promotes creativity and improvisation, as needed, to respond to threats, challenges, and opportunities in real time. A decentralized command and control structure will also be coordinated and kept intact by leveraging communication technologies that link and connect the joint force to ensure coordinated action.

- ***Incorporate a continual assessment and feedback process into all security activities.*** The joint force will continue to conduct security activities in dynamic environments, characterized by constantly changing conditions requiring continuous assessment and adaptation. Consequently, security activities require a continual assessment and feedback process that enable adaptation to the situation at hand. One type of assessment involves discovery learning, lessons learned, or learning by doing, and then adapting tactics and techniques. Because security is a building block for parallel activities, it will also require a continual exploration of the relationship between the tactical execution and the strategic logic and context. This exploration or reframing will be accomplished through operational design, which will help identify when

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[77] *CCJO,* 25-26.

[78] David H. Petraeus, *Commander's Counter-Insurgency Guidance* (accessed June 30, 2010; available from http://www.centcom.mil/en/commanders-mnf-i-archive.html; U.S. Strategic Command, *STRATCOM Posture Statement 2009* (accessed June 30, 2010); available from http://www.stratcom.mil/posture/.

strategic conditions change, and, subsequently, when the joint force must transform the scope and scale of its security activities.[79]

9. IMPLICATIONS OF ADOPTING THE JOINT SECURITY CONCEPT

Adopting this concept for joint combat has implications for how the Services organize, man, equip and train their forces. Some implications are already being implemented and require only continued emphasis. Some require little or no additional analysis and should be implemented immediately, while others will need to be explored, validated, and refined through further experimentation, analysis, and operational experience before being institutionalized into the joint force.

- ***Update joint doctrine to reflect the new security definition and functions.*** The Joint Security Concept defines security activities as the protection and control or people, territories and resources. This definition expands on the current doctrinal definition of security and the security definition outlined in the CCJO. Understanding how the JSC definition builds on or changes the current doctrinal definition and mindset toward security activities is an area for further experimentation and exploration. Similarly, further study and experimentation of the intervention and regulation functions and how they interrelate may provide new insights into how to refine doctrine, education, and training.

- ***Develop specialized security-focused training for both dedicated security specialists and the broader joint force.*** The Joint Security Concept emphasizes the increased requirement for joint force security activities in the future operating environment; these activities will demand broader security-focused training in joint force development. Although many security activities fall into traditional military tasks (e.g., raids, assaults, interdictions), some security activities also encompass non-traditional military tasks, especially many regulation actions that often involve joint force support for enforcement and administration of the civil order and the rule of law. As a result, joint force training must incorporate many of the distinctive aspects of non-traditional security activities. How the joint force administers specialized security training to both components of the joint force dedicated to security operations and activities (e.g., civil affairs units) and to the broader joint force will require additional study and experimentation.

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[79] Shimon Naveh, Jim Schneider, and Tim Challans, *Prolegomena to the Structure of Operational Revolution*, (Washington: Booz Allen Hamilton, 2009), 82-84.

In some situations, in addition to actively conducting security activities, the joint force must also conduct security-focused training and assistance to enable a viable transition to interim or host government security institutions. Accordingly, the joint force must also develop specialized capabilities to "train the trainers" and build a strong cadre of trainers and advisors for security-focused activities.

- ***Develop joint force leaders with exposure to and an understanding of foreign languages and cultures and who are able to apply innovative approaches to planning and implementing security activities.*** The Joint Security Concept describes a complex future operating environment wherein security activities will require multidimensional situational awareness. Security-focused operational planning must consider the psychological adjustment between combat and security, which will require more than simply applying new tactics, techniques, and procedures. Joint force leaders must be able to operate and make decisions in complex and ambiguous situations where the threshold between security and combat are not always clear, or where combat activities do not necessarily dominate, or where the joint force may be in a supporting role. Moreover, the joint force must have an appreciation for language and culture, as the success of security activities will frequently hinge on acceptance by the populace and their perceptions of its activities. Therefore, joint professional military education institutions should enhance language and cultural studies as well as creative thinking in their curricula.

The joint force should also explore alternative and innovative methods to develop security-focused skills and aptitudes. For example, the joint force could offer fellowships at law enforcement academies and agencies to immerse members of the joint force into the cultures and capabilities of prospective partners in security activities. Additionally, courses designed for a combination of military personnel, diplomats, developmental specialists, and legal and judicial professionals could facilitate and expedite application of the comprehensive approach from the outset of the design and planning process. The U.S. military could also combine cultural, language, and area studies at non-DOD institutions such as the Department of State's Foreign Service Institute, offering additional exposure to other agencies' mindsets and organizational cultures. Further, to prepare military leaders and other key personnel for deployments, professional military education institutions could conduct targeted language and cultural familiarization courses, on short notice, if necessary.

- ***Restructure personnel management of the joint force.*** The Joint Security Concept posits that the frequency of joint force security activities will increase, and will therefore require a balanced approach to force management so that key security-focused skills will be available when

necessary. Personnel management systems must improve the documentation and management of security-focused competencies within the Active and Reserve Components, so that the joint force commanders can readily access and employ the right personnel with the right skills at the right time. This is especially true for the Reserve Components, where many specialized civilian skills reside.

- ***Develop non-lethal capabilities required to conduct regulatory-security activities.*** The Joint Security Concept seeks to describe the delicate balance that will be required of joint force security activities to create and maintain safe and secure environments. Many security activities, especially regulatory-focused activities associated with supporting the restoration of civil order and administration of the rule of law, require capabilities to defuse violence and lawlessness through non-lethal means. Specialized munitions and other capabilities munitions (e.g., taser guns, heat-wave guns) are required for crowd control and dispersion, especially in densely populated urban environment. To monitor and protect large groups of people, the joint force also requires materials and technology that enable the processing and verification of large groups of people (e.g., biometric technology, census tools). Some security tasks require the logistical infrastructure to shelter, transport, and often incarcerate large groups of people.

Future security activities will also require modular, deployable units that can "plug and play" in theater to provide immediate support for security activities. A rapidly deployable criminal investigative unit with forensic capabilities is one example. These deployable units should be multifaceted and self-contained with representation from service intelligence agencies, criminal investigation divisions, government and contracted law enforcement professionals, linguists, and forensic specialists. These deployable units could also deliver in theater training to joint, coalition, and host government forces, as well as assess and disseminate real-time lessons learned in the field.[80]

- ***Establish processes, procedures and technological capabilities that facilitate operating across multijurisdictional boundaries.*** As described in the Joint Security concept, joint force security activities require national and international understanding and situational awareness to enable unified action and integrated responses. The development of joint force regional and operational assessments must overcome legacy organizational seams and divisions. Accordingly, the joint force requires processes, procedures, and standards that facilitate multijurisdictional, cross-agency information and intelligence collection,

[80] J.M. Manson, *Joint Prosecution and Exploitation Center* (accessed June 30, 2010);available from http://info.publicintelligence.net/170.pdf

analysis, production, and dissemination. Key participants in integrated military-civilian assessments should include DOD, the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Department of Justice. During conflicts and operations, integrated teams should also be embedded with units in the field to collect data and intelligence from all activities on the ground (e.g., civil affairs, provincial reconstruction teams, and government and security forces).[81]

The joint force should store and frequently update written assessments in a central repository, accessible by participating organizations, as well as coalition and partner forces, as necessary. Joint force information systems must be able to transfer data among partner military, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies (e.g., similar to the NIPRNET/SIPRNET infrastructure within DOD). This data sharing requires easing restrictions concerning the sharing of information with interagency partners, multinational partners, and nongovernmental organizations.

- ***Develop and institutionalize training and planning mechanisms for information actions.*** The JSC emphasizes that information will be a critical function for joint force security activities. To optimize information actions for population-focused security activities, the joint force must possess the requisite training and have sufficient planning mechanisms that will allow it to conceive and formulate timely and culturally attuned messages, quickly produce and deliver information designed to influence selected audiences as desired -- ensuring that joint force actions and messages are in concert with one another to build confidence and trust with the local population(s). The joint force must possess adequate processes and procedures to collect, analyze, disseminate, and share information on key stakeholders and target audiences, as well as to assess the perceptions of joint force security activities on target audiences.

- ***Update processes and procedures that address the management, coordination, oversight, and regulation of private security contractors.*** Private security contractors (PSCs) can provide flexibility and surge capacity for security activities -- especially where unanticipated U.S. Government capacity gaps may exist. For example, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the joint force and other U.S. Government entities increasingly used private contractors to provide vital security services, such as protecting government officials and property. By 2007, approximately 30,000 PSCs were providing services in Iraq, primarily for the Departments of Defense and State and the U.S. Agency for

[81] For a detailed discussion on integrated military-civilian information and intelligence teams see Michael T. Flynn, *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan* (U.S. Army, January 5, 2010); (accessed June 30, 2010) available from http://www.cnas.org/node/3924.

International Development.[82] Despite this critical augmentation of joint force actions, joint force commanders do not exercise command and control over PSCs. To ensure joint force operations adequately support U.S. security objectives, joint force commanders should be better enabled to coordinate and secure cooperation with contractors.[83] Predeployment training on the operating procedures of private security contractors may help promote better understanding of and coordination with PSCs. DOD should review PSC contracting procedures to assess the viability of crafting contracts that can be amended during an operation to better allocate and focus PSC efforts. [84] If the trend for contracting private security firms continues, DOD must also provide adequate contracting oversight personnel (e.g., contracting officer's representatives), who are responsible for supervising the contracted work. Improved management and oversight will not only benefit day-to-day interactions between the military and PSCs, but also help reduce behavior that could potentially alienate the same population the military is trying to cultivate.

- ***Develop cyberspace capabilities and capacity to ensure the joint force freedom of action in planning, managing, and executing security activities.*** In the future operating environment, the joint force must possess a combination of offensive and defensive cyber capabilities that secure information systems, reduce potential vulnerabilities, protect against intrusion attempts, provide robust identification and verification measures, and anticipate future threats.[85] In addition to technological capabilities, information sharing for situational awareness is critical to cyber security efforts, as it develops understanding of vulnerabilities, attack methods, and emerging trends. Cyber security efforts require organizational processes and procedures that enable extensive coordination and integration across the interagency community, as well as with international partners. Coordination process should include the establishment of rules of engagement in response to cyber incidents (e.g., technical standards, legal norms, sovereign responsibility, the use of force), and guidelines and standards for transparency and information sharing.[86]

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[82] Sarah K. Cotton, Ulrich Petersohn, Molly Dunigan, Q Burkhar, Megan Zander-Cotugno, Edward O'Connell, Michael Webber, *Hired Guns: View About Armed Contractors in Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010), xi.

[83] Jennifer K. Elsea, *Moshe Schwartz, Kennon H. Nakamura, Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues* (accessed June 30, 2010); available from www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32419.pdf, 38.

[84] In December 2007, the Department of State and Department of Defense signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to jointly develop, implement, and follow core standards, policies, and procedures for the accountability, oversight, and discipline of PSCs. This implication looks to build on this MOA.

[85] U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Cybersecurity: Progress Made but Challenges Remain in Defining and Coordinating the Comprehensive National Initiative*, (accessed June 30, 2010); available from www.gao.gov/new.items/d10338.pdf, 4.

[86] Ibid, 40-42.

10. RISKS OF ADOPTING THE JOINT SECURITY CONCEPT

- ***Increased emphasis on security could dilute proficiency in other military competencies.*** Although security will be a predominant activity in the future operating environment, there is a risk that the increased emphasis on security and additional training requirements could dilute the joint force proficiency in the other three military activities: combat, relief and reconstruction, and engagement. Future joint operations will require versatile units and adaptive commanders whose education and training reflects a balance among combat, security, relief and reconstruction, and engagement. One way to mitigate this risk is to balance education and training between the four military activities to produce and sustain proficiency in all of them. Intrinsically, combat forces possess many of the skills required for security activities. In much the same way, many combat support and combat service support units are well-suited to undertake relief and reconstruction activities. Therefore, where applicable, joint force training should focus on developing transferable skills that overlap among combat, security, relief and reconstruction, and engagement activities. Therefore, the Joint Staff, Services, and Combatant Commanders must periodically review the mix of general and special purpose forces that need to be manned, trained, and equipped to conduct security activities. This review must be a comprehensive effort, balancing security needs against the other joint activities of combat, engagement, and relief and reconstruction.

- ***Increased emphasis on joint security activities could impede the development and maturation of complementary U.S. civilian institutions capable of conducting these activities.*** The future operating environment presents increasing potential for rising violence, criminality, and lawlessness across all domains -- complicating and expanding the security calculus. The joint force's increasing role in security activities could potentially detract from U.S. whole of government efforts to develop sufficient deployable civilian capacity such as the Department of State's Civilian Response Corps. Potential mitigation efforts should focus on identifying collaborative mechanisms to ensure key institutions -- especially within the Departments of State and Justice and the U.S. Agency for International Development -- receive the necessary support to assume increasing roles in security efforts. A potential model for such collaborative mechanisms is the "shared responsibility pooled resources" initiative between the State Department and DOD, which creates structural mechanisms to combine financial resources and jointly prioritize and conduct Security Sector Assistance initiatives.

- ***The breadth and scope of joint security activities could stress and exhaust the DOD -- and the national -- budget.*** The financial cost of conducting security activities during peacetime, crises, and conflicts at the local, regional, and global levels could potentially create an untenable financial burden for DOD. In times of increasing national deficits and shrinking budgets, DOD may not be able to sustain the costs of manning, training, and equipping the joint force for increasing levels of security activities. One way to mitigate this risk is to develop tailored regional partnerships to share in security roles and responsibilities. Allocating adequate and focused funding for joint engagement activities could also mitigate the often higher financial costs of providing security.

11. JOINT SECURITY AND THE OTHER CONCEPTS

Like combat, security activities both benefit from and facilitate the other activities. A primary purpose of security activities is to provide the conditions that allow the conduct of engagement, relief and reconstruction, and essential combat support and sustainment activities to occur. Moreover, security activities not only support the defeat of armed enemies through combat, but may also contribute directly to that defeat, especially during counterinsurgencies that revolve around the allegiance of the population by physically isolating the enemy from that population, preventing enemy intimidation and denying the enemy access to critical human and material resources.

Because they use many of the same basic capabilities and military success typically will require a smooth and rapid transition from one to another, a special tension exists between combat and security activities. As the CCJO points out, despite their commonalities, these two activities proceed from fundamentally different premises. Combat seeks to defeat organized opposition, while security protects and controls populations. Combat favors the aggressive application of overwhelming combat power, while security urges restraint in the use of force. Finally, combat favors surprise and speed of action, while security favors patience, predictability and persistent presence. These contrasts are by no means limited to land combat, but apply equally to maritime, air, and space operations ranging from anti-piracy activities to civil airspace control.

This tension produces practical complications. The reliance of combat and security activities on similar capabilities can produce competition for scarce resources when a joint force must conduct both activities concurrently, which often will be the case. Units and personnel recently engaged in intense combat can have difficulty transitioning to a

security role. Conversely, and more importantly, the tactical skills and habits of combat units relegated to protracted security activities can easily atrophy. The earlier and more carefully planned the transition from combat to security and vice versa, the less operationally troublesome these complications are likely to become.

Security activities likewise often enjoy a close relationship with engagement, especially in missions that require the transition to host-nation security forces. Joint forces often will be required to perform security activities simultaneously with restoring indigenous institutions and organizing, equipping and training indigenous security forces. The transition from conducting security and engagement activities separately to mentoring and partnering in the conduct of multinational security activities to eventually transferring authority to host-nation forces often requires considerable planning and coordination. In situations in which the host-nation forces are well constituted, the transition may be minimal and short. However, in situations in which the joint force initially must provide the preponderance of security activities, the transition may be a lengthy process requiring significant U.S. resources and careful integration.

Finally, security activities enjoy a mutually reinforcing relationship with relief and reconstruction. In conflict settings, effective relief and reconstruction usually depends on security activities to create the conditions that allow the relief and reconstruction to take place. This is especially important in counterinsurgencies in which relief and reconstruction activities are designed to gain popular support by improving quality of life and therefore are likely to become primary targets of insurgent attacks. At the same time, however, security activities can rely on relief and reconstruction. Not only do relief and reconstruction activities improve the physical infrastructure that facilitates joint security activities, but they also can gain popular compliance and allegiance by improving quality of life, thereby significantly easing the security challenge.

12. CONCLUSION TO THE JOINT SECURITY CONCEPT

Joint force security activities provide protection of populations, territories, and resources relevant to U.S. national interests across multiple domains. This protection seeks to create or maintain a broader condition of security and stability on a local, regional, or global scale. By applying the prevention and de-escalation frameworks, joint force security activities enable the mitigation of threats before they become larger security concerns and the reduction of violence and lawlessness after an untenable deterioration of stability. Each security effort requires a unique combination of interventional and regulatory actions, which respectively

aim to reduce violence or its manifestations and to establish and maintain order.

As many security threats and challenges continue to cross military and civilian jurisdictions and areas of responsibility, the need for closer collaboration and a comprehensive approach with participation from U.S. Government civilian agencies and departments, NGOs, international partners, and the private sector is imperative. Therefore, critical to all security activities is the joint force's establishment of a robust multidomain and multiagency understanding of the political, military, economic, and social impacts that will influence the conduct and evolution of joint security activities. Additionally, this concept offers an initial assessment of the implications and risks associated with joint force security activities. The combination of the total set of capabilities brought by the joint force when partnered with the civilian capabilities of the U.S. Government and its non-state and foreign partners offers the best tool set to advance U.S. security policies in the modern local, regional, and global environments.

The potential for increasing violence and lawlessness in the future operating environment will likely increase the frequency and intensity of joint security activities. As threats to the safety and security of vital U.S. national interests emerge and evolve, so too must the joint force become the vanguard of sophisticated security activities. These activities must not only contribute to the accomplishment of joint operations, but also help maintain military and strategic superiority over adversaries. Accordingly, the joint force must develop the necessary plans and capabilities that integrate the security requirements of the future operating environment.

Part III

Joint Engagement Concept

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1. INTRODUCTION TO THE JOINT ENGAGEMENT CONCEPT

The *Joint Engagement Concept* (JEC) is a vision for how the future joint force will conduct engagement activities in a wide variety of combat and non-combat conditions. The JEC describes engagement within the framework laid out in the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (CCJO), which describes engagement as activities that "seek to improve the capabilities of or cooperation with allies and other partners." The JEC goes beyond the CCJO by including adversaries as a type of actor, distinct from partners, with which the joint force might engage to alter or mitigate the adversarial status of the relationship.

This concept describes the fundamental challenge of how to meet the increasing need for engagement[87] as the emerging operating environment complicates the ability of the joint force to do so.[88] It proposes that the joint force integrate and leverage a full range of relevant capabilities as part of a comprehensive approach[89] to confer and coordinate, exercise, train and advise, and equip various actors. By applying the appropriate combination of these four functions as dictated by the situation, the joint force will establish and manage relationships

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[87] The existing doctrinal definition of military engagement is "Routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation's armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence." This concept will provide a broader treatment of the military activity of engagement, building on its treatment in the *CCJO*, to include building partner capabilities and capacity as well as altering the behavior or status of an adversary. The elements of the existing definition for military engagement will receive treatment in this concept, particularly the requirements to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence through engagement with a variety of actors. JP 1-02.

[88] The future engagement envisioned in this concept includes but extends significantly beyond direct and indirect support activities approved under authorities emanating from civilian decision makers, including, but not limited to, Security Assistance (SA), which is a subset of Security Cooperation (SC); Security Force Assistance (SFA); Foreign Internal Defense (FID); Building Partnerships (BP); and Building Partner Capacity (BPC). For example, security cooperation is defined as engagement with foreign defense establishments. This concept, however, includes engagement with: nonmilitary security forces; other elements of host governments at all levels from national to provincial to local; indigenous forces or entities or individuals that are not part of any security force, such as village elders, nongovernmental leaders, religious leaders, tribal leaders, and informal localized militias; and nontraditional alliances other than the NATO coalition model, such as multinational gatherings of tribes, clerics or other non-state actors.

[89] Comprehensive approach is defined as "An approach that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the U>S. Government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal." U.S. Army, *Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations* (Washington: Department of the Army, 2008). (Hereafter cited as FM 3-07.)

based on trust to secure mutual interests for the United States, partners, and other actors with whom the joint force engages, including its adversaries under certain conditions.

This concept will also present precepts that must guide the joint force in conducting engagement, as well as implications that engagement will pose for how the Services organize, staff, equip, and train U.S. forces and risks that may come with implementing this concept. The joint force will require greater adaptability and versatility, as well as more flexible resources and authorities to cope with the uncertainty and complexity of the future operating environment.

2. THE NATURE OF ENGAGEMENT

Joint force engagement activities seek to improve cooperation with allied and other partners; build or improve a partner's capability; and/or change the behavior or status of an adversary through means other than combat.[90] The scope and nature of joint force engagement will vary widely depending on the situation and the interests of the other actors. These actors may include another government's security forces, foreign civilian authorities, non-state actors, local populations, and other organizations.[91]

The joint force conducts engagement activities before, during and after combat operations to assist another government's security needs, or, when requested as a complement to broader diplomatic or economic

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[90] This concept follows the construct for the purposes of engagement introduced in the *CCJO* to include improving cooperation and to build partner capabilities and capacity, as well as the idea included in the existing doctrinal definition of military engagement about building trust and confidence. This concept, however, takes a broader view of engagement and proposes that cooperation between, and efforts to build trust and confidence with adversaries are conceptually distinct enough so as to warrant separate treatment from cooperation with, and efforts to build trust and confidence with partners.

[91] In addition to partners and adversaries, the joint force may engage with actors that are officially declared neutral. In many cases, these actors can influence outcomes in both positive and negative ways. For the purposes of this concept, however, all "neutral" actors will likely engage with the joint force through a process similar to that of a partner, or less frequently, an adversary. For example, engagement with many governments, NGOs, and other actors will continue to resemble engagement with partners, including the steps of building trust and identifying mutual interests. This engagement may either occur unofficially in a bilateral manner, or with international governing bodies, such as the European Union, of which the other government may be a member.

engagement in steady state environments.[92] Engagement should benefit all parties involved, but it ultimately benefits the joint force by offering a means to prevent, as much as possible, the need for more costly methods, such as the use of force; to create coordination mechanisms and integrate capabilities with partners in case combat does occur; to share the responsibility for security requirements with other partners; to deter and dissuade adversaries and potential adversaries; to secure access and enhance influence for the joint force and other USG agencies; and to deny access and influence to those opposed to or attempting to undermine the United States and its mission.[93]

Policy decisions and other authorities pertaining to engagement fall under the routine direction of the Department of State (DOS) and other civilian agencies, as well as the Department of Defense (DOD). Joint force engagement typically occurs as part of a broader comprehensive approach that includes other USG agencies and the relevant country teams operating in accordance with the U.S. Mission Strategic Resource Plan. Subject to these authorities, joint force engagement can occur at varying organizational levels, from combatant commands to joint task forces (JTF), and with different authorities and capabilities depending on the level and on the requirements of the relevant elements of the joint force.

Engagement activities can be episodic, but generally are enduring to facilitate the development of trust, familiarity, confidence and shared commitment. Specific engagement efforts end when all parties mutually agree that they have achieved their goals or any party concludes that the specific engagement effort is no longer productive or necessary.[94]

When conducting engagement to improve cooperation, the joint force may interact with partners in formal bilateral and multilateral alliances, ad-hoc coalitions, and other less formal collaborative

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[92] For the purposes of this concept, "steady state" refers to environments that do not change substantially over time, and include the routine employment of force, infrastructure, and agreements as defined in the Global Defense Posture. It may include peacetime and contingency environments.

[93] This definition builds on the one included in the CCJO. The primary addition to the CCJO consideration of engagement is to distinguish between engagement with partners and adversaries. Even though engagement with these two types of actors may at times look similar, it is important to distinguish between the two, as engagement with adversaries requires a different mindset, approach, and understanding than does engagement with partners. This concept also adds to the treatment of engagement in the CCJO in that it recognizes engagement will likely occur with new and varied types of actors; and considers ad-hoc, purpose-built coalitions with new and non-traditional partners to be at least as important and likely in the future as formal alliances. *CCJO*, 16-18.

[94] Ibid. 16.

structures reflecting common interests. The joint force may use these partnerships to address specific issues -- bilateral objectives -- and regional security requirements, or to wage combat against common threats.[95]

The joint force may also conduct engagement to improve all aspects of a partner's security capabilities and capacity to better enable that government to provide for its own security requirements and enhance its ability to contribute to regional security and wider cooperative security endeavors. This may include capability and capacity building at all levels, from tactical to ministerial. In certain conditions, policymakers may request that the joint force assist with building or reestablishing governance and development capacity. This, for example, may occur following a natural disaster, in a combat environment, or where extreme violence prevents civilian agencies from assuming responsibility for these functions.

The joint force may also conduct engagement with adversaries to achieve tactical cooperation, to limit a conflict or the potential for escalation, or to alter the status of the adversarial relationship in a more fundamental way.[96] In the last case, the joint force may engage with elements of an adversary to shatter its coherence by peeling off reconcilable individuals or segments that it can persuade to lay down arms, switch sides, or otherwise contribute to conflict termination.

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[95] The *National Security Strategy 2010* states that the United States will work with strong capable partners to: foster security and reconstruction in the aftermath of conflict; pursue sustainable and responsible security systems in at-risk states; and prevent the emergence of conflict. *National Security Strategy* 2010, 26. (Hereafter cited as *NSS 2010*.)

[96] The use of the word "adversaries" in this concept is not intended to imply that these must be countries or parties with which the United States is at war, or may be at war. Instead, it is intended to refer to actors whose interests differ from those of the United States significantly enough to result in an antagonistic relationship. This concept includes adversaries among the groups with which the joint force might engage, specifically for the purposes of resolving or mitigating conflict, identifying shared interests, and building on those interests in order to pursue a common end. Consideration of engagement with adversaries as well as the use of the word are in line with *NSS 2010,* which describes how the United States will approach its relationship with adversaries. *NSS 2010,* 14, 21, 23, 27, 41, 50.

3. ENGAGEMENT IN THE FUTURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

The 2010 *Joint Operating Environment* (JOE) describes a future operating environment in which several geopolitical trends that will likely contribute to instability will also make engagement increasingly difficult. These include greater competition for influence driven by the rise of new actors, including networked organizations that often result in increased agility; amplified demand for engagement driven by the proliferation of fragile states; the increasingly multidisciplinary nature of many future threats; the increased transparency and flow of information; and financial and economic crises that drive resource constraints.[97]

The rise of new actors in the international system, including potential near-peer competitors and non-state actors, will increase the competition for partnerships and influence around the world. These new actors possess increasing technological capabilities and extended operational reach and presence in land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. The diffusion of power confronts the United States with a difficult task of re-evaluating both what it sees as a threat and an opportunity, and who it views as an adversary and a partner. Furthermore, the joint force will have to recognize when and why other actors view it as a potential partner or potential adversary.

The agile nature of many networked organizations such as violent extremist groups will require the joint force to engage with an increased number of actors in whose territory elements of these networked organizations may be operating. The joint force will therefore need to pursue many and varied forms of engagement to secure access and influence, as well as deny other actors access and influence that could benefit those competitors to the relative disadvantage of the United States.

The proliferation of fragile states and the rise of powerful non-state actors that can fill power vacuums will also increase the difficulty of engagement. The joint force will face increased demand to work with partners to improve their capabilities and capacity to counter internal threats, provide effective governance, and maintain stability. Improving capabilities and capacity will often involve multidisciplinary issues of governance and development in addition to security, and will therefore require the joint force to work with other USG agencies, allied and coalition partners, and other civilian organizations within a comprehensive approach to leverage resources and ensure unity of effort.

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[97] *JOE 2010*, and Tony Judt, *Ill Fares the Land*, (London: The Penguin Press, March 2010).

Given this challenge, the joint force will have to rely on partners and other actors to meet certain security and stability requirements for which they are better suited to address. The United States may have little to no role in some of these operations, and in others, may play a supporting role to other partners leading the operation.

In some instances, as weakened governance becomes more common and non-state actors hostile to U.S. and partner interests proliferate and gain influence, there is an increased possibility that governments may lose control over nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, or the materials and capabilities needed to construct such weapons. The joint force will also have to engage with partners to improve their capacity to safeguard these resources.

The increasingly rapid flow of information will create a much more dynamic and transparent information environment. This environment will present the joint force with many advantages, but together with increased competition for influence, it will also create specific problems for engagement. The solution is not for the joint force to seek less transparency, but to recognize the difficulties and identify ways to mitigate their impact. Pressure to respond to crises may reduce the time for deliberate planning and misperceptions of intent may increase opposition to proposed actions. The support of local populations will likely play a larger role than it has in past conflicts. Adversaries will actively seek to create perceptions that favor their agendas, and will leverage new technologies such as camera phones, satellites and social networking sites to do so. The joint force will have to learn to operate in this environment by making every effort to be timely and accurate in the articulation of its objectives and information about its actions. It will have to work with partners to craft compelling narratives to explain its intentions, counter competing arguments, and ensure that actions match words. In this type of environment, explaining the purpose and progress of its actions to relevant populations will often be as important as the execution of those actions.

The increasing transparency of the globalized information environment and increased accessibility of information may also place increasing strains on partnerships, or create difficulties in reaching cooperative security agreements. Non-state actors, including terrorist and other extremist groups, operate across great distances to plan and execute attacks, requiring the joint force to build new relationships and improve existing ones to monitor, track and disrupt terrorist activities. Furthermore, the joint force may find it difficult to establish or maintain relationships with partner governments that face internal opposition to engagement with the United States. The increased flow, transparency, and accessibility of information will make it easier to learn about

developments in distant parts of the world, and networked organizations will make it easier for opposition groups to organize, mobilize, and coordinate activities with similar groups in other regions of the world. As these groups gain influence, U.S. partners may find themselves increasingly vulnerable to internal pressures that could render the partnership fragile and short-lived.[98] The joint force may have to find new and improved engagement methods to maintain military relationships with traditional allies and ad-hoc partners, as well as support efforts to identify new ways to speak to populations to build support for U.S. partnerships with their respective governments.

Recent financial and economic crises will likely exacerbate longer-term fiscal trends and place a strain on the ability of the joint force to conduct robust and effective engagement. As USG financial resources become more constrained, the joint force's resources may also become more limited, thereby challenging its ability to conduct military activities, including engagement. At the same time, however, engagement will remain the most cost-effective of the military activities.

For all of these reasons, the joint force will face an environment in which it will have to perform a greater variety of engagement activities that also involve a greater number of stakeholders. This will require the joint force to be more adaptive and agile in order to conduct a wide variety of engagement activities and quickly shift between various roles as circumstances dictate.

New constraints on resources will require the joint force to prioritize engagement demands, make deliberate choices, and rely more on partnerships to share responsibility for engagement requirements. Social and macroeconomic realities will determine the capacity of the partner to accept assistance, and therefore will determine how the joint force responds to these demands.

With an increased demand for engagement and increased competition for influence, to effectively meet the requirements of engagement in a timely manner, the joint force will have to tailor its engagement to factors such as the host government's economy and literacy rate, as well as the level of development of its infrastructure.[99]

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[98] For a more in-depth discussion of this topic, see John Mackinlay, *The Insurgent Archipelago* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), p. 7.

[99] By "host government" and "partner government" this concept means not only the central government of a state, but also sub-state provincial, district, and local governments; state and local governments within the United States; transitional authorities, and military governments established by occupying powers under international law; United Nations trusteeships and other forms of government established by intergovernmental organizations; tribal assemblies and other traditional

4. THE CHALLENGE OF ENGAGEMENT FOR THE FUTURE JOINT FORCE

Greater competition for influence, amplified demand for engagement, increased transparency and flow of information, and new resource constraints increase the importance of and need for engagement while also complicating the ability of the joint force to conduct engagement.

5. A CONCEPT FOR FUTURE JOINT ENGAGEMENT

To meet the challenge described above, the joint force must be able to establish and manage formal and ad-hoc cooperative relationships over time for optimal benefit to U.S. and partner interests.[100] The joint force will do this by integrating and leveraging a full range of relevant capabilities to confer and coordinate, exercise, train and advise, and equip various actors to contribute toward a comprehensive approach for engagement.

In most cases, due to the authorities vested in DOS, the U.S. mission in a given country will assume the lead role in establishing the framework for cooperation and support to a partner government. Within the framework of a comprehensive approach, DOD efforts should be informed by DOS and other relevant USG agencies, thereby allowing the joint force and the country team to act in concert according to the U.S. Mission Strategic Resource Plan, as well as the combatant command's Theater Campaign Plan and any other relevant plans derived from these documents.

Given the increased demand for influence and the fiscal constraints in the future operating environment, the joint force will have to prioritize its engagement to first secure vital U.S. interests, including threats of instability that have the potential to destabilize a broader or critical area, and where no ally or regional partner is willing or able to address the threat.[101]

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forms of governance that supplement or substitute for central governance; and "shadow governments" established by insurgent groups or resistance movements.

[100] For the purposes of this concept, "cooperative relationships" refer to those established through engagement with a partner to improve coordination and cooperation, engagement to build partner security capacity, or engagement with an adversary to mitigate or alter its adversarial status.

[101] In planning engagement activities, commanders should reference several high level DOD documents that can assist them in identifying desired end states, priorities, partnerships and other aspects of theater campaigns.

All joint force engagement should reflect a process of design, during which the relevant joint force commander will work with senior and subordinate commanders, as well as country teams to understand the context of U.S. involvement, and visualize and develop engagement solutions. Joint force action must take account of and understand the political context, the objectives, and the limitations that will determine the nature and scope of a cooperative endeavor.[102] Engagement commences with initial contact with the other actor to identify and align shared interests, which may be of a strategic, operational, or tactical nature. The joint force will then support efforts to establish a relationship with the other actor and develop a specific set of activities that will be mutually beneficial. Although formal alliances like NATO will continue and develop, an increasing number of these relationships will be of an ad-hoc nature, and may not include formal mechanisms to institutionalize the relationship.

The joint force and the other actors with which it engages will undertake a variety of actions depending on their defined objectives and needs. Engagement activities will typically include some combination of conferring and coordinating, exercising, training and advising, and equipping, as described in the next section.

6. FUNCTIONS OF JOINT ENGAGEMENT

Joint doctrine identifies six essential joint functions: movement and maneuver, fires, command and control, intelligence, protection and sustainment. To that list, this concept proposes the following four functions that are unique to joint engagement: confer and coordinate, exercise, train and advise, and assist.

Confer and coordinate

Confer and coordinate refers to formal and informal means of bringing partners and other actors together in dialogue, often in smaller groups or on an individual basis. The joint force will confer and coordinate to define shared interests and objectives; establish mechanisms for cooperation; develop and share information,

[102] In some cases, partners may work with the United States on one matter to achieve some other objective. A partner's principal motivation may be to develop or maintain friendly relations with the U.S. Government, or seek specific benefits unrelated to the activity. For example, many partners participated in coalition operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq in part to improve their chances for gaining membership in NATO or secure the favor of the U.S. Government as a measure of confidence given their specific regional security requirements.

perspectives, and common understandings; leverage the niche capabilities of each partner; increase responsibility sharing; establish conditions for joint force access; anticipate future events; and establish the conditions and guidelines that allow for other engagement activities to occur. The joint force may confer and coordinate in steady state environments, and before, during and after combat operations.

DOS will establish formal frameworks and ad-hoc relationships with partners and other actors that will provide general strategic guidance that the Combatant Commander and other joint force commanders will follow in designing specific engagement strategies. Similarly, the joint force may confer and coordinate on a more spontaneous basis through interactions with partner security force personnel whenever the two parties come together to pursue any common activity.

To address the challenge of increased competition for influence in the future operating environment, the joint force will have to confer and coordinate with partners and other actors as part of a more concerted effort to explain how their interests align with those of the United States, how they would benefit from establishing a cooperative relationship with the joint force, and why they should work with the United States to maintain that relationship over time. This final element will require sustained efforts by the joint force and other USG agencies to ensure the engagement is meeting the requirements of the other parties involved, and not just those of the United States.

Also given the increased competition for influence, and in particular the rise of new actors and the agility of networked organizations in the future operating environment, the joint force may find itself conferring and coordinating with a number of partners and other actors with which it has not traditionally engaged, but that are nevertheless operating within the same territory. This type of actor includes NGOs, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and various sub-state actors. The joint force may confer and coordinate with these actors to deconflict operations, accommodate their requirements, and otherwise meet common ends. Joint force personnel may also confer and coordinate with political, tribal and religious leaders, as well as with other segments of populations they encounter within the territory of the partner government. To engage with these nontraditional elements, the joint force must work closely with DOS, including the relevant country team, as well as other USG agencies to address issues beyond those of a strictly military nature.

The increased flow and transparency of information in the future operating environment will also require the joint force to confer with

broader populations, including coalition members, other partners, and adversaries. It will confer in this way primarily through the media to convey a narrative that explains its actions and to build legitimacy for its involvement with the respective host government.

Exercise

Exercises bring partners together in a military maneuver or simulation to practice and rehearse planning, preparation, and execution requirements. Exercises serve as a means to improve and sustain the training, readiness and operational expertise of the joint force; identify partner and joint force strengths and the most effective way to leverage these strengths as part of a coalition; and improve interoperability and coordination between the joint force and its partners in the event they are required to work together. Exercises often occur in steady state environments, but may also occur simultaneously with joint force involvement in combat.

With the increased demand for engagement due to the proliferation of weak and failing states,[103] and the increased competition for influence driven by the rise of new actors and the increased flow of information, the joint force will conduct exercises in part for confidence building purposes. These exercises can reassure partners of U.S. commitment to their security and to shared interests. Exercises also allow the joint force and its partners to improve interoperability and leverage niche resources and capabilities as a means of making engagement more effective and cost-efficient given the fiscal constraints of the future operating environment.

Given the proliferation of actors in the future operating environment, the joint force will have to engage in new ways and with new and varied partners. As a result, in addition to gaining mutual familiarity with the other partner's organization, doctrine and operating culture, the joint force will also have to conduct exercises focused on interoperability with increasingly complex systems and capabilities. An example of this is Empire Challenge, the Office of the Secretary of Defense-sponsored and U.S. Joint Forces Command-executed joint/combined demonstration to manage, access and use intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to improve command and control and enhance information sharing and situational understanding.

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[103] The use of the expression "weak and failing states" corresponds to "chronically fragile states" as discussed in the QDR 2010. U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (accessed June 30, 2010); available from www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20of%2029jan10%201600.pdf, p 9. (Hereafter cited as QDR 2010.)

The requirements of the future operating environment, such as addressing weak or failing states, will also require joint force exercises with other USG agencies and their multinational counterparts. One example of this type of exercise is the U.S. European Command-sponsored Austere Challenge, which brings Service components together with other USG agencies and multinational counterparts to plan and execute operations. Likewise, the joint force will increasingly exercise on select operations such as relief operations with non-traditional partners such as NGOs and IGOs. An example of this includes the March 2010 Joint Intermediate Staff Planning Exercise held at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, bringing together joint force and Service elements with other USG agencies and NGOs to address uncertainties of potential joint, interagency and multinational operations.

Train and Advise

The joint force will train and advise partner security forces and institutions to improve their capabilities, capacity, and mission performance. The joint force will train partner security forces in a number of ways. These include programs independent of the provision of equipment or other services to enable partners to undertake specified activities that have a mutual benefit for the partner and the United States; specialized programs to provide instruction on the use and maintenance of equipment provided to the partner; and security assistance programs such as International Military Education and Training (IMET) that provides individual members of partner security forces with U.S.-based training and education opportunities.

The joint force will also advise partner security forces and institutions by detailing U.S. military teams to provide operational guidance to the partner's units, headquarters, and, when requested, ministries involved in ongoing operations in both steady state and combat environments.[104] Advising will involve a process of "learning by doing" that includes both the host government security force and the joint force in a particular mission. An example of how the joint force may model train-and-advise efforts in the future is Southern Partnership Station (SPS) in Colombia. SPS includes routine joint force visits to Colombia to conduct training and advising tasks with regard to law enforcement and infrastructure protection; Colombian leaders have specifically recognized its success in reducing crime in the maritime domain.

[104] Advising does not only occur during conflict, but is just as likely to occur during steady state operations. One example is advising the Ministry of Defense in Macedonia on planning, budgetary, training, human capital, and other reforms.

The potential for greater instability caused by weakened governance and the rise of new actors, particularly violent extremist groups, will increase the requirements for the joint force to train and advise partner security forces to maintain security and stability to prevent the development of threats to the partner government. Training and advising partner security forces will also allow the joint force to build partner security forces that are able and willing to share responsibility for meeting security requirements elsewhere in the world. The joint force may also build the capabilities and capacity of a partner to participate in peacekeeping operations or capability and capacity building operations in which the United States is not a part. Training and advising along these lines will allow the joint force to address the requirements created by fiscal constraints, the increased competition for influence due to the rise of new actors, and the demand for engagement due to weak or failing states.

The requirements of engagement in the future operating environment will require that the joint force be prepared to support other USG departments and agencies in efforts to build partner capabilities and capacity in non-military areas such as counternarcotics, border security, and coastal security. The joint force will have to understand the policy and funding authorities of other USG agencies. However, the current security assistance structure, in which DOS maintains the authorities while DOD maintains the resources, is a remnant of a Cold War environment in which the lines between defense, diplomacy, and development responsibilities were more easily recognized.

In the future, the joint force and other USG agencies may have to work in an environment in which the military and political aspects of a problem are fundamentally interrelated and do not correspond with strictly defined authorities and responsibilities of current security assistance programs. This environment, characterized by increased fluidity and rapid change, may require adjustments to security assistance programs built for the Cold War to make them more flexible and accessible to allow for rapid assistance to foreign militaries, while maintaining civilian control and oversight inherent in the current security assistance structure.[105] One example of how DOD can work

[105] Secretary of Defense Robert Gates suggests one method based on a UK model, in which different agencies would have access to pooled funds, thereby "creating incentives for collaboration between different agencies of the government." Gates outlines five essential points that should apply whatever model is used. These include providing for flexibility and agility; effective mechanisms for Congress to continue its Constitutional oversight role; focus on the long-term to allow for a measure of predictability and planning; continued DOS lead in crafting and conducting security assistance; and understanding and application of modesty and realism in planning and implementation. Robert Gates, "Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S.

with other USG agencies to identify flexible ways to access and use resources and authorities is DOD funding of the Department of Justice to implement training and development programs for law enforcement agencies in regions where DOD has counterterrorism and counternarcotics missions.

Finally, the increased transparency of the information environment will make the joint force's partners more apparent, requiring selectivity and care from the joint force and policymakers in choosing when, where, and how to train and advise partner security forces, as well as an ability to explain the rationale behind such engagement to relevant populations, Congress, and other stakeholders.

Equip

The joint force will equip partners to build their capabilities and capacity through security assistance programs that allow for the provision of equipment and other goods, as well as intellectual capital such as subject matter expertise and lessons learned. Examples of these programs include Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS).[106] The joint force may facilitate the equipping of partners both in steady state or combat environments.

The joint force will consider several aspects of the future operating environment when implementing programs to equip other partners. As with training and advising partner security forces, the increased demand for influence will require more flexible multiyear authorities to enable greater cooperation between DOD and DOS in the timely provision of equipment.[107] The joint force will work with DOS to address the increased demand for engagement to build the capabilities and capacity of weak or failing states. This includes training, manpower, logistics, and providing as required advanced and complex technology and

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Security Assistance," Foreign Affairs (May/June 2010). (accessed June 30, 2010); available from http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66224/robert-m-gates/helping-others-defend-themselves. (Hereafter cited as Gates, "Helping Others Defend Themselves.")

[106] Foreign Military Sales (FMS) is a non-appropriated program through which partner governments can purchase defense articles, services, and training from the U.S. Government to help build national security infrastructures. The Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program provides funding to purchase defense articles and services, design and construction services, and training through FMS or commercial channels to support partners with weak economies that would otherwise be unable to afford U.S. assistance. The International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program contributes to internal and external security of a partner by providing training to its military and related civilian personnel to help partners develop properly functioning, civilian controlled, apolitical military professionals.

[107] Gates, "Helping Others Defend Themselves."

systems from both the joint force and the equipping partners of the United States.

As with training and advising, the joint force may mitigate the impact of fiscal constraints by building partner capabilities and capacity, when directed by civilian authorities, to address challenges elsewhere in the world independent of the joint force.[108] Finally, as with training and advising, as the information environment becomes increasingly transparent, the partners to whom the joint force provides equipment and other supplies will be more apparent to the broader public. This will require that means of engagement correspond with the relevant U.S. Embassy Mission Strategic Resource Plan.

7. EXAMPLES OF CONCEPT APPLICATION

The joint force conducts engagement to build, improve, and sustain partnerships; to build partner security capabilities and capacity; and with an adversary to manage, mitigate, or alter the adversarial nature of the relationship.

The joint force will pursue engagement with a partner or another actor based on guidance from civilian leadership that considers both short- and long-term objectives and prioritizes engagement opportunities. The type of engagement the joint force pursues will depend on the type of partner. The joint force will have to tailor engagement specifically to the partner using an appropriate combination of the functions described in the preceding section. To determine the appropriate mix for each engagement and specific actor, the joint force will require an in-depth understanding of variables like the partner's security requirements and how they complement U.S. security requirements; the specific nature of the relationship with the partner; the level of development of the partner security forces; the status of other partner government entities; the relevant cultural, national, regional and global contextual aspects of the engagement; and the partner's capacity for accepting additional assistance. To determine this capacity, the joint force must understand political and economic factors, infrastructure, level of host government training, ability to maintain equipment, human capacity levels, and other factors. The joint force should use the relevant country team expertise to acquire most of the information it needs to make these assessments.

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[108] This idea moves beyond the current treatment of security force assistance in doctrine (such as JP 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* and JP 3-26 *Counterterrorism*) and will allow the joint force to prioritize its engagement while still ensuring that U.S. partners are able and willing to address conflicts in other areas of the world that the United States cannot address.

Building, Improving and Sustaining Partnerships

The joint force will build, improve and sustain partnerships to improve cooperation and achieve common ends. The joint force may use partnerships with allies, coalition members and other actors to deter aggressors, secure or deny access, conduct combat operations or meet other regional security requirements. Although these partnerships in the past have most often involved formalized frameworks, in the future they will increasingly involve more informal, ad-hoc partnerships outside of formalized alliance structures and mechanisms. All partnerships should optimize use of each other's resources; leverage partner niche capabilities; improve interoperability; and enhance familiarity and trust between the partners.

This type of engagement allows the joint force to meet the future challenge of increased competition for influence by increasing the number of partners the joint force can rely on to approach threats and opportunities by operating effectively as part of a united front. This includes the challenge of addressing agile, networked organizations, which will require the joint force to engage with a greater number of actors -- including all of those with elements of that networked organization operating within its territory. This type of engagement similarly addresses the challenges of increased demand for engagement and resource constraints by working with partners to identify common interests that can be met by partners without U.S. involvement and to build interoperability to streamline use of resources to make engagement more efficient.

With the proliferation of new types of actors in the future operating environment, the joint force may also find itself partnering with new and non-traditional types of actors, including NGOs, IGOs, and sub-state actors such as tribal leaders and district or neighborhood councils. These types of partnerships may also occur on a more episodic basis or in new ways that accommodate respective concerns and requirements. Some of these actors, particularly NGOs looking to maintain the neutrality that allows them to deliver assistance and support to all sides, may wish not to be seen openly working with the joint force. The joint force may want to engage discreetly with these organizations to establish guidelines for coordination to maximize effectiveness without forfeiting the NGO neutral status. The joint force should also recognize that many NGOs and IGOs will not have mutually aligned interests with the joint force, and cooperation may be counterproductive.

The joint force may confer and coordinate with partners to build a formal, structured and deep relationship. The joint force can meet this requirement by establishing protocols for sharing information and

intelligence; synchronizing communications and logistics requirements; and increasing interaction and familiarity through liaison officer exchanges and senior officer visits. The joint force can also gain access and increase its ability to act by supporting relevant USG negotiations to develop Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) and Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA). These agreements provide for access and support when deployed to a partner's territory, and position supplies or personnel in that territory. This access will serve both USG requirements and enhance partner confidence in the United States. The joint force will also support negotiations for treaty agreements, and support implementation by conducting combined monitoring activities with partners.

The joint force will confer and coordinate with partners to identify and leverage those with unique skills and capabilities needed to address particular challenges, and that the joint force does not possess. One example is building or advising a *gendarmerie*, or a uniformed national police force associated with the military. This type of force is relatively common elsewhere in the world, but does not exist in the United States. The joint force may also identify potential partners who enjoy access and influence in specific regions that the United States lacks. The joint force may be able to work with partners to counter a threat, leverage an opportunity, or otherwise shape an outcome in the region.

The joint force will exercise to sustain and improve its training, readiness and operational expertise; identify partner and joint force strengths and weaknesses; and improve interoperability between the joint force and its partners. The joint force may exercise with both multinational and other foreign partners, as well as with other USG agencies and some NGOs and IGOs. In some instances, the joint force may conduct an exercise with both other USG agencies and multinational partners to secure access for other USG agencies. For example, the joint force may expand the scope of Exercise Vigilant Shield, the USNORTHCOM exercise that brings together select local, state, national, and nongovernmental organizations and agencies from the United States and, when appropriate, other countries including Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom to improve emergency response and other homeland defense requirements.

The joint force may also exercise with two neighboring joint force partners who may not have a friendly relationship with each other to improve relations between them. By serving as an intermediary, the joint force contributes to regional security and strengthens multinational partnerships that may be of future use in meeting regional security challenges. One such example is the Cobra Gold exercises conducted with the militaries of Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea and

Japan. The joint force used its close relationship with the Thai military to request that it extend the invitation to develop closer ties between the five countries. By following this model, the joint force can contribute to regional security while broadening regional alliances.

Although the joint force functions of equipping and training and advising are focused primarily on building partner capabilities and capacity, they can also be used in ways to improve and sustain partnerships. For example, there will be security assistance opportunities through IMET and other programs to bring partner and joint force personnel together in education and training environments. This will present an opportunity for more spontaneous engagement between personnel as they confer in a more informal setting as classmates and training partners.

Building Partner Security Capabilities and Capacity

The joint force will engage to build the security capabilities and capacity of partners to provide for their security requirements and contribute to regional and global stability. This allows the joint force to meet the challenges of increased demand for engagement due to weak or failing states and resource constraints driven by the emerging fiscal environment. In many cases, if directed by civilian authorities, the relationship with the partner may evolve from a focus on building the partner's security capabilities and capacity to a longer-term effort to improve the partnership, and possibly improve interoperability.

An example of this type of evolution in a partnership is the U.S. relationship with El Salvador, which began in the 1970s with the provision of U.S. equipment and military advisers to the Salvadoran military for its counterinsurgency efforts. This developed into an enduring relationship that continues with ongoing efforts to further build partner capabilities and capacity, and has also evolved into a broader form of partnership that included Salvadoran participation in Iraq as part of the multinational coalition. While Salvadoran troops provided critical relief and reconstruction support in southern Iraq during its five-year deployment as part of the coalition, the longest of any Latin American country, they also developed a reputation for their security and combat abilities, illustrating the benefits of building partner capabilities and capacity and transitioning these partnerships into longer-term relationships.

Another example is the Georgia Train and Equip Program, which began in 2002 to develop Georgian capabilities and capacity to counter Chechen rebels and other Islamist militants in the Pankisi Gorge. In 2005, this program transitioned into the Georgia Sustainment and

Stability Operations Program to further develop Georgian capabilities and capacity to participate in the multinational coalition in Iraq.

During efforts to build partner capabilities and capacity, the joint force will confer and coordinate mostly to determine the scope of the partnership, identify partner requirements, and establish guidelines for short- and long-term provision of support. These guidelines will include a variety of measures to maintain regular contact with the host government security services. The joint force may also support negotiations to determine the long-term direction of the relationship, particularly through SOFA and basing agreements.

In steady state environments, the joint force will exercise with the partner security force to improve the ability of the joint force and the partner to use and leverage their respective capabilities, including niche capabilities, in a coalition setting. In combat and other crisis environments, however, exercises may be less frequent. Nevertheless, opportunities may exist for the joint force to take elements of the partner security forces out of the conflict zone to exercise in a secure, isolated area that provides the equivalent of a steady state environment. Examples of this are command post exercises held with partner security forces to develop expertise within elements of headquarters leadership to plan, coordinate, synchronize various scenarios and react to a continuous set of changing circumstances.

The joint force will equip partners to help build the latter's capabilities and capacity, using security assistance programs to provide equipment and other specific capabilities when approved by civilian authorities. The joint force will have to tailor any equipment or other material it provides to the specific requirements of the partner and the partner's capacity to accept the assistance. The joint force should work with the relevant country team to make these assessments. Failure to take into account this requirement may result in the joint force providing certain types or levels of support to the host government for which it does not have the knowledge, training, or economic base to support and maintain. Such situations will also likely result in an increased dependency on the joint force and, in extreme cases, can even contribute to the eventual collapse of host government institutions that are not economically sustainable, or where personnel are insufficiently trained and educated.

The joint force will train and advise partner security forces using a variety of means. It can leverage grant aid as part of an IMET program for training and education opportunities in the United States. It can also provide specialized training on the use and maintenance of specific equipment provided under security assistance programs. As force

constraints and an increased demand for engagement in the future operating environment require the United States to prioritize its engagement needs, the joint force may train and advise one partner to conduct peacekeeping operations elsewhere, independently or with other partners. The joint force may also train and advise in specific tactics, techniques, and procedures independent of the provision of equipment to improve the ability of partner security forces to conduct specific types of operations.

The joint force may advise by augmenting host government security forces during operations to build capabilities and capacity in real time to meet all security requirements. An example of this includes threat reduction efforts of partner governments who want to reduce, dismantle, redirect or improve protection of existing weapons of mass destruction programs, stockpiles, and capabilities.

A potential model for future training and advising for these capability and capacity-development purposes is Africa Partnership Station (APS), a recurring engagement vehicle that routinely brings together the joint force and other USG agencies with NGOs to build partner security force capabilities and capacity. For example, APS was able to increase the capabilities and capacity of Sierra Leone to police its territorial waters in concert with the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard. In situations when the population is uncertain about, or even hostile to joint force presence, this model has the additional benefit of reducing the number of necessary joint force personnel within the partner government's territory.

Engaging Adversaries

The joint force may engage with adversaries for tactical gain, to manage or mitigate the adversarial relationship or its effects, or to alter the adversary's status. This type of engagement can enable the joint force to mitigate some of the effects of the increased competition for influence driven by the rise of new actors.

The joint force may confer and coordinate with adversaries to achieve limited tactical coordination, for example in search and rescue operations. The joint force will conduct this type of engagement on a case-by-case basis and it will often be episodic in nature. This could include conferring and coordinating on maritime security as traffic in sea lanes increases, resulting in an increased vulnerability to the transport of WMD and other illicit material. The joint force will also confer and coordinate in support of efforts to avoid escalation of an adversarial relationship by building trust and preventing misunderstandings that could lead to conflict. These activities could include, for example,

support to international treaty negotiations and implementation, including monitoring activities and challenge inspections as mandated by the individual treaty.

The joint force may also engage with adversaries to alter their adversarial status or even the course of a conflict by inducing significant numbers of fighters to cease fighting or switch sides. This allows the joint force to destroy the coherence of the enemy force by splitting the reconcilable from the irreconcilable elements of the adversary. In some situations, particularly in those involving insurgency or other forms of rebellion, the joint force may be in a position to induce belligerents to lay down arms when another party to the conflict, such as the host government, is perceived as partial, or the joint force may work with the host government to encourage reintegration of reconcilable adversaries.[109]

In either case, the joint force may serve as a bridge between the government and the reconcilable elements of the adversary force. This type of reconciliation and reintegration amid a conflict is a reversal of the traditional sequence in which parties to a conflict reach a ceasefire or negotiate an accord, and the belligerent force is disarmed, demobilized and then reintegrated into the society. Instead of reconciliation and reintegration occurring after the cessation of hostilities, such overtures

[109] The joint force will confer and coordinate to identify members of the adversary group that might be open to reconciliation with the government. It can do this by interviewing detainees; using third party intermediaries; building relationships with local power brokers and influential figures, such as political, religious, business and tribal leaders; or contacting known adversaries directly. As these relationships mature, the joint force may confer and coordinate with the host government security forces to identify ways to provide the reconcilable elements with supplies, and utilize their fighting skills against the irreconcilable members of the adversary organization. The joint force will also need to confer and coordinate with both the reconcilable elements and the host government to identify concrete ways to address the legitimate concerns each side has about the other, as well as to identify ways to incorporate these ad-hoc groups back into society or into the official security apparatus of the government to ensure a lasting peace after the departure of the joint force. As the relationship with reconciled former adversaries transitions toward partnership, the joint force may train and advise these elements in gathering intelligence on insurgent activity, providing fixed-site security in their own neighborhoods, and conducting patrols with the support and approval of the host government military and the joint force. As these elements are incorporated into the formal security institutions of the host government, they will be a part of any host government relationship with the joint force that includes combined exercises and security assistance programs. See Linda Robinson, *Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search For a Way Out of Iraq* (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), p. 253.

may become a means of ending hostilities or at least reducing the ranks of adversaries and its will to fight.[110]

In all aspects of engaging with adversaries, the joint force will also have to confer and coordinate with partners, particularly those who are neighbors with the adversary or have significant interests in the adversary's territory or region. In this instance the joint force will have to balance consequences of potentially alienating partners by engaging with these adversaries, and identify ways to avoid alienating partners or mitigating its consequences if unavoidable.

In certain situations, the joint force may exercise with select adversaries in specific operations and at the direction of DOS. These exercises could include improving interoperability in anti-piracy or counternarcotics operations. The joint force may equip and train and advise adversaries on a limited basis. It may also train and advise some adversaries in select capability and capacity-building activities such as those intended to secure weapons of mass destruction and related materials.

8. ENGAGEMENT PRECEPTS

The following are precepts that the joint force should apply to all types of engagement.

- ***Establish Enduring Relationships Based on Trust***. Many associations between the joint force and a partner government or organization are a product of the numerous relationships developed between individuals. As a result, the increased competition for influence will require that engagement strategies and efforts reflect the objective of building trust and developing, widening, and sustaining relationships with key leaders and future leaders of the partner government and security forces. The joint force must seek to evolve these relationships from the personal to institutional to mitigate against personnel transitions in the joint force and in the partner government or organization.

Engagement efforts build on contact between all joint force personnel and their counterparts to build trust and influence. An increased number of joint force personnel will need to develop

[110] Reconciliation is addressed in JP 3-07.3 *Peace Operations* and JP 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*. This concept, however, further develops reconciliation as an outcome of engagement as well as combat, and one that can occur prior to demobilization and disarmament.

relationships with their counterparts in the host government security forces; with key political, religious, and tribal leaders; and with other segments of local populations. These relationships will enhance trust and ensure common purpose, establish mechanisms for cooperation, leverage common benefits of these relationships, increase legitimacy for the joint force presence in a certain country or region, and otherwise ensure effective engagement. Relationships of trust with segments of the population will also provide an important source of information and awareness of how the broader population views the joint force engagement effort.

The joint force can improve the chances of building enduring relationships in three ways. One approach is to push engagement down to the lowest effective level.[111] Joint force personnel at these levels will often have the most frequent day-to-day contact with partner government personnel, and may be able to develop a deeper relationship with their counterparts. Relationships are often easier to institutionalize from the bottom up than from the top down.

A second approach is for the joint force to focus particular attention on building relationships with the younger generation of leaders in the partner security forces. For example, American military advisers in El Salvador in the 1980s found that "deficiencies in initiative, dedication, and integrity among field-grade officers . . . had deep roots" in the failure of the old system of recruiting, training and educating officers. Instead, "the officers who could be improved dramatically by excellent Salvadoran leaders and American advisers were the younger ones."[112]

A third approach is for the joint force to identify personal relationships that require preservation and create assignment patterns or career paths that foster the continuity of personal relationships over time. For example, joint force personnel who have established such relationships might be assigned to a U.S. mission or joint force headquarters for extended tours of three to five years or longer with the same benefits afforded DOS and defense intelligence personnel assigned to U.S. missions overseas for extended periods.

In all three types of engagement, a key joint force objective is to institutionalize individual relationships to ensure they do not end when joint force or partner government replace personnel. If the joint force is replacing a particular unit, the unit commander should not only facilitate an introduction between the new commander and counterparts in the partner government, but also do everything possible to foster the

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[111] *CCJO*, 25.

[112] Mark Moyar, *A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 189.

relationship to ensure its seamless transition between rotating units and personnel.

- ***Understand Legal Authorities and Funding Boundaries***. All joint force commanders must understand the legal authorities and funding requirements that govern and constrain the ability to conduct engagement at different levels, and identify ways to meet joint force requirements within those constraints. In most cases, DOS maintains authorities to train and advise, as well as equip nonmilitary security forces, and oversees funding of security assistance programs such as IMET and FMF. In other cases, authorities are overlapping or shared between DOS and DOD. Failure to understand these authorities and resources may risk violations of U.S. laws and policies, the creation of unmet expectations by partners, and missed opportunities by the joint force. Combatant Commanders must also support efforts within DOD and DOS to work with Congress to secure more flexible authorities and funding streams that better allow the U.S. Government to meet the multidisciplinary challenges of the future operating environment in an effective and timely manner.

The joint force must consider which DOD elements and USG agencies to work with to develop a common understanding of the authorities and funding sources of each agency. This may allow the joint force and other USG agencies to identify ways to complement each other's resources and authorities to avoid gaps in the engagement process, achieve economies of scale, and avoid duplication of effort. Understanding the authorities and resources of other USG agencies will also let the joint force know which USG civilian agencies have the authorities to take over at the point where the joint force's end.

The joint force must also be able to assess the results achieved through the provision of resources. This assessment process is particularly important for making the case for new resources and for reallocating existing resources. Without a tangible "return on investment," oversight agencies will often question the need for the resource requests. The degree to which the joint force can show outcomes (decrease in the number of insurgent attacks or improved partner ability to deploy and sustain forces with the joint force in coalition operations), and not just outputs (number of military personnel trained or capabilities acquired) will help make the case for resources. This will present a challenge for engagement given its generally long-term

nature and the possibility that results may not be apparent for a number of years.[113]

- ***Build Coalitions and Alliances to Satisfy the Growing Demand for Engagement.*** The joint force must support USG efforts to build and work within coalitions and formal alliances to foster cooperation, create common access to niche capabilities and skills, and expand interdependence and interoperability to meet future challenges. This will allow the joint force and coalition and allied partners to achieve the most efficient means of meeting the high demand for engagement and address the impact of fiscally driven resource constraints in the future operating environment. When building these coalitions and alliances, the joint force will work with civilian agencies to identify the relevant U.S. interests that are at stake; the foreign partners and other actors with similarly aligned interests; and the specific capabilities, experiences and insights necessary for successful coalition operations. The joint force may also contribute to coalitions and alliances of which it is not a member by building capabilities and capacity of a partner that is a member, enabling that partner to participate in those coalitions and alliances or to further build capabilities and capacity of other foreign security forces. An example of this includes U.S. Africa Command's efforts to build capabilities and capacity of African Union members to conduct operations in Somalia and elsewhere in Africa.

The joint force must support the efforts of U.S. civilian leaders to attract coalition and allied partners with the capabilities in niche areas for which the coalition partner is more uniquely suited than the joint force. For example, certain partners may be more uniquely qualified to train and advise a gendarmerie or national police force, since the United States does not have such forces. USG and joint force efforts to build coalitions and alliances will also require identifying potential partners that will allow military forces to engage in combat operations. If this is not a politically feasible option for the partner, the joint force and civilian leaders may identify opportunities, such as reconstruction or law enforcement training, to which the partners can commit their efforts.

The joint force will establish partnerships with partner security forces to improve interoperability in multilateral operations or in steady state regional security missions intended to address common challenges. These partnership initiatives develop certain mechanisms and capabilities to address specific security challenges such as piracy and

[113] As part of adopting a comprehensive approach to engagement, DOD, DOS and USAID should, whenever possible, consider in the planning phase the relationship between respective missions, outcomes and assessment results in order to create linkages that would help strengthen rationale provided to oversight committees delegating continued funding for each agency.

smuggling, but the joint force can also use these mechanisms and capabilities to rapidly assemble coalitions to respond to crises in other areas of the world. By generating cooperation on one specific set of issues, the relationships developed within these regional security arrangements can facilitate further cooperation on other issues, thereby expanding interdependence in the region.[114] By encouraging regional actors to work with their neighbors and fostering the development of these relationships, the joint force shares responsibility for addressing regional security threats with partners in that region.

- ***Emphasize the Importance of Matching Actions to Words in the "Battle of Narratives."*** As information becomes more accessible and transparent in the future operating environment, communication with relevant populations and stakeholders will be critical to ensure joint force ability to conduct engagement with other actors. In this environment, joint force operations will require a level of legitimacy that goes beyond strict adherence to legal obligations.[115] In many instances, the local population may welcome joint force presence. In some instances, however, close identification with the United States may undermine the host government in the eyes of the population. In these instances, the joint force will often have to determine the potential impact of the size of its presence, and, if necessary, identify ways to reduce its physical presence, improve perceptions, deter and dissuade consequent recruitment by adversary groups, and minimize potential entanglements while improving security and force protection.

One way to improve perceptions is through sea-basing of forces involved in engagement activities, which can effectively reduce the number of necessary joint force personnel required on land within the partner government's territory. The joint force must also be prepared to conduct outreach to relevant populations and partners, and maintain an awareness of outreach efforts of any adversaries and how to negate their influence or use them to its advantage, recognizing that adversaries will attempt to counter U.S. power and legitimacy through their own narratives.

Perception is shaped by actions and words, and the joint force must be able to use both to convey the same message. Actions taken that are contrary to words undermine the credibility and impact of the narrative. The joint force must have a well-crafted narrative prior to beginning engagement that explains the joint force mission. To address

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[114] David H. Petraeus, *Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Posture of U.S. Central Command,* 16 March 2010 (accessed June 30, 2010); available from http://armed-services.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?wit_id=9109&id=4425.

[115] The *NSS 2010* describes effective strategic communications as essential to sustaining global legitimacy and supporting our policy aims *NSS 2010*, 16.

the challenges inherent in an environment of increased transparency, the joint force must also ensure that its actions correspond to public statements and be ready to respond in a rapid and proactive manner to provide truthful information and evidence about joint force actions. It is always more difficult to change perceptions that events or actions have already created than it is to form initial impressions.[116]

To improve perceptions of the legitimacy of engagement with partners and other actors, the joint force must demonstrate to local populations the ways in which their security interests align with those of the United States, and that the two are best served working together in pursuit of common objectives. To do this, the joint force will need to work through local, regional and international media; develop relationships with key political, religious and tribal leaders; and maintain routine contact with elements of the population in the course of its normal operations. In this sense, addressing the "battle of narratives" facilitates improved engagement. At the same time, however, a key way of addressing the "battle of narratives" is through further engagement. There is a cyclical relationship between the two that the joint force must recognize and understand.

The joint force also needs to consider its adversaries throughout engagement efforts. If the objective is to work closely with an adversary in specific areas or turn an adversary, the joint force will have to be able to convince relevant populations of the value of engaging with an adversary or former adversary.

In other cases, the joint force will have to consider the adversary's narratives, including its objectives, actions and statements, as many times it will also design operations to influence the perceptions of local, regional and even international populations. The joint force narrative must therefore delegitimize the message of the adversary by avoiding actions and statements that feed the narrative, by demonstrating how the adversary's actions contradict its own stated message as well as the needs, values and security of the population, and by providing an alternative narrative to the population that is at least as compelling as that of the adversary.[117]

- ***Align Engagement with Partner Requirements and Priorities in Ways That Ensure Host Government Ownership and Reduce Dependency.*** As the demand for engagement increases, the joint force must work with and through its partners to the greatest possible extent

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[116] U.S. Joint Staff, *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept v 2.0* (accessed June 30, 2010); available from http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/joc.htm, 29-31. (Hereafter cited as IW JOC.)

[117] Ibid. 30.

to ensure the partner is committed and assumes ownership of the engagement. It will do this by aligning engagement with the priorities of the partner in ways that ensure host government ownership and decrease its dependence on the joint force.[118] The host government will also have specific capabilities, insights and knowledge of local communities that enable it to perform many functions better than the joint force.

In planning for and conducting engagement, the joint force must develop strategies that reflect an understanding of the partner, including its political and power structures, culture, history, capabilities, requirements, objectives, and security challenges. This knowledge enables the joint force to manage expectations; ensure the partner can operate and sustain relevant programs, functions, infrastructure and equipment; and provide support to the partner government only at a rate consistent with the partner's ability to accept the assistance.

The joint force must also avoid, if possible, the temptation to satisfy near-term requirements on its own. Although doing so may bring security to the country for a time, the long-term consequences of such action may result in an increased dependency of the host government on the joint force.

- ***Pursue a Comprehensive Approach to Ensure Balanced Development of Partner Institutions, Share Resources and Skills, and Ensure Sustained Engagement.*** The multidisciplinary nature of engagement in the future operating environment will require that the joint force pursue a comprehensive approach. This approach will ensure engagement strategies and activities are properly aligned with other USG agencies, as well as multinational and other partners; leverage common and niche resources, skills and capabilities; and ensure sustained engagement with a partner or other actor even if the element of joint force engagement is of an episodic nature. To do this, the joint force will work, where appropriate, with other USG agencies, multinational partners, relevant non-state actors, and private sector entities to pursue unity of purpose to ensure a common understanding of the problem and mutual goals, as well as unity of effort in implementing engagement.

In many situations, the joint force and partner security forces will work in parallel with civilian agencies and organizations to build capabilities and capacity within the host government. In such instances, the joint force must work as part of a comprehensive approach to ensure capability and capacity development is not limited to the security sector, but instead is properly synchronized to the efforts of civilian USG

[118] *CCJO*, 26.

agencies and other partner governments to build capabilities and capacity in the governance and development sectors of the host government. The joint force must also support efforts to improve coordination of disparate host government departments and agencies to facilitate a functional governing process and more efficient cooperation with the joint force and other USG agencies.

Working as part of a comprehensive approach also allows the joint force and its many partners to identify, leverage and share specific resources, skills, authorities and capabilities. As noted in a previous precept, DOD, DOS, and other USG agencies have specified, overlapping authorities and funding streams, and working within a whole of government construct will allow for a more coherent U.S. engagement effort. Many USG agencies, including DOS and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), as well as other partners also have skills, capabilities, and developed relationships with the partner that the joint force does not possess.

In some situations, using certain USG capabilities or capabilities of other partners to conduct security requirements may be more palatable to foreign partners than others, and more appropriate for successful implementation of an engagement effort. For example, the U.S. Coast Guard may be the more appropriate force for certain operations to train and advise maritime security forces instead of the U.S. Navy. Other USG agencies may also have more relevant experience, authorities and equipment that the joint force does not possess. For example, the U.S. Border Patrol may be the more appropriate USG agency to engage host government security forces on border security, and the Justice Department can provide advisers to mentor host government law enforcement officials for the purpose of building capabilities and institutional capacity.

Although some engagement activities are undertaken on a short-term or episodic basis, it is likely that other elements of the joint force or other USG agencies will maintain a more enduring relationship with the partner government. Since this long-term engagement is often the most difficult to sustain, the joint force must adopt a whole of government mindset to understand the role joint force engagement activity plays in the broader U.S. relationship with the partner, and conduct the engagement with sustained effort to ensure fulfillment of the desired objective(s).

As part of any comprehensive approach, the joint force must recognize that many civilian agencies and friendly non-state actors will have been working in the operational space for a number of years prior to joint force involvement. At a minimum, the joint force must take the

greatest care possible to not disrupt either the work of these actors or the relationships they have built, and should attempt to work with these actors whenever their objectives and interests align with those of the joint force.

- ***Ensure Holistic Development of Partner Security Institutions When Building Partner Security Capabilities and Capacity***. The joint force must adopt an integrated, holistic view of engagement to ensure development at all levels of security institutions. Efforts to build a partner's operational capabilities and capacity must also take into consideration the need to develop capabilities and capacity, when requested, at the ministerial level, as well as at all other requisite levels, and should inculcate the requirements and values of a professional security force. This is true for all types of engagement.

Failure to conduct holistic planning to focus on more than solely building operational capabilities and capacity can often result in unintended and unfortunate consequences. For example, efforts focused primarily on building operational capabilities and capacity, while ignoring or placing less emphasis on capability and capacity development at the ministerial level and the concepts of military professionalism and strong civilian control of the military, can often lead to elements of the partner security forces being used against civilian authorities, creating the environment for a military coup.

Since the responsibility for some of these requirements required to develop balanced security institutions may belong to other DOD and USG elements, the joint force will have to work with the country team, Combatant Commanders and relevant elements of the Joint Staff, Services and the OSD to develop a comprehensive understanding of the problem and desired objective, and to coordinate engagement efforts in that country.

9. IMPLICATIONS OF ADOPTING THE JOINT ENGAGEMENT CONCEPT

Adopting this concept for joint combat has implications for how the Services organize, man, equip and train their forces. Some implications are already being implemented and require only continued emphasis. Some require little or no additional analysis and should be implemented immediately, while others will need to be explored, validated, and refined through further experimentation, analysis, and operational experience before being institutionalized into the joint force.

- ***Address engagement in joint doctrine***. Engagement should be given a more prominent place in joint doctrine. This would include a comprehensive approach to global and regional engagement strategies, avoiding piecemeal and inconsistent use of military force. The joint force should consider making military planning for engagement as vital as planning for other activities.

- ***Expand conventional forces training to focus on engagement***. The Services, combatant commands, and other DOD agencies should consider future force development for select segments of conventional forces in ways that allow for rapid assembly of liaison teams with the requisite area expertise to complement the capabilities of special operations forces. Military educational institutions must be able, on short notice, to conduct necessary targeted cultural familiarization and language courses for leaders and other key personnel.

- ***Improve whole of government coordination by establishing policy adviser (POLAD) teams within the joint force***. Depending on the situation, a POLAD team should consist of a POLAD supported by an appropriate combination of a political officer, public diplomacy officer, and economic officer. Under more austere staffing levels, the team may consist of two members, splitting the responsibilities of the team between them. The joint force should emphasize to DOS the importance of these teams to ensure that these members are experienced Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) with a deep understanding of military roles and functions. As certain operations require more time from the country team, the POLAD team may also serve in a liaison capacity between DOS and DOD to ensure unity of effort between the two agencies.

- ***Refine authorities and funding streams to allow for more timely and effective engagement.*** The joint force must support efforts to advocate for amendment of the U.S. Code to refine authorities of different USG agencies to allow them to more effectively integrate, when necessary, specialized skills and capabilities for a whole of government effort. DOD, DOS, and USAID and other USG agencies such as the Departments of Justice, Agriculture, and Commerce must work closely together and leverage their respective capabilities for mutual advantage. One possible model is to create a pool of resources available to both DOS and DOD. Any attempt to refine authorities and funding streams must maintain both effective oversight mechanisms for Congress and DOS lead in conducting engagement.

- ***Integrate engagement instruction into professional military education.*** Professional military education (PME) and training should include instruction in the laws and regulations by which a joint force

commander at any level must operate, as well as the authorities and responsibilities of other USG agencies. PME should place emphasis on thinking critically and adaptive leadership in addition to operations and tactics. The joint force and Services should also develop training criteria that addresses engagement competency as a way to assess joint force readiness to conduct engagement.

- ***Improve Service and institutional military personnel management cultures to better support, reward, and promote specialty training required for engagement.*** The additional skills required to focus the joint force on activities beyond combat necessitate new and expanded training (language, cultural training, intelligence, security, laws and regulations, etc.). Since units have limited time to conduct required specialized individual and organizational training prior to deployment, maintaining these skills is critical. The Services may need to make changes in recruiting, training, and retention procedures to ensure the continued availability of individuals with critical functional skills; otherwise the joint force would lose valuable experience and require expensive training to replace this expertise. The Services and other DOD agencies should develop personnel management systems that make it easier to acquire and keep required specialties. They should establish "career paths" that allow individuals with special skills to remain competitive for promotion in positions where they can use their skills, and provide an environment where their particular skills enable success. The Services and other DOD agencies need to recruit a greater number of experienced individuals with appropriate language and cultural education than in the past and better track individuals with special skills in their career progression. This includes the active and reserve communities, as well as civilians, and the civilian skills of Reserve Component members.

The Services should also address the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program and similar programs to ensure that sufficient members knowledgeable in regional/local language and culture are available to support engagement efforts. Retaining more skilled personnel requires changes to long established personnel policies to include better promotion opportunities for critical specialists, proficiency or specialist pay for a broader range of specialties, and the ability to continue to serve in an appropriate grade without being forced out (commonly referred to as "up or out"). Many of these activities, particularly those involving interaction with other agencies outside DOD, require senior and experienced personnel. This could call for a greater number of limited duty officers or warrant officers. There should also be provisions for longer careers (30 to 40 years) that would allow those with valuable skills to continue to serve, as is now the case with medical officers.

- ***Improve capability to leverage social networking in the "battle of narratives."*** In the future operating environment of proliferating technology and increased information transparency, on-scene reports from individuals with video cameras and cell phones will influence military activities just as much, if not more so, than traditional media. There are multiple message sources in the battle space, and these are not limited to the joint force and the enemy. International media, coalition military members, civilian populations, NGOs, IGOs, and other USG agencies will all have a presence in the same area. For example, the first technology-based information after the Haiti earthquake was not from high-tech government systems, but rather Facebook and Twitter updates from within the rubble. As a result, it is critical that joint force narratives correspond to the context of the other messages and realities on the ground. Appropriate use of social networks will also better enable the joint force to be the first with the truth, rather than the last with a carefully crafted and coordinated message.

- ***Reduce restrictions on sharing information with coalition, interagency and other partners that prevent effective information and intelligence sharing.*** The Services and other DOD agencies should seek an easing of restrictions on sharing information with other USG agencies, multinational partners and NGO partners. This is essential to enable the joint force to perform the civil-military and military-to-military coordination necessary to perform effective engagement. The joint force should also ensure that information databases and repositories are better integrated, more easily searchable, and more user-friendly.

10. RISKS OF ADOPTING THE JOINT ENGAGEMENT CONCEPT

- ***Underlying differences in interests and expectations by multiple actors, including USG agencies, institutional factions within the partner government and a host of non-traditional partners (i.e., NGOs, IGOs) will increase the complexity of engagement and the difficulty of coordinating and synchronizing efforts.*** These differences increase the potential for disagreement, stalled progress, and other unintended consequences in engagement activities. The joint force can mitigate this risk by maintaining the flexibility to adapt when needed to changing circumstances and conditions. It should also continuously monitor ongoing or potential engagements in a regional and global context to produce effective plans and guidance and avoid "one size fits all" planning. Similarly, operators

may need to conduct activities with a degree of decentralized planning and execution not common in other operations. The entire chain of command responsible for implementing the engagement strategy will need a clear understanding of roles, responsibilities, and authorities for planning and executing operations.

The joint force can further mitigate this risk by pursuing improved interagency coordination. DOD should advocate for amendment of the U.S. Code to define interagency authorities, develop the equivalent of a military planner position at other USG agencies, and identify ways for USG agencies to integrate, when necessary, specialized skills and capabilities in a whole-of-government effort.

- ***In engagement, the joint force may give the impression that it can or will provide more material assistance than it is authorized, or deliver success that is outside of its ability to influence.*** Although unintended, these false expectations may undermine joint force and USG credibility among multinational partners. Political groups within a partner polity that are less favorable to the United States can exploit these divisions to the detriment to the relationship between the United States and that partner. The joint force can mitigate this risk by coordinating engagement activities with other USG agencies, host government, and multinational partners in a sustained effort to ensure that U.S. policy objectives and narratives are aligned, achievable and understood. The joint force should also construct narratives that clearly state the assistance that it will provide partners and how that assistance will benefit both parties in the partnership.

- ***As the joint force engagement with adversaries and other near-peer competitors increases, there is a risk that limited engagement with an actor in one functional area will provide unintended support for all actions taken by the actor in that functional area.*** For example, some partners may use combined counterterrorism exercises with the joint force and other elements of the U.S. Government, and the increased emphasis placed on counterterrorism by the United States, as sanction to crack down on internal dissidents under the cover of counterterrorism. The joint force can mitigate this risk by ensuring that all engagement activity, particularly that with adversaries and near-peer competitors, aligns with guidance received from civilian officials and the U.S. Mission Strategic Resource Plan for the country.

- ***There is a risk that U.S. policy changes outside of the purview of the joint force will lead to "on-again/off-again" engagement.*** This may generate frustration and disillusionment within the host government and require the joint force to repeatedly begin anew

with previous partners during each subsequent engagement, erasing any progress made during the previous engagement effort. The joint force can partly mitigate this risk by developing a longer-term planning strategy (i.e., a multiyear roadmap) enabling the joint force to ensure adequate authorities and resources to support engagement activities. Unless directed otherwise by civilian authorities, the joint force should seek, wherever possible, to maintain established relationships, even if only at a reduced level of effort. Nevertheless, DOD must work with DOS to seek authorities that allow multiyear funding to support flexible and sustainable engagement. This authority will also enhance the joint force's ability to quickly take advantage of opportunities. Funding of Section 1206, 1207, and 1208 activities is approved only as a one-year funding authority. This limitation may lead to an authority gap, which could prevent sustained engagement. Multiyear assistance programs such as those employed for Colombia, Iraq, and Pakistan provide planning predictability and help strengthen relationships.

11. JOINT ENGAGEMENT AND THE OTHER ACTIVITIES

Engagement activities have the distinction of often existing to preclude the requirement for conducting the other activities altogether. For example, engagement may preclude the need for combat by preventing the crises that cause it or by building the partner capabilities and capacity or cooperative security arrangements that deter aggression.

Another key purpose for engagement is to set the conditions needed to conduct those activities effectively should the need arise. This includes maintaining and improving relationships with multinational partners, establishing coordination mechanisms and plans that will facilitate coalition operations, exercising with partners, and establishing support agreements with partners. Although the actual act of coordination during a multinational operation does not constitute engagement, anything done to make that coordination possible does.

The third purpose for engagement is to improve a partner's own capacity to conduct those activities, decreasing or even obviating the need for U.S. forces. During multinational operations, the joint force will continue engaging with coalition and allied partners to improve effectiveness. Finally, following multinational operations, especially in the wake of combat, joint forces may engage with partners or former enemies to prevent a recurrence of the conditions that led to crisis.

Engagement has a close and integrated relationship with security activities in situations involving a transition to indigenous authority. In

such cases, the practical distinction between security activities and engagement activities may be unclear -- and unimportant as long as the transition occurs successfully. There often also is considerable overlap between engagement and relief and reconstruction activities, as the latter often are supported and facilitated by joint forces but actually performed by U.S. government, indigenous or other partners. Additionally, whether an action qualifies as engagement or relief and reconstruction can depend on circumstances. Building or improving a military airfield in a foreign country can qualify as either -- or both -- depending on whether the objective is to improve the host nation's own capacity or U.S. access to the region.

Moreover, engagement often tends to overlap with the other activities in general, as joint forces often will mentor friendly forces at the same time that they partner with them in the conduct of multinational operations -- for example, U.S. special operations forces that organize, train and equip indigenous combat forces and then fight side-by-side with them.

12. CONCLUSION TO THE JOINT ENGAGEMENT CONCEPT

This concept reflects the conditions of the future operating environment as described in the JOE, and constructs a framework for how the joint force will conduct engagement to meet the challenges of that environment. This framework requires that the joint force be able to establish and manage cooperative relationships over time for optimal benefit to U.S. and partner interests. To achieve these aims, the joint force will integrate a broad array of Service capabilities through conferring and coordinating, exercising, training and advising, and equipping the partner security forces and other actors.

Although some elements of the joint force are experienced and comfortable conducting engagement, as an activity, engagement still lies outside the traditional operational parameters of much of the joint force, which is trained for and familiar with combat and other security operations. Nevertheless, the future operating environment will require the joint force to assume new, varied and increasingly complex engagement activities. Since it will likely face greater fiscal constraints in the future environment, the joint force will have to identify relatively cost-effective ways of meeting its security requirements. To do this, the joint force will have to build partnerships to leverage capabilities and address common requirements. This may include preventing security threats before they arise by working with partners to improve their ability to meet internal and regional security requirements. This could also

include increasing the pool of available forces able to address these threats and other requirements by training and advising partners to then go build capabilities and capacity, and conduct other required operations elsewhere. Finally, this may also involve joint force engagement to mitigate or alter adversarial relationships to avoid conflict or end a conflict. Engagement will provide the joint force with a means to prevent, as much as possible, more costly combat and security requirements; to create coordination mechanisms and integrate capabilities with partners in the event combat becomes necessary; to share the responsibility for security with other partners; and to secure access and influence for the joint force and other USG agencies.

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Part IV

Joint Relief and Reconstruction Concept

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1. INTRODUCTION TO THE JOINT RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION CONCEPT

This concept describes how the joint force will both enable and, when required, conduct relief and reconstruction activities domestically and abroad in the future.[119] The *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (*CCJO*) describes relief and reconstruction as those activities that "seek to restore essential civil services in the wake of combat, a breakdown of civil order, or a natural disaster."[120] Joint force participation in these operations optimally concludes when host government[121] and commercial efforts effectively meet the basic needs of the population or when other agencies assume responsibility for the effort.[122] Senior policymakers will decide when to draw down and, ultimately, conclude joint force relief and reconstruction activities. A transition strategy that defines the conditions and corresponding metrics for successful accomplishment of the joint force mission will inform this political decision.

As applied in the concept, "relief" is immediate or short-term[123] assistance provided to save lives, relieve suffering, and mitigate the impact of natural and man-made disasters.[124] This concept intentionally uses the word "relief" instead of "humanitarian assistance" to make the distinction that the joint force may conduct relief activities for explicit political and tactical objectives. Therefore, humanitarian assistance principles of humanity, neutrality, and impartiality do not govern relief

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[119] The ability of the joint force to conduct relief and reconstruction activities supports the objective stated in the *National Security Strategy 2010* that the United States will leverage its "engagement abroad" to support broader policy goals. In addition to expanding its political-military reach and deepening its partnerships with states, involvement in relief and reconstruction increases the United States' direct access to populations and governments where it has a strategic interest, but otherwise little political contact. *NSS 2010*, 2-3.

[120] *CCJO*, 18.

[121] This concept uses "government" to mean the central government of a state, as well as sub-state provincial, district, and local governments; State and local governments within the United States; transitional authorities, and military governments established by occupying powers under international law; United Nations trusteeships and other forms of government established by international organizations; and tribal assemblies and other traditional forms of governance that supplement or substitute for formal governance. Throughout the document, the meaning of "government" is expanded to include effective forms of governance both formal and informal.

[122] *CCJO*, 18.

[123] "Short term" in this concept is defined as 6 months to a year.

[124] This definition is consistent with USG agencies' and departments' accepted definitions of humanitarian assistance including the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and U.S. Department of State's (DOS) Bureau for Population Refugees and Migration (PRM).

activities.[125] "Reconstruction" is defined as the restoration, improvement or creation of damaged, degraded or otherwise needed critical infrastructure and essential services.[126]

The *Joint Security Concept* directly addresses the provision of security and the establishment of public order. Security activities are critical for successful relief and reconstruction and complementary to this concept. Additionally, the *Joint Engagement Concept* discusses building partner capacity though the *Joint Relief and Reconstruction Concept describes* various civil-military partnership models to enable relief and reconstruction activities.[127]

Relief and reconstruction activities can be interdependent. Though they may occur simultaneously or sequentially, the joint force's approach may vary between relief and reconstruction across situations. Section two of this concept discusses the fundamental nature of relief and reconstruction and their relationship, highlighting important tradeoffs between the two sets of activities that the joint force should consider.

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[125] Joint doctrine undergoing revision concerning stability operations states that "during crisis response and limited contingency operations, the joint force commander may conduct humanitarian assistance as a stabilizing influence, particularly when lack of human security could undermine other objectives of the joint operation." The Joint Relief and Reconstruction Concept (JRRC) purposefully distinguishes "relief" from the use of the term "humanitarian" in keeping with internationally recognized standards. General Assembly Resolution 46/182 was passed by United Nations member states in 1991 to make emergency response more effective. This resolution is the basis of the United Nation's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) mandate and emphasizes that assistance must be linked to the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence. *U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-07 Stability Operations Final Coordination draft (*April 2010) III-23. (Hereafter cited as JP 3-07 Draft.)

[126] "Reconstruction" is defined in U.S. Army doctrine as "the process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political, socioeconomic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create the foundation for long-term development." The Joint Capability Area "Joint Stability Operations" defines "reconstruction" as "the ability to rebuild the critical systems or infrastructure (i.e., physical, economic, justice, governance, societal) necessary to facilitate long-term security and the transition to legitimate local governance. It includes addressing the root cause of the conflict. Reconstruction is likely to be a civil led effort." FM 3-07.

[127] The full scope of relief and reconstruction activities exceeds the doctrinal definition of stability operations, "various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the U.S. in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, and to provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief" (JP 3-07). The joint force conducts relief and reconstruction activities in a variety of operational environments (permissive, semi-permissive and hostile) and missions (foreign humanitarian assistance, counterinsurgency, nation assistance, etc.) Therefore, these activities are not exclusively limited to stability operations. Relief and reconstruction may be conducted to help shape an environment during steady state.

A wide variety of actors, in addition to the joint force will conduct relief and reconstruction. These include other U.S. Government (USG) departments and agencies and their implementing partners, international organizations (IOs), foreign security forces, NGOs, private sector entities, the host government, and indigenous populations and organizations. In this concept, the joint force's "partners" includes any or all of these entities unless otherwise specified. The number of other actors involved in relief and reconstruction will significantly affect the joint force's approach to these operations by offering opportunities for cooperation and coordination and by challenging the joint force through competition and opposition.

The joint force will seek to enable its USG partners to lead the planning and execution of relief and reconstruction activities. However, the joint force must also be prepared to conduct relief and reconstruction activities if for any reason its partners cannot.[128] Success will require skillful collaboration with others. Surmounting the challenges and environmental trends described in the *CCJO* "will exceed the capabilities of any single agency of government, including the joint force. Instead, successful future military operations typically will require the integrated application of all the instruments of national power."[129] The central challenge for this concept is to describe how the joint force will conduct, or enable it partners to conduct scalable and adaptive relief and reconstruction activities, accompanied by credible communication efforts, to sustain populations during or in the wake of combat, the breakdown of civil order, or a natural or man-made disaster, in the homeland or abroad.

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[128] DODI 300.05 states that "It is DOD policy that: … the Department of Defense will be prepared to: (1) Conduct stability operations activities throughout all phases of conflict and across the range of military operations, including in combat and non-combat environments. The magnitude of stability operations missions may range from small-scale, short-duration to large-scale, long-duration. (2) Support stability operations activities led by other U.S. Government departments or agencies, foreign governments and security forces, international governmental organizations, or when otherwise directed. (3) Lead stability operations activities to establish civil security and civil control, restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian assistance until such time as it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments and security forces, or international governmental organizations. In such circumstances, the Department will operate within U.S. Government and, as appropriate, international structures for managing civil-military operations, and will seek to enable the deployment and utilization of the appropriate civilian capabilities." U.S. Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05: Stability Operations, 16 September 2009* (accessed June 30, 2010); available from http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/ins1.html.

[129] *CCJO*, 6.

Although the *JRRC* focuses on the future, many of its ideas are timeless. Best practices and guiding principles that inform relief and reconstruction, elaborated in section eight of this concept, have been developed over time by a community of disparate actors who, despite different organizational values, share common insights and wisdom. The joint force's success in these future operations may not result from radical innovation, but from adaptation of these practices to meet future conditions and challenges.

2. THE NATURE OF RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION

Relief

During or after violent conflict or in the wake of a natural disaster, populations often face acute shortages of food, clean water, shelter, and access to basic health services. Those who are displaced from their homes may seek to return or resettle elsewhere. The joint force may be called on to directly provide or enable other organizations to provide the following kinds of relief assistance to a population struggling to survive: water and sanitation, energy and electricity, food and nutrition, emergency transportation, shelter and non-food items, search, rescue, and recovery, health systems, telecommunications support, protection of vulnerable and displaced populations, hazards reduction and foreign consequence management, and short-term measures to resume economic/commercial activity.[130] Joint force relief activities will be limited in duration and scope as the ultimate well being of the supported population is the primary responsibility of the affected government or indigenous actors and supporting civilian partners.[131]

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[130] These technical sectors of relief assistance map to the United Nation's cluster system. After a comprehensive review of the humanitarian system and its capability gaps, the United Nations developed a system of technical clusters with corresponding organizational leads to improve accountability in humanitarian operations. The sectoral clusters operate at multiple levels--national, regional, and local -- and are focused on the following needs: Agriculture, Camp Coordination/Management, Early Recovery, Education, Emergency Shelter, Emergency Telecommunications, Health, Logistics, Nutrition, Protection, and Water Sanitation Hygiene. Interagency Standing Committee (accessed 11 August 2010); available from http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/.

[131] See current joint doctrine on Foreign Humanitarian Assistance: U.S. Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 3-57, Civil-Military Operations* (Washington: Department of Defense, 8Jul08); and U.S. Joint Staff, Joint *Publication 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance* (Washington: Department of Defense, March 17, 2009). (Hereafter cited as JP 3-29.)

The joint force, together with its partners, may provide relief assistance in anticipation of a crisis. For example, during preparations for Hurricanes Ike and Gustav in 2008, military assets were used to transport medical patients from hospitals that were in the path of the hurricanes. In a steady state context, the joint force has an opportunity to shape the operational environment through its relief activities and to build partner governments' and indigenous institutions' and actors' preparedness for future responses to disasters and complex emergencies. The joint force should synchronize its relief activities with the objectives emphasized in the theater campaign plans (TCPs), which prioritize steady state activities focused on prevention and preparedness.

In response to a crisis other than war with the U.S., the affected host government, or, domestically, the State government, may request relief assistance.[132] The U.S. ambassador, or for a domestic response the State governor, will then issue a disaster declaration that may facilitate the provision of initial funding and the deployment of response teams and supplies. The U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has the primary responsibility for managing the USG's response to foreign humanitarian disasters. OFDA developed the Field Operations Guide (FOG) to provide reference information and guidance to members of their Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs). The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), coordinates domestic crisis responses. FEMA is guided by the National Response Framework, which details key domestic response principles and structures for a coordinated response across all state, federal, private and nongovernmental partners. Though not a definitive model, the National Response Framework provides concepts and models for cooperation and information sharing that could inform the development of an international response framework to guide integrated U.S. civilian-military and partner nations in foreign disaster responses.

When the joint force enables or conducts relief activities in response to a crisis, it will focus on the immediate priority of saving lives and mitigating suffering by restoring critical infrastructure and life-sustaining essential services. In most cases, the joint force will provide relief when a disaster or violent conflict overwhelms a government's capability to respond effectively; when USG civilian agencies, IOs, or

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[132] While JP 3-28 and JP 3-29 cover relief support activities in terms of Humanitarian Assistance and Civil Support, the JRRC expands and unifies those activities into a single concept. U.S. Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 3-28, Civil Support* (Washington: Department of Defense, September 14, 2007).

NGOs seek military assets and assistance to enhance the relief activity; or when other actors cannot function effectively because the environment is too insecure or unstable.[133] Military involvement in relief should be a "last resort" and should be planned for and leveraged as a tool to complement existing relief mechanisms and to fill an acknowledged response gap when there is no effective civilian alternative.[134] Due to the complexity and order of magnitude of disasters such as the 2005 Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans and the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, DOD tasked the joint force with significant responsibilities in support of civilian responders. The joint force can effectively leverage its capabilities during relief activities to include airborne, sea and ground logistical support, crisis response and contingency planning capabilities and specialized supplies and human capacity.

With the exception of the National Guard responding under state authority to contingencies inside the United States or to facilitate its combat objectives, the joint force will provide relief assistance only if so directed by the President or Secretary of Defense after the affected foreign or State government requests assistance. Abroad, the affected government will frequently dictate the scope of permissible joint force involvement. For example, the joint force role in the response to the 2003 earthquake in Bam, Iran, was limited to air lifting medical commodities and temporary shelters because of the political sensitivities of the situation. The United States does not provide relief in every disaster situation nor in response to every conflict. National interests and the extent of devastation will condition when, and to what extent, the United States will provide relief assistance.[135]

The DOD may direct the joint force to conduct relief activities to gain or maintain access and influence in a particular region. Significant

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[133] This response criterion is consistent with the United Nations' *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets*, also known as *The Oslo Guidelines*, which the U.S. Government helped negotiate. Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief ("Oslo Guidelines") (accessed June 30, 2010); available from http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/type,OPGUIDELINE,,,47da87822,0.html.

[134] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets In Disaster Relief* (November 2007), (accessed June 30, 2010) available from http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47da87822.html.

[135] OFDA responds to foreign disasters according to the following criteria: "the magnitude of the disaster exceeds the affected country's capacity to respond; the affected country has requested or will accept USG assistance; and it is in the interest of the USG to provide assistance." U.S. Agency for International Development, *Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response*, version 4.0, November 2005, (accessed June 30, 2010); available from www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster.../fog_v4.pdf pg. xix.

political instability and violent conflict may restrict civilian agencies' ability to operate effectively. In these environments, the joint force may initiate relief activities, while relying on civilian expertise to the extent possible, and work to set the conditions for transition to civilian responders. Effective civil-military cooperation in long-term planning for relief operations can significantly enhance reliable and efficient transition.

The joint force may also provide relief to facilitate its combat, security, or engagement activities, especially when an affected government is hostile, ineffective, or non-existent. For example, the joint force may provide critical relief to an affected population during combat to influence the population to foster a more permissive operational environment. In these instances, relief is a means to an end. This is in contrast to humanitarian assistance efforts where the end is solely to mitigate suffering and save lives.

Reconstruction

The joint force will focus its role in reconstruction on the restoration or improvement of critical infrastructure and essential services and those activities that facilitate combat or security operations. It will also focus on activities that foster a successful post-conflict transition, such as economic stabilization and effective governance.

"Critical" infrastructure implies *prioritizing* the restoration of systems. The sequence in which the joint force enables or conducts the restoration or improvement of roads, power, communication systems, water, and waste management systems will depend on the circumstances of each reconstruction mission, combat and security objectives, and the specific priorities of a host government and local population. "Essential" services include those social, political, and economic civil services that populations depend on their government, local actors or the private sector to provide to sustain their daily lives.

Essential civil services that the joint force may help restore or improve could include, but are not limited to, the provision of critical infrastructure such as roads, ports, power, energy, waste management, communication, essential service delivery (socio-economic-political) and small-scale employment generation through cash for work programs and business revitalization. Except during combat, the host government and the local population will usually set the relative priorities for infrastructure development and service delivery in collaboration with the joint force and its other partners. Host governments, indigenous institutions, civilian partners and the private sector are more desirable and sustainable leaders of long-term reconstruction. As such, the joint

force should defer to these partners and enable them to the greatest extent possible.

The joint force may enable and conduct reconstruction activities more frequently in insecure and politically unstable environments than in those that are benign. Stable environments may not require the same scale of joint force assistance for reconstruction as those affected by violent conflict. Rampant public disorder and lawlessness in a country will require significant joint force assistance to mitigate insecurity and facilitate reconstruction activities conducted during open conflict.

During combat operations, the joint force may need to build or restore infrastructure to facilitate combat or security, and will determine reconstruction priorities based on the joint force mission. For example, the joint force may need combat engineers to restore or enhance bridges to facilitate continued combat activities or facilitate movement for security forces. However, consideration of the full variety of post-conflict reconstruction requirements should be an influencing factor in the development of combat operations to avoid or minimize counterproductive consequences.

The Relationship between Relief and Reconstruction

A given situation may not require both relief and reconstruction activities. The appropriate activity -- either relief or reconstruction or some combination -- will depend on the nature and scale of a crisis. In situations that require both relief and reconstruction activities, the way the joint force and its partners design, plan, and execute the relief operation will fundamentally impact the design, plan, and execution of the reconstruction mission. Similarly, in situations where the joint force intends for relief or reconstruction activities to facilitate or follow combat or security activities, the planning for and conduct of combat or security will have a profound shaping impact on relief and reconstruction.

In support of USG civilian leadership, the joint force commander may have to make difficult decisions about which host government and local entities to empower as partners. He will have to consider difficult tradeoffs between the extent of immediate and direct provision of life saving assistance and essential services and reinforcing a community's own sources of resiliency and preparedness. Civilian and military leadership will have to consider whether to restore the status quo or pursue and support a country's transformation of fragile political, social, and economic systems. All of these choices -- about partners, priorities, and approaches -- will shape transitions between short-term relief

assistance and medium- to long-term[136] reconstruction activities. The joint force should, to the maximum degree possible, draw on the knowledge of and work closely with its USG civilian partners when making choices.

The joint force must strive to prepare, plan and execute support to relief and reconstruction activities in a manner that avoids a host government's and local population's long-term dependence on joint force assistance and paves the way for autonomous effective governance. Relative to other USG entities and, especially, the host government, the joint force will engage in relief and reconstruction activities for a shorter period. If directly conducting reconstruction activities, the joint force must set conditions early in its operations for a stable transition to host government or other USG or IO entities that will have a more enduring presence. USG support of integrated planning processes with and among host government and local partners can enhance their national and regional capacity to respond in an integrated manner and on a timely basis, thereby reducing contingent requirements for additional USG civilian and military resources.

Experts no longer consider relief and reconstruction activities as independent, sequential phases that progress linearly. Organizations and militaries that provide relief and reconstruction recognize the critical interdependencies across their missions and the imperatives of integrated planning among civilian and military actors involved in these operations. In situations requiring both relief and reconstruction, the joint force will plan and execute these activities to be mutually reinforcing to enhance conditions for success of both.

If managed effectively, reconstruction can help reduce a population's or host government's long-term vulnerability to disasters, helping them become more resilient and equipped to respond to future disasters. Similarly, relief can help build local preparedness and capability to respond to disasters, thus the joint force should take care not to create dependency on foreign assistance or exacerbate prolonged conflict which could derail reconstruction.

However, there are inherent tensions and tradeoffs between relief and reconstruction activities that may complicate the joint force's and its partners' intentions to pursue sustainability and plan for mutually reinforcing activities.[137] A critical tradeoff is the pressure on the USG

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[136] In this concept, medium term is 2 to 5 years and longer term is more than 5 years.

[137] Joint doctrine does not recognize the inherent tension between relief and reconstruction activities, nor the requirement for commanders to reconcile the tradeoffs between the two.

and international actors to provide immediate life saving assistance directly to a suffering population instead of indirectly by supporting the host government's capacity to provide the necessary life saving assistance and relief. The joint force's direct provision of assistance may risk making the host government and its population dependent on external assistance, thereby inadvertently degrading local capacity to respond and recover. The same tension between direct provision of assistance and long-term capacity building efforts applies to reconstruction activities, though these efforts may be slightly less time sensitive than relief activities.

Another tradeoff is between restoring the status quo and pursuing an opportunity for conflict transformation.[138] Some cases may limit relief and reconstruction activities to restoring conditions to pre-conflict or disaster levels. However, underlying social, economic, or political tensions and grievances may have sparked the onset of the disaster or conflict and, if left unaddressed, will continue to undermine relief and reconstruction in the future. This may also, in the long term, undermine or significantly affect the host government's relative legitimacy.

The joint force must be able to effectively plan for and manage complicated transitions: between phases of relief and reconstruction, between civilian and military roles and responsibilities, and in response to changing political and security dynamics. Anticipating and setting the appropriate conditions for smooth transitions, together with partners, will enable successful relief and reconstruction activities in the future.[139]

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[138] "Conflict transformation" is defined in U.S. Army doctrine as, "the process of reducing the means and motivations for violent conflict while developing more viable, peaceful alternatives for the competitive pursuit of political and socioeconomic aspirations." Training on planning for and conducting conflict transformation activities is required for all members of the U.S. Government Civilian Response Corps. The training guide, the *Whole of Government Planning and Execution System for Reconstruction and Stabilization Level I Planner's Guidebook,* defines "conflict transformation" as "the two-pronged approach of seeking to diminish the factors that cause violent conflict and instability while building the capacity of local institutions so they can take the lead role in national governance, economic development, and enforcing the rule of law. The goal of this process is to shift the responsibility for providing peace and stability from the international community to local actors, who can sustain their roles with minimal support from external actors." FM 3-07

[139] Joint planning is discussed in detail in the central idea and implications section of this concept.

3. RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION IN THE FUTURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

The *Joint Operating Environment* (*JOE*) describes a future characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and rapid change. Many of the patterns of potential instability forecasted in the *JOE* -- competition and potential conflict between rival state actors for enhanced political influence and access to natural resources, conflict fueled by unmet expectations, exacerbated by fragile economies and poor governance, and the increasing political influence of non-state actors such as militias and networked extremist organizations[140] -- collectively affect how the joint force will conduct relief and reconstruction activities in the future. Central to all future joint force relief and reconstruction activities will be the imperatives of thoughtful and timely action, especially given an operational environment that is highly dynamic and constantly changing. The future operating environment will not only require the joint force to be highly responsive to crises globally, but also to anticipate and prepare for future crises where it forecasts they are likely to occur.

Joint force relief and reconstruction in the future operating environment can be categorized according to two broad themes -- *competition* and *cooperation* -- and two complicating factors -- *increasing transparency* and *global financial constraints* -- that will condition how and with whom the joint force conducts these activities.[141]

Competition

A multiplicity of actors -- rival states, militias, networks, and other non-state actors -- competing with the joint force for increased political influence and access to natural resources -- will complicate the future operating environment for relief and reconstruction. The world's population grows by approximately 60 million people each year. Ninety-five percent of that growth will occur in the developing world,[142] generating increased demand for life sustaining resources such as food, water, and energy. Rival state powers may pursue expanded roles in reconstruction activities as they seek control over and access to natural resources to sustain their economies and their future energy needs.

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[140] *JOE 2010*, 5. 7. 23.

[141] The *NSS 2010* states that U.S. policy will "advance constructive cooperation" which "is essential to the security and prosperity of a specific region" and facilitates "global cooperation on issues ranging from violent extremism and nuclear proliferation, to climate change, and global economic instability." *NSS 2010,* 11.

[142] *JOE 2010*.

These competitors also may seek greater political influence in local and regional affairs. In some cases, the goals and objectives of rival powers may diverge significantly with the United States, contributing to an increasingly competitive or opposed environment for relief and reconstruction. The joint force may find itself in direct competition with these powers for influence and access.

Non-state actors such as militias or networked adversaries may also attempt to exploit power vacuums created in the wake of a violent conflict or significant disaster to gain control over valuable resources or the support of public opinion. "Conflict entrepreneurs" will capitalize on political, social, and economic vulnerabilities to gain greater power, access, and influence within a system. Several terrorist and insurgent groups have developed sophisticated social service networks to cultivate the loyalty of a population. For example, Hezbollah swiftly responded to the immediate relief and reconstruction needs of the Shia in Southern Lebanon after the war with Israel in summer 2006. They leveraged their extensive network of charities and social service providers to conduct detailed damage assessments of physical structures and provided money and services directly to survivors.[143] In the future operating environment, these groups will continue to effectively exploit power vacuums, competing with the joint force to influence populations and cultivate sympathetic supporters. The joint force and its partners should strive to synchronize actions, words, and images to convey a consistent message that effectively competes with those of our adversaries.

As a large, multilayered organization, with rules and regulations governing its action, the joint force, together with its USG partners, may struggle to compete with non-state actors or even other nation's militaries in the provision of rapid relief and reconstruction. Despite these limitations, which are likely enduring, the joint force must exploit technological innovations and more flexible organizational processes that will give it a competitive advantage to respond quickly and to capitalize early on windows of opportunity to conduct or enable relief and reconstruction activities. Otherwise, a delayed joint force response may enable its competitors to act more immediately, gaining a competitive edge in access and influence.

In the future operating environment, the joint force will also engage in a struggle between ideologies, values, and narratives. Underscoring the competition between rival ideologies and values is the "battle of narratives" where rival actors compete to influence and shape a population's perception. The propagation of global values of human

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[143] Shawn Teresa Flanigan and Mounah Abdel-Samad, "Hezbollah's Social Jihad: Nonprofits as Resistant Organizations," *Middle East Policy* 16 (Summer 2009).

dignity, tolerance, and respect directly challenge violent extremism, intolerant political ideologies and limited personal freedoms and can have a stabilizing influence. These values shape the nature of the social change the joint force and its partners are striving to achieve in contested environments and will fundamentally regulate how they conduct relief and reconstruction. The way the joint force conducts relief and reconstruction will have a profound shaping impact on the narrative.[144]

Cooperation

The future operating environment will also offer the joint force significant opportunities for cooperation with other states and their militaries, USG departments and agencies, international organizations, and local partners. The variety and complexity of partnerships between these disparate actors will complicate how the joint force enables and conducts relief and reconstruction activities in the future.

The extreme range of actors -- all with varying legal authorities and organizational cultures -- engaged in relief and reconstruction activities will make cooperation among them inherently complicated but essential. The challenge for the joint force will be to prioritize among the actors and organizations with whom it must partner and to develop a manageable model of coordination and collaboration with those partners. This will require the joint force to develop a deep understanding of how these organizations operate, their comparative advantages, and the constraints they face.

The future operating environment will require the joint force to develop various partnership models to enhance cooperation with civilian organizations that may be sensitive about working with the military. Especially when enabling or conducting relief activities, the joint force will need to maintain indirect relationships with humanitarian organizations, sensitive to the perception of alignment with military objectives, ideally through USG civilian agency representatives. In many cases, these organizations will have information on and access to hard-

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[144] The *National Security Strategy 2010* states "effective strategic communications are essential to sustaining global legitimacy and supporting our policy aims. Aligning our actions with our words is a shared (whole of government) responsibility that must be fostered by a culture of communication throughout government. We must also be more effective in our deliberate communication and engagement and do a better job understanding the attitudes, opinions, grievances, and concerns of peoples -- not just elites -- around the world. Doing so allows us to convey credible, consistent messages and to develop effective plans, while better understanding how our actions will be perceived. We must also use a broad range of methods for communicating with foreign publics, including new media."

to-reach communities or belligerent actors that the joint force would find valuable.

However, not all organizations will willingly share their information and access with the joint force. Some organizations will choose to disassociate themselves from the joint force. Others will develop a mutually beneficial relationship with the joint force, conducting joint planning and freely exchanging information. This cooperation will prove pivotal in an environment with increased transparency and financial and other constraints.

Increasing Transparency

Increasing transparency, fueled in part by new media and social networking Web sites, will further complicate this environment of competition and cooperation. In many cases, the real time transmission of images of vulnerable, exploited and suffering populations accelerates the demand signal for the USG to respond by providing relief or reconstruction assistance. This heightened transparency significantly raises the global public's expectations that the United States and its partners will provide swift assistance to ameliorate their suffering, though national interests may prevent the United States from responding. Such unmet expectations may limit U.S. ability to effectively and favorably shape global public opinion. Transparency will also expose U.S. actions to instantaneous and constant scrutiny, reducing its room for error and increasing the consequences of missteps.

Global Financial Constraints

Global financial constraints will also affect the ability of the United States, its partners, and its competitors to respond globally. Patterns of political, social, and economic instability in the future operating environment will demand significantly more resources and assistance at a time when U.S. capacity to respond may be financially constrained. The global financial crisis may reduce discretionary federal funds, significantly constraining the joint force and its partner's response capacity. To compensate for this impending reality, USG civilian and military entities must consider how best to leverage their respective comparative advantages while seeking financial management efficiencies. Financial constraints could encourage greater territoriality and protectionism among agencies and departments instead of engendering increased cooperation.

4. THE CHALLENGE OF RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION FOR THE FUTURE JOINT FORCE

The future operating environment--characterized by competition for access, resources and influence and the challenges of cooperation among disparate actors, unfolding against a backdrop of heightened transparency and global financial constraints--will complicate the joint force's ability to conduct relief and reconstruction at the same time there is increasing demand for these activities. Therefore, the joint force must conduct, or enable its partners to conduct, scalable and adaptive relief and reconstruction activities, accompanied by credible communication efforts, to sustain populations during or in the wake of combat, civil disorder, or a natural or man-made disaster, in the homeland or abroad.

5. A CONCEPT FOR FUTURE JOINT RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION

To meet the challenge of relief and reconstruction, the joint force will primarily enable its partners to provide, restore, and improve essential civil services and critical infrastructure. Though the future joint force will place a priority on enabling others' efforts, it will directly conduct relief and reconstruction activities when required. Focused attention to developing and communicating credible narratives in tandem with its partners will underscore all joint force relief and reconstruction activities. The joint force and its partners will design and conduct these activities to enhance the host government's legitimacy and effectiveness as the means to achieve enduring success.[145]

Every instance of relief or reconstruction will be different, depending on the environment, and will require the joint force to tailor the implementation of activities to the demands of the situation. However, there are common relief and reconstruction tasks that the joint force and its partners will conduct across differing environments and situations which are elaborated in the following section. The challenge for the future joint force commander is to design an effective approach, combining common relief or reconstruction tasks, as he accounts for multiple variables such as the variety and complexity of operational

[145] Some cases of relief or reconstruction may be very narrowly focused on limited objectives, for example rebuilding a port to conduct military operations or feeding populations to prevent them from overwhelming military supply lines. In most cases relief or reconstruction will involve aiding a country and helping it provide for itself, e.g., rebuilding its infrastructure and service provision capacity. In these cases, carrying out these activities in ways that enhances legitimacy and effectiveness in those countries will increase the likelihood of the long-term success and sustainability of that relief or reconstruction effort.

partners, variances in the scope and scale of required tasks, and the appropriate sequencing of those tasks. To be successful, the future joint force commander must understand the complex interrelationships among these variables, and then develop a plan in collaboration with key partners, that allows for synchronization of efforts to address these complexities during mission execution.

Collectively, the joint force and its partners must regularly validate their strategic and operational planning assumptions and adapt the plan accordingly through continuous assessments of the environment and the dynamics that animate it. An integrated planning process that effectively aligns partners' expectations, timelines and outcomes is critical. By making the intended outcome explicit early in the planning process, the joint force commander can benchmark his progress, evaluate his real or intended impact in concert with partners, and plan for follow-on activities as he assesses and then adapts to changing circumstances.

Legitimacy and Effectiveness

Relief and reconstruction activities will be most successful and have an enduring positive impact if the joint force conducts them in ways that help build the legitimacy of the affected government and enhance the effectiveness of its capacity to sustain the population.[146] This concept defines *legitimacy* as the population's perception that indigenous governance structures are fair and act in its interests.[147] *Effectiveness,* in this concept, is the capacity or ability of government and indigenous governance structures to ensure order and deliver public goods and services. A strategic goal for relief or reconstruction is enhanced legitimacy and effectiveness of the host government.[148] This goal may

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[146] Reinforcing the primacy placed on legitimacy and effectiveness in the JRRC. This issue of legitimacy and effectiveness as the cornerstones of stability in a country or region is being addressed in future joint doctrine. (JP 3-07, Draft).

[147] Legitimacy and effectiveness are defined similarly in by the U.S. Agency for International Development and in joint doctrine. The JRRC's definitions are broader to include informal governance structures such as indigenous institutions or traditional legitimizing entities in addition to formal government institutions.JP 3-07, Draft ; U.S Agency for International Development, *Fragile States Strategy* (accessed June 30, 2010); available at www.usaid.gov/policy/2005_fragile_states_strategy.pdf.

[148] While doctrinal publications identify the importance of legitimacy and effectiveness, the JRRC further develops them as two key criteria the joint force is to employ in designing, executing and assessing relief and reconstruction activities. This concept presents legitimacy and effectiveness as a construct to assess the specific situation and guide the type of action the joint force engages in and with whom it partners. The concept employs legitimacy and effectiveness as *variable* criteria (i.e., a sliding scale, which section seven of this concept elaborates) to inform how the joint force will conduct relief and reconstruction activities differently across multiple contexts, according to a government's particular standing and its capability to achieve the desired results.

take decades to realize fully. However, the joint force's and its partners' actions in the short- to medium-term can influence incremental progress toward achieving more capable, effective and trusted governance in the future.

In this concept, *legitimacy* describes credible and accountable action by the joint force and its partners. Successful relief and reconstruction will not only depend on how an affected population perceives its governing institutions, but also whether it perceives the joint force as acting equitably and in its interest. Joint force actions are most effective if the affected population deems them credible and legitimate.

To the extent possible, the joint force should plan, prepare, and execute relief and reconstruction activities, together with its partners, to facilitate the transition between its immediate mission and the establishment of a host government that is legitimate and effective. At times, awaiting action from partners or the affected government can seem to slow the joint force commander's planned progress, but the joint force commander must weigh the impact of moving ahead separately against potential consequences of not fully synchronizing with all partners.

A legitimate government that can credibly determine the population's relief and reconstruction priorities is the ideal partner for the joint force, as it can best ensure the long-term success of the endeavor. However, there will be situations where the joint force must deal with governments as they exist. In these cases, where the government is exploitative and predatory and thus part of the problem, the joint force and its partners should seek indigenous institutions and other legitimizing structures as partners. Section seven of this concept elaborates how the joint force will conduct or enable relief and reconstruction activities differently when a government faces a legitimacy or effectiveness deficit. In these difficult environments, the joint force commander must carefully calculate the political impact of relief and reconstruction activities. Successful relief and reconstruction outcomes optimally require an effective government to progressively assume maintenance, administration, and funding of reconstituted or newly developed systems. Where effective government does not exist, the joint force may transition its reconstruction activities to international or other civilian partners who will fill the void.

When conditions limit legitimacy and effectiveness, the host government is less likely to be capable of conducting its own relief and reconstruction in a sustained or ultimately successful manner. In these circumstances, many rival state and non-state powers may intervene to

seek access and influence to capitalize on and exploit a government's lack of capacity to meet the expectations of the population. Indeed, the government's very incapacity often acts as an engine of instability in a country or region. An inability to meet the population's expectation of political representation, safety, economic livelihoods, or essential services may drive instability within a region. In this context, the joint force will enable its partners, and when required, directly conduct relief or reconstruction activities in a manner that facilitates the legitimacy and effectiveness of the affected government to provide for the essential needs of the population. However, the joint force may also find itself enabling or conducting relief and reconstruction activities in environments where the host government enjoys strong legitimacy and effectiveness. In all contexts, however, the joint force should be cognizant of the impact its approach to relief and reconstruction will have on the relative legitimacy and effectiveness of a state or indigenous institutions and actors. Section seven of this concept details a diagnostic tool for the joint force to determine what environment it is operating in and, therefore, what its ideal approach is to conducting and enabling relief and reconstruction.

Enable and Conduct

The joint force primarily will enable its partners' relief and reconstruction efforts to provide, restore, or improve essential civil services and critical infrastructure. In most cases, civilian partners and agencies have the appropriate authorities, capabilities, and technical knowledge to effectively plan and implement relief and reconstruction activities. When enabling its partners, the joint force will maximize its comparative advantages to complement those of its partners. For example, senior leaders may task the joint force to support these civilian entities by providing or participating in a framework for coordination to integrate its activities into the broader relief effort. Increasingly, DOS and DOD ask USAID Mission Directors to jointly plan and approve joint force projects implemented using Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funds. Additionally, USAID and DOS officers embedded at combatant commands are helping shape the TCPs to ensure synchronization with the goals and objectives of the country team's strategic plans. The geographic combatant commanders should also ensure TCPs specifically recommend creation of a civil-military operations capability within our partner government's security forces to conduct or support relief and reconstruction activities.

Circumstances in the operational area and its partners' relative capabilities and capacity to conduct relief and reconstruction will condition the joint force's proportionality of effort relative to its partner's. When directed and practicable, the joint force should shore up pressing capacity deficits of civilian partner organizations.

Circumstances such as extreme insecurity, the imperatives of rapid response, and limited physical access may require the joint force to initially conduct a wide range of tasks to provide, restore, or improve essential services and critical infrastructure. When confronted with violent conflict, only the joint force has the capability to effectively neutralize deadly threats while protecting itself and its civilian partners. In these situations, however, circumstances will require the joint force to either enable or conduct the provision, restoration, or improvement of essential services while also facilitating an immediate combat or security function. Restoring power, providing health care, purifying water, updating sewer systems, and collecting trash are significantly more complex while in combat or in other situations of extreme insecurity. In these cases, the joint force's and its partners' collective challenge will be to identify critical vulnerabilities in services, systems, and infrastructure and prioritize their reconstitution for a maximum stabilizing impact. This will require identifying the appropriate local entities who can influence relief or reconstruction activities and partnering with them to secure and rebuild the priority systems, infrastructure and services. The joint force should prioritize reconstruction projects that are highly visible and deliver early tangible benefits to a population.

A benign environment cannot be a precondition for reconstruction. Rather, incremental progress across all lines of an operation -- essential services, economic pluralism, governance, training security forces, and combat -- creates mutually reinforcing benefits and, collectively, stabilizes communities. Progress can also create early opportunities for transition of activities from the joint force to host government and civilian actors.[149]

Whether conducting or enabling relief or reconstruction the joint force, together with its partners, will employ coordinating mechanisms to achieve unity of effort. Civil-military operational platforms such as provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), civil-military planning cells, and fusion centers are all examples of innovative approaches to achieving unity of effort by planning, coordinating, and integrating partner and joint force activities through rapid sharing of information and coordinating activities. To further drive unity of effort, the joint force will implement an integrated pre-deployment training regimen to enhance joint planning, assessment, and project implementation tools among civilian and military partners. The implications section of this concept offers additional detail.

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[149] Peter Chiarelli and Patrick Michaelis, "Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations," *Military Review* (July-August 2005).

Though USG civilian agencies are increasing their expeditionary and crisis contingency planning capacity, the joint force still maintains a comparative advantage in rapid response for complex operations conducted in hostile and austere environments and in crisis response and scenario based contingency planning. However, USG civilian departments and agencies have always recruited, deployed, and retained officers with significant regional and technical expertise to lead relief and reconstruction activities. The challenge for the joint force, and DOD more broadly, will be to support other USG departments and agencies in exercising their expeditionary capacity to meet the demand signal generated by increasingly complex operations.

If the U.S. mission of an affected country does not possess the required technical expertise, the joint force will be capable of rapidly deploying in tailored, integrated civilian-military teams to lead early cross-functional assessments and to catalyze immediate relief and reconstruction planning efforts and implementation. For example, structural assessments of damaged facilities such as ports, airfields, bridges and hospitals that enable relief and reconstruction activities are an urgent requirement though the civilian capability to conduct these assessments is relatively limited. However, as USG civilian partners expand their expeditionary capability and capacity, the demands on joint force capabilities should diminish over time.

Preparation for scalable all-hazard responses for the Homeland will continue to be a key civil support mission. When responding to an event inside the United States, DOD will enable civilian authorities at Federal, tribal, State, and local levels. The joint force will enable civilian authorities, as directed, when requested by civilian leadership of the State or territory or when tasked directly by the President or Secretary of Defense. The ever-present threat posed by natural hazards like earthquakes and hurricanes will likely not dissipate in the future. The joint force will continue to collaborate with partners from the Federal government, the States, and the private sector to coordinate responses.

Sustaining the joint force's distributed units and enabling the sustainment needs of partners during relief and reconstruction places unique demands on joint logistics capabilities. Effective sustainment is critical as units are increasingly operating over long distances for extended periods, potentially exceeding their organic logistics and support capabilities and capacity. Therefore, the joint force must be capable of rapidly assessing mission requirements and building a tailored logistics and support package to sustain its needs and those of its partners. To the extent possible, joint sustainment planners should seek to identify the sustainment needs of other interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners during the planning of the

operation. Prefabricated and prepositioned logistical packages, tailored to specific regional environments and organized according to delivery method (i.e., rail, river, air drop) may help enable a rapid response.[150] Investing in pre-disaster assessments focused on identifying existing sources of resiliency and preparedness in vulnerable countries and regions can also help streamline response time and ensure the joint force leverages appropriate assets.

Relief and reconstruction require a swift response; yet, the disaster or conflict will likely significantly deplete available resources in the affected environment that could enable a rapid response (i.e., water, power). Therefore, the joint force and its partners must be cautious not to overly strain limited resources and should plan accordingly for sustainment of their activities. In a future operating environment of increased competition between responders, the joint force must deploy with as light a footprint as possible and capitalize on emerging technologies that generate operational efficiencies. For example, current experiments are testing whether the trash and rubble that is cleared from disaster areas could be used to generate electricity and power joint force operations centers or local government buildings and community centers. Various organizations are conducting experiments to develop a capsule that will efficiently refuel gas tanks. If successful, this innovation could help replace over 40% of bulk liquids shipped to enable relief and reconstruction activities.[151] In the longer term, DOD should design and tailor emerging technologies to local capacity for sustainment. Technologies that enable rapid reaction and provide efficiencies for responders should be left behind to support community's development needs.

6. FUNCTIONS OF JOINT RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION

The JRRC uses the term "functions"[152] to depict the tasks conducted or enabled by the joint force during relief and reconstruction activities. The JRRC builds on the traditional warfighting joint functions -- command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver,

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[150] United States Joint Forces Command, *Joint Distributed Operations Project Commander's Handbook (draft)* (Suffolk: Department of Defense, 16Jun10), 49-50.

[151] LTG (ret) John Goodman (Director of Center of Excellence for Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response at Pacific Command) in discussion with the author.

[152] Joint functions are defined as "related capabilities and activities grouped together to help joint force commanders synchronize, integrate, and direct joint operations. Functions that are common to joint operations at all levels of war fall into six basic groups: command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment." JP 1-02.

protection, and sustainment -- by introducing provide, restore and improve as well as communicate credibly as key functions of joint relief and reconstruction activities. As described in the previous section, the joint force will conduct or enable these functions specific to relief and reconstruction with a goal of enhancing the host government's legitimacy and effectiveness in sustaining its population. Accordingly, the provision, restoration and improvement of essential services and critical infrastructure, reinforced by credible communication efforts, will help the joint force commander integrate, synchronize, and direct joint relief and reconstruction activities.[153]

Provide, Restore, Improve

Figure JRRC-1 illustrates common relief and reconstruction tasks.

Relief Tasks	Reconstruction Tasks
The immediate or short-term provision, restoration, improvement in following services/systems and infrastructure: •Water and sanitation; •Energy and electricity; •Food and nutrition; •Emergency transportation; •Shelter and non-food items; •Search, rescue, and recovery; •Health systems; •Telecommunications; •Protection of vulnerable populations; •Hazards reduction and foreign consequence management; and •Short term measures to resume economic/commercial activity.	**The medium to longer-term provision, restoration, improvement in following services/systems and infrastructure:** •Critical infrastructure such as roads, ports, power, energy, waste management, and telecommunications; and •Essential service delivery (socio-economic-political), such as: •Public information and communications; •Transitional governance; •Small scale employment generation through cash for work programs and business revitalization; and •Anti-corruption mechanisms.
Cross-cutting Tasks	
•Assessment: Conduct early and frequent assessments to determine the scope and relative priorities of needs. Conduct regular conflict assessments to identify opportunities for mitigation and stakeholder analysis to identify credible partners and effectively manage spoilers and illicit power structures. •Planning: Conduct ongoing integrated planning with critical partners. •Information management: Develop and communicate credible narratives, reinforced by action. Support the affected government's ability to communicate with its population. •Transition: Set the conditions for transition, between phases of relief and reconstruction, between civilian and military roles and responsibilities, and in response to changing political and security dynamics	

Figure JRRC-1 Common Relief and Reconstruction Tasks

[153] Corresponding to the CCJO, the JRRC categorizes relief and reconstruction as "activities", together with combat, security, and engagement. "Functions" are subordinate and specific to each category of activity and are comprised of specific "tasks".

Relief tasks include those focused on the immediate and short-term priority of saving lives, reducing suffering and mitigating the impacts of natural or man-made disasters. Reconstruction tasks are those social, economic, and political services and infrastructure that meet the needs of and, ultimately, sustain a population.

Underpinning all these tasks is continuous assessment and stakeholder analysis and ongoing integrated planning with critical partners. Effective information management between the joint force and its partners and with local populations is essential, as is setting the conditions for successful transition, both of which cut across all relief and reconstruction tasks. In all contexts, several variables will affect the sequence or simultaneity of tasks and their relative priorities. These variables include: the extent of degradation or damage to critical infrastructure, the extent of restoration required to fulfill the strategic objectives of a particular relief or reconstruction mission, the limits of host government absorptive capacity, local political will and priorities, and local cultural norms and expectations.

The joint force's superior logistical capabilities make it an ideal partner to enable the provision of essential services. The joint force will employ innovative solutions for basing at sea and sustaining forces and partners from pre-positioned supply stations. This will allow the joint force to execute swift and timely relief or reconstruction activities, whether it is directly conducting these activities or enabling its partners.

In addition to leveraging its logistics capabilities as an enabler, the joint force will augment projects managed by civilian agencies with specialized capabilities. For example, the joint force may provide dedicated forces with technical relief and reconstruction expertise (e.g., civil affairs units and engineers) to advise and assist its partners. It may direct its engineers to provide quality assurance and quality control (QA/QC) oversight on structures contracted or funded by USAID and built by local partners. For example, the joint force might provide the logistical and engineering support required to build a school while USAID's local partners hire and train teachers and coordinate the curriculum and the provision of supplies with the district and provincial council and the Ministry of Education. However, not all specialized assistance is exclusively focused on construction. For example, the joint force's partners may call on it to provide elections support, as it did in both Iraq and Afghanistan, to help facilitate credible and secure elections that lead to effective governance.

Cultivating and supporting local partners to conduct relief and reconstruction is essential. The joint force challenge is to empower local public and private partners to lead relief and reconstruction efforts and

to help make their contributions as visible as possible to the affected populations. In many cases, these partners will face significant capacity and effectiveness deficits. The joint force can help mitigate these deficits by relying on local labor and skills to implement relief and reconstruction tasks, and on the training capacity inherently available within the joint force, thereby building the capacity of local organizations and professionals. The joint force should minimize its role in these activities to the extent practicable, especially in insecure areas where accepting assistance from the U.S. military can make beneficiaries a target. One of the many ways to do this when responding to a disaster is by leveraging supply distribution centers. Authorities may task the joint force to deliver USAID's or FEMA's relief supplies to a central staging area where local leaders and organizations distribute the goods directly to the population. In these situations, the joint force and its partners should employ locals as equitably as possible with sensitivity to local dynamics.

In some cases, circumstances may require the joint force to conduct relief and reconstruction tasks directly. The joint force should be cautious, however, that over-reliance on direct provision of support may cultivate a population's dependency on joint force assistance, undercutting local capacity and ownership and making it more difficult for the joint force to transition and conclude its assistance.

The USG's broader foreign policy goals in a country will determine how and to what extent the joint force is to restore or improve essential services and critical infrastructure. The joint force commander must work with the chief of mission to ensure that joint force actions are supporting these objectives. If the joint force's or its partners' objective is to restore services and infrastructure, it will seek to achieve a similar level of functionality and capacity that existed before the conflict or disaster. If restoring the status quo is the guiding priority, the joint force will focus on restoring "just enough" socio-economic and political services and supporting infrastructure to facilitate an acceptable level of functionality that meets the mission criteria.

Improving services and infrastructure, however, requires a commitment to raise their quality and character to a more desirable condition than what previously existed. Though reconstruction is often focused on the short- to medium-term needs of a population, the joint force must integrate improvements in services and infrastructure into a long-term development plan, orchestrated by its partners. Long-term improvement will be the responsibility of the host government or civilian agencies as the joint force commitment will be more limited in scope and duration. However, the joint force can contribute knowledge and awareness of new technologies and integrated systems to help catalyze local partners' development. Examples of joint force contributions might

include working with local partners to install fiber or cellular communications systems where none previously existed, or, when called on, the joint force may teach agricultural communities about advances in sustainable farming techniques. While its partners will lead the effort in long-term improvement projects, senior leaders may call on the joint force to improve infrastructure to facilitate other joint force tasks and activities. For example, the joint force may replace old bridges in a country, improving their quality to accommodate heavy vehicle traffic, or, it may improve the capacity of airfields to facilitate heavy lift aircraft.

The joint force, together with its partners, will prioritize reconstruction activities that demonstrate tangible progress and benefits to a population in operations where gaining the support of the population is vital to the overall success of the mission. For example, hiring local labor to clear trash from city streets and markets, or establishing business parks to catalyze local business development can help set the conditions for long-term reconstruction, which the joint force's partners will sustain while building a community's sense of confidence in its environment and its future.

Typically, relief includes the stages of response, recovery, and restoration. Tasks undertaken in the first stage, initial response, focus on saving and sustaining life, such as urban search and rescue and the provision of emergency food, water, shelter, and sanitation. Recovery follows an immediate response where tasks are oriented to reestablish commercial and governmental infrastructure and services to a population. During the final stage of relief, restoration tasks set the conditions for medium- to long-term improvements to services and infrastructure, either by restoring the status quo or improving their quality and condition beyond pre-disaster levels. During relief, the joint force may heavily engage during the initial response but redeploy in large numbers from the affected area as the relief operation begins to focus on restoration.[154]

The joint force will need to rely on the knowledge, insights, and skills of its partners to ensure successful relief and reconstruction. Authorities may ask the joint force to conduct or enable activities for which it has no formal knowledge or training. In the future operating environment, the joint force will continue to support the restoration or improvement of a wide variety of degraded social, political, and economic systems. The challenge for the joint force commander will be to identify

[154] These stages are identified and described in FM 3-07. However, combatant commands may label the phases of their relief activities according to different terms as USSOUTHCOM did during the Haiti 2010 earthquake response. USSOUTCOM's Haiti response began with initial response, followed by relief, restoration and stabilization and concluded with recovery. Terminology may be situationally dependent.

and develop partnerships with local, international, and other USG entities possessing the requisite knowledge and experience. The joint force commander should establish coordination mechanisms, or synchronize with existing ones, which promote collaborative information sharing at all levels. These may draw on the joint force's ability to assess, analyze, integrate and share multiple streams of critical information, which can enable all partners to better understand, visualize, describe and direct a comprehensive relief and reconstruction effort.

The primacy of credible communication

The increasingly transparent environment, which allows observers to spotlight and analyze joint force activities in real time, presents both a challenge and an opportunity for the joint force. The joint force should be aware that its actions and methods are under continuous scrutiny by supporters and opponents around the world. Transparent communications, a pervasive media environment, and the saturation of social media and networking all provide opportunities to build a positive narrative around the joint force's role and utility in the provision of life saving assistance, essential services, and critical infrastructure. Strategic communication and the dissemination of credible messages, reinforced by joint force activities and conduct (matching words with deeds), enhance relief activities and facilitate transparency during reconstruction activities.[155] In this environment, the actions or words of a single individual can have strategic and lasting impacts. The joint force must understand that it is competing in a media environment in which some people may not always portray its actions favorably. Therefore, the joint force must assess the biases of leading media outlets in an effort to better understand and influence public opinion.

Heightened transparency of action can have both a positive and a negative impact for the joint force. For example, when the joint force responds to a disaster swiftly and capably, positively impacting the lives of those who are suffering, media campaigns help spotlight the success and benefits of joint force action. The international media carefully tracked and widely covered the joint force's successful role in the 2004

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[155] According to the *Strategic Communications Joint Integrating Concept*, "few things will damage credibility and legitimacy more than a disconnect between what is said and what is done." Furthermore, while a coordinated message improves the joint force credibility, it is important to note that, "the joint force will not necessarily 'speak with one voice,' but with harmonious voices -- there is a difference -- since the situation will rarely be universal across an area of operations." U.S. Joint Staff, *Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept* (accessed June 30, 2010); available from http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/jic.htm, 12.

tsunami response. This provided a unique opportunity to influence Indonesian public opinion more favorably toward the United States. Segments of the population that had previously held negative opinions of the United States were significantly more supportive of U.S. interests and our military in particular, as a result of the relief activities. In some cases, however, this transparent environment creates negative fall-out. Therefore, effectively managing expectations will be essential for joint force relief and reconstruction activities globally.

A well-managed and timely strategic communication campaign that widely disseminates information on relief and reconstruction goals, objectives, beneficiaries, and partners is a critical component of transparent and accountable activities. However, the joint force should be aware that its diverse partners might have goals and objectives that are divergent from their own and, as a result, may not be fully synchronized. Information and education about specific relief and reconstruction activities are critical for U.S. domestic audiences as well as communities receiving joint force assistance abroad. However, in hostile environments where insurgents kill beneficiaries and destroy projects, the joint force must balance transparent distribution of information against the importance of maintaining operations security (OPSEC) and coordinate with civilian partners and beneficiaries.

Relief and reconstruction activities can provide opportunities for the joint force to communicate information and influence perceptions to build host government legitimacy. The way the joint force conducts relief and reconstruction will have a profound shaping impact on the narrative. For example, Islamist extremists exploit the perception that the West threatens Islamic identity and values, “justifying” violent action to protect their cultural identity and to guard against any sense of humiliation. To counter this perception, the joint force and its partners should engage locally trusted opinion leaders, such as traditional and religious leaders, to help disseminate messages that will resonate with the targeted population. Engaging religious communities in relief and reconstruction activities will help assure that activities are in accordance with the religious norms of a community.

Though the “battle of narratives” is essential, the joint force commander and his staff must also support targeted efforts to promote the host government’s legitimacy and ability to tell its own story. The joint force must incorporate this critical consideration in a comprehensive TCP, which determines the role, function, and differentiation of both public affairs and strategic communication capability within a host government's military. A key effort during these types of operations is building partnership capacity with the host nation forces in conducting information and influence operations. This includes

the ability to train and advise foreign forces in the planning and conduct of strategic communication and public affairs. This effort should highlight the host government's ability to meet the needs of its population. Winning the "battle of narratives" will depend on effectively leveraging the U.S. and the host government's information operations capabilities in support of relief and reconstruction activities.

7. EXAMPLES OF CONCEPT APPLICATION

This section of the concept explores how a host government's relative legitimacy and effectiveness conditions the joint force's approach to relief and reconstruction. The model presented below is a diagnostic tool to help the joint force assess what environment it is operating in and how that environment will affect its role in enabling partners or conducting itself the provision, restoration or improvement of services and infrastructure. The joint force should tailor its approach to relief and reconstruction according to the existing government's standing and capability to achieve the optimum results.

Figure JRRC-2 (on the following page) describes how multiple variables -- the operating environment, the joint force role, and the range of potential partnerships -- affect relief and reconstruction activities, based on the degree of the host government's legitimacy and effectiveness.[156]

[156] Thirty government members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) developed guidance on promoting stronger service delivery in fragile states. The model used here draws inspiration from the best practices and service delivery models identified by the OECD/DAC and from the discussion of legitimacy and effectiveness in USAID's *Fragile States Strategy*. It builds on donor community insights and guidelines by identifying and mapping windows of opportunity and approaches for the joint force to conduct relief or reconstruction activities. Organization Economic Cooperation and Development, *Service Delivery in Fragile States: Key Concepts, Findings and Lessons* (accessed June 30, 2010); available from www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/54/40886707.pdf.



Figure JRRC-2 Host Government's Legitimacy and Effectiveness Variables

High effectiveness/low legitimacy. In this case, a government with significant capacity to ensure public order and deliver services faces a legitimacy deficit as its population does not perceive it to be working in their interest. Saddam Hussein's dictatorship is an example of a government with high effectiveness and low legitimacy. Though essential services were provided, they were apportioned selectively to the political elite and favored religious groups. The regime misused the United Nations program to provide food for oil in this manner. In such environments, the joint force should assess to what extent the political regime has captured and is controlling state resources. The government may intentionally polarize communities and exacerbate conflict dynamics to fuel its own political interests.

Whether enabling or conducting relief or reconstruction assistance during combat or counterinsurgency operations, the joint force should attempt to develop collaborative partnerships, when possible, with informal or traditional governance structures such as community councils, assemblies of tribal elders, or faith based groups. The joint force, together with its partners, should provide, restore or improve essential services and infrastructure at the grass-roots level to those who the leaders have excluded from government-provided services. This will

help generate alternatives to those services provided directly by a government with limited legitimacy. In this case, the joint force should exercise caution when conducting relief or reconstruction activities and avoid reinforcing a strong but predatory host government. The immediate goal is to manage relief or reconstruction activities in a manner that builds the legitimacy of local governance structures. Once authorities establish or restore a more legitimate political presence at the national level, the joint force and its partners can reinforce linkages between local governance structures and formal government representatives. The joint force must also consider the long-term consequences of empowering local actors with competing political agendas or of dubious legitimacy, such as warlords and militia leaders. For example, the joint force leveraged warlords' networks in Afghanistan to transport humanitarian supplies to inaccessible populations. Empowering such non-state actors in the wake of the Taliban regime undermined future reconstruction activities and the Afghan Government's process of legitimate state formation. *How* the joint force conducts relief and reconstruction in low legitimacy environments is particularly sensitive and is often more important than *what* goods and materials it provides. Given the intense political sensitivities of dealing with sub-national armed groups in relief and reconstruction contexts, the joint force should coordinate planned activities of this type closely with Department of State (DOS) officials.

Hypothetical Illustration.[157] For example, if the future joint force together with its partners went to war with a belligerent regime it could confront a daunting humanitarian crisis, potentially significant political instability, lawlessness, and, in some cases, the catastrophic threat of nuclear weapons. In this scenario, existing state institutions and infrastructure could be overwhelmed, and the United States would need to be prepared to address multiple relief and reconstruction challenges to include mass migrations, a population in need, and degraded or destroyed infrastructure.

A highly effective but belligerent regime would likely have a well developed security sector through which it would oppress and exploit its population. Under these circumstances, during and after combat with the US, multiple political and military factions might compete for control over resources and political influence, exerting active resistance against the central government and, potentially, catalyzing the dissolution of a once highly effective but now fracturing regime. This instability could

[157] This illustration and all subsequent ones in this section demonstrate the application of the key components of the JRRC's solution -- legitimacy and effectiveness; enable and conduct; provide, restore and improve; and the primacy of credible communication.

have devastating consequences if weapons of mass destruction were not immediately secured.

Successful relief and reconstruction during or in the wake of combat would require a swift response to prevent potentially widespread lawlessness and chaos. The joint force, together with multinational peacekeeping forces and regional actors would need to rapidly deliver life saving assistance and set the conditions for medium- to long-term reconstruction.

In many cases, an illegitimate and belligerent regime might be supported by rivals of the United States. The investments of rival powers could improve the effectiveness of an illegitimate regime by helping to bolster its capacity to quell internal political dissent. Rival powers might also have cultivated economic influence in the country by restoring and improving its infrastructure. In this scenario, the future joint force would likely be confronted with multiple competitors seeking increased access and influence in the country.

High effectiveness/high legitimacy. A government with both high effectiveness and high legitimacy is a fair, effective and accountable government that protects its population and meets their social, economic, and political aspirations. In this case, a capable and accountable government in partnership with a viable private sector and an informed population effectively manages and regulates life saving relief, the provision of essential services, and the restoration of infrastructure. The United States and countries in Western Europe are good examples of highly effective and legitimate states as are middle-income developing countries such as Brazil, South Africa, and India.

In this case, the joint force would have a more limited role in relief and reconstruction activities in support of a host government strongly in the lead. However, senior leaders might be call on the joint force to provide immediate medical assistance, search and rescue or personnel recovery support, specialty communications or logistics assistance, and augmentation of emergency transportation to the government on a short-term basis.

Historic Illustration. The joint force's immediate response to Hurricane Katrina, a category three storm, which devastated the city of New Orleans in August 2005, offers an example of a challenging domestic disaster response despite strong effectiveness and legitimacy of the State governments and the Federal Government.

Though some Federal, local and State authorities were initially slow to react, the joint force responded within 24 hours of the storm's

end. Despite this swift response, Federal, State, and local agencies' early search and rescue efforts were not well synchronized. Competing demands over airspace ownership, management, and use exacerbated this problem. To meet this challenge, the joint force established a combined air operations center to coordinate, track, and schedule life saving flight missions. Navy and Coast Guard pilots provided immediate life saving assistance to a distressed population, rescuing stranded individuals and families from their rooftops and flying them to safety on higher ground.

In the frenzied early days of the response, the only sources of information to inform the planning process were regular media reports by expeditionary journalists. Stationary television and radio towers were significantly damaged in the hurricane, hindering local, State, and Federal responders' communication with the affected population. This resulted in the population's lack of information and, ultimately, assurance during the critical early stages of the response. A saturated media environment, however, exacerbated the domestic political imperatives to demonstrate joint force presence and effectiveness. Therefore, even after joint force assets exceeded their utility, they maintained a visible and sustained presence in an effort to assure the population.

With little information, limited pre-crisis planning, and an environment of extreme uncertainty, the joint force acted swiftly to save lives and provide life-sustaining supplies such as water and food in the absence of an early, coordinated whole of government response. The U.S.S. Iwo Jima supported the immediate relief efforts by acting as a central command center for Federal, State, and local disaster recovery operations. The Iwo Jima also served as a platform for helicopters flying rescue missions and distributing supplies. Additionally, the ship provided immediate medical and surgical support to disaster victims and exported energy into the city of New Orleans to sustain generators.

The joint force, together with its partners, should designate locations throughout the country for receiving, staging, moving, and integrating critical supplies to ensure more effective employment of Federal disaster relief personnel and assets in the future. To enhance unity of effort in the future, relevant federal, state, and local decision makers should be co-located during response management with leaders of State National Guards and other members of the joint force.[158]

Low legitimacy/low effectiveness. In this case, a government may not have a legitimate monopoly on violence nor the ability to

[158]U.S. Northern Command, *Lessons Learned Progress Review* (May 9, 2006).

establish public order. It may not have control over its territory or populations nor would its population perceive it to be accountable for their needs. Some analysts have identified the government of Afghanistan in 2009, in the wake of presidential election irregularities and besieged by the Taliban insurgency, as an example of a government with low legitimacy and low effectiveness. In contrast to governments with high effectiveness and low legitimacy, low effectiveness suggests that a host government may not have an effective presence in all of its territory. These areas are not ungoverned, however, as some communities may have their own traditional local governance structures that the joint force must respect and, ultimately, leverage. In these environments, community groups, elders, and local governance structures will be important partners for the joint force in the provision of relief and reconstruction assistance.

Governments in this category will likely be politically fractured by a multiplicity of actors asserting their political agendas and playing identity politics. In this case, the joint force may likely play a more extensive role together with its partners, since the host government lacks both legitimacy and effectiveness. The joint force must conduct careful conflict assessments and regular stakeholder analysis to identify potentially competing political agendas among local actors. This can take a substantial amount of time and resources to do well. The strategic objectives of a relief or reconstruction operation, developed through an integrated planning process, will inform which local actors the joint force partners with and which ones it will intentionally marginalize. The joint force must exercise care so that its engagement with local actors does not further undermine the already fragile central government.

Historic Illustration. Joint force reconstruction activities in southern Afghanistan illustrate the challenges of service provision when a partner government is weak and does not enjoy strong popular support throughout its territory. In Helmand province, the joint force is enabling the district governor of Marja to build greater credibility and trust within a politically fractured population, regularly coerced and victimized by Taliban insurgents. In this environment, Marine Corps civil affairs projects provide cash incentives to the local population to build small-scale infrastructure and to clear debris and rubble. The joint force is also providing compensation payments to the population for damage rendered during combat and clearing operations. In an effort to build his popular base of support, the district governor must approve all payments within the community.

There is no formal vetting system regulating the beneficiaries of joint force assistance in Helmand. Therefore, the Taliban and its

supporters may be benefiting directly from these cash infusions, in some cases buying components for IEDs to strike back at the joint force and local government officials. Further, the Taliban regularly victimizes or kills the local managers of the cash for work programs for supporting joint force and local government initiatives.[159]

Further, disputes over how to enhance the electricity supply in Kandahar province illustrate the potential friction that can occur between civilian and military partners conducting reconstruction activities in highly contested and violent environments. The joint force advocates that by expanding the supply of electricity in Kandahar City through the provision of multiple generators and millions of gallons of fuel, the population will reject the Taliban and begin to support its district government. However, USAID and DOS reject this approach as counterproductive to long-term stability since it is unlikely that the local government could sustain this investment. As an alternative, USAID and DOS advocate for smaller scale improvements or capacity building initiatives to help the electric utility in Kandahar collect fees to buy fuel for existing generators.[160]

Given that the host government is struggling for control over its territory and population in Afghanistan, the joint force role in reconstruction will necessarily be much greater than in other cases. The political complexities of reconstruction in this environment present profound challenges for the joint force and its U.S. Government and local partners. However, in hostile and politically volatile environments like Afghanistan, the joint force is a necessary partner for civilian organizations.

High legitimacy/low effectiveness. In states with fair but weak governments, a variety of actors may likely provide essential services seeking to stem the government's significant capacity deficit. In this case, the government, supplemented by a nascent private sector, IOs, NGOs, donors, and local community groups may provide and regulate, in varying degrees, life saving assistance, services, and the restoration of infrastructure. In newly independent Kosovo, for example, the government is heavily dependent on the international community to provide key services such as helping ensure freedom of movement for minority Serbs seeking livelihood assistance. In this case, the host government will be a credible partner but may need significant assistance to perform central government functions, placing an

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[159] Richard Oppel, "Violence Helps Undue Afghan Gains," *The New York Times* (April 3, 2010).

[160] Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "U.S. Military, Diplomats at Odds Over How to Resolve Kandahar's Electricity Woes," *The Washington Post* (April 23, 2010).

additional burden on the joint force or other actors. When central government structures are present but ineffective or weak, the joint force should try to reinforce those structures' capacity, presence, credibility, and legitimacy as participants in relief and reconstruction. This may mean encouraging the host government to partner with and take commensurate credit for its role in relief or reconstruction activities organized or even executed by the joint force. In this case, *what* the joint force provides in relief and reconstruction activities is as important as *how* it provides it.

Historic Illustration. In the case of a host government with relatively high legitimacy but low effectiveness, the joint force's response to the Haiti earthquake offers an illustration of how it enabled its partners to execute critical life-saving activities.

In early 2010, the joint force responded when a devastating earthquake struck the heart of Port au Prince, destroying much of the city and resulting in an estimated 230,000 killed and 200,000 injured. The magnitude of the devastation, exacerbated by the political and economic fragility of Haiti, presented an overwhelming challenge for the joint force and its partners. President Rene Preval and his government were heavily criticized for their slow response and limited communication with the Haitian population, despite efforts by the joint force and its partners to demonstrate the government's leadership. As a result, initial relief efforts were hampered by the Government of Haiti's limited capacity to assume critical, time-sensitive tasks.

USAID, as the lead USG agency, coordinated a multiagency relief operation, with the joint force in an enabling role. Immediate joint force response included the United States Navy and Coast Guard vessels arriving off the coast of Haiti the day after the earthquake. At the height of its relief efforts, 25,000 members of the joint force were deployed to Haiti providing critical engineering, logistics, ISR, medical and strategic airlift to enable the initial life-saving and life-sustaining relief activities. Early entry capabilities quickly opened critical air and sea ports, facilitating the mobility and access of incoming forces, civilian assets and supplies. The use of unmanned aerial vehicles facilitated the joint force's monitoring efforts of food distribution sites across the capital, enabling a swift response if security support was required. The rapid infusion of personnel and supplies, while creating some inefficiency, was nonetheless very effective in giving the joint task force (JTF) and USAID the means to stabilize the situation and to save lives.

The preliminary USG strategic planning guidance, jointly crafted by USAID, DOS and the Joint Staff, J-5 defines the relief end state as "Haiti is stable, basic population needs are met and the country is on a

path to recovery."[161] The JTF headquarters worked closely with the embassy and USAID to develop productive relationships that facilitated planning and implementation of critical relief tasks. U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and JTF priorities focused on enabling unity of effort, providing and balancing logistics support, assisting the Haitian government, the UN and other actors to stabilize the medical situation, transition planning and sustaining a strategic communication campaign. These priorities supported the broader USG and international focus on management of settlement sites, water sanitation and hygiene needs, meeting the health needs of the population, supporting the Haitian government's promotion of jobs, enabling food distribution and protecting orphans and other vulnerable children.[162]

The JTF established communication using deployable and commercial systems. The use of open communication and an unclassified information-sharing network successfully allowed for expanded coordination and collaboration with joint force partners. Cell phones, hand-held messaging devices, Web sites, and social media were key tools that facilitated a rapid and coordinated response. [163]

A civilian-military transition planning team was stood up almost immediately to identify key transition benchmarks that when met, allowed elements of the joint force to transition their responsibilities and redeploy. The transition planning team coordinated activities across multiple lines of operations -- basic services, economic security, rule of law, and governance -- and monitored integrated progress and impact.[164] Five months after the initial earthquake response, the JTF concluded its operations as the mission requirements transitioned from relief to reconstruction and resettlement.

8. RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION PRECEPTS

The joint force must be critically mindful of its approach to relief and reconstruction. In many environments, *how* and *why* the joint force conducts its activities may have a greater impact on mission success

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[161] U.S. Department of State. *Preliminary U.S. Government Strategic Planning Framework* (January 24, 2010).

[162] General Doug Fraser, *USSOUTHCOM Commander's Call Brief* (5 February 2010).

[163] Joint Center for Operational Analysis, U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Operation Unified Response: Haiti Earthquake Response Briefing* (accessed June 30, 2010); available from https://us.jfcom.mil/sites/JCOA/Pages/HADR.aspx.

[164] *Preliminary U.S. Government Strategic Planning Framework* (January 24, 2010).

than *what* it physically provides in terms of goods, services, and material. Several broad precepts, derived from recognized best practices in relief and reconstruction activities, should govern the joint force's approach to these activities.[165] Though many of the precepts detailed below apply to both relief and reconstruction activities, their application and relative importance may vary between the two.

- ***Understand the unique context of relief and reconstruction.***

The CCJO's central thesis emphasizes the importance for the joint force of understanding the unique context of its operating environment. A contextual understanding of the particular political and strategic context of these activities complemented by a deep knowledge and awareness of the socio-cultural, economic, historical, and political dynamics that animate the society in which the joint force is operating must inform successful relief and reconstruction activities.

In addition to developing a deep understanding of the trends and dynamics in its operating environment, the joint force must also invest in learning about its potential partners. This will require building the joint force's knowledge base of organizational dynamics, authorities, comparative advantages, constraints, and cultural values of priority partners such as USG civilian organizations, local and multilateral partners. Coalition and host government militaries are also critical partners as the joint force can achieve even more with their combined support and additive military assets. For example, during the combined relief response to the 2005 Tsunami in Southeast Asia, the U.S. led Combined Support Group-Sri Lanka conducted daily coordination meetings with all of the militaries providing relief support. As a result, the combined team identified excess multinational military capacity and subsequently allocated and applied these to support mission specific requirements, resulting in increased effectiveness and efficiency of military support to the Sri Lankans.

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[165] The cross-cutting best practices identified in the *JRRC* directly overlap with guiding principles and best practices identified in the following sources listed in this footnote. These sources underscore the centrality of host nation ownership and capacity, unity of effort, conflict transformation and the importance of conflict assessment, integrated whole of government planning, sustainability, and accountability. Andrew Natsios, "The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development," *Parameters* (Autumn 2005); U.S. Institute of Peace, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (accessed June 30, 2010); available from *www.usip.org/files/resources/guiding_principles_full.pdf*; FM 3-07; U.S. Army, *Field Manual 3-24*, *Counterinsurgency Operations,* (Washington: Headquarters Department of the Army 15Dec06). (Hereafter cited as FM 3-24.) U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, *Joint Lessons Learned: Keys to Successful International Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations* (accessed January 30, 2010); available from https://us.jfcom.mil/sites/JCOA/Pages/HADR.aspx.

The precepts on coordinating civilian and military assets and conflict prevention and mitigation elaborate the importance of conducting joint assessments to better understand the environment and the supporting conflict and stakeholder analytical tools. In addition to assessments, the joint force will develop more sensitive mechanisms for listening to and learning from its environment and partners. This could include hosting or participating in regular community forums or town halls to discuss community expectations about the relief or reconstruction process or building a network of local opinion leaders who regularly discuss with the joint force the challenges and opportunities within the affected community.

The process of conducting or enabling relief or reconstruction activities will provide information and insight on the environment and the actors involved in these activities. Therefore, the joint force should develop culturally and politically sensitive feedback mechanisms that deepen its understanding. Monitoring social networking sites can provide useful insight for the joint force. Additionally, a rigorous monitoring and evaluation process will inform the joint force about its real or perceived impact in a community, thus facilitating greater understanding.

- ***Coordinate civilian and military assets and establish variable partnership models.*** Careful coordination of civilian and military assets for relief and reconstruction activities for both planning and response will maximize impact if organizations focus on their respective comparative advantages. However, determining specific comparative advantages between civilian and military actors will depend on the environment and the relative capacity of organizations to deliver results. For example, the joint force has superior capabilities to directly access physically austere terrain, such as remote communities in the mountains of Pakistan affected by an earthquake, as it did in 2005. In this situation, the joint force's strategic lift capabilities enabled a relief operation by distributing supplies to remote, affected communities. However, ongoing reconstruction activities in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is more effectively managed by civilian organizations that employ local Pakistanis to work directly with the FATA secretariat and communities to deliver essential services. Visible joint force presence in FATA could aggravate communities and potentially undermine the FATA secretariat's credibility and opportunity to provide services.

The skillful combination of both hard power (coercive options, such as the application of force, diplomatic sanctions, withholding foreign assistance) and soft power (inducements or incentives whether military,

diplomatic or developmental) to achieve U.S. objectives, requires harmonization of all relevant instruments of national power and their appropriate alignment with foreign policy goals. The cooperation between the Government of the Philippines, the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group and USAID to support conditions for peace and security in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao offers a strong example. Working with and through local government officials, the U.S. military transports USAID-procured educational materials and construction supplies to conflict affected areas. In collaboration with the provincial Ministry of Education, USAID provides desks and equipment for schools built and renovated by the joint special operations task force on the island of Basilan.[166]

Ensuring information and intelligence flow freely between U.S. military and civilian actors will enhance a shared understanding of potential threats to and local assets for relief and reconstruction activities. The joint force possesses deep knowledge on anti-government elements and potential threats to local and USG interests. Military intelligence can complement and validate civilian assessments that may not be as threat focused but that detail broader population dynamics. For example, a civilian organization may implement a cash-for-work program to provide productive alternatives to participation in an insurgency. The joint force may know exactly how much an insurgent group is paying local recruits to fight. With access to this information, civilian organizations can set a more attractive price for their cash for work program, enticing local young men to work instead of fight. The converse is also true. If the joint force compensates laborers without considering local norms and appropriate rates, it runs the risk of siphoning labor from local businesses and alienating power brokers by manipulating local labor rates.

Partnerships with the host government and other USG and international entities are a critical component of the joint force's approach to relief and reconstruction. The joint force will cultivate, establish, and maintain both direct and indirect relationships with partners, depending on the sensitivity of the situation. Joint forces have used specific coordination structures such as Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Centers (HACCs) or Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOCs) in previous complex emergencies to great effect, improving coordination, the prioritization of activities, information flows, and intelligence dissemination.

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[166]U.S. Agency for International Development, *Mission in the Philippines* (accessed December 8, 2009); available from http://philippines.usaid.gov/abt_military_coordination.

The erosion of the neutral humanitarian space for organizations operating in modern conflicts has important implications for the joint force. Many organizations may not want a relationship with the joint force or they may seek indirect relationships to preserve their security and community access. Humanitarian organizations will be especially sensitive and may significantly limit their interaction with the joint force during relief or reconstruction activities. Other organizations, some USAID and DOS implementing partners, international organizations, and host government structures may seek a close and collaborative relationship with the joint force to attain shared goals and, when possible, achieve unity of effort. Following basic guidelines governing the interaction and coordination between entities in hostile environments, such as those developed between DOD, DOS, USAID, and U.S. humanitarian organizations,[167] will be important in the future operating environment. Such guidelines identify procedures and forms of coordination that help minimize the "blurring of lines" between a military force and humanitarian actors in complex operations.

Stakeholder analysis will suggest local entities for joint force partnership but these tools also provide an opportunity to inform integrated whole of government planning for relief or reconstruction activities at every level -- national, regional, and local. Conducting rigorous and continuous assessments to inform ongoing integrated, civilian/military planning is a recognized best practice. It is a priority to institutionalize opportunities for USG, host government and other partner entities to jointly conduct both crisis response and long-term deliberative planning for relief and reconstruction activities. Integrated planning, early in the process, will foster greater unity of effort, more integrated decision-making, and better engagement with the host government and international partners. Conducting such planning will require the joint force to participate in and support whole of government analysis and planning processes. The joint force must contribute its

[167] For military actors, the guidelines recommend that they always wear their uniforms when distributing humanitarian supplies to ensure the population does not confuse their assistance with that of civilian humanitarian organizations and that they arrange to meet with humanitarian organizations away from military installations. It is also recommended that the military does not interfere with humanitarian organizations delivering assistance to populations deemed unfriendly by the military. For NGOs, the guidelines seek to enhance humanitarian organizations' independence from the military, encouraging separate travel, and discouraging the co-location of headquarters. If military force protection is requested by civilian humanitarian organizations, the joint force will provide it on a reimbursable basis and is subject to the military's prioritization of that assistance. The guidelines also suggest ways to improve information sharing and coordination without jeopardizing operations security. U.S. Institute of Peace, *Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments* (accessed June 30, 2010); available from *www.usip.org/files/resources/guidelines_handout.pdf*.

conflict assessment and other analyses, as well as specialized functional and technical information and capabilities, to an integrated plan or operation. Likewise, senior leaders may call on the joint force to support or collaborate with other partners in the analysis development and planning process.

- ***Consider local political and cultural sensitivities when planning and conducting activities.*** The joint force's ability to innovate is a vital asset in relief and reconstruction activities that requires frequent adaptation to changing political conditions. Innovation, however, should not come at the cost of sensitivity to local, political, and cultural concerns. Instead, joint force innovation must enable successful relief or reconstruction that meets the needs of the local population while respecting local sensitivities.

For example, the U.S.-led PRT built and paved the Pech River road in Kunar Province in eastern Afghanistan between 2006 and 2008. Some commentators have observed that, although the road was critical in securing greater freedom of movement for the population and the joint force, and helped facilitate economic growth by enabling transportation and trade, the PRT's strategic approach to building the road was more important than the road itself.[168] Critically, the PRT exploited the road's construction as an opportunity to pursue an integrated counterinsurgency strategy. Through road construction, the PRT learned from its immediate environment through negotiations with local leaders that provided an opportunity to observe and better understand complex tribal dynamics. The PRT cultivated local ownership over the road and helped boost employment by insisting on using local labor for construction. This ownership ultimately ensured that the local communities would help protect and defend their newly constructed road. Local government officials were empowered as they resolved disputes over resources or access, facilitating the extension of government at the local level. As communities observed tangible benefits of good governance and reconstruction, tribes that were formerly sympathetic to insurgent groups switched sides in favor of supporting their local government.[169]

The PRT demonstrated the central thesis of the *CCJO* -- the road construction was conditioned by the specific political challenges of reconstruction activities conducted during a counterinsurgency campaign in a particular cultural and tribal context. It integrated a

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[168] In his book, Dr. Kilcullen documents the Kunar PRT approach to road-building, likening it to "political maneuver." David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 93-109.

[169] Ibid.

broad spectrum of reconstruction activities through road construction that ultimately enabled greater security and engagement and reduced the need for combat. Underpinning the PRT's entire approach was ongoing assessment of the population's expectations and opinions, which allowed the PRT to adapt and tailor its approach accordingly.

- ***Ensure a swift response.*** Seizing and capitalizing on early windows of opportunity to earn and maintain a population's trust is critical during reconstruction. The joint force should identify and exploit immediate opportunities for impact to demonstrate the tangible benefits of reconstruction assistance to a population in crisis. However, speed of response may be more instrumental for successful relief activities. If the joint force, the international community, and the host government do not launch an immediate response, multiple lives may be lost in a short time. Negotiating joint agreements about the deployment of assets -- such as search and rescue teams -- well in advance of a disaster, will help facilitate a quicker response. Effectively leveraging deployed sea-based forces can also help achieve a swift response to a crisis.

A well-planned and executed distribution management process that ensures critical supplies and medical attention are made available as soon as possible is central to enabling a swift and effective response for relief. Efficient delivery and management of life-saving assistance requires the development of a prioritization and distribution system tailored to the physical and political terrain of a particular country.[170]

Except when the joint force provides relief to gain a tactical or strategic advantage during combat or security operations, it should plan and execute relief activities based on the urgent, life-saving needs of a population. By contrast, stabilization goals and objectives may drive reconstruction priorities in conflict and post-conflict settings, not the population's greatest needs. For example, a host government, supported by the joint force and its civilian partners, may prioritize inoculation campaigns in areas of the country most affected by insurgent violence over populations with greater health needs in more secure areas to expand its influence and access and undermine popular support for the insurgency.

- ***Enhance accountability.*** Interconnected with transparency, accountability in relief and reconstruction activities is critical to gain and maintain the population's support for host government and USG

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[170] Joint Center for Operational Analysis, U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Joint Lessons Learned: Keys to Successful International Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations (accessed January 30, 2010); available from https://us.jfcom.mil/sites/JCOA/Pages/HADR.aspx.*

activities. Rampant corruption can erode and may ultimately undermine legitimacy. If the people perceive political elites misdirecting or mismanaging relief and reconstruction resources for their personal benefit, it may damage the credibility and trust required for these operations. The joint force must aggressively mitigate potential vulnerabilities or negative perceptions. Relief and reconstruction activities can provide opportunities for the joint force to communicate information and influence perceptions to build or reinforce legitimacy. Participatory planning and assessment tools will enhance credibility and accountability by creating inclusive management processes between the joint force and its local and international partners. These tools will greatly assist the joint force in ensuring that tactical relief and reconstruction actions do not have negative strategic implications by enforcing standards of proportionality and fairness consistent with U.S. policy.

Large-scale infrastructure projects can be vulnerable to potential fraud and abuse as it can be difficult to develop an effective system of checks and balances to counter potential corruption. Further, in highly insecure environments, security threats may limit freedom of movement and thus constrain regular monitoring and evaluation of projects. In these environments, smaller scale, community-based infrastructure projects may be easier to monitor, reinforcing partner accountability. For example, many PRTs in Afghanistan host public bidding conferences for reconstruction projects. Sealed bids are reviewed and awarded in well-attended meetings. Community development councils do the same as part of the National Solidarity Program. The joint force can also leverage such groups to monitor progress on projects and ensure the responsible stewardship of resources.

- ***Cultivate local ownership and sustainability.*** The "iron triad" of local ownership, sustainability, and capacity building are the critical elements for ensuring successful and enduring reconstruction results.[171] Long-term sustainability of infrastructure and essential services will depend on early cultivation of local ownership and buy-in. Some situations may require additional investments in skills training for local partners and careful attention to boosting weak technical capacity. The scale and scope of projects should correspond to local capacity levels to operate and maintain services and infrastructure.

Sustainability is even more challenging to plan for and achieve in the context of relief activities and may not always be necessary. Unintended consequences can result from major relief activities, such as

[171] Andrew Natsios, "The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development," *Parameters* (autumn 2005).

significant price distortion on foodstuffs in local markets or dependence on imported grains, which may compromise sustainability in an attempt to provide immediate and urgent life-saving assistance to a population in crisis. To prevent these unintended consequences and potential dependencies, the joint force must integrate local private sector entities into the relief process from the beginning.

The joint force, together with other USG and international first responders, should consider which aspects of its relief operation must be sustainable and which are, by design, focused on an immediate and short-term impact. The provision of immediate shelters, for example, is designed to be a short-term activity. Long-term population resettlements and return, however, must be sustainable to avoid future dislocation and should be undertaken and overseen by relevant national and international institutions.

The host government and its population ultimately own the process and the benefits of relief and reconstruction. The joint force and its other USG or international partners should support activities and projects that will have an enduring impact long after their presence in a country ends. The joint force can only accomplish this if local communities, organizations, and host government prioritize their needs and have a significant role in developing and implementing solutions that address those needs. If external actors unilaterally project their solutions in favor of quick fixes to complex challenges, it will alienate local communities and their government. Especially in politically fragile environments, alienated populations or other opponents may seek to undermine or subvert reconstruction projects. However, if communities have prioritized projects and invested their own sweat equity and human capital in implementation, they are far more likely to maintain, protect, and defend newly generated assets such as small-scale infrastructure or local services.

- ***Pursue conflict prevention and mitigation.*** Violent conflict will likely be enduring in the future. Former World Bank Economist and author of *The Bottom Billion*, Dr. Paul Collier, estimates that the total national and regional cost of a single war is more than $54 billion, which includes the loss of economic productivity due to the conflict, the economic cost of harm to human health, rising military expenditures within a country's neighborhood, and other factors.[172] The *JOE* highlights that our Nation's projection of military might is intrinsically linked to our economic power. If our economy suffers, it may diminish our military capabilities or degrade them if discretionary spending is

[172] Dr. Paul Collier, http://users.ox.ac.uk/~econpco/research/conflict.htm, (accessed 6 May 2010).

cut.[173] In uncertain economic times, there is a new primacy on our Nation's ability to prevent costly, deadly conflict using all available tools in our arsenal.

In the future, the joint force, together with USAID and DOS, will find it increasingly important to develop advanced early warning systems and conflict prevention measures to help identify, shape, and change behavior before a requirement arises for the application of military force. As the USG considers how to organize and structure itself to more effectively prevent violent conflict in the future, it should consider the impact of the joint force's steady state relief and reconstruction activities that help shape the operational environment.

Relief and reconstruction activities can be crucial opportunities to support a struggling host government or local governance structure to build its institutional capacity to more effectively address the population's grievances. The ultimate objective is to support a host government or informal legitimate structures to pursue a "sustainable positive trajectory" to mitigate the dynamics fueling violent conflict.[174]

Especially during relief activities, the joint force should ensure the provision of its life-saving assistance and urgent supplies and services do not exacerbate local grievances or further enflame community conflict. Widely recognized as the "do no harm"[175] principle, the joint force should recognize that beneficiaries can fundamentally distort and manipulate the assistance it provides according to local political agendas. The joint force should work with local partners to analyze societal tensions or "dividers" within and between communities to mitigate suspicions and grievances about how assistance is provided. The joint force should also examine local "connectors" or aspects that bring people and communities together in collaboration, such as markets, local associations, common experiences, or historical events.[176] By developing a deeper awareness of

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[173] *JOE 2010.*

[174] Jock Covey, Michael Dziedzic, Leonard Hawley, ed., *Quest for a Viable Peace* (Washington: U.S. Institute for Peace, 2005); U.S. Agency for International Development, *Conducting a Conflict Assessment* (Washington: U.S. Agency for International, 17Aug05); U.S. Institute of Peace, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (accessed June 30, 2010); available from *www.usip.org/files/resources/guiding_principles_full.pdf*.

[175] Collaborative for Development Action, Collaborative Learning Projects, *Do No Harm Handbook: The Framework for Analyzing the Impact of Assistance on Conflict* (accessed March 25, 2010); available from *www.cdainc.com/dnh/docs/DoNoHarmHandbook.pdf*.

[176]Ibid. For the last two decades, the Do No Harm Project has analyzed and evaluated the impact of assistance on conflict globally. After examining multiple case studies and collected evidence, the Do No Harm Project developed a seven step

dividing and connecting forces and their impact on assistance programs, the joint force can design, plan, and implement relief and reconstruction programs to avoid unintended consequences such as further exacerbating conflict and disrupting a fragile peace, or empowering winners and creating aggrieved losers through the delivery of its assistance.

The joint force should use a suite of conflict assessment and planning tools early in its planning process to examine a conflict's context, identify grievances and potential sources of resilience, and better understand conflict drivers and potential mitigating factors to exploit. Conducting conflict assessments jointly with the U.S. Government, host government, and other partners will help ensure the development of a shared understanding of the problem space to inform planning. These assessment and planning tools include: the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) and the follow-on interagency Planning and Execution Process, as well as the ICAF's tactically focused derivative, the Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework (TCAPF).[177] The TCAPF is especially effective at singling out a community's priority issues and identifying trusted actors who can effectively address sources of tension, conflict, or grievance within the community.

9. IMPLICATIONS OF ADOPTING THE JOINT RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION CONCEPT

Adopting this concept for joint combat has implications for how the Services organize, man, equip, and train their forces. Some of these implications are already being implemented and require only continued emphasis. Some require little or no additional analysis and should be implemented immediately, while others will need to be explored, validated, and refined through further experimentation, analysis, and operational experience before being institutionalized into the joint force.

- ***Establish command and control (C2) doctrinal processes and mechanisms within the joint force that allow the joint force commander to establish unity of effort with interagency partners.*** When agencies and departments collaborate, their coordination is highly dependent on good will and the spirit of cooperation rather than

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analytical framework to help guide those who provide assistance in conflict contexts to minimize the negative impacts of their assistance.

[177] U.S. Agency for International Development, *Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework* (accessed June 30, 2010); available from http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_partnerships/ma/tcaf.html (2008); FM 3-07.

institutionalized mechanisms and regular training, experimentation, and education about how to forge and sustain operational partnerships across the government. Military command and control systems, therefore, must include mechanisms and doctrinal processes that make them interoperable and accessible across the joint force and enhance collaboration and cooperation among its partners.

- ***Develop mechanisms and standards for partnering with foreign and domestic groups, both public and private, often in an enabling role.*** Although it is imperative for the joint force to partner with a wide range of groups and individuals such as foreign governments, tribes, indigenous institutions, NGOs, and private businesses, it must balance these partnerships against its capability to innovate, adapt, and take immediate action. In conjunction with its civilian partners, and taking into account their mandates and capacity, the joint force should build mechanisms and sets of standards for partnership in relief and reconstruction activities that allow for maximum flexibility and adaptability, with the least implications to the combat and security missions of the joint force.

- ***Develop awareness and understanding of specific funding authorities to ensure that joint force commanders can effectively plan and implement relief and reconstruction activities.*** The joint force commander will have access to Operation and Maintenance (O&M) funds to support reconstruction and humanitarian assistance projects, in addition to separately appropriated OHDACA funds and Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds. Joint force commanders need direct access to funds to accomplish the operational objectives of their relief and reconstruction activities. However, a joint force commander may be constrained by U.S. Code Title 10 authorities that may not support a critical activity or program. A broader awareness of authorities and funds will allow joint force commanders to leverage all available resources when planning with civilian USG agencies and departments whose separate U.S. Code Title 22 funding authority -- such as Economic Support Funds (ESF) or Development Assistance (DA) Funds -- can cover activities that directly complement joint force tasks. Deployed comptrollers and staff judge advocates will need to help ensure joint force commanders heed the appropriate laws and directives, and that they know where to reach out to access experts for such funding.

- ***Include requirements to support reconstruction activities in the determination of intelligence collection targets.*** Intelligence collection cannot focus exclusively on adversaries or high-value targets. Though this analysis is an important ingredient in developing a holistic operating picture of the environment, specific relief and reconstruction

requirements, such as collection on key actors, their orbits of political influence and credibility, community sympathies and interests, traditional religious leaders' agendas and other socio-economic and cultural patterns must complement it. Traditional military intelligence personnel may not initially consider the unique logistical and operational issues related to relief and reconstruction. Intelligence personnel may also leverage the tools used to acquire information on the enemy in military operations to support the information requirements of relief and reconstruction. For example, additional relief and reconstruction collection requirements might include infrastructure damage assessments, using ISR for locating survivors, or analyzing terrain features and weather patterns to determine potential hazards for displaced persons or the placement of new encampments. Expanded intelligence and information collection will help ensure more tailored, focused, and ultimately successful relief and reconstruction activities.

- ***Develop scalable mobility and logistics mechanisms that allow the joint force to right size for each relief and reconstruction operation.*** Successfully leveraging joint force logistics capabilities during relief and reconstruction will require a flattened logistics and sustainment support framework that facilitates coordination and synchronization across Services and between the various levels of command. Theater-wide visibility of competing requirements and a process of de-confliction that facilitates responsive mobility must inform an efficient and effective logistics and sustainment support framework. Mobility enablers that are tailorable, scalable, and well postured can extend the joint force commander's operational reach and access, as well as set the conditions to support relief and reconstruction tasks. Logistics and mobility packages will depend heavily on the relative hostility of the operating environment and on the accessibility of roads, airfields, and ports in the wake of a disaster or armed conflict. Joint force commanders should consider a range of options, to include sea-basing and using commercial aircraft and ships to reduce the U.S. footprint ashore and to diminish the reliance on local resources in already strained areas. To ensure mobility and access, joint force commanders should be ready to employ combat and general support engineers to repair roads, ports, and airfields where they have been degraded or destroyed. The joint force should also leverage and incorporate additional military functions and capacities that are directly applicable to relief and reconstruction -- such as medical, transportation, water and supply production and distribution, and operations management -- when considering mobility and logistics packages. Relief and reconstruction contingency plans should include logistics support packages tailored to local conditions such as climate and infrastructure capacity.

- ***Develop awareness and build understanding of approaches to complex operations by collaborating on the development of a community of integrated civilian-military planners.*** The success of the U.S. Government in conducting complex operations will require an integrated, interagency approach that allows both military and civilians to plan for and operate in new and rapidly evolving environments. The joint force will work closely with civilian agencies and departments to help them build and maintain a community of professional planners and enhance their overall planning capacity for crisis response and contingency planning. Increasingly, though in small numbers, civilians are enrolling in the Service specific planning courses to develop an indepth understanding of the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). The joint force will facilitate civilian participation in such courses and look for opportunities to send military planners to civilian courses. The Services also need to identify selected military liaison officers and embed them in agency-specific and interagency planners training programs, doctrine development efforts, and operational offices at DOS and USAID to support their planning and implementation processes and facilitate integrated planning. In addition, the joint force should develop, together with civilian partners, civilian/military focused exercises and experiments designed to test and improve joint planning processes and structures and enable civilian participation in such events. Finally, they need to participate in civilian agency-led exercises and relevant planning forums. The joint force should participate in the policy level and technical level dialogue as the civilian agencies and departments codify a common planning lexicon, methodologies, the principles of planning for complex operations, and comprehensive planning guides.

- ***Use operational design methodology, informed by comprehensive assessments, to better understand the relationships, environments, and conditions that relief and reconstruction require.*** The joint force should cultivate, maintain, and leverage mutually beneficial relationships with host governments and populations to ensure their needs are addressed effectively. Detailed assessments are critical to help the joint force understand who its critical partners are and the nature of the dynamics that shape the environment. Operational design takes into account the cultural, political, and social makeup of a host government and its population. Operational design allows the joint force commander to better understand his complex operating environment and to tailor his response and partnerships more productively, to include the logistical support loads deployed to the area.

- ***Create a specialized trainer and advisor cadre that can participate in short- and long-term "building partnership capacity"***

efforts with interagency partners and foreign governments during reconstruction. Though the joint force will be working with civilian partners, it will develop its capacity to train and advise foreign civilian institutions, such as a Ministry of Defense or Interior. The Department of Defense should cultivate a cadre of trainers and advisors for immediate response to meet an immediate need and fill the gap until its civilian partners can take over. A training and advisory cadre is essential to the joint force, ensuring that the skills used to rebuild civil infrastructure and provide essential services are transferred to the host government and relevant local civilian organizations.

- ***Conduct relief and reconstruction related exercises, experiments and joint training with interagency and non-governmental partners to develop and maintain collaborative relationships for enhanced coordination in relief and reconstruction activities.*** Relief and reconstruction requires coordination and partnership among many disparate organizations. The DOD should leverage existing opportunities, such as the established National Level Exercise (NLE) Program, and sponsor additional forums with invitations to other government agencies and nongovernmental organizations to increase mutual awareness and education of organizations' capabilities and capacity to conduct relief and reconstruction activities. Effective exercises will include a focus on building partners' capability to communicate credibly within and among governments and to the various interested publics.

- ***Develop an accessible, searchable, and multiagency integrated lessons-learned database, leveraging the current Joint Lessons Learned system[178], for relief and reconstruction activities.*** This system should be jointly accessible and populated by both civilian and military organizations, to create an integrated lessons-learned database that can inform future responses and ensure the dissemination of best practices. Lessons learned databases must be unclassified to allow USG departments and agencies, NGOs, host governments, and international partners to use it. Information collected during relief and reconstruction activities should be unclassified, to facilitate whole of

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[178] The existing Joint Lessons Learned Information (JLLIS) database and the Stability Operations Lessons Learned Information Management System (SOLLIMS), feature non-proprietary, internet-enabled, open architecture, available in an unclassified format. JLLIS provides the ability to: add and view observations and recommendations; share reports, briefings and other documents; assemble after action reports; and, conduct lesson validation and collaboration within communities of interest for user-defined lesson topic areas.

SOLLIMS is an initiative implemented by the U.S. Army War College which provides a similar capability for the global Peace and Stability Operations (P/SO) community.

government sharing. Conducting after action reviews of relief and reconstruction activities involving all partners can help facilitate learning across stakeholder organizations.

- ***Train and educate U.S. military personnel on the sensitivities of operating with humanitarian actors that wish to maintain neutrality***. Many NGOs and other private humanitarian actors do not wish to be associated with military activities. However, the line between operational organizations and their disparate objectives has blurred on contemporary battlefields where military, NGO, IO, and other civilian organizations all operate in the same environment. The joint force should be sensitive to humanitarian organizations' concerns and make concerted efforts to ensure information is not disseminated in a way that puts these organizations at immediate or long-term risk. Likewise, the joint force should educate itself on humanitarian organizations' activities and endeavor to respect their independence and operations: for example, taking humanitarian organization activities into consideration regarding timing and scope of combat operations in areas where they are working. The Services should incorporate information from the *Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments* into appropriate military education courses.

- ***Train and educate U.S. military personnel in cultural awareness techniques and on specific cultures where relief and reconstruction activities are deemed most likely.*** This does not mean, however, that conventional forces must rival special operations forces or civilian partners in their level of cultural and language expertise. All U.S. military personnel should cultivate and maintain a degree of cultural understanding and sensitivity, but conventional forces do not need to become fluent in multiple languages or extensively versed in the nuances of a local culture. Instead, the Services should train them in basic language skills, generic cultural appreciation skills, cross-cultural communication skills, and learn how to recruit and use local translators to facilitate their mission objectives.

- ***Consider the effects and impact of combat actions on future relief and reconstruction in all targeting reviews.*** Joint force targeting must take into account the potential impact that physical damage to infrastructure can adversely impact future relief and reconstruction requirements. For example, it may be sufficient to render certain power lines inoperative, rather than destroying the power plant. However, the joint force should exercise caution and not overly restrict its combat actions to the extent they are compromised or undermined.

- ***Increase the ability to gain rapid contracting support.*** The emerging Joint Contracting and Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) fly away teams could provide highly valuable support to joint force relief and reconstruction efforts, and should have the ability to incorporate other agency representation to maximize funding options and requirements determination. This rapid procurement capability could be used to support whole of government procurement processes, beyond the unique requirements of the joint force.

10. RISKS OF ADOPTING THE JOINT RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION CONCEPT

- ***Gaining the level of local cultural understanding required to craft an effective operational design for relief and reconstruction activities could divert intelligence and information gathering efforts required for other joint force activities.*** To effectively assess the operational environment for relief and reconstruction -- to include analysis of credible partners, potential adversaries and relative degrees of a host government's legitimacy and effectiveness -- and craft an effective operational design will require the dedication of substantial intelligence and information gathering resources. With only a limited number of these resources available to the entire joint force, those dedicated to support relief or reconstruction activities may mean fewer available for other operations. Balancing these requirements will be an additional burden on the joint force commander. However, DOD is already making significant investments in deepening its cultural understanding and appreciation skills.

- ***Extended joint force relief and reconstruction activities could create host government, interagency and international partner dependency and render them unable to assume responsibility for such activities.*** Few of the joint force's partners will have similar levels of capacity to plan, prepare and execute relief and reconstruction as swiftly or as comprehensively. Enabling a host government's capacity to sustain services and new infrastructure will be a lengthy endeavor. However, integrating the partners into the process is a necessity, even when it seems to slow progress. The more frequently the joint force delivers reconstruction assistance, the more likely it will be to institutionalize changes in DOTMLPF to ensure reconstruction activities are core joint force competencies. Though the Services must be better prepared to conduct these activities in the future, the joint force role should become more limited over time as USG civilian agencies and departments increase their expeditionary capacity. Enhanced

reconstruction capacity among USG civilian agencies and departments and integrated planning among all entities can mitigate the risk of partner dependency on the joint force.

- ***The joint force may be required to fill a gap over the long-term if civilian partners do not acquire sufficient capacity to conduct relief and reconstruction activities.*** It will significantly tax joint force resources to continue to fill a capability and capacity deficit among USG civilian departments and agencies. It may put the joint force at risk if there is a competing contingency operation that requires urgent attention. Too many troops and resources committed to a major relief or reconstruction effort could jeopardize the ability of the United States to respond militarily where needed. Given resource constraints, the joint force must consider dual-purpose equipment in new acquisitions and maximize its ability to effectively leverage combat equipment for non-combat purposes to the greatest extent possible. Purchasing "dual purpose" equipment may incur Service costs, but could save costs over the long run. A benefit is that the engineering equipment used by the joint force to support combat operations is the same type of equipment needed to support relief and reconstruction activities. In some cases, it may be possible to negotiate the purchase of specialized equipment with civilian agencies which these agencies could then loan to the joint force during deployments.

- ***Joint force involvement in relief and reconstruction activities, especially if USG civilian participation is limited, may inspire host government militaries to advocate for an expanded role in similar activities, which may weaken their government's civilian institutions.*** There is greater risk of "blurring" boundaries between the military and civilian institutions in fragile or nascent democracies. For the joint force, this may mean creating friendly foreign militaries that might at some point in the future turn into adversaries. However, effective continuous engagement by the joint force and its partners with those militaries and their governments can minimize any such risk. An explicit focus on professionalism and response to civilian control of the military are important lessons the Services need to include in foreign military training. Effectively prioritized USG engagement in joint relief and reconstruction activities will produce a significant overall increase in partner capacity for response in emergency circumstances.

- ***The joint force risks doing too much reconstruction that is beyond the host government's ability to sustain.*** The joint force should be a relatively short-term enabler compared to its lesser resourced partners in the international aid community, who will likely have an enduring presence in a host country. Though the joint force has

the capability and capacity to build more than a host government can sustain after its departure, unsustainable reconstruction projects are counterproductive to U.S. national interests. To mitigate this risk and ensure sustainable approaches, the joint force should work with its civilian partners to design and implement reconstruction projects that are scaled to local capacity for sustainment.

11. JOINT RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION AND THE OTHER ACTIVITIES

Relief and reconstruction activities complement combat, security, and engagement. The joint force conducts relief and reconstruction activities to support combat to gain or maintain a strategic or tactical advantage, or increase access and influence in an area of operations, especially in environments in which a host government is hostile, ineffective, or nonexistent. Combat can be a ruthless and blunt instrument used to disrupt or destroy an adversary system. Relief and reconstruction activities seek to reconstitute a degraded or damaged system. The juxtaposition of destruction and rebuilding makes the relationship between combat and relief and reconstruction complicated.

Relief activities conducted during and in the wake of combat help mitigate potentially destabilizing effects of an affected population in search of immediate shelter, food, and medical care. Through stabilizing relief efforts, the joint force can better control the movement of populations, minimize their exposure to combat, and reduce irregular threats. The joint force will conduct reconstruction to repair damaged physical infrastructure to facilitate ongoing combat (e.g. airfields, bridges, roads) and will repair physical and institutional infrastructure after combat to facilitate the restoration of civil services.

Relief and reconstruction and security activities create a mutually reinforcing and virtuous circle of stability. Although security activities often are essential to the conduct of relief and reconstruction, relief and reconstruction can facilitate security activities by helping to improve a deteriorating security situation. Relief and reconstruction activities can help restore security by augmenting and enhancing security forces and institutions, through stabilizing or rebuilding physical infrastructure, and by meeting the needs of a desperate and vulnerable population. In this way, relief and reconstruction tasks can contribute directly to defeating an insurgent movement by gaining popular allegiance by improving both the quality of life of the population and the legitimacy of the indigenous government.

Of the other three activities, relief and reconstruction is most closely related to engagement. These activities share the fundamental purpose of partnership with host governments and local populations and the enhancement of partners' ability to provide for the well-being of their communities. Many engagement activities are derived from lessons learned during relief and reconstruction operations. These activities can be used to build partner nation capacity in order to mitigate and prepare for future natural or man-made disasters. However, whereas relief and reconstruction tends to be responsive to the conditions created by a disaster or a conflict, engagement to build partner capacity is a proactive and long-term pursuit, usually commencing before relief and reconstruction and continuing after these activities conclude.

12. CONCLUSION TO THE JOINT RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION CONCEPT

This concept emphasizes the responsibilities, opportunities, and challenges of the future joint force in conducting and enabling relief and reconstruction in a wide variety of environments. Operational art is central to the application of this concept. Trends in the future operating environment and the relative capabilities and capacity of other actors conducting relief and reconstruction in a shared space will condition every instance of relief or reconstruction.

A successful joint force approach to relief and reconstruction will reduce the suffering of populations affected by combat, civil disorder, or natural and man-made disasters, consistent with U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives. To achieve a successful and enduring impact the joint force must effectively enable its wide variety of partners, who will likely be leading relief and reconstruction, and enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of a host government to sustain the population.

Learning how to effectively enable such a diverse variety of potential partners to conduct relief and reconstruction will require a significant paradigm shift within the joint force. Most joint doctrine, professional military education and training programs, and existing policy focus on how the joint force will conduct relief and reconstruction in a leading role. However, DOD Directive 3000.05 and speeches by the Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and senior military leadership emphasize the fundamental importance and corresponding challenges of learning how to enable others to conduct these activities directly. This concept fully explores the imperatives of enabling partners by offering

relief and reconstruction best practices and guiding principles to the future joint force.

Appendices

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APPENDIX A. MAPPING OF JOINT COMBAT CONCEPT IMPLICATIONS TO JCA

JCC Implications	Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
	JCA Tier 1	JCA Tier 2	JCA Tier 3	
1. Pursue precision capabilities in all forms	3 Force Application	3.1 Maneuver	3.1.1 Maneuver to Engage (MTE)	The concept emphasizes the use of precision maneuver, fires and information in the discriminate application of combat power. Achieving that precision without penalty to the effective application of combat power will require improvement of intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination; doctrinal, materiel and training adjustments to enable smaller land, sea and air formations to operate more independently within the framework of a common operational scheme; and leader development efforts aimed at refining the ability of small unit commanders to apply combat power effectively in conditions limiting the use of lethal force.
			3.1.2 Maneuver to Insert (MTI)	
			3.1.3 Maneuver to Influence (MTInfl)	
			3.1.4 Maneuver to Secure (MTS)	
		3.2 Engagement	3.2.1 Kinetic Means	
			3.2.2 Non-Kinetic Means	
			8.1.3 Influence Adversary and Competitor Audiences	
	8 Building Partnerships	8.1 Communicate	8.1.1 Inform Domestic and Foreign Audiences	
			8.1.2 Persuade Partner Audiences	
			8.1.3 Influence Adversary and Competitor Audiences	
	7. Protection	7.1 Prevent	7.1.1 Prevent Kinetic Attack	
2. Pursue weapon systems with scalable munitions	3 Force Application	3.2 Engagement	3.2.1 Kinetic Means	The concept's emphasis on discrimination suggests the requirement for munitions effects that are capable of furnishing scalable munitions

JCC Implications	Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
	JCA Tier 1	JCA Tier 2	JCA Tier 3	
effects	7. Protection	7.1 Prevent	7.1.1 Prevent Kinetic Attack	effects that operators can tailor rapidly and on the fly to the nature of the target, its topographic and demographic surroundings and the quality of the targeting information—whether accomplished by using a single weapon or multiple weapons in a single system. Reliable prediction of secondary weapons effects and their associated damage radii must accompany such scalability.
3. Develop leaders with a heightened understanding of the restraints that will characterize future combat and operate discriminately within them	1 Force Support	1.2 Force Preparation	1.2.1 Training	The concept's emphasis on the role various restrictions will play on future U.S. joint combat suggests that commanders at all levels must understand the nature of these restrictions and how to operate successfully within them. Moreover, this concept implies that senior commanders especially must be able to communicate to political leaders the impact these restrictions have on combat effectiveness and must be able to gain relaxation of these restrictions when they imperil the mission. This has implications for leader development especially.
			1.2.2 Exercising	
			1.2.3 Educating	
			1.2.4 Doctrine	
			1.2.5 Lessons Learned	
			1.2.6 Concepts	
			1.2.7 Experimentation	
	5 Command and Control	5.2 Understand	5.2.1 Organize Information	
			5.2.2 Develop Knowledge and Situational Awareness	
			5.2.3 Share Knowledge and Situational Awareness	
		5.3 Planning	5.3.1 Analyze Problem	
			5.3.2 Apply Situational Understanding.	
		5.4 Decide	5.4.1 Manage Risk	
			5.4.2 Select Actions	
			5.4.3 Establish Rule Sets	
			5.4.4 Establish Intent and Guidance	

JCC Implications	Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
	JCA Tier 1	JCA Tier 2	JCA Tier 3	
			5.4.5 Intuit	
		5.5 Direct	5.5.1 Communicate Intent and Guidance	
			5.5.2 Task	
4. Develop a balanced and flexible force able to defeat a wide range of potential enemies	1 Force Support	1.1Force Management	1.1.1 Global Force Management	The growing diversity of potential enemies, weapons and tactics will challenge the versatility of joint forces. Meeting that challenge will require both conventional forces organized, equipped and trained to fight any enemy in any conditions, and specialized forces optimized to conduct specific kinds of combat operations for more narrowly defined purposes. Balancing the force between these requirements may be the most difficult challenge of the concept.
			1.1.2 Force Configuration	
			1.1.3 Global Posture Execution	
		1.2 Force Preparation	1.2.1 Training	
			1.2.2 Exercising	
			1.2.3 Educating	
			1.2.4 Doctrine	
			1.2.5 Lessons Learned	
			1.2.6 Concepts	
			1.2.7 Experimentation	
5. Adopt an operational design process that assists commanders in recognizing and exploiting the operating patterns of a wide variety of potential enemies in complex situations	5 Command and Control	5.2 Understand	5.2.1 Organize Information	The concept's emphasis on disruption as the preferred defeat mechanism implies the need to be able to understand the operating patterns of a wide variety of adversaries, including irregulars, and suggests the need for the adoption of an operational design process by which commanders and staffs can come to understand these patterns in complex situations.
			5.2.2 Develop Knowledge and Situational Awareness	
			5.2.3 Share Knowledge and Situational Awareness	
		5.3 Planning	5.3.1 Analyze Problem	
			5.3.2 Apply Situational Understanding.	

JCC Implications	Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
	JCA Tier 1	JCA Tier 2	JCA Tier 3	
6. Develop the capabilities required to identify, characterize, locate and destroy chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats, including toxic industrial materials; to deter, defend against, respond to and manage the consequences of their employment or accidental release; and to operate effectively in a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear environment.	7 Protection	7.1 Prevent	7.1.1 Prevent Kinetic Attack	The future joint force faces chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats from both the expanding list of actors with access to weapons of mass destruction, some of whom will not demonstrate traditional restraint with respect to the employment of those weapons, and the possibility of exposure to industrial hazards through release other than attack. As a result, future joint forces are more likely to find themselves operating in such an environment. Defenses against such threats once organic to conventional forces have atrophied since the end of the Cold War. In any case, they were in many respects unsuitable to the wider range of conditions and hazards anticipated by this concept. Future chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear warning, protection, and decontamination technology must be smaller and lighter, and should be operable by personnel without extensive specialized training. Doctrine and training similarly must incorporate battle drills designed to posture forces rapidly for operations in a contaminated environment without prolonged interruption of operational tempo. Additionally, both specialized and conventional units should be trained to deal with the increased challenges of toxic industrial materials.
		7.2 Mitigate	7.2.1 Mitigate Lethal Effects	
			7.2.2 Mitigate Non-lethal Effects	

JCC Implications	Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
	JCA Tier 1	JCA Tier 2	JCA Tier 3	
7. Develop the capabilities and capacity required to fight for domain superiority, including in space and cyberspace	3 Force Application	3.1 Maneuver	3.1.1 Maneuver to Engage (MTE)	The combat environment described in this concept may require future joint forces to fight for air, maritime, space and cyber superiority both within forward operating areas and to protect their strategic lines of communications. The more that the force can conduct the fight jointly across domains, the less likely that it will divert domain-specific forces from other missions. A key prerequisite for achieving ground, air and maritime freedom of maneuver will be destroying, neutralizing or suppressing advanced air defense systems, which are becoming increasingly prevalent and lethal to aircraft. Defeating such systems will require integrating space-based sensors, remotely-piloted systems, and standoff precision fires from surface platforms and aircraft. As with air defense suppression, defeating littoral anti-access capabilities will require a cross-domain effort in which enemy delivery systems may be the least important targets. The fight for space and cyber domains cannot be localized and is likely to affect the entire joint battlespace. Gaining and maintaining control of these domains perforce is a strategic challenge, made more so by the intimate connection in both domains between civil and military vulnerabilities.
			3.1.2 Maneuver to Insert (MTI)	
			3.1.3 Maneuver to Influence (MTInfl)	
			3.1.4 Maneuver to Secure (MTS)	
		3.2 Engagement	3.2.1 Kinetic Means	
			3.2.2 Non-Kinetic Means	
	9 Corporate Management and Support	9.2 Strategy and Assessment	9.2.1 Strategy Development	
			9.2.2 Capabilities Development	
			9.2.3 Enterprise-Wide Assessment	
			9.2.4 Studies and Analyses	
		9.3 Information Management	9.3.1 Enterprise Architecture	
		9.4 Acquisition	9.4.1 Acquisition Program Execution	
			9.4.2 Contracting	
		9.5 Program, Budget and Finance	9.5.1 Program / Budget and Performance	
			9.5.2 Accounting and Finance	

JCC Implications	Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
	JCA Tier 1	JCA Tier 2	JCA Tier 3	
8. Improve the capabilities to apply adequate but discriminate combat power in populated urban settings	5 Command and Control	5.1 Organize	5.1.1 Establish and Maintain Unity of Effort with Mission Partners	Expanding urbanization increases the likelihood future combat will occur among dense civilian populations, increasing both the pressure for restraint to protect those civilians and the difficulties of applying combat power effectively under those conditions, especially when the enemy is an indigenous irregular force deliberately hiding among that population Urban combat always has presented a tactical challenge, from lethally short engagement ranges and difficult command and control to problems conducting resupply and casualty evacuation. Urban terrain also poses enormous problems for both surface and air-delivered supporting fires. Weapons with the penetrating power to defeat urban structures, but whose lethal radius is scalable, can help to limit unintended casualties and damage. Remotely piloted air and ground vehicles can help clear narrow and enclosed urban spaces without exposing their operators. Digital and voice communications not dependent on an unobstructed line-of-sight can significantly improve command and control. And no development would more radically alter the dynamics of urban combat than nonlethal weapons able to
			5.1.2 Structure Organization to Mission	
			5.1.3 Foster Organizational Collaboration	
	9 Corporate Management and Support	9.2 Strategy and Assessment	9.2.1 Strategy Development	
			9.2.2 Capabilities Development	
			9.2.3 Enterprise-Wide Assessment	
			9.2.4 Studies and Analyses	
		9.3 Information Management	9.3.1 Enterprise Architecture	
		9.4 Acquisition	9.4.1 Acquisition Program Execution	
			9.4.2 Contracting	

JCC Implications	Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
	JCA Tier 1	JCA Tier 2	JCA Tier 3	
		9.5 Program, Budget and Finance	9.5.1 Program / Budget and Performance	incapacitate with minimal risk of fatalities even over enlarged areas. No force that relies solely on specialized capabilities is likely to be effective. Instead, such combat must be considered a routine mission for conventional land and air forces.
			9.5.2 Accounting and Finance	
9. Improve the capabilities required to defeat advanced anti-access capabilities and to conduct forcible-entry operations	3 Force Application	3.1 Maneuver	3.1.1 Maneuver to Engage	Given the combination of the United States' continuing global interests and the CCJO's projection of decreasing overseas basing, joint forces increasingly will find it necessary to project combat power into a hostile operational area from afar without the benefit of staging bases in the region. Joint forces therefore increasingly may find it necessary to defeat an enemy's anti-access measures, to include executing a forcible entry of land forces, as a prerequisite to accomplishing the assigned mission. Lacking the capabilities to conduct such operations, joint forces will be limited in their utility as strategic instrument. The capabilities required for such operations are specialized and will have broad implications for force development.
			3.1.2 Maneuver to Insert	
			3.1.3 Maneuver to Secure	
	4 Logistics	4.1 Deployment and Distribution	4.1.1 Move the force	
			4.1.2 Sustain the force	
		4.6 Engineering	4.6.2 Combat Engineering	
10. Expand access at every echelon to purpose-filtered all-source intelligence	2 Battlespace Awareness	2.1 Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance	2.1.1 Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Planning & Direction	Joint forces in combat must be able to read the behavior of a wide range of potential enemies with vastly different attributes and be able to understand the broader situation within which they operate. Accumulating this information will require
			2.1.2 Collection	
			2.1.3 Processing / Exploitation	
			2.1.4 Analysis and	

JCC Implications	Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
	JCA Tier 1	JCA Tier 2	JCA Tier 3	
			Production	diverse collection capabilities from technological collection platforms to open and covert human sources. The very volume of the resulting information will present collation, interpretation and analysis problems. Future joint forces will require a system that assigns reliability and importance to information from the moment it is acquired, adjusts those criteria as the information is interpreted, and allows users at any point along the way to decide for themselves what level of intelligence precision they require based on their unique tactical and operational needs.
			2.1.5 Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Dissemination	
		2.2 Environment	2.2.1 Collect	
			2.2.2 Analyze	
			2.2.3 Predict	
			2.2.4 Exploit	
11. Reconcile Service employment requirements with the requirements for flexible joint integration	9 Corporate Management and Support	9.2 Strategy and Assessment	9.2.1 Strategy Development	The principle of putting maximum combat power promptly in the hands of the commander best able to employ it discriminately—which often means at lower echelons—likely will have potentially broad and dramatic doctrinal, organizational, procedural and technological capability requirements for how the Services employ their various capabilities in support of one another.
			9.2.2 Capabilities Development	
			9.2.3 Enterprise-Wide Assessment	
			9.2.4 Studies and Analyses	
		9.3 Information Management	9.3.1 Enterprise Architecture	
		9.4 Acquisition	9.4.1 Acquisition Program Execution	
			9.4.2 Contracting	
		9.5 Program, Budget and Finance	9.5.1 Program / Budget and Performance	
			9.5.2 Accounting and Finance	
12. Improve the ability to interoperate with foreign military	5 Command and Control	5.1 Organize	5.1.1 Establish and Maintain Unity of Effort with Mission Partners	This concept has significant implications for multinational combat. The imperative for discrimination will require interoperability with foreign

JCC Implications	Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
	JCA Tier 1	JCA Tier 2	JCA Tier 3	
partners, especially at lower echelons			5.1.2 Structure Organization to Mission	partners—many of whom will employ different technological and other capabilities than the joint force—at increasingly lower echelons. This applies both for foreign units receiving joint force support and for U.S. units supported by foreign partners.
			5.1.3 Foster Organizational Collaboration	
13. Develop joint proficiency at lower echelons and grades without sacrificing Service proficiency	5 Command and Control	5.1 Organize	5.1.1 Establish and Maintain Unity of Effort with Mission Partners	The requirement to achieve joint synergy at increasingly lower echelons urges complementing Service training at every echelon with mission-appropriate joint training, to include wherever feasible actual field training vice simulations. Doing so implies an unprecedented cross-Service effort to reconcile training calendars, and has implications for facilities, ranges and Service training plans.
			5.1.2 Structure Organization to Mission	
			5.1.3 Foster Organizational Collaboration	
	8 Building Partnerships	8.2 Shape	8.2.4 Leverage Capacities and Capabilities of Security Estabs	
	6 Net-Centric	6.2 Enterprise Services (ES)	6.2.1 Information Sharing/Computing	
	5 Command and Control	5.2 Understanding	5.2.3 Share Knowledge and Situational Awareness	
14. Dramatically improve the ability to employ information as a component of combat power	8 Building Partnerships	8.1 Communicate	8.1.1 Inform Domestic and Foreign Audiences	The impact of public perceptions and attitudes on combat implies a need to improve joint forces' understanding of and ability to apply information as a component of combat power. The principle of placing combat power in the hands of the commander best able to employ it discriminately applies equally to information. Because
			8.1.2 Persuade Partner Audiences	
			8.1.3 Influence Adversary and Competitor Audiences	

JCC Implications	Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
	JCA Tier 1	JCA Tier 2	JCA Tier 3	
	5 Command and Control	5.1 Organize	5.1.2 Structure Organization to Mission	information is less easily confined in space and time than other elements of combat power, devolving its use downward incurs certain risks, and will require both comprehensive communication of the higher commander's information intent and restrictions, and careful monitoring of the impact of any information release at subordinate echelons.
15. Design Service capabilities from the outset to operate in a joint context	9 Corporate Management and Support	9.2 Strategy and Assessment	9.2.1 Strategy Development	The imperative for pushing jointness down to lower echelons implies that all Service combat capabilities must be developed within a joint context—that is, designed to interoperate with other Services (and, for that matter, foreign partners) at the lowest level of employment rather than only within Service formations. Policy changes on the approval authorities for lower acquisition categories may result.
			9.2.2 Capabilities Development	
			9.2.3 Enterprise-Wide Assessment	
			9.2.4 Studies and Analyses	
		9.3 Information Management	9.3.1 Enterprise Architecture	
		9.4 Acquisition	9.4.1 Acquisition Program Execution	
			9.4.2 Contracting	
		9.5 Program, Budget and Finance	9.5.1 Program / Budget and Performance	
			9.5.2 Accounting and Finance	
16. Develop mechanisms for transitioning forces quickly	1 Force Support	1.1 Force Preparation	1.1.1 Training	A central implication of the CCJO is that joint conventional forces must be able to perform any of the
			1.1.2 Exercising	
			1.1.3 Educating	

JCC Implications	Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
	JCA Tier 1	JCA Tier 2	JCA Tier 3	
and effectively between combat and other CCJO activities	5 Command and Control	5.1 Organize	5.1.2 Structure Organization to Mission	four joint activities on short notice and without immediate augmentation by other governmental or allied partners. This will require units to transition quickly between combat and those other activities, which are driven by quite different imperatives and impose different requirements and constraints. To facilitate and shorten that transition requires developing pre-packaged training and organizational reconfiguration programs, together with sufficient reserve stocks of activity-relevant equipment and consumables to preclude the need for procurement only after the transition becomes necessary.
17. Reduce the logistical support required by joint forces in combat.	4 Logistics	4.1 Deployment and Distribution	4.1.2 Sustain the Force	Given increasing challenges to American use of the global commons, the requirement to sustain joint operations at global distances puts joint forces at risk. There are capability development implications for Deployment and Distribution, Supply and Logistics Services.
			4.1.3 Operate the JDDE	
		4.2 Supply	4.2.1 Manage Supplies and Equipment	
			4.2.2 Inventory Management	
			4.2.3 Manage Supplier Networks	
			4.4.1 Food Service	
		4.4 Logistic Services	4.4.2 Water and Ice Service	
			4.4.3 Basecamp Services	

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APPENDIX B: MAPPING OF JOINT SECURITY CONCEPT IMPLICATIONS TO JCA

JSC Implications	Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
	JCA Tier I	JCA Tier 2	JCA Tier 3	
1. Update joint doctrine to reflect the new security definition and functions	1. Force Support	1.2. Force Preparation	1.2.3. Doctrine	Definitions in this concept expand on the current doctrinal definition of security, as well as on the security definition outlined in the CCJO. Understanding how the JSC definition builds on or changes the current doctrinal definition and mindset toward security activities is an area for further experimentation and exploration.
2. Develop joint force leaders, who have exposure and understanding to foreign language and cultures and who are able to apply innovative approaches to planning and implementing security activities	1. Force Support	1.2. Force Preparation	1.2.1. Training	The Joint Security Concept describes a complex future operating environment wherein security activities will require multidimensional situational awareness to optimize operational planning. Security-focused operational planning will, therefore, require a psychological adjustment between combat and security more than simply applying new tactics, techniques, and procedures. Joint force leaders must be able to operate and make decisions in complex and ambiguous situations where the threshold between security and combat are not always clear. Moreover, the joint force must have an appreciation for language and culture, as the success of security activities will frequently hinge on acceptance by the populace and their perceptions of its activities. The joint force should also explore alternative and innovative methods to develop security-focused skills and aptitudes.
			1.2.2. Exercising	
			1.2.3. Educating	
	8. Building Partnerships	8.2. Shape	8.2.2. Provide Aid to Foreign Partners and Institutions	
			8.2.5. Strengthen Global Defense Posture	
3. Develop specialized security-focused training for both dedicated	1. Force Support	1.2. Force Preparation	1.2.1. Training	The concept emphasizes the increased requirement for joint force security activities in the future operating environment; these activities will, therefore, demand broader security-focused
			1.2.3. Educating	
	3. Force Application	3.2. Engagement	3.2.1. Kinetic Means	

JSC Implications	Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
	JCA Tier I	JCA Tier 2	JCA Tier 3	
security specialists, as well as for the broader joint force			3.2.2. Non-Kinetic Means	training in joint force development. Although many security activities fall into traditional military tasks (e.g., raids, assaults, interdictions), some security activities also encompass non-traditional military, especially many regulation actions that often involve joint force support for enforcement and administration of the civil order and the rule of law. Joint force training must, incorporate many of the distinctive aspects of non-traditional security activities. In some situations, the joint force must also conduct security-focused training and assistance to enable a viable transition to interim or host government security institutions.
	7. Protection	7.1. Prevent	7.1.1. Prevent Kinetic Attack	
			7.2.1. Prevent Non-Kinetic Attack	
	8. Building Partnerships	8.2. Shape	8.2.1. Partner with Governments and Institutions	
			8.2.2. Provide Aid to Foreign Partners and Institutions	
			8.2.4. Leverage capacities and capabilities of security establishments	
4. Restructure personnel management of the joint force	1. Force Support	1.3. Human Capital Management	1.3.2. Personnel Management	Personnel management systems need to improve the documentation and management of security-focused competencies within the Active and Reserve components, so that joint force commanders can readily access and employ the right person, with the right skills, at the right time. This is especially true for the Reserve components, where many specialized civilian skills reside.
5. Develop non-lethal capabilities required to conduct regulatory-security activities	3. Force Application	3.2. Engagement	3.2.2. Non-Kinetic Means	The concept describes the delicate balance required of joint force security activities in order to create and maintain safe and secure environments. Many security activities, especially regulatory-focused activities associated with supporting the restoration of civil order and administration of the rule of law, require capabilities to defuse violence and lawlessness through non-lethal means. Specialized munitions and other capabilities munitions (e.g., taser guns, heat-wave guns) are required for crowd control and dispersion, especially
	4. Logistics	4.1. Deployment and Distribution	4.1.1. Move the Force	
			4.1.3. Operate the JDDE	
		4.2. Supply	4.2.1. Manage Supplies and Equipment	
		4.3. Maintain	4.3.1. Inspect	
		4.4. Logistics Services	4.4.1. Food Services	
			4.4.2. Water and Ice Services	
			4.4.3. Shelter	

JSC Implications	Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
	JCA Tier I	JCA Tier 2	JCA Tier 3	
			4.4.4. Hygiene	in densely populated urban environment. To monitor and protect large groups of people, the joint force also requires materials and technology that enable the processing and verification of large groups of people (e.g., biometric technology, census tools). Additionally, some security tasks require the logistical infrastructure to shelter, transport, and often incarcerate large groups of people. Future security activities will also require modular, deployable units that can "plug and play" in theater to provide immediate support for security activities. A rapidly deployable criminal investigative unit with forensic capabilities is one example. These deployable units should be multifaceted and self-contained with representation from service intelligence agencies, criminal investigation divisions, government and contracted law enforcement professionals, linguists, and forensic specialists.
		4.6. Engineering	4.6.1. General Engineering	
	2. Battlespace Awareness	2.2. Environment	2.2.1. Collect	
			2.2.2. Analyze	
			2.2.3. Predict	
			2.2.4. Exploit	
	7 Protection	7.1. Prevent	7.1.1. Prevent Kinetic Attack	
			7.1.2. Prevent Non-Kinetic Attack	
6. Establish processes and procedures and technological capabilities that facilitate operating across multi-jurisdictional boundaries	2. Battlespace Awareness	2.1. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance	2.1.1. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Planning and Direction	Joint force security activities require national and international understanding and situational awareness to enable unified action and integrated responses. The development of joint force regional and operational assessments must overcome legacy organizational seams and divisions. Accordingly, the joint force requires processes, procedures, and standards that facilitate multijurisdictional, cross-agency information and intelligence collection, analysis, production, and dissemination. During conflicts and operations, integrated teams should also be embedded with units in the field to collect data and intelligence from all activities on the ground (e.g., civil affairs, provincial
			2.1.3 Processing and Exploitation	
	5. Command & Control	5.1. Organize	5.1.3. Foster Organizational Collaboration	
		5.2. Understand	5.2.1. Organization Information	
			5.2.3. Share Knowledge and Situational Awareness	
		5.4. Decide	5.4.3. Establish Rule Sets	

JSC Implications	Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
	JCA Tier I	JCA Tier 2	JCA Tier 3	
		5.5. Direct	5.5.1. Communicate Intent and Guidance	reconstruction teams, and government and security forces). The joint force should store and frequently update written assessments in a central repository, accessible by participating organizations, as well as coalition and partner forces, as necessary. Additionally, joint force information systems must be able to transfer data seamlessly among partner military, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies (e.g., similar to the NIPRNET/SIPRNET infrastructure within DOD). This data sharing requires easing restrictions concerning the sharing of information with interagency partners, multinational partners, and non-governmental organizations.
	8. Building Partnerships	8.1. Communicate	8.1.1. Inform Domestic and Foreign Audiences	
			8.1.2. Persuade Partner Audiences	
		8.2. Shape	8.2.1. Partner with Governments and Institutions	
7. Develop and institutionalize training and planning mechanisms for information actions	1. Force Support	1.2. Force Preparation	1.2.1. Training	Information will be a critical function for joint force security activities. Therefore, to optimize information actions for population-focused security activities, the joint force must possess the requisite training and have sufficient planning mechanisms that will allow it to conceive and formulate timely and culturally attuned messages, quickly produce and deliver information designed to influence selected audiences as desired -- ensuring that joint force actions and messages are in concert with one another to build confidence and trust with the local population(s). Thus, the joint force must possess adequate processes and procedures to collect, analyze, disseminate, and share information on key stakeholders and target audiences, as well as to assess the perceptions of joint force security activities on target audiences.
	8. Building Partnerships	8.1. Communicate	8.1.1. Inform Domestic and Foreign Audiences	
			8.1.2. Persuade Partner Audiences	

JSC Implications	Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
	JCA Tier I	JCA Tier 2	JCA Tier 3	
8. Update process and procedures that address the management, coordination, oversight, and regulation of private security contractors	1. Force Support	1.2. Force Preparation	1.2.1. Training	Private security contractors (PSCs) can provide flexibility and surge capacity for security activities -- especially where unanticipated U.S. Government capacity gaps may exist. Despite this critical augmentation of joint force actions, joint force commanders do not exercise command and control over PSCs. To ensure joint force operations are optimized for U.S. security objectives, joint force commanders should be better enabled to coordinate and secure cooperation with contractors. Predeployment training on the operating procedures of private security contractors may help promote better understanding of and coordination with PSCs. Additionally, DOD should review PSC contracting procedures to assess the viability of crafting contracts that can be amended during an operation to better allocate and focus PSC efforts. DOD must also provide adequate contracting oversight personnel (e.g., contracting officer's representatives), who are responsible for supervising the contracted work. Improved management and oversight will not only benefit day-to-day interactions between the military and PSCs, but it can help reduce unorthodox behavior that could potentially alienate the same population that the military is trying to cultivate.
	4. Logistics	4.5. Operational Contract Support	4.5.1. Contract Support Integration	
			4.5.2. Contractor Management	
	5. Command and Control	5.6. Monitor	5.6.1. Assess Compliance with Guidance	
9. Develop cyberspace capacity and capabilities to ensure joint force freedom of action in planning, managing, and executing	2. Battlespace Awareness	2.1. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance	2.1.1. Define and Prioritize Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Reqs	In the future operating environment, the joint force must possess a combination of offensive and defensive cyber capabilities that secure information systems; reduce potential vulnerabilities; protect against intrusion attempts; provide robust identification and verification measures; and anticipate future
			2.1.2. Collection	

JSC Implications	Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
	JCA Tier I	JCA Tier 2	JCA Tier 3	
security activities	6. Net-Centric	6.1. Information Transport	6.1.1. Wired Transmission	threats. In addition to technological capabilities, information sharing for situational awareness is critical to cyber security efforts, as it develops understanding of vulnerabilities, attack methods, and emerging trends. Therefore, cyber security efforts require organizational processes and procedures that enable extensive coordination and integration across the interagency community, as well as with international partners. Coordination process should include the establishment of rules of engagement in response to cyber incidents (e.g., technical standards, legal norms, sovereign responsibility, the use of force), as well as guidelines and standards for transparency and information sharing.
		6.2. Enterprise Services	6.2.1. Information Sharing / Computing	
		6.3. Net Management	6.3.4. Cyber Management	
		6.4. Information Assurance	6.4.1. Secure Information Exchange	
			6.4.2. Protect Data and Networks	

APPENDIX C: MAPPING OF JOINT ENGAGEMENT CONCEPT IMPLICATIONS TO JCA

JEC Implications	Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
	JCA Tier 1	JCA Tier 2	JCA Tier 3	
1. Address engagement in joint doctrine	1. Force Support	1.2. Force Preparation	1.2.3. Doctrine	Engagement should be given a more prominent place in joint doctrine. This would include a comprehensive approach to global and regional engagement strategies, avoiding piecemeal and inconsistent application of military ways and means. The joint force should consider making military planning for engagement as vital as planning for other activities.
		1.3. Human Capital Management	1.3.2. Personnel Management	
	5. Command & Control	5.1. Organize	5.1.3. Establish Collaboration Policies	
		5.3. Planning	5.3.2. Apply situational understanding	
2. Expand General Purpose Force training to focus on engagement	1. Force Support	1.1. Force Management	1.1.1. Global Force Management	The joint force and Services must ensure that future force development for select segments of the general purpose forces allows for rapid assembly of liaison teams with the requisite area expertise to complement the capabilities of the special operations forces community, and that military educational institutions be able on short notice to conduct necessary targeted cultural familiarization and language courses for leaders and other key personnel expected to deploy to relevant areas.
		1.2. Force Preparation	1.2.1. Training	
			1.2.3. Educating	
		1.3. Human Capital Management	1.3.2. Personnel Management	
3. Improve whole of government coordination by establishing policy adviser	5. Command & Control	5. Organize	5.1.1. Establish and Maintain Unity of Effort with Mission Partners	The joint force should emphasize to DOS the importance of these teams to ensure that these members are experienced Foreign Service Officers (FSOs)
			5.1.3.. Foster Organizational Collaboration	

JEC Implications	Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
	JCA Tier 1	JCA Tier 2	JCA Tier 3	
(POLAD) teams within the joint force		5.2. Understand	5.2.3. Share Knowledge and Situational Awareness	with a deep understanding of military roles and functions. As certain operations require more time from the country team, the POLAD team may also serve in a liaison capacity between DOS and DOD to ensure unity of effort between DOS and DOD.
	8. Building Partnerships	8.1. Communicate	8.1.2. Persuade Partner Audiences	
		8.2. Shape	8.2.1. Partner with Governments and Institutions	
			8.2.3. Build the Capabilities and Capacities of Partners and Institutions	
	6. Net Centric	6.2. Enterprise Services	6.2.1. Info Sharing/Computing	
	5. Command & Control	5.1. Organize	5.1.1. Establish and Maintain Unity of Effort with Mission Partners	
		5.5. Direct	5.5.2. Task	
		5.6. Monitor	5.6.1. Assess Compliance with Guidance	
4. Refine authorities and funding streams to allow for more timely and effective engagement	5. Command & Control	5.1. Organize	5.1.1. Establish and Maintain Unity of Effort with Mission Partners	The joint force advocate for amendment of the U.S. Code to refine authorities of different USG agencies to allow them to more effectively integrate, when necessary, specialized skills and capabilities for a whole of government effort. DOD, DOS, and USAID and other USG agencies must work closely together and leverage their respective capabilities for mutual advantage. One possible model is to create a pool of resources available to both DOS and DOD.
		5.5. Direct	5.5.2. Task	
		5.6. Monitor	5.6.1. Assess Compliance with Guidance	

JEC Implications	Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
	JCA Tier 1	JCA Tier 2	JCA Tier 3	
5. Integrate engagement instruction into professional military education	1. Force Support	1.1. Force Management	1.1.1. Global Force Management	PME and training must include instruction in the laws and regulations by which a joint force commander at any level must operate, as well as the authorities and responsibilities of other USG agencies. PME must place emphasis on critical thinking skills and adaptive leadership in addition to operations and tactics. The joint force and Services must also develop training criteria that addresses engagement competency as a way to assess joint force readiness to conduct engagement.
		1.2. Force Preparation	1.2.1. Training	
			1.2.3. Educating	
			1.2.4. Doctrine	
6. Improve Service and institutional military personnel management cultures to better support, reward, and promote specialty training required for engagement	1. Force Support	1.1. Force Management	1.1.1. Global Force Management	The additional skills required to focus the joint force on activities beyond combat necessitate new and expanded training (language, cultural training, intelligence, security, etc.). Since units have limited time to conduct required specialized individual and organizational training prior to deployment, maintaining these skills is critical. The joint force and Services may need to make changes in recruiting, training, and retention procedures to ensure the availability of individuals with critical functional skills after their initial enlistment.
			1.1.2. Force Configuration	
		1.2. Force Preparation	1.2.1. Training	
			1.2.3. Educating	
			1.2.4. Doctrine	
		1.3. Human Capital Management	1.3.2. Personnel Management	
7. Improve capability to leverage social networking in the "battle of narratives"	6. Net-Centric	6.1. Information Transport	6.1.1. Wired Transmission	In the future operating environment of proliferating technology and increased information transparency, military activities will be

JEC Implications	Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
	JCA Tier 1	JCA Tier 2	JCA Tier 3	
			6.1.2. Wireless Transmission	influenced not just by the traditional media, but also by on-scene reports by individuals with video cameras and computers. There are multiple message sources in the battle space, and these are not limited to the joint force commander and the enemy. International media, coalition military members, civilian populations, NGOs, IOs, and other USG agencies will all have a presence in the same area. It is therefore critical that joint force narratives correspond to the context of the other messages and realities on the ground. In a world of instant information movement and nearly universal access to information, it will often be critical to be the first with the truth, than the last with a carefully crafted or coordinated message.
		6.2. Enterprise Services	6.2.1. Info Sharing/Computing	
		6.3. Net Management	6.3.4. Cyber Management	
	2. Battlespace Awareness	2.1. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance	2.1.1. Intel, Surveillance and Recon Planning and Direction	
			2.1.2. Collection	
	5. Command & Control	5.2. Understand	5.2.1. Organize Information	
			5.2.2. Develop knowledge and situational awareness	
			5.2.3. Share Knowledge and Situational Awareness	
	8. Building Partnerships	8.1. Communicate	8.1.1. Inform Domestic and Foreign Audiences	
			8.1.2. Persuade Partner Audience	
			8.1.3. Influence Adversary and Competitor Audiences	
		8.2. Shape	8.2.3. Build the Capabilities and Capacities of Partners and Institutions	
8. Reduce restrictions on sharing information with coalition, interagency and other partners that prevent effective information and intelligence	8 .Building Partnerships	8.1. Communicate	8.1.1. Inform Domestic and Foreign Audiences	The joint force and Services must seek an easing of restrictions on sharing information with other USG agencies, multinational partners and NGO partners to perform the civil-military and military-to-military coordination necessary to perform the military activities. The joint force also needs to ensure that
	1. Force Support	1.2. Force Preparation	1.2.4. Doctrine	
	2. Battlespace Awareness	2.1. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance	2.1.1. Intel, Surveillance and Recon Planning and Direction	
	5. Command & Control	5.1. Organize	5.1.1. Establish and Maintain Unity of Effort with Mission Partners	

JEC Implications	Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
	JCA Tier 1	JCA Tier 2	JCA Tier 3	
sharing			5.1.2. Structure Organization to Mission	intelligence, procedures, and lessons learned repositories are better integrated, more easily searchable, and more user-friendly.
		5.2. Understand	5.2.3. Share Knowledge and Situational Awareness	
	6. Net-Centric	6.2. Enterprise Services	6.2.1 Info Sharing/Computing	
		6.3. Net Management	6.3.4 Cyber Management	

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APPENDIX D: MAPPING OF JOINT RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION CONCEPT IMPLICATIONS TO JCA

JRRC Implications	Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
	JCA Tier I	JCA Tier 2	JCA Tier 3	
1. Establish command and control (C2) doctrinal processes and mechanisms within the joint force that allow the joint force commander to establish unity of effort with interagency partners	5. Command & Control	5.1. Organize	5.1.1. Establish and Maintain Unity of Effort with Mission Partners	This concept emphasizes the need for institutionalized mechanisms, regular training, and education about how to forge and sustain operational partnerships across the government. Command and control systems for relief and reconstruction must include mechanisms that make them interoperable and accessible across the joint force and its partners.
			5.1.2. Structure Organization to Mission	
			5.1.3. Foster Organizational Collaboration	
		5.3. Planning	5.3.2. Apply situational understanding	
		5.5 Direct	5.5.1. Communicate Intent and Guidance	
			5.5.2. Task	
	1. Force Support	1.2. Force Preparation	1.2.1. Training	
			1.2.4. Doctrine	
	8. Building Partnerships	8.1. Communicate	8.1.2. Persuade Partner Audiences	
		8.2. Shape	8.2.1. Partner with Governments and Institutions	
			8.2.3. Build the Capabilities and Capacities of Partners and Institutions	
2. Develop mechanisms and standards for partnering with foreign and domestic groups, both public and private, often in an enabling role	5. Command & Control	5.1. Organize	5.1.1. Establish and Maintain Unity of Effort with Mission Partners	It is imperative in performing relief and reconstruction for the joint force to partner with a wide range of groups and individuals like foreign governments, tribes, NGOs, and private businesses. It must balance these partnerships against its ability to innovate, adapt, and take immediate action. This concept highlights the need for the joint force, in
			5.1.2. Structure Organization to Mission	
			5.1.3. Foster Organizational Collaboration	

JRRC Implications	Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
	JCA Tier I	JCA Tier 2	JCA Tier 3	
	8. Building Partnerships	8.1. Communicate	8.1.2. Persuade Partner Audiences	conjunction with partners, and in accordance with their mandates and capacities, to build mechanisms and sets of standards for partnership in relief and reconstruction activities that allow for maximum flexibility and adaptability.
			8.1.3. Influence Adversary and Competitor Audiences	
		8.2. Shape	8.2.1. Partner with Governments and Institutions	
3. Develop awareness and understanding of specific funding authorities to ensure that joint force commanders can effectively plan and implement relief and reconstruction activities	9. Corporate Management & Support	9.5. Program, Budget and Finance	9.5.1. Program/ Budget and Performance	Joint force commanders need direct access to funds to accomplish the operational objectives of their relief and reconstruction activities. However, funding authorities for relief and reconstruction are inherently complex and may, in some cases, constrain a joint force commander if a critical activity or program is not supported by the specific authorities of the available funds for relief and reconstruction.
			9.5.2. Accounting and Finance	
4. Include requirements to support reconstruction activities in the determination of intelligence collection targets	1. Force Support	1.2. Force Preparation	1.2.1. Training	Intelligence collection cannot focus exclusively on adversaries or high value targets. Specific relief and reconstruction requirements such as collection on key actors, their orbits of political influence and credibility, community sympathies and interests, traditional religious leaders' agendas and other socio-economic and cultural patterns must complement it. Intelligence personnel must consider the unique logistical and operational issues related to relief and reconstruction. Expanded intelligence and information collection will help ensure more tailored, focused, and, ultimately, successful relief and reconstruction activities.
	2. Battlespace Awareness	2.1. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance	2.1.1. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Planning and Direction	
			2.1.2. Collection	
			2.1.4. Analysis and Production	
5. Develop scalable mobility and logistics mechanisms that allow the	4. Logistics	4.1. Deployment and Distribution	4.1.1. Move the Force	Logistics and mobility packages will depend heavily on the relative hostility of the operating environment and on the accessibility of roads, airfields,

JRRC Implications	Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
	JCA Tier I	JCA Tier 2	JCA Tier 3	
joint force to right-size for each relief and reconstruction operation			4.1.3 Operate the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise	and ports in the wake of a disaster or armed conflict. The Joint force commander must consider a range of options, to include seabasing and using commercial aircraft and ships in order to both reduce the U.S. footprint ashore and lessen reliance on local resources. Additionally, joint force commanders may need to employ combat and general engineers to repair degraded or destroyed roads, ports, and airfields to ensure mobility and access. Relief and reconstruction contingency plans should include logistics support packages tailored to local conditions such as climate and infrastructure capacity.
		4.2 Supply	4.2.1 Manage Supplies and Equipment	
		4.3 Maintain	4.3.3 Service	
			4.3.4 Repair	
		4.4 Logistic Services	4.4.1 Food Service	
			4.4.2 Water and Ice Service	
			4.4.3 Basecamp Service	
			4.4.4 Hygiene Services	
		4.5 Operational Contract Support	4.5.1 Contract Support Integration	
		4.6 Engineering	4.6.1 General Engineering	
			4.6.3 Geospatial Engineering	
		4.7 Installations Support	4.7.2 Installation Services	
	3 Force Application	3.1 Maneuver	3.1.1 Maneuver to Engage	
6. Develop awareness and build understanding of approaches to complex operations by collaborating on the development of a community of integrated civilian-military planners	5 Command & Control	5.1 Organize	5.1.1 Establish and Maintain Unity of Effort with Mission Partners	This concept highlights the need for an integrated, interagency approach that allows military and civilians to plan for and operate in new and rapidly evolving environments. The joint force will work closely with civilian agencies to help them build and maintain a community of professional planners and/or enhance their overall planning capacity for crisis-response and contingency planning. The joint force should facilitate civilian participation in military planning courses and look for opportunities to send military
			5.1.3 Foster Organizational Collaboration	
		5.2 Understand	5.2.2 Develop Knowledge and Situational Awareness	
			5.2.3 Share Knowledge and Situational Awareness	

JRRC Implications	Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
	JCA Tier I	JCA Tier 2	JCA Tier 3	
				planners to civilian courses and embed military liaison officers in agency-specific and interagency planners training programs, doctrine development efforts, and operational offices at the DOS and USAID. Combined Civilian-military exercises, experiments, and forums designed to test and improve joint planning processes and structures are needed. The joint force should participate in the policy level and technical level dialogue as the civilian agencies and departments codify a common planning lexicon, methodologies, the principles of planning for complex operations, and comprehensive planning guides.
	8. Building Partnerships	8.2. Shape	8.2.1. Partner with Governments and Institutions	
			8.2.3. Build the Capabilities and Capacities of Partners and Institutions	
7. Use operational design methodology, informed by comprehensive assessments, to better understand the relationships, environments, and conditions that relief and reconstruction require	5. Command & Control	5.1. Organize	5.1.1. Establish and maintain Unity of Effort with Mission Partners	Relief and reconstruction activities require the joint force to cultivate, maintain and leverage relationships with host governments and populations to ensure their needs are effectively addressed. Detailed assessments are critical to help the joint force understand who its critical partners are and the nature of the dynamics that shape the environment. This concept emphasizes the use of operational design to better enable the joint force's understanding.
			5.1.2. Structure Organization to Mission	
		5.2. Understand	5.2.2. Develop Knowledge and Situational Awareness	
			5.2.3. Share Knowledge and Situational Awareness	
		5.3. Planning	5.3.1. Analyze Problem	
			5.3.2. Apply Situational Understanding	
	8. Building Partnerships	8.1. Communicate	8.1.1. Inform Domestic and Foreign Audiences	
			8.1.2. Persuade Partner Audiences	

JRRC Implications	Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
	JCA Tier I	JCA Tier 2	JCA Tier 3	
8. Create a specialized trainer and advisor cadre that can participate in short- and long-term "building partnership capacity" efforts with interagency partners and foreign governments during reconstruction	1 Force Support	1.2 Force Preparation	1.2.1 Training	Along with civilian partners, the joint force must develop its capacity to train and advise foreign civilian institutions, such as a Ministry of Defense or Interior, to ensure the skills required to rebuild civil infrastructure and provide essential services are transferred to host government and local civilian organizations. The concept suggests the cultivation of a cadre of trainers and advisors who can respond immediately to fill the gap until civilian partners can take over while also emphasizing support for civilian initiatives underway to build a similar cadre of experts.
			1.2.3 Educating	
	8 Building Partnerships	8.1 Communicate	8.1.2 - Persuade Partner Audiences	
		8.2 Shape	8.2.1 - Partner with Governments and Institutions	
			8.2.2 - Provide Aid to Foreign Partners and Institutions	
			8.2.3 - Build the Capabilities and Capacities of Partners and Institutions	
9. Conduct relief and reconstruction related exercises, experiments and joint training with interagency and non-governmental partners to develop and maintain collaborative relationships for enhanced coordination in relief and reconstruction activities	1 Force Support	1.2 Force Preparation	1.2.1 Training	Relief and reconstruction activities require coordination and partnership among many disparate organizations. This concept recommends DOD leverage existing opportunities, such as the National Level Exercise (NLE) program, and sponsor additional forums that include other government agencies and nongovernmental organizations to increase mutual awareness and education of organizations' capabilities and capacity to conduct relief and reconstruction activities.
	8 Building Partnerships	8.1 Communicate	8.1.2 - Persuade Partner Audiences	
		8.2 Shape	8.2.1 - Partner with Governments and Institutions	
10. Develop an accessible, searchable, and multi-agency integrated lessons-learned database, leveraging the current Joint Lessons Learned	1 Force Support	1.2 Force Preparation	1.2.5 Lessons Learned	The current Joint Lessons Learned system should be leveraged for relief and reconstruction activities to create an integrated lessons-learned database that can inform future responses and ensure best practices are well disseminated. This system should be unclassified to allow all partners
	6 Net-Centric	6.2 Enterprise Services	6.2.1 - Information Sharing / Computing	
		6.3 Net Management	6.2.2 Core Enterprise Services	
			6.3.4 Cyber	

JRRC Implications	Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
	JCA Tier I	JCA Tier 2	JCA Tier 3	
system, for relief and reconstruction activities			Management	to jointly access and populate.
	8. Building Partnerships	8.1. Communicate	8.1.1. Inform Domestic and Foreign Audiences	
11. Train and educate U.S. military personnel on the sensitivities of operating with humanitarian actors that wish to maintain neutrality	1. Force Support	1.2. Force Preparation	1.2.1. Training	Many NGOs and other private humanitarian actors do not wish to be associated with military activities. However, the line between operational organizations and their disparate objectives has blurred on contemporary battlefields where military, NGO, IO, and other civilian organizations all operate in the same environment. This concept calls for training on Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments at all levels of military education.
			1.2.3. Educating	
	8. Building Partnerships	8.1. Communicate	8.1.1. Inform Domestic and Foreign Audiences	
		8.2. Shape	8.2.1. Partner with Governments and Institutions	
	5. Command & Control	5.2. Understand	5.2.1. Organize Information	
			5.2.3. Share Knowledge and Situational Awareness	
12. Train and educate U.S. military personnel in cultural awareness techniques and on specific cultures where relief and reconstruction activities are deemed most likely	1. Force Support	1.2. Force Preparation	1.2.1. Training	All U.S. military personnel should cultivate and maintain a degree of cultural understanding and sensitivity, but general purpose forces do not need to become fluent in multiple languages or extensively versed in the nuances of a local culture. They should be trained in basic language skills, in developing generic cultural appreciation skills and cross-cultural communication skills, and learn how to recruit and use local translators to facilitate their mission objectives.
			1.2.3. Educating	
13. Consider the effects and impact of combat actions on future relief and reconstruction in all targeting reviews	2. Battlespace Awareness	2.2. Environment	2.2.1. Collect	Combat operations targeting must include potential physical damage to infrastructure and impact on future relief and reconstruction requirements in their calculations. For example, it may be sufficient to render certain power lines inoperative,
	5. Command & Control	5.2. Understand	5.2.2. Develop Knowledge and Situational Awareness	

JRRC Implications	Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
	JCA Tier I	JCA Tier 2	JCA Tier 3	
				rather than destroying the power plant.
		5.3. Engagement	5.3.1. Analyze Problem	
			5.3.2. Apply Situational Understanding	
14. Increase the ability to gain rapid contracting support	4. Logistics	4.5. Operational Contract Support	4.5.1. Contract Support Integration	The emerging Joint Contracting and Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) fly away teams could provide highly valuable support to joint force relief and reconstruction efforts, and should have the ability to incorporate other agency representation in order to maximize funding options and requirements determination.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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