TITLE: An Analysis of 404 Non-Military Incidents Involving Either Chemical or Biological Agents

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The following component part numbers comprise the compilation report:
ADP013371 thru ADP013468
96. AN ANALYSIS OF 404 NON-MILITARY INCIDENTS INVOLVING EITHER CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL AGENTS

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INTRODUCTION
GOALS:
1. Facilitate our understanding of chemical and biological terrorism by profiling both the perpetrator and the incident.
2. Relate the broad choice of agent to other factors that characterize both the perpetrator and the incident.
3. Generate a set of tables useful for a variety of analytical tasks.

DATA SOURCES:
All data was acquired from open sources including newspapers, magazines, books, transcripts of radio and television broadcasts and reports prepared by various organizations.

ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGY:
1. Data describing 404 incidents of the non-military use or threatened use of CB agents were collected and then compiled in the CABO Database.
2. The data were coded for 18 factors that characterize both the perpetrator and the incident.
3. Tables were prepared using PSG’s Incident Analysis Tool to facilitate analysis of the relationship between agent and the 18 characterization factors.

CHARACTERIZATION FACTORS:
Perpetrator Categories
Perpetrator Action
Cost
Dedication and Discipline
Dissemination Technique
Engineering Skills
Information Access
Load Carrying
Logistics
Motive
Number of Adversaries
Outcome
Planning Ability
Security and Tactical
Specialized Materials
Target
Technical Knowledge
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS REGARDING AGENTS

Type of CB material: Chemical or Biological?
1. 250 of 404 incidents involved a toxic chemical (62%)
   - Specific chemical identified in 191 incidents
   - Specific chemical not identified in 59 incidents
2. 101 of 404 incidents involved a biological pathogen or toxin (25%)
   - Specific biological identified in 92 incidents
   - Specific biological not identified in 9 incidents
3. Type of CB material was not identified in 53 incidents (13%).

Availability of CB materials
1. CB material was actually acquired in 264 incidents (64%)
2. CB material was actually or apparently used in 234 incidents (58%)

AGENTS INVOLVED IN 3 OR MORE INCIDENTS
Bacillus Anthracis
Butyric Acid
Mercury
Botulinum Toxin
Rat Poison (Warfarin)
Thallium Salts
Ricin
Arsenic
Potassium Cyanide
Sarin
Sodium Cyanide
LSD
Paraquat
Salmonella Species
Strychnine
Vibrio Cholera
Yersinia Pestis

SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS FROM THE COMPARISON TABLES

PERPETRATOR CATEGORIES
Perpetrators whose actions were based on religious or philosophical beliefs were the most common type of adversary (33%) and were most often associated with biological agents (53%).

PERPETRATOR ACTIONS
Actual use other than for extortion was the predominant type of action (51%). Threatened use without clear demands was the predominant type of action involving biological agents (51%).

COST
Approximately 75% of all incidents apparently cost less than $250.00.
DEDICATION AND DISCIPLINE
Most incidents required little or no dedication or discipline (69%).
A willingness to persevere was more often required in chemical incidents (33%) than in biological incidents (9%).

DISSEMINATION TECHNIQUE
The most common means (40%) of either actual or threatened dissemination was via contaminated consumables (food, water, medication, etc.).

ENGINEERING SKILLS
Approximately 80% of all incidents in which agent was used required little or no workshop or engineering skills to fabricate the dissemination device.

INFORMATION ACCESS
The majority of incidents involving biological agents required the lowest level of information access (63%).

LOAD CARRYING CAPABILITY
Dissemination devices would fit in the perpetrator’s pocket in a majority of biological incidents (62%).

LOGISTICS
Approximately 64% of all incidents required no more than a personal vehicle and typical household kitchen equipment.

MOTIVE
Deological considerations were the most common apparent motive (49%).

NUMBER OF ADVERSARIES
Most incidents (67%) apparently involved no more than three individuals.

OUTCOME
Approximately half of all incidents (49%) were successful.
Chemical incidents failed less often (3%) than did biological incidents (9%).

PLANNING ABILITY
Very few incidents displayed sophisticated planning (12%).

SECURITY AND TACTICAL
47% of the incidents required no security or tactical skills.
Incidents involving chemical agents more often (56%) required basic skills than did incidents involving biological agents (19%).

SPECIALIZED MATERIALS
The majority of incidents (75%) did not require access to specialized materials handling or processing equipment.
TARGET
Groups of individuals linked by a common characteristic were the most frequent target (55%).

TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE
In 79% of the incidents the perpetrator needed no more technical knowledge than the ability to recognize toxic or infection material.

VENUE
Retail stores and reproductive rights clinics were the most common venues for both chemical and biological incidents.

CONCLUSIONS
Material that may be a CB agent is likely to be encountered in slightly less than two-thirds of all incidents.
Incidents involving chemical agents are more likely than those involving biological agents.
“Military” agents are less likely to be encountered than industrial materials.
Perpetrators whose actions are based on religious or philosophical beliefs represent the greatest threat.