<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNCLASSIFIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNCLASSIFIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCLASSIFIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCLASSIFIED</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AD NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADB225714</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NEW LIMITATION CHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies only; Administrative/Operational Use; 22 Apr 96. Other requests shall be referred to CAC, Attn: ATZ-GCJ-S, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1389.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHORITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USACGSC ltr, 2 May 2001.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
This study assesses the utility of specialized units for Operations Other Than War (OOTW) as opposed to relying on conventionally trained Army units. The assessment is based upon three major sources. First, the thesis determines if there is significant support for specialized units within the topic literature. Second, it determines if doctrine supports the use of specialized units. Third, the thesis summarizes recent OOTW participants' views on the topic. The topic is based upon two schools of thought. The first school states that conventional units are appropriate for OOTW. This is due to a training overlap between wartime and OOTW skills and due to the flexibility of the U.S. soldier. The opposite school of thought states that the OOTW environment is so different than war that a specialized unit is required. The findings reveal that there is very limited support for specialized units among the three source groups. Overall, the sources agree that using conventional troops for OOTW is appropriate. The study concludes that emerging Force XXI doctrine and the increased complexity of OOTW will challenge the current reliance on using conventional units.
| Block 1. | Agency Use Only (Leave blank). |
| Block 2. | Report Date. Full publication date including day, month, and year, if available (e.g. 1 Jan 85). Must cite at least the year. |
| Block 3. | Type of Report and Dates Covered. State whether report is interim, final, etc. If applicable, enter inclusive report dates (e.g. 10 Jun 87 - 30 Jun 87). |
| Block 4. | Title and Subtitle. A title is taken from the part of the report that provides the most meaningful and complete information. When a report is prepared in more than one volume, repeat the primary title, add volume number, and include subtitle for the specific volume. On classified documents enter the title classification in parentheses. |
| Block 5. | Funding Numbers. To include contract and grant number may include program element number(s), project number(s), task number(s), and work unit number(s). Use the following labels: |
| Block 6. | Author(s). Name(s) of person(s) responsible for writing the report, performing the research, or credited with the content of the report. In office or compiler, this should follow the name(s). |
| Block 7. | Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es). Self-explanatory. |
| Block 8. | Performing Organization Report Number. Enter the unique alphanumeric report number(s) assigned by the organization performing the report. |
| Block 9. | Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Address(es). Self-explanatory. |
| Block 10. | Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Report Number. (If known) |
| Block 11. | Supplementary Notes. Enter information not included elsewhere such as: Proposed in cooperation with...; Trans. of...; To be published in...; Where report is revised, include statement whether the new report supersedes or complements the older report. |
| Block 12a. | Distribution/Availability Statement. Denotes public availability or limitations. Cite any availability to the public. Enter additional limitations or special markings in all capitals (e.g. NOFORM, REL, ITAR). |
| Block 13. | Abstract. Include a brief (maximum 200 words) factual summary of the most significant information contained in the report. |
| Block 14. | Subject Terms. Keywords or phrases identifying major subjects in the report. |
| Block 15. | Number of Pages. Enter the total number of pages. |
| Block 16. | Price Code. Enter appropriate price code (NTIS only). |
| Block 20. | Limitation of Abstract. This block must be completed to assign a limitation to the abstract. Enter either UL (unlimited) or SAR (same as report). An entry in this block is necessary if the abstract is to be limited. If blank, the abstract is assumed to be unlimited. |
DOES THE U.S. ARMY NEED A FULL-TIME OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR UNIT?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

MICHAEL ALAN JOINER, MAJ, USA
B.A., University of Georgia, Athens, GA, 1981

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1996

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
DOES THE U.S. ARMY NEED A FULL-TIME OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR UNIT?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

MICHAEL ALAN JOINER, MAJ, USA
B.A., University of Georgia, Athens, GA, 1981

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1996

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Name of Candidate: MAJ Michael Alan Joiner

Thesis Title: Does the U. S. Army Need a Full-Time Operations Other Than War Unit?

Approved by:

John B. Hunt, J.D., Thesis Committee Chairman
LTG James Pankey, B.S., Member
LTC James White, B.A., Member

Accepted this 7th day of June 1996 by:

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D., Director, Graduate Degree Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


This study assesses the utility of specialized units for operations other than war (OOTW) instead of relying on conventionally trained Army units. The assessment is based upon three major sources. First, the thesis determines if there is significant support for specialized units within the topic literature. Second, it determines if current and emerging doctrine supports the use of specialized units. Third, the thesis summarizes recent OOTW participants' views on the topic. The topic is based upon two schools of thought. The first school states that conventional units are appropriate for OOTW. This is due to a training overlap between wartime and OOTW skills and due to the inherent flexibility of the U.S. soldier. The opposite school of thought states that the OOTW environment is so completely different than war that a specialized unit is required.

The findings reveal that there is very limited support for specialized units among the three main source groups. Overall the sources agreed that using conventional troops for OOTW is appropriate.

The study concludes that emerging Force XXI doctrine and the increased complexity of OOTW will challenge the current reliance on using conventional units. The Army of the future will need both expert warriors and expert peacekeepers.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE OF CONTENTS</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APPROVAL PAGE</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. LITERATURE AND DOCTRINE REVIEW</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. MATRIX ANALYSIS</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENDNOTES</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUMMARY MATRIX</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAR After-Action Report
ACOM Atlantic Command
ARFOR Army Forces
BUR Bottom-Up Review
CAC Combined Arms Center
CALL Center for Army Lessons Learned
CINC Commander in Chief
CINCSOUTH Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command
CONPLAN Contingency Plan
DMZ Demilitarized Zone
DoD Department of Defense
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FM Field Manual
JP Joint Publication
JTF Joint Task Force
LNO Liaison Officer
MEL Military Education Level
METL Mission Essential Task List
MOOTW Military Operations Other Than War
MOS Military Occupational Specialty
MTOE Modified Table of Organization and Equipment
OOTW Operations Other Than War
OPLAN Operations Plan
OPTEMPO Operations Tempo
PVO Private Volunteer Organization
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOE</td>
<td>Table of Organization and Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The Army's capstone manual on operations, Field Manual 100-5, states that the Army's "purpose is to win wars." However, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently stated: "While we have historically focused on warfighting, the our military profession is increasingly changing its focus to a complex array of military operations—other than war."

These two emphases frame the debate on how the Army will prepare for future Operations Other Than War (OOTW). Is the Army solely a warfighting force which conducts OOTW as a collateral duty? Or is the Army's mission something broader which includes OOTW as a primary duty? If the latter is true, does the Army need a unit specialized in the intricacies on OOTW?

This paper will research the question, "Does the Army need specialized OOTW troops?" At first glance, it seems that the Army has already answered the question with a resounding "no." However, a few dissenters are not convinced. Also, the actual OOTW participants' opinions have not been summarized. This thesis will focus on the recent participants' viewpoints on this controversy.

The post-Cold War world is awash with numerous security problems, many of which involve OOTW. The world has changed, yet serious threats to U.S. interests remain. Daily headlines are reminders
that some religious and ethnic minorities, and transnational groups, such as the narcotraffickers, hold little regard for boundaries or law. In addition, there is little evidence that these OOTW-related threats will decrease in the foreseeable future.

These threats often come into conflict with U.S. goals and policies. When these conflicts become critical to U.S. interests, soldiers somewhere in the Army are alerted for deployment and potential commitment. For this reason, the U.S. Army needs to prepare its limited forces for OOTW. Simply using whatever unit was available probably influenced the unit selection process in the past. However, what the Army now lacks in quantity, can be overcome by selecting the best available Army units for OOTW commitments. Does "best available" mean taking the best "warriors" and training them to be the best OOTW soldiers? Or, as the Army doctrine implies, are the U.S. Army's high quality soldiers good enough to simply adapt to OOTW? These questions provide focus on the topic question of having specialized units.

One might respond by saying that OOTW units would still be comprised of soldiers trained with weapons. However, there may be serious implications for soldiers trained to kill who suddenly become ad hoc policemen, diplomats, and food distributors. These implications may be much greater than what simply happens to that soldier. For example, a tragic tactical mistake, such as a Rules of Engagement violation, could have negative strategic consequences.

The behavior of U.S. soldiers influences American public support, international support, and local host nation support. U.S. Army soldiers are closely scrutinized by the media and international observers. Negative portrayals of U.S. troops could impact upon the
military's ability to successfully conduct a variety of OOTW missions. Joint doctrine states that, "Media reporting influences public opinion, which may affect the perceived legitimacy of an operation and ultimately influence the success or failure of the operation."\(^2\)

A significant military failure could have a larger impact than negative media coverage on U.S. political, social, or economic objectives. For these reasons, it is important to determine if the Army's current response to OOTW is adequate. Or if any enhancement is needed, should that enhancement be specialized OOTW units?

**Key Definitions**

Unfortunately, this topic of specialized units is interwoven with imprecise, and sometimes overlapping, terminology. For example, there are several definitions of peacekeeping and peacemaking. In itself, OOTW is an imprecise term because it only eliminates one type of conflict and simultaneously embraces all others. However, the following definitions are generally from the Army's Field Manual (FM) 100-23, Peace Operations:

**Operations Other Than War.** Encompasses the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the instruments of power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).\(^3\)

**Peace Building.** Consists of post-conflict actions, primarily diplomatic, that strengthen and rebuild civil infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a return to conflict.\(^4\)
Peace Enforcement. The application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions.  

Peacekeeping. Military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents; designed to monitor or facilitate implementation of an existing truce and support diplomatic efforts to reach long-term political settlement.

Peacemaking. A process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that ends disputes and resolves issues.

Peace Operations. Comprised of three types of activities: support to diplomacy (peacemaking, peacebuilding, and preventive diplomacy), peacekeeping, and peace enforcement.

Thesis Question and Subordinate Questions

The thesis question is, "Does the U.S. Army need a specialized OOTW unit?" However, the answer is dependent upon research on seven subordinate questions. These subordinate questions will summarize the topic opinion from three major sources: literature, doctrine, and the participants' viewpoints. Taken together, these three sources will determine how much support exists for specialized units. The following paragraphs will explain the seven subordinate questions.

The first question is, "What is the range of opinion in the topic literature?" Who supports the concept of specialized troops, and what is the degree of their influence? For example, rank, position, and experience all influence an audience. It is also important to determine a rough ratio of supporters and dissenters of current doctrine. The
The purpose of these questions is to determine how many schools of thought exist on the topic and the relative strength of different viewpoints.

The second question is, "Can the Army afford a specialized unit?" Do current and future force structure constraints determine that a specialized unit is unrealistic? Also, is the "cost" too high for a force constrained by the Department of Defense (DoD) Bottom-Up Review? It is possible that a force structure determined by two major regional conflicts simply cannot reprioritize assets for full-time OOTW.

The next question is, "Does the Army doctrine consider specialized units? If not, why not?" It is important that the doctrine consider alternatives and discuss why some doctrinal alternatives are unacceptable. Also, since doctrine generally reflects the senior leadership's influence, doctrine provides insight into the key leaders' beliefs. Also important, are there significant contradictions on this topic within Army doctrine? Contradictions suggest more than one school of thought at work. If so, what are the different schools of thought? This may be especially important as the Army develops its Force XXI doctrine for conflict in the next century. It is important because, theoretically, doctrine can incorporate a wide range of ideas during its development. However, incorporating new ideas becomes more difficult once doctrine is approved. The Army's capstone document on Force XXI agrees with this concept: "Thus, this concept is intended to provide focus for experimentation, stimulate further thought, and generate discussion on future War and Operations Other Than War."³

Using even stronger language, the same pamphlet states, "The greatest intellectual challenge confronting the Army today is maintaining its doctrinal relevance."⁴
Another aspect of doctrinal relevance is the harmonization of Army and Joint doctrine. Thus, the sixth subordinate question asks, "Are there significant contradictions between Army and Joint doctrine on this topic?" Many Joint publications establish their authority over service doctrine. For example, Joint Publication (JP) 3-07 states: "The guidance in this publication is authoritative: as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise."

Therefore, any serious conflict between Army and Joint doctrine is important, especially if they conflict over using specialized units. An example of this conflict is the doctrinal definition of OOTW. The definition in Joint Publication 3-07 emphasizes that OOTW is an operation used to complement the national instruments of power, and it implies OOTW's subordination to political goals. Whereas, the Army's formal definition in FM 100-5 does not discuss the instruments of power nor does it place OOTW in the realm of political conflict.

Other than the thesis topic literature and doctrine, a third source is critical to the thesis question. That third source is the participants' viewpoints. In particular, have their viewpoints been summarized and analyzed? If so, do the overall results support or conflict with the ideas of specialized units? This portion of the research is important for several reasons. First, participants' viewpoints have a legitimacy that is difficult for nonparticipants to achieve. The participants have experienced, not just conceptualized, the practicality of the doctrine. Second, some of the participants experienced OOTW with little or nonexistent doctrine. This physical and intellectual detachment from the doctrinal debate gives the participants...
a degree of objectivity. Third, doctrinal developers should be familiar with the participants' field expedient solutions to OOTW doctrinal problems. Possibly an imaginative soldier has already solved some doctrinal dilemma.

In summary, this thesis question is dependent upon seven subordinate questions. When answered, these subordinate questions will determine if there is a consensus of opinion among the major sources. Those major sources are the literature review, the doctrinal review, and the participants' viewpoints.

Limitations and Delimitations

1. This project will not attempt to define success or failure in previous OOTW. It will accept the idea that improvement in future OOTW is possible.

2. This thesis is generally concerned with recent major OOTW involving brigades and divisions of the U.S. Army. This limitation is imposed for two reasons. First, since the end of the Cold War, major OOTW are no longer part of a larger bipolar struggle. With some exceptions, most OOTW involving U.S. units during the Cold War were part of a larger U.S.-USSR conflict. However, since the end of the Cold War, most OOTW conflicts involving Americans are not defined by a larger bipolar struggle. Second, U.S. military downsizing has affected the military's OOTW capabilities. For example, the loss of many of the Army's light divisions has decreased the overall U.S. OOTW capability.

3. This project will consider other services/nations experiences in OOTW, but it will not research their experiences in depth. Joint/Combined experiences are important aspects of many OOTW
missions; however, this would quickly become unmanageable within the confines of a single thesis.

4. This project will consider academic research, media reports, and official government positions on Army OOTW. These sources are relevant for understanding the larger, and especially the nonmilitary, aspects of certain OOTW. Once again, due to thesis constraints, this will not be the primary focus. The primary focus is to determine if a consensus of opinion exists within literature, doctrine, and the actual participants’ views.

5. Topic research will consider the Army’s OOTW doctrine. Understanding U.S. Army doctrine is the key to understanding the Army’s preparations for OOTW. However, the doctrine is not universally accepted by the OOTW participants or their senior decision makers. Therefore, as stated previously, actual OOTW experiences are the critical information in this thesis.

6. Finally, if supported by research, this project will suggest actual changes to force structure for OOTW. Adding several joint-experienced liaison officers to a standard Table of Organization and Equipment is an example.

Research Approach

This thesis will utilize primary source material, such as after-action reports (AARs), executive summaries, and written comments from individuals/units actually deployed in OOTW. The intent is to find trends among disparate units, locations, and missions. Assuming this evidence exists, these trends will either generally support the idea of a specialized OOTW unit, reject the idea, or offer conflicting
conclusions. If any of these three trends is strong enough, the thesis will summarize the findings in a matrix. The purpose of the matrix is brevity and clarity of this complex topic. The thesis will also utilize pertinent secondary sources, such as professional journals, unit histories, and academic analysis of previous Army OOTW.

**Potential Outcomes**

As stated in the Research Approach, the overall goal is to summarize the actual participants' suggestions and compare their beliefs to doctrine and literature. Do the participants believe that the Army is "optimized" for OOTW? If the thesis can succinctly summarize this wealth of experience, then it has contributed to a critical OOTW debate. This debate centers on OOTW preparedness and how that preparedness impacts on the Army's primary mission of winning wars. This debate of OOTW readiness versus combat readiness strikes at the fundamental purpose of the Army as the United States approaches the twenty-first century. In other words, should the Army prepare for the most dangerous threats to the United States or the most likely threats? Therefore, even a small contribution to this debate is worthwhile.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE AND DOCTRINE REVIEW

This chapter is an overview of the pertinent literature and doctrine available for the topic question. Fortunately there are a large number of sources on this subject which support a four-part literature review. First, this chapter concentrates on primary source material, such as unit AARs, executive summaries, and the Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL) documents. Second, the chapter utilizes other academic secondary source materials. Examples include U.S. Army Command and General Staff College’s Master of Military Art and Science theses and the U.S. Army War College’s research papers. Third, the chapter reviews periodicals on Army involvement in OOTW and associated topics. Taken together, these primary and secondary sources constitute the chapter’s literature review. This chapter also reviews pertinent Army, Joint, and limited international OOTW doctrine. This information is summarized in the doctrine review portion of this chapter.

The CALL of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth has gathered a large collection of AARs. This is an excellent resource for the research because CALL’s documents are detailed, generally unclassified, and cover virtually all significant Army deployments and operations.

Specifically for this topic, CALL’s collection includes OOTW AARs and summaries. These documents specify force structure, training,
and equipment problems which directly impact upon the topic question. While most of the documents' authors do not actually take a stand for or against full-time OOTW units, their problems and suggestions will have a large impact on the research analysis. Although disparate in location and mission, several different units involved in OOTW encountered similar challenges and voiced similar complaints about their OOTW capabilities. The thesis research has not located data which identifies these trends across several recent OOTW events. The intent is to cover the analysis in chapter 5. The following CALL reports were most useful for the topic question.

From the U.S. Army Somalia Crisis Collection, research has located the official Operation Restore Hope After-Action Report. This report was generally written by field-grade staff officers with input from the Joint Task Force (JTF) units. This extensive document shows how to form a JTF from an Army unit. Also, the report describes the problems and successes in changing a division into the Army Forces (ARFOR) component of a JTF. This report has an entire chapter on the U.S. military interface with the United Nations (UN) organizations. There are other pertinent chapters, such as task organizing Army brigades for OOTW and explanations of the Rules of Engagement. An example of the detail available in this report is shown below:

In the deployment, 1000 (+) pieces of unneeded equipment (including 900 vehicles and 16 helicopters) were deployed without being used. This represented approximately 18 percent of the total Army equipment deployed by sealift. Deploying unneeded equipment was primarily a result of changing METT-T, inability of the IPB process to determine clan intent and difficulty in defining end state.
Information like this is useful for the topic question. When taken with several other reports, it suggests that current OOTW capabilities may not be optimized.

Also, not all of the utility resides in numerical details and low-level suggestions. Often new information is provided, or at least clarified, at the conceptual level of problem solving. For example, the report contends that the OOTW environment, such as Operation Restore Hope, requires a staff that plans and executes at the operational, strategic, and tactical levels.² While other authors hinted at this concept, no other source in the research adequately clarified the problems of a tactical staff attempting strategic/operational planning.

Finally, the Restore Hope (Somalia) documents compared actual deployment results with traditional and emerging OOTW doctrine. For example, one useful approach compared the Restore Hope experience with the Principles of War in FM 100-5, Operations, and the Principles of OOTW.

Another important CALL document was the Operation Uphold Democracy--Initial Impressions (Haiti). Similar to Restore Hope documents, the Haiti initial impressions have detailed reviews of specific subunits' performances and the force structure and training challenges of OOTW. Especially useful were the discussions of the Reserve augmentee's impacts on a unit, problems with expanding a division into a JTF, and the comparison of Uphold Democracy operations with OOTW doctrine.

It was noteworthy that even though their complex mission in Haiti was successfully completed, some of the JTF staff sections were almost entirely comprised of augmentees from the Reserves, Atlantic
Command (ACOM), and other units. This had far-reaching effects on the J3 section and the JTF Commander and was one of several problems created by the critical shortage of Military Education Level (MEL) 4 officers. Once again this insight was unique in the research and underscored the importance of studying actual participants' views.

The Uphold Democracy report substantially supports OOTW doctrinal literature discussed later in this chapter. However, the detailed review of specific issues tends to disagree with the overall support of current doctrine and unit OOTW preparations. This may suggest that command influence could impact on summarized, high-profile conclusions. This possibility exists throughout the official AAR and CALL summaries. This potential problem underscores the necessity of diverse sources for conclusions and analysis.

Last, the report suggests that critical gaps exist in OOTW doctrine while conversely stating that doctrine was thorough and adequate. For example, the reports conclude that: "No doctrinal literature currently exists concerning expansion of a division staff into a JTF element." The same report stated, "Doctrine, training, leadership, organization, and materiel of the U.S. Army proved sound during Operation Uphold Democracy."

Another useful CALL document is French and British Peace Operations Lessons Learned. This is a compilation of interviews and AARs from British and French Army officers and enlisted soldiers. The operations included recent OOTW in Somalia, Cambodia, and the former Republic of Yugoslavia. The interviewers and other researchers met often to compare results as they searched for emerging trends. As other modern Western militaries struggling with OOTW, the British and the
French experiences are valid for research. Since their OOTW doctrine mirrors the United State’s in many ways, their comparisons of OOTW experiences with their doctrine are both useful and appropriate. More important, for the thesis, both the British and the French strongly favor using conventional combat units with specific OOTW-focused predeployment training. In other words, they support the use of conventional troops instead of specialized troops. This conclusion supports their OOTW doctrine.

Another important theme of the British and the French OOTW literature is the degradation of combat skills during OOTW. This central theme dovetails perfectly with U.S. OOTW doctrine. It suggests that the concern is valid if three different sophisticated armies, on two different continents, arrive at the same conclusion.

Most of these CALL documents concentrate on operational and intelligence issues during OOTW. However, there are also AARs from the combat service support units. For example, Logistics in a Peace Enforcement Environment—Operation Continue Hope is a collection of supply, transportation, and maintenance issues associated with a major OOTW. The final product was a collection of 63 interviews and the personal diary of Brigadier General Norman Williams, Commander, UN Logistics Support Group and Deputy Commander of U.S. forces in Somalia.6

This is an excellent source of information about the U.S. and coalition logistics interface. The report has chapters on command and control, supply support, maintenance, transportation, and sustainment and includes a discussion on OOTW training and doctrine for logistics operations.
On the surface, the report generally supports both current U.S. OOTW doctrine and logistics doctrine. However, the content of the report suggests a reappraisal of OOTW doctrine and training based on the Continue Hope experience. For example, the summary states that U.S. doctrine and training are merely, "sufficient to prepare the U.S. Army for success on the battlefield." Discussing the applicability of the nine Principles of War and the Five Characteristics of Effective Logistics, the same summary concludes:

Difficulties will abound when applying the principles and logistics characteristics with coalition forces; this should simply be stated and overcome. Normally, these difficulties arise not from incompetent people, but from diverse cultural backgrounds of coalition forces.8

These difficulties are a dominant theme in all chapters of the text. Generally speaking, the difficulties of OOTW logistics, and especially coalition OOTW logistics, were slowly overcome with ad hoc organizations and procedures rather than doctrine, preplanned training, or standard operating procedures (SOPs). The eventual solutions were commendable. Yet, one wonders if previous OOTW experience, coalition experience, or a force structure optimized for OOTW might have resulted in dependable logistics in less time. Unfortunately, the report does not address this possibility in any depth.

Most of the CALL documents mentioned so far emphasized U.S. and coalition peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and foreign humanitarian assistance operations. However, considering the broad definition of OOTW, a researcher should also consider domestic operations, such as disaster relief. Obviously, the Army has a long history of supporting the United States during fires, famine, earthquakes, and floods. Insight into recent Army performance during these domestic operations, read the
Joint Task Force Andrew After-Action Report. The overall review of military performance, called Joint Assessment Topics, is described from an interagency point of view. Hurricane Andrew stressed not only the federal civilian authorities' emergency response, but also the military's ability to support those federal civilian agencies.

Due to Hurricane Andrew's tremendous damage, the Federal Response Plan was heavily modified by the President. This modification placed new demands on the military in domestic support operations and formalized an ongoing initiative to "push" the military into heavier domestic support roles.

These responsibilities are not new to the Army in a combat, training, or installation support role. Unfortunately, this document does not describe how well the deployed forces conducted these missions in a domestic environment with civilian leadership. One important, although unsurprising, conclusion in the report is that different federal and state agencies did not work well together or work well with private volunteer organizations (PVOs). The active military components were specifically cited for their unfamiliarity with Federal response plans and poor damage assessment coordination with civilian agencies.

The remainder of the report deals with the command and control procedures within a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)-directed disaster relief operation and also details the criticality of military engineer support. Therefore, the overall utility of the document is that it describes the military shortcomings during a short, but intense, nonviolent domestic OOTW. Unfortunately, the document does not address possible OOTW doctrinal or training shortfalls for domestic operations.
To summarize, the CALL has a vast collection AARs, personal correspondence, interviews, and summarized reports on virtually all recent U.S. Army OOTW. The utility of the collection is its emphasis on the participants' opinions, the recent dates of the reports, the unclassified formats, and useful summaries. Additionally, most of the reports specifically address OOTW doctrine, training, and force structure. Drawbacks of the collection include contradicting conclusions from the participants and possible "command pressure" on high-profile AARs. Although in most AARs, the writers did not hesitate to criticize U.S. shortcomings. One final generalization is that most AARs and summaries stated their support of current U.S. doctrine. Specifically, many mentioned that conventionally trained combat units are best suited for OOTW.

**Doctrine Review**

The next portion of the literature is the doctrinal review. Numerous military manuals, circulars, white papers, and publications play a significant role on this topic. However, for brevity's sake, the most useful ones for the topic are listed below:

1. Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*
2. Army Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations*
3. Joint Publication 3-0 (series), *Doctrine for Joint Operations*
4. Marine Corps/Army Field Manual 100-19, *Domestic Support Operations*
5. Army Field Manual 100-20, *Operations Other Than War*
6. Army Field Manual 25-100, *Battle Focused Training*
This chapter will briefly describe these sources, discuss their utility, and identify gaps in the OOTW doctrinal coverage. Although OOTW may not involve combat, OOTW is still a doctrinal operation. For this reason, one must begin the doctrinal review with the U.S. Army's capstone operations manual, FM 100-5.

FM 100-5 was designed to briefly describe how the U.S. Army conducts war and OOTW. This manual is influenced by the National Military Strategy and its specific missions and roles for the Army. Chapter 13 of FM 100-5 also has succinct guidance for OOTW. Besides the chapter dedicated to OOTW, a researcher could also use the force projection, combined operations, joint operations, and logistic chapters for information pertaining to OOTW.

With implications for the thesis research, the introduction of FM 100-5 states, "Winning wars is the primary purpose of this document." This statement clarifies the primacy of war over OOTW and is representative of a consistent theme throughout Army doctrine.

FM 100-5 has an entire chapter on OOTW and effectively uses a historical perspective to explain OOTW. The chapter has an adequate explanation of the OOTW environment and is ultimately more useful than other doctrinal text's OOTW descriptions. It states that OOTW is not new, but the operational pace has quickened. It also briefly describes the range of operations in the following paragraph:

Army forces face complex and sensitive situations in a variety of operations. They range from support to U.S., state, and local governments, disaster relief, nation assistance, and drug interdiction to peacekeeping, support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, noncombat evacuation, and peace enforcement."
Another useful portion of FM 100-5 is the principles of OOTW which are modified from the principles of war. For example, the principle of war called "Unity of Command" is modified as "Unity of Effort" because a single controlling commander may be absent in an OOTW environment. The modified principles apply to the topic question in two areas.

First, the fact that the immutable principles of war require modification suggests that OOTW may be remarkably different than war. If OOTW is so remarkably different than war, then why does Army doctrine state that combat troops are the best OOTW soldiers?

Second, the modified principles of war completely change the military emphasis. For example, the modified principles require "legitimacy," "restraint," and "perseverance" replacing "offensive," "mass," "maneuver," "economy of force," "surprise," and "simplicity." The principles of OOTW found in FM 100-5 are mirrored in Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for MOOTW, and FM 100-23, Peace Operations.

However, the draft version of FM 100-20, Operations Other Than War, states additional principles of OOTW, such as "adaptability," and deletes "objective" as a principle. FM 100-20 is discussed later in this chapter.

Therefore, the utility of FM 100-5 to the research topic lies in its description of the OOTW environment, its generalized description of where OOTW fits into the continuum of conflict, and the principles of OOTW.

Another important manual is titled FM 100-23, Peace Operations. This manual is useful in three ways. It provides more detailed explanations within the specific OOTW subset of peace operations. The
manual also relates peace operations to the OOTW principles of war and emphasizes the key principles of "restraint" and "legitimacy."

Unlike FM 100-5, FM 100-23 bridges the gap from generalized concepts to specific guidance for peace operations. It is more of a user's manual and is more descriptive, focusing on this subset of OOTW. The manual draws important distinctions between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. For example, some of the major peacekeeping missions include "negotiation and mediation," "liaison," and "investigation of complaints." In contrast, some of the major peace enforcement missions are "enforcement of sanctions, forcible separation of belligerents, and restoration of order and stability." Since FM 100-23 represents only one subset of OOTW, a researcher should also consult other FMs for information on peacekeeping versus peace enforcement. Those other manuals are FM 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict; FM 100-20 (Draft), Operations Other Than War; and FM 100-23-1, Humanitarian Assistance Operations.

Elsewhere in FM 100-23, it states that conventional combat units can complete either the peacekeeping or peace enforcement mission. This dichotomy is a near constant trend within the official doctrine. On one hand, the doctrine firmly states its belief in using conventionally trained combat units for OOTW missions. On the other hand, U.S. Army doctrine goes to great lengths to describe how different OOTW is from war and how both types of operations require different skills.

These different skills are further emphasized in Chapter 1 of FM 100-23. The modified principles of war for OOTW from FM 100-5 are defined and explained in more detail. The emphasis, once again, is on how different a peacekeeping role is from the combat expected in peace
enforcement and war. This chapter also underscores the importance of restraint and legitimacy. Although emphasis on these principles may suggest the need for specialized soldiers, the FM fails to discuss this possibility.

To summarize FM 100-23 for this topic, it provides the details and further describes one specific portion of OOTW, Peace Operations. The overall assertions in FM 100-23 support FM 100-5. But more important for this topic, it draws critical and numerous distinctions between the skills required for peacekeeping and war. It also implies that peace enforcement skills more closely resemble warfighting skills than peacekeeping skills. This is interesting because peace enforcement and peacekeeping constitute Peace Operations and are thus doctrinally separate from war.

Although these FMs are instructive, they only represent U.S. Army doctrine. Recent history illustrates that most U.S. OOTW will be joint or combined. For example, the U.S. Army's most recent OOTW, such as Provide Comfort, Restore Hope, and Uphold Democracy, were all joint and combined operations. Therefore, joint doctrinal references are also needed for the thesis research.

As a keystone manual, Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, is an important source. Like FM 100-5, it provides broad conceptual guidance instead of detailed and directive guidance. Unlike FM 100-5, it does not state the primacy of war over OOTW. In fact, the authors seemed concerned with OOTW right from the beginning. For example, the Preface describes the manual's scope as:

This publication describes how to think about directing, planning, and conducting Joint and multinational operations as well as interagency operations across the full range of military operations (war and operations other than war). It guides the
planning and execution of combatant command strategy, campaigns, and Joint operations.¹⁴

In subtle ways, JP 3–0 contrasts with its Army counterpart, FM 100–5. FM 100–5 emphasizes short- and intense-training periods for deploying units. JP 3–0 emphasizes that time for specialized training may not be available. JP 3–0 also states that training has to be very thorough and detailed for all types of joint and combined operations.¹⁵

For this thesis' purposes, JP 3–0 does not voice support for using only conventionally trained combat units. In fact, its emphasis on detailed training and short-notice deployments may inadvertently support the concept of specialized OOTW units. However, a JP cannot dictate to the services how to organize units. That responsibility remains a service mission.

Chapter 1 of JP 3–0 adds additional OOTW roles and missions not discussed in most Army doctrine. For example, it adds "Arms Control" and "Support to Insurgencies" as specific OOTW missions.¹⁶ While these operations could fall under the broad definition of OOTW, the Army does not use conventionally trained combat units for these missions. In fact, "Support to Insurgencies" translates to the term of unconventional warfare. In the Army, this mission belongs almost exclusively to the Special Forces. Also, it is not clear why "Support to Insurgencies" is more important than counterinsurgency. The U.S. Army has traditionally conducted more counterinsurgency operations than insurgency support operations. This fact is reflected in both JP 3–07 and FM 100–20 (Draft). JP 3–07 and FM 10–20 identify both support to insurgency and counterinsurgency as OOTW missions. However, the key point is that some very important OOTW missions are already controlled by specialized
units. This may be a doctrinal dilemma. If the OOTW mission of insurgency support is important enough to be the exclusive domain of Special Forces, why is the equally important mission of truce monitoring applicable for any combat unit? One possible answer to this question is "mission complexity." However, truce monitoring and supervision in Bosnia is certainly a complex operation.

Therefore, JP 3-0 is important due to its emphasis on joint preparation and its expansion of OOTW roles and missions. Also, lacking the Army's view of exclusively using combat units for OOTW, the JP leaves the topic of specialized units unresolved.

Another critical source for this topic is FM 100-20, Operations Other Than War (Draft). Like FM 100-5, FM 100-20 (Draft) is a capstone document, is conceptual in nature, and does not attempt to specify techniques. This draft manual will help a researcher to further understand the nuances of OOTW because it provides additional principles of OOTW. Similar to FM 100-5's modification of the principles of war, this version changes the principles once again. For example, it adds "Primacy of the Political Instrument" and "Adaptability" while deleting "Objective."

However, the literature gap mentioned earlier remains open. In support of other doctrinal manuals, FM 100-20 (draft) states that conventionally trained combat units should not change their Mission Essential Task List (METL) for OOTW. This is based on the concept that combat units' training and METL are already well suited for OOTW. This is due to the assumed overlap between warfighting and OOTW tasks. Yet, acknowledging the relationships between peace, conflict, and war, the manual states the following:
Because the three states are qualitatively different, each requires its own method. What works for one probably will not work for the others. The selection of ends, ways, and means help to define the states.²⁰

This manual also states that U.S. Army soldiers “do not have a natural attitude of neutrality and instinctive desire to negotiate conflict resolution.”²¹ However, if patience and negotiation are somehow "unnatural," how can it be said that combat units are always the best units for OOTW? Can mistakes, such as the ambush of the Rangers in Somalia, be attributed to the natural and appropriate aggressiveness of combat units? Other military units with long-term restraint training, such as Canadian and Nordic peacekeeping units, may not have suffered those casualties and destroyed public support for the entire operation. Obviously, this is speculation, but it does illustrate the importance of the literature gap.

Another interesting concept discussed in FM 100-20 (Draft) is the issue of combat degradation. Combat degradation can be simply defined as the loss of the combat edge while deployed on OOTW. This could range from degraded marksmanship up to the inability to employ combined arms maneuvers. As discussed earlier, the British and French OOTW units noted the severe impact this had on their combat units. U.S. Army doctrine supports their findings and FM 100-20 states, "When these units return from extended OOTW activities, they require additional training resources to regain their warfighting effectiveness." The British and French estimated that their units spent six months retraining. U.S. Army units recently redeploying from the Sinai Peacekeeping Mission reported similar retraining timelines.
One argument against specialized OOTW units is that the force structure "price" would be too high for a downsized army. Combat units are not available for war when they are deployed in OOTW. Also, as stated above, it may require one-half of a year to retrain a combat unit after it has completed a lengthy OOTW. Thus an OOTW deployment, redeployment, and retraining will ensure that a given combat unit is unavailable for an extended period of time. Additionally, if more than one combat unit is rotated into an OOTW, then more than one unit's combat effectiveness has been degraded. An example of this is Operation Uphold Democracy. A reinforced brigade of the 25th Infantry Division relieved the 10th Mountain Division in Haiti early in 1995. Therefore, the 10th was combat degraded for approximately six months after redeployment while key elements of the 25th were still deployed. For one-half of 1995, 20 percent of the U.S. Army's active divisions or both of the light infantry divisions were unavailable for war. Using 20 percent of our active combat divisions for a mission which never required large combat operations seems like a very high price to pay. If one specialized OOTW unit rotated brigades or task forces into Haiti, only one unit would have been affected. The word "affected" is intentionally used instead of "degraded." This is because an OOTW unit cannot be considered degraded after it returns from an OOTW mission. The negative impact of equipment loss and maintenance problems would be compensated with "real-world" OOTW experience.

Unlike some other doctrinal publications, FM 100-20 (Draft) does go beyond solely discussing combat units for OOTW. For example, it accurately states the importance of task organization and the careful selection of units engaged in OOTW. One example mentioned is the
The utilization of the "closest unit" for fighting fires with the U.S. Forestry Service. While not blindly assuming that the mission should go to a quick reaction combat unit, it does fail to mention the degradation of combat effectiveness for whatever unit is chosen. Even if this selected unit is not a combat arms unit, it probably supports a combat arms unit in several Contingency Plans and OPLANs. What is the impact on the supported combat arms unit when an associated support unit is fighting fires? Not only has the supported combat arms unit been degraded, but the supporting fire-fighting unit is also degraded. Who has maintained all the rolling stock and specialized support equipment during the fire fighting? How much mission-related training has the unit conducted while fighting fires? How much longer would it now take to deploy this unit if it was needed elsewhere? These questions may not be critical if all wars had the long preparation period of Desert Storm. However, the warning times for other potential conflicts, such as along the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), are considerably shorter.

If the unit responding to the fire was a specialized OOTW unit, would the overall impact on the force structure be less? Unfortunately U.S. Army doctrine in general and this FM in particular do not address the question.

Another critical source of doctrine is FM 100-19, *Domestic Support Operations*. It is the Army's and Marine Corps' capstone document for military involvement within U.S. borders. The manual has three useful parts for the thesis question. First, it explains the increased military responsibilities for domestic support. Second, it confirms that domestic support is a subset of OOTW and that domestic support will be a continuing mission for the active military. And
third, it supports other doctrine in utilizing conventionally trained combat forces for domestic support operations.

One of the contentions of this thesis is that OOTW has become a primary, if not a predominate, mission for the U.S. Army. This is not a mission that the Army hierarchy has universally embraced, yet national policies have prevailed. Fm 100-19 reminds readers that military support to domestic operations is now a stated principle of the National Command Authorities and is formalized within the National Security Strategy. It effectively supports this conclusion with numerous examples of recent military support to civilian authorities. Taken together, these recent examples represent a significant portion of the Army's increased operations tempo (OPTEMPO).

FM 100-19 also places the four components of domestic support operations within the overall definition of OOTW. The manual states that even though these operations occur within a wide range of conditions, the OOTW modified principles of war still apply. However, not all of the principles are useful for domestic support operations. "Legitimacy," as a domestic OOTW principle, probably does not apply. Most polls of U.S. citizens verify that the public has high confidence in the overall credibility of the armed forces. Also, if someone needs to be rescued from a flood or fed after an earthquake, they probably will not ask if the Army is a legitimate player. Of course, there have been times in U.S. history when domestic military intervention was controversial. The Union Army's occupation of the South during Reconstruction led to the posse comitatus restrictions in Title 18 of the U.S. Code. Also, the Army's involvement in desegregation in the 1960s was controversial. However, both Reconstruction and desegregation
reflected the beliefs of many Americans. Also, as proof of domestic military legitimacy, many of the posse comitatus restrictions have been diluted with statutory exceptions.

Unlike "legitimacy," "unity of effort" and "objective" seem to always be valid in an environment controlled by disparate agencies, governments, and PVOs.

The manual's authors have taken the initiative to produce a "characteristics" list for each major type of domestic support operation. For example, some of the "principles" of environmental support operations are "compliance, restoration, prevention, and conservation." These characteristics or principles for specific subsets of OOTW are useful and current.

The last area of applicability for this thesis, is the manual's support for utilizing conventionally trained combat units. FM 100-19 asserts that the active Army does not, and should not, train for domestic operations. However, like other doctrinal manuals, FM 100-19 does qualify this statement. For example, the manual states that some domestic operations are not appropriate for warfighting units.26 Also, while stating its confidence in warfighting units' ability to train for domestic operations, it also states that training time may not be available. Disaster relief is an example. Also, like other doctrine, this manual does confront the issue of combat degradation. However, the manual's simplistic answer is to ensure that domestic support tasks mirror wartime tasks whenever possible. This solution seems fine for a military police unit involved in a domestic riot. It does not seem adequate for artillery soldiers involved in fire fighting, chemical units helping hurricane victims, or armor soldiers building dikes.
Nevertheless, FM 100-19 does not conflict with other doctrine and suggests that short-term training for combat units is the answer.

Quality training may be the answer for the OOTW environment. However, the Army's capstone manual, FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training, does not even discuss OOTW training. As the title suggests, this manual prepares units for warfare. Its detailed information on planning, executing, and assessing battle training has no OOTW counterpart.

Additionally, FM 25-101 describes the unit METL as a prioritized list of competencies that each unit must maintain. These competencies are prioritized because no unit has the resources to maintain proficiency in all of the potential warfighting tasks. This concept has an impact on the thesis question.

Doctrine states that combat units are expected to quickly obtain proficiency for OOTW through training. The METL concept states that units do not have enough assets to maintain proficiency in all of their warfighting tasks. If limited assets restrict training to a short list of warfighting skills, how will OOTW training ever fit in? One solution is that units will quickly change their training to include OOTW skills after notification and prior to OOTW deployment. Other doctrinal sources suggest that there is also enough overlap between warfighting and OOTW skills to fill the training void. For an Army that prides itself in standardized and intricate training, both of these solutions seem ad hoc in nature. For example, "restraint" is a modified principle of war for OOTW. How does a combat unit suddenly teach restraint just prior to deployment? Also, where is the training overlap that teaches restraint? One could argue that well-disciplined soldiers using Rules of Engagement (ROE) is the answer. However, it is hard to imagine
soldiers more disciplined than the Rangers who died in Somalia. Undoubtedly, they operated under known and approved ROE.

Therefore, even though FM 25-101 is an exceptional training manual for fighting wars, it offers little for OOTW. OOTW doctrine needs to fill this void with a similar detailed approach. At a minimum, the FM needs a chapter on transitioning from war training to OOTW training. Perhaps this chapter should focus on the most complex and critical OOTW missions. Research suggests that the most complex OOTW missions are peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

The U.S. Army Infantry School has attempted to fill this doctrinal void for infantry battalions and brigades. A recent white paper, The Application of Peace Enforcement Operations at Brigade and Battalion, has detailed checklists and suggestions for infantry units in this specific type of OOTW. Unfortunately, ROE, as a tool of restraint, was taken too far. For example, the manual gives twenty-three ROE dilemmas ranging from "Received Sniper Fire" to "FM Communications Go Out." Each of these twenty-three dilemmas has a Leader's Checklist with required actions numbering from four to thirteen separate tasks. Thus a soldier would have to memorize hundreds of actions, to recall them in the proper order, and to utilize them under stress. If possible at all, this solution to OOTW restraint would require a significant training commitment. In other words, it would have to be a METL task. But, as discussed earlier, current Army doctrine does not support OOTW METL tasks.

While the goal of the white paper is commendable, it does fail to present solutions within current doctrine. However, infantry
commanders at least have a source which helps them prepare for OOTW with specific guidance and checklists.

Doctrinal Summary

Based on this review of doctrinal literature, research can now state some generalizations in respect to the thesis topic.

1. Virtually all pertinent doctrine states that the Army's primary purpose is to win wars.

2. If the OOTW environment is mentioned, almost all doctrine supports the use of conventionally trained combat forces for OOTW missions.

3. Since the Army's primary purpose is to win wars, training as reflected in METL, must include only core warfighting competencies.

4. Units prepare for OOTW in three ways: (1) using "overlap" skills already honed in combat training; (2) quickly concentrating on OOTW skills just prior to OOTW deployments; or (3) dependence upon the inherent discipline and flexibility of U.S. soldiers.

5. OOTW doctrine successfully describes the OOTW environment, but is reluctant to offer "how to" advice.

6. The Principles of OOTW are very useful but are not universal in application.

7. Even when supporting the use of combat troops for OOTW, virtually all doctrine caveats this support.

8. Doctrine recognizes that OOTW causes combat degradation for combat units.

9. Doctrine does not discuss the possibility of using specialized OOTW units.
10. Doctrine does not address the impact on high priority OPLANs and CONPLANS if a combat unit is unavailable due to an OOTW deployment.

11. Most doctrine suggests that OOTW is remarkably different from war.

Noting these generalizations, one concept pervades virtually all of them. Official doctrine strongly favors using conventional troops for OOTW. However, doctrine spends very little time discussing the "price" of OOTW on combat preparedness.

Periodicals

The last major area of the literature review is the periodical sources. Unlike the doctrinal reviews and official Army reports, periodical sources offer a wider range of OOTW discussion and suggestions. Depending on how one looks at it, some of the authors are unhampered or unsupported by doctrine. Also, as expected, they make OOTW a current and controversial topic in ways that doctrine and official reports cannot duplicate.

The thesis research found three different types of articles truly useful. First, the news magazines kept the research up to date on the latest OOTW operations. Second, military scholarly periodicals had excellent doctrinal and philosophical discussion without undue "command influence." And third, general military periodicals, such as Army magazine, often discussed how soldiers and senior leaders felt about their unit's performance in OOTW.

The national news magazines have literally hundreds of articles on U.S. involvement in OOTW. A summary of articles on how OOTW is covered and portrayed is probably a dissertation in its own right.
However, of particular use is how well the OOTW environment is described. If lacking actual OOTW experience, a researcher can grasp some of the complexities of OOTW preparation and execution by reading many of these articles. Recently U.S. News and World Report had several articles on how U.S. forces in Germany are training for the Bosnia Peace Operations. It describes a scenario where U.S. soldiers are trained to deal with "puffed-up faction leaders, local mayors, refugees, and even TV camera crews." This sounds like realistic training, but it does not sound much like an Armor Division's METL.

The scholarly periodicals, such as Parameters and Military Review, also provide critical information. There are two general trends. First, the articles often use doctrine for standardized terms and concepts, while simultaneously finding some fault with the overall OOTW doctrine or practice. An example is General George Joulwan's article "Operation Other Than War" in Military Review. After first discussing the modified principles of war for OOTW, he finishes by implying that the U.S. Army's commitment to "normal" operations has inappropriately dominated its commitment to OOTW.

A second generalization of these articles is their insistence on specific objectives for OOTW deployments. Often authors bemoan the fact that the Army can describe, train, and teach OOTW. But the military is still faced with vague or conflicting guidance and with open-ended commitments and is often confused about the political objective. This represents a prevalent frustration in the literature. The frustration is that OOTW can sometimes be an impulsive government reaction, described as "just go and do something about it." Last, the general military periodicals offer a wide range of OOTW beliefs and suggestions.
For example, the winning article in *Army* magazine's essay contest was a suggestion about forming a "Peace Brigade." This critical article basically stated that the U.S. Army is totally unprepared for OOTW in the Information Age. The article is highly representative of the nondoctrinal school of thought for OOTW.

Another interesting article is titled the "Expeditionary Police Service." The article synopsis states the following:

The author suggests that the United States create a permanent expeditionary force that could conduct the bulk of police and development chores that are routinely assigned to the Department of Defense. This would allow the nation's warfighting structure to commit itself to preparation of winning major combat actions. It would also create a two-tier decision path for the deployment of American forces overseas. The chief executive would use the hybrid police-military service as a standard tool for implementing administration foreign policy, while warfighting units could be reserved for deployment during those military emergencies that enjoyed a broader governmental consensus.

Thus, there are a few articles suggesting the possible use of specialized forces. However, the articles are few in number and are not written by senior Army decision makers.

**Literature and Doctrine Review Summary**

The review has led to several topic generalizations. First, AARs, lessons-learned, and other official documents state their support for current doctrine, including the use of conventionally trained combat troops for OOTW. Additionally, OOTW is clearly a subordinate mission to war. However, the doctrine has inconsistencies in these claims. For example, combat degradation is not fully considered. Also, training guidance for conventional units preparing for OOTW is sparse, while war and OOTW are constantly portrayed as "inherently different environments."
Third, to find nondoctrinal suggestions for OOTW, such as specialized troops, an observer will have to utilize periodicals which allow true dissent. The dissenters are a minority and have seemingly failed to change the Army's doctrine or beliefs about specialized OOTW troops.

However, this debate fits neatly onto a much larger context. Perhaps it is the U.S. Army's Cold War past, or perhaps it is a cold fact, that the Army must be prepared for the most dangerous threat. Potentially for the Army, that threat is high-intensity combat with nuclear or chemical weapons. The opposite argument is that we should prepare for the most likely threats. Clearly, the most likely threats involve OOTW. The debate is ongoing. However, the literature suggests that the "most dangerous" believers are well in control of U.S. Army doctrine and its actual practices.
CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter will describe the methods used to analyze the thesis sources. In particular, it will describe methods in the context of the literature gap mentioned in chapter 2. That gap included a summary of participants' opinions concerning current OOTW preparation. Ultimately, that summary will either support or contradict the need for specialized OOTW units. Therefore, the methodology in this chapter, and the resulting analysis in later chapters, is important for two reasons. First, it will fully describe the summary process. Second, it will explain the final product, which is called the After-Action Matrix.

Purpose

The purpose of this chapter is to utilize recent OOTW documents to either support or contradict the need for specialized troops. Chapter 2 illustrated that most doctrine is firmly supportive of solely using conventional units. However, the research ended by simply reviewing doctrinal beliefs. By the very nature of the doctrine approval process, doctrine often represents a "top-down" belief system. Of course, most viable doctrine may be influenced from lower levels, but it ultimately espouses the senior leadership's or organizational beliefs. Therefore, the utility of subordinates opinions, especially those subordinates with recent experience, offer three possible outcomes...
for the thesis statement. First, overall support of current doctrine would further validate the doctrine. Second, an overall disagreement with current doctrine may indicate doctrinal weaknesses. Third, qualified support may indicate specific trends which do not contradict doctrine but nevertheless, require some changes in current practices.

This chapter will describe how to summarize results from these possible outcomes by utilizing the matrix located in appendix A. This matrix will compare participants' recommendations and criticisms with general categories of OOTW preparedness. The remainder of this chapter will describe the matrix development.

Participants' Views

The participants' views in the matrix are from AARs and lessons-learned from recent major OOTW. Recent is defined as the period from 1990 to the present. As stated in chapter 2, this restriction is necessary for several reasons. First, OOTW involving U.S. forces since the end of the Cold War is no longer a subset of bipolar competition. For example, recent OOTW in Haiti and Rwanda came from a clash of American ideals and the subject nation's behavior. In other words, the clash was competition mainly over moral issues and was not part of any larger issue. Whereas containment of the former Soviet Union and Communism defined many of the Cold War OOTW actions. Examples are U.S. counterinsurgency in El Salvador, insurgency support in Nicaragua and Afghanistan, and the "Proxy Wars" of southwest Africa.

The second reason for the 1990-to present time restriction is the recent Army downsizing. Before downsizing began in the early 1990s, the Army had seventeen active divisions. Several of these division were
light infantry divisions which were well suited for OOTW roles. However, the Army has only two truly light divisions left in the force structure. Therefore, since the early 1990s, the Army now has significantly less forces available to respond to OOTW. This is supported by the two major regional conflicts concept. This concept states that the current force structure is designed to be the minimum force capable of conducting two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts. Also, regardless of one's opinion of two major regional conflicts and the associated Bottom-Up Review (BUR), it is the official baseline agreed upon by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the President.\footnote{1}

The participants' views are also limited to major operations. Major OOTW are defined as complex operations usually involving a combination of joint task forces, high media visibility, and a significant degree of American public interest. This is a subjective call but necessary for an After-Action Matrix.

The participants' views are usually a compilation of opinions among a staff or unit. Occasionally, the documents represent a key individual's opinion. In most cases, specific recommendations or criticisms are written by subject matter experts at the conclusion of a major OOTW.

In all cases except one, the participants' views represent only the U.S. military. This emphasis is necessary since the thesis asks if the U.S. military needs a full-time OOTW unit. The question of the UN or other entities needing a full-time OOTW unit is beyond this thesis' scope. However, there is no reason to totally disregard opinions from
experienced foreign armies. For this reason, the British and French AAR on Bosnia is included.

In summary, the participants' views are recent, major OOTW reports generally from U.S. military sources. Also, the participants' views are purposely chosen from widely distributed geographic locations. This is an attempt to avoid regional issues which may be location dependent.

Procedures

The matrix will summarize the above participants' views with the intent of finding common issues among disparate units, locations, and OOTW missions. Disparate units mean different U.S. units and joint task forces and the mixture of U.S. and non-U.S. units. Disparate locations mean selecting participants' views from different regions of the world. Disparate OOTW missions mean using participants' views derived from a mixture of humanitarian support, peace operations, domestic disaster relief, etc. An emerging doctrinal term for these multimission OOTW is complex operations.

Finding common issues is admittedly a subjective process of summarizing trends from the participants' views. It is difficult to reference each data point for the summaries. Therefore, one potential drawback of the matrix is the summarization process. Ultimately, a summary is an opinion about the data and is not a scientific process. However, the summaries are based on numerous statements within a specific participant's view. If the summary results were contradictory or unclear, a dash was used in the matrix instead of a conclusion. In addition, some issues were so frequent that calling them trends is very defensible. The need to improve OOTW staff proficiency in JTFs is an
example. In other issues, trends were either missing or contradictory. In these cases, the information's utility is open to interpretation. In the worst case scenario, the matrix would provide only contradictory information or fail to identify any significant trends. However, if that happens, the matrix has still served a function. Recalling that the methodology goal was to support or contradict doctrine, a matrix lacking trends and shortcomings is still useful. For example, if one extrapolates from the matrix that there is not a significant contradiction of doctrine, then doctrine is somewhat validated. Additionally, the matrix may identify OOTW shortcomings without contradicting doctrine. For example, stating that the U.S. military has an liaison officer (LNOO shortage in OOTW, certainly does not contradict doctrine. In summary, matrix procedures include using disparate OOTW circumstances, finding common issues or trends, and summarizing any trends in a matrix.

Criteria

1. Objective Criteria: Issues must be specifically mentioned in one of the Participants' Views. For example, if the Uphold Democracy (Haiti) AAR mentions a shortage of LNOs trained for coalition operations, this remark would be represented in the matrix under the Force Structure--Personnel vertical column and in the Uphold Democracy horizontal column.

2. Subjective Criteria: Limited subjective criteria are used to determine if an OOTW issue is significant for most U.S. Army units. Those issues which apply to the Army at large will have priority. For example, the Restore Hope (Somalia) AAR mentioned a critical shortage of Somali linguists, this fact alone is not significant for future OOTW.
However, if several different AARs mention a linguist shortage, then possibly a trend has been identified.

**General Conclusions**

Applying the subjective criteria for paragraph two above, Trends are predicted in the following areas:

1. **Linguist shortage**: Defined as a deficiency in quantity or quality of organic or attached linguists for the area of operations.

2. **LNO shortage**: Defined as a shortage of personnel capable of joint or coalition liaison, usually a company or field-grade officer.

3. **Equipment shortages/deficiencies**: Defined as an equipment shortage for a specific OOTW.

4. **Staff officer training**: Defined as a staff's ability to support the commander in OOTW.

5. **Combat degradation**: Defined as the loss of wartime skills while conducting OOTW.

6. **Doctrinal shortcomings**: Defined as the inadequacy of current OOTW doctrine as used by the participants.

**Matrix Development**

Display

Similar to decision matrices, this matrix will display the criteria in vertical columns. Criteria is based upon broad groupings of recommendations and issues. For example, a shortage of vehicles for LNOs would fall under the criteria "Force Structure--Equipment." The horizontal display, commonly called Courses of Action in decision matrices, will consist of the major recent OOTW discussed in the "Literature and Doctrine Review" and in the beginning of this chapter.
List of Specific Criteria

1. Force Structure--Equipment
2. Force Structure--Personnel
3. OOTW Training
4. Doctrine
5. Conventional versus Specialized Units

Definitions of Specific Criteria

Force Structure--Equipment includes complaints or recommendations about equipment shortages or deficiencies from the participants' views. Of special interest are those cases where an adequate wartime TOE has OOTW inadequacies. A "yes" in this column indicates that Force Structure--Equipment is adequate according to each specific participant's view. A "no" indicates significant deficiencies.

Force Structure--Personnel includes personnel shortages within an OOTW. A "yes" in this column indicates support for current personnel allocations. A "no" indicates a significant deficiency in allocations. A dash indicates there is not enough evidence for an overall "yes" or "no."

Training for OOTW is applying the training conclusions from chapter 2, this criterion seeks to answer if current OOTW training is adequate. A "yes" indicates broad satisfaction with current OOTW training. A "no" indicates significant dissatisfaction with current OOTW training.

Doctrine for OOTW is applying the doctrinal summary from chapter 2; this criteria seeks to answer if OOTW doctrine is considered adequate by recent participants. A "yes" response indicates broad
support of current OOTW doctrine. A "no" response indicates overall dissatisfaction with current OOTW doctrine. Unfortunately, there is a degree of risk by drawing conclusions from this column. When many of the AARs were written, recent OOTW doctrine was still in draft form or unavailable. Therefore "overall satisfaction" with OOTW doctrine may, in some cases, reflect satisfaction with localized processes.

Specialized versus Conventional units, as the reader will recall, chapter 1 described "two schools of thought." One school of thought states that using only conventional Army units for OOTW is adequate. Another school of thought advocates the use of specialized OOTW units. This criterion seeks to answer if there is support for specialized units within the participants' views. A "yes" response indicates stated support for specialized units. A "no" response indicates a preference for conventional units. A dash indicates that a preference was not indicated.

Reading the Matrix and Possible Uses

The matrix is read similar to a standard decision matrix. Entering at the left along a horizontal row are the different participant’s views described earlier in this chapter. Reading across that row, the "yes" or "no" responses indicate support/nonsupport of the vertical criteria. For example, a "yes" in the upper left corner indicates that the Restore Hope subject supports current Force Structure--Personnel.

The matrix is useful as a very brief and informal summary of recent participants’ views. This responds to the literature gap review noted in chapter 2. Although not all inclusive, the matrix summarizes
the views on the most important aspects, such as training, equipment, doctrine, etc. Thus, it serves as another tool for analyzing the thesis question. The following chapter "Matrix Analysis" will describe the results of the matrix.
CHAPTER 4
MATRIX ANALYSIS

Introduction

The After-Action Matrix located in appendix A represents an informal summary of the conclusions from the participants' views. While subjective in nature, the matrix did accomplish the three goals. The three goals are:

1. Summarize overall support or contradiction of current OOTW processes and doctrine;
2. Identify trends from a macrolevel;
3. Identify contradictory information concerning the chosen criteria. Analyzing these results will determine the generalized degree of support for OOTW processes. In turn, this generalization will either support or contradict the need for specialized units. Thus the purpose of this chapter is to analyze the matrix results in light of the thesis question.

Process

The analysis process is a five-step process. The first step is to analyze the criteria results. In other words, were there identifiable trends within the vertical columns of the matrix? For example, was there overwhelming support, as shown with "yes" responses, for any given vertical column?
The second step is to analyze trends within the horizontal rows which are called participant’s views. In this case, not only the "yes" or "no" response is important. Due to matrix space constraints, important comments from the subjects are not graphically displayed. These comments are important because they caveat "yes" or "no" responses and because they identify subordinate trends within a criteria. For example, a participant’s view may respond "yes" to Force Structure--Personnel while complaining of an inadequate LNO capability. Therefore, some participant’s comments will be incorporated into the participant’s review process.

The third step is to analyze mission trends. For example, did subjects with primarily humanitarian assistance missions have similar after-action results?

The fourth step is to summarize the analysis done in steps one to three. And finally, the last step is to place this summary in the context of the thesis question.

Criteria Review

The first criterion is Force Structure--Equipment. Simply put, this criterion asks, were units generally well equipped for OOTW? In all cases where a generalization of the participant’s view was possible, the answer was "yes" with the exceptions of one no and the remaining two were undetermined. Remembering the disparity of units, locations, and missions, this conclusion supports the use of conventional units. In fact, it disputes the need for specialized OOTW equipment. The single exception was the 49th Military Police Brigade’s AAR on Operation Garden Plot (Los Angeles riots). However, their serious deficiencies in
personal protective gear, ammunition, and communications equipment were more of a problem of distribution rather than availability.\(^1\)

The next criterion is Force Structure—Personnel. Basically this criterion asks, "Was there an adequate number of personnel with applicable Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) to complete the mission?" Of the nine participants' views, five answered yes, three lacked a general response or contradicted themselves, and one answered "no." Of the undetermined responses, most complained about staff deficiencies rather than unit or overall manpower deficiencies. Even most of the participants who responded affirmatively mentioned this same problem. Due to the mixture of the responses, an observer could infer less overall confidence in personnel adequacy than equipment adequacy. This conclusion is supported by the next criterion's results.

The next criterion is Training for OOTW. The previous criterion focused on quantitative personnel adequacy while this criterion focused on personnel qualitative adequacy. It asks, "Were U.S. Army personnel adequately trained for OOTW?" Similar to the previous criterion, this criterion's results were also mixed. Of the nine subjects, six responded with "yes," and three with "no." Subjects who responded affirmatively generally did so in strong, clear language. For example, the commander of JTF Support Hope in Rwanda made the following statement:

Good soldiers, properly led, in units that have solid chains of command, can execute these kinds of missions without specialized training. That speaks well for the versatility of our armed forces, and reinforces the point that good soldiers are the fundamental requirement in these kinds of operations. America's sons and daughters were magnificent in this operation.\(^2\)
This quote is representative of the strong support for individual training. Even the participants who responded negatively did not criticize individual or unit preparedness for OOTW. Therefore, the matrix supports the OOTW literature and doctrinal belief that U.S. Army soldiers and units are prepared for OOTW as well as war.

Unfortunately, there is significantly less confidence in staff preparedness. Categorized broadly, staffs were criticized in two areas. These areas are lack of competency in JTF operations and a deficiency in foreign language capability.

Lack of competency in JTF operations is the most critical of the two. Often, even highly positive AARs were concerned about this issue. For example, the commander of Operation Continue Hope in Somalia frankly stated that his staff and the UN augmentees were "quickly overwhelmed" during periods of "mission creep."³

A domestic OOTW mission on the other side of the world had similar results. The JTF Andrew staff and associated federal agencies were cited for, "a lack of familiarity with other agencies, equipment, operational procedures, and capabilities in providing relief support."⁴

In Haiti, entire staff sections were considered inadequate for their task. For example, "The J5 section was composed almost entirely of augmentees who had never functioned together as a staff. They did not have familiarity with the staff processes being used nor were they knowledgeable of the plan prior to their arrival."⁵ Even units which specialized in skills similar to their OOTW mission complained about the ad hoc nature of staff organization. For example, during the Los Angeles riots, a military police brigade complained about the staff structure. This 800-man brigade, its staff, and its Commanding General
were subordinated to a division Provost Marshal and his small staff. Thus, in domestic, foreign, violent, or nonviolent OOTW, staff procedures and competence are called into question.

The second area of staff problems is possibly a subset of the first. Inadequate language training sometimes hampered effective liaison and unity of effort. This was true in Haiti and Somalia and to a lesser extent in Rwanda and Bosnia.

To summarize the criterion "Training for OOTW," the analysis has identified three important points. First, the overall support from the participants was mixed. Second, some of the participants supporting current training caveated their support. And lastly, most participants lauded the American soldiers ability to conduct OOTW while retaining misgivings about OOTW staff capabilities. Fortunately, the next criterion offers a clearer picture from the participants.

The next criterion is "Doctrine for OOTW." Of the seven participants' views which could be generalized, everyone supported the current doctrine. Often this was done in emphatic language. For example, the Commander of JTF Support Hope made the following statement:

The doctrine works. OPERATION SUPPORT HOPE was a military operation like any other. The same principles of analysis (METT-T), organization, deployment, employment, and redeployment worked in the RCA as it worked in JUST CAUSE, PROVIDE COMFORT, or DESSERT STORM. The joint service doctrine and procedures now in the structure provided clarity and focus for the operation.

JTF AARs from Somalia and Haiti made similar remarks. In fact, these participants' views stated their satisfaction with both OOTW and wartime doctrine. Also, those participants who had misgivings about staff performance did not criticize OOTW staff doctrine. Therefore, one
may conclude that the participants strongly supported current doctrine during recent OOTW missions.

The final criterion (or vertical column) is called "Specialized Units." This criterion asks, "Is there any support for specialized units from the participants?" Unfortunately, only one-third of the participants addressed the topic. Of those three participant subjects, only one answered "yes." Even this response was restricted to a specialized OOTW staff, not a specialized OOTW unit. Therefore, among the participants, none of them specifically supported the use of specialized troops.

As stated earlier, support for U.S. Army doctrine, equipment, and individual and unit training is generally strong throughout the matrix. Thus, the combination of minimal support for specialized units and the strong support for conventional processes infers a single conclusion. The conclusion is that stated support for specialized troops is almost nonexistent within the participants’ views.

Before moving on to the participants’ view analysis (horizontal rows), one can summarize the criteria analysis with the following comments:

1. Equipment was generally adequate during recent OOTW.
2. Personnel quantity and MOS training were generally adequate during recent OOTW.
3. Training to specifically prepare for OOTW had mixed reviews. Staff training was usually criticized.
4. OOTW doctrine was adequate during recent OOTW.
5. The concept of specialized units was not generally supported or was left unstated during recent OOTW.
This chapter began with three matrix goals. These goals are:

1. Summarize the overall support or contradiction of current OOTW processes.
2. Identify trends from a macrolevel.
3. Identify contradictory information concerning the chosen criteria.

For the first goal, one can conclude that the participants generally support current OOTW processes. This is illustrated by the support shown in three criteria including equipment, personnel, and doctrine. Also, lack of support for specialized units may also inadvertently support current processes.

For goal number two, there is a common trend to criticize staff processes and linguistic support. Additionally, there is a strong trend to applaud soldiers and doctrine. The difference between unit and staff preparedness was also the most important finding for the third matrix goal (contradictions).

Subject and Mission Analysis

The next step in the analytic process is the participants' view and mission analysis. In other words, were there significant trends within the horizontal rows of the matrix? Are there trends among units with similar missions? Also, do these trends support or contradict the criteria conclusions?

The first two participants' views, Operation Restore Hope and Continue Hope in Somalia, generally support the criteria conclusions. Although separated chronologically, their missions shared some similarities. Therefore, it is not surprising that their conclusions agreed in most areas. The Restore Hope AAR criticized staff procedures
but remained positive about training for OOTW in general. However, the Continue Hope AAR criticized staff procedures and leaves an overall negative view of training for OOTW. This difference may be explained by the "mission creep" factor. An initial mission of humanitarian support may not have taxed the staff's ability like later expanded missions.

The three domestic OOTW participants were JTF Andrew, Operation Sudden Response (Los Angeles riots), and JTF Los Angeles (Los Angeles riots). There were similar findings from both units involved in the riots. However, there were also significant differences. For example, the active duty writers of the JTF feared having too much equipment. Their challenge was finding ways to reduce the transportation burden. Conversely, the Army Reserve writers of the Sudden Response AAR were highly critical of equipment availability. Ironically, the two major units involved in the riots had opposite problems. The Military Police brigade had adequate transportation but lacked critical equipment. In contrast, the JTF's infantry division had the proper equipment but lacked transportation. Drawing conclusions from active and reserve unit comparisons is sometimes risky due to training, equipment, and mission differences. However, fundamental coordination problems like this were clearly the responsibility of the JTF staff. Therefore, this failure may support the earlier conclusions about OOTW staff inefficiencies.

Those staff deficiencies found in Los Angeles were also apparent in Florida after Hurricane Andrew. The JTF Andrew conclusions supported the Los Angeles conclusions. As mentioned earlier, JTF Andrew was cited for poor interagency coordination at the JTF staff level. Interestingly, JTF Andrew experienced "mission creep" in a domestic environment. Initially, the mission included providing shelter, food,
and security for the victims. According to the JTF Andrew AAR, the mission was expanded into areas like urban search and rescue, emergency public works, mass transportation, and health care. If mission creep adversely affected the staff's ability to coordinate, it was not discussed in the AAR. However, the two participants with the worst coordination records were also the participants with the most pronounced mission creep. In order to draw substantive conclusions from this, a researcher would need more participants with similar results. If further research supported this finding, a significant trend is implied. For example, assume a notional staff must maximize liaison and coordination due to mission creep. Possibly this notional staff is less able to conduct that coordination because of the increased responsibilities of mission creep.

The next participants' view is the Bosnian AAR completed by British and French forces. In most matrix areas, like equipment and personnel, the British and French support the criteria analysis. However, they seem to have overcome some of the staff's inefficiencies by developing specific OOTW officer courses. Additionally, their primary concern was combat degradation after a long-term OOTW.

The Rwanda AAR (JTF Support Hope) came the closest to directly answering the thesis question. It stated emphatic support for all OOTW processes except ad hoc staff development. Additionally, it responded to the thesis question by stating that there was no need for specialized units or even specialized training. According to the Rwanda report, "... the tasks and standards are the same, only the conditions changed." However, Support Hope did not involve violence toward U.S. troops or the use of combat arms units. Arguably, support units' OOTW missions are
more closely aligned to their wartime roles than is true for combat arms units. Nevertheless, the participant's view in this specific OOTW was clearly supportive of current OOTW processes.

This overall support was also evident in the Haiti AAR. In this case, however, most of the forces were combat arms units. Yet, this participant's view confirms the views of the Rwanda's AAR, including denying the need for specialized forces. Thus, in both cases of relatively nonviolent foreign OOTW, the participants felt strongly about not using specialized troops.

The final subject, the CINCSOUTH OOTW Review, is satisfied with overall OOTW processes. Yet, this support is qualified numerous times. The review is concerned that current processes downplay the differences between OOTW and wartime environments. Without specifying details, the Southern Command CINC suggested a reassessment of U.S. forces to contend with future OOTW. Not surprisingly, these conclusions come from an area of operations which is primarily concerned with OOTW.

Matrix Summary

The purpose of this matrix was to summarize recent participants' views on OOTW. Specifically, did their views support or contradict the use of specialized troops or processes?

From both the criteria analysis and the combined subject/mission analysis, one conclusion is apparent. The participants did not state their support for using specialized troops. Additionally, with one exception, there was overall satisfaction with equipment, personnel, training, and especially doctrine. That exception was staff deficiencies.
Thus, this matrix has served as another tool to answer the thesis question. However, to finally answer the thesis question, the matrix results must be compared to both the doctrinal review and the literature review discussed in chapter 2. This three way comparison is the purpose of the next chapter.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this chapter is to summarize and draw conclusions from the literature review, the doctrine review, and the After-Action Matrix. With a few exceptions, these sources all tend to support current OOTW practices and dispute the need for specialized troops. Thus, the topic question does have an answer according to the chosen sources. Unfortunately, as chapters 1 through 4 suggested, the topic complexity may not lend itself well to a direct "yes" or "no" answer. The caveats, qualifying remarks, and outright criticisms by supporters of current practices cannot be ignored. Therefore, this chapter will prove two things. First, it will suggest that current OOTW practices, such as using conventional troops, are supported in general. Second, this chapter will propose that there are significant flaws in the details of that support.

As discussed in chapter 2, both the professional journals and general publications tended to support current practices. Critical remarks were generally confined to two areas. These areas were narrow criticisms of OOTW doctrine and the lack of clear political and military objectives during recent OOTW. Even the detailed doctrinal arguments did not generally propose using only specialized OOTW units. In addition, the use of specialized units would not solve the issue of unclear military or political objectives. This thesis' research only located two significant articles, out of dozens, which suggested a
specialized OOTW division or brigade. Neither of these articles were written by senior Army leaders. One of these articles was considered so unique that it won an essay contest from a professional journal. Therefore, the overall conclusion from the topic literature is that the U.S. Army does not need specialized units.

Chapter 2 also summarized the OOTW doctrine on the topic of specialized units. The Army's most important doctrinal publications supported the topic literature conclusions. For example, the capstone Field Manual 100-5 does not even address the possibility of specialized OOTW troops. In contrast, the same manual does mention the current practice of using conventional troops. Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations; FM 100-20, Operations Other than War; and FM 100-19, Domestic Operations, all agree on using conventional troops. The applicable training manuals do not discuss training a unit, specialized or otherwise, for OOTW. Last, the research failed to locate a single senior military source who openly disputed using conventional units for OOTW. Therefore, from a doctrinal and leadership standpoint, the Army fully supports the use of conventional units. In fact, specialized units are not even discussed as an alternative.

Chapter 4 discussed the thesis question from the participants' standpoint. The Matrix in Chapter 4 purposely chose disparate units, locations, and missions to catch the breadth of opinion on OOTW preparedness. One drawback of that chapter was the relatively small number of participants' views. However, this limitation was imposed by a specific time period (1990-present) and by the scale of operations. Surprisingly, the selected participants all agree that the U.S. Army does not need specialized troops for OOTW. Therefore, the dissenters
are few in number, are rarely influential, and have not managed to change institutional or common beliefs on this topic.

Yet, this apparent consensus is marred. It is marred because current OOTW practices, including using only conventional units, have failed to respond to significant shortcomings. Importantly, these shortcomings are identified by observers who generally support current practices. Thus, these shortcomings are not "splitting hairs" by disenchanted critics. Rather they are the serious concerns of believers in current practices. These shortcomings were discussed throughout the thesis. For clarity, the primary shortcomings are summarized as (1) staff deficiencies in OOTW (especially in coalition OOTW), (2) impact of combat degradation, and (3) OOTW training (no training doctrine, no METL training).

Chapter 4 showed that the participants had serious concerns about staff proficiency in OOTW. Even the most positive AARs identified staff operations as a problem. Also, doctrine emphatically states that war and OOTW are dramatically different environments. The participants' views suggest that the lean staffs of conventional units are simply inadequate for the OOTW environment. The example of the 10th Mountain Division's staff trying to do operational and strategic level planning in Haiti is a prime example. Additionally, the potential problem of lean staffs is not going to improve. Force XXI doctrine suggests that staffs will become even "leaner" in the coming years.¹

Since the Matrix showed that personnel quality and equipment are adequate, then the problem must rest with either the personnel quantity or the organization's structure. In either case, some form of a standardized augmentation seems appropriate. What does not seem
appropriate is the ad hoc nature of OOTW staff development during recent OOTW.

The next shortcoming is combat degradation. This is critical in light of the DoD's BUR and the two major regional conflicts' force structure. Some members of Congress believe that U.S. Army's current force structure is already too small to fight in two major regional conflicts. Even supporters of the current structure realize that it is the minimal force needed for the two major regional conflicts' scenario. In either case, can the U.S. Army meet its two major regional conflicts' obligations if one or two of its divisions are combat degraded from OOTW? According to the BUR, the Army cannot meet the two major regional conflicts' obligations concurrently with an OOTW obligation. The BUR states: "This means that the United States would have to forgo the option of conducting sizable peace enforcement or intervention operations at the same time it was preparing for two MRCs."2

In addition, the defense budget will not allow for new OOTW units. For example, the Force XXI doctrine states:

Although the downward trend on the size of the force will stabilize toward the end of the century, the Army as well as the other services, will be smaller than the one that served our nation well through the early 1990s.3

Therefore, the Army cannot meet the two major regional conflicts and concurrent OOTW obligations, and additional funding for new units is very unlikely. Thus, is there any feasibility to having a "Peace Brigade" which is constantly degraded instead of spreading out the degradation among warfighting divisions? This deserves serious research and consideration when the force structure is, once again, under congressional scrutiny.
One possible solution is to designate an active Army brigade as the OOTW brigade, to modify the brigade's MTOE, to provide full-time OOTW training, and then to deploy the unit into an OOTW environment. The Army could study this unit's performance and also determine if its use helped other units avoid combat degradation.

The last major shortcoming is OOTW training. Similar to the staff proficiency problem, most OOTW headquarters from the matrix adopted ad hoc procedures. The Army's capstone training manuals are solely designed for training on wartime skills. Currently, they even lack a chapter for transitioning from wartime training to OOTW training. Some would argue that OOTW environments are too diverse for textbook training. Yet, somehow, the Army has had no problem in breaking down the chaos of war into specific tasks, conditions, and standards. The Army should produce a set of OOTW training manuals similar to FM 25-100, Training the Force, and FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training.

In summary, this chapter has answered the thesis question. According to literature, doctrine, and the participants, the U.S. Army does not need a specialized OOTW force. However, there are still serious shortcomings in current OOTW practices. Those shortcomings deserve more attention in an era of declining resources and increased OOTW missions.

Finally, emerging doctrine is challenging the conventional wisdom on only using conventional troops and war-focused training. For example, Force XXI doctrine states:

The likely propensity for many OOTW and the current make-up of the active component and reserve component should be reviewed. Although we envision achieving success in OOTW through training, the possibility of tailoring forces based on the unique requirements of OOTW should be explored.
The TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 also states, "The days of the all purpose doctrinal threat are gone, just as the days of single prescription Army doctrine are gone." In addition the BUR stated, "Forces for peacekeeping and peace enforcement need specialized training, doctrine, and equipment." Also, OOTW will remain a critical mission. Force XXI doctrine says that, "Lower scale operations will likely spread widely over distance and time." All of these quotes infer that the doctrinal consensus discussed in this thesis will be challenged.

In addition, the sheer number, complexity, and risk associated with future OOTW will elevate its importance to the U.S. Army’s national goals. Surely, U.S. military preparedness must reflect these national goals. Also, the possibility exists that the lines between future war and future OOTW will become less distinct in terms of national risks, costs, and credibility. If that happens, the Army had better have both expert warriors and expert peace keepers. Success will ultimately depend on both.
Chapter 1


2Ibid., IV-6.

3Ibid., Glossary-3.


5Ibid., 6.

6Ibid., 5.

7Ibid., 2.

8Ibid.


10Ibid., 4-2.


Chapter 2


4Ibid., 77.

5Ibid., 113.

Ibid., 10.

Ibid., 10.


Ibid., 13-0.

Ibid., 13-3.


Ibid., V-6.

Ibid., V-16.


Ibid., 1-8.

Ibid., 3-1.

Ibid., 1-2.

Ibid., 2-9.

Ibid., 3-3.


Ibid., 9-0.

Chapter 3


Chapter 4


5Center for Army Lessons Learned, UPHOLD DEMOCRACY Executive Summary, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1994), 27.


77th Infantry Division, Operation GARDEN PLOT, (Ft Ord, CA: 1992) 1.


Chapter 5


3Force XXI Operations, p. 4-2.

4Force XXI Operations, p. 4-7.

5Ibid., 2-11.

6Bottom-Up Review, slide number 17.

# APPENDIX A

## AFTER-ACTION MATRIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>After-Action Reports</th>
<th>Force Structure--Equipment</th>
<th>Force Structure--Personnel</th>
<th>OOTW Training</th>
<th>OOTW Doctrine</th>
<th>Special Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operation Restore Hope</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Continue Hope</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Andrew</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK/FR in Bosnia</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Uphold Democracy</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHCOM Review</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.A. Riots-MP Brigade</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.A. Riots-JTF HQs</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Hope Rwanda</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BIBLIOGRAPHY

After-Action Reports


Articles


Books


Congressional Hearings


Government Publications


Department of Defense. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1.


News Releases


Other Reports

Unpublished Presentations, Theses, and Papers


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Combined Arms Research Library
   U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
   1 Reynolds Avenue
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  66027-1352

2. Defense Information Center
   Cameron Station
   Alexandria, Virginia  22314

3. Mr. John B. Hunt
   Corps and Division Doctrine Division
   U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
   1 Reynolds Avenue
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  66027-1352

4. LTC James Pankey
   Center for Army Tactics
   U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
   1 Reynolds Avenue
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  66027-1352

5. LTC James White
   Directorate of Joint and Combined Operations
   U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
   1 Reynolds Avenue
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  66027-1352
CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

1. Certification Date: 21/03/96
2. Thesis Author: MAJ Michael Alan Joiner
3. Thesis Title: Does the Army Need a Full-Time Operations Other Than War Unit?

4. Thesis Committee Members
   Signatures:
   [Signatures]

5. Distribution Statement: See distribution statements A-X on reverse, then circle appropriate distribution statement letter code below:
   A B C D E F X SEE EXPLANATION OF CODES ON REVERSE

   If your thesis does not fit into any of the above categories or is classified, you must coordinate with the classified section at CARL.

6. Justification: Justification is required for any distribution other than described in Distribution Statement A. All or part of a thesis may justify distribution limitation. See limitation justification statements 1-10 on reverse, then list, below, the statement(s) that applies (apply) to your thesis and corresponding chapters/sections and pages. Follow sample format shown below:

   S-----------SAMPLE-----------SAMPLE-----------SAMPLE-----------SAMPLE-----------S
   A Limitation Justification Statement / Chapter/Section / Page(s)
   M P Direct Military Support (10) / Chapter 3 / 12
   L Critical Technology (3) / Sect. 4 / 31
   E Administrative Operational Use (7) / Chapter 2 / 13-32
   SAMPLE-----------SAMPLE-----------SAMPLE-----------SAMPLE-----------SAMPLE-----------

   Fill in limitation justification for your thesis below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Limitation Justification Statement</th>
<th>Chapter/Section</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Operational Use (7)/</td>
<td>Chapter 2</td>
<td>13-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chapter 4</td>
<td>50-58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. MMAS Thesis Author's Signature: ____________________
STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. (Documents with this statement may be made available or sold to the general public and foreign nationals.)

STATEMENT B: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only (insert reason and date ON REVERSE OF THIS FORM). Currently used reasons for imposing this statement include the following:


2. Proprietary Information. Protection of proprietary information not owned by the U.S. Government.

3. Critical Technology. Protection and control of critical technology including technical data with potential military application.

4. Test and Evaluation. Protection of test and evaluation of commercial production or military hardware.


6. Premature Dissemination. Protection of information involving systems or hardware from premature dissemination.

7. Administrative/Operational Use. Protection of information restricted to official use or for administrative or operational purposes.

8. Software Documentation. Protection of software documentation—release only in accordance with the provisions of DoD Instruction 7930.2.

9. Specific Authority. Protection of information required by a specific authority.

10. Direct Military Support. To protect export-controlled technical data of such military significance that release for purposes other than direct support of DoD-approved activities may jeopardize a U.S. military advantage.

STATEMENT C: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors: (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to DoD and U.S. DoD contractors only: (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT E: Distribution authorized to DoD only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

STATEMENT F: Further dissemination only as directed by (controlling DoD office and date), or higher DoD authority. Used when the DoD originator determines that information is subject to special dissemination limitation specified by paragraph 4-505, DoD 5200.1-R.

STATEMENT X: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and private individuals of enterprises eligible to obtain export-controlled
MEMORANDUM FOR ATTN: Larry Downing, DTIC-OCQ, Defense Technical Information Center, 8725 John J. Kingman Road, Suite 0944, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

SUBJECT: Request for Distribution Change

1. The following documents should be changed from distribution B to distribution A. The limitations have been removed and they are now publicly available.

**THESIS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Accession No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arracourt—September 1944</td>
<td>ADB067783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Investigative Activities, World War II and Vietnam, Battlefield Implications</td>
<td>ADB125460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the US Army Need a Full-Time Operations Other Than War Unit?</td>
<td>ADB225714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-16 Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared System for Night and the Night Close Air S</td>
<td>ADB135971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finite Element Analysis of Laser-Induced Damage to Mechanically Loaded Laminated Comp</td>
<td>ADB157706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of Army Intelligence in the Domestic Drug War</td>
<td>ADB149106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should Members of the Military be Concerned about Television Coverage of Wartime Operation</td>
<td>ADB135563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching Mission Orders in Officer Advance Course Instruction: Reality or Myth?</td>
<td>ADB135628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Cut of the Scythe</td>
<td>ADB125547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Light Infantry Division, Regionally Focused for Low Intensity Conflict</td>
<td>ADB150050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Role of the Corps Air Defense Artillery Brigade</td>
<td>ADB148423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Strategic Rationale for Special Operations Forces Employment</td>
<td>ADB157746</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Thanks. Please let me know when they are done. My e-mail address is burgesse@leavenworth.army.mil, and my phone number is (913) 758-3171.

EDWIN B. BURGESS
Chief, Public Services
Combined Arms Research Library