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ARE SPECIAL OPERATIONS IMPERATIVES APPLICABLE TO COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS?

A thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Military Art and Science

by

Ronald A. Newton, Major, U.S. Army
B.A., Methodist College, 1986

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1993

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This study investigates the contributions of Special Forces to the nation's counterdrug efforts to interdict the flow of drugs coming into the United States according to Department of Defense directives. The research hypothesis is that Special Forces, incorporating the special operations imperatives in its mission planning and execution have experienced success when conducting counterdrug operations. Drug trafficking has become a threat to our national security. Efforts by law enforcement agencies to stop the flow of illicit drugs crossing our borders have not succeeded. The President has directed that we use all our national resources, including the military, to stem the flow. The research concludes that the hypothesis is valid and that Special Forces incorporation of the special operations imperatives into counterdrug operations has made a contribution to the national effort to stop the flow of illicit drugs into the United States. The study provides a review and analysis of selected counterdrug operations executed, incorporating selected special operations imperatives, and the success or failure of these missions based on the use of those imperatives. It also proves that special operations imperatives, as defined in current doctrine, are realistic and essential to success.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other government agency. (Reference to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

ARE SPECIAL OPERATIONS IMPERATIVES APPLICABLE TO COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS? by MAJ Ronald A. Newton, USA, 85 Pages.

This study investigates the contributions of Special Forces to the nation's counterdrug efforts to interdict the flow of drugs coming into the United States according to Department of Defense directives.

The research hypothesis is that Special Forces incorporating the special operations imperatives in its mission planning and execution, have experienced success when conducting counterdrug operations.

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The research concludes that the hypothesis is valid and that Special Forces incorporation of the special operations imperatives into counterdrug operations has made a contribution to the national effort to stop the flow of illicit drugs into the United States. The study provides a review and analysis of selected counterdrug operations executed, incorporating selected special operations imperatives, and the success or failure of these missions based on the use of those imperatives. It also proves that special operations imperatives, as defined in current doctrine, are realistic and essential to success.
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Finally, I dedicate this thesis to my family, who tolerated the long nights and weekends they had to spend alone, to my wife who had to raise my son alone, and to my son, who one day may have the opportunity to wear the "Green Beret."
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

The supply of illicit drugs to the United States from abroad, the associated violence and international instability, and the use of illegal drugs within the country pose a direct threat to the sovereignty and security of the country. The department of defense has a crucial role in defending the United States from the scourge of illegal drugs.

The President’s National Drug Strategy of 1989 directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to allocate resources to interdict the flow of illicit drugs into the United States. In a memorandum to the Commanders-In-Chief (CINCs) of the unified and specified commands, former Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney directed that they prepare and submit plans by October 1989 for the detection and countering of illegal drug trafficking into the United States. Each CINC submitted plans that required the support of Special Operation Forces. Since that time one major element contributing to the CINCs’ effort is the United States Army Special Forces (SF). In compliance with their plans, Special Forces has not only incorporated men and equipment, but has also its doctrinal planning procedures, which includes SOF imperatives.
A key part of Special Forces counterdrug operations, as in all its missions, is the incorporation of the special operations imperatives in planning to insure the effective use of Special Forces. This thesis focuses on the use of these imperatives by Special Forces supporting law enforcement agencies and host nations.

**Research Question**

Are special operations imperatives applicable to Counterdrug Operations? This study will investigate specifically the contributions of the Army Special Forces to the nation’s counterdrug effort. More importantly, the study will show how these imperatives contributed to the success of this effort. This investigation focuses on the period from 1986-1992.

The study will explain what the SO imperatives are and their uses in planning and executing counterdrug missions. It will review the laws that govern SF participation in counterdrug operations, and SF interaction with law enforcement agencies and host nations.

The threat will be described in terms of its political-military, social, and economic impact on society and the U.S. military. Also, the threat posed by terrorist organizations, drug producers, and methods of infiltrating drugs across our borders will be reviewed.
Selected SF counterdrug operations will be examined as case studies involving the use of selected SO imperatives. The evidence of the case histories will validate or refute the usefulness of these imperatives. SO imperatives are described in FM 100-25 as:

Prescribed key operational requirements that Special Operations Forces (SOF) must incorporate into mission planning and execution to use their forces effectively. They do not replace good judgement and common sense. They help less experienced operators think through problems and make better decisions. They help conventional commanders and their staffs better appreciate the nature of SOF and improve the integration of SOF into their operations.

**Special Operations Imperatives**

1. Understanding the Operational Environment
2. Recognizing Political Implications
3. Facilitating Interagency Activities
4. Engaging the Threat Discriminately
5. Considering Long-Term Effects
7. Anticipate and Control Psychological Effects
8. Apply Capabilities Indirectly
9. Develop Multiple Options
10. Ensure Long-Term Sustainment
11. Provide Sufficient Intelligence
12. Balance Security and Synchronization
Of the twelve SO imperatives used in planning and executing missions, this thesis will address only three. They are:

1. Understanding the Operational Environment
2. Recognizing Political Implications
3. Facilitating Interagency Activities

This study emphasizes these three imperatives because they are common in all of the after action reports (AARs). Selection of these imperatives was to a certain degree arbitrary. However, they do provide the best means for evaluation. This is not to say that the other nine are less important, but only that these three, based on my experience, offer the best opportunity to observe how the imperatives are incorporated into counterdrug operations.

Background

The United States has been involved in counterdrug control programs since 1967 when the Agency for International Development (AID) allocated funds to enforce opium poppy control in Turkey. The U.S. effort really became meaningful when in April, 1986:

April 1986, the President signed a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 221), which specified narcotics trafficking as a threat to national security. This directive was instituted to improve the U.S. response capability by increasing the use of the military and intelligence assets in the fight against drugs.
In August 1986, General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, the reported that of the 18 countries responsible for illicit narcotics entering the United States, 15 received some form of U.S. economic, military, or narcotics control assistance. Although some countries have shown an increasing commitment to controlling illicit narcotics, production remains high.  

Illicit trafficking of drugs has affected every level of society and drastically impacts our everyday lives because it leads to increases in crime and violence. Organized drug gangs in the United States which fought over territorial areas now kill each other and innocent bystanders as they compete for control of the drug trade. Gangs like the Bloods and Crips of Los Angeles, and the Posses of Jamaica have spread into cities across the U.S., making billions of dollars and taking hundreds of lives a year. Law enforcement agencies and the Joint Task Forces have to increasingly rely on military assistance to help stem the flow of drugs across U.S. borders. The reason: drug traffickers are better armed, better financed, and have more routes of infiltration than law enforcement agencies can presently cover. Increased trafficking has led to what some government officials consider almost a wartime atmosphere, "focusing the national will, as the military mobilizes to support the counterdrug effort."
The Soviet threat which once faced U.S. forces is now being replaced—at least in part and least for now—by drug-running narco-terrorists who have infiltrated the political and military infrastructure of many third world countries, especially our neighbors to the south. In Peru the farmers have few other ways of making a profitable living. Peruvian leaders fear that their economic discontent could be exploited by drug-runners who support local revolutionaries.

However, the main threat to the United States is not the narco-terrorist who plagues the drug producing countries, but the drug-trafficking organizations within and outside our borders. In a 1989 report to the President, the attorney general of the United States described the threat as a pattern of organized crime:

Although there is no single type of organizational structure that serves to define major drug trafficking organizations, there are a few defined patterns. There are the major international, vertically integrated trafficking groups, best exemplified by the Colombian Cartels. There are groups such as the Outlaw motorcycle gangs, which operate domestically and tend to have smaller, less sophisticated operations. . . lines of supply are shorter, bank accounts are fewer, and quantities of drugs transported are not as great. Then, there are city-based drug operations such as the California street gangs, which have even less sophisticated organizational structure at the management end, which have extensive sales networks of low-level operatives, many of whom work directly on the streets who are primarily involved in local distribution and retail sale aspects of trafficking.
The principal drug trafficking organizations smuggling drugs across the U.S. borders are:

1. The Colombian Drug Cartels. These cartels are large international organization with many layers like onions. The leaders are safe at the center insulated by layers of subordinates. These cartels are composed of four principal organizations, the Medellin, the Cali, the Bogota, and the North Atlantic Coastal groups. The largest of these is the Medellin group which, along with the Cali traffickers, control 70% of the cocaine produced and 80% of the cocaine that enters U.S. borders. Initially operating out of Florida, law enforcement and military interdiction has forced the cartels' operations to transfer to the southwestern United States.

2. La Cosa Nostra (LCN) and the Sicilian Mafia. There are 25 known LCN and Mafia families led by a "boss", who is supported by a principal under-boss. Each family is responsible for selected geographical areas throughout the United States, and are reportedly involved in all forms of criminal activities. Today the LCN acts as intermediary in cocaine distribution.

3. Asian Organized Crime Groups (AOC). The AJC is a major force in the illicit trafficking of drugs in the United States, operating on both coasts. The two main groups in the United States are the American-Chinese Organized Crime (ACOC), and the Triads. The ACOC is the
largest importer of heroin from Southeast Asia, all from the Golden Triangle of Burma, Thailand, and Laos. Most of the heroin is shipped to the west coast of the United States, then to New York for distribution along the east coast. The Triads are the Chinese Mafia. They have exported its organization to the U.S. and now deals in all forms of crimes, to include drug trafficking.

4. Jamaican Posses. Forty organized crime gangs, known as Jamaican Posses, operate in the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and the Caribbean. Their collective estimated strength is 10,000 members, primarily convicted felons or illegal aliens from Jamaica. The Posses move most drugs into the United States through Florida and California. The Posses have developed a relationship with the west coast street gangs for the distribution of crack cocaine.

5. Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs. Originally from California, this highly structured national drug organization controls most of the amphetamine trafficked in the U.S. The most important gangs are the Hell’s Angels, the Outlaws, the Pagans, and the Bandidos. It is expected that they have at times placed operatives in court houses, prisons, and police stations, to gather intelligence on law enforcement operations and planning.

6. California Street Gangs. Street gangs are one of the most dangerous and menacing developments in drug trafficking in the United States. Street gangs first
appeared in the late 1960s. The most dangerous groups are the Crips and the Bloods comprising over 25,000 members 14 to 30 years old. They primarily deal in PCP and crack cocaine. Their organizations have spread throughout the United States. The following observation is based on having lived in a neighborhood congested with these gangs.

Initially identifiable by their dress, language, and habits, they now tend to avoid drawing unwanted law enforcement attention. They will not hesitate to use violence against anyone who stands in the way of their operations. Their weapon of choice is the AK-47.

Production Areas

The major production areas for drugs entering the United States are listed below in descending order:

OPium
- Burma
- Mexico
- Pakistan
- Thailand

Cocaine
- Bolivia
- Colombia
- Ecuador
- Peru

Marijuana
- Belize
- Columbia
Methods of Infiltration

Border penetrations are not limited to any specific geographical area. Methods of infiltration range from illegal aliens carrying the drugs along the Southwest border to small aircraft and boats. Couriers dressed as tourists have drugs strapped to their bodies or inside their stomachs or other body cavities. The means and methods to smuggle drugs are limited only by the imagination.

The JTF-6 Southwest Border Handbook states that overland smuggling is the preferred method of infiltrating drugs across the U.S. border. Other methods include the use of inner-tubes in areas of the Rio Grande River, use of backpackers or foot couriers, and horse or mule trains. Backpackers, who are often illegal aliens, commonly enter in small groups and conceal drugs in hiding places for subsequent pickups by distributors. Smugglers have been known to buy land in the United States adjacent to their own land in Mexico to facilitate their operations.

Drugs are smuggled through ports of entry by concealing them in vehicles. Commonly used vehicles are recreational vehicles, commercial and private vehicles, 18-
wheeled trucks, and pickup trucks with false bottoms or walls. Larger shipments moved on commercial ships.

Because of numerous abandoned and unattended airstrips, airfields, small airports, and closed airbases, the smuggling of drugs by air is still a major reality. There are also airdrops off-shore and overland throughout the Southwest border area of the United States. Smugglers often take the path of least resistance to insure successful infiltration. For example, they take advantage of sparsely populated National Park Lands, U.S. Forest Lands, and Indian reservations which border Mexico.

Their infiltration methods include scouting borders to detect surveillance by drug law enforcement agencies and using detectors to find DEA aircraft and police radars. Other methods include using lookouts in vehicles or on foot the lookouts use radio frequency scanners, night vision devices, and cellular telephones to direct cross border infiltration of drugs.

National Drug Strategy

The first national U.S. drug strategy was published in 1989 by President George Bush. It has been published every year since, as directed by Congress. The 1989 report says in fact:

Section 1005 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 requires that each national drug control strategy include "Long-range goals for reducing drug abuse in
the United States" and "Short-term measurable objectives which the director determines may be realistically achieved in the two-year period beginning on the date of the submission of the strategy. ³

The National Drug Strategy of 1989-1991 established national priorities, in the following descending order of priority:

1. The Criminal Justice System. Law enforcement by the criminal justice system attacks the supply of drugs and reduces the demand for drugs. The central idea is to make those who break the law pay such a heavy price that it would deter others and cause users to seek treatment or rehabilitation.

2. Drug Treatment. Another alternative approach is expanding and improving federal and state treatment systems for those seeking rehabilitation treatment. This would reduce demand. For 1992, the President asked for $2 billion for drug treatment services.

3. Education, Community Actions, And The Workplace. The major goal is to change national attitudes about drugs, for example, to reduce the level of non-addictive drug use nationwide and to prevent drug use before it starts. The focus for this program is the family, neighborhood, community, church, school, and workplace.

4. International Initiatives. The initiatives are economic assistance, respect for human rights, adherence to economic polices, and conditions on counterdrug performance
that the United States has imposed on Andean nations
(Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia).

5. Border Interdiction And Security. This effort
focuses on the disruption of trafficking operations by
interdicting shipments, entering U.S. borders, disrupting
the flow of drugs, and raising the traffickers cost, thus
making them vulnerable to foreign law enforcement. This is
accomplished by increasing U.S. air, land, and sea
interdiction activities.

6. Research Agenda. The federal government has
sponsored efforts to research drug treatment, education and
prevention, criminal justice, and drug use to determine
better ways to fight the drug war.

7. Intelligence And Information Management. This
stresses both increasing funding and coordination of United
States federal and foreign nation intelligence assets to
provide military and law enforcement agencies with the
critical intelligence needed to combat drug traffickers.

DOD Mission

The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for
providing the military forces needed to deter war and
protect the security of the country. Under the President,
the Secretary of Defense exercises direction, authority, and
control over the Department of Defense which includes the
military departments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff provide
military advice to the unified and specified combatant commands, and various defense agencies.

The broad mission of the DOD in the drug war is "to provide forces for detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States; to provide operational (units and personnel) and nonoperational (equipment and training) support to Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (DLEA); and to help in developing an effective command, control, communication and intelligence (C3I) network among the DLEAs, supporting agencies, and the National Guard." The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs has been designated as the DOD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support. He directs DLEA support from the active duty services and reserves which function under the authority of Title 10 and (NG) Title 32, U.S. Code.

Federal Agencies' Missions

Drug traffickers continue to move large quantities of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and other dangerous drugs into the United States daily. Fourteen federal agencies are directly involved in some aspect of law enforcement at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The national strategic counterdrug objectives are translated into operational and tactical guidance, which specifies the missions to be accomplished by federal agencies. The
Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College describes the functions of the three levels as follows:

At the strategic level broad policies and desired conditions are established. Strategic objectives are what is needed to support policy and protect interests, the strategic concept is the means chosen to support policy and protect interests. Finally, the priorities for resources will establish what it will take in terms of money, manpower, time and other resources to pursue and achieve policy objectives.

At the operational level, planners and organizations translate the strategic intent into directions to achieve strategic objectives.

 Officials and the military have the authority of law and regulations to synchronize efforts to support the tactical execution of the counterdrug units' missions. Detail synchronization for joint operations, application of resources, and coordination with the Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (DLEAs) is necessary.

At the tactical level actual counterdrug operations are conducted within the parameters of the strategic guidance and operational plans. Federal, state and local DLEAs, are often combined in various task forces. It is at this level where we will find Special Forces elements being incorporated to support those various task forces.¹⁰

Legislation

The law which governs military actions in counter-drug operations is "The Posse Comitatus Act." In 1878 the original Posse Comitatus legislation was enacted to ensure military forces would not be used to enforce civil laws. This was in response to military abuses committed during the reconstruction era following the Civil War. However, in less than a year, Section 27 of the Judiciary Act of 1879 allowed US Marshals to call upon the military to act as a posse.

In 1981, Congress responded to the drug problem by modifying the original act to expand and clarify the
military's role in counterdrug operations. This amendment authorized DOD to:

1. Share information and intelligence with DLEAs.
2. Provide training and advice to those agencies.
3. Loan equipment and facilities to those agencies.
4. Provide selected personnel to support law enforcement counterdrug operations.

The act as amended in 1981 still restricted direct military participation in search, seizure, arrest and interdiction. The current Posse Comitatus Act, amended again in 1988 "prohibits any part of the army or air force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws, unless authorized by the Constitution or an act of Congress."11 However, this amendment did expand military authority outside the United States as in the capture of General Manuel Noriega in Panama during Operation "JUST CAUSE".

The provisions of the Act do not apply to the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. However, these services conform to the provisions of the act except as directed during counterdrug operations.

The Act does not apply to the National Guard when employed under Title 32, U.S. Code status, state active duty status, or when it is under the command of a state governor. All of the above are normal provisions which allow the National Guard to "interdict, search, seize, and arrest during counterdrug operations."
United States Army Special Forces

The 1981 Amendment to the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S. Code 1385) authorizes specific DOD assistance in drug interdiction and drug eradication. The CINCSOCOM stated in his January 1992 strategic perspective:

Special Operation Forces can be employed directly or indirectly to counter terrorism, narcotic trafficking, subversion or insurgencies, consistent with the requirements of U.S. National Security Policy and objectives . . . .

Current doctrine published in FM 100-25 (doctrine for Army Special Operation Forces), and FM 31-20 (doctrine for Special Forces Operations) refers to counterdrug operations and counter-narcotics operations as "those actions taken to disrupt, interdict, or destroy illicit drug activities." Included also are active and passive measures, psychological operations, training support of selected U.S. government agencies and foreign military personnel, special reconnaissance activities, and other activities.

The command and control headquarters under which Special Forces conduct counterdrug operations were initially established in 1989. These headquarters were established to serve as the planning and coordinating headquarters for the provision of DOD Counterdrug plans in all 52 states. The headquarters are:

1. Commander-In-Chief, Pacific Command established Joint Task Force Five in Alameda, California.
2. Commander-In-Chief, Atlantic Command established Joint Task Force Four in Key West, Florida.

3. Commander-In-Chief, Forces Command established Joint Task Force Six in El Paso, Texas.

Assumptions

This thesis assumes that Special Forces participation in counterdrug operations will increase due to increased drug use and activities, the national focus, and past success of Special Forces.

Limitations

The study is based on unclassified information. The majority of the counterdrug operations conducted by Special Forces are classified, especially OCONUS operations naturally this limits the sources availability.

Delimitations

This thesis will focus only on counterdrug operations conducted by Special Forces units in the last five years (1987-1992). The geographical areas to be reviewed delineated by the Areas of Responsibility (AOR) is Forces Command (FORSCOM). The selection criteria will be limited to only three of the twelve SO imperatives.
Definition of Terms

Collateral Activities. The inherent capabilities of all military forces may be periodically applied to accomplish missions other than those for which the forces are principally organized, trained, and equipped (i.e. counter-narcotics). (FM 100-25)

Counterdrug. Actions taken to prevent, deter, and respond to all aspects of illicit drug trafficking. (FM 100-25)

Direct Action. Short duration strikes and other small scale offensive actions by SOF to seize, destroy, or inflict damage on a specific target; or to destroy, capture, or recover designated personnel or material. (FM 100-25)

Doctrine. Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements of it guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (JCS Pub 1-02)

Drug Interdiction. Actions took to interrupt the flow of drugs from the point of cultivation, preparation, or production to the point of actual distribution and consumption. (JTF-6 SWB Handbook\FM 100-20\AFP 3-20)

Executive Order. Orders issued by the President by virtue of the authority vested in him by the Constitution of the United States or an act of Congress. (JCS Pub 3-05)

Exfiltration. Removal of personnel or units from an area under enemy control. (FM 100-25)
**Foreign Internal Defense.** Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any program or actions taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. (FM 100-25)

**Host Nation.** A nation in which representatives or organizations of another state are present because of government invitation or international agreement. (JCS Pub 1-02)

**Insurgency.** An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government by subversion and armed conflict. (JCS Pub 1-02)

**Liaison.** That contact or communication maintained between elements to insure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (JCS Pub 1)

**Narco-Terrorism.** The use of coercion, violence, or threat of violence to support drug production and distribution. (MMAS, Harry N. Rising)

**National Strategy.** The art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives. (JCS Pub 3-05)

**Special Operations.** Actions conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve the military, political, economic, or
psychological objective by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, politically sensitive areas. (JCS Pub 3-05)

**Special Operations Imperatives.** Key operational requirements that special operations commanders must incorporate into their mission planning and execution to insure effective employment of their forces. (FM 100-25)

**Special Reconnaissance.** Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by SOF to obtain or verify by visual observation or other collection means information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (FM 31-20)

**Support.** The action of a force which aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. (JCS Pub 1)

**Threat.** The ability of an enemy to limit, neutralize, or destroy the effectiveness of a current or projected mission, organization, or item of equipment. (FM 100-25)

**Title 10 U.S.C.** The section of the U.S. Code which governs active duty military. U.S. forces in a "Federal" status, under Title 10, serves in accordance with the directives of the President of the United States and the National Command Authority. These personnel, when conducting counterdrug operations, are bound by the
restrictions imposed by Title 10 U.S. Code, Section 371-380, and the Posse Comitatus Act (Title 18 U.S. Code, Section 1385). Title 10 personnel are prohibited from direct participation in search, seizure, arrest, or similar activity. (JTF-6 Southwest Border Area Handbook)

Title 32 U.S.C. The section of the U.S. Code which governs National Guard Forces. National Guard (NG) forces under Title 32, serve in a "State" status, in accordance with the directives of the respective governor. NG personnel, in a Title 32 status, are not restricted by the provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act. However, as a matter of policy, the National Guard Bureau has adopted guidelines which restrict active law enforcement activity by NG personnel. (JTF-6 SBA Handbook)

Significance of the Study

This study will seek to demonstrate to military planners how the Special Operation Imperatives of Special Forces apply to counterdrug operations, and how they will be applicable to future operations. The study will identify areas that need improvement or perhaps a change in focus during operational planning.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

The main sources for this research have been current Field Manuals, graduate theses, periodicals, government documents, Joint Task Force reports, and various books by authors who have shown expertise in counterdrug operations. The FMs have provided doctrinal information, the graduate theses has provided insight into issues already researched, and the Joint Task Force Reports have assessed Special Forces participation in counterdrug operations. The limitations are that all of the OCONUS operations are classified and will not be disclosed by this thesis.

My intention to undertake this thesis is fueled by one central fact: there is no significant guidance which specifically addresses how to conduct counterdrug operations or how to incorporate the special operations imperatives into counterdrug operations. This is especially important since all other major special forces missions have doctrinal manuals to provide guidance for mission planning and execution.

The literature search began with a background review of current doctrine which addresses the SO imperatives.

Periodicals examined were many and diverse, and Newspaper articles seemed to lean toward the "sensational" aspects of the illicit drug traffickers' actions. The *National Security Strategy of the United States* and the *National Drug Control Strategy* outlined the objectives, efforts, and resources incorporated into the nation's effort to eliminate the drug trade. *Campaign Planning and the Drug War* by Mural D. Munger and William W. Mendel provided excellent information on understanding the drug problem and key drug interdiction players.

Government documents provide an understanding of the military and drug law enforcement agencies' involvement in
counterdrug operations. Unclassified after action reports (AARs) on counterdrug operations from special forces units and the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), on operations conducted along US borders provide the actual data to be analyzed for this thesis. An analysis of eleven of the forty-three AARs reviewed are provided in chapter four of this thesis. The intent is not to give the impression that the literature review of this thesis does not cover the magnitude of material available on the governments' counterdrug effort, but to focus the readers attention to the current AARs on mission conducted by Special Forces. This material is not readily available, yet it provides the basic data that special operations forces use when planning counterdrug operations.

AARs on overseas (OCONUS) drug operations, due to their sensitive nature and classification are available, and were reviewed, but not referenced in this thesis. Conversations with fellow Command and General Staff College (CGSC) students who participated in counterdrug operations provided insight about how conventional units and sister services planned and conducted counterdrug operations.
CHAPTER THREE
METHOD AND PROCEDURES

The methodology for conducting and organizing this thesis included analyzing special operations imperatives as used by Special Forces elements in counterdrug operations. These imperatives are guidelines for planning and conducting Special Forces missions. The selected imperatives represent a common sense approach allowing for effective employment of forces and resources required to accomplish the special operations missions. FM 100-25 describes Special Operations Imperatives as follows:

While the applied principles of war characterize successful Special Operations (SO), the SO imperatives prescribe key operational requirements. SOF operators must incorporate these imperatives into their mission planning and execution if they are to use their forces effectively. The SO imperatives do not replace good judgement and common sense. Experienced SOF operators have developed an intuitive appreciation for these imperatives. The imperatives help less experienced operators think through problems and make better decisions. They also help conventional commanders and their staffs better appreciate the nature of SO and improve the integration of SOF into their operations.

An explanation of the components of the nation's counterdrug strategy and agencies used for counterdrug
operations is presented first. A discussion of the infrastructure of the drug trafficking system, and the law enforcement agencies key players follows. This will provide an overview of the doctrine, organization, and legalities that special forces have to integrate into counterdrug operations. Third, selected counterdrug operations conducted by special forces units and elements are analyzed. Lastly, a summary and conclusion of this analysis, with recommendations, are provided.

Three imperatives will be the criteria used to evaluate selected counterdrug operations AARs. The goal is to see if these imperatives are applicable to the success or failure of Special Forces counterdrug missions. The imperatives to be used are (FM 100-25):

1. Understanding the operational environment. SOF operators must understand all aspects of the environment-political, economic, sociological, psychological, geographic, and military-before acting to influence it. The operator must know who the friendly and hostile decision makers are, their objectives and strategies, and how they interact.

2. Recognizing political implications. SOF operators must not anticipate a conventional battlefield environment where military concerns dominate. SO missions are at times conducted to advance critical political objectives. SOF is frequently in a supporting role that creates conditions for
decisive nonmilitary activities to occur. SOF operators' must consider the political effects of their military activities. Rules of engagement (ROE) cannot anticipate every situation. SOF operators must understand the intent of the rules of engagement and act accordingly, despite any military disadvantage that may result.

3. Facilitating Interagency Activities. SOF operators, when participating in an interagency and combined effort, must strive for unity of effort, but recognize the difficulty of achieving it. Many military programs support and complement civilian programs driven by nonmilitary considerations. SOF operators must anticipate ambiguous missions, conflicting interests and objectives, compartmentalize activity, and disunity of command. Commanders should respond to disunity by-

a. Requesting clear mission statements and the decision makers' intent.

b. Actively and continuously coordinating with all relevant parties (U.S. and non-U.S., nonmilitary and military).²

These three imperatives provide the best means to evaluate the successful or unsuccessful incorporation of SOF imperatives into counterdrug operations. Failure may show a violation of these imperatives. This does not mean that the other nine are less important, but these three based on my
experience of planning and executing counterdrug missions, offer the best opportunity to address the thesis question.

This analysis will be the answer to the thesis question: Are Special Operations Imperatives Applicable to Counterdrug Operations?
Analysis Of Special Forces Counterdrug Operations

This chapter provides the data to answer the thesis' question: are special operations imperatives applicable to counterdrug operations?

This study, has focused on counterdrug operations conducted in the Continental United States (CONUS). A total of forty-three CONUS counterdrug operations conducted by Special Forces units in support of Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6) After Action Reviews (AARs) provides the detailed material to conduct this analysis.

In reviewing these AARs, the twelve (12) Special Operations Imperatives were initially analyzed. Of those twelve imperatives this study focuses on the three that were common in all of the AARs, and provided the best means to evaluate the successful or unsuccessful incorporation of special operations imperatives (SOIs). Those three common imperatives are:

1. Understanding the Operational Environment.
2. Recognizing Political Implications.
3. Facilitating Interagency Activities.
I have analyzed the use of these three imperatives or their non-use in forty-three AARs I researched. Sixteen of those AARs contain the following similarities that provided the best opportunity for evaluation. Those similarities are as follows:

1. Site Survey. Surveys conducted by members of the detachments or unit responsible for execution of the counterdrug mission. These surveys were normally conducted in the area of operations after the members had received a JTF-6 orientation and mission briefing.

2. Land use Agreements. Legal agreements coordinated by JTF-6 and law enforcement agencies with the land owners, that allows military personnel to operate on privately owned lands. Interface with Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs). Coordination between JFT-6, DLEA, and the military for execution of the counterdrug operation.

3. Special Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by the Special Operations Forces in support of JTF-6 and the LEAs.

4. Mobile Training Teams. Special Forces personnel providing training to LEA personnel on equipment, small unit tactics, weapon systems, and techniques that could be used in counterdrug operations.

5. Medical Support. The coordination required with the civilian and military authorities insure that the detachment or unit personnel are adequately cared for.
6. Transportation. The means of transportation that the detachment and unit will have available to accomplish its' mission. Especially the transportation means for infiltration and exfiltration of the operational target areas.

7. Communication. The communication nodes and command and control nets for reporting all counterdrug operations communication.

8. Rules of Engagement. The guidelines that govern the detachment or unit actions in the operational area, as established by JTF-6.

9. Repair Parts. The guidelines and procedures that the unit or detachment would follow to obtain maintenance support while executing the mission.

10. Local Purchases. The guidelines and procedures that the unit or detachment would use to procure mission support from civilian businesses in the operational area.

11. Intelligence Support. The intelligence support provided by JTF-6, the El Paso Intelligence Center, and the LEAs that the unit is supporting.

12. Logistical Support. The logistical support that the unit would receive from JTF-6, the LEA, and the nearest military installation in the operational area.

13. Legal Training. The mandatory legal training directed by JTF-6 that all units and detachments must execute prior to each counterdrug mission.
Using the imperatives as the selection criteria to evaluate these similarities provides the opportunity to evaluate hypothesis of the thesis. Each mission AAR is referred to by its Joint Tasking (JT) number, and the identification of the unit conducting the mission. The unit abbreviations used are the operational terms describing Special Forces' elements conducting counterdrug operations. They include ODA and RSU. ODA means Operational Detachment Alpha, a 12-man special forces detachment. The basic combat element of a special forces Company. RSU means Rapid Support Unit, a special forces company augmented with communication and aviation assets attached to the company which is OPCON to JTF-6 to execute a short or no-notice counterdrug mission within 72 hours.

Analysis Of Mission AARs With Respect To The Use Of SOIs

Mission 1. JT-164/164A was a Mobile Training Team (MTT) mission conducted by ODA-322, 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group (Abn). The detachment's mission was to provide instruction to the Colorado River Indian Tribe and Parker Police forces tactical entry teams to enhance their small unit tactical capabilities.

SOI 1. Understanding Operational Environment

The detachment made a detailed area study of the operational area, and confirmed its assessment during the
site survey. Interagency coordination was made with the local LEA to insure that the training requested was fully understood. The detachment fully understood that the local police chiefs' jurisdiction would not be challenged, that the detachment was strictly in a training support role. This is evident by the fact that the entire Indian reservation was placed at the disposal of the detachment to develop and conduct training. Notable was the inclusion of such local facilities as the courthouse, high school football field, railroad bridge trestle, sandbags provided by the local fire department, even a house personally owned by an officer participating in the training. However, the detachment a during its area study failed to identify the following two problems:

1. The government telephone credit card could not be used in the area of operations.
2. Ammunition for the detachments' M24 Sniper system would not be available to support their opportunity training.

FM 100-25 states that in understanding the operational environment the SOF operator "cannot dominate their environment, they must know who the friendly decision makers are, and must understand all aspects of the environment--before acting to influence it."¹ The factors that JTF-6 uses to decide mission success are that the supported LEA feels that it has received the support it
requests, and that the military unit executes the Mission Essential Task List (METL) training that it proposed in its initial concept.

Analysis of this mission shows that the detachment understood the operational environment.

1. It received training from the JFK Special Warfare Center and School in Special Operations Training Course (SOTC) before deployment to insure it could provide the training support requested.

2. It conducted face-to-face coordination with the local LEA to insure that the detachments' presence would not dominate the training requested. This allowed it to determine who the decision makers were.

One important indicator that demonstrated the detachments' incorporation of this imperative was the comment listed in the commanders closing statement of the AAR, "The Crisis Reaction Interdiction Team" (CRIT) and Parker Police Department tactical entry teams desire future training with Army Special Forces."2

SOI 2. Recognizing Political Implications

SOF operators must not anticipate a conventional battlefield environment where military concerns dominate. Many special operations are conducted to advance critical political objectives; the role of SOF is a supporting one that creates conditions for decisive nonmilitary activities to occur.

Rules of engagement cannot anticipate every situation, and SOF must understand the intent of the rules of engagement and act accordingly, despite any military disadvantage that may result.
The detachment identified local areas of support required to accomplish the mission during its site survey. The personnel involved understood that by using these assets they would be providing a source of economic income to the area of operations, be supporting the government's counterdrug programs and stimulating the economy no matter how small this stimulation would be.

Since this was not a sensitive mission that required strict classification requirements, the detachment included the local Mayor of Parker, Arizona. This provided the opportunity for him as a civil servant to show his political support to improving the LEA's ability to conduct counterdrug activities to better protect the members of his community. The detachment fully understood that their professional and personal actions would have a direct bearing on the results of their mission and the impression of LEA they were tasked to support. While they did not have the ammunition to conduct all of the METL training they planned, they realized the most important aspect of their mission was still the training they provided to the LEA. Although this mission was one that did not require the detachment to conduct an actual counterdrug surveillance operation they still attended a legal situational training exercise (STX) conducted by the SF Group JAG officer [as required by JTF-6] before their deployment. This STX reenforced the commander's and ROE intent, insuring the
detachment understood the political implications of their mission.

SOI 3. Facilitating Interagency Activities

Facilitating interagency activities during the planning and execution of the detachment mission contributed to its total ability to overcome problems and provide the Parker LEA with the training requested.

FM 100-25 states:

That when participating in an interagency and often combined effort, SOF operators must strive for unity of effort but recognize the difficulty of achieving it. Many military programs support and complement civilian programs driven by nonmilitary considerations. Operators must anticipate ambiguous missions, conflicting interests and objectives, compartmentation of activity, and disunity of command. Commanders should respond to disunity by:

1. Requesting clear mission statements and the decision makers' intent.
2. Actively and continuously coordinating with relevant parties (military and nonmilitary).

The detachment received a clear mission statement during its preparation. As reported in its AAR,

Notification was adequate and provided effective guidance on mission, type and level of training desired, training material, and training aids. The site survey coordinated for and confirmed these arrangements.

Actively and continuously coordinating with relevant parties was a problem the detachment experienced in the application of this aspect of the imperative. Some problems noted in the ARR are:
1. Some JTF-6 staff members were unaware of individual documents or conversations forwarded to JTF-6 by the detachment.

2. The advance party did not receive the pellet pistol cartridges and pellets requested although coordination had been made prior to their arrival at JTF-6.

3. Mission tasking period and ammunition policies did not allow the detachment to forecast and receive training ammunition requested to conduct sniper training.

Continuous coordination with all parties involved during interagency activities could have alleviated these problems during this mission. Although faced with these problems the detachments interagency facilitation allowed the detachment to have unity of command, unlimited use of the Indian reservation, coordination and signing of damage release forms, opportunity to attend the special operations training course, understanding of human rights issues (i.e. hand-to-hand combat holds) that civil police forces are not allowed to use or be trained in, and the support and guidance that would be provided by JTF-6.

Mission 2. JT-363-92 was a short-notice Mobile Training Team (MTT) mission conducted by ODA-383, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group (Abn). ODA-383’s mission was to provide Special Reconnaissance and land navigation training for the Arizona National Park Services Rangers as
part of the Park Service's annual training. The training was conducted near Lake Meade National Park.

**SOI 1. Understanding Operational Environment**

ODA-383 did not conduct a detailed study of the operational area because of its short-notice for execution of this mission. However, the detachment did a detailed study of the Park Service's required training requirements during its initial planning conference (IPC) with the Park Services representative. The site survey party initially identified who the decision maker was in the area of operations. The Park Service's limited knowledge of SOF capabilities required the site survey party to explain exactly what training a special forces detachment could provide. Though no detail study was made of the operational area the site survey party did conduct a detailed study of the training sites and area, to include photographing all training sites. They also conducted an initial assessment of the capabilities of the Park Rangers, and from this developed a training plan that would allow them to conduct their mission.

This set the tone of ensuring the Park Service that the detachment understood fully the its training objectives and strategies.
SOI 2. Recognizing Political Implications

There is no mention of the detachments' awareness of the political implications its mission would have on the operational area. However, the detachment did insure that the Park Service understood that the detachment's mission was to provide the support requested. The detachment attended a legal situational training exercise before its deployment from home station to insure it understood the political implications of its mission.

SOI 3. Facilitating Interagency Activities

Interagency coordination was conducted during the site survey with JTF-6, the Arizona National Parks Service, and the Nevada National Parks Service. One major difficulty encountered during the activity was that the park services had no idea of the capabilities of the detachment to teach a vast amount of subjects that related to the parks service's ability to interdict drugs.

Facilitating interagency activities requires that SOF actively and continuously coordinate with relevant parties to overcome difficulties and accomplish the mission. In doing so the detachment could develop a training plan that would allow the Park Services to meet its annual training requirements. A suggestion was made by the detachment "that in future missions the Park Services should receive a briefing from the DLEA or JTF-6 on the training
capabilities of an SOF detachment. "\textsuperscript{6} Unity of effort is key to interagency activities. During this mission there were no problems noted. The chain-of-command was clear cut and well defined. The detachment commander summed up interagency activities for this mission by saying:

Just as it is important for the civilian agency to be open minded about military operations, even if they don’t seem to apply directly, it is important for the military personnel to be just as open minded about the civilian agencies operating procedures, capabilities and limitations. . . . this becomes important when you are analyzing courses of action of personnel you have not had much interaction with and don’t know how they specifically will act.\textsuperscript{7}

Mission 3. JT 79\textsuperscript{80-92} was an LP\OP and Ground Reconnaissance mission conducted by Company A, 3rd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn). Company A’s mission was to assist the National Park Service in locating and reporting on areas in Death Valley National Monument which were used to transport or produce narcotics. The objective was to gather intelligence on any suspicious activity indicative of methamphetamine production and air smuggling activity nearby. They were to accomplish this by using ground and aerial reconnaissance through the operational area, and by manning listening and observation posts. All missions conducted by the company and its seven detachments were staged out of Indian Springs Nevada Auxiliary Airfield. The company was augmented with an aviation, signal, and rigger detachment.
SOI 1. Understanding Operational Environment

In understanding the operational environment the commander for this mission realized that clandestine, covert, and low visibility techniques were required. Study of the operational area led him to divide the area into three areas of operations (AO); AO ALPHA (WINGATE WASH), AO BRAVO (SARATOGA SPRINGS), and AO CHARLIE (OWLS HEAD MOUNTAINS-BLM LAND). This allowed the detachments to focus on specific areas assigned to them. It also allowed them to apply doctrinal mission planning before each employment. Also, as he understood the operational environment and realized that this was a vast area to be covered, the commander was better able to task organize his unit. The results were that the unit effectively conducted six ground reconnaissance, and seven LP\OP missions. One of the latter resulted in the sighting and reporting of a highly probable narcotics air drop during mission number JT 80-92.

SOI 2. Recognizing Political Implications

JT 79\80-92 was an operation conducted in close coordination with the U.S. Park Rangers and JTF-6. To insure that the political implications were fully understood, the commander top priorities to all participants centered on sound intelligence, safety, and the rules of engagement. Pre-mission training was conducted with the Park Rangers to insure unity of command, delineation of responsibilities,
and understanding of the rules of engagement. This helped the Park Rangers to understand that the military was to be used strictly in a supportive role.

SOI 3. Facilitating Interagency Activities

This mission clearly required the facilitation of interagency activities. The company commander stated, "in support of this JTF-6 mission it should be noted that we were very dependent upon operational intelligence and indigenous assets (Park Rangers) in planning our missions." The importance of interagency activities were highlighted when the unit reported a probable airdrop of narcotics to C3I West and did not receive a response from the LEA interdiction team. The reason: there was no interagency agreement of cooperation from local law enforcement agencies and the Bureau of Land Management on boundary jurisdiction in national parks, on military reservations, and the crossing of state and county lines. Third, coordination between the SF company and a Marine unit operating in the AOR resulted in the company being able to use a Marine aircraft to confirm a nighttime sighting as not drug related.

The commander best summed up the use of this imperative by saying,
In retrospect we have found that the training and maturity of the special forces soldier has given us a solid understanding of the political implications, operational environment, and facilitated interagency cooperation between U.S. Army Special Forces and U.S. Park Rangers.

Mission 4. JT 292-91 was the first Rapid Support Unit (RSU) mission conducted by a Special Forces unit. When the mission was conducted by Company C, 2nd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn). The mission was to act as a rapid support unit to deploy men and equipment within 72 hours, into JTF-6’s area to support counterdrug operations. Company C was augmented with SOF aviation and signal assets. During this deployment as the RSU Company C deployed personnel and one MH-60 helicopter to execute three counterdrug missions.

1. JT 292-91A To Monterey, California to support law enforcement agencies searches for possible marijuana plots. Nothing was found during this mission.

2. JT 292-91B To Bishop, California to support law enforcement agencies search for possible marijuana plots. This mission was a success. Seven inactive sites and two active sites were discovered. A total of 200 plants valued at $480,000 were found.

3. JT 292-91C To Dona Anna New Mexico to help the Dona Anna County Sheriff’s department in counterdrug operations along the New Mexico/Mexico border.
SOI 1. Understanding Operational Environment

FM 100-25 states:

remain flexible and adapt their operations to changing realities. . . must anticipate these changes in their environment to exploit fleeting opportunities . . must also help indigenous military forces adjust their strategy and tactics.10

During this mission Company C experienced many changing realities, starting with a no-notice tasking to prepare and execute this mission with only seven days' preparation. Understanding the geographical aspects of the environment did not pose a problem because the operational area (south western United States) was similar to the unit wartime operational area. However, the political, economical, psychological, and operational structure of executing missions under the control of JTF-6, and in support of law enforcement agencies was a new reality that required anticipation and flexibility as noted in this imperative. The company conducted an internal FTX before assuming its first actual counterdrug missions. This training consisted of mission planning, area studies, briefbacks, 48 to 72 hours reconnaissances, and debriefing by JTF-6 personnel. This not only helped the unit to better understand the environment it was operating in, but afforded the opportunity for it to influence the JTF-6 decision makers, and help them better understand the implications of SOF mission requirements.
SOI 2. Recognizing Political Implications

To insure that the political implications of their missions were understood by all, the unit received legal situational training from JTF-6 JAG elements. The units' aviation element abided by the territorial limitation of not flying within three nautical miles of the United States - Mexico border, during the infiltration and exfiltration of SOF teams even though an inadvertent border overflight was not probable due to the fact their aircraft are fitted with global positioning system navigational equipment.¹¹

Not having to abide by this politically sensitive requirement would have allowed the aviation assets to better support the SOF teams, and execute their mission as normally done during peace time training and war. Recognizing the political implication imperative requires that SOF must understand the rules of engagement and act accordingly, despite any military disadvantage that may result.

SOI 3. Facilitating Interagency Activities

Because this was the first Rapid Support Unit mission conducted by Special Forces it definitely required the incorporation of the imperative. Many lessons were learned, and many areas of improvement were identified that required attention then, and will also require dedicated interagency activity in the future. The company headquarters acting as an Special Operations Command and Control Element
(SOCCE) synchronized and deconflicted SF operations with law enforcement agencies and JTF-6, advised JFT-6 on the units capabilities and limitations, and provided secure communication between law enforcement agencies and JTF-6.

Mission 5. JT 002-92 was a Rapid Support Unit (RSU) mission conducted by Company A, 2nd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn). Company A’s mission was to conduct on call counterdrug operations throughout the Southwestern border area of the U.S. in support of JTF-6 and law enforcement agencies. The company was augmented with elements from TF-160 Special Operations Aviation Regiment. During the support cycle the following counterdrug operations were conducted.

1. A MTT mission to provide small unit tactics training to the Border Patrol Reaction Teams.

2. A scuba reconnaissance mission to inspect a ship hull for the U.S. Coast Guard in Brownsville, Texas. No contraband was found.

3. An LP\OP operation conducted with the U.S. Border Patrol in Falfurries, Texas. No contraband was found, but sixteen illegal aliens were reported to the border patrol.

4. An MTT mission to provide small unit tactics, rappelling, airmobile techniques, and marksmanship training for the Park Service Rangers. The mission was conducted in Twenty-nine Palms, California.
5. An MTT mission to provide small unit tactics, repelling, and airmobile techniques for the Police Department of Hurst, Texas.

SOI 1. Understanding Operational Environment

When incorporating this imperative SOF operators must insure that they assist supported forces to adjust their strategy and tactics. Also, they must influence friendly decision makers to ensure they understand the implications of SO mission requirements, and the consequences of not adequately supporting them.

The MTTs assisted the Border Patrol reaction team, the National Park Service and the Hurst Police Department to adjust their strategy and tactics. This training provided these law enforcement agencies with the skills needed in a changing hostile environment.

The JTF-6 South West Border Handbook highlights the importance of this training: "The growing Colombian presence in the border region makes the potential for drug related violence a serious threat to all law enforcement personnel... personnel must be consistently vigilant of potential shoot-outs with violators."

Further, the MTTs refined the SOF operators ability to conduct foreign internal defense missions by improving their teaching skills.
SOI 2. Recognizing Political Implications

Both the commander JTF-6 and commander Company B, considered the political effects of their military activities. Also, that their actions would create the conditions for decisive nonmilitary activities to occur, that could advance critical political objectives. JTF-6 in its AAR to CINCFOR (Commander-in-Chief, Forces Command) highlighted two objectives:

1. To identify and approve RSU missions which will achieve the goals of the National Drug Control Strategy and the Southwest Border Drug Control Strategy.

2. To execute JTF-6 RSU mission within the limits of all laws and regulations.13

Another important perspective was recognizing that joint military\DLEA missions near the border had to respect the sovereignty of Mexico by obeying the three nautical mile flight restriction agreement.

SOI 3. Facilitating Interagency Activities

JTF-6 area handbook states, "military units will not conduct independent counterdrug missions in Operations Alliance AOR."14 This statement implies that the facilitation of interagency activities is required for all counterdrug operations. JTF-6 and the RSUs’ AARs identified a lack of coordination between drug law enforcement agencies (DLEAs). On JT 002B-92, a scuba operation for the U.S. Coast
Guard; linkup between the RSU team and the USCG was not coordinated. After linkup it was discovered that the suspected vessel had not been secured by observation, leaving the possibility that contraband could have been removed prior to the RSU arrival. On JT 002C-92, a special reconnaissance mission in support of the U.S. Border Patrol (USPB); mission parameters changed during presentation of the Operations Order. DLEA had failed to coordinate the operation with the adjoining USPB, causing a minor "Turf Battle." This issue was resolved by Operation Alliance during the mission. Continuous interagency coordination is essential for effective military support. Each supporting military agency must establish a system of liaison and coordination to insure unity of purpose and action.

Mission 6. JT 82-92 was a special reconnaissance (SR) mission conducted by Company A, 2nd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn). Company A’s mission was to support the Mono-Inyo Narcotics Enforcement Team (MINET) detect narcotic air smuggling activity on Federal lands. Area of operations included Deadman Pass, Shoshone, Greenwater Valley, and Charleston View airfields located on the Death Valley National Monument. The company was augmented by Seal Team Eight, 309th MI Bn, and 160th SOAR.
SOI 1. Understanding Operational Environment

Company A, task organized a force that would have the ability to influence the Mono-Inyo Narcotics Enforcement Team and LEA counterdrug actions. Special Forces and Seal Team elements to man the LP\OPs with the Mono-Inyo Narcotics Enforcement Team, military intelligence teams emplacing sensors on areas not LP\OP suitable, and SOF aviation assets that could infiltrate and exfiltrate teams covertly day and night. By using these forces, the commander could exploit fleeting opportunities, such as working with intelligence and naval assets normally not included in counterdrug operations with Special Forces. Intelligence for counterdrug operations is normally handled by JTF-6, and Navy Seals normally execute unilateral counterdrug operations for the JTF.

SOI 2. Recognizing Political Implications

Recognizing the political implications was not mentioned in this unit's after action report. In recognizing this imperative, military elements must realize that the rules of engagement may put them at a disadvantage. This was apparent when the unit reported two possible sightings of drug smuggling activities and received no response from the LEA\MINET apprehension teams, and could not take any action other than reporting the incidents. Incorporation of this imperative early on in the mission planning stage may have
resulted in the unit identifying this potential problem, and alleviating it by facilitating interagency activities.

SOI 3. Facilitating Interagency Activities

Actively and continuously coordinating with all relevant parties is essential to the incorporation of this imperative. The failure of the agencies to fully coordinate seemed to cause the most problems during this mission.

The last minute attachment of the MI battalion (REMBASS) sensor team caused the following as stated by the commander:

adding an unknown unit to a mission at the last minute complicates command and control as well as logistics... added one week prior to deployment requiring us to change preplanned ground missions as well as alter infiltration plans for the aviation unit... required unanticipated support from the unit supply section.15

Mission 7. JT 145-92/284-91 was a Special Reconnaissance mission conducted by Company C, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group (Abn). Company C’s mission was special reconnaissance of selected airfields in the vicinity of Pineland and Woodville, Texas to detect illegal drug smuggling activity. This mission would provide real time intelligence of smuggling activities to support apprehension operations by the U.S. Customs Service and a composite Texas Counter-Narcotics Task Force.
SOI 1. Understanding Operational Environment

The company realized that for this mission it would have to remain flexible, and adapt to changes if it was going to provide the support requested by the law enforcement agency. This became apparent when the company received its pre-mission intelligence package. The package focused on "force protection," but lacked detailed intelligence about the objective areas (airfields) that detachments' require for mission planning. The consequence, for one mission was that an detachment spent ninety (90) minutes moving through a farm area, trying to avoid detection while enroute to their objective. SOF must insure the supported headquarters understand the SO mission requirements and the consequences of not adequately supporting them. The commander in his effort to insure that this happens, made the following comment in his after action report.

Special Forces doctrine (as outlined in FM 31-20) calls for the development of a Special Operations Mission Planning Folder (SOMPF) prior to detailed operational planning and execution. A key element of the SOMPF is a Target Intelligence Package (TIP) normally prepared by the theater intelligence production agencies. Normally the TIP consist of target area information, a detailed target description, maps, charts and target materials.

Also, incorporation of the operational environment imperative was highlighted when the company sent a man to U.S. Geological Service in Denver, Colorado to acquire updated maps of the operational area.
SOI 2. Recognizing Political Implications

The commander in his operations order (OPORD) made the assumption that "no significant political events or changes will occur." Placing his concern, his opinion, or his guidance as it applies to this imperative in the operations order is one technique of making all parties aware of its importance. Other guidance in the OPORD addressing this imperative was:

1. Public release of information regarding the mission is not authorized. Should inadvertent disclosure occur, all connection between 3rd SFGA and JTF-6 is to be guarded information.

2. Each detachment member will read the JTF operational legal briefing.

SOI 3. Facilitating Interagency Activities

Providing an Special Operations Command Control Element (SOCCE) to the law enforcement agency at Lufkin, Texas was one way that the unit attempted to insure unity of effort. This liaison afforded the commander the opportunity to insure his units' training supported the drug task force programs, objectives, and interest. Lessons learned from other counterdrug missions resulted in interagency agreements, on the procedures that the Texas counter- narcotics Task Force mobile apprehension team would use when it reacted to intelligence provided by the detachments. The
major result was that this element would be in a position
where it could rapidly react and apprehend suspects, setting
an example of unity of effort.

Mission 8. JT 031-92 was an LP\OP mission conducted
by Company B, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group (Abn).
Company B's mission was to conduct LP\OP operations on
selected targets in support of the Riverside County
Sheriff's Department counterdrug operations in Palm Desert,
California. No suspicious drug related activity was seen at
the target sites. The company's after action report focused
on logistical support, economic support, and unit training.

SOI 1. Understanding Operational Environment

One aspect of understanding the operational
environment is the units' assessment and understanding of
the economical aspect of the environment, in which the
mission must be conducted. Understanding the operational
environment also requires the SOF operator to anticipate
changes, know who the decision makers are, and ensure that
these decision makers understand the consequence of not
supporting SO mission requirements. The company commander
having submitted an initial cost estimate, briefed a revised
estimate during the OPORD brief to JTF-6, deployed under the
impression that his budget proposals were approved. However,
upon arrival at the mission support site he learned after an
initial purchase that the operational funding established by JTF-6 was less than agreed upon.

SOI 2. Recognizing Political Implications

Counterdrug operations are sensitive in nature, Operational Security (OPSEC) is a major consideration for units conducting these missions. The unit used the standard answer when confronted with questions about their operations, "Desert Training." Understanding that many SO missions create opportunities for the advance of critical political objectives, and that the unit may have to execute their mission despite any military disadvantages that occur. A prime example is DOD support of JTF-6 counterdrug effort. Rules of engagement (ROE) training started before the unit departed its home base, and continued throughout the entire mission. This insured that all participants realized the political effects that their military actions would have.

SOI 3. Facilitating Interagency Activities

Interagency activities require active, continuous coordination by all parties involved in the mission. This AAR shows that incorporation of this imperative was not a continuous effort, and that reoccurring problems still existed.
Problems listed in the AAR were:

1. Company B was supported by another unit conducting training at 29 Palms, Ca. The support unit hours of operations centered around their parent unit’s training plans, forcing the Company B, to schedule it 24 hour operation around the times that support would be available.

2. Company B had to conduct long range infiltration and exfiltration by use of civilian rental vehicles, because of the nonavailability of aviation support. One of the measures that JTF-6 uses in determining mission success is that "the unit executes mission essential training." In other words, it trains as it will fight during wartime mission.

At mission tasking the SOF commander must request clear mission statements, commanders’ and decision makers intent, and insure continuous coordination is conducted with all parties. Yet, he must also realize that unity of effort will be difficult to achieve when military programs are driven by nonmilitary considerations. The commander described this imperative’s incorporation in his AAR:

Problems encountered were no different than those encountered for other MTTs funded and commanded by outside agencies. Like childbirth labor pains the end results were worth the initial pain. Initial problems were put aside and everyone admirably performed their portion of the mission to ensure the overall success of the company’s mission.
Mission 9. JT 298-92 was a special reconnaissance (SR) mission conducted by Company A, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group (Abn). Company A’s mission was to conduct special reconnaissance of a selected airstrip and plateau located vicinity of Boulder City, Nevada to collect priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) for the Law Enforcement Division, Lake Meade Recreational Area, National Parks Service, U.S. Department of Interior. Company A was augmented with aviation support from the 214th Aviation Regiment.

SOI 1. Understanding Operational Environment

Company A, upon mission tasking conducted a three day mission analysis of the support requested by the LEA; establishment of LP\OP’s at two airstrips for 10-14 days. In conducting its mission analysis of the tasking, the company identified that the restated mission should be one of special reconnaissance and analysis of the area of operations. This allowed the unit to answer the LEA tasking, and filled the void that existed by the absence of a properly emplaced collection management system. More importantly, this allowed the unit to correct the LEA habit of using and requesting military assets for inappropriate missions. One aspect of the imperative (Understanding Operational Environment) is that SOF must assist the supported unit in adjusting its strategy and tactics.
SOI 2. Recognize Political Implications

A Legal/PAO situational training exercise (STX) was conducted by the unit before leaving home base to insure all participants understood the rules of engagement (ROE), and the political impact of their military/personal actions. This became very important for this mission because, the unit conducted a five day move of its equipment by rental vehicle from FT. Bragg to Boulder City, Co., and deployed to an area that did not have a local military installation. Causing it to subsist on the local economy.

SOI 3. Facilitating Interagency Activities

This missions' unity of effort was achieved initially when the commander insured through his mission analysis that the unit received a clear cut mission statement and JTF-6 commander's intent. Yet, interagency coordination for leasing, cross-country vehicle movement, and funding and support procurement, required a continuous effort by all parties. One example is the following comment made by the unit commander: "The system worked, but required extensive fine tuning, and minute coordination...."22

Mission 10. JT 043-92 was an MTT conducted by Company A, 3rd Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Abn). Company A's, mission was to train New Mexico Law Enforcement Agency members how to function as a battalion staff, how to conduct an IPB exercise, and how to write a OPORD.
Participants included the Hobbs Police Department, Lovington Police Department, and the Lea County Drug Task Force.

SOI 1. Understanding Operational Environment

Understanding this imperative includes knowing what the supported units' decision makers' objectives and strategies are. The detachment prepared for this mission by making sure it received copies of practical exercise situations that the LEAs would like to be trained in, even through they only received them three days prior to deployment. Yet, to remain flexible and adapt to a changing reality, the detachment changed the practical exercise from a bank robbery scenario to a drug raid. This worked well in assisting the supported unit to adjust its strategy and tactics.

SOI 2. Recognizing Political Implications

Generally, the POI taught to the local agencies was very effective in achieving their training objectives, to the degree that some of the teaching points were beginning to be implemented in their daily operations before the MTT was even concluded.23

In recognizing political implications, the training created the opportunity for decisive nonmilitary activities to occur, as stated above. It also established the basis for the initial interagency coordination and cooperation that would be required to support the training and the detachment.
SOI 3. Facilitating Interagency Activities

Interagency activities considerations are apparent in this mission. The mission involves a military unit and five law enforcement agencies, all focused on improving their counterdrug operations capabilities. More importantly, there was no disunity of command, even through the mission was planned initially by one team and executed by another.

Mission 11. JT 039-92 was a special reconnaissance (SR) mission conducted by Company A, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group (Abn). Company A’s mission was to support the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) by establishing LP/Ops in the Los Padres National Forest to observe landing strips in the Cuyama Valley. To provide accurate and timely information, while avoiding comprise or disclosure of the operation to the public.

SOI 1. Understanding Operational Environment

All aspects of the environment must be understood before the SOF operator, or the environment’s decision makers can act to influence it. The absence of this imperative resulted in the Medevac support not being adequately addressed prior to the mission. A detailed area study would have shown that dialing 911 would not provide the medical support the unit needed while working out of remote mountainous terrain. The unit commander stated:
Also currently missing, due to short lead time, is the opportunity to do a proper IPB, acclimatize troops to the terrain, and analyze the mission in conjunction with the customer.  

SOI 2. Recognizing Political Implications

Units conducting counterdrug operations in the same area there stood the possibility that an incident may occur. Especially if two armed elements made unexpected contact at night while moving toward a suspected drug site. The commander made every effort to insure that he coordinated with all known elements conducting counterdrug operations or unit training in the area. SOF operators must anticipate ambiguous missions, compartmentation of activity, and disunity of command.  

SOI 3. Facilitating Interagency Activities

The unit noted that there were two problems requiring it to insure the facilitation of interagency activities. First, there was a platoon of Navy Seals working for the FBI doing the same mission, in the same area. Second, the California National Guard (TF Grizzly) was conducting training along the units AOR. TF Grizzly is the California National Guard Counterdrug Task Force. The unit insured through active and continuous coordination that the danger of units colliding did not occur. The commander stated:
As the pace of counterdrug operations continue to increase, the danger of units colliding during operations also increases... Lack of coordination waste resources, fails to optimize collection efforts, increases the chance of operations being comprised and raises the risk level for personnel involved.26

Basically, there was no interstate or intrastate coordination between law enforcement agencies conducting mission in the area. No unity of effort to insure missions collectively support the LEAs support taskings, and no interagency medical evacuation procedures or coordination. Counterdrug operations interagency coordination must be planned and executed at all levels.
CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary
The answer to the thesis question, "Are Special Operations Imperatives Applicable to Counterdrug Operations?" is a positive one "YES." All of the counterdrug operations conducted by United States Army Special Forces Command (USASFC) units incorporate SO imperatives.

In determining this answer, it was important to review and establish the guideline or boundaries in which Special Forces units were required to operate. The National Drug Strategy as directed by the President, the Department of Defense, and Special Operations Command directives created a unity of command structure. A structure that allowed the elements and units conducting counterdrug operations to focus the special operations imperatives on those issues required unity of effort. Unity of effort that would support law enforcement agencies' war against drugs, and provide an opportunity for special operations forces to conduct wartime mission essential training tasks. Reviewing the threat showed the magnitude of harm that drug trafficking can have to National Security, and how important
it is that SOF operators use sound and proven methods when planning and executing counterdrug operations.

Research

Table 1.--SOF participation in DOD drug war.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missions Completed FY-91</th>
<th>13</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missions Reviewed by USASFC in FY-92</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missions Canceled by LEA\JTF-6\FORSCOM (CONUS)</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missions Turned Back as Non-Supportable by USASFC</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Missions Completed by USASFC MSU’s</td>
<td>43</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Mission by Unit</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNIT</td>
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<tr>
<td>3rd SFGA</td>
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<td>19th SFGA</td>
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<td>20th SFGA</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note:

1. Special Reconnaissance
2. Mobile Training Team
3. Military Intelligence Support
4. Language Support
5. Communication Support
6. Rapid Support Unit
The figure shows that both active duty and reserve special forces' units are participating to support the law enforcement agencies counterdrug operations. These units conducted special reconnaissance missions to report drug traffickers' activities to law enforcement agencies so that the law enforcement agencies could interdict and apprehend drug traffickers. They provided special forces detachment mobile training teams to train law enforcement agencies in the tactical skills required to combat traffickers. Military intelligence support provided by special forces enabled the law enforcement agencies to predict more accurately where drug traffickers would attempt to cross the border. It also enabled them to predict where drug traffickers would conduct drug activity along the border, or on private and government owned lands within the border. Special forces' personnel were provided to assist law enforcement agencies in the language translation of foreign documents captured during the apprehension of traffickers. This translation also supported the law enforcement agencies' intelligence efforts. Special Forces' communication equipment provided the law enforcement agencies with the capability to conduct surveillance and apprehension activities in a secure mode that drug traffickers could not intercept. Special Forces' Rapid Support Units enabled law enforcement agencies to have special forces assets that could rapidly support their
efforts to conduct counterdrug operations available within seventy-two hours.

This thesis finds that incorporation of the special operations imperatives is a key requirements for effective use of Special Forces in counterdrug operations. The criterion was to decide if the units conducting counterdrug operations incorporated at least two of the imperatives out of the three chosen for this study. Research shows that in doing so the units experience a greater degree of success, because each imperative reinforced the requirement that the other imperatives be addressed. While reviewing the after action reports (AARs), only three commanders address how the presence or absence of imperatives affected their missions. Although the others did not directly address the imperatives as a separate part of their planning and execution process in their AARs, reviewing the AARs show that the imperatives were incorporated. However, the amazing factor was that each commander's AAR comments--good or bad--attributed success or failure to at least two of the three imperatives.

To give a clear perspective of the impact of each imperative, key comments or events from the AARs is address below.

SOI 1. Understanding the Operational Environment

Detailed area studies of the operational environments by the special forces' units and detachments
provided them the opportunity to develop a task organization for any unforeseen actions that the drug traffickers could present as the units conducted their missions. During JT 82-92's mission the commander task organized his unit to offset the law enforcement agency's tactical intelligence weaknesses by employing military intelligence assets to cover unmanned areas. This type of action is becoming important due to drug traffickers' counterintelligence efforts to learn where law enforcement agencies will try to interdict drug shipments.

The studies provided an assessment of the training that the special forces' detachments would have to prepare for, and provide to the law enforcement agencies. During JT 002-92's mission, the detachment identified that the United States Border Patrol (USBP) and several law enforcement agencies interdiction efforts could be improved if they adjusted their tactical interdiction techniques. This became the training program of instructions that the units' mobile training teams provided to the USBP and LEAS. The result of this training was the immediate apprehension of sixteen illegal aliens. The detachment helped the law enforcement agencies adjust their strategy and tactics for conducting counterdrug operations.

The unit could identify who the law enforcement and civilian decision makers were, and what, if any, their hidden agendas for requesting military support. Detailed
studies by the detachment conducting the JT 164/164A mission identified that the local mayor's cooperation was essential to the total support that they would receive in the operational area. They eliminated a potential adversary by including the mayor in the decision making process. JT 043-92's mission study resulted in the commander having to request detailed objectives and strategies from the operational area decision makers. This created a unity of effort among the law enforcement agencies and civilian decision makers, and eliminated all hidden agendas.

SOI 2. Recognize Political Implications

Counterdrug operations conducted within the borders of the United States by military personnel are politically sensitive in nature. This is first, due to the fact military forces are being used to support civilian law enforcement agencies on private and government owned lands. And second, the limitations of the Posse Comitatus Act provide strict guidelines that protect all civilians from what could be perceived as the federal government's employment of forces to "nullify the authority and jurisdiction of elected law enforcement officials." However, each AAR review shows that the special forces' commander incorporated the imperative of recognizing the political implications of their missions. They did this by enforcing the requirement that detachments and units attend a rule of engagement, and a legal
situational training exercise before leaving their home stations. The commander of JT 79\80-92 mission not only did this, but also developed priority rules of engagement for intelligence operations and safety considerations. The commanders of JT 292-91 and JT 002-92 missions abided by the territorial flying area restrictions, despite the fact that it hinders their ability to accomplish the mission. And the commander of the JT 82-92 mission did not try to conduct an apprehension of drug traffickers, although in a position of possibly being able to do so. Also, other units delayed the infiltration of their detachments into operational areas, because they did not have interagency approval to cross law enforcement jurisdictional boundaries, or private land owners’ approval to conduct missions on their lands.

Noncompliance of incorporating this imperative not only hinders special forces ability to conduct its mission, but will create distrust among the law enforcement agencies, and provide a window of opportunity for drug traffickers to cross our borders freely.

SOI 3. Facilitate Interagency Activities

The commanders realized that the accomplishment of their missions, and the incorporation of the other two imperatives depended on the incorporation of the imperative of facilitating interagency activities. They also realized that unity of effort could only be gained by incorporation
of this imperative. Commanders of JT 292-91 and JT 145-92\284-91 missions insured unity of effort in their operations by providing Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCEs) liaison teams to the law enforcement agencies headquarters which they supported. No doubt a factor in JT 292-91 successful interdiction of seven inactive and two active marijuana sites valued at $480,000.

Incorporation of this imperative insures continual face-to-face coordination needed to determine boundary jurisdictions, chains-of-command, logistical support, rules of engagement, and the focus for unity of effort.

Each problem noted by commanders in the AARs is attributed to a flaw in the incorporation on this imperative. This imperative will become extremely important in the future because of new budget constraints, downsizing of the military forces, new tactics employed by drug traffickers, and the increased employment of special forces to other areas of the world. Any missions conducted by special forces to support the counterdrug effort must be coordinated early and continuously with all parties involved.

Conclusion

After careful review one can see that the above is a collection of key requirements to incorporate doing counterdrug operations planning and execution. They are
required for mission success! FM 100-25, which is the doctrinal manual for Army Special Operation Forces states;

Fundamental principles govern the planning and execution of SO. Special operators have derived these principles through the critical analysis of past SOF actions. They provide a conceptual framework for understanding and applying the lessons of history to contemporary problems and issues. In the U.S. Army, these principles are applied within the context of Airland Battle doctrine and the more theoretical principles of war. They are embodied in the more practical SO Imperatives that provide useful guidelines for mission planning and execution.¹

The increased presence of drugs crossing our borders, the instability of governments affected by narco-terrorists, and the ever-increasing role of the United States to protect its national interests, will surely mean that Special Forces will be called on to help fight the drug war and so, what does the future have in store?

Recommendations

The present administration has not at this time presented its national strategy. While all other services reduce their forces, Special Forces is increasing. While the United States may bring most of its forward based forces home, the presence of Special Forces (SF) abroad increases. And as the drug traffickers continue to adapt to methods of interdiction, the request for SF participation will increase. I submit that the following recommendations should be considered to improve Special Forces ability to conduct counterdrug operations:
1. New legislation is needed at the national level to allow SF to employ all of its capabilities against drug traffickers.

2. Equipment now in preposition overseas stocks should be allocated to the JTF commanders, providing them with assets that they would not have to request from regional logistical support offices (RLSO) of the armed services.

3. JTF-6 needs to incorporate more military intelligence personnel into the counterdrug missions' intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).

4. Present automation capabilities the U.S. Army now have (secure modems and computers) need to be enhanced to tie the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) into the military intelligence centers at SF Group level, so that companies and detachments can at least have updated area studies to review before they deploy in support of JTF-6.

5. Area studies need to be developed that help SF to incorporate the SO imperatives into mission planning and execution.

6. Interagency agreements and procedures need to be established to allow SF to cross jurisdictional boundaries to conduct operations on federal lands. LEAs need to insure that use of privately owned lands is approved before requesting military support.
7. The Director of Training and Doctrine (DOTD), U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, determines training doctrine for SF soldiers. He should determine:

a. What counterdrug operation tasks need to be incorporated into SF qualification training.

b. How best to incorporate these tasks within the present qualification training requirements.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies in its Strategic Survey for 1991-1992 states the following about the drug threat we faced:

Drug production, trafficking and money laundering remained a top priority for a growing number of Latin American countries, as signs emerged that Brazil and Argentina were becoming new bases for production. The United States continued to emphasize military operations as the cornerstone of its anti-drug strategy. . . .

If military operations are the cornerstones that support the national effort to combat drug trafficking abroad, and also the efforts of LEAs to interdict drugs crossing our borders, then the above recommendations are only samples of the efforts we need to take. Mission success dictates that we incorporate the SO imperatives when conducting counterdrug operations. SOF operators and the agencies that they support must ensure that they fully understand how to incorporate the imperatives into their counterdrug operations.
Suggestions for Further Research

1. I recommend a study to analyze the impact of having Special Forces increase Mobile Training Teams missions in the countries where drugs are produced.

2. A more important study would be to decide if a Field Manual or Mission Training Plan (MTP) that SOF operators can use to plan and conduct counterdrug operations should be produced, similar to the Mission Training Plans now available for special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, and direct action missions.
Chapter One


3 GAO, *Drug Control, International Narcotics Control Activities of the United States*, Jan 1987, 44.

4 Ibid., 43.


Chapter Three

Chapter Four


Ibid., 2-16.


Ibid., 5.


Ibid.


77


18 Ibid., 7.

19 Ibid., 14.


26 Ibid., 3.

Chapter Five

Books And Periodicals


Bryant, Leroy. The Posse Comitatus Act, the Military, and Drug Interdiction: Just How Far Can We Go?. The Army Lawyer, DA PAM 27-50-216, Dec 1990.


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