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THE ROLE OF JEDBURGH TEAMS IN OPERATION MARKET GARDEN

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

ROBERT G. GUTJAHR, MAJ., USA
B.S., United States Military Academy, 1978

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

1990

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(Proprietary information) (3 June 1990). Other requests for this document shall be referred to HQs., CAC and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-GOP-SE, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-5000.
This study evaluates the six Jedburgh teams which supported Operation Market Garden during the period 11 September-24 September 1944. Recruitment and training of volunteers for Jedburgh missions in Europe is first examined. The status of the Dutch resistance and the operational situation in Europe which eventually led to the planning for Market Garden are discussed. Each Jedburgh team's story is told in the context of the battles fought during Market Garden. The Dutch Jedburgh teams had varying degrees of success. Special Forces Headquarters refined their operational procedures to support the airborne divisions. Their roles were greatly affected by the unique nature of the flat, densely populated Dutch countryside, by the tactical exigencies which characterized the battles during Market Garden, and by the divisiveness of the Dutch resistance. This study concludes that the Jedburgh concept was viable, but that poor intelligence, inadequate equipment, and lack of understanding of Jedburgh capabilities by division staffs and commanders hindered overall effectiveness. Jedburgh teams deployed too late to make a difference at Market Garden. Had they infiltrated earlier, their work with the resistance could have provided the manpower and intelligence to make a difference in the operation's outcome.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


This study evaluates the six Jedburgh teams which supported Operation Market Garden during the period 11 September-24 November 1944. The conceptual development of Jedburgh missions and the recruitment and training of men for these missions are first examined. The formation of the Dutch Jedburgh teams which comprised the Dutch Liaison Mission is then discussed. The status of the Dutch resistance following the aftermath of the damaging "NORD POL" counter intelligence operation and the operational situation in Europe which eventually led to the planning for Market Garden are provided as background for understanding the unique roles Jedburgh teams played in the operation. Each Jedburgh team's story is told in the context of the battles fought during Market Garden.

The Dutch Jedburgh teams had varying degrees of success. Special Forces Headquarters refined their operational procedures to support the airborne divisions. Their roles were greatly affected by the unique nature of the flat, densely populated Holland countryside, by the tactical exigencies which characterized the battles during Market Garden, and by the lack of intelligence on the Dutch underground as a result of "NORD POL."

The study concludes that the Jedburgh concept was good, but that poor intelligence, inadequate equipment, and lack of understanding of Jedburgh capabilities by division staffs and commanders hindered overall effectiveness. Jedburgh teams deployed too late to make a difference. Had they infiltrated earlier, their work with the resistance could have provided the manpower and intelligence to make a difference in Market Garden's outcome. Reviewing their histories is useful to modern day special operations planners as a means of evaluating SOF support to conventional forces in large theater operations.
This study will examine the role of the six Jedburgh teams which supported Operation Market Garden. Essentially, it will evaluate how SOF was included in theater plans during that time; how viable were the missions assigned the teams; and how effective were the teams in accomplishing their missions. It will also identify what lessons can be drawn from these operations.

The study makes several assumptions. The first is that reader is familiar with Market Garden. It is not the purpose of this manuscript to review all of the details of this operation, which has already been well documented. Instead, the study will focus on the story of the Jedburgh teams in the context of the battles fought during Market Garden. Second, it is assumed the reader has a basic understanding of the formation, development, and operations of the British Special Operations Executive and its American counterpart, the Office of Strategic Services. The limited scope of this study cannot adequately address a complete retrospective of their formation and development.

I would like to thank Dr S.J. Lewis, Lieutenant Colonel Lorne Bentley and Major Bobby Leicht for their continual support and encouragement. Their sense of humor lightened the burden of this effort, and their acumen on this rather obscure topic was essential to my research.

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CHAPTER ONE

ORIGINS

"... In no previous war, and in no other theatre during this war, have resistance forces been so closely harnessed to the main military effort..."

General Dwight D. Eisenhower
Supreme Allied Commander- 31 May 1945

Introduction

The story of the Jedburgh teams and their operations in the European theater in 1944 was declassified and made public along with most of the documents of the defunct Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Although a small chapter in the grand history of World War II, the Jedburgh teams were one of the first organized attempts by the United States to assist in the planning and implementation of unconventional forces in support of theater operations. The Special Operations Executive (SOE), which supervised and conducted clandestine warfare operations for Britain’s War Office and originated the Jedburgh concept in 1942, and its American counterpart in London, the fledgling Special Operations (SO) Branch of the Office of Strategic Services, jointly developed the Jedburgh’s objectives, which were to advise and assist
local partisan forces in their assigned area of operations; to synchronize partisan efforts with that of theater headquarters; and, whenever possible, to arrange for resupply of arms, munitions, and equipment to maintain partisan morale and effectiveness in support of theater goals. (1) Eventually over 70 Jedburgh teams were formed in the spring of 1944 after rigorous training at various SOE and Special Air Service sites in northern England. American, British, Belgian, Dutch, and French personnel comprised these teams, which consisted of two officers and one noncommissioned radio operator. (2)

SHAEF designated the Special Forces Headquarters (SFHQ) of its G3 Branch to coordinate Jedburgh team operations in the theater. A Special Forces (SF) detachment was in turn assigned to each field army and army group headquarters to monitor and direct the Jedburghs once they were on the ground in the army's area of operations. (3)

The first Jedburgh teams were air dropped into France the day of the Normandy Invasion. By September, 1944, approximately 93 teams had been infiltrated behind German lines into France. (4) That same month, Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, Commander 21st Army Group, obtained approval from General Eisenhower, the SHAEF
Commander, to implement Operation Market Garden, an ambitious plan, that, if successful, would enable Montgomery’s forces to eventually seize the Runr and bring an early end to World War II. (5) Market Garden called for British, Polish, and American airborne units to drop and seize key bridges at Eindhoven, Nijmegen, and Arnhem in German-occupied Holland. Concurrently, Montgomery’s Second Army, spearheaded by XXX Corps, was to dash 60 miles and link up with these lightly armed forces, relieving them from possible German counterattack. Conducted on 17 September 1944, Market Garden was a failure, and caused the highest casualties of any operation in the European theater, to include the Normandy Invasion. Although the U.S. 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions landed successfully and linked up with XXX Corps, the British 1st Airborne encountered powerful opposition at Arnhem and sustained heavy losses. (6)

Five Jedburgh teams deployed to Holland in support of Market Garden. They included team DUDLEY, which infiltrated separately from the other four teams on 4 September, dropping at night to a Dutch reception committee north and east of the Rhine; team EDWARD, which landed by glider with the Airborne Task Force Headquarters; team CLAUDE, which dropped with the 1st British Airborne
Division outside Arnhem; team CLARENCE, which dropped with the U.S. 82d Airborne Division near Nijmegen; and team DANIEL II, which landed by glider with the U.S. 101st Airborne Division. DUDLEY's mission was procedurally similar to previous "Jed" missions deployed to France. The other four team missions differed markedly. (7) Their missions were to contact the Dutch resistance and to report to 21st Army Group on any intelligence developments; to requisition transportation for forces in the area; to arrest or eliminate any Dutch Nazi sympathizers; and, to prevent civilians from moving into the battle area. Adding to the inherent danger of such missions was the mistrust that SOE/SC intelligence and the Dutch resistance had for each other. Although contact was established between London and the resistance in 1941, SOE agents who had initially infiltrated Holland had been captured and interrogated by the Gestapo, compromising SOE codes and future operations. Over 50 SOE agents who subsequently parachuted into Holland during the next two years were killed, in what German Counter Intelligence called Operation "NORD POL." As a result of "NORD POL," the SOE did not deploy agents to Holland again until after the Normandy landings. (8)
While much has been written about Market Garden, the Jedburgh team missions have been largely ignored. The plight of these teams is compelling, because they are the only "Jed" teams in the European theater to deploy to a catastrophic battle where tactical blunders, intelligence failures, and the fog of war demanded tremendous flexibility and initiative. The latent uncertainty that SOE and OSS planners felt for the Dutch resistance compounded the problem for these teams. With the recent declassification of the Jedburgh team after action reports, it is now possible to discuss the Jedburghs' actions in Holland in the context of the well-documented Market Garden operation and to evaluate what impact, if any, they had on its outcome.

This study will tell the little known story of the six Jedburgh teams which have largely been omitted from most historical accounts of Market Garden, and, more importantly, to determine how their actions affected the conduct of the operation. It will analyze how Special Operations Forces (SOF) were included in theater plans during that time; how viable the missions assigned to the individual teams were; how effective the teams were in accomplishing their missions; and, lastly, how effective the SF detachments were in coordinating between the teams.
An evaluation of Jedburgh team missions in support of Market Garden will also provide an historical perspective of the use of SOF in theater operations. The Jedburghs were the progenitors of U.S. Army Special Forces (The training that Jedburgh teams received in the United Kingdom was used in developing our own Special Operations Forces Program of Instruction (9)) and their experiences still have merit in any contemporary military art discussion on the inclusion of SOF in support of theater operations. The 1943 Jedburgh concept of specially trained uniformed soldiers working with the resistance behind enemy lines is one of the blueprints for today's SOF training of guerilla forces in support of the theater Unconventional Warfare (UW) mission as explained in FM 100-20. Thus, it is also the purpose of this study to examine the historical lessons learned from the five Market Garden Jedburgh teams in the context of modern day SOF support to conventional operations; specifically, the deployment of SOF to coordinate the activities of partisan forces in support of conventional battles and campaigns.
Origin of the Jedburgh

Britain's Special Operations Executive planning section (codenamed "MUSGRAVE") initiated the Jedburgh concept in the spring of 1942 when the Allied invasion of Europe was thought to be a possibility by the end of the year. (10) The Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) had phased SOE's tasks for future Allied operations in northwest Europe in a 12 May 1942 directive. In Phase One, SOE would organize patriot forces and direct their attacks on the enemy's rail and signal communications, air personnel, etc. In Phase Two, SOE would provide guides for British troops, enlist personnel as guards, and organize raiding parties capable of penetrating German lines. By May 1942, SOE had already begun organizing underground groups in France, Belgium, and Holland for sabotage directed against German lines of communications, and Brigadier Colin McV. Gubbins, then the Military Deputy to the Head of SOE, sought further guidance from the British Army staff on SOE activities in conjunction with a possible invasion. An excerpt of SOE records of these discussions reveals the germination of the Jedburgh concept:

As and when the invasion commences, SOE will drop additional small teams of French speaking personnel...

to arrange by W/T communication the dropping points and reception committees for
further arms and equipment on the normal SOE system. Each Team will consist of one British officer, one W/T operator and possibly one guide. (11)

On 8 July 1942, Major-General C. McV. Gubbins, then head of SOE London Group, informed the Chief of the SOE Security Section of these refined plans:

A project is under consideration for the dropping behind of enemy lines, in cooperation with an Allied invasion of the Continent, of small parties of officers and men to raise and arm the civilian population to carry out guerilla activities against the enemy's lines of communication. These men are to be recruited and trained by SOE. It is requested that 'JUMPERS' or some other appropriate code name be allotted to this personnel.

The Chief Security Officer designated the concept "JEDBURGH" the following day. (12)

For planning purposes, SOE developed the role of Jedburghs to support an Allied invasion of Europe in late summer, 1943. As early as 22 July 1942, SOE determined that 70 Jedburgh teams would be required to organize the patriots, to make contact with local authorities or existing SOE organizations, and to arrange for and distribute arms and equipment. British personnel would comprise half the teams and Americans the other half. The various departments of SOE held meetings at this stage to evaluate the program, equipment, and facilities required for training and deploying these teams. Personnel recruitment interviews began the following month, but few
men had the desired qualities. SOE realized that it would need a special priority to recruit the right men.

SOE continued to develop the Jedburgh concept during the fall of 1942. SOE concluded that the teams should wear uniforms, that the commander or second in command should have the same nationality as the team's area of operations, and that at least 72 hours would probably elapse between the time a commander approved a task and when a Jedburgh team could infiltrate and begin operations. For that reason, SOE believed commanders could not assign tasks of immediate tactical importance to Jedburghs. In December, SOE agreed to participate on "SPARTAN," a General Headquarters exercise, to test these ideas. (13)

In March, 1943, SOE staff personnel portrayed the roles of eleven Jedburgh teams on "SPARTAN," which simulated conditions in France during an Allied breakout from the initial bridgehead. "SPARTAN" validated the Jedburgh concept and refined SOE planning. (14) SOE then concentrated on the best procedures for equipping, training, and recruiting these teams, and conducted Exercise "DACHSHUND" a few weeks later to determine suitable supply containers and personnel equipment. On 6 April 1943, SOE's Planning Section officially proposed the Jedburgh concept to the SHAEF commander in a paper entitled
“Coordination of Activities Behind the Enemy Lines With the Actions of Allied Military Forces Invading North West Europe.” (15)

OSS cooperation with SOE in 1942 and early 1943 eventually involved the SO in combined Jedburgh planning and training. SOE and the OSS had signed a cooperative memorandum known as the SOE/SO Agreements in June, 1942 and, when SO established its London Office in January 1943, revised this document, creating the SOE/SO London Arrangements. (16) As part of these Arrangements, SO’s Planning Section Chief, Lieutenant Colonel Franklin O. Canfield, observed "SPARTAN" and was cognizant of Jedburgh planning. With the assistance of SOE’s Planning Chief, Lieutenant-Colonel Rowlandson, Canfield drafted an SO version of SOE’s Jedburgh proposal (using the same title), and recommended to the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA) that the Jedburghs be a "joint SOE/SO action." (17) SOE and SO’s close association resulted in a restatement of the London Arrangements in late April, 1943, and the Jedburgh concept became a combined SOE/SO effort. (16)

The SOE and OSS considered the Jedburghs a "strategic reserve" which could be directed by the Supreme Allied Commander (SAC) to meet any particular military
situation and to lead, give technical advice, or assist resistance groups in operations at least 40 miles behind German lines. Through the presence of Jedburghs, SHAEF and its major subordinate commands could synchronize the activities of diverse resistance groups with their conventional forces over a large area of northwest Europe in both initial operations launched against the continent and in follow-on campaigns. Planners envisioned the Jedburghs and their assigned resistance forces performing acts of sabotage, misdirecting enemy movements, assassinating key commanders and their staffs, interdicting lines of communications (LOCs), and preventing enemy destruction of bridges and port facilities. (19)

On 27 May 1943, SOE forwarded its personnel requirements to Britain's War Office for the Jedburgh mission. It proposed that a reserve of 35 Jedburgh teams be made available in England consisting of 70 men from the British Home Forces and 35 foreign nationals from the Free French Committee or other Allied governments. Lieutenant General Frederick R. Morgan, the COSSAC, approved the SOE proposals on 19 July 1943. The British Chiefs of Staff Committee subsequently approved the measure on 21 July 1943. (20) Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers, the Commander of the European Theater, United States Army
approved similar OSS proposals on 24 August 1943, and authorized recruitment of personnel. COSSAC, SOE, G-3 ETOUSA, and OSS Headquarters subsequently staffed and concurred with these proposals, which allotted 35 American Jedburgh teams and 15 more in reserve. Fifty officers and 50 enlisted men were to comprise the teams, with the Free French to supply the third man for each team. (21) The original plans for the organization of the teams had envisaged the use of only French speaking Americans and Britons. However, the inherent advantages of having indigenous officers operating with familiar resistance groups in their homelands changed this concept, and planners decided to have a French, Belgian, or Dutch officer in each American and British team, the officer in command to be chosen by his ability as a leader regardless of his nationality. SOE/SO accordingly contacted the French General Staff in Algiers in July 1943 to supply officers for the teams, and immediately received a favorable reply. (22)

While Jedburgh recruitment was in progress, SOE and SO conferred during the last three months of 1943 and developed a directive to govern all details of the Jedburgh plan. This Basic Jedburgh Directive, issued on 20 December 1943, outlined the Jedburgh's operational role, operational
machinery, training equipment, coordination, liaison, and cover stories. (23) It stated:

**JEDBURGHS** are specially trained three-man teams. They will be dropped by parachute at prearranged spots in France, Belgium and Holland on and after D-Day. Each JEDBURGH team consists of two officers and a radio operator with his W/T set. One officer is a native of the country to which the team is going, and the other British or American. The members of the team are soldiers and will normally arrive in the field in uniform. There they will make contact with the resistance groups, bringing them instructions from the Supreme Allied Commander, W/T communications, supplies, and, if necessary, leadership. (24)

Essentially, the Jedburghs were to coordinate unconventional warfare requirements of Allied military forces following the invasion of Europe. Army and army group requirements for Special Operations Forces or resistance group activities were communicated to Special Forces Detachments (liaison staffs collocated with the army headquarters; see Origins of SF Detachments) which forwarded the requests to SOE/SO Headquarters (Special Forces Headquarters or SFHQ) in London. SFHQ could then deploy a Jedburgh team or notify a team on the ground to accomplish the mission. (25)
Origins of SF Detachments

Concomitant to planning for Jedburgh Team operations, the SOE and SO introduced the concept of Special Operations Staff groups in early 1943. These SO staff units would be attached to the staffs of the Allied field armies to coordinate resistance group, agent, and Jedburgh activities with conventional operations. Working in close conjunction with the operations and intelligence cells of the field armies, these Special Forces Detachments, as they would later be called, could convey field army requirements to resistance forces via the Jedburgh teams. (28) SOE/SO approved the concept and created Tables of Distribution for the Detachments by August, 1943. (28) Personnel tables called for 33 men attached to each field army staff and 21 with each army group staff. Each staff consisted of three functional groups; Operational or Ops, Intelligence or Ia, and Counter-intelligence or Ib. Moreover, SOE/SO designated liaison officers to contact resistance personnel overrun by Allied forces, and created a cell to displace and accompany task forces sent out by the army. Signal detachments accompanied the SF Detachments, and consisted of 19 men for the army staff and 17 for the army group staff. (28)
To coordinate special operations with the Allied plans for the invasion of the continent, the SOE/SO Planning Section maintained liaison with SHAEF and the various military commands in the United Kingdom. In January, 1944, the Planning Section prepared an information paper for the signature of Major General Harold R. Bull, SHAEF G-3, which explained to the army groups and armies that SF detachments would be assigned to their headquarters as points of contact for information and requests for resistance group activities. On 31 January, SOE/SO formally attached SF detachments and their signal detachments to G3 sections of the 21st Army Group, to include the Second British Army and the First Canadian Army, and to the First United States Army Group (FUSAG, later the 12th Army Group), the First US Army, the Third US Army, and the Ninth US Army. (29)

The SF detachments would link the army field headquarters back to the Special Forces Headquarters (SFHQ). Despite the presence of the signal detachments, the SF detachments could not directly contact organized resistance groups and the Jedburgh teams. Instead, communications originating from the army or army group SF detachments went through SFHQ, which summarized agent and
resistance group reports and then dispatched these summaries to the SF detachments. (30)

Origins of SFHQ

SO/SON planners soon realized that a combined SOE/SO Headquarters was required for command and control of Jedburgh teams in the field. (31) Following the SOE/SO London Arrangements and its subsequent modifications in the spring of 1943, SOE and SO cooperated to develop the principle of dual control and equal responsibility at one combined headquarters. This London Headquarters would be responsible for maintaining contact with resistance groups in the field; for the briefing and dispatch of Jedburgh teams; for liaison with Supreme Headquarters and the Free French; and for the operation of a combined SOE/OSS radio station. By April 1943, SO was coequal with SOE at the command level, and by the latter part of the same year the two organizations were fully integrated at SOE's Headquarters at Norgeby House on Baker Street, London. (32)

A joint memorandum signed by Brigadier Eric E. Mockler-Ferryman, head of the London Office of SOE, and Colonel Joseph F. Haskell, Chief of SO, OSS, on 10 January 1944 formally integrated the two organizations, and established an official SOE/SO Headquarters. The action was
somewhat controversial. The British Chiefs of Staff favored a combined SOE and SO field force that could be employed as a single fifth column organization to assist an Allied invasion force. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed the opinion that the interests of both nations could be better served by the continuation of OSS independent operations under the control and direction of the Commanding General, U.S. Forces, in the European Theater. The matter was put before General Eisenhower, who cabled the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington his approval of the integration of SOE and SO. (33)

On 23 March 1944, SHAEF issued an operations directive appointing SOE/SO as the coordinating authority for matters of sabotage and the organization of resistance groups and their activities in Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, and northwest and south Germany. The Combined Chiefs of Staff specified to SOE/SO in this document that "OVERLORD" received priority for all planning, directing SOE/SO to recruit, train, and have available 70 Jedburgh teams to operate in France and the low countries, and to arm, equip, and prepare resistance groups to support the Allied invasion of Europe. (34) COSSAC directed the appropriate members of SOE/SO to take part in the preparation of all plans at Supreme
Headquarters:

Once a plan has been approved and issued to Army Groups and Force Commanders you will, without further directions, plan jointly with them in all the necessary details; with US and British Army Groups and associated naval and air force commanders within their sphere of operations and with G-3 of this Headquarters for the remainder of SHAEF’s sphere. (35)

SOE/SO essentially became a separate headquarters under the SHAEF G3 Branch, and, in accordance with the 23 March directive, used a strategy of escalating SOF operations during the training of the Jedburgh teams prior to the Normandy invasion. (36) It acquired, equipped, and operated a packing station for the receipt, storage, and dispatch of supplies and equipment to be parachuted into Europe for use by resistance groups. It procured, trained, and infiltrated agents into France and other occupied countries for organizing, equipping, training, and directing the activities of resistance groups prior to the invasion. It established escape lines for the crews of downed Allied aircraft, and, it directed acts of sabotage and unconventional warfare activities against the enemy until the Jedburghs could be deployed and assume active leadership. (37)

In March 1944, SHAEF directed SOE/SO Headquarters adopt a common name and open mailing address. SOE/SO complied, and officially became Special Forces Headquarters
(SFHQ) on 1 May 1944. The new title was a logical extension of the SF detachment nomenclature, and precluded army and army groups confusing their assigned SF Staff Detachments with another higher headquarters. (38) In a political gesture, SHAEF appointed the French General Pierre Marie Koenig as Commander of the SFHQ in August, 1944, which became a combined British, French and American organization under the titular direction of Koenig's État-major des Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur (EMFFI). Despite this arrangement, SOE and SO deputies maintained the formal mechanisms of command, and continued to direct Jedburgh operations. (39)
CHAPTER ONE

ENDNOTES


2. S.J. Lewis, "Jedburgh Team Operations in Support of the 12th Army Group, August 1944" (Draft, CSI, USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027), p. 4. M.R.D. Foot estimates that 93 Jedburgh teams deployed to France. If one uses Foot’s figure and includes the six Market Garden teams, total Jedburgh team deployments reach 99. However, some teams deployed more than once.

3. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

4. Ibid., Jedburgh Footnote # 4.


10. OSS/London Special Operations Branch and Secret Intelligence Branch War diaries, (University Publications of America, Frederick, Maryland Microfilm Publication), (hereafter OSS/London SO Branch micro.), Reel III, Vol IV, JEDBURGHS, Preamble to 1 January 1944, p. i.


12. OSS/London SO Branch micro., Reel III, Vol IV, JEDBURGHS, Preamble to 1 January 1944, p. i.


15. Ibid., p. xii; Cowell, pp. 3-5.


17. OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel I, Volume II, PLANNING, Preamble to 1 January 1944, p. xxiii.


21. Ibid., pp. xv-xvi.


23. Ibid., p. xxxi.


25. Lewis, p. 3.
28. OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel V, Volume V, ARMY STAFFS, Preamble to 1 January 1944, p. i.

27. OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel I, Volume II, PLANNING, Preamble to 1 January 1944, pp. xxvi-xxvii.

28. OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel V, Volume V. ARMY STAFF, Preamble to 1 January 1944, pp. xx-xxiii.


30. Lewis, p. 3.

31. OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel I, Volume II, PLANNING, Preamble to 1 January 1944, p. xxxiii.

32. OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel I, Volume II, PLANNING, Preamble to 1 January 1944, p. xxxix; and Reel I, Volume I, ADMINISTRATION, CUMULATIVE TOTALS, Office of Chief, p. 1.

33. Ibid., Reel I, Volume I, ADMINISTRATION, CUMULATIVE TOTALS, Office of Chief, pp. 2-5.


35. Ibid., p. 16.

36. Lewis, p. 3.


38. Ibid. pp. 4-5.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

SHAEF

SOE/SE
(LONDON GROUP)

B/TRG

SCHOOLS

JEDBURGHS

CHIEF OF STATE

CD

TABLE ONE
Outline SOE chain of command, January 1944
TABLE TWO
Outline Chain of Command, July 1944
Jedburgh Teams in the Netherlands

1- DUDLEY (11 September) 2- EDWARD (17 September)
3- CLAUDE (17 September) 4- DANIEL II (17 September)
5- CLARENCE (17 September) 6- STANLEY II (2 October)
CHAPTER TWO

JEHDURGH RECRUITMEXT AND TRAINING

"Reports from the Dutch Office in London... made us only more eager to be done with training and get going."

John "Pappy" Olmsted, Team DUDLEY

Jedburgh Recruitment

The development of Jedburgh planning and the subsequent recruitment, training, and employment of the teams became a disputed issue in the OSS, London Headquarters. The Western European Section claimed operational control of the Jedburghs because they would eventually be deployed to their area of operations. The Special Operations (SO) Planning Section insisted that Jedburgh teams were their responsibility because their office had developed the concept in conjunction with planners in SOE. (1) On 15 April 1943 the OSS appointed the Chief of the Special Operations (SO) Planning Section, Lieutenant Colonel Franklin O. Canfield, as the Project Officer responsible for the recruitment and initial training of American Jedburgh teams. As SO's representative on SOE's newly formed Planning Section, Lieutenant Colonel Canfield had closely coordinated OSS
Jedburgh proposals with those of his SOE counterpart, Lieutenant-Colonel M.W. Rowlandson. Due to the cooperation of these officers and their staffs, the Jedburgh proposals had been approved almost simultaneously by their respective countries' joint staffs and Jedburgh recruitment given final approval. (2) Thereafter the Planning Section took the initiative in promoting and planning Jedburgh team recruitment, training, and deployment. The Western European section never acquiesced on this turf battle, and friction continued to occur between the two sections. In practice, the chairman of the SOE Planning Section and Lieutenant Colonel Canfield, SO's Planning Chief, maintained similar "watching briefs" over the organization, training, and planning of the Jedburghs. The Planning Section recruited the Jedburghs, coordinated with COSSAC and later SHAEF, and, in conjunction with SOE, established training programs and procured training areas. The Western European Section maintained operational control of the teams once they were selected for specific missions. (3)

Following the European Theater Command U.S. Army's (ETOUSA) final approval of the OSS proposals, recruitment for American Jedburgh teams began in August, 1943. SO's Planning Section had unsuccessfully canvassed available American personnel in the United Kingdom, and determined
that qualified individuals would have to be recruited in the United States. (4) Lieutenant Colonel Canfield strongly believed that the success of the Jedburgh Concept depended exclusively on qualified personnel to carry it out, and decided to head the recruiting mission to Washington D.C. himself. (5) On 9 September, Canfield met with representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, and secured their approval for the Jedburgh and army staff proposals and recruiting requirements. (6)

OSS Headquarters in Washington authorized 100 officer personnel slots to implement the Jedburgh proposals: 50 for Jedburgh teams, 34 for the SF detachments, and 16 for SOE/SO Headquarters (later SFHQ). (7) Candidates were supplied through the cooperation of G2 Division, War Department, and the Army Ground Forces. (8)

The qualifications for Jedburgh officers were as follows:

Officers recruited as leaders and seconds in command should be picked for qualities of leadership and daring, ability to speak and understand French, and all-round physical condition. They should be experienced in handling men, preferably in an active theater of operations, and be prepared to be parachuted in uniform behind enemy lines and operate on their own for some time. They must have had at least basic military training and preferably have aptitude for small arms weapons. (9)

The OSS flew Army officers who indicated a willingness to perform such duty to Washington D.C. for interviews. By 14
October, Canfield's committee had interviewed 83 officers. (10) Qualified candidates were trucked to an isolated area in northern Maryland near Camp Ritchie where they underwent further interrogation and testing. (11) Concurrently, SO recruiters interviewed officers for SF detachment positions. Criteria for army staff officers were stringent: The officers must have had considerable staff experience and an intimate knowledge of France and the French language. (12)

The OSS received permission from G1, Military Personnel Division, Army Service Forces, to recruit W/T operators from Army Signal Corps schools at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey and Camp Crowder, Missouri. (13) The qualifications for Jedburgh radio operators were as follows:

Qualifications for radio operators are not so high as for leaders and seconds-in-command and a fair working knowledge of French is sufficient. In addition to normal requirements for good radio operators, they must be of exceptionally good physique to stand up to training and be prepared to be parachuted behind enemy lines to operate their sets in open under war conditions. They should attain a speed of 15 words per minute before being shipped to the U.K. (14)

SO recruited 50 radio operators from Camp Crowder, six from Fort Monmouth, and navy ratings at the OSS communications school who were French linguists. (15)
The OSS trained all Jedburgh recruits on individual small arms and demolition techniques in the northern Maryland hills during an intensive indoctrination program in late October and November of 1943. (18) By the end of November, most of these exercises had been completed, and SO selected 55 officers, 62 radio operators, 54 staff officers, and 27 enlisted men for the Army staffs for further training in the United Kingdom. SO continued to screen these men upon their arrival in the UK in late December, and by 1 January only 35 American officers were found qualified for Jedburgh missions. The OSS received permission from the ETOUSA Commander to recruit the remaining officers from U.S. divisions based in England. Some of these officers were recruited immediately, although others did not report to Milton Hall until late February. (17)

The OSS also recruited ten French officers from the French Military Mission in Washington, but these men did not count against the American quota. (18) The SOE unsuccessfully attempted to recruit French personnel from l'Infanterie de l'Air, a battalion based in the United Kingdom, and hurriedly secured 70 French Jedburghs on a recruiting drive in the Middle East in January and February, 1944. Since they would miss almost two months of
preliminary training and specialized instruction, these French recruits were experienced combat veterans. (19)

Through their contacts with resistance groups on the continent and expatriate soldiers living in the United Kingdom, the SOE also secured Dutch and Belgian personnel for the teams. SOE recruited British Jedburgh team members from its own ranks or selected soldiers who had volunteered for dangerous duty with assault or airborne forces or had previous experience with these types of units. (20)

Jedburgh Training

SOE and OSS agreed to rudimentary Jedburgh training procedures on 5 September 1943 at a meeting at Norgeby House. (21) The SOE Training Section Chief, Colonel James Young, and the SO Branch Training Head, Major John Tyson, worked out specific details of this training program in consultation with the Jedburgh Section, Western European Section. (22) While recruiting was in progress, the two organizations drew up The Basic Jedburgh Directive (see page 12, Chapter 1), and a supplementary directive which described the training program in detail. With the imminent arrival of the American volunteers in January, Lieutenant Colonel Canfield and Brigadier Mookler-Ferryman, the head of the London Office, SOE, continued to meet
throughout December to finalize plans for the Jedburgh School and its training program, which called for the training of 300 men by 1 April. (23) SOE had been designated the proponent agency for the school, and appointed British Army Lieutenant-Colonel Frank Spooner as its Commandant. The SOE requested OSS representation in the school's chain of command and cadre, and USMC Major Horace W. Fuller of the OSS was named as its Deputy Commandant. (24)

The American officer contingent disembarked from the Queen Elizabeth on 23 December 1943 at Gourack, Scotland (near Glasgow), and were sent north to the area of Loch Morar (near Fort William) for initial processing and preparation for training. The officers departed for London on 29 December, and moved again two days later to Peterfield, south of London. For the next two weeks, an SOE/SO Student Assessment Board (SAB) screened these men, administering a grueling battery of psychological and physical tests (The Jeds disdainfully called Peterfield "The Booby Hatch."). The SAB selected 37 officers to remain in the Jedburgh program. Because Milton Hall would not be available until 1 February, SOE/SO split these officers into three groups for preliminary training conducted at British Special Training School (STS) 45 in Fairford in
Gloucestershire, STS 48 at Gumley Hall in Lancashire, and STS 6 AT Walsingham in Surrey. (25) The officers trained the remainder of January, emphasizing physical training, hand to hand combat, basic marksmanship, and familiarity with foreign weapons and radio/cryptological operations. The American contingent met some of their British, French, Belgian, and Dutch colleagues for the first time at these schools, but the first mass assemblage of the Jedburghs took place at Hilton Hall in early February. (26)

The 62 American radio operators arrived in the UK on 31 December and were immediately assigned to the SOE communications school at Henley-on-Thames. They were billeted in nissen huts and several houses in the town. For the next month they underwent parachute training, psychological testing, and small arms training. The Female Auxiliary Nursing Yeomanry (FANY), whose covert cipher training mission supported SOE throughout the war, taught them Morse code and secure communications procedures at Farley Court. Forty six W/T operators passed this phase and went on to jump training immediately afterward. (27)

Regardless of their previous airborne experience and nationality, all Jedburgh officers and enlisted men rotated through a three day SOE parachute training school at Ringway, near Cheshire, in late January 1944. Each man
made three jumps at this school to practice exiting (without a reserve parachute) through the hole of the floor of British aircraft. Barrage balloons and older Wellington bombers were used as jump platforms. (28)

Upon the completion of preliminary and jump training, Jedburgh officers and enlisted men reported to Milton Hall in Peterborough, Northamptonshire, on 5 February 1944 to begin their specialized and technical training. All nationalities were represented with the exception of the French, who SOE were still recruiting in the Middle East. The French would not report for almost another two months, arriving in late March, 1944. (29) The SOE and OSS initially set the target dates of 1 April 1944 for completion of "operational" Jedburgh training and 1 May, the projected date for D-Day, for all British and American officers to have a working knowledge of French and to be familiar French customs. This latter date drove the training objectives at Milton Hall. (30)

After their arrival at Milton Hall, Jedburghs continued to receive instruction on small arms, demolitions, tactics, and French. Robust physical training, including long marches and hand-to-hand combat, and familiarization on guerilla tactics continued. (31) Since SFHQ did not yet have a requirement for Dutch teams,
Milton Hall did not provide Dutch language instruction. (The consensus among most Jeds in February was that France took precedence over other occupied areas of Europe and that Dutch and Belgian personnel would also work in France.). (32) Several groups of American and British officers entered the school during the first weeks in February without preliminary training, and underwent two weeks of specialized instruction. (33)

Advanced or "operational" training began on 21 February and continued until 6 June. During this phase, Milton Hall stressed team training in a series of demanding field exercises, as opposed to the individual training that had dominated the preliminary phase. (34) Enlisted men, and, to a lesser degree, officers, continued to receive language training and Morse code/communications instruction. By the end of April, most W/T operators could send and receive approximately 20 words per minute, while officers' speeds varied (SOE determined after several field exercises that officers had to be able to receive approximately 6-8 words per minute and send about 10-12 in an emergency.). (35) In addition, Milton Hall provided numerous background intelligence briefings for the trainees, including the history of resistance movements in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. (36)
The field exercises constituted the most important part of operational planning, simulating actual conditions and problems that were likely to be encountered in France. They varied in duration from 36 hours to ten days, and verified tactical procedures for Jedburgh teams and staff operations for the Special Forces Detachments. "SPILL OUT," the first to be undertaken, was a six day operation carried out in the last week of March, and included drops to reception committees, establishment and maintenance of communication networks, road block attacks, and escape and evasion games with mock Gestapo agents. "SPILL OUT" revealed various problems with Jedburgh tactics, and all trainees were given leave to afford Milton Hall and the Planning Committees time to work out solutions. (38)

SOE and SO conducted two command post exercises in that same month to evaluate Special Forces (SF) Detachments' operational procedures for coordinating Jedburgh teams. In Exercise "LEVEE", Americans portrayed SF Detachments assigned to field armies, and SOE ran the control. In Exercise "SALLY," the roles were reversed. For the last two weeks of March a field training exercise deploying Jedburgh teams had been planned, but was subsequently cancelled. Instead, "SALLY" was extended through 24 March 1944. (39) "SALLY" revealed flaws in
Jedburgh briefing procedures (which were later remedied by incorporating the Air Corps briefing system), and manifested the inexperience of staff personnel of the Country Sections (France and the Low Countries) assigned to the SOE/SO Headquarters. (40)

The Jedburghs completed the essential part of their training by 1 April, although by this time SHAEF had moved the date for the invasion back to 1 June. (41) Jedburghs continued individual and collective training for the rest of the month. Milton Hall staged “SPUR” on 24 and 25 April for General Koenig’s benefit during his inspection of the facilities and ongoing training. For this demonstration, Jedburgh teams directed a partisan ambush of a German general staff, and SOE/SO Headquarters improved its Country Sections’ working procedures. (42)

By the end of April, the Jedburghs had consolidated into teams, and trained on all tasks collectively. Rumors were rampant among teams that a target date had been designated for their deployment. (43) SOE/SO had selected 15 teams to deploy to Algiers for their subsequent infiltration into France, and the school began evaluating collective training levels of all teams in a series of fitness tests. (44) The first two weeks in May witnessed escalating activity at Milton Hall. The Algiers teams
departed on 2 May, the "kits" of all remaining personnel were completed, and many teams, to include all for the Dutch mission, deployed on a ten day "commando" hike in Scotland. Each team was assigned a 100-200 mile route in desolate areas of the Scottish hills with three days rations per man and ration cards for the remaining days. (45) Presumably, this exercise tested the efficiency of the SOE/SC communications system. (46) Upon their return to Milton Hall, all Dutch teams (with the exception of DANIEL II) entrained back to northern Scotland to undergo a 10 day British Commando small boat course. (47)

Following their return from Scotland, the Dutch teams began their collective skills tests. Milton Hall administered the demolitions tests first, and then for some reason cancelled the remaining evaluations, much to the delight of the teams. (48)

During the last half of May, Milton Hall sent many of the remaining teams to a Dakota landing course, which taught procedures for landing transport aircraft into unimproved fields for exfiltration of personnel. (49) Selected teams, to include all five Dutch teams, were then deployed on "LASH," a 10 day problem lasting from 31 May through 8 June. "LASH's" area of operations extended over the hilly Leicestershire region, and required Jedburgh
teams to contact a resistance group and to direct attacks on rail communications and other targets in accordance with instructions received over the W/T. (50)

Hilton Hall considered "LASH" a success despite daylight movement to target areas by large groups of resistance forces. Other operational failures on this exercise would be repeated in combat several weeks later, to include issuance of vague orders to the teams to carry out their missions and poor hide procedures during evasion from the enemy. (51) The Jedburgh teams involved with "LASH" returned on 8 June, and were extremely disappointed to learn that they missed the invasion of Normandy. Gradually, the teams overcame their exasperation, and resumed Hilton Hall's program of instruction. The Dutch teams concentrated on deficient or weak training areas or those skills they thought would be required in their area of operations. Throughout the summer months of 1944, the teams attempted to maintain their high levels of training. Milton Hall did not schedule any major field exercises for these teams, and by the end of the summer the program was relatively relaxed, with individual teams training strictly as they saw fit. (52)
Team "Marriages"

Jedburgh officers formed their own teams (The men called this unique process "marriages.") in March and April of 1844. According to the OSS War Diaries, Lieutenant-Colonel Frank Spooner, the Milton Hall Commandant, his successor Lieutenant-Colonel G. Richard Musgrave, and the chief instructor (and later deputy commandant), Major Richard V. McLallen, determined team membership but "much consideration was given to individual preferences expressed in a poll taken among the officers and men." (53) Surviving Jeds insist that they chose their own teams, which probably eliminated personality conflicts and promoted harmonious team relationships. During March, there was an underlying tension among all Jedburghs in the ongoing political maneuvering for team partners. At this point in their training, all personnel, to include the Dutch, believed they would be deployed to France, and competition to woo a French officer on a team was keen. The men's unpredictable behavior during these important personality contests was divisive. "Engagements" were broken in arguments. Some Jeds engaged themselves to two or three teams to ensure a position. By the first of April the majority of teams were established, although changes continued to be made throughout the operational period until D-Day. Colonel
Musgrave gave final approval to the "marriage" of each team, which was officially promulgated in the daily Milton Hall orders. The Dutch team officers "married" out of friendships formed during the training regimen in February and March, as did the other Jedburgh teams. Wireless operators were not chosen immediately. Each team used several enlisted men during the initial weeks of training to determine compatibility. (54)

Following formation of the teams at beginning of April, four of the five Dutch teams quit attending French language and map classes. A close bond developed between these four teams, and they performed the majority of training together from April until their deployment the following September. In the words of Major John "Pappy" Olmsted:

This compact little group probably was the most tightly knit unit in the entire school. We engaged in small exercises, studied, and ran our problems as a closed organization. (55)

DANIEL II, which was to accompany the 101st Airborne Division into Market Garden, consisted of British officers, and had no low country orientation until alerted for the actual operation. (56) The four teams to deploy with Market Garden units, DANIEL II with the 101st, CLARENCE with the 82d, CLAUDE with the British 1st Airborne Division, and EDWARD with the Airborne Corps were called
the Dutch Liaison Mission (DLM). Ironically, team DUDLEY, which had been designated a Dutch team since its formation, was not part of this "mission," but, instead, infiltrated earlier than the rest of the teams. (57)

Once formed, the Dutch teams began to receive intelligence reports from the Low Country Section Office in London. Captain Henk Brinkgreve of team DUDLEY arranged a visit to this office in the third week of April. The four teams talked to the Dutch section staff, studied maps and the latest intelligence reports, and became familiar with activities of the Dutch resistance. (58)

Problems and Morale of Teams

American Jedburgh candidates experienced several problems immediately after their arrival in England. Foremost was jump pay. OSS Headquarters in Washington had assured qualified parachutists in the Airborne Command who had been selected for Jedburgh training that they would continue to receive jump pay while in the United Kingdom. Despite an urgent memorandum written by Lieutenant Colonel Canfield that this pay be dispersed from OSS Special Funds until the War Department consented to recompense the men, the OSS, European Theater of Operations, United States Army
ETOUSA), denied the authorization for jump pay to all Jedburgh trainees.

A second problem involving American Jedburghs was enlisted promotions. OSS Headquarters in Washington had promised Army non commissioned officers selected as radio operators promotion to officer rank upon their arrival in the United Kingdom. Once again, Lieutenant Colonel Canfield urged this be done in a memorandum to OSS ETOUSA, and once again, his request was denied. (Virtually all French radio operators were given officer rank.) (59)

Food was another problem. For American Jedburghs unaccustomed to the austere British diet and disparate meal times, the eventual preparation of American rations overseen by an American paratrooper was a major triumph at the mess. Moreover, the opening of an American post exchange/NAAFI (British PX equivalent) in which team members regardless of nationality could purchase regular PX rations was also important to morale. (80)

Morale went through various stages in the Jedburgh training cycle. Morale and enthusiasm for training was very high during the first months at Milton Hall, despite rather spartan conditions. Lieutenant-Colonel Spooner attempted to administer the Jeds like a Colonial Indian Army Battalion, drawing upon his Indian experience to
enforce strict discipline. This daily regimen of roll calls and morning parades instilled resentment in American personnel, who did not expect such treatment. Within 48 hours, SFHQ relieved Spooner and a few days later installed Lieutenant-Colonel G. Richard Musgrave as Milton Hall's new commandant. Musgrave's more relaxed methods eliminated the tension between the British and Americans and improved staff morale. (61)

The teams honestly thought their training was completed and they were going to be deployed upon the completion of "SPILL OUT." Following the postponement of the invasion by one month, some Jedburghs were not sure if they would be used at all. Many believed they would be disbanded during those last weeks in April, 1944. Rumors swirled about Milton Hall at this time, but were quickly dashed when the training program intensified and preparations made to dispatch the 15 Algiers teams. Prior to their departure, Milton Hall sponsored an organization day for all the teams, which consisted of athletic contests and general foolishness. This day, 1 May 1944, was the last time all the Jedburghs would be assembled together. (62)

The commando hikes and the small boat school in May were excellent training vehicles that cemented team
relationships and raised individual expectations that deployment would occur shortly. But team morale, which had been very high during this period, reached its lowest ebb following the return of the teams from Operation "LASH" on 8 June 1944. Major Olmsted states:

"...the Normandy Landings came on June 6 after which date those still remaining in England were completely fed up and did a bare minimum of work.... The [deployed] teams reported daily which further added to the unhappiness of those still not in action. (83)"

During the late spring and summer of 1944 when SOE/SO deployed the majority of the French Jedburgh teams, the Dutch teams took advantage of a less formal training schedule to develop into cohesive, skilled units. They ate, slept, trained, and played together throughout that summer despite receiving no word on their future infiltrations for Market Garden. During this cycle, they experienced a series of false alerts, anticipating their infiltration when rumors stirred up, and reeling in disgust when the rumors proved groundless. As General George S. Patton's Third Army raced across France, the Dutch teams in Peterborough gave up hope of being deployed to Europe. Several began to study the languages of the China-Burma-India theater in anticipation of a future deployment to the far east. (84)
Jedburgh Team Equipment

SOE/SO established a combined committee to consider and designate Jedburgh team equipment. Milton Hall obtained and stored all supplies for team "kits." (65) SOE signals section designed a short wave radio set known as the A Mark III set for Jedburgh field use. The A Mark III, known as the "Jed Set" weighed approximately 5.5 pounds and was stored in a suitcase with its accessories (total weight of suitcase: 9 pounds). This device had a five watt output with a range of 500 miles. For longer ranges, the 30 watt B-2 was used, which was also stored in a suitcase and weighed 32 pounds. (66) Jedburgh radio operators encoded all messages using a 9" x 4.5" piece of silk and ten microfilmed pages of key lists. The silk, which resembled a handkerchief, contained some 500 printed four letter codes for reporting or requesting operations. The key lists measured 4.5" x 4" and contained a thousand groups which could only be read with a magnifying glass. The key lists were one-time pads which, despite their capture, the Germans could never decode. The microfilmed pages consisted of special paper which could be eaten or dissolved instantly in hot liquids. (67)

By May, Milton Hall had distributed most of the "kit" to the teams. Each man had his own national uniform
with web gear and pack, American jump boots, the American M1911 .45 caliber pistol, the American M1 Winchester 7.62mm carbine, a British fighting knife known as the Fairburn knife (It was designed by a Jed close combat instructor of the same name who had been a member of the Shanghai police), a British oil compass, and survival equipment similar to that issued to RAF bomber crews. (68) Each Jedburgh had in his possession a number of false documents, to include an identity card, ration card, demobilization paper, textile ration card, certificate of domicile, work permit, and driving license. These documents afforded Jed teams the flexibility to remain in uniform (to claim POW rights under the Geneva Convention) or to wear civilian clothes. (69)

**Dispatch and Briefing of Jedburgh Teams**

Detailed procedures for the dispatch of Jedburgh teams on and after D-Day was specified in the "Operational Procedure of Special Force Headquarters, 12 May 1944." SO/SF Staffs in the field normally requested French Jedburgh teams. However, SOE/SO liaison officers attached to SHAEF or the London Group, SOE, also originated requests, as was the case for the Jedburgh Dutch Liaison Mission in support of Market Garden.
SFHQ held a daily conference at 1030 hours to review the events of the past 24 hours, requirements from the field, and requests for Jedburgh teams. If intelligence indicated a Maquis (French resistance fighters who took their name from the thorny brush in Corsica) or an underground group needed leadership, organization, or supplies, Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman or his appointed representative considered the dispatch of a Jedburgh team to the area. For all requests for Jedburgh teams, Mockler-Ferryman's London Group staff consulted with the appropriate country section and Chief of the Jedburgh Section before recommending deployment. Mockler-Ferryman or Colonel John Haskell of the OSS made the final decision. The Commandant of Milton Hall determined the composition of a Jedburgh team, augmenting them with attached personnel who were not necessarily Jedburghs. Mockler-Ferryman, his London Group Staff or Haskell might delineate specific Jedburgh teams for special missions.

Following selection of a team, the London Group Staff then informed the Chief of the Jedburgh Section, the team's briefing officer, and a representative of the country section about mission details. The Chief of the Jedburgh Section subsequently issued a warning order to the
The country section was responsible for assembling material for the mission briefing. However, the briefing officer, detailed by the Chief of the Jedburgh Section to the country section, conducted the formal brief to the team. For these briefings, the country section often coordinated the visit of regional experts who could possibly contribute to the team's success. The country section also requested aircraft through the U.S. Army Eighth Air Force (known as the "Carpetbaggers") based at Harrington Aerodrome, Kettering or through the RAF 38th Group out of Tempsford. It arranged for parachutes and packages, ordered containers for mission equipment, and coordinated transport of the team to the airfield. The country section normally directed the team's activities once it infiltrated.

Once alerted, the team would upload its kit and would be driven to London for its mission briefing and final preparations. SFHQ representatives would brief the team for 3-4 hours, providing background information, particulars on its assigned mission, a Michelin road map illustrating the team's DZ and final destination, codewords.
for commo procedures back to London, and bona fides for
link up with the resistance.

From its briefing room in London, the team was
usually driven to Harrington or Temspford Air Bases for its
flight that same evening. Although other air bases were
sometimes used, the 801st (Provisional) Bomb Group (Heavy)
of the 8th AAF fielded modified bombers painted black,
which were preferred for infiltration. SFHQ maintained its
supply and packing area (Area H) approximately 35 miles
from Harrington near the village of Holme. Here, the team
would get a final meal, check equipment, chute up, and fly
to the continent.

The reception committee on the ground would mark
the DZ with an assigned code letter designator using small
fires, or transmit a designator with blinking flashlights
in Morse Code. The signal of a Eureka beacon was also
sometimes used to indicate a clear DZ. The country
sections briefed the teams to immediately report back to
SFHQ once on the ground. After bona fides were exchanged
with the resistance, the teams would begin coordinating
operations with resistance leaders and SFHQ in London. If
a reception committee failed to meet them, the team would
proceed to a safehouse on a specific azimuth and distance
from the DZ. Throughout their operations with the
resistance, the Jeds often requested additional drops of equipment and supplies. (70) In the case of the Netherlands, members of the Dutch underground reconnoitered possible DZs on bicycle. These liaison officers as they were known were technically competent in drop procedures and extremely diplomatic in convincing a farmer to allow his field to be used for drops. (German retaliation for such collaboration, if detected, was severe. Normally, the Gestapo or SD would murder the farmer and his family and then burn the buildings to the ground. SFHQ drops over Holland were very dangerous because of the low horizon and wide visibility of the country's flat landscape. Heavy concentrations of German troops in Holland which purposely deployed air guards each night to detect such clandestine operations added to the danger.) (71) The team alerted London of such a request by transmitting the number of its Michelin map, its section number, pli number, and the coordinates for the drop. (72) At 2015 hours every evening, the BBC broadcast Radio Oranje for its sympathetic listeners in the Netherlands. This program was followed at 2030 by Radio Belgique, whose content included carefully worded "blind" messages that confirmed or rescinded Dutch drops, their time, and number of aircraft. (73)
CHAPTER TWO

ENDNOTES

1. OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel I, Volume II, PLANNING, Preamble to 1 January 1944, pp. xxviii-xxix.

2. OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel III, Volume IV, JEDBURGHS, Preamble to 1 January 1944, pp. xvi-xvii.

3. OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel I, Volume II, PLANNING, Preamble to 1 January 1944, pp. xxviii-xxix.

4. Ibid., pp. xxviii-xxix.

5. Ibid., p. xxix and OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel III, Volume IV, JEDBURGHS, Preamble to 1 January 1944, p. xvii.


7. OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel III, Volume IV, JEDBURGHS, Preamble to 1 January 1944, p. xviii.

8. Ibid., pp. xix-xxi.

9. Ibid., p. xviii.

10. OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel I, Volume II, PLANNING, Preamble to 1 January 1944, p. xxx.


12. OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel I, Volume II, PLANNING, Preamble to 1 January 1944, p. xxx; and OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel III, Volume IV, JEDBURGHS, Preamble to 1 January 1944, p. xxi.
13. OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel III, Volume IV, JEDBURGHS, Preamble to 1 January 1944, p. xxi.


15. Ibid., p. xxi.


17. OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel III, Volume IV, JEDBURGHS, Preamble to 1 January 1944, p. xx, and January to July 1944, p. 4.

18. Ibid., p. xx.


20. Foot, p. 18, 35, 40-42.


22. OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel III, Volume IV, JEDBURGHS, Preamble to 1 January 1944, p. xxiv.

23. OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel I, Volume II, PLANNING, Preamble to 1 January 1944, pp. xxxii-xxxiii; and OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel III, Volume IV, JEDBURGHS, Preamble to 1 January 1944, p. xxii.


30. OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel III, Volume IV, JEDBURGHS, Preamble to 1 January 1944, pp. xxii-xxiii.


32. Olmsted, p. 10.

33. OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel III, Volume IV, JEDBURGHS, January to July 1944, p. 10.

34. Ibid., p. 10.

35. Olmsted, p. 28; and letter from Major John Olmsted (ret.) of 10 January 1990 to the author.

36. OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel III, Volume IV, JEDBURGHS, January to July 1944, p. 10.

37. Ibid., p. 12.

38. Ibid., p. 12; and Olmsted, pp. 24-25.

40. OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel I, Volume II, PLANNING, January-September 1944, pp. 5-6, and 30.


42. Ibid., p. 12; OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel I, Volume II, PLANNING, January-September 1944, p. 5; and OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel V, Volume V, ARMY STAFFS, April, May, June 1944, p. 11.


44. OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel I, Volume II, PLANNING, January-September 1944, p. 31; OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel III, Volume IV, JEDBURGHS, January to July 1944, p. 14; and Olmsted, pp. 28-29.

45. Olmsted, pp. 28-33.


47. Olmsted, pp. 33-35.

48. Ibid., p. 36.

49. Ibid., p. 38.

50. Ibid., pp. 36-37; and OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel III, Volume IV, JEDBURGHS, January to July 1944, pp. 12-13.


54. Olmsted, pp. 22-23; Alsop and Braden, p. 149; and letter from Mrs. Daphne Friele of 14 January 1980 to the author.

55. Olmsted, pp. 22, 27.
56. OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel IV, Volume IV, JEDBURGHS, July to December 1944, Team "EDWARD" Report, p. 6; letter from Mrs. Daphne Friele of 10 October 1989 to the author.

57. OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel IV, Volume IV, JEDBURGHS, July to December 1944, Team "EDWARD" Report, pp. 6-8; OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel III, Volume IV, JEDBURGHS, January to July 1944, p. 62.


60. Olmsted, p. 24; and letter of Major John Olmsted (ret.) of 10 January 1980 to the author.


63. Ibid., pp. 33-37.

64. Ibid., pp. 37-38.

65. OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel III, Volume IV, JEDBURGHS, Preamble to 1 January 1944, p. xiv.


69. OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel III, Volume IV, JEDBURGHS, Preamble to 1 January 1944, 32-35.

70. Ibid, pp. 14-16, 32-35; Cowell, p. 7; and Lewis, pp. 9-10.
71. Olmsted, p. 75


73. Olmsted, p. 81.
CHAPTER THREE

THE SITUATION BEFORE MARKET GARDEN

"...paratroopers and glidermen...had become in effect coins burning holes in SHAEF's pocket."

In the text of a speech by Geog M. Belgium

SEMI and the Dutch Resistance

In 1941, SOE's London Headquarters established a Dutch section to recruit and train Dutchmen in the United Kingdom for future infiltration into Holland, where they would organize and direct the underground. Initially, SOE was solely responsible for the operations of this organization, which had no relationship with the Royal Netherlands government in exile. SOE dispatched four groups of agents into Holland between November, 1941 and June, 1942. (1)

In November, 1941, the German Abwehr in Holland, under the direction of Major Herman Giskes, recruited a Dutch diamond smuggler named Ridderhoff, whose illegal actions in the black market had brought him to the attention of German customs officials. Ridderhoff revealed he had befriended Captain v.d. Berg, a Dutch reserve officer in The Hague working for two infiltrated SOE
agents. Giskes' men worked quickly, and pressured Ridderhoff to collaborate with them in exchange for protection against prosecution and by remunerating him for his efforts. On 10 December, Ridderhoff reported a Berg disclosure that one of the SOE agents in The Hague was reconnoitering drop sites for the reception of additional agents and equipment. Berg had gone on to describe SOE's plans for systematically arming and training the Dutch resistance, which Ridderhoff dutifully repeated to his German case officer. Subsequent reports from Ridderhoff (dubbed source F2087 by the Abwehr) confirmed his reliability, and the Germans now had an excellent source of information concerning SOE activities in Holland. By January 1942, the Abwehr knew SOE plans for drops of weapons and equipment, to include SOE codes, BBC signals, drop locations, and reception committees. On 28 February 1942, the Abwehr clandestinely observed such a drop of radio equipment, and, through directional finding (DF) equipment, eventually arrested its wireless operator, SOE agent H.M.G. Lauwers on 8 March 1942. Three days later, the Abwehr captured Lauwers' co-agents Thijs-Taconis and Jaap van Dijk, and Operation "NORD POL," one of the more successful counter intelligence operations in World War II, began in earnest. (2)
For the next eighteen months, the Germans used captured British radios and codes to request almost 200 more drops of men or equipment through SOE and MID, the attached Dutch Military Intelligence Section colocated with SOE in London. The Abwehr deceived, threatened, and tortured agents into collaborating with them, and intercepted nearly 50 agents who parachuted into Holland during this time. Despite captured agents' attempts to warn off SOE by deliberately sending incorrect security checks, SOE radio operators did not discern this ruse. The SOE over time learned to disregard the importance of this check when reliable agents in other countries made legitimate errors. Eventually, the presence or absence of the security check came to have little significance, and SOE accepted without question the Abwehr messages as well as those sent by its own agents.

The very nature of Plan Holland, SOE's plan to organize Dutch resistance, helped the Abwehr to defeat it. The essence of Plan Holland was for the Dutch to remain underground until SOE ordered its activation. Occasionally, SOE ordered an act of sabotage, and the Abwehr would immediately contrive some rationale or stage some plausible demonstration to satisfy London. Generally,
SOE did not demand much from the resistance, and was satisfied with its immediate responses to wireless traffic. (6)

The Germans had a total of 60 people running "NORD POL" from the Abwehr, the Gestapo, the Ordnungspolizei (ORPO, the German force stationed in Holland during the war years whose mission was to suppress clandestine radio links) and Dutch collaborators. Very few knew all the details of the operation. Some members of the Dutch underground had a vague idea what was happening, but could not tie in the disappearance of agents with the presence of seven German radio transmitters broadcasting to London. The underground believed that a Dutch traitor in London was responsible, but Germans captured couriers carrying this intelligence in Belgium. Nonetheless, it is doubtful the message would have credibility with Dutch authorities and SOE representatives in London, who were rather complacent. (7)

SOE finally abandoned its Holland effort in November, 1943 when two agents escaped from the Haaren Concentration Camp and reported to London that the entire Holland sabotage organization had been compromised. (8) Abwehr channels quickly informed Giskes of the escape, and on 23 November 1943 he audaciously transmitted the
following message in the clear to SOE in London:

To Mssrs. Hunt, Bingham & Co., Successors Ltd., London. We understand you have been endeavoring for some time to do business in Holland without our assistance. We regret this the more, since we have acted for so long as your sole representatives in this country, to our mutual satisfaction. Nevertheless we can assure that, should you be thinking of paying us a visit on the continent on any extensive scale, we shall give your emissaries the same attention as we have hitherto, and a similar warm welcome. Hoping to see you. (9)

On 10 January 1944, SOE/SD integrated, forming SFHQ. During this period of reorganization, the Air Ministry banned any operations over Holland, and SFHQ maintained contact with reliable resistance leaders attempting to build up a new organization. Despite close collaboration with General van Vorschot of the BBO (the Dutch headquarters in London for sabotage and underground armed resistance in Holland), this approach met with serious setbacks. (10) By the end of March, SFHQ had established radio contact with the R.V.V. (RAAD VAN VERZT, or Council for Resistance), which expressed its willingness to follow SHAEF's directives and to build up resistance organizations inside Holland. Believing it had been penetrated by the Abwehr, SFHQ was extremely cautious in proceeding with the RVV until its credibility could be verified. SFHQ dispatched two agents on 31 May to Holland to assist the RVV, but their plane was shot down over
Holland. SFHQ did not attempt any infiltrations in June, when German air defenses were taking an enormous toll of Allied aircraft. (11)

In July, 1944, SFHQ became more optimistic about the viability of Dutch resistance operations. The Netherlands Minister of Justice, Mr. Van Huven Goldhart, who had been exfiltrated from Holland, provided insightful reports on the Dutch underground. Later in the month, SFHQ successfully infiltrated agents to reestablish contact with the RVV. These agents discovered the Council was a "central federative body" closely connected with all the principal resistance movements in the Netherlands, and their reports helped dispel SFHQ concerns that the RVV had been compromised. Council leaders readily acknowledged an SFHQ directive governing their activities in support of Allied operations. (12)

The following month, SFHQ dispatched two SAS parties to the Prinsenkamp and Assen areas in the Drente province. Both missions collected intelligence on the status of Dutch Resistance and the military will of the Dutch population in these areas. SFHQ authorized no overt military activity.
In August, SFHQ dropped two officers near Rotterdam to improve communications and coordination with the RVV. SFHQ had coordinated this infiltration with the SIS in Holland, whose agents assisted the SOE operatives in establishing a communications network which extended from Rotterdam to most of the Dutch provinces. This enabled SFHQ to "vet" or establish the credibility of the indigenous resistance and to issue instructions to Dutch operatives. By mid month, London had one secure communications link with the RVV. At this juncture, SFHQ had not developed extensive resistance plans for the Netherlands, but hoped the "Council" could orchestrate a moderate scale of sabotage operations, principally against communications systems. Due to Abwehr arrests of RVV leaders and continuing German antiaircraft success against air sorties, SFHQ cautiously dropped small quantities of arms and supplies to the Council, and, as a result, no major sabotage attacks occurred during the month. The SFHQ ordered the RVV to attack German lines of communications extending along Venlo-Helmond-Neerpelt and the Nijmegen-Hertogenbosh-Rosendall lines, and received reports that the plan was executed later in September. (13)

By the end of August, SFHQ had a fairly accurate picture of the Dutch resistance. SFHQ considered the RVV
as the brains of the Dutch Resistance and able to influence the actions of other disparate groups. (14) With a strength of several thousand, the RVV had operatives throughout Holland. They were the only para military Dutch resistance organization in Holland, and SFHQ had now verified their reliability through confirmation of their intelligence reporting. The ORDE DIENST (Order of Service or OD) consisted of ex-soldiers and older men. The OD reported some intelligence, but, more importantly, developed plans for administration and maintenance of civil services and order following the Allied liberation of Holland. The OD had wide representation in Holland with myriad contacts with local authorities. SFHQ believed that the Abwehr had long since penetrated the OD, although most elements were still loyal to the Crown. The third branch was the LADELIJKE ORGANISATIE (National Organization or LO) which was responsible for hiding refugees or individuals sought by the Gestapo. The KNOCKPLOEGEN (Knocking Groups or KP) worked in conjunction with the LO, providing identity and ration cards for the underground. The KP had their own fabrication center, and consisted of some 550 active personnel spread throughout the country. (15) The KP also carried out some sabotage missions for SFHQ in the latter part of the summer and fall. (16)
As the British Second Army approached the Dutch borders in early September, and it seemed probable that Holland would fall as quickly as Belgium, SHAEF instructed SFHQ to activate the resistance in two phases. Phase One would occur south of the Waal River and included missions for what was to eventually become Market Garden. In this phase, Jedburgh teams attached to the airborne forces would direct resistance forces in specialized roles. Phase Two would occur north of the Waal River. In this phase, SHAEF planned for the resistance to conduct a number of sabotage missions against railways, telecommunication lines and canals. In addition, they would prevent scorching of the large ports, especially Rotterdam. (17)

SFHQ believed the Dutch resistance morale remained low due to lack of arms and equipment. Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman wrote on 16 August:

As the result of the failure to deliver supplies to Dutch resistance, the feeling in Holland is growing up that the Allies do not intend to support resistance. There is a danger, therefore, that unless supplies can be sent to them at an early date, morale will seriously deteriorate. (18)

The Brigadier proposed to SHAEF that ten supply drops be conducted for the August-September moon period beginning 28 August. SFHQ's objective was to provide the RVV with sabotage demolitions and personal weapons, enabling them to sustain attacks over a 30 day period against critical
railway and telecommunications lines targeted by SHAEF planners. (19)

At the end of August, Montgomery's 21st Army Group rapid advance buoyed Allied confidence that Brussels and Antwerp would soon be liberated. The aged Queen of the Netherlands, Wilhelmina, was fearful that civil order would break down in her country and that Dutch Resistance operations would be uncoordinated and uncontrolled. The Queen wanted SHAEF to designate Prince Bernhard, her 33 year old son-in-law, as the Commander of the Dutch Resistance under the command of General Eisenhower in much the same manner as General Koenig was appointed Commander of the EMFFI in France. (20) The Prince, who was extremely popular with Dutch resistance forces, visited SHAEF at the end of August, and expressed the Crown's concerns. SHAEF staffed this matter with SFHQ, which approved as long as Prince Bernhard remained the titular head of the resistance and actual control remained with SHAEF under SFHQ control. Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman was concerned about the timing of the announcement of Prince Bernhard's appointment, and cautioned SHAEF to delay this action until the Allies reached the Dutch borders. (21)

On 31 August SHAEF issued an order approving the nomination of Prince Bernhard as Commander of the
Netherlands Forces of the Interior. This document stipulated that the Prince and his small staff would continue to operate through SFHQ and that no change in the organization and staff of SFHQ would be necessary. (22) Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman visited the Prince on 2 September to discuss the organization and scope of operations conceptualized in the order. His Royal Highness agreed with the document, but was anxious that all factions of the Dutch Resistance, which would be unified under the his Forces of the Interior (BINNENLANDSE STRIJDKRACHTEN) command, be designated regular soldiers as soon as possible. The Brigadier advised him to wait to broadcast such instructions until the Allies reached Holland, and incorporate the Forces of the Interior into the Army at that time. (23)

On 3 September, Queen Wilhelmina broadcast from London that liberation was at hand and that Prince Bernhard had been named Commander-in-Chief of the Netherlands Forces and would assume leadership of all underground resistance groups. His Royal Highness then went on the air and requested that the underground have armbands displaying the word "Orange." He warned the resistance to refrain from "premature and independent actions, for these would compromise yourselves and the military operations
underway." (24) Prince Bernhard's instructions unified the RVV, KP, and OD into an organization known as The Triangle, and, from this date forward, he appointed all subunit leaders. (25)

The Prince's announcement and SHAEF's directives did not immediately change the modus operandi of the Dutch Resistance forces. In fact, they may have caused problems. Lieutenant Colonel Theodor A. Boeree, a member of the Dutch Resistance at Arnhem writes:

In this team [the interior forces] there would be no place for all the chiefs of the three branches and they all wished to stand in the first file when our Queen would return.... Moreover, the men of the second and third branch considered themselves as the real resistance men. They pretended that the first branch [the OD] never practiced any resistance at all. They had only "prepared" they had seen [sic], which way the cat would jump, the 3rd branch [the RVV] had been obliged to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for the first branch and they were not inclined to put themselves under the command of those salon-partisans as soon as the war was over. So in the days preceding the battle of Arnhem the 3 branches were bickering and squabbling instead of amalgamating and pulling together. (26)

SFHQ was not cognizant of this discord in the Dutch Resistance. On 10 September, SFHQ reported to SHAEF that resistance forces were far more organized than they had initially estimated, and planned on beginning operations in Northern Holland. In this same message, SFHQ stated that the RVV was prepared to initiate a general railway strike in Holland on receipt of orders from London to coincide
with the launching of Operation Comet, the precursor to Market Garden that was subsequently cancelled. (See pages 40-43.) (27)

The Operational Situation Prior to Market Garden

A series of political and military considerations coincided to produce the ill-fated Market Garden operation. Prior to the Normandy invasion, General Eisenhower had been under close scrutiny by his superiors in Washington over his use of both British and American airborne divisions. (28)

Germany's success with airborne operations in the Low Countries in 1940, at Corinth, during the Greek campaign, and in the 1941 invasion of Crete impressed upon Allied leaders the strategic potential of airborne troops. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, General George C. Marshall, the U.S. Chief of Staff, and General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Corps, became convinced that vertical envelopments of ground forces could break tactical deadlocks. After the near-disaster at Sicily in 1943, however, Eisenhower flatly told Marshall he 'did not believe in the airborne division.' (29) Nevertheless, since February 1944, Generals Marshall and Arnold had reiterated to the Supreme Commander the
importance they attached to the strategic employment of Allied airborne units. (30)

Eisenhower had under his command three American airborne divisions, two British airborne divisions, an independent Polish parachute brigade, two British troop carrier groups, and an American troop carrier command. Organized on 8 August 1944 as the First Allied Airborne Army (FAAA), these formations comprised one-sixth of SHAEF's total fighting strength and its only strategic reserve. Britain had long since exhausted its reserves of manpower, and its two airborne divisions were all she had available to commit to battle. (31) Geoffrey Powell in *The Devil’s Birthday* observed:

First Allied Airborne Army had been borne of political and military expediency rather than of real operational need—the need for a formation of sufficient status to ensure that airborne operations were given their full weight. (32)

When discussing the FAAA activation in mid-July with its designated commander, Lieutenant General Lewis H. Brereton, Eisenhower demanded a bold plan which would 'have as its purpose a maximum contribution to the destruction of the German armies in western Europe.' An audacious use of airborne forces appealed to Brereton, and met with Marshall and Arnold’s strategic expectations. (33) Moreover, General Arnold wanted the FAAA used because missions of
troop carrier planes were not "comparing at all favorably with combat plan missions (other than supply and training)...." (34)

Creation of the FAAA bureaucracy instituted airborne planning on a strategic scale. Both General Brereton and his deputy, General Frederick A.M. "Boy" Browning, Commander of the British Airborne Corps, desired to see paratroopers execute operations as a separate fighting formation. By mid-August for example, the British Airborne Corps had researched and planned almost every remotely practical airborne operation in northern Europe within the range of its DC-3 aircraft. (35) Incredibly, FAAA had devised 18 disparate plans for the employment of its forces by early September, and all were cancelled. The unpredictable weather of northwest Europe coupled with the rapid advance of the Montgomery's 21st Army Group in the North and Bradley's 12th Army Group in the south precluded execution of these plans. Five plans had reached the stage of detailed planning, and three had been almost launched. The first major plan was a British Airborne Corps drop in front of Patton's Third Army to disrupt German operations in the Paris-Orleans gap. Subsequent objectives included the city of Boulogne; the city of Tournai (to block Germans retreating from the Channel coast); the vicinity of Liege
(to assist the U.S. First Army across the Meuse River); the Aachen-Maastricht Gap (to assist Allied forces through the West Wall); and Operations Linnet I and II (to place airborne forces in Belgium to assist the advance of the 21st Army Group). (36)

The cancellation of these plans throughout the late summer of 1944 had in effect made airborne operations an extracurricular adjunct to the operational plans of the army groups. (37) By early September, the newly formed First Allied Airborne Army staff was overworked in its quest to find a worthwhile use for their divisions. Planners were desperate: their airborne forces, withdrawn and refitted in the U.K., were impatiently watching the war in Europe pass them by, and the 21st Army Group was nearing Holland, the absolute limit on the range of transport aircraft stationed in Britain. (38)

At this same time, the classic debate over a narrow or broad front strategy ensued between Eisenhower and Montgomery. In late August 1944 Cherbourg remained the only large usable port capable of supporting both army groups. The Allies were still hauling most of their supplies over the invasion beaches, and shortages influenced Allied strategy. Montgomery believed that a single thrust towards Berlin through the Ruhr, the
industrial heartland of Germany, would end the war, and demanded that his 21st Army Group be the SHAEF main effort, receiving logistical priority. In a meeting at 21st Army Group Headquarters on 23 August, Eisenhower conceded that Montgomery should have priority for supplies, and placed Brereton's First Allied Airborne Army in support of the 21st Army Group. (39) This latter decision proved easy for Eisenhower: General Bradley had no enthusiasm for airborne operations and desired to use transport aircraft to supply Patton's advancing Third Army. (40)

From late August to 11 September, General Miles C. Dempsey's Second British Army advanced about 280 miles from the Seine River to the Escaut Canal. Its lines of communication ran along the road networks from the beaches near Caen. No intermediate ports and very few railway lines were available to sustain operations. Second Army had only sufficient supplies, ammunition, and vehicles to support its XXX Corps advance. As a result of these logistics constraints, Dempsey placed his 8th and 12th Corps in supplementary roles. Although the German army continued fighting hard along the Albert and Escaut canals in Belgium, Montgomery's intelligence officers reported the Germans were incapable to resist another determined advance, and, once their front line defenses had been
penetrated, would be unable to concentrate forces in sufficient strength to stop a breakthrough. (41)

Following the liberation of Brussels and the subsequent cancellation of Operation Linnet II on 4 September, Second Army's offensive slowed against mounting German opposition. The Canadian First Army continued to sustain heavy losses attempting to clear the port approaches to Antwerp. In an encrypted message to SHAEF that day, a frustrated Montgomery reiterated his ideas for a narrow front to Eisenhower, who thought the matter had already been settled. Eisenhower's reply that the broad front strategy would remain in effect took 36 hours to reach Montgomery, and set up the famous meeting at the Brussels airport on 10 September between the two men. (42)

Prior to this meeting, the FAAA had extensively modified Operation Linnet II, which became Operation Comet. In this plan, the British 1st Airborne Division and the independent Polish Parachute Brigade would drop on the critical bridges over the Maas at Grave, the Waal at Nijmegen, and the Neder Rijn at Arnhem to speed the advance of the British XXX Corps from Brussels and Antwerp. 21st Army Group scheduled Comet to go on 8 September, and subsequently cancelled it for 48 hours due to bad weather and the stiffening Wehrmacht opposition. (43) Following V-
Montgomery's staff amended the plan to include the U.S. 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions. Montgomery, greatly apprehensive about Bradley's influence on Eisenhower, remained very secretive about this new operation, and did not inform Brereton, the FAAA Commander. (44)

Eisenhower and Montgomery's conference two days later at Brussels was acrimonious. Eisenhower would not compromise his broad front strategy but delayed his decision to open the approaches to Antwerp in lieu of Montgomery's impressive proposal. Montgomery's plan combined the largest airborne assault in history with an armored charge to seize the Rhine and to position the 21st Army Group for its capture of the Ruhr. Eisenhower welcomed this bold use of Airborne forces, which was precisely the type of operation Arnold and Marshall had advocated. He instructed Montgomery to execute the plan immediately, but emphasized that he considered Market Garden "merely an extension of the northern advance to the Rhine and the Ruhr" to establish a bridgehead. (45)

Montgomery informed Eisenhower the following day that his proposal could not be executed until 23 September due to a shortage of supplies. In response, Eisenhower
promised the Field Marshal he would receive logistics priority, and on 12 September Montgomery changed the date of the operation to Sunday, 17 September. (46) Codenamed Market Garden, this plan was an expanded version of Comet and Montgomery's hope to bring an early end to the war in Europe. The airborne operation ("Market") called for a "carpet" of three and a half airborne divisions to seize crossings over the three major rivers specified in Comet and a number of lesser waterways which intersected XXX Corps' axis of advance. Montgomery required the FAAA to hold five major bridges along a narrow 64 mile corridor from the Dutch border to the lower Rhine for 48 hours until relieved by advancing XXX Corps armor of the Second British Army. This armored advance was codenamed "Garden". (47) The plan was risky, and demanded tremendous speed by XXX Corps armor units moving over a single highway from their starting point at the Escaut Canal near Neerpelt through Eindhoven (13 miles), Uden (32 miles), Grave (43 miles), Nijmegen (53 miles) to their intermediate objective, the bridge at Arnhem (64 miles). Montgomery's planners designated the Zuider Zee as XXX Corps' final objective, a distance of 99 miles from Neerpelt. (48)
**SFHQ Involvement with Market Garden**

In early August, 1944, SFHQ learned that the newly formed FAAA was planning its first operation, a multi division paratroop drop, in the Orleans Gap to assist the advance of Patton's Third Army. SFHQ volunteered to infiltrate Jedburgh teams or Operational Groups into the region to secure the support of the local FFI, if Generals Bradley and Koenig approved. Following the cancellation of this operation in mid August, Major Black, an SOE liaison officer assigned to FAAA HQ, became convinced that closer liaison should exist between EMFFI and the Allied field armies. He received subsequent approval from Brigadier General Parks, Chief of Staff, FAAA, to assign an EMFFI liaison officer to the FAAA staff for future airborne operations. This action eased staff coordination between FAAA and SFHQ, and resulted in special operations support to future airborne plans. (49)

Operation Linnet, the cancelled airborne operation to interdict the German retreat through Belgium, was one of the first major plans for which SFHQ nominated Jedburgh teams to coordinate resistance groups in support of airborne units. The Linnet concept was unusual. In France, Jedburgh teams had dropped 40 miles behind German lines and had coordinated resistance activities through
SFHQ Headquarters in London. For the first time, SFHQ did not plan to infiltrate Jedburgh teams independently from the conventional forces they were to support. Instead, Jedburgh teams would have jumped with the headquarters of their assigned airborne units. In addition, a small SF Detachment, consisting of an SFHQ staff officer and two Belgian liaison personnel, would have accompanied the Task Force Headquarters to monitor traffic from London. (50)

For Operation Linnet, SFHQ assigned a Jedburgh team to the 101st Airborne, the 17th Infantry (U.S.), the British 1st Airborne, and the British 52d Lowland (L) Infantry Divisions. SFHQ assigned American Jedburgh team leaders and their teams to the American Divisions, and Belgian team leaders and their teams to the British Divisions, respectively (Every team had a Belgian officer or radio operator). (51) They would have first contacted resistance leaders inside the airhead, coordinating guides and labor, directing intelligence efforts, and, if feasible, designating guards and patrols. As the tactical situation developed, the Jedburgh teams would have linked up with resistance groups within a 20 kilometer radius of the airhead, collecting intelligence and directing resistance harassment of approaching enemy columns SFHQ allocated only one Jedburgh team to drop in the Ardennes
area to organize resistance efforts for diverting and harassing German forces away from the drop zones. SFHQ apparently believed that radio broadcasts from London and SAS missions operating in the vicinity could direct Belgian Resistance outside the proximity of the airhead. (52)

With the rapid advance of the Allies through Northern France and Belgium, SFHQ developed a contingency plan for the possible cancellation of Linnet. SFHQ planned to immediately recall the four Jedburgh teams from their airborne units, and, within 36 hours, to dispatch them to the continent. One team would have coordinated the activity of resistance forces in the area of Antwerp. Another would have linked up with the Commander-in-Chief of TROUPES SECRETES (the main body of Belgian organized resistance); and the remaining two would have reported to resistance force subordinate commanders in two separate areas in Belgium. SFHQ did not designate specific Jedburgh teams for Operation Linnet or its contingencies, but in all probability it can be assumed that only the Belgian teams would have participated. (53)

SFHQ cancelled Linnet II on 4 September, and by 7 September, had devised its plan to support Operation Comet. Initially, Comet called for the 1st British Airborne, the British 52d Lowland Division, and the 1st Polish Parachute
Brigade to seize and hold the bridges over the Maas at
Grave, the Rhine at Nijmegen, and the Neder Rijn at Arnhem.
SFHQ assigned three specific Jedburgh teams for Comet,
dubbing them "Liaison Missions." SFHQ assigned Jedburgh
team EDWARD to the Airborne Force Headquarters, and
attached Jedburgh teams CLAUDE to the British 1st Airborne
Division and CLARENCE to the 52d (L) Division,
respectively. Like Linnet, these teams would have
accompanied their respective divisions, and then, once on
the ground, would have pursued similar missions with the
Dutch Resistance. Unlike Linnet, no SF Detachment would
have been at the Task Force Headquarters. Instead, SFHQ
assigned Jedburgh team EDWARD as the mission headquarters
under the command of the Airborne Task Force Headquarters
for all activities involving coordination of resistance
forces in the proximity of the airhead. The sub-missions
(CLAUDE and CLARENCE) attached to the divisions would have
referred all policy matters affecting Resistance Groups in
their area of operations to the Mission HQ at corps for
coordination. SFHQ specified in their operations annex to
Comet that the Jedburgh teams would been attached to the
operations branch of their respective headquarters, and
should have made contact with other staff sections as
necessary. Moreover, SFHQ stipulated that these teams be
called the Dutch Liaison Missions, and that particulars on special operations and Resistance activities be closely guarded. (54)

Montgomery's staff revised Operation Comet on 8 September, and SFHQ amended its annex accordingly. This expanded plan added the American 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions, and removed the British 52d (L) Division. SFHQ assigned EDWARD as the mission headquarters, CLAUDE to the British 1st Airborne Division, and reattached CLARENCE to the 82d Airborne Division. SFHQ attached Team DANIEL, a predominantly British team, to the 101st Airborne Division. (55)

During the interval between Operation Comet's postponement on 8 September and its cancellation two days later, Montgomery's staff developed its concept for Market Garden. SFHQ had to only slightly modify its old annex to accommodate the new operational plan. Jedburgh teams constituting the Dutch Liaison Mission (DLM) remained attached to the same organizations as for Comet. Like Comet, the sub-missions attached to the airborne divisions would refer all matters of policy affecting resistance groups to team EDWARD (Mission HQ) for coordination. SFHQ stipulated that the DLM HQ and the sub-missions would have
direct radio communications with SFHQ's home station in London.

Jedburgh missions for Market Garden were similar to those in Comet. As outlined in the 18th Airborne Corps Operation Order for Market Garden, Jedburgh teams would initially establish contact with resistance groups inside the airhead and, as the tactical situation developed, with groups in the outlying areas. The teams also would advise divisional commanders on employing the resistance; maintain liaison between airborne forces and SFHQ London; and assist in identifying members of recognized resistance movements when they had been overrun or had entered friendly lines. (56) Airborne Corps Headquarters would centrally control civilian labor forces identified by the Jedburgh teams. The 1st British Airborne Division's operation order for Market Garden stated that its Jedburgh team (CLAUDE) would be responsible for furthering military operations with resistance groups and their resources, and advising Division counter intelligence as to their reliability. In addition, CLAUDE would relay the division commander's instructions to any formations of resistance employed in ground operations, and report or obtain information from underground sources as required. (57)
SFHQ exercised official operational control of the Dutch Resistance through Prince Bernhard, whose headquarters would operate from XXX Corps. SFHQ directed that its liaison detachment at FAAA HQ maintain close contact with the Prince and update him on resistance matters. Bernhard, whom SHAEF had now designated as Commander-in-Chief of Dutch Resistance, had direct W/T contact with SFHQ in London, and indirect contact (through SFHQ) with the Jedburgh teams composing the Dutch Liaison Mission at the airheads. The DLMs were thus Bernhard's liaison with resistance forces for all of Holland and the airborne division commander's representative for resistance operations in support of forces on the ground. (58)

Although SFHQ had had no radio contact with resistance forces in the "Market" area throughout its planning in September, SFHQ intended to alert resistance forces within a 20 kilometer radius of the airhead using its rear link or the RVV network. (59) The rest of the country's resistance would remain underground until receiving further instructions. Due to the lack of air drops in August, SFHQ thought it unlikely that resistance groups would be armed. (60) SFHQ planned to drop limited supplies and packages of orange-colored armbands to selected RVV units prior to the actual operation. Deployed

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Jedburgh teams would issue "vetted" resistance groups inside the airhead armbands if they were not available. In addition, SFHQ authorized the London-based Dutch Government-in-Exile to call for a general strike of Holland's railways on D-Day, 17 September. (61)

On 15 September, Colonel Rowlandson, the SF Detachment Commander at 21st Army Group, met with Prince Bernhard in Brussels to discuss the Market Garden operation and the role of Dutch Resistance. The Prince did not consider SHAEF's earlier phased plan as practical, but was mollified with SFHQ's proposal not to call out the entire resistance but instead to direct groups in the Market Garden vicinity through the Jedburgh teams. The Prince notified Rowlandson that his broadcast following D-Day would strongly emphasize that resistance forces not within the scope of Allied operations remain underground. He concurred with SFHQ that the resistance should operate clandestinely against enemy withdrawals and should only indulge in overt guerilla warfare as called for by the Allies in the immediate area of operations. (62)

The Dutch resistance missions to support Market Garden both within and outside the airhead were exactly the same as for Linnet and Comet. Resistance leaders in the local area were to "remain quiet" and to place themselves
under the direction of the local Allied military commander upon contact with the Jedburgh teams. Resistance leaders within a 20 kilometer area of the operation would enter friendly lines and contact the unit’s Jedburgh team. Outside a radius of 20 kilometer from the airhead, resistance groups would interfere with enemy units and assist the advance of the main Allied armor forces, preventing destruction of supplies and equipment. Due to their lack of arms, SFHQ and the DLM expected the Dutch Resistance forces to provide guides and intelligence while conducting only limited military operations against German columns. (63)
CHAPTER THREE

ENDNOTES


3. Ibid., p. 85.


6. Ibid., p. 191.

7. Ibid., p. 192.


13. Ibid., pp. 1668-1670.


17. Ibid., p. 1671.


19. Ibid.


Prince Bernhard was born in 1911. His wife, Princess Juliana, was the daughter of Queen Wilhelmina. The Prince represented the Queen’s wishes with the Allies throughout the war. He had very little military background, having attended a course at the War College before the war. He usually relied upon his aides, members of the Royal Netherlands Army, to counsel him on military affairs. The Prince and his staff became exasperated with Montgomery’s 21st Army Group staff, who did not include them in Market Garden planning and did not heed the intelligence reports they passed along from the Dutch resistance. When the Allies executed Market Garden, the Prince and his staff were amazed at the tactical blunders inherent in the plan; Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974), pp. 20, 62, and 508.


28. Powell, p. 11.

29. Ibid., p. 12.

31. Belgium, pp. 7-9; Powell, pp. 11, 24.


33. Belgium, p. 15.

34. Ibid., p. 9.


36. Belgium, p. 8; and Urquhart.


39. Ryan, p. 68.


41. National Archives, Washington, D.C. Record Group # 331 SHAAB G3 Division Airborne Section File Number 24571, "Operation Market." First Allied Airborne Army After Action Report, "Report on Operations "Market" and 'Garden'." (Undated) (Cited hereafter as FAAA Report), paragraph 6,

42. Powell, pp. 23-24; and Ryan, pp. 77-78.

43. Powell, pp. 24-25.

44. Ryan, pp. 83-84.

45. Ibid., pp. 88-89.

46. Powell, p. 27.

47. Ibid., p. 25.

48. FAAA Report, paragraphs 5, 7-10.
49. OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel I, Volume I, PLANNING, January-September 1944, p. 86.


51. SFHQ Preliminary Instructions, Operation Linnet, p. ii.

52. Ibid., pp. i-ii.


54. National Archives, Washington, D.C. Record Group # 331 SHAEF G3 Division Airborne Section File Number 24571, "Operation Market." SFHQ Instruction No 1 to Operation Comet, MUS/1501/1914, 7 September 1944.

55. National Archives, Washington, D.C. Record Group # 331 SHAEF G3 Division Airborne Section File Number 24571, "Operation Market." Amendment No 1 to SFHQ Instruction No 1 to Operation Comet, MUS/1501/1914, 10 September 1944.


57. National Archives, Washington, D.C. Record Group # 331 SHAEF G3 Division Airborne Section File Number 24571, "Operation Market." British 1st Airborne Division Notes on Resistance, Civil Affairs, and Counter Intelligence (CI) Instructions (undtd) (cited hereafter as British Notes on Resistance).

58. 18th Airborne Corps OPORD, p. i. 59. Ibid., p. ii.
60. Ibid., p. 1.

61. National Archives, Washington, D.C. Record Group # 331 SHAEF G3 Division OPNS "C," File Number 370. SHAEF W/T Messages and Field Reports Volume IV, 1 September–30 September 1944, Message to FAAA, 15 September 1944. p. 571. These bands bore the word 'ORANJE' in black letters to identify resistance forces for the Task Forces.


63. 18th Airborne Corps OPORD, pp. ii; and British Notes on Resistance.
CHAPTER FOUR

TEAM DUDLEY

"The organized resistance movement was in fact a collection of often extremely thin webs of contacts, which were partly interwoven...."

Author Coen nilbrink in De Illegale

The Dutch Liaison Mission is Alerted

On Saturday, 2 September 1944, SFHQ alerted the four Dutch Liaison Mission teams (EDWARD, DUDLEY, CLARENCE, and CLAUDE) in concert with planning for Operation Comet. The four Dutch members of these teams proceeded to London on 3 September and received a preliminary briefing from the Dutch Country Section on future operations. While in London, they received bogus identification papers and civilian clothes for their teams' kits. SFHQ had initially directed that the other team members remain at Milton Hall and begin preparations for clandestine drops, but then ordered them to report to London on 5 September. SFHQ designated Team DUDLEY, consisting of Major Henk Brinkgreve (Dutch Regular Army), Major John "Pappy" Olmsted (U.S. Army), and Sergeant John "Bunny" Austin (British Army) to infiltrate that same evening. (1) Prince Bernhard visited
with all four teams, assuring them they would be deployed and wishing them well. The Prince made it a point to discuss DUDLEY's mission with the team, and highlighted specific facets that concerned him. SFHQ informed the three other teams about their imminent participation on Operation Comet and then returned them to Hilton Hall. (2)

**Team DUDLEY Deploys**

The Dutch country Section briefed DUDLEY throughout 5 September, and the team finalized preparations for its clandestine drop to the Almelo-Overijssel area that night. The briefing was thorough, but little was known about the situation in eastern Holland where the team would be employed. (3) SFHQ had determined that only the Dutch officers would take civilian clothes and that all personnel would drop in uniform, bearing no false documentation. (4) SFHQ had arranged for an RVV reception committee to prepare the DZ and to meet the team, but if DUDLEY had no visual contact from the air, they would drop blind. (5) The team's mission was: to organize and equip the partisans of Overijssel, acting as liaison for SFHQ; to select and train operators for reception committees and air landing operations; to carry on active sabotage in the area; to establish an intelligence network in the area; and to
prepare plans for defenses of essential bridges for Allied movements. (6) DUDLEY would also attach themselves to the airborne forces, providing an additional link with headquarters. Their immediate actions, once on the ground, were to immediately contact the RVV at a designated safe house, and then to assist in recruiting men for intelligence collection, augmentation and creation of resistance groups, and prevention of enemy scorching. (Scorching, or the destruction of property and equipment to deny use to the enemy was commonly practiced by retreating German forces.) If possible, the team would obtain a reliable contact from the RVV between Nijmegen and Arnhem, notifying SFHQ immediately. (7) At 1500, the Dutch Country Section completed its briefing and released the team for their supper and transport to the Tempsford airport. (8) SFHQ postponed the mission to the following day due to high winds, and the team returned to Milton Hall. SFHQ again postponed the mission on 8 September until Friday, the 8th. On 8 September, the team took off at 2300 hours from Tempsford Airport in an RAF Stirling. The aircraft flew north of Holland at an altitude of 10,000 feet, and then dove, passing over the island of Terschelling at 200 feet (RAF intelligence indicated the German ack-ack could not depress under 200 feet.). Luftwaffe fighters shot down
a sister plane which carried a Dutch agent and his radio operator. DUDLEY's pilot could not find the drop zone and refused to look for the alternate field, returning to England. (9)

SFHQ realerted DUDLEY on Monday, 11 September, and the team proceeded to Tempsford by truck, flew to Kettering in a Lockheed Hudson, and then took off at 2200 hours in an RAF Stirling. The aircraft encountered only light flak near the Dutch coast at Ijmuiden, and flew directly to the drop zone near Overijssel. Major Brinkgreve had convinced the pilot to drop the team and then its containers, which was opposite to normal Jedburgh procedures. When the pilot identified the DZ markers, DUDLEY dropped at 0045 hours, 12 September, approximately 10 miles from the Dutch-German border. As Major Brinkgreve had predicted, the inexperienced reception committee turned off the lights as the Jeds exited the Stirling, and, after landing, he contacted its leader to relight for the drop of the team's twelve equipment containers. (10)

Reception and Initial Contacts with RVV

The reception proceeded smoothly. The Dutch partisans loaded all equipment on carts, and ushered the team to its first safe house, known as "Die Kolonie."

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There, the team met Evert, local head of the RVV and self-styled commandant of Overijssel, and several other influential partisans in the area. (11)

On Tuesday, 12 September, Major Brinkgreve began detailed discussions with Evert on partisan operations, and slowly realized that the RVV knew little of the German situation, and had few, if any, contacts in the larger cities. Evert had approximately 500 men under his control, organized in 18 groups of varying strengths. They had no arms or equipment. Moreover, Evert had no second in command or viable staff organization. As a result, the RVV in Veluwe slowly distributed the arms shipment, although it did notify the KP to fabricate false documentation and obtain civilian clothes for the team. The team reported its safe arrival to SFHQ in London the following day.

On Thursday 14 September, two KP leaders, Johannes and Cor, visited DUDLEY without Evert's approval to discuss their operations. It quickly became apparent to the team that the majority of underground operations in the area for which Evert and the RVV had taken credit had actually been performed by the KP. The team agreed to the KP request to join their headquarters.

DUDLEY evacuated Evert's area within two days. On 15 September, the team dispatched Sergeant Austin to a new
safe house in Daarle. The German ORPO service employed directional finding equipment to locate clandestine transmitters, and DUDLEY's officers established the practice of separating themselves from Sergeant Austin to preclude a complete mission compromise. That same day, Evert's safe house became compromised when another resistance group hid several stolen Wehrmacht trucks in the woods nearby. The following night Majors Brinkgreve and Olmsted and ten partisans carted DUDLEY'S equipment 15 kilometers due north without incident to an isolated farm.

Majors Brinkgreve and Olmsted evaded enemy patrols on Sunday morning, 17 September, and learned of Operation Market Garden that afternoon from a SFHQ wireless transmission. SFHQ informed DUDLEY to keep the roads cleared of civilians, arrange guides for leading Allied columns, and seize and hold vital bridges in their area of operations. Expected time of arrival for Allied ground forces was ten to twelve days. The team spent the remainder of the afternoon contacting as many resistance leaders as possible, prevailing upon them not to commence overt operations. Some eager resistance leaders, who had been hunted since 1940, could not be restrained, and German reprisals were swift and brutal.
On 18 September DUDLEY’s officers hid in the woods from patrols rumored to be in the area. That evening they discussed what their roles should be in assisting the Allied columns, and concluded that progress would be extremely slow. The heavy concentration of Germans around Arnhem and the risks involved in dropping airborne forces at such a distance away from armored forces would, the officers thought, preclude a rapid advance. (12)

**DUDLEY Joins the KP at Zenderen**

The following day, large numbers of German units passed through the Overijssel area to reinforce the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions at Arnhem. DUDLEY held a council of war with Johannes and Cor of the KP and Evert and several of his RVV personnel. Evert’s RVV HQ in Veluwe had ordered DUDLEY to move west of the Ijssel River, but the team decided to terminate its association with Evert when he couldn’t support the operation. Instead, DUDLEY decided to join the KP HQ “Villa Lidouenna” in Zenderen. Johannes and Cor, dressed in Gestapo uniforms, motorcycled back to their headquarters and returned that evening with a 1941 Lincoln, replete with driver and gunner. The team evacuated its safe house at 2100 hours, but its drive was slowed by numerous German convoys. At Enter, the SS
ordered the car to halt, but the driver crashed through the road block. Johannes and Cor covered his escape with bursts from their Stens, killing or wounding five SS troops. Thereafter, their journey was uneventful, and the KP HQ was a revelation to the DUDLEY officers: guards were posted; electric warning systems were operable; a variety of vehicles protected in a motorpark were in constant use by a highly efficient courier service; and an organized intelligence system was fully functional.

DUDLEY dispatched a KP operative named Dolf to Arnhem on Wednesday afternoon, 20 September to contact the British 1st Airborne Division on the current situation in the Overijssel area and to provide information on partisan capabilities to assist the operation. Dolf failed to return to Overijssel immediately, but eventually reported that he had reached Arnhem and conversed via an underground-controlled telephone line in Nijmegen with Captain Staal, EDWARD's team leader who was in charge of the entire DLM. Despite excellent radio communications, DUDLEY received no confirmation from London that the remainder of the Jedburgh DLM mission had in fact deployed or their subsequent activities and dispositions.

Major Brinkgreve spent Wednesday, 21 September in conference with area partisan leaders, including the OD
leader from Twente. During these councils, active OD groups agreed to place themselves under KP control during the fighting. (13) Major Olmsted and Sergeant Austin were glued to the radio requesting new drop fields and answering questions about the situation at Arnhem. (14) The team notified SFHQ that the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions were one kilometer south of Ruurlo, and reported that partisans had blocked the roads the night of 20 September from Enschede to Hengelo, from Hengelo to Hooksbergen, and from Hengelo to Odenzaal by felling trees. The team also reported that partisans were cutting rail lines each night. (15)

On Thursday and Friday, Major Brinkgreve continued to meet with the KP and other resistance groups. (16) The team reported to London that it scheduled a conference for 24 September with representatives of the OD, KP, and RVV, whose leaders had agreed to form an operational HQ for the province. (17)

On Friday afternoon, 22 September, Johannes, the KP leader of the area, traveled to Almelo to visit a lad wounded on a sabotage mission several nights before. The SS in Almelo detained Johannes for questioning and shot him in the leg as he attempted to escape on motorcycle. The SS brought him to a German hospital, where the German SD
subsequently tortured him. (18) His headquarters in Zenderen, including team DUDLEY, evacuated the villa within 20 minutes of his capture. That evening, the KP aborted an attempt to liberate Johannes, who was now under heavy guard at an SD HQ building. All was quiet the following day, and the team and nine members of the KP attempted to return and remove compromising material from the KP HQ building. The SD was waiting for them, and killed three KPs as they approached its entrance. (19)

The team quickly withdrew from German patrols to the nearby farm where they had spent the previous night. This safe house served as the ammunition storage area for the KP, and after 40 claustrophobic minutes of hiding amidst C2, incendiaries, and ammunition, the team bicycled to a deserted barn. Cor, who had assumed command of the KP in Zenderen, and two of his men joined the team on Sunday at the barn. That evening, they bicycled 10 kilometers to another safe house east of Almelo-Hengelo and north of Oldenzaal, near Saasveld. (20)

DUDLEY Unifies KP and OD in Overijssel

The news out of Arnhem was not encouraging, and DUDLEY realized that the Allies would not reach Overijssel immediately. The team decided to assign new duties to each
man during the period 24 September-1 October. Major Erinkgreve met and organized underground forces. In conjunction with Cor's KP organization, he reestablished contacts with all important towns in Overijssel, and rescheduled Sunday 1 October to meet with leaders of the RVV, KP, and OD for unification of resistance operations in the area. Initially, Major Olmsted and Sergeant Austin both handled the increasingly heavy radio traffic. The team soon trained several partisans to encode and decode messages, freeing Major Olmsted to process and analyze intelligence data. The Dutch underground lacked intelligence collection skills, and Major Olmsted prepared a simple, efficient guide for resistance groups in collating information. The resistance in turn provided DUDLEY with a windfall of intelligence material.

DUDLEY determined that approximately 3500 men could be trusted to immediately carry out missions with possibly 12-15,000 more available upon the arrival of Allied forces. Many small partisan groups were already performing small scale direct action missions, such as nightly attacks on lines of communication. (21) From 10 September through 1 October, the underground cut 30 railway lines and five canals. (22) By 1 October however, increased SD presence in the area and critical shortages in supplies and arms
forced DUDLEY to postpone intelligence collection and sabotage. (23)

On Sunday, 1 October, Majors Brinkgreve and Olmsted met with representatives of the three main resistance groups in Overijssel. Evert, the team's initial contact with the RVV, was too busy to join them. The team met Edouard for the first time. Edouard, whose real name was Colonel Houtz, was a retired officer in the Royal Dutch Army who had served in the Dutch East Indies and was now an member of the OD in Zwolle. He commanded no armed groups, but did maintain radio contact with SFHQ in London. During DUDLEY's stay at the Villa Lidouenna the week before, KP partisan leaders from various towns in the province had met and agreed to subordinate their efforts under his leadership. DUDLEY's officers, Colonel Houtz, and the now unified resistance forces decided to establish the Overijssel Headquarters in the vicinity of Raalte, a move 20-30 kilometers to the west. Liaison officers from the KP and the RVV would later join DUDLEY and their partisan assistants in Raalte. (24)

On Monday, 2 October, the team met more local resistance leaders and prepared to evacuate. The team realized it was risking compromise; too many partisans knew of their location, and there was a constant stream of
pedestrians and cyclists to their secluded farm, which doubled as their courier address and safe house. (25) On 4 October, DUDLEY informed SFHQ that the Germans had conducted reprisals against the town of Almelo for its complicity with Johannes' KP organization. The SS had moved 1500 of its population to Germany, randomly shot suspected partisans and sympathizers, and demolished many buildings. (26) Moreover, the area around their farm, which included Almelo, Hengelo, and Enschede, had become a training grounds for German airborne and SS troops. DUDLEY decided to move 20-30 kilometers north on 5 October to be closer to their drop areas near the German border and to avoid detection by the Germans, who were training around the clock. (27)

In the morning hours prior to their move on 5 October, DUDLEY received maps and additional intelligence on the disposition of a large ammunition dump two kilometers northeast of Oldenzaal. The underground had counted 18 freight cars of ammunition parked under trees, awaiting movement to Arnhem. The team requested a bombing mission from SFHQ in London, but was never notified what action was taken. (28) The team left for its new safe house on bicycles approximately three hours before the 2000 hour curfew then in effect. After couriers informed that
their DZ had been attacked, the team holed up at a safe house midway to their destination for three days. The team returned to their original safe house to elude Wehrmacht patrols and reestablish partisan contacts. The team remained there for four or five days and had no contact with London, since transmitting from the location virtually ensured capture by the paratroopers training in the proximity. (29)

Operations and Intelligence Collection at Enter and Heaton

The team moved west to its new headquarters at a farm near Enter on 12 October. During their stay at the farm, Major Brinkgreve and his Dutch liaison officers reestablished all contacts, and the team met new resistance leaders as well. The different factions of the underground worked well together with the exception of Evert’s 500 men centered about Veluwe in eastern Holland. Evert and his RVV faction performed adequately, but their refusal to obey the orders of “Edouard” was a source of continuing frustration to the resistance groups and Major Brinkgreve. “Edouard,” now the commanding officer of Overijssel and Northeast Polder, came to this HQ several times to check progress and to plan future operations.
The team stayed at this headquarters until 23 October. Resistance units in the province reported 10-15 typewritten pages of intelligence per day, enabling the team to develop an intelligence collection index of 200 towns and communities. Through this network, the team received detailed plans of the German defenses at Zwolle, one of the more fortified positions at the northern end of the Siegfried line. As a result of DUDLEY's reports to SHFQ, SHAEB apportioned several Allied air force interdiction missions to Holland, including one on General Friederich Christiansen's Headquarters, the commander of German forces in the Netherlands. (30)

DUDLEY's prolonged stay at its safe house near Enter jeopardized its operational security, and on 17 October the team dispatched Sergeant Austin to a new safe house 30 kilometers to the west. SHFQ was concerned over DUDLEY's recent scrapes with the SD in Almelo, and on 18 October warned:

Under no circumstances let yourself be provoked into taking any armed action without express orders from us. If necessary try and restrain civil population in same sense. (31)

From intelligence compiled from its agent network in Holland, SHFQ also advised DUDLEY to warn its resistance groups that the Germans were attempting to penetrate the Dutch underground. (32) After German patrols swept through
their area, DUDLEY's officers and their partisan supporters evacuated on 23 October. For a brief moment, their infiltration was in jeopardy: Germans halted and searched their supporters, and Majors Brinkgreve and Olmsted, carrying extensive plans and intelligence documents, casually bicycled away without challenge. The team and its partisans (who were released by the SS) proceeded to their safe house near Heeton on separate routes. (33)

At Heeton, Major Brinkgreve established contacts with the KP in Twente, the KP and RVV in the Achterhoek area, independent groups in Deventer, and partisans in Veluwe. Major Brinkgreve and Colonel Houtz conferred daily with members of these groups to unite the underground in the area. The team now had extensive contacts with the underground and covert Dutch intelligence organizations such as Group Albrect and the Intelligence Centrum Oost. Major Olmsted received over 30 typed pages of intelligence daily on troop dispositions, storage depots, ammunition dumps, lines of communication, and detailed plans for numerous installations. He obtained details on the German defense of the Ijssel line, the fortifications of Deventer, and a 17 page typed deployment plan in the event of an Allied attack from western Holland. Sergeant Austin could not send all the intelligence data back to London within
his regularly allotted periods for transmission bursts. Major Olmsted, who kept a daily situation map for Colonel Houtz, unsuccessfully attempted to arrange an air exfiltration back to London to brief SFHQ on the voluminous intelligence pouring into the safe house. (34)

During the latter half of October, DUDLEY attempted to provide relief to the beleaguered Dutch populace following the withdraw of Allied forces involved in Market Garden. The team requested and received 50,000 guilders from London to remunerate Dutch railroad workers who had been on strike since 1 September. (35) SFHQ also approved a subsequent DUDLEY request for 200,000 guilders to seal gaps in the dike of the northeast Polder which had been mined by the Germans. (36)

During this period, the partisan struggle against the Germans and their Dutch collaborators was very fluid and disjointed. The divisiveness of Dutch resistance groups inherently produced decentralized operations and conflicting reports. SFHQ constantly requested status reports from DUDLEY on the demographics of their resistance forces and actions taken against the Germans. On 2 November, SFHQ dispatched the following message to DUDLEY as well as to all resistance groups and agents in Holland:

To all resistance groups in Holland. It is with grave misgivings that we have followed the exchange
of messages relating to the disunity which apparently exists between certain underground organizations. We the British have been doing our best to supply you with arms with the object of your helping us to kick the Germans out of your country when the right time comes. By their present attitude underground organizations are doing exactly what the Germans would like to do. They are wasting valuable time. Please get together and long live your Queen. From your British Allies. (37)

In an attempt to update SHAEF HQ and Prince Bernhard's HQ on the muddled resistance picture in Overijssel, SFHQ requested on 4 and 9 November to know the number of men DUDLEY had armed or under their control. SHAEF and the Prince were especially interested in DUDLEY's estimate of the number of armed partisans in the "main centers" of Holland or areas for which the DUDLEY had contacts. (38) DUDLEY replied to these requests on 14 November, stating in a message to SFHQ that there were 4,000 Stosstruppen (shock troops) in Overijssel of which 1500 were armed. There were three principle operational areas of responsibility. The KP and OD, unified under Colonel Houtz' HQ and advised by team DUDLEY, jointly controlled the line of Ijssel, the NE Polder, the area immediately east of the NE Polder (Kop), as well as the Twente area. Evert's RVV organization, which took orders from its Headquarters in Veluwe, controlled the Salland, an amorphous area compromising that part of Overijssel north

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and east along the Ootmarsum-Almelo-Zwolle axis. This did not include the Deventer and Achterhoek areas, which DUDLEY was organizing after the RVV leader in Achterhoek was removed by the second in command. (39)

**Major Olmsted Exfiltrates to the Rhine**

By 1 November it became apparent that only limited resistance activity could continue until the Allies resumed conventional operations in Holland. DUDLEY thought it imperative that one member of the team carry their accumulated intelligence files to SHAEF HQ and update Prince Bernhard’s HQ on the resistance situation in Overijssel. The team, however, could not arrange an air landing operation with SFHQ. (40)

At a conference in early November with Major Brinkgreve, partisans from Achterhoek and the Veluwe areas revealed a plan to exfiltrate 1st British Airborne Division evacuees from Arnhem, downed RAF and Army Air Corps fliers, and several members of the Dutch underground. Colonel Houtz fully endorsed the team’s proposal to include Major Olmsted in this operation, and Major Brinkgreve made preliminary arrangements with the resistance. (41)

On Sunday, 12 November 1944, the team was together for the last time. Sergeant Austin left that afternoon with
partisans to establish a different transmission site. On 14 November, Major Brinkgreve drove to Amsterdam to contact underground headquarters there and to resolve problems posed by uncooperative partisan organizations. The trip was unusual. The Germans permitted no Dutch cars on public roads, but Major Brinkgreve’s escort was a wine dealer from a town west of Zwolle who had supplied high German officials with their wines and liquors during the occupation. His fellow countrymen despised him as a collaborator, but the Germans had issued him papers enabling him to travel anywhere in the Netherlands. This man had previously transported many Allied airmen outside the country.

Upon returning Major Brinkgreve to Raalte on 16 November, the wine merchant drove Major Olmsted 100 kilometers to his contact in Ede. (42) Dressed in black, the men appeared to be SD or civilian German officials, and were not noticed by the large number of German forces on the roads. The men drove first to Zwolle, up the Ijssel to Kampen, then through Wezep, Epe, and Apeldoorn, arriving at Ede slightly before noon. Throughout his travels, Major Olmsted observed a tremendous buildup of men and material from Arnhem extending southeast along the Rhine. Large concentrations of German armor and self propelled artillery
moved regularly west in preparation for the eventual Ardennes offensive.

At Ede, Major Olmsted met Pieter Kruyff of Arnhem, the leader of the local underground who was organizing the escape party. He then bicycled six kilometers west where he linked up with Martin Dubois, a Dutch agent who had dropped at Arnhem with team DANIEL II (see Chapter Seven), returned to England, and then had dropped again to organize the exfiltration. DuBois and an SAS officer named Captain King had arranged drops of uniforms, arms and equipment for the escape party.

The following day, Major Olmsted bicycled and then walked to the party’s assembly area outside the village of Lunteren. There, he met Major Maguire, the intelligence officer of the 1st British Airborne Division and the designated commander of the 119 man party. Many of the men were extremely weak or ill, having escaped from POW or hospital camps. This motley band of grizzled Arnhem veterans, Dutchmen in the underground, and downed American and British airmen were very suspicious of Major Olmsted, whose full beard and well-worn wooden shoes gave him the appearance of an old Dutch farmer. Maguire extensively questioned both Major Olmsted and DuBois before he was convinced of the American’s bona fides. (43)
Major Maguire had planned the escape according to British Second Army directives. He divided the party into groups which would follow one another in single column. At 1700, the party left the area with the majority of the Stens assigned to 33 1st Airborne Division paratroopers located in the rear of the column. The column disintegrated after encountering a German sentry point near the Eden-Arnhem highway. Major Olmsted hid in the woods and, by crawling around in the dark, collected about 35 men. This group walked for about 20 minutes until detected by German sentries. German units set off illumination flares and pursued the men with automatic weapons. Major Olmsted had his intelligence briefcase shot away from him and laid up in the woods with a lance corporal of the 1st Airborne Division and an RAF Flight Sergeant. (44)

After evading a German patrol late on Sunday afternoon, 18 November, the men walked all night through the rain. At dawn the following day, they reached the Rhine. A patrol from the American 101st Airborne Division picked them up at dusk. The 101st sent Major Olmsted to a hospital at Nijmegen. He later flew from an airfield in Eindhoven to London to render a full report to SFHQ.
Out of 119 men who left Lunteren with Major Maguire, only seven had crossed the Rhine by 24 November 1944. (45)

Team Actions After Major Olmsted's Departure

DUDLEY had informed SFHQ on 17 November that Major Olmsted planned to exfiltrate, and requested notification when he arrived safely. (46) During their last weeks of activity, Major Brinkgreve and Sergeant Austin were in constant danger due to the mounting buildup of German forces for the Ardennes offensive. Relations between Dutch resistance groups were deteriorating as a result of German counterintelligence and razzia operations (razzias were the forced deportation of Dutch males to Germany for slave labor). DUDLEY spent the rest of the month attempting to maintain a unity of effort within the resistance and to guard against their own compromise. Unfortunately, they would fail.

The enemy situation continued to make DUDLEY's operations difficult. From information compiled from its resistance groups and Group Albrect, DUDLEY reported that a German airborne division was concentrated at the Enschede-Almelo area. On 14 November, the team informed SFHQ that 60,000 men were stationed or arriving at the
Achterhoek and Drente areas for the defense of the entire Ijssel province. The Germans were reportedly forming an additional 40 divisions from arms workers and making preparations to connect the Lolle-Coevorden-Ootmarsum-Hengelo line with the Siegfried line from Zwolle to Ijsselmeer via the Ijssel and Zwarte canals. (47)

During November, Evert, the RVV leader of Salland, and Major Brinkgreve clashed over the coordination of resistance activities in Deventer. From the onset of its operations in Overijssel, DUDLEY had been at odds with Evert, who had run his own operations under the guise of his headquarters and often in contravention to DUDLEY activities. Now, two competing groups based in Deventer brought this acrimony to a head. One group, headed by a man named Johann, had ties to SFHQ, and was concerned with the operations of the second, a communist faction with ties to Moscow. Major Brinkgreve attempted to resolve the differences between these groups and protested to SFHQ when Evert contacted the communists for an airborne drop in Ijssel. Evert also became incensed at what he saw was Brinkgreve’s deliberate attempt to coordinate resistance activities which would detract from Evert’s own operations. (48) On 20 November SFHQ told DUDLEY:

Re Evert. Consider he should operate in his own area which is Salland. We will instruct him
accordingly; but suggest you use tact. All major action will be confided to you but important all friction should be avoided otherwise conditions chaotic. (49)

Evert's bitterness increased when Prince Bernhard officially limited his authority to the Salland area. Evert assumed that Brinkgreve was behind this action, and threatened to resign on 24 November as the "Commander of the Brigade Zwente." He reconsidered for the unity of the resistance. Strife between factions which supported Evert and those which aligned themselves with Major Brinkgreve and Colonel Houtz continued until Evert was killed on 5 February. (50) The conflicting reports engendered by this divisive situation caused confusion at SFHQ in London. On 21 November, SFHQ asked DUDLEY who was in command of the KP and OD in Overijssel. (51)

DUDLEY's struggle to coordinate resistance operations in the latter half of November was further complicated when German reprisals against the Dutch populace increased in scale. After Market Garden's failure, these widespread reprisals were very effective in identifying members of the underground resistance groups and in isolating SOE agents and operatives such as DUDLEY. German reprisal actions included the feared razzias, the internment of the Dutch male population for forced labor. Administrating large groups of interned civilians enabled
the German authorities to question suspected members of the underground or those sympathetic to their efforts. The Abwehr and Gestapo quickly followed up any disclosures, capturing partisans, torturing them for information and, in some cases, turning them into double agents. (52) An unidentified SOE officer later reported that resistance movements in the area had lost much of their effective strength due to compromising information extracted from interrogations of interned locals taken in the razzias. (53) On 14 November, DUDLEY informed SFHQ that all active Dutchmen had gone underground to escape the razzias and German reprisals. (54) That same day, Sergeant Austin informed SFHQ that intense German activity precluded transmissions, and requested that London transmit blind. (55)

The Germans captured Sergeant Austin four days later on 18 November 1944. An SD patrol had been searching a nearby residence when the Dutch owners of Austin's safe house panicked and fled. The Germans observed their evacuation, and immediately began searching the safe house. They captured Sergeant Austin and imprisoned him in Zwolle. (Sergeant Austin was eventually executed on the Ijssel dyke near Holten on 4 April 1945.) (56) Major Brinkgreve's HQ, which was in a separate location, immediately evacuated
upon notification of Austin's capture. Brinkgreve and his men formed another HQ near Okkenbroek, and stayed at this location until mid January 1945. (57)

Major Brinkgreve and his men were in constant danger as razzias and penetration of the underground continued. On 21 November, SFHQ cautioned DUDLEY to be careful after the Germans had arrested two SOE agents and 13 district commanders in the Utrecht Province. The following day, SFHQ advised DUDLEY that Major Olmsted had arrived safely, but expressed concern about the team's security. An independent report from the area stated too many people knew about their activities. (58)

Subsequent reports to SFHQ raised concerns over possible penetration of DUDLEY's operations in the province. On 24 November, SFHQ notified DUDLEY to execute the following security measures:

Firstly, all heads of resistance groups should break off contact with each other and reduce contact with their subordinates to a minimum until the situation improves. Secondly, limit all activity to reduce wireless traffic to a minimum. We consider these measures vital in order not to lose you valuable support in the future. (59)

Intelligence reports to SFHQ indicated that the Gestapo had infiltrated the resistance network in the Overijssel Province and was pursuing SOE agents. The following day, SFHQ transmitted the following message to
DUDLEY:

Latest information makes it essential you break off contact with resistance but remain in W/T contact with us. Keep us informed of local situation. We are watching closely our end and will advise you when time has come to resume contact. Realize this will be difficult for you but consider interests of resistance that you and your communications should not be caught up in Gestapo drive. Emphasize this is temporary measure to meet dangerous situation. Contact will be resumed at soonest date consistent with safety. (80)

The situation for all agents working in Holland had badly deteriorated, and the following day SFHQ transmitted this message to its operatives:

All SFHQ agents in Holland have been instructed, in view of the present extensive razzias, temporarily to sever relations with Resistance to keep W/T traffic to a minimum, and to have the minimum of contact with each other. This is a temporary measure only. (61)

On 28 November, SFHQ logged its radio last message from DUDLEY. (82) In a report originating from the Overijssel province an unidentified SOE agent (perhaps rinkgreve) reported that the "whole situation in German occupied Holland becomes more impossible every day, and especially near the river Ijssel." (63) German SD and Gestapo units relentlessly pursued the remaining members of the Dutch underground in Overijssel. On 11 February, the SD shot and killed Evert at one of his own safe houses. Herman Doppen assumed command from Evert and cooperation with Brinkgreve's factions improved. Still, all resistance
units continued to work independently because German directional finding equipment had seriously degraded their ability to communicate with one another. (84)

On 5 January 1945, SOE dispatched a Dutch radio operator named Sjoerd Sjoerdsma to replace Sergeant Austin. Major Brinkgreve met up with Sjoerdsma when he moved his HQ to a safe house near Enschede. Over the ensuing weeks, Sjoerdsma moved frequently to escape German ORPO units. Despite warnings that the area was compromised, Major Brinkgreve transferred his HQ to Losser to be closer to Sjoerdsma. On 5 March 1945, Germans foraged Brinkgreve's safe house for milk and eggs, discovered him there, and killed him. (85)

Summary of Activities

During the period 11 September-24 November 1944 DUDLEY lived continuously in civilian clothes and moved its headquarters 15 times. By the time Major Olmsted exfiltrated back to London, the team had organized 1,200 armed men, had arms in store for 3,800 more, and, with an Allied advance, could have had mobilized 12,000 to 15,000 more. Although its missions were unlike those it had trained for at Hilton Hall, the team achieved great success, and, had the Allies been able to advance from
Arnheim as planned, DUDLEY and its underground network could have given significant support. (66)

DUDLEY’s initial success was tempered by infighting among competing resistance groups in Holland. German reprisals and razzias slowly degraded the operations of the underground, and invariably threatened DUDLEY’s own survival. When DUDLEY first infiltrated, all of the Dutch resistance groups fully embraced them as Allied harbingers for the liberation of Holland. After DUDLEY aligned itself with the KP and attempted to better organize the resistance groups in Twente, resentment and infighting almost immediately surfaced. (67) Resistance groups perceived the KP as having the true power and authority in the province because of its association with DUDLEY. (68) Evert, who considered himself the Commander of the Brigade Twente and the Commandant of Overijssel, competed against DUDLEY for SFHQ supplies and control of the resistance. The contrasting perceptions of this infighting was manifested in the reports back to higher headquarters. DUDLEY reported: “Major Brinkgreve was very busy and the only force that kept the underground in this area more or less united.” (69) Evert, in a telegram to one of his resistance groups, reported that resistance commanders of the Dutch provinces were inexperienced and incompetent,
causing infighting between competing groups. He specifically cited Overijssel, where

\{(DUDLEY) without knowledge wants to interfere with everything. I supply weapons for the whole province and therefore have the overview of all resistance groups in Overijssel. (70)\}

This situation lasted until Evert's death in February, 1945.

The effective German prosecution of razzias and reprisals against the Dutch underground only made things worse. DUDLEY's area of operation was inundated with SD and Gestapo personnel who constantly pursued British and American agents. The team's survival depended upon their operational security. Mistakes were made, such as having couriers report directly to their safe house. Nevertheless, DUDLEY normally kept its radio operator in a separate location, and moved 15 times in two months to preclude compromise. Their ability to survive for so long in such an environment without detection was remarkable.

By the end of November 1944, the situation had deteriorated to the point where SFHQ forbade any contact between its agents and the resistance.

Certainly DUDLEY was not aware of the divisive resistance situation in Holland. The Dutch country section did not have adequate information to brief the team on the extent of the divisions or the key leadership in all the
faotions. Major Brinkgreve's background may have caused some of the problems. He was from western Holland, and some of the resistance groups viewed him as an outsider. His Jedburgh training taught him how to quickly organize resistance groups to prosecute unconventional warfare campaigns, but it is possible that Major Brinkgreve's zeal overshadowed the realities of the resistance situation in eastern Holland. Organizations were already in place, and when Brinkgreve attempted to restructure these groups for his own purposes, he may have alienated some factions of the underground. (71)
CHAPTER FOUR

ENDNOTES


Henk Brinkgreve had been a fire direction officer for the Royal Netherlands 20th Artillery Regiment and an intelligence officer for the Royal Netherlands Brigade Irene. He escaped to England in 1940. In the summer of 1942, he became a member of a Dutch commando unit that was part of a larger Allied organization known as No 10 Commando. He met Sergeant John "Bunny" Austin in this unit, and both volunteered for Jedburgh training in 1943. Coen Hilbrink, De Illegalen. (Oldenzaal, Holland: 1989), p. 198.

Major John "Pappy" Olmsted was born in 1914. He was a member of the 35th Division and then volunteered for parachute training at Fort Benning, Georgia. He completed this training in October, 1942, and was assigned to the 507th Parachute Infantry Regiment at Fort Bragg. He participated on the Louisiana Maneuvers, and after completing the Infantry Officers advanced course in August, 1943, was reassigned as the operations officer for the newly formed 541st Parachute Infantry Regiment at Fort Bragg. He volunteered for Jedburgh duty in October, 1943. After his exfiltration from Holland, he prepared for a special operations mission into Norway, which was later cancelled. He then returned to Holland from May to October 1945 in an advisory capacity with the Royal Dutch Army. After the war, he became a Department of the Army civilian, working with diverse units such as the 10th Special Forces Groups and Seal Team 2. Now retired, he resides in Bellevue, Washington. Letter from Major John Olmsted (ret.) of 18 April 1990 to the author


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4. Olmsted, p. 39. This decision, based on experiences of French Jedburgh Teams, would not be feasible in eastern Holland. After infiltration, the rest of DUDLEY's mission was delayed while the KP procured civilian clothes and papers for the Team.

German occupation identity cards in the Netherlands were called Persoonsbewys or PBs. Letter from Major John Olmsted (ret.) of 10 January 1980 to the author.


Evert was nom de guerre for the RVV leader in Overijssel. The individual's actual name was A.F. Lancker. Hilbrink, p. 382.


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Due to the situation created by Market Garden, resistance groups all over Holland requested arms from SFHQ, and DUDLEY’s province was no exception. On 1 October, for example, the team requested an urgent weapons drop in the North East Polder area for 800 men. SFHQ Periodic G3 Report for 2 October 1944 (#30), document # 838.

In a note delivered to DUDLEY, Evert stated his commanding officer in Veluwe forbid him to accept any orders other than from the RVV or to make any commitments without approval by the RVV in Veluwe. Colonel Houtz also used GUIZINGA as a nom de guerre. Telephone conversation between Major John Olmsted (ret.) and the author of 17 April 1990.


26. SFHQ Periodic G3 Report for 6 October 1944 (#33); document # 851.

27. Olmsted, pp. 87-88.


30. Olmsted, pp. 75-76, 79; Team DUDLEY Report, p. 5.


32. Ibid.

33. Olmsted, pp. 81-85; Team DUDLEY Report, p. 5.

34. Olmsted, pp. 85-86; Team DUDLEY Report, p. 5.

35. Olmsted, p. 70; Team DUDLEY Report, p. 5. Confusion exists on the actual amount of Dutch guilders DUDLEY requested and received from SFHQ to remunerate striking Dutch railroad workers. Major Olmsted in his narrative states the Team requested 150,000 guilders, although he does not say how much they actually received. In the team DUDLEY Report which he also authored, Major Olmsted states the team received 50,000 guilders.

36. SFHQ Periodic G3 Report for 20 November 1944 (#74); document # 903; OSS DUDLEY Report, p. 3. DUDLEY later reported on 20 November that the KP robbed 46 million guilder from a bank in Almelo. Major Brinkgreve hid the money until the situation quieted down. OSS DUDLEY Report, p. 3.

37. OSS DUDLEY Report pp. 3-4.

38. Ibid. pp. 4-5.

39. Ibid. pp. 5-6; SFHQ Periodic G3 Report for 15 November 1944 (#70); document # 897.

40. OSS DUDLEY Report, p. 2, 4; As early as the 23 October, SFHQ expressed great interest in the defense plans, and suggested that DUDLEY attempt a line crossing at Tois Siage. DUDLEY thought this extremely risky, and on 25 October requested a pick up operation at Innepoldpr for the first week of November to send Major Olmsted and his
intelligence files and a wounded paratrooper back to London. On the 28th, DUDLEY reiterated its desire to report first-hand on the situation in Overijssel. The Team suggested SFHQ dispatch a Dakota or Hudson for an air landing operation, citing Major Olmsted's previous training in such operations as a safeguard to the mission's success. To convey their sense of urgency, DUDLEY reported to SI IQ it would personally reconnoiter the pick up zone (PZ) and send the field's description and location as soon as possible. Moreover, they promised to exfiltrate the one wounded airborne officer and as many air personnel hiding in the area as the aircraft could carry. SFHQ responded the same day, stating it would await the recce report but feared the operation would take a long time to be coordinated and approved.

41. Olmsted, p. 86; Team DUDLEY Report, p. 5.
42. Olmsted, pp. 89-91; Team DUDLEY Report, p. 6.
43. Olmsted, pp. 91-102; Team DUDLEY Report, p. 6.
44. Olmsted, pp. 102-113; Team DUDLEY Report, p. 6.
46. OSS DUDLEY Report, pp. 5-6. The team report includes Major Olmsted's exfiltration narrative, but does not detail Major Brinkgreve's or Sergeant Austin's actions subsequent to his departure.
47. OSS DUDLEY Report, pp. 5-6.
48. Ibid., p. 5, 6; Hilbrink, p. 248.
49. Ibid., p. 6.
As early as 13 November, an SOE agent in Rotterdam reported to SFHQ that razzias in Rotterdam were deporting 10,000 people by rail and Rhine barges. By 17 November, the Germans had interned 50,000 men in Rotterdam. In an attempt to hinder their deportation, SFHQ directed DUDLEY to request resistance forces to sabotage railways in the Zwolle-Deventer-Zutphen corridor. There is no record to determine if the resistance conducted the attack or its effects. Similar razzias or threats of razzias occurred in Amsterdam and at the Hague, where on 23 November an SOE agent reported that the Germans had rounded up 10,000 people for forced labor outside Holland. The results of these razzias were severe. For example, the Germans captured one third of the RVV and OD in their razzias on Rotterdam. The RVV in Rotterdam became compromised, resulting in the arrests of its members and the capture of its arms stores. On 14 November, DUDLEY reported that the Germans had interned 20,000 Dutch to construct and improve German defenses in the Twente area. This effort especially affected large resistance groups whose logistical and manpower needs were much greater than the smaller organizations. SFHQ Periodic G3 Reports for 13-23 November 1944, #68, 72, 73, 75, 77 and 78, document # 894, 800, 901, 904, 908, and 909, respectively.

SFHQ Periodic G3 Report for 28 November 1944 (#81); document # 813. The officer may have been Major Brinkgreve, but probably was an SAS officer assigned to work in the Veluwe area.

SFHQ Periodic G3 Report for 15 November 1944 (#70); document # 897.

OSS DUDLEY Report, pp. 5-6.

Hilbrink, p. 296.

Ibid.

OSS DUDLEY Report, p. 7.

Ibid., p. 7.
80. Ibid., p. 5, 7. In evaluating SFHQ G3 Periodic Reports
for the period January through March 1945, there was a
noticeable decrease in resistance operations and agent
traffic after the razzias.

81. SFHQ Periodic G3 Report for 26 November 1944 (#80);
document # 912. The razzias continued through December.
Their psychological and material effects on the underground
were immense. The Germans drained the Dutch of their
manpower, equipment, and morale, and during the winter
months almost starved portions of the populace due to
severe food shortages.

82. OSS DUDLEY Report, p. 7.

83. SFHQ Periodic G3 Report for 7 December 1944 (#90);
document # 925. Reports from the Overijsssel area greatly
diminished after this last message, and this author can
only speculate on the origin of subsequent messages from
unidentified agents in and around the Overijsssel province.

84. Hilbrink, p. 249.

85. Hilbrink, p. 296.


88. Ibid. p. 292.

89. Team DUDLEY Report, p. 5.

70. Hilbrink, p. 248.

71. Major Ton van Osch, Royal Netherlands Army in his
translation notes to the author on Hilbrink's De Illegalen.
CHAPTER FIVE

TEAM EDWARD

"The Dutch liaison party provided by SFHQ for Airborne Corps HQ did excellent work...."

First Allied Airborne After Action Report on Operation Market Garden

Assigned Missions

Following Linnet II’s cancellation on 7 September, the 21st Army Group and the First Allied Airborne Army developed plans for Operation Comet. Comet was a natural successor to Linnet, and SFHQ modified its previous support to now include its Dutch Jedburgh teams (designated the Dutch Liaison Mission or DLM) for this Allied airborne assault into Holland. After planners revised Comet on 8 September, the DLM consisted of the Headquarters Mission team, EDWARD, and its sub-missions: team CLAUDE, attached to the British 1st Airborne Division, team CLARENCE, attached to the U.S. 82d Airborne Division, and team DANIEL II, newly assigned and attached to the U.S. 101st Airborne Division. This configuration remained unchanged throughout Operation Market Garden. SFHQ attached EDWARD to the airborne corps HQ to act as liaison with the local
population and to provide an additional communications for the airborne corps with England. In its principle mission as liaison between corps and SFHQ, EDWARD would coordinate the work of its sub-missions with their assigned divisions and act as an additional communications link for these sub-missions to SFHQ. The teams would refer all matters of policy affecting resistance groups in their area to EDWARD for coordination.

Upon landing, team EDWARD would come under the command of the airborne corps headquarters, advising its commander on the use of resistance groups in support of corps operations. The team would establish contact with the local population and the Dutch underground movement, providing guidance to resistance leaders and identifying and vetting recognized resistance organizations when encountered. EDWARD and its sub-missions were to establish direct W/T communications with SFHQ's home station as soon as possible after arrival in the field. Due to its complication mission, EDWARD would use two operators conducting a 24 hour radio watch at all times. (1)

**Actions Prior to Market Garden**

Team EDWARD was composed of Captain J. Staal (Royal Netherlands Army), who was in charge of the HQ Mission.
Captain McCord Sollenberger (U.S. Army), and Technical Sergeant James. R. Billingsley (U.S. Army). With the exception of team CLARENCE, the entire Dutch Liaison Mission (DLM) reported to airborne corps headquarters, Moor Park, on Thursday, 14 September 1944 to coordinate procedures. Following a briefing by the corps intelligence officer on the scope of the operation and the expected role of the DLM, Captain Staal then briefed the conference on Jedburgh operating procedures. (2)

Stationed at Moor Park in the days preceding D-day, team EDWARD collated and developed valuable intelligence for corps Hq on the Market Garden area of operations. The team procured various terrain studies and, with the assistance of the SFHQ Dutch Country Section, and the current enemy order of battle. In addition to preparing for the mission and collecting intelligence during this hectic time, EDWARD conferred with the corps chief of staff, the G2, and civil affairs officers to refine the missions of the DLM teams. These revised mission tasks included assisting the operation through employment of local resistance forces, and providing intelligence to the command from local resistance groups both inside and outside the airhead. After teams assisted in vetting members of the resistance, they would recommend or select
individuals to be used as guides, guards, patrols, or other military contingencies such as the building of landing strips. (3)

On Friday, 15 September, team EDWARD and its attached personnel assembled at Harwell Transit Camp in readiness for the operation. Due to its extensive communications and liaison missions, SFHQ had assigned team EDWARD Captain R. Mills (British Army), who would serve as an additional liaison officer, and Second Lieutenant L. Willmott (British Army) who would serve as an additional W/T operator.

The team gathered for the corps HQ Market Garden operations briefing on 16 September. Captain Sto... reviewed for the staff the activities of the DLM and the planned use of resistance forces. The team later packed its assigned glider with its kit, including a jeep and trailer loaned from the SAS. The corps HQ assigned four members of EDWARD to this glider, while Captain Staal would travel in the glider of the G2 I. (4)

**Deployment and Initial Actions**

The team took off from Harwell Transit Camp with the rest of advance corps HQ at H Hour, 1120 hours 17
September 1944. Its glider encountered no fighter or flak opposition on its journey, and landed perfectly at its landing zone (LZ) near Groesbeek at 1410 hours. Upon landing, the team unpacked its glider, drove along an assigned route to the advance corps HQ assembly area, and then proceeded with other HQ staff personnel to the operations center area located near Mooksche Raan. Enemy opposition in and around Groesbeek was slight, and the corps staff took some prisoners. At 2000 hours, the team reported to SFHQ that it had arrived safely, but had not yet contacted any resistance forces. In the late evening, they established contact with the local Groesbeek underground, an organized force of approximately 300 men. Some of these men were already assisting the ground forces. Because the military situation was uncertain, the team did not immediately employ this force, although it noted the cooperative attitude of the local populace in a report to SFHQ the following day. (5)

The following morning on 18 September, EDWARD accompanied the corps HQ to a new operations center location in the woods near Groesbeek. It visited the nearby village of Malden and contacted the local resistance, arranging a meeting with the OD leadership of Malden, Heumen, Overaasselt and Mook. EDWARD discovered at
this meeting that the groups were operationally ineffective because of internal strife and political in-fighting, and later resolved these problems at a mass meeting at Malden town hall. 200 members of the local resistance attended, and EDWARD organized these men for operations with the 82d Airborne Division, which was fighting nearby. (6) In addition, the team released 50 of its orange arm bands to resistance leaders at Malden for wear by members, who began acting as guides and scouts for the local commander. The team reported to SFHQ that the resistance detention of local collaborators was well organized. (7)

Although the D+1 resistance situation was satisfactory, the operational situation was another story. Advance corps HQ communications were poor. The corps could talk to the 82d Airborne Division and at times to the Rear CP in London, but transmissions to XXX Corps and the British 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem were ineffective. (8) EDWARD's message to SFHQ reflected the growing concern at Corps HQ:

Most urgent. Corps needs information concerning military situation Arnhem. Watermark (SFHQ) ask CLAUDE for latest details and send us all information already available. (9)

EDWARD investigated a reported underground telephone link to Arnhem but found nothing. They did establish telephone communications with the telephone switch center in the town
of Nijmegen, which was still occupied by the Germans. CLARENCE, which had lost its wireless set on the initial drop, sent valuable information over this line to corps HQ on the local military situation and the defenses of the railway and highway bridges across the Waal River. CLARENCE also reported to EDWARD that Lieutenant Verhaeghe had been wounded and was out of action and that Captain Bestebreurtje had also been wounded but was still active. As a result, EDWARD appointed Captain Sollenberger to act as a direct liaison between CLARENCE and the Corps HQ. (10)

**Actions from 19 September through 23 September**

The advance corps HQ moved early on D+2 to De Kluis (south of Nijmegen) to be on the main axis of advance. Their communications were now good with the nearby 82d Airborne Division, XXX Corps and Second Army. Transmission exchanges with airborne base in England, however, remained unreliable and slow. (11) EDWARD, using resistance operated telephone lines, was the first element in the Corps to make contact with the British 1st Airborne Division in Arnhem, which was engaged in heavy fighting with the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions. EDWARD passed messages and instructions from the airborne corps commander
to the 1st Division Commander through this channel, and reported all intelligence from Arnhem to the corps staff.

In conjunction with team CLARENCE, EDWARD held a meeting of resistance leaders from the district of Nijmegen and organized resistance actions to support the 82d Airborne Division's unsuccessful assault on the bridge across the Waal. EDWARD had furnished 100 men from the local Dutch populace to the corp HQ for construction of a landing strip for light aircraft at De Kluis, which was completed early that morning. The team requested that SFHQ dispatch an arms shipment for the local gendarmerie, but air supply operations were not authorized. (12)

Bad weather persisted on D+3, preventing corps logistical reinforcement and resupply from First Allied Airborne Army in England. XXX Corps linked up with the 82d Airborne Division at Nijmegen, and the advance corps HQ moved at 1500 hours to the southern outskirts of Nijmegen. (13) Upon link up, EDWARD arranged a meeting through its underground channels with the XXX corps engineer and the chief engineer for water works and ferries for the town of Nijmegen. In subsequent conferences with this engineer and other local figures, XXX Corps obtained detailed intelligence on bridges and river crossing areas in and around Nijmegen. In a separate conference with civil
affairs officers, EDWARD planned future actions for local vetted civilians and resistance forces in both corps and CLARENCE's areas of operations.

In conjunction with the advance corps HQ move to Nijmegen, EDWARD established a signal office at the St Anna Hospital in Nijmegen and employed two women of the local resistance for code and cipher work. Signal traffic was extremely heavy for EDWARD's radio operators, and EDWARD requested SFHQ reduce its traffic to mission essential messages. (14) The team informed SFHQ that advance corps Headquarters was delighted with the excellent work of the nine resistance groups in the Market area. Resistance groups were well organized in the Nijmegen, Arnhem, and Malden areas and the Allies used them extensively as guides and prisoner guards. According to EDWARD they provided "first class tactical information not otherwise available." (15)

SFHQ dispatched three important messages to EDWARD on 20 September. The first, a directive from Prince Bernhard's HQ to all Dutch agents in the field, stated that the Prince entrusted his leadership to the OD-RVV-KP Triangle. In places where this leadership was insufficient, the triangle would nominate local leadership. The second message concerned team DUDLEY, which had radioed London
that it had dispatched a partisan messenger that day to contact the Allied HQ in Arnhem. SFHQ requested EDWARD relay this message to CLAUDE, which had not established communications. (18) In a separate message relayed from DUDLEY, SFHQ provided valuable intelligence to EDWARD and its sub-missions on German activity in the Overijssel area. The Germans had ordered all men 17 to 45 to report for construction of defensive barriers along the Ijssel River near Olst and Wyne. The Germans were rapidly augmenting their forces east of Ijssel and fortifying the Waal line, because heavy concentrations of airborne units were nearby. In addition, DUDLEY reported that German Command HQ for Holland, designated HQ Christiansen for its commander, Luftwaffe General Friedrich Christiansen, arrived in Denikamp. (17)

EDWARD continued to maintain its communications link with the British 1st Airborne Division in Arnhem. Corps wireless communications with the "Red Devils" remained erratic and unreliable. According to the Corps after action report for D+3,

The Dutch liaison party provided by SFHQ for Airborne Corps HQ did excellent work in establishing telephone communication with the Dutch Resistance and getting their reports on the situation at Arnhem. (18)

Nevertheless, EDWARD could not contact team CLAUDE or
DANIEL II on its Jed sets. EDWARD informed London about CLARENCE's situation, and SFHQ radioed back that an air resupply mission for the 82d Airborne Division contained a new wireless for that team. (18)

On D+4, main British Airborne Corps HQ joined the advance HQ at Nijmegen. During the morning hours, EDWARD finally contacted DANIEL II at Eindhoven. The team had lost their crystals, and had had minimal contact with the resistance. DANIEL II's participation in various engagements with the 101st Airborne Division precluded accomplishment of their primary mission, and up to this point, they had only managed to collect local intelligence for the division's intelligence officer. That afternoon, Major Wilson of DANIEL reported to Nijmegen to personally update EDWARD on his team's progress and to review the current situation of the 101st Airborne Division, which remained under incessant German attacks and raids. EDWARD'S officers redirected DANIEL's activities to compliment resistance operations in the Nijmegen area until the team could be exfiltrated. Subsequent to this meeting, EDWARD arranged with the G2, 101st Airborne Division to withdraw DANIEL from operations as soon as 12th and 8th Corps had advanced beyond the 101st Airborne Division flanks. (20)
EDWARD's resistance telephone links with the British 1st Airborne Division remained a vital intelligence source and communications link for the corps HQ. Over this line, they obtained eye witness reports on the drop of the Polish Parachute Brigade and the subsequent German response. The team still could not contact CLAUDE, however.

Work with the Dutch Resistance was very effective. In a message to SFHQ, EDWARD reported their effective detention of German collaborators and called the liberated population "magnificent." EDWARD continued to effectively coordinate civilian affairs and resistance activities with CLARENCE, who established a vital intelligence and communications center with links to resistance organizations throughout Holland. This operation was so effective that XXX Corps and the Second Army immediately commandeered the makeshift station as part of their own C3I infrastructure. (21)

The weather on D+5, 22 September, was again bad for the fourth straight day. Air supplies to the corps decreased and German opposition stiffened. EDWARD still had no contact with CLAUDE, and attempted to infiltrate from Nijmegen into Arnhem to determine the situation there. Mounting German opposition augmented by tanks made movement
to the north difficult, and prevented EDWARD from reaching the city or contacting the Oudenhoff RVV located nearby.

EDWARD coordinated with both XXX Corps and Second Army on 22 September, discussing the resistance situation with Captain Strutt of the Army's SF Detachment Number 1 and later with the XXX Corps Civil Affairs Office. The XXX Corps, which now controlled Nijmegen, was concerned about the uncertain status and future role of resistance forces in the area now that German forces had withdrawn. The XXX Corps civil affairs officer expressed these concerns to EDWARD, which subsequently arranged to have CLARENCE organize an armed resistance force of approximately 300 men for "mopping up operations" of isolated enemy pockets. In addition, the corps agreed that resistance forces would continue to perform military tasks until hostilities ceased. Upon release by their assigned military liaison or commander, the resistance would then fall under control of the local Burgomastors for civil use. XXX Corps modified these plans on D+6. After consulting with EDWARD, the corps decided that resistance groups operating its area would not carry arms. (22)

As a result of their conferences on D+5 and D+6 with XXX Corps, EDWARD felt its mission was complete. Captains Mills and Staal had discussed their situation D+5
with the corps chief of staff, who concurred that the team be reassigned upon arrival of XXX Corps tactical units in the area. The resistance was fully organized and did not require stores. In a message to SFHQ on 23 September, Captain Mills, the British liaison officer attached to EDWARD for this mission, requested permission to return the following week. Captain Staal and the rest of the EDWARD Jedburghs preferred to remain in Holland, operating with resistance forces in the northern part of the country. In another message to London later the same day, EDWARD considered its mission would be completed once it contacted CLAUDE in Arnhem that evening. Captain Staal requested an immediate reply to his proposal to operate in north Holland. He termed the situation "urgent" and reported:

...possibilities Overijssel-Drente (area) seem promising but recall London and redropping must be done very quickly. Team keen to go and confident of success after experience of Dutch resistance. (23)

Attempts to Find Team CLAUDE

Airborne Corps HQ remained in the same location throughout D+8, and assumed command of the Royal Netherlands Brigade for the defense of the Grave bridge. The corps HQ also assumed responsibility for the defense of the Nijmegen bridges and the bridge over the Maas-Waal canal. (24) In the evening hours, EDWARD advanced from
this HQ location, and proceeded with great difficulty to
the south bank of the Rhine near Driel, opposite the
forwardmost fighting positions of the 1st Airborne
Division. The entire area was under withering fire, and
EDWARD aborted its plan to cross the river and contact
CLAUDE, attached to the division’s 1st Brigade. EDWARD
could not contact Division HQ, which was also across the
Rhine, but reports indicated that Lieutenant Knottenbelt, a
Royal Netherlands Army officer assigned to CLAUDE the week
before D-day as an additional liaison officer, was slightly
wounded. These same reports postulated that the entire
team was killed in action in the fighting around Arnhem.
EDWARD reported to SFHQ the following day: “Have not much
hope for them but will find out at earliest possible
moment.” (25)

On Sunday, 24 September (D+7), EDWARD returned from
the Arnhem area and reported CLAUDE’s situation to SFHQ.
The team again contacted sub-mission DANIEL at Veghel.
Captain Mills reported that Major Wilson of the British
Army had performed well for the 101st Airborne Division,
continuing to collect intelligence from the local
population. DANIEL had contacted virtually no resistance
forces the past seven days. However, the team informed
EDWARD that Lieutenant Dubois, a Royal Netherlands Army
officer assigned to DANIEL the week prior to D-day for liaison duties, was unsatisfactory. Dubois was not a Jedburgh and evidently his actions did not meet the expectations of Major Wilson, DANIEL II's Team Leader. (28)

EDWARD continued its liaison duties with resistance forces while attempting to arrange its own exfiltration. They met with the leader of the St Oedenrode resistance, who reported that the airborne forces had fully employed his men. A KP member from Utrecht passed through enemy lines to report that his KP group had 60 members, arms and explosives, and was very active. EDWARD later sent one of its men (probably Captain Staal) to instruct this group to disrupt enemy rail transport. EDWARD obtained additional information on the Utrecht area from a rendezvous at Oudenhoff with an officer of the Dutch intelligence service in the Resse-Bemmel area. This officer maintained a network of 30 W/T sets and information offices around the country. Team EDWARD provided him a corps W/T set to contact HQ. EDWARD reported all information collated from these sources to both the airborne corps HQ and XXX Corps.

Three members of the 25 man Kesteren KP resistance group also infiltrated German lines to inform EDWARD on enemy dispositions in the Tiel area and along the Waal River. The airborne HQ thought this information extremely
valuable, and that evening had EDWARD dispatch them with false documentation to collect additional information. EDWARD passed information to the Utrecht KP via this group. With rail traffic now completely halted, EDWARD instructed both groups to only collect intelligence. (27)

On 28 September (D+9), the British 1st Airborne Division withdrew from Arnhem. EDWARD reported to SFHQ that team CLAUDE was still missing in Arnhem and that Lieutenant Knottenbelt was last seen the night of 25 September on the northern bank of the Rhine. Despite attempts to identify Knottenbelt among the evacuated paratroopers who were passing through Nijmegen, EDWARD could not find him or trace his whereabouts.

On D+8, the team contacted the Oss resistance forces and arranged a meeting in Oss with its Burgomaster, its OD leader and two separate KP leaders (one of whom was from Oss), and the district leader of the resistance in E. Brabant. At this meeting on D+9, the team resolved the friction between the local OD and KP, and coordinated their activities. EDWARD dispatched 40 men of the KP to the Maas-Waal line to attack enemy communications lines and to gather intelligence, and sent an agent to the Utrecht area to pass similar instructions to the 60 man KP organization located there. In a message to SFHQ, EDWARD reported that
all resistance forces outside Oss were armed, that the total Oss resistance forces numbered 100 men partly armed, and that the entire area required no additional weapons.

(28)

EDWARD notified SFHQ that it intended to proceed to Brussels as soon as it completed these ongoing missions. The team prepared to exfiltrate along with personnel from teams DANIEL II and CLARENCE. Although it had never made effective contact with the resistance, DANIEL II had fulfilled its mission and had been ready to evacuate for several days. CLARENCE was still contributing important intelligence data to the 82d Airborne Division and carrying on highly successful liaison activities with resistance forces. Its team leader, Captain Arie Bestebreurtje and its radio operator, Sergeant Willard Beynon elected to remain in Holland.

Exfiltration and Summary of Activities

On 27 September (D+10), EDWARD completed final preparations for its departure. Several days earlier they had instructed DANIEL II to report to the SF Detachment Number 3 of the 21st Army Group in Brussels, and had arranged for CLARENCE to continue supporting the 82d Airborne Division in and around Nijmegen until cessation of
operations in that area. Prior to leaving Nijmegen, EDWARD relinquished its B-2 set to CLARENCE (whose own set was destroyed on impact during the D-day drop) to maintain communications with SFHQ in London. EDWARD then reported to SF Detachment Number 1, Second Army Headquarters, and proceeded on to Brussels. They flew to England the following day, 28 September. (28)

EDWARD's mission was highly successful. Upon their attachment to the corps HQ in England, they immediately proved invaluable by producing terrain studies and enemy information from the Dutch Country Section that was not previously available to planners. During the actual operation, their liaison with the local populace and resistance forces produced willing labor for constructing airstrips, guarding prisoners, patrolling, and copious information on the enemy situation and Dutch collaborators. Resistance augmentation enabled soldiers to return to the desperate battles which characterized the Market Garden operation. The corps after action report noted: "Their liaison with the resistance was good throughout and most valuable." (30)

The team's mission with the resistance was not without problems. The Dutch were overjoyed to be liberated, and EDWARD found it difficult to distinguish
between friendly civilians and actual resistance forces who desired to assist the Allied forces. In the later stages of Market Garden, the team added an official stamp on the orange arm bands and identification cards to identify genuine resistance members. Nevertheless, they discovered that German penetration of some resistance groups continued even after a town's liberation, and counter intelligence agents detained approximately ten alleged enemy agents. EDWARD reported that the small resistance groups or parties in Holland were well organized in almost every town, but in some cases failed to cooperate with one another or to understand EDWARD's directives. The team had to organize competing resistance groups under one leader at many locations, and recommended to SFHQ that:

a definite policy be laid down as regards to arming Dutch resistance and the use of them, as in many cases contradictory opinions were encountered and in some cases misunderstandings occurred. (31)

Through their resistance contacts and continuous, efficient communications with SFHQ in London, they proved to be an invaluable source of information to the operations staff in Airborne Corps HQ, whose own communications was inadequately staffed, unreliable, and slow. Most importantly, team EDWARD provided initial intelligence on the ill-fated British 1st Airborne Division when no other sources were available. Throughout the operation, they
supplied the bulk of the reports on the situation in Arnhem. With its one B-2 set, EDWARD was the sole communications link between SFHQ and all three of its sub-missions, who had lost their Jedburgh sets upon landing. EDWARD established 24 hour communications with London immediately, transmitting a total of 28 messages and receiving 48 on its ten day mission. (32)
CHAPTER FIVE

ENDNOTES

1. OSS/London SO Branch micro. Reel III, Volume IV, JEDBURGHS, July–December 1944, Operations Team EDWARD (Hereafter referred to as Team EDWARD Report), pp. 1–2, and 7.; National Archives, Washington, D.C. Record Group # 331 SHAEF G3 Division Airborne Section File Number 24571, “Operation Market.” Appendix D to 18th Airborne Corps OPORD, HQ AirTrps/TS/2561/G, 13 September 1944. (Cited hereafter as 18th Airborne Corps OPORD.) SFHQ agents on the ground reporting special intelligence would request to see division and brigade intelligence officers using the password "Telephone," and EDWARD and its sub-missions were to ensure their assigned units immediately passed these operatives to division HQ. (EDWARD explained these procedures to its teams at a meeting with Airborne Corps Headquarters at Moor Park on 14 September.). 18th Airborne Corps OPORD.


Captain McCord Sollenberger survived the war and bought a farm in Maryland. Captain Staal, originally from South Africa, returned there after the war. Sergeant Billingsley settled in Ohio. All three men on EDWARD are now deceased; Daphne Friele, letter to the author dated 10 October 1989.

After their initial briefings in London, SFHQ issued the team 10,500 guilders, one B-2 set and one Jedburgh W/T set. At the briefing at Moor Park, Captain Staal explained that the sub-missions fell under the command of their assigned Division Commander; that they would act in an advisory capacity to the G2 or to the local unit commander in vetting and organizing resistance forces. They would transmit orders from the division G2 or local unit commander to the leaders of the resistance, supervising the execution of these orders. Team EDWARD Report, pp 8–7.

3. Ibid., p. 8. Prior to the corps operations briefing held on 16 September, the corps HQ communicated these
detailed mission tasks and Jedburgh policies to the corps subordinate commands and their attached sub-missions.

4. Ibid., pp. 8-9. Neither Captain Mills or Lieutenant Willmott was a Jedburgh.

5. Ibid., pp. 2-3, and 9.

6. Ibid., pp. 9-10.

7. Ibid., pp. 2-3, 10.


10. Ibid., pp. 10-11. The Dutch had developed a "secret" telephone network for their own use. At the time, Dutch telephone numbers were four digits. A telephone technician named Nicolaas Tjalling de Bode improvised a procedure to bypass local switchboards. By dialing certain numbers, the underground was able to call all over Holland; Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, p. 144.

11. FAAA Report, p. 10.

12. Team EDWARD Report, pp. 10-11. The Bomber Command in support of Market Garden operations refused to fly night operations over Holland during the non-moon period, and, although the 38th Group was prepared to fly at night, they were heavily committed elsewhere. The inclement weather also made all flying hazardous.


15. Ibid., p. 3.

16. Ibid., p. 3; Olmsted, pp. 49-54. Authors note: There is no mention in the team after action Reports of EDWARD or CLAUDE making contact with Dolf, DUDLEY's messenger.
DUDLEY's report states that Dolf spoke with Captain Staal on Arnhem's telephone line to Nijmegen and reported on the friendly and enemy situation in Overijssel.


19. Team EDWARD Report, p. 3.
20. Ibid., p. 4, 11.
21. Ibid., p. 4, 12.
22. FAAA Report, p. 14; Team EDWARD Report, pp. 12-13. The corps told EDWARD that this was standard policy for resistance forces that were never incorporated into the armed forces of a country. To some degree, the decision may have been influenced by the British distrust of Dutch Resistance forces arising from "NORD POL." Powell, The Devil’s Birthday, pp. 101-102.

23. Team EDWARD Report, pp. 4-5, 12-13. Author's note: This last message is unusual. According to DUDLEY's reports, EDWARD was aware of the situation in the Overijssel Province and DUDLEY's deployment there. However, the text indicates EDWARD did not know DUDLEY's whereabouts or operations in eastern Holland.

25. Team EDWARD Report, p. 5, 11. Two of the original members of CLAUDE had been killed, but Second Lieutenant H. Allen Todd, U.S. Army, survived the battle and the war. See Chapter Seven report on team CLAUDE.

26. Ibid., p. 5, 13. While on this mission, Technical Sergeant Billingsley had been wounded in the eye diving into a foxhole, and he received the Purple Heart.

27. Ibid., pp. 13-14.
28. Ibid., p. 6, 14.
29. Ibid., p. 6, 14.
31. Team EDWARD Report, p. 15.
32. Ibid., pp. 15-16.
CHAPTER SIX

TEAM DANIEL II

"Our situation reminded me of the early American West, where small garrisons had to contend with sudden Indian attacks at any point along great stretches of vital railroad."

General Maxwell Taylor, describing the situation of the 101st Airborne Division in the Son-Eindhoven area

Assigned Missions

When the 21st Army Group and the First Allied Airborne Army expanded Operation Comet on 8 September, SFHQ had three of its four Dutch Liaison teams available to provide support. SFHQ had previously assigned team DUDLEY the responsibility of coordinating resistance operations in the Overijssel province, and now required an additional Jedburgh team for the added American airborne divisions. SFHQ responded by assigning team DANIEL II, a predominantly British Jedburgh team, to the Dutch Liaison Mission, and attaching it to the U.S. 101st Airborne Division for liaison between the Division's HQ and the local populace. The original Jedburghs assigned to DANIEL included Major R.K. Wilson and Sergeant G.W. Mason of the British Army. SFHQ subsequently attached Lieutenant Martin DuBois of the
Royal Netherlands Army to the team as liaison officer and interpreter for General Maxwell Taylor, the Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division. SFHQ attached another Dutch soldier, Sergeant Fokker, to augment the team's communications and liaison duties. The Dutch Country Section initially briefed these men, providing them a list of rendezvous points and contacts for Dutch resistance organizations in the area. (1)

The team's essential mission was to advise General Taylor on resistance capabilities, support division operations, and coordinate the actions of local resistance groups. SFHQ issued DANIEL II 5000 guilders and one Jedburgh Set, which provided the team with its own communications link to London. The team then reported to the 101st Airborne Division Headquarters at Greenham Lodge, Newbury on Tuesday, 12 September, and proceeded to Moor Park two days later to attend the airborne corps HQ operational briefings with the rest of the DLM. They returned to Greenham Lodge and attended the 101st Airborne Division's operations briefing on 15 September. Afterward, the men prepared their equipment for their mission to Holland. (2)
Deployment and Initial Actions

The 101st Airborne Division manifested the team and its equipment on three different aircraft (assigned to the division HQ) for the flight to Holland. Lieutenant DuBois accompanied General Taylor in Plane 2, Major Wilson flew in Plane 6, and Sergeants Wilson and Fokker were in Plane 9, which also contained the team's radio equipment loaded in one pannier and one leg-bag. All aircraft were in the first wave, and left Welford Airfield, located about 10 miles northwest of Newbury, about 1050 hours, 17 September. The trip was uneventful until 1320 hours when heavy flak over Holland seriously damaged Planes 6 and 9. The aircraft caught fire but held their positions in the massive formation. Both sticks jumped to safety six minutes later.

All men in team DANIEL II dropped without injury near Son. No trace of the team's radio equipment, which was to be door dropped out of the Plane 9, was found. The team had loaded the remainder of its personal kit and a spare radio set on a glider in the division's second lift, but most gliders in this lift were destroyed. The team recovered only a few personal items.

Team DANIEL quickly evacuated the DZ, and successfully arrived two hours later at the division HQ.
collection point despite significant German shelling of the area. Lieutenant DuBois remained with General Taylor, and the rest of the team began operating out of the Division CP near Son. Major Wilson and the W/T operators had few initial resistance contacts, but obtained important information from local civilians. (2)

The 101st Airborne Division drop had achieved complete surprise. Ground opposition was light, and, by nightfall, division units had occupied Son, St Oedenrode and Veghel. (3) In the St Oedenrode area to the north of Son, the KP had met soldiers of the 502d Parachute Infantry Regiment on their DZ, led them to bridges over the Dommel River, and informed them on local enemy dispositions and organization. According the 101st Airborne Division staff, the KP was vital to the 502d Parachute Infantry Regiment's success in securing the bridges near St. Oedenrode. (4)

Actions During the Battles for Control of the Eindhoven-Nijmegen Corridor

For the next three days, the 101st Airborne Division fought hard to keep the corridor between Eindhoven and Nijmegen open. The German Fifteenth Army's fierce defense south in the division at Best threatened to cut off the Guards Armored Division spearhead, and drained General
Taylor's combat power. The Germans maintained pressure along the entire length of the 101st Airborne Division's 15 mile corridor, which the division soldiers tabbed "Hell's Highway." (5) For these three critical days, DANIEL II worked out of the division CP at Son. Their contacts with the resistance were limited due to periodic attacks on the CP, which they helped defend. On D+1 at 1000 hours, German troops infiltrated into the division DZ from the west, and were repulsed after intense fighting. The Germans mounted harassing attacks and raids in this vicinity for the next 48 hours.

During the night of 18 September, Royal Engineers of the Guards Armored Division, XXX Corps, constructed a Bailey Bridge to replace the bridge over the Wilhemina Canal near Son, which the Germans had blown the day before. The leading elements of the Guards Armored Division crossed this bridge at 0700 hours on 19 September, and by 1600 hours a large portion of the division had passed through Son on its way north towards the 82d Airborne Division in Nijmegen. (6)

Early Tuesday afternoon on 19 September, General Taylor ordered his entire 502d Parachute Regiment to capture Best. The attack was a success, forcing the Germans back toward the Wilhemina Canal, where they
conducted a disorganized withdrawal. This first major victory for Allied forces in Market Garden was tempered with yet another attempt to cut the main LOC leading to Nijmegen. (7) At 1700 hours four Mark V tanks and dismounted infantry, supported by considerable artillery fire, attacked the Armored Division's Bailey bridge from the east. General Taylor led his staff, including team DANIEL II, to reinforce the battle and defend the division CP. 101st Airborne Division paratroopers repulsed the attack on the bridge from the south side of the canal, but the town of Son and the division CP sustained numerous artillery hits. Several members of the division staff were wounded.

XXX Corps, the spearhead of the Guards Armored Division encountered pockets of German resistance along its avenue of advance, and could not link up with the 101st Airborne Division per Market Garden's operational schedule. With this delayed arrival of XXX Corps, Hell's Highway became a slim artery without protected flanks. DANIEL II members participated in the defense of Son and the bridge again in the morning hours of 21 September, when the enemy mounted yet another assault, this time from the east. (8) Once again, the 101st Airborne Division repulsed the attack. General Taylor later noted:
Our situation reminded me of the early American West, where small garrisons had to contend with sudden Indian attacks at any point along great stretches of vital railroad. (9)

On 21 September (D+4), EDWARD contacted DANIEL II at Son, and requested that Major Wilson report to Nijmegen for a situation update. CLAUDE's participation in the defense of the 101st Airborne Division Headquarters had precluded extensive liaison with resistance forces and, that afternoon, EDWARD redirected DANIEL's activities to better conform with resistance operations and the current situation to the north. Major Wilson's return to Son was difficult; the road was completely open from Nijmegen but German troops were in the vicinity of Uden, north of Veghel. Subsequent to this meeting, EDWARD arranged with the G2, 101st Airborne Division to withdraw DANIEL from operations as soon as 12th and 8th Corps had advanced beyond the 101st Airborne Division flanks. (10)

During the night of 21-22 September, the division CP moved north from Son to St Oedenrode. DANIEL II contacted the eight remaining members of the KP in St Oedenrode, and received additional intelligence on the enemy situation. During the night and early morning hours of 22 September, Dutch resistance forces in the villages and hamlets east of Veghel spotted a new Panzer Brigade in the area, and promptly alerted team DANIEL II at the
division CP. The warning arrived just in time. Twice in four hours, German tanks from this brigade attempted to drive from the east to seize the major bridges at Veghel and strangle the Allied corridor at its critical chokepoint between Eindhoven and Uden. The 101st Airborne Division, aided by British armor, succeeded in throwing back the assaults along four miles of this corridor. Uden, however, was cut off, and Lieutenant DuBois, who was in Uden at the time attempting to organize resistance forces there, was isolated from the division CP for 48 hours. (11)

The battle for this corridor would decide the fate of Arnhem. General Brian Horrocks, the commander of the Guards Armored Division, turned around some of his units bound for Arnhem to relieve the British 1st Airborne Division to instead support the General Taylor's desperate situation at Uden. (12) The following day the Germans heavily shelled St. Oedenrode in support of a well organized dismounted infantry assault from the west. Despite the Germans' use of numerous self-propelled guns, the 101st Airborne Division repelled the assault on the outskirts of town.

On 24 September the 101st Airborne Division reopened the road between St Oedenrode and Veghel, and at 1000 hours the Division CP moved north to Veghel. DANIEL
II recovered Lieutenant DuBois, and contacted the Veghel KP. This KP group, well organized and led, had recruited a number of competent people since the 101st Airborne Division landings, and continued to proficiently support Allied forces in the area. DANIEL II also contacted the Veghel ORDE DIENST, which had excellent relations with the KP and also functioned well. (13)

The 101st Airborne Division was housing over 400 German prisoners of war in a factory building in Veghel. When a large German task force with tanks and self propelled guns cut the road south of Veghel again on 24 September, the division dispatched paratroopers guarding these prisoners to assist the 502 Parachute Regiment in interdicting this force. General Taylor ordered Major Wilson to take charge of the prisoners, and Wilson coordinated with the Veghel KP to provide guards. (14)

During the day, EDWARD contacted DANIEL II for a situation update, and learned that their resistance contacts were "almost nil" and that Major Wilson considered Lieutenant DuBois unsatisfactory for Jedburgh missions. EDWARD reported this to SFHQ, and noted Major Wilson's "good work" with the division. (15)

The fighting for the main access road from Veghel to Uden lasted almost two days. German shelling destroyed
some British vehicles and caused many civilian casualties in the town. The team lived on captured German rations, and the Veghel OD organized the distribution of limited food supplies to the civilians. During this period, the team received exfiltration instructions from DANIEL, and Lieutenant DuBois returned to Uden where the KP and OD were at odds. Their political infighting prevented effective support to the 101st Airborne Division. Lieutenant DuBois succeeded in improving relations between the organizations and coordinating some of their activities. He also took part in the close and confused fighting around Uden over those two days. (16)

DANIEL discovered in Veghel that a number of young men not aligned with any resistance movements were brandishing captured German and American weapons. The team had first noticed occurrences of this type in St Oedenrode, where unorganized gangs wearing armlets with the initials PAN roamed the streets, pilfering from farmers and the local population. These young men interfered with the actions of the police and the local civil administration. They were a nuisance during the intense battles for the main road leading to Nijmegen, and General Taylor ordered the KP to collect all American arms and return them to the division. By 25 September, as DANIEL was preparing to
Exfiltrate to Brussels, the KP were prosecuting General Taylor's orders with great enthusiasm, and taking appropriate measures to suppress their undisciplined countrymen. DANIEL noted in their report that the KP "made every endeavor to cooperate with the American authorities." (17)

Exfiltration and Summation of Activities

The 101st Airborne Division, supported by the 50th Infantry Division, opened the main road on 26 September. The previous evening the team received orders from the airborne corps HQ to withdraw to London, subject to divisional approval. The division concurred, and DANIEL II left Veghel in a captured car for Brussels as soon as the road reopened. During their return to Brussels, they nearly entered German lines in the Tournhout region, but escaped capture via the Bourg-Leopold road to Brussels. There, they reported to SF Detachment Number 3 at 21st Army Group Headquarters the evening of the 26th. The SF Detachment Commander, Lieutenant Colonel M.A.W. Rowlandson, had Major Wilson and Lieutenant DuBois make a personal report to Prince Bernhard on their activities and the status of resistance forces in the Son-Veghel areas.
At 1800 hours on 27 September (D+10), DANIEL flew from Brussels and, two hours later, landed at Groenham Airfield. They then proceeded to London by train. (18) DANIEL II’s mission was not an overwhelming success. SFHQ assigned DANIEL to the DLM’s Market Garden mission to replace DUDLEY, which was already operating in the Overijssel province. Major Wilson, the team leader, and Sergeant Mason, its chief radio operator, were the only Jedburghs on the team, and they did not speak Dutch. SFHQ augmented the team with Sergeant Fokker and Lieutenant DuBois who were native Dutch speakers but not trained in Jedburgh operations.

The team had minimal contact with resistance forces because of its participation in the defense of the 101st Airborne Division CP. DANIEL II simply did not have the luxury of time the other Jedburgh teams had to coordinate with resistance forces in their area. They participated in the fighting around Son, St Oedenrode, Veghel, and Uden. They did succeed in producing some intelligence from the local populace in the 101st Airborne Division area of operations, in resolving the dispute between competing resistance factions in Uden, and in guarding the Veghel POW facility, which enabled the 101st Airborne Division to
dispatch men to support forces retaking the critical main axis road.

SFHQ had no communications with DANIEL II the entire time the team was in the field. Team EDWARD routed all message traffic for DANIEL II from SFHQ. This may have hindered DANIEL's capabilities to react to the fast moving situation.

Evidently, Lieutenant DuBois' actions provided some problems for Major Wilson or else he would not have raised the issue with EDWARD on 24 September. There are no current references or accounts available to explain DuBois' actions and why they frustrated Major Wilson, so this facet of the mission will never be known. Perhaps there was a personality conflict between the two men. Certainly, Lieutenant DuBois proved his worth in Uden, where he settled the dispute between the KP and the OD during the period 24-25 September.
CHAPTER SIX

ENDNOTES

1. OSS/London SO Branch micro. Reel III, Volume IV, JEDBURGHS, July-December 1944, Operations, Team DANIEL II (Hereafter referred to as Team DANIEL II Report), pp. 1-2; Major Wilson, Sergeant Mason and a Lieutenant Scherrer (nom de guerre, SAUVAGE) are thought to have compromised one of the Belgium Dutch teams which never deployed. Scherrer was killed in Algeria. Major Wilson was a Royal Artilleryman was in his 40's when he began training at Milton Hall. He wrote a book entitled Textbook of Automatic Pistols, 1884-1935, copyrighted in 1943 by Thomas G. Samworth. The book was printed in the USA by the Small-Arms Technical Publishing Company in Plantersville, South Carolina. Both Major Wilson and Sergeant Mason are deceased. Martin DuBois was a Dutch Commando who redeployed to Holland in November. He assisted in the evacuation of Major John Olmsted of team DUDLEY and numerous British 1st Airborne Division paratroopers out of the Arnhem area. Letter from Mrs. Daphne Friele of 10 October 1989 to the author; telephone conversation between Major John Olmsted (ret.) and the author of 18 April 1990.

2. Team EDWARD Report, p. 7; 18th Airborne Corps OPORD. The 18th Airborne Corps' Market Garden Operations Order further defined the team's missions, which were discussed at the 101st Airborne Division's operations briefing at Greenham Lodge on 15 September.

3. Team DANIEL II Report, pp. 3-4.


5. Team DANIEL II Report, p. 4.


9. Ibid., pp. 424-425; Team DANIEL II Report, p. 4. Lieutenant DuBois participated on the attack of the bridge from the south side of the canal along with paratroopers of the 101st Airborne Division.


12. Team DANIEL II Report, pp. 5-6; Ryan, p. 533-534.


14. Team DANIEL II Report, p. 6. When DANIEL II contacted the Veghel KP, 15 of its original members were still alive. The OD in Veghel consisted of local citizenry formed to assist and then assume administration of the town upon occupation of Allied troops.

15. Ibid., p. 8. When the road reopened on 26 September, the KP guards evacuated the prisoners south to Oedenrode.


17. Team DANIEL II Report, pp. 6-7.

18. Ibid., pp. 5, 7.

19. Ibid. pp. 7-8. Lieutenant Colonel Rowlandson was an SOE officer who had been involved in early Jedburgh planning.
Glider with Market Garden plans lands and is captured near Student's Hq.

1st Battalion 501 REGT.

Less 1st Battalion

DIV. HQ, SIG. CO., MED. CO., RECON. PLAT. & TRANSP. LANDED BY PARA. & GLIDER

St. Oedenrode

1st Battalion

DANIEL 2

CO. H

SO2 REGT.

SO6 REGT.

FOREST

Son

Best

WILHELMINA CANAL

Bridge Blown

EINDHOVEN

Team DANIEL II & ASSAULT AREA
U.S. 101st ABN DIV.
Sept. 17, 1944
"...sir, I think we might be going a bridge too far."

Lieutenant General Frederick Browning, Deputy Commander, First Allied Airborne Army, in a comment at the final conference at Montgomery's Headquarters on Operation Market Garden.

**Assigned Missions**

Since planning had begun for Operation Comet, SFHQ attached team CLAUDE to the British 1st Airborne Division ("The Red Devils") as part of the Dutch Liaison Mission. The team, initially consisted of Captain J. Groenevoud (Royal Netherlands Army), Lieutenant Harvey Allen Todd (U.S. Army) and Sergeant C.A. Scott (U.S. Army). They reported to London for their initial briefing on 5 September, and five days later received the outline for Operation Market Garden. Prior to receipt of its Market Garden mission, SFHQ attached Lieutenant M.J. Knottenbelt, a Dutch Commando but not trained as a Jedburgh, to the team as an additional liaison officer.

SFHQ attached team CLAUDE to the 1st Airborne Division to act as a liaison with the local population and
to provide an additional communications link between the division and London. Upon arriving in the field, they would take commands from the 1st Airborne Division and would advise its commander on resistance capabilities to support Division operations and to coordinate with local resistance groups for execution of these capabilities. (1)

On 14 September CLAUDE along with the entire DLM reported to airborne corps HQ at Moor Park. The team received briefings from the corps G2 on the scope of the operation and the enemy situation and from Captain Staal, the team leader for EDWARD and the overall commander of the DLM, on their refined missions (See Chapter 5, Team EDWARD.). (2) Captain Groenewoud and Lieutenant Todd derived a priority of tasks from these missions and their subsequent discussions with the 1st Airborne Division staff. They determined that, upon landing, they were to contact civilians to furnish labor parties for clearing the DZ and helping load supplies. They intended to commandeer all local transportation to help move their supplies and equipment into Arnhem. Once uploaded, the team would advance with the advance guard of 1st Brigade, 1st Airborne Division, and contact the ex-Burgomaster and ex-chief of police of Arnhem to resume governing the city until assisted by corps civil affairs officers. Once CLAUDE
accomplished these tasks, they would infiltrate ahead of Allied forces, providing updated enemy order of battle information to assist the corps advance. (3)

In its own operations order, British 1st Airborne Division attached team CLAUDE (excluding Lieutenant Knottenbelt) to its 1st Parachute Brigade. Upon completion of initial tasks with the brigade, they would revert to the command of Colonel Hilary Barlow, who was both the Deputy Commander of the 1st Air Landing Brigade and the designated post battle military-government chief of Arnhem, and begin their DLM mission tasks. (4)

Deployment and Initial Actions

As a result of this task organization, 1st Division separated the original team from Lieutenant Knottenbelt for the flight to Holland. Knottenbelt was in the first lift with the advance division HQ that took off from Gloucester Airfield at approximately 1035 hours on 17 September. Knottenbelt's glider, assigned to the 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron, touched down at 1320 hours 600 yards west of the Wolfheze Psychiatric Institute west of Arnhem. Captain Groenewoud, Lieutenant Todd, and Sergeant Scott took off in a C-47 from Gloucester and experienced very little flak on their flight to the 1st Para Brigade DZ
near Oosterbeek, Holland. During the flight, Sergeant Scott asked the jumpmaster to drop his wireless set before he went out the door. The R.A.F. Flight Sergeant in charge decided that the set should be dropped last, and, as a result, the team never located its radio equipment. That prevented communications with Moor Park and SFHQ's home station. The team, however, dropped without injury on its assigned DZ at 1400 hours. (5)

Lieutenant Knottenbelt spent the afternoon determining the credibility of civilians who had offered their assistance to 1st Airborne Division patrols and contacting local resistance leaders. He could not find the division G2, and issued the orange arm bands to resistance forces without staff authorization. (6)

As soon as Captain Groenewoud and Lieutenant Todd hit the ground, they immediately began executing their essential tasks. Groenewoud marshalled civilians in Oosterbeek into work parties for clearing the DZ and loading supplies. Todd returned an hour later with farm carts and 30 civilians to clear the DZ, and dispatched Sergeant Scott to pick up the team's containers. Scott was to contact the division supply officer and return with him to Arnhem. Groenewoud and Todd then linked up the leading element of the 1st Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel John Frost's
Second Battalion, and advanced into Arnhem. Captain Groenewoud called the ex-Burgomaster and the ex-chief of police on the way, and discovered the German's Burgomaster, a Dutch collaborator, had fled the town. The team momentarily stopped at St Elizabeth Hospital, and then fought their way to the Forward Brigade HQ, which was under heavy fire. After visiting the Arnhem police station where a civilian reported on German activities, the team reached the main bridge, and crossed the highway with three British officers in an attempt to reconnoiter a suitable brigade HQ location. As they attempted to recross the highway, a small enemy armored force counterattacked from the north down the road, splitting CLAUDE from the main body of 2nd Battalion paratroopers. The 2nd Battalion repulsed this attack, and the team dashed across the highway and stayed the night with 2nd Battalion in a large two story structure. This building, which the brigade HQ also occupied, was on the west side of the road overlooking the bridge and the highway. The brigade had no contact with division HQ, and Groenewoud and Todd did not know the location of Sergeant Scott or Lieutenant Knottenbelt. (7)

During the evening hours of 17 September, Lieutenant Knottenbelt unsuccessfully attempted to contact Captain Groenewoud and Lieutenant Todd, and, throughout the
night, continued establishing contacts with civilians. These bands of volunteers helped locate supplies dropped in the woods and transported these supplies the following afternoon to the Arnhem-Utrecht road where Division vehicles collected them. In the afternoon, the lieutenant met Pieter Kruyff, the leader of the resistance in Arnhem. Kruyff and his men reported the dispositions of Lieutenant Colonel Frost's 2nd Battalion and its situation at the north end of the bridge. They convinced the lieutenant that both the Oosterbeek and Arnhem telephone exchanges were completely reliable. Knottenbelt verified their claims by calling the number the resistance said would reach the division's security officer, Captain Killick, who immediately reported his situation. Lieutenant Knottenbelt relayed all of this information to division HQ at 1800 hours, and later joined the new division headquarters location at the Hartenstein Hotel in Oosterbeek. (8)

Actions: 18 September-24 September

18 September was a difficult day for Lieutenant Colonel Frost's men and team CLAUDE at the bridge. The Germans conducted counterattacks at dawn and at 0700 hours. While Captain Groenewoud and the brigade signal officer attempted to raise division, Lieutenant Todd took up an OP
position in the rafters of the building which overlooked the highway and the bridge. Lieutenant Todd engaged German dismounted infantry and directed anti tank fire at armored columns from this position until a sniper's bullet glanced off his helmet. The round ricocheted into a window and fractured splinters and glass into his face. Todd was carried to the basement of the building, where he rested the remainder of the day. Captain Groenewoud notified Todd later in the day that he had contacted division and the situation was grim. Third Battalion defended a half a mile away and First Battalion was bogged down in the center of town. By the end of the day, fifteen men in the brigade HQ building had been killed or seriously wounded. (9)

At 0900 hours on 19 September, a resistance leader phoned Lieutenant Knottenbelt at division HQ to report that the situation for 1st Brigade soldiers in Arnhem was desperate and required immediate reinforcement. Knottenbelt called Captain Killick to verify this information, and the phone was answered in German. At 1200 hours, intense fighting in Oosterbeek severely damaged the Oosterbeek telephone exchange, and Lieutenant Knottenbelt had no further communications with Arnhem. He continued to recruit civilians, however, and had 50 organized under the command of a cleared local leader by 1800 hours. Of these
50 recruits, only six claimed to belong to any resistance organization. Most were young men who had been hiding from the Germans. (10)

The situation at the bridge for team CLAUDE and Frost's men worsened on 19 September. The Germans counterattacked at dawn and again at noon and conducted harassing attacks throughout the day. Lieutenant Todd returned to his OP position in the building that morning and in the early afternoon, manned a Bren gun, knocking out a 20mm Flak gun. Lieutenant-Colonel Frost and Major C.F.H. "Freddy" Gough, the brigade executive officer, both complimented Todd on his intrepid steadfastness. A civilian informed Captain Groenewoud that an armored column of 100 vehicles was enroute to Arnhem along the Amsterdam road, but the brigade could not raise division to confirm this report. By the afternoon the situation was critical. Frost now had 50 casualties in the building and no medical supplies. Captain Groenewoud and Lieutenant Todd attempted to reach a doctor's house two blocks away, but a sniper shot Captain Groenewoud through the head, killing him instantly. Lieutenant Todd had a civilian call the hospital for the supplies, but the Germans controlled the area around the hospital and prevented Dutch medical personnel from assisting British wounded. Todd returned to
the brigade HQ and resumed his OP position in the rafters where he again directed AT fire during yet another German counterattack at dusk. Major Gough had assumed command that afternoon after Lieutenant Colonel Frost had been wounded. The brigade had no food and very little ammunition. Resupply was impossible. (11)

On 20 September it became obvious to Lieutenant Knottenbelt that the division was surrounded and that civilian presence around HQ would only result in greater casualties from the constant shelling and mortar fire. Because of the gravity of the situation, the 1st Division G2 and Lieutenant Knottenbelt agreed to disband civilian recruits, enabling them to return to their homes or to hide in order to escape German reprisals. Knottenbelt gave the order and retained only a half dozen civilians, who proved themselves invaluable in the latter stages of the operation. On the afternoon of the 20th, Knottenbelt linked up with Sergeant Scott, who had spent two days unsuccessfully attempting to find his wireless set in spite of continual sniping around the DZ. (12)

The situation at the bridge completely unraveled on 20 September. Lieutenant Todd had remained in his OP throughout the night and continued to fire at targets on the bridge and in the streets below. The Germans had
surrounded the beleaguered HQ building, and Tiger tanks from the 10th SS Panzer Division were firing their 88s point blank at its walls. Casualties were heavy and Lieutenant Scott was knocked out of his OP position by a mortar shell that destroyed the building's rafters. The men in the building fought on throughout the day with dwindling supplies and ammunition. At dusk Lieutenant Todd had only two rounds left in his carbine and one grenade when the building caught fire. Major Gough directed all wounded outside and formed his remaining men into ten man groups to infiltrate to the rear. Todd was in charge of one group, and rushed out of the house to a burned out school building. The Germans approached the building, and the men ran for their lives until a machine gun cut down the group. Todd was knocked down, threw his last grenade to eliminate the machine gunner, and ran down the street through two or three burned out buildings. He hurtled a stone wall, and, hearing Germans, climbed a tree, where he decided to stay until morning. (13)

On 21 September, the 1st Airborne Division situation was very uncertain. Lieutenant Knottenbelt consulted with Captain Scott-Malden, who had assumed the duties of the division G2 after Major Maguire had been injured, and told him he would inform him of his location
daily. Lieutenant Knottenbelt then moved to a house on the northern side of the division’s perimeter. (14) Lieutenant Todd spent the entire day in his tree, tying his belt around his arm and a limb so he would not fall if he dozed off. He had an unobstructed view of the Arnhem bridge which the Germans now occupied, and inwardly still hoped that XXX Corps would be able to punch through and rescue the division. In the evening he climbed down from the tree, crawled under a bush, and slept until morning. (15)

Lieutenant Knottenbelt escaped death on 22 September when the Germans shelled his house on the northern perimeter. All of the soldiers in the house except Knottenbelt were killed. Knottenbelt then joined a platoon of the Independent Parachute Company defending houses on the eastern portion of the perimeter. That afternoon the Independent Company commander ordered him to evacuate 50 civilians from several of these houses and escort them to the hospital nearby. Knottenbelt stated later that he saw Sergeant Scott for the last time that afternoon. (18) Lieutenant Todd hid in his bush all that day, with Germans passing within several feet of him. That evening it began to rain and Todd found shelter in a burned out machine shop approximately 100 yards from his bush. (17)
Lieutenant Knottenbelt fought from house to house on 23 September. That evening, team EDWARD infiltrated as far north as the south bank of the Rhine, and heard a report that Knottenbelt was still alive and the remainder of CLAUDE had been killed in action. This was the first news about CLAUDE since the team had deployed, and the following day, Captain Mills reported their situation to SFHQ in London, which had been seeking word since D-day. (18) Lieutenant Todd spent 23 September in the machine shop waiting for the Germans to discover him or XXX Corps to rescue him. He subsisted on pears and one swallow of water. (19)

Knottenbelt Exfiltrates and Todd is Captured

Lieutenant Knottenbelt continued fighting from house to house on 24 and 25 September. On 1900 hours on the 25th, the 1st Airborne Division HQ received orders from corps HQ to withdraw. The division staff attached him to a group of HQ personnel which exfiltrated to the south bank of the Rhine at 0200 hours on 28 September. Knottenbelt eventually returned to London, although SFHQ did not know of his survival until October. (20)

Lieutenant Todd remained in his bombed out machine shop until 27 September, when Germans looted the place and
captured him. The Germans moved Lieutenant Todd to a series of transit POW camps in Holland and then larger, permanent camps in Germany. He stayed at Oberursel and Limburg until the Germans sent him to Schubin, Poland on 10 November 1944. At the end of January 1945, Russian units were approaching Schubin, and for the next six weeks the Germans marched Todd and his fellow prisoners up to the Baltic and then down through the German cities of Magdeburgh and Erfurt. They arrived in Hammelburg, Germany on 9 March 1945. Of the 1,391 officers and men who started on this march, only 380 arrived at Hammelburg. An American reconnaissance task force liberated this camp on 27 March, and Todd joined the unit on lead tank. Germans ambushed the column that night, and recaptured Todd, returning him to the Hammelburg. The commandant evacuated the prisoners the following morning, and moved them in a southeasterly direction away from the advancing American forces. Todd successfully escaped this formation on 1 May, and took shelter in a nearby house until American units overran the area three days later. Todd reported to OSS Headquarters in Paris on 12 May 1945. (21)

SFHQ attempted to trace CLAUDE for weeks. On 30 September, the 21st Army Group radioed SFHQ that it had dispatched a liaison officer to the evacuated 1st Airborne
Division Headquarters in an attempt to trace CLAUDE. SFHQ never recorded his findings. A report dated 1 November 1944 from Captain C.P. Scott-Nalden of the 1st Airborne Division stated:

I have now heard that Captain Greenwood (sic), the Dutch officer in charge of the team, was killed in action. Lt. Todd, the American officer, did very well in the battle for the main bridge, and was alive and unwounded when order (sic) were finally given for the force holding the bridge to disperse; it is though that he may be in hiding. Sergeant Scott was seen in the early stages, but nothing is known of what happened to him. (22)

CLAUDE's story was completed when Lieutenant Todd reported to Paris. If he had been killed, it is doubtful SFHQ would have ever been able to trace the actions of these brave men.

Summary of Activities and Conclusions

The dangerous tactical situation in Arnhem prevented CLAUDE from accomplishing its missions. From the time the team dropped with 1st Brigade and lost its radio until Lieutenant Todd was captured, CLAUDE struggled to survive against mounting German opposition. Both Captain Groenewoud and Lieutenant Todd demonstrated tremendous courage and fighting spirit in the battles at the main bridge at Arnhem, but they were not a factor in organizing the resistance or providing liaison between the beleaguered
British 1st Airborne Division and advance corps headquarters. The team had no communications and were completely isolated from the rest of the division in their combat actions at the bridge and in the town of Arnhem.

Lieutenant Knottenbelt achieved limited success with the resistance. He was able to organize a 50 man group and arrange the civilian recovery of supplies spread out over the drop zones. Moreover, he established contacts with local resistance leaders who provided invaluable intelligence on Lieutenant-Colonel Frost's 2nd Battalion in Arnhem. Knottenbelt believed that, had the situation been more fluid and XXX Corps linked up with the 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem, civilian aid and resistance operations would have proven progressively more valuable.

Knottenbelt was disturbed, however, about certain aspects in the preparation and execution for this mission. First, it was extremely difficult for him to establish the identities of underground members because of lack of information on the local resistance leaders. Knottenbelt located and identified several resistance leaders by sheer luck, and recommended that future liaison missions have more specific information on their resistance contacts. He stated that the mission was standard liaison duty and that was more applicable to a "regular liaison mission fully
equipped with the necessary information to enable them to make a direct approach to the local Resistance Leaders.” (23)

Knottenbelt also commented on the role of the 1st Airborne Division staff in dealing with the Dutch populace and resistance. He stated that although CLAUDE was to act in an advisory capacity with these groups, the British Staff preferred to place the whole responsibility for identifying and organizing the Dutch on the shoulders of the available Dutch personnel. (24) This comment echoed the complaints of many Dutch in the Arnhem area, that the British failed to respond to underground offers for assistance. The Arnhem resistance groups were armed and ready to provide support to Frost’s men at the bridge, but the British politely rejected their offers. The British wariness of the Dutch underground arose from the lingering aftermath of "NORD POL" in intelligence circles, and many senior British officers were warned before Operation Market Garden not place too much trust in the Dutch resistance. (25)

Then there is the matter of Colonel Hilary Barlow, the Deputy Commander of 1st Brigade and the designated post battle military-government chief of Arnhem. Prior to Market Garden, an Anglo-Dutch intelligence committee had
issued Barlow top-secret lists of cleared Dutch underground personnel. From these lists, Barlow and his assistant, Lieutenant Commander Arnoldus Wolters of the Dutch Navy, were to screen the groups' capabilities, and dispatch them on intelligence, sabotage, and combat missions. According to Wolters, only he and Barlow knew about the lists and what their mission really was. When General Urquhart ordered Colonel Barlow to coordinate the faltering attacks of 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 1st Para Brigade, Barlow was killed. When Wolters then produced the lists and made recommendations, the 1st Airborne Division staff immediately distrusted him. Despite Wolters persistent efforts, there was simply not enough time for other members of the staff to assist in properly identifying and organizing Dutch resistance forces. (26)

It is doubtful if team CLAUDE could have taken advantage of Wolters and Barlow's lists because of the worsening situation in Arnhem. However, SFHQ should have briefed them on this unique mission, which was one of the team's own essential tasks. Certainly Lieutenant Knottenbelt's efforts to identify and organize the resistance in Arnhem would have been expedited with the possession of these lists or the knowledge of their existence.
CHAPTER SEVEN

ENDNOTES

1. National Archives, Washington, D.C. Record Group # 228, War Diaries of the London Office, Special Operations: Boxes 17-30. OSS/London War Diaries, Volume IV, JEDBURGHS, July, August, September 1944, Operations Team CLAUDE (Cited hereafter as Team CLAUDE Report), p. 1. SFHQ’s instructions to CLAUDE were similar to other teams that comprised the L.M. Integral to these tasks was the vetting and identification of resistance forces when they were overrun. SFHQ issued CLAUDE 5000 guilders and one Jedburgh radio set, and instructed the team to contact the Home Station as soon as possible after their arrival.

   Lieutenant Todd survived a series of German POW camps and eventually escaped in April, 1945. He is retired and currently lives in Decatur, Illinois. Lieutenant Knottenbelt redeployed to Holland on 3-4 April 1945 as part of Jedburgh team GAMBLING. Letter from Daphne Friele of 10 October 1990 to the author and letter from Gervase Cowell of 14 February 1990 to the author.


4. British Notes on Resistance, pp. 1-3; Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, p. 444;


14. Team CLAUDE Report, p. 3.
15. TODD Report, p. 4.
17. TODD Report, p. 4.
20. Team CLAUDE Report, p. 3.
21. TODD Report, pp. 4-10.
23. Team CLAUDE Report, p. 3
24. Team CLAUDE Report, p. 3.
26. Ibid., p. 444.
CHAPTER EIGHT

TEAM CLARENCE

"The Dutch proved to be among the bravest and most patriotic people we had liberated"

Brigadier General John Gavin, Commanding General, 82d Airborne Division, Operation Market Garden

Assigned Missions

SFHQ had initially attached sub-mission CLARENCE to the British 52d Lowland Infantry Division as part of initial planning for Operation Comet. When 21st Army Group expanded Comet on 8 September and eliminated the 52d from the operation, SFHQ attached CLARENCE to the U.S. 82d Airborne Division, which had been involved in the fighting at Normandy and the hedgerow fighting and now would participate in Market Garden. (1) Jedburghs assigned to team CLARENCE included the team leader, Captain Arie D. "Harry" Bestebreurtje (Royal Netherlands Army), Lieutenant George M. Verhaeghe (U.S. Army), and Technical Sergeant Willard W. "Bud" Beynon (U.S. Army). (2)

The Dutch Country Section initially briefed these men in early September before the First Allied Airborne Army finalized Market Garden details. Their missions for

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Market Garden remained unchanged from Comet. The team was to provide liaison between the 82d Airborne Division and the local population and to provide an additional communications link back to SFHQ in London. Once on the ground, the team would advise the commander on resistance capabilities and to coordinate with local resistance groups for execution of these capabilities. The Dutch Country Section provided CLARENCE with lists of leaders and meeting locations for Dutch resistance organizations in the field. Captain Bestebreurtje, whose home town, Nijmegen, was one of the tactical objectives of the 82d Airborne Division, knew some of these individuals, and provided an inherent advantage to the team in organizing and directing the Dutch underground. Prior to the team's departure for the 82d Airborne Division HQ, SFHQ also issued the team 5000 guilders and one Jedburgh W/T. (3)

The FAAA had briefed the Market Garden plan to its major subordinate commands at 1800 hours, 10 September. Captain Bestebreurtje reported to the 82d Airborne Division HQ on 11 September at 0800 hours, and immediately began to assist the staff in planning the operation. Captain Bestebreurtje provided significant information on the terrain, local populace and underground organizations. (4)
Deployment and Initial Actions

The 82d Airborne Division manifested Sergeant Beynon separately from his officers for the flight to Holland. Captain Bestebreurtje and Lieutenant Verhaeghe accompanied Brigadier General John Gavin, the Commanding General of the division, in the first plane of the division's assault, and Beynon was in Plane 3 with the team's equipment and radios. The planes took off from bases around Grantham, Lincolnshire and encountered heavy flak enroute. All members of CLARENCE jumped safely with the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment in C47s, but the team's equipment was lost. Instead of repacking the three equipment panniers and attaching them to the wings of the plane so they could be dropped simultaneously with Beynon's stick, the IX Troop Carrier Command chose to drop the equipment from the door before the stick jumped. As a result, the equipment landed in the Reichswald forest in Germany and was never recovered. (5)

The 82d Airborne Division dropped accurately over its drop zones and achieved complete surprise. (6) Enemy opposition was light, although CLAUDE and the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment encountered some resistance on their DZ north of Groesbeek. Beynon and another paratrooper went off to the forest in an attempt to recover
the team's equipment, but quickly met automatic weapons fire and returned. (7)

CLARENCE was very successful in vetting and organizing members of the resistance. Within one hour after their drop, Captain Bestebreurtje had contacted the leader of the 80 man Groesbeek resistance movement, and assigned some of these individuals to the division's regiments as guides and interpreters. The Groesbeek resistance leader found Captain Bestebreurtje a phone and provided him the special code which enabled him to talk to underground leaders in Nijmegen and Arnhem. The resistance in Arnhem informed him that the British had landed safely and that all seemed to be going well. He relayed this news to General Gavin. (8)

Misfortune befell the team that first day. Lieutenant Verhaeghe was seriously wounded in the leg, and was evacuated to England the following day. Captain Bestebreurtje was wounded later that night. Although the division had captured the Grave Bridge southwest of Nijmegen and had secured a crossing over the Maas-Waal Canal in Heumen, the Germans still controlled the critical 1,860 foot long railroad bridge in the town Nijmegen. General Gavin ordered the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment to secure the southern approaches to this bridge, and
esistance intelligence played a key role in this operation. The underground had reported to the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment's 1st Battalion that the detonating mechanism for destroying the bridge was installed in Nijmegen's main post office building. The units which received this information dispatched a platoon to the building, where engineers cut the wires and destroyed the detonating controls. Captain Bestebreurtje, who accompanied the regiment's 1st Battalion in an attempt to contact leaders of the Nijmegen resistance, was wounded in a firefight in the streets. Despite injuries to his left hand, elbow, and right index finger, Captain Bestebreurtje continued to perform his duties. (9)

By 18 September CLARENCE had organized approximately 800 members of the underground for military duties. Some, armed with German weapons, were already guarding German prisoners captured at Groesbeek. One of the first orders General Gavin had issued upon landing was that his headquarters provide arms and explosives to resistance groups. He assigned CLARENCE the responsibility of vetting members and arming them with the weapons of fallen Americans. Gavin recommended that these groups prevent the destruction of the Nijmegen bridges by guarding the approaches and cutting any wires leading to the
structures. Thus, early on in the 82d Airborne Division area, these enthusiastic, armed resistance personnel were fighting alongside the American paratroopers. (10)

**Actions: 18 September–22 September**

During the early morning hours on 18 September (D+1), members of the Dutch underground in Arnhem reported through their telephone network that Panzer divisions were overwhelming the British 1st Airborne Division. A member of the Nijmegen resistance who had received this call passed the report to Captain Bestebreurtje, who relayed it to division headquarters. It was the first message out of Arnhem to alert the advance corps HQ that the Red Devils' mission was in jeopardy. (11) CLARENCE immediately contacted EDWARD from the telephone switch center in Nijmegen using this network, and relayed the Arnhem news as well as dispositions of German troops defending the railway and highway bridges across the Waal River. EDWARD used this phone network to advantage and directly contacted 1st Airborne Division staff the following day, relaying information between the latter and Corps. (12)

In conjunction with EDWARD on 19 September, CLARENCE held a meeting of resistance leaders from the district of Nijmegen, and organized resistance actions to
support the 82d Airborne Division's assault on the massive bridge across the Waal. EDWARD reported to SFHQ that these groups originated from Malden, Heumen, Overasselt, and Mook and numbered 290 men. (13) By the end of D+2, CLARENCE employed a total of 800 volunteers, some of whom were armed. (14)

On D+3, the 82d Airborne Division captured the northern end of the railway bridge across the Waal. The Guards Armored Division, which had linked up with the "All American Division" the day before, supported this daylight operation. (15) The Germans attempted to blow the bridge, but their emplaced demolition charges failed to explode. Many Dutch believe that James Van Hoof, a member of the local underground, saved this main crossing. Captain Bestebreurtje had recruited Van Hoof on 18 September, and dispatched him to Nijmegen on 18 September to act as a guide for forward 82d Airborne Division units. Van Hoof may have infiltrated German lines on his own and severed the detonating lines leading to the charges on the bridge. (18)

The advance corps HQ moved to Nijmegen on D+3, simplifying coordination between CLARENCE and EDWARD. At the end of this day, a platoon of U.S. paratroopers averted Sergeant Beynon from driving into a minefield. Beynon, who
was enroute to corps HQ, temporarily joined this platoon. While Beynon was with them, the platoon repelled two German crossing attempts along the canal at Hook. (17)

CLARENCE’s coordination with the Dutch resistance continued to achieve excellent results on D+4 and D+5. On 21 September CLARENCE established an information center in the Nijmegen power station that used underground telephone lines to communicate with forces in Amsterdam, Utrecht, Rotterdam, The Hague, Arnhem, Elst, Geertruidenberg, and Zwolle. This makeshift communications center supplied such a plethora of valuable operational intelligence across Holland that XXX Corps assumed control of it the following day. (18)

On 22 September XXX Corps assumed control of the town of Nijmegen and conferred with EDWARD on the status of resistance forces in the area. In coordination with EDWARD, CLARENCE organized an armed resistance force of 300 men to eliminate isolated pockets of enemy resistance around Nijmegen. XXX Corps later countermanded this effort, citing corps policy, which prevented arming large resistance groups that did not belong to the country’s military forces. (19)
Organization of Resistance: 23 September-30 September

For the next nine days CLARENCE continued to work with the Dutch underground in the 82d Airborne Division area of operations. The team employed its most reliable resistance members as guides and guards for Nijmegen. It also made contact with small communities outside of Nijmegen which had their own resistance group. By 26 September CLARENCE had organized two companies for reconnaissance and direct action missions, but had inadequate stores of arms and ammunition to support their operations. CLARENCE’s situation contrasted to that of EDWARD’s, which reported that its resistance groups were fully armed. (20)

Communications improved for CLARENCE from 22 September until the end of their mission. Sergeant Beynon borrowed EDWARD’s B-2 set to request another radio from SFHQ. Although SFHQ never supplied a W/T set, CLARENCE retained EDWARD’S set when the headquarters mission exfiltrated on 27 September. (21)

Termination of Mission and Summary of Activities

Team CLARENCE continued to operate out of Nijmegen until the end of September, when it requested and received permission from General Gavin to resquip in London under
the condition that it return to the 82d Airborne Division for continued work with the resistance. Sergeant Beynon returned to England on 1 October, refitted, and then flew back to the continent two days later. Captain Bestebreurtje remained in Holland, and worked out of Prince Bernhard's HQ until Beynon's return. CLARENCE renewed operations as team STANLEY II. (22)

Team CLARENCE accomplished all of its missions with the resistance and won the admiration of the commander and staff for their battlefield contributions to the success of the 82d Airborne Division in Operation Market Garden. CLARENCE's headquarters was usually with the advance elements of the 82d Airborne Division in order to contact Dutch Resistance forces. Because Captain Bestebreurtje's knowledge of the area was so extensive, the team contacted and organized approximately 1,000 men in the resistance during its time on the ground. Bestebreurtje's numerous contacts assisted team EDWARD, which operated in the vicinity and also enjoyed great success in these same tasks. (23)

CLARENCE provided significant intelligence to their division headquarters. Through the underground telephone network, the team was the first unit to receive word on the desperate plight of the 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem.
CLARENCE’s contacts and knowledge of this system enabled EDWARD to maintain direct contact with the 1st Division staff and to provide the corps with continuous situation reports on Arnhem when wireless communications were erratic and unpredictable. CLARENCE greatly expanded this capability when it established its makeshift communication center in the Nijmegen power plant. This center had telephone contact with virtually all major resistance forces in Holland, and yielded tremendous amounts of intelligence to XXX Corps and Second Army, which staffed the facility after Nijmegen’s reversion to XXX Corps control.

Captain Bestebreurtje became somewhat of a legend during the opening days of the battle around Nijmegen. He saved General Gavin’s life almost immediately after the drop. Minutes after General Gavin and he had landed near Groesbeek village, they became involved in a firefight during which Captain Bestebreurtje shot a German machine gunner through the head. (24) Bestebreurtje’s organizational capabilities astounded the division, whose units quickly received Dutch guides fighting along side them and providing critical intelligence. Bestebreurtje gained the respect of the division staff when he continued to fight despite his wounds. According to Sergeant Beynon,
"His coolness under fire was the talk of the Division."

(25) Gavin considered Bestebrechtje so valuable that he made him promise to return to the division after SFHQ had debriefed in England.

Team CLARENCE enjoyed great operational success with the Dutch resistance in supporting the Division and in collecting intelligence, but it experienced some problems. The team had no radio communications, and had to rely on EDWARD to relay their reports back to London. Despite several requests, SFHQ could not resupply the team with a new man because of the persistent bad weather or the loss of resupply aircraft to German flak. After EDWARD relinquished its B-2 set, Sergeant Beynon had excellent communications until British tank radios interfered with his assigned frequencies. (26)
CHAPTER EIGHT

ENDNOTES

1. National Archives, Washington, D.C. Record Group #331 SHAPE G3 Division OPNS "A," File Number 17104, "Operation Linnet." Amendment No 1 to SFHQ Preliminary Instructions, Operation "Linnet", HUS/1501/1877, 30 August 1944, pp. i-ii.; National Archives, Washington, D.C. Record Group # 331 SHAPE G3 Division Airborne Section File Number 24571, "Operation Market." SFHQ Instruction No 1 to Operation Comet, MUS/1501/1914, 7 September 1944; and Amendment No 1 to SFHQ Instruction No 1 to Operation Comet, MUS/1501/1914, 10 September 1944.

2. Team CLARENCE Report, p. 1. Captain Arie Bestebreurtje was an Olympic speed skating champion before the war. He became a Dutch commando and volunteered for Jedburgh duty in 1943. After Market Garden, Bestebreurtje remained in Holland and, as part of team STANLEY II, worked with Prince Bernhard's HQ. He later redeployed to Holland on 4-5 April 1945 as part of Jedburgh team Dicing. This team dropped with the 3rd and 4th French Regiments in the Assen area to coordinate Dutch resistance operations. Captain Bestebreurtje was injured on the drop. He survived the war, emigrated to the United States, and became a church minister in Charlottesville, Virginia. Several years ago, he was ice skating on a canal near his home, fell through the ice, and drowned; Letter from Mrs. Daphne Friele of 10 October 1990 to the author and letter from Gervase Cowell of 14 February 1990 to the author.

Beynon later deployed with a Jedburgh team to the China-Burma-India-theater. Willard "Bud" Beynon and George Verhaeghe both survived the war. Beynon, now retired, became a officer with the Scranton, Pennsylvania police department. He still resides there. Verhaeghe, also retired, lives in South Bend, Indiana; Letter from Mrs. Daphne Friele of 10 October 1990 to the author and letter from Bob Baird of 21 November 1989 to the author.


Powell mentions that the Nijmegen resistance used the separate telephone networks connecting the area's power and waterway installations. Captain Bestebreurtje exploited this for additional intelligence, establishing his HQ at the Nijmegen power station. See endnote # 18.


Several days later, doctors told Bestebreurtje that they would have to amputate his wounded finger. He refused and kept the finger. Verhaeghe walks stiff legged as a result of his wounds suffered in Market Garden. Ryan, p. 288 and letter from Mrs. Daphne Friele of 10 October 1989 to the author.


13. Ibid., pp. 10-11.


15. FAAA Report, p. 11.
16. Ryan, p. 474. In 1948 a Dutch commission investigated this story and determined that Van Hoof did cut some lines. The detonating lines and demolition charges were on the Lent side of the Waal, and some historians believe the Germans surely would have detected Van Hoof on the bridge attempting to sever these lines. The commission could not confirm if the lines Van Hoof sabotaged in fact saved the bridge.


18. Team EDWARD Report, pp. 4, 12. Second Army eventually commandeered this center, establishing a C3I center manned by officers from the 21st Army Group, Second Army, XXX Corps, a Dutch Liaison officer, and an interpreter.


23. Ibid., pp. 1-2.


CHAPTER NINE

TEAM STANLEY II

"... My military knowledge was learned in a practical way by reading and by discussions with my officers. I depended on my staff, who were very well qualified."

Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands

Assigned Missions

Sergeant Beynon remained in London for approximately 48 hours, and returned to Holland on 3 October with Captain Peter Vickery, a British Jedburgh who replaced the wounded George Verhaeghe. Captain Bestebreurtje, who had remained in country and was now receiving orders directly from Prince Bernhard's HQ, linked up with these men in the Arnhem-Nijmegen area to form team STANLEY II. STANLEY II's mission differed greatly from CLARENCE's earlier mission to organize underground and local populace support for the 82d Airborne Division. SFHQ, in coordination with Prince Bernhard's HQ, directed CLARENCE to train resistance groups into functional military organizations that could perform conventional missions when operating with Allied forces. (1)
Once assembled, STANLEY II reported to Prince Bernhard’s Headquarters. Bernhard decided to retain the team under his command to temporarily work in the Nijmegen area. Under this arrangement, STANLEY II worked directly for Bernhard and reported their operations to him as well as to SFHQ. In addition, Captain Bestebreurtje, who knew the Prince well, reported to his headquarters in The Hague every two weeks to deliver a situation update. (2)

Captain Vickery’s Actions

Upon Captain Vickery’s arrival in Nijmegen, Captain Bestebreurtje assigned him responsibility for commanding and arming OD resistance groups in the Leeuwen, Wamel, Dreumel, and Alphen areas. Establishing his headquarters at Leeuwen, Captain Vickery over the course of four weeks organized and armed two OD groups totalling 150 men. Despite numerous German harassing raids into this area, Vickery’s losses were light, although on 19 October he was wounded by mortar fire.

By the end of the month, Vickery had organized and formed volunteers from the resistance into a 165 man Stoottrophen company. Since the company had no reserve and was responsible for 24 hour local security, training was difficult. This company stiffened the defense of the
Leeuwen and Wamel areas and permitted the OD there to perform guard missions along the dyke and population control duties in the towns. The OD, commanded by a Dr. Van Hooper, numbered approximately 140 men and remained responsible for the Alphen and Dreumel areas. (3)

In addition to commanding a Stoottrophen company and coordinating resistance operations, Captain Vickery assumed control of covert transport missions of men and materiel across the Waal and through German lines. Inherent in this responsibility was infiltrating and exfiltrating SOE sponsored agents over the Waal to evacuate paratroopers of the 1st Airborne Division still hiding in the vicinity of Arnhem. To coordinate these operations, Captain Vickery communicated via the secret underground telephone network to three members of the Dutch Intelligence service working directly for him on the other side of the Waal in Tiel. Eventually he began smuggling arms across the river via canoes to the resistance. These operations were successful until the end of November. Captain Vickery then organized another crossing area near Bies Bosch with the local OD leader. (4)

The 8th Armored Brigade, commanded by Brigadier E. Prior-Palmer, moved into Vickery’s area during the third week in October. His Dutch intelligence operatives
reported enemy troop, artillery and HQ dispositions, and
Captain Vickery acted as a forward OP for medium artillery
units of the 8th Armored Brigade, which destroyed the
railway bridge northwest of Tiel and other targets.
Brigadier Prior-Palmer, who had known Vickery at Sandhurst,
took a great interest in the Dutch, and had his 8th Armored
Brigade supply the Stoottrophen and OD with food, medical
care and some military equipment. In coordination with
Captain Vickery, the brigade trained the Stoottrophen on
heavy weapons, mortars, patrolling, and first aid. The
Dutch immediately responded, and, according to Vickery,
"started to behave more like soldiers." (5)

The 8th Armored Brigade fully integrated Captain
Vickery's Stoottrophen into their defense plans. The
brigadier ordered Vickery to construct a series of
defensive strong points along the Waal stretching six
kilometers from Dreumel to Leeuwen. Vickery stationed six
to eight men at each post, but ammunition was a problem due
to the disparity of weapons. The posts engaged in
firefights with German patrols throughout the latter weeks
in October and all of November. (6)

At the end of November, the Canadian 7th Armored
Brigade, under the command of Brigadier Bingham and
reinforced by Major General MacMillan's 49th Armored
Division, replaced the 8th Armored Brigade in the Leeuwen area. Stoottrophen Company Number 8, which had trained under Dutch officers in England and was fully equipped, relieved Captain Vickery's Stoottrophen company, which withdrew from the line. The 49th Recce Regiment of the 49th Division assumed control of Company Number 8, and the 7th Recce Regiment of the Canadian 7th Brigade directed activities of the OD in Dreumel.

The Canadians modified Vickery's defensive positions along the Waal, but were surprised at the efficiency of the Stoottrophen and OD groups. During December, Captain Vickery formed another company of Stoottrophen from OD volunteers in the Dreumel area. Stoottrophen Number 8 was responsible for the upper Leeuwen and the new company, Number 7, became responsible for the line along Wamel, Dreumel, and Alphen. (7)

The 49th Division was very generous with its stores and Captain Vickery eventually equipped his new company with everything they needed. The 49th also trained Vickery's men on minelaying, marksmanship, and small unit tactics.
Captain Bestebreurtje and Sergeant Beynon's Actions

Vickery's mission concluded on 25 January. Throughout his deployment he reported to Captain Bestebreurtje once a week for instructions. Captain Bestebreurtje and Sergeant Beynon had continued to operate out of Nijmegen. They initially organized and armed resistance forces in the Oxninys, Wijseej, Druten, and Weurt areas. By 16 October STANLEY II had settled infighting between resistance groups, and had established training centers in Wychen, Hexpen, and Nijmegen. Their groups formed part of the static defensive line along the Waal Canal from Dreumel to Nijmegen. (Vicker's units occupied the left flank of this line from Dreumel to Alphen.) At the end of October, Captain Bestebreurtje had organized his own Stoottrophen company in Nijmegen, and had several other companies in training.

Throughout October, the Dutch underground telephone network continued to report significant enemy intelligence data to Captain Bestebreurtje from cities still occupied by the Germans. STANLEY II also attempted to provide assistance to the stranded paratroopers and citizens in the Arnhem area. They organized 80 men at Wychen and Anvaldenheu to smuggle arms across the Lek and Waal canals to 1st Airborne Division personnel still behind enemy
lines. They requested SFHQ to arrange a drop of food and medical supplies north of Arnhem for Dutch civilians, but London denied this request, citing higher air supply priorities. (8)

Sergeant Beynon returned to England on 4 November and Captain Bestebreurtje remained behind in Holland, where he continued to train resistance groups and perform missions for both Prince Bernhard and SFHQ until April 1945. (6)

Summary of Activities and Conclusions

Team STANLEY II was quite successful in arming, organizing and training resistance groups. Both officers coordinated the work of disparate resistance groups in their area of operations and eventually formed some of their volunteers into proficient combat units. Captains Vickery and Bestebreurtje organized at least five Stoottrophen companies in the last three months of 1944, which defended stretches of the Waal Canal in support of Allied forces. Both British, American, and Canadian forces in the area were impressed with the training and professionalism of these companies, which supported their operations. Moreover, STANLEY II continued to obtain significant information from their contacts behind German
lines, which proved very useful to the advancing 21st Army Group. (10)

Communications to SFHQ and to Prince Bernhard's HQ were excellent. Sergeant Beynon was in contact with SFHQ's home station in London the entire five weeks he was on the ground. Captain Bostebreurtje's bi-weekly visits to Prince Bernhard ensured excellent coordination and support. (11)
CHAPTER NINE

ENDNOTES

1. National Archives, Washington, D.C. Record Group # 226, War Diaries of the London Office, Special Operations: Boxes 17-30. OSS/London War Diaries, Volume IV, JEDBURGHS, July, August, September 1944, Operations Team STANLEY II (Hereafter referred to as Team STANLEY Report), p. 1. SFHQ dispatched the team with a B-2 set and a Jedburgh set and issued them 10,000 Dutch Guilders and 250,000 Belgian Francs. During their training at Milton Hall, Captain Vickery and Sergeant Willard “Bud” Beynon formed a Jedburgh team, and prepared for deployment to France. Lieutenant Verhaeghe, however, approached Beynon, and convinced him to break off the “engagement” and to go to Holland as part of Captain Bestebreurtje’s team. Although neither report written by Beynon or Vickery discusses the details of their deployment to Holland, it is assumed they traveled together on the same plane and eventually linked up with Captain Bestebreurtje, who had remained behind in Holland. Letter from Mrs. Daphne Friele of 10 October 1989 to the author and telephone conversation between Major John Olmsted (ret.) and the author of 18 April 1990.


HQ supplied STANLEY's forces with British and German weapons.

4. Ibid. pp. 1, 4.

5. Ibid., pp. 2-3. This equipment included binoculars, mortars, and maps.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., pp. 3-5.


10. Ibid., p. 1.

11. Ibid., p. 1.
Team Stanley II
"My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success."

Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands in a comment to Cornelius Ryan

**Contrasts in Missions**

The six Jedburgh teams deployed to support Operation Market Garden had varying degrees of success. The teams’ missions differed greatly. DUDLEY, deployed almost a week before Market Garden, conducted clandestine operations in a heavily occupied area. Their mission was along the lines of Jedburgh teams previously deployed to France. The DLM teams, CLARENCE, CLAUDE, DANIEL II, and EDWARD, operated as both SF Detachments and Jedburgh teams. Their mission was highly unusual, and prosecuted in a series of fast moving battles that demanded great initiative and agility. STANLEY II’s mission was also unusual in that the team worked directly for Prince Bernhard with responsibilities similar to today’s SOF support for Foreign Internal Defense. In evaluating the role of all of Jedburgh teams in support of Operation
Market Garden, it is important first to analyze the terrain and political environment in which these six teams fought.

**Limiting Aspects of Terrain**

The employment of Jedburgh teams in the Netherlands differed from those in France in several important respects. The flat and densely populated Dutch countryside was ill suited to resistance operations on a large scale, and lacked the mountains necessary for training and concealment. There was no Maquis due to the nature of the terrain and the limited area of operations. (1) SFHQ drops over Holland were very dangerous because of the low horizon and wide visibility of the country's flat landscape. During the months before Market Garden, when SOE resumed infiltrating agents and supplies to the resistance in Holland, heavy concentrations of German troops deployed air guards each night to detect such clandestine operations, adding to the danger. (2) As a result, it was difficult for the Dutch underground to conduct operations unobserved, and opportunities for guerilla action were far fewer than in France. (3)

The nature of the terrain and the German presence in Holland created many new problems for SFHQ planners and the Jedburgh teams. A Jedburgh team attempting to operate
40 miles or more behind German lines would undertake all missions under the watchful eye of the German Wehrmacht, Gestapo, SD, as well as Dutch collaborators connected to the Landwacht and the NSB. For some situations in Holland, a Jedburgh team could perform a protective role or an intelligence collection mission, but opportunities to harass enemy troop movements were far fewer and more hazardous. Thus, Jedburgh missions in Holland were inherently clandestine, and the traditional Milton Hall scenario of Allied officers dropping in uniform was a source of danger to the underground rather than an impetus as in France. (4) This explains why DUDLEY immediately exchanged their uniforms for civilian clothes. For DUDLEY and members of the underground operating in such an environment, the risk of compromise was very great and survival was a day to day proposition. The danger of their work is manifested in DUDLEY's constant struggle to evade German and Dutch security forces, and, ultimately, in the deaths of two of its members.

Status of the Dutch Resistance

The Dutch resistance itself was highly suspect. Only at the end of 1943 did SOE discover that the Germans had completely penetrated its agent network in Holland in
Operation "NORD POL." With 50 agents lost and an entire covert operation compromised, those few British officers and officials privy to such matters developed a deep distrust of the Dutch resistance. The Allies did not begin dropping small numbers of agents into Holland again until after the invasion of Normandy. Only as the British Second Army approached the Dutch frontier at the beginning of September and it seemed probable that Holland would fall as easily as Belgium had done, did SFHQ parachute agents in with weapons and equipment.

"NORD POL" hindered Allied intelligence collection. SFHQ had inadequate information on the Dutch resistance in the late summer of 1944. SFHQ attempted to rectify this problem by dispatching agents to determine the dependability and fighting spirit of the myriad groups in the Dutch provinces. Although these groups had tremendous enthusiasm, they were poorly organized and equipped. SFHQ had provided them minimal support for almost ten months. (5)

SFHQ's intelligence reports in August 1944 mention the diversity of resistance groups in Holland but fail to discuss their disunity and political problems. It is doubtful that SFHQ realized the discord in the Dutch underground, which was riddled by com-
groups, political infighting between left and right factions, and widespread parochialism among the provinces. The usual political split between left and right was missing in western Holland during the war, however, and the communist groups were confined largely to the industrialized eastern provinces. Coordination between the various competing groups was rare. The inherent dangers for partisans moving through numerous Wehrmacht checkpoints and evading Gestapo and SD counterintelligence operations preluded a nationally organized and unified effort. In the Twente area, for example, resistance groups operated independently because they simply did not know the others existence. A partisan dealt with the pressures of occupation in his own circle, and was usually totally unaware of other people's resistance activities. (6)

As planning for Market Garden intensified, SFHQ did not have an adequate network of agents in Holland. By September, however, it was too late for the Dutch Country Section to develop an accurate picture of the complicated Dutch resistance for Operation Market Garden or to dispatch sufficient numbers of Jedburgh teams which could have worked with resistance groups to develop this unity of effort. Despite Prince Bernhard's call for a united resistance on 11 September, the competing groups never
coalesced into a unified effort, and, as a result, Jedburgh teams faced numerous coordination problems once on the ground.

**Unusual Nature of Market Garden Missions**

The enemy and resistance situations in Holland necessitated modifications to the Jedburgh mission, and plans for Market Garden further refined SFHQ's employment of its Jedburgh teams. The unique Market Garden mission demanded a flexible, responsive SFHQ support. The DLN concept initially developed for Operations Linnet I and II and refined for Operation Comet was unlike previous Jedburgh missions. For the first time, Jedburgh teams were to drop into an ongoing battle and immediately attempt to contact and organize resistance support for Allied Forces fighting at that same time in the fields right along side the resistance. The teams would have no time once on the ground to develop contacts or to slowly organize and train the underground. Their liaison operations had an urgency about them which French Jedburgh teams did not experience. The resistance groups they contacted and hastily organized were immediately attached to airborne infantry as guards, guides, and interpreters.
The Dutch Liaison sub-missions were the first Jedburgh teams to act as SF Detachments for a conventional division. Although they performed standard missions such as coordinating the actions of resistance groups and providing underground intelligence, these teams had the additional responsibility of working for their respective division commander on the ground. The Jedburghs organized the missions of the resistance in accordance with the instructions of their assigned commanders, and often performed additional missions at their direction (e.g. Major Wilson guarding the prisoners at Utrecht when the 101st Airborne Division had no one else available). In this way, Jedburgh teams functioned more like SF Detachments than actual operational teams on the ground.

The importance SFHQ stressed on communications to all DLM teams reinforced this SF detachment concept. The teams updated SFHQ on their progress with resistance forces in their areas of operation and serve as a back up link to apprise London of the tactical situation of their respective airborne units. Inherent in this mission was EDWARD’s coordination of resistance operations for the entire airborne corps Headquarters. For the first time, a Jedburgh team made a concerted effort to command and control subordinate Jedburgh missions and to coordinate the
actions of resistance movements over a large area of responsibility.

**Preparation of Teams for Missions**

SFHQ prepared these teams for their missions in much the same way as it dispatched the French Jedburgh teams. The Dutch Country Section failed to consider the peculiarities of the Dutch underground movement and the special requirements of the terrain. This caused problems for the teams once on the ground. As previously mentioned, the decision to send DUDLEY in uniform was a mistake. The team changed into civilian clothes immediately upon their arrival.

Although the teams complimented the Dutch Country Section on their thorough briefings, they were actually incomplete. The Dutch Country Section did not have adequate intelligence on the Dutch resistance groups or a complete understanding of the widespread divisions between the different resistance factions to prepare a detailed briefing. DUDLEY dropped to an RVV organization that the SFHQ thought extremely reliable. However, this organization was extremely uncooperative, and caused DUDLEY numerous coordination problems over the next few months. Lieutenant Knottenbelt, attached to team CLAUDE, also noted
this in his after action report. Knottenbelt found it extremely difficult to establish the identities of underground members because he lacked information on the local resistance leaders. He stated that the mission was standard liaison duty, which was more applicable to a regular liaison mission fully equipped with the necessary information to enable them to make a direct approach to the local Resistance Leaders. (7)

Relationship of Attached Liaison Officers to the Teams

The officers attached to the teams may have created some problems once they deployed. Although SFHQ established the precedent of attaching officers and agents to French Jedburgh teams that summer, Jedburgh training and an intuitive understanding of the Dutch resistance were required in dealing with the myriad problems posed by the competing resistance factions. SFHQ had attached three Dutch liaison officers (Lieutenant N.J. Knottenbelt to CLAUDE, Lieutenant DuBois and Sergeant Fokker to DANIEL II) and one British liaison officer (Captain R. Hills to EDWARD) to the DLM before their attachment to the airborne divisions. While some acted as interpreters or liaison officers for the teams and their respective units, their lack of Jedburgh experience put them at an immediate disadvantage in dealing with the resistance in the fast
moving tactical situation at Market Garden. Lieutenant DuBois provided some problems for Major Wilson of team DANIEL II. Although there are no current references or accounts available to explain DuBois' actions and why they frustrated Major Wilson, it may be assumed that DuBois had difficulty that first week on the ground in coordinating resistance actions to Wilson's satisfaction. (8)

The Market Garden Tactical Situation

The desperate situation at Market Garden is another consideration in evaluating the success of the teams. The Dutch Liaison Mission performed their missions as best they could under trying circumstances. Very often they did not have the time or personnel to direct the movements of the Dutch underground. CLAUDE and DANIEL II, for example, could not effectively accomplish their mission with the resistance or communicate back to SFHQ in London because of the exigencies of their own tactical situation. These teams fought alongside their attached units in an incessant struggle to repel numerous German attacks and raids. Their courage and Jedburgh training enabled them to survive in most cases, but the members of these teams did not have the time or the resources to adequately support their higher headquarters as envisioned by SFHQ.
Results of Coordination with the Dutch Underground

Thus, the Jedburgh teams which participated in Operation Market Garden achieved mixed results. EDWARD and CLARENCE enjoyed great success in coordinating activities of local resistance groups in support of the airborne divisions. The Dutch underground provided invaluable intelligence to these teams when erratic communications in the airborne corps prevented immediate situation updates—especially in Arnhem, where the Red Devils' plight was so desperate. Captain Bestebreurtje was instrumental in providing this intelligence and coordinating with the resistance. His knowledge of the terrain and the people of his native Nijmegen was a tremendous asset to the 82d Airborne Division and the Dutch Liaison Mission as a whole. Captain Bestebreurtje was largely responsible for organizing the resistance around Nijmegen, for establishing the intelligence/communications center at the city's power plant, and for tying in the secret Dutch underground telephone network to team EDWARD and corps headquarters. All of these accomplishments contributed the success of the 82d Airborne Division and informed the corps of 1st Airborne Division's plight at Arnhem.

The success of the Jedburgh teams in the Dutch Liaison Mission is linked to the results their respective
Divisions had in working with the Dutch underground. The greatest value of the resistance to both the 82d Airborne Division, and, to a lesser extent, the 101st Airborne Division, was intelligence collection. Both American divisions lacked ground reconnaissance units, and without on-call aerial reconnaissance, the Dutch resistance forces assigned by the Jedburgh teams became excellent intelligence collectors. In addition, both divisions made good use of resistance guides, who led units through strange streets and wooded paths to their tactical objectives. General Gavin of the 82d Airborne Division commented: "The Dutch proved to be among the bravest and most patriotic people we had liberated." (9)

The British experience with the Dutch resistance was quite different than their American counterparts. The advance corps HQ received a steady volume of intelligence data from Arnhem because it capitalized on the resistance operated telephone network. The Dutch people also assisted in building an airfield at DeKluis and in moving some of their equipment from their various headquarters locations throughout the operation. The British 1st Airborne Division situation was different, due in part to the tactical situation in Arnhem and the fate of team CLAUDE, which lost its radios and two men in the ensuing struggle
to survive continuous German attacks. Although members of
the underground attached themselves at one time or another
to 1st Airborne Division units and headquarters, the
British did not exploit resistance forces. It is known
that Lieutenant Colonel Frost was told not to trust the
Dutch, and this warning may have influenced the rest of the
1st Brigade as well. Certainly, the British were cognizant
that German sympathizers hid within the enthusiastic crowds
of liberated Dutch, and this may have also effected their
decision not to use Dutch. (10)

The British security concerns may also explain
their failure to exploit the Dutch telephone network, which
Captain Bestebreurtje and team EDWARD used so effectively
in the Nijmegen area. While use of civilian circuits had
not been previously considered in Market Garden planning
for security purposes, the abysmal state of the 1st
Airborne Division communications in Arnhem required some
innovation and flexibility to redress, and the British lost
yet another opportunity to use the Dutch underground to
advantage. It was also unfortunate that British signal
officers did not discover the separate and secure telephone
system linking electric power and water supply systems from
Nijmegen to Arnhem. Captain Bestebreurtje used this system
for his intelligence reports to the 82d Airborne Division on the situation at Arnhem. (11)

DUDLEY and STANLEY II's missions were markedly different than those teams comprising the Dutch Liaison Mission, and for that reason, their successes and failures cannot be analyzed in the same context as the DLM teams. DUDLEY'S mission most closely approximated the previous Jedburgh missions deployed to France. However, the team lived in constant danger of compromise because of the flat, heavily populated terrain and the large number of German forces in the area. Despite moving 15 times in a period of 70 days, the team managed to organize approximately 1,200 members of the underground and had arms in store for 3,800 more. This was a remarkable feat in a country where competing resistance groups were often at odds and Nazi sympathizers had penetrated several operations. Had the Allies been able to advance from Arnhem as planned, DUDLEY could have mobilized 12-15,000 men in the Overijssel area to assist. The intelligence the team acquired was not immediately useful for the Market Garden operation. However, had 21st Army Group been capable of liberating Holland in November and December of 1944, DUDLEY's contributions would have been quite significant.
Nevertheless, the team achieved excellent results in difficult conditions fraught with constant danger. (12)

Team STANLEY II’s mission to organize and train Stoottrophen and OD in support of Allied conventional forces was unlike the tasks SFHQ assigned to the other DUTCH teams. In this mission, STANLEY trained resistance to perform conventional operations as regular forces, and received the support of Prince Bernhard’s HQ at The Hague. The team had actual control of these forces in the line for the defense of the Waal canal. STANLEY II trained these resistance forces on standard Allied weaponry and soldier skills, and eventually formed them into conventional companies. This mission was very similar to today’s modern Foreign Internal Defense mission that Special Operations Forces perform on mobile training missions. The difference is that STANLEY pioneered training techniques and saw the effectiveness of their training immediately in war. STANLEY enjoyed great success in this mission, having trained approximately five Stoottrophen companies and organizing the OD to supplement the rest of the defensive line along Waal.
Results as Communications Link for SFHQ

If the Dutch Liaison teams enjoyed mixed results in their efforts to coordinate the activities of resistance groups, they failed in their assigned mission to act as a backup communications link to London. Of the four teams which deployed as the Dutch Liaison Mission, three lost their radios. Jedburgh teams which deployed to France constantly had their radio sets destroyed on drops, and this problem was not resolved in early September when the SFHQ activated the DLM. (13) Their radio sets may have been state of the art in 1944, but they were heavy and fragile. As a result, only the headquarters mission EDWARD maintained communications with London, and this largely because it landed in a glider as opposed to jumping as did the other three teams. It is likely that if EDWARD had jumped, SFHQ would not have had any communications with the teams throughout the entire Market Garden operation. The communications equipment was fragile and SFHQ had not developed sufficient doctrine for deploying it out of aircraft.

Lessons Learned for Modern Day SOF Operations

There are numerous lessons learned from the Jedburgh role in Operation Market Garden that are
applicable to modern day SOF support to conventional operations. Certainly the 1943 Jedburgh concept is a blueprint for U.S. armed service support to insurgent forces as outlined in FM 100-20. Jedburgh forces were directly involved with the recruitment, organization, and equipping of insurgent forces in a classical unconventional warfare campaign and in support of conventional forces during a major theater operation. They influenced resistance intelligence collection methods, developed their infrastructure, and trained them on sabotage, patrolling, and insertion techniques. Jedburgh teams were instrumental in coordinating with leaders of the underground for conventional force commanders, providing a unique liaison capability that is not discussed in detail in 100-20. (14)

SFHQ and the Jedburghs failed to accomplish certain aspects of their mission, however. It is these failures that are still relevant for study in developing proper procedures for modern day special operations support in insurgency and counterinsurgency operations. First, SFHQ inserted the Jedburghs too late. By accompanying the airborne forces on this mission, the teams did not have adequate time to fully organize resistance forces to perform their assigned tasks. Had the Jedburghs arrived earlier, more intelligence and larger numbers of resistance
forces would have been available for disposition by FAAA planners in London. Second, the division commanders did not have a full appreciation of what resistance forces could provide them in the way of support. Moreover, they had no familiarity with Jedburgh teams and their operations. Thus, the effectiveness of the teams was largely dependent on the flexibility and confidence of their commanders. This worked well in the case of CLARENCE. It was disastrous for CLAUDE and the British First Airborne Division at Arnhem.

Other failures included inappropriate doctrine, poor intelligence, and inadequate communications equipment. The terrain and enemy situation in the Netherlands necessitated a change in Jedburgh tactics. SFHQ should have deployed the teams earlier and in civilian clothes, which would have better prepared them for the contingencies of covert and clandestine operations. Jedburgh teams had inadequate intelligence on the resistance forces. Any special operations unit deploying behind enemy lines requires detailed intelligence on all facets of its operation. As a result of "NORD POL" and the subsequent British distrust of the Dutch underground, Jedburghs deployed without knowing the extent of the friction within the underground or the important leaders who could broker
power. Lastly, Jedburgh teams on the DLM had inadequate personnel to perform all the missions asked of them. To provide a rear link back to London, coordinate resistance operations over a 20 kilometer radius, and produce intelligence for both their division commanders and SFHQ in London required a much larger team. This is especially true when analyzed in the context of the intense series of battles fought over a week’s time in Operation Market Garden. Although SFHQ attempted to obviate this problem by providing attachments, the teams encountered difficulty with some of these personnel and could have more effectively employed Jedburghs exfiltrated from France or elsewhere.

Would SFHQ’s earlier deployment of the DLM teams have made a difference? Many teams in France wrote in their after action reports that an earlier deployment would have improved the success of their missions, yet SFHQ did not follow these suggestions in their planning for Market Garden. (15) Undoubtedly, an earlier deployment would have enabled the teams to establish contacts with the local resistance and prepare them for Market Garden. This was the purpose for team DUDLEY’s earlier deployment and the results were excellent. Only after the Allied advance stalled and the Germans began their razzias and reprisals
against the Dutch population did DUDLEY’s mission lose its effectiveness. Had the other teams of the DLM been deployed a week earlier, it is possible they also would have achieved similar results, and the results for the operation might have been different.

**Affects on the Dutch Population**

Market Garden’s failure and the mixed results of Jedburgh operations in Holland weighed heavily on the Dutch population. The Dutch had initially expected to be liberated within days after the Allies had staged Market Garden. Their bold and overt actions against German forces had been a natural outpouring of confidence that the war would soon be over in the Netherlands. The defeat at Arnhem was a tremendous blow to the Dutch people, who now struggled to endure German SS and Gestapo reprisals. Major Olmsted wrote in his narrative:

...it seemed unbelievable that the Allies would not be in this area for over six months. After the first excitement caused by the airborne landings, hopes sagged as the weeks and months went by and reached a new low during the final preparation of and fighting of the Battle of the Bulge. (18)
CHAPTER TEN

ENDNOTES


2. Olmsted, "Team 'DUDLEY' Eastern Europe, Fall 1944," p. 75.


4. Ibid., p. 9.


7. Team CLAUDE Report, p. 3.

8. Team EDWARD Report, p. 5. It is possible that Wilson simply did not like DuBois. The Dutch lieutenant performed well in the latter stages of Market Garden, and redeployed in November to assist in the evacuation of 1st Airborne Division paratroopers through German lines to the Rhine. Major John Olmsted of team DUDLEY was one of these men.


11. Powell, p. 103.


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15. Lewis, p. 61.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abwehr</td>
<td>The Secret Military Intelligence Department of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (the German High Command), responsible for espionage, counter-espionage and sabotage service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afu</td>
<td>Clandestine radio set operated by an agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agent</td>
<td>Specially trained individual dropped behind enemy lines to obtain information, commit acts of sabotage, and organize resistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bevelhebber Binnenlandse Strijdkrachten</td>
<td>Commander, National/Internal forces. Prince Bernhard's Dutch designation following his appointment by SHAEF as the Commander of the Netherlands Forces (the Triangle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBO</td>
<td>The Dutch headquarters in London for sabotage and underground armed resistance in Holland. Worked under the auspices of SFHQ from 1944-1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBS</td>
<td>See Bevelhebber Binnenlandse Strijdkrachten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BI</td>
<td>The headquarters of the Dutch Secret Intelligence Service in London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-2 Set</td>
<td>SOE designed radio provided to Jedburgh teams for extended communications back to London. This 30 watt device weighed 32 pounds when stored in its suitcase.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Binnenhof</td>
<td>The Dutch parliament Buildings at The Hague. Occupied during the war by the Chief of the SIPO and the SD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bren Gun</td>
<td>British light machine gun ZGB30 adopted in 1934, a modification of the Czech Zb26 machine gun to fire .303 inch ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burgomaster</td>
<td>Mayor or chief administrator of Dutch community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSSAC</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command (Western Europe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Plastic explosive used for demolitions</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<td>---------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSI</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications &amp; Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Command Post</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crystal</td>
<td>Means of regulating the wave-length of radio transmissions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dachshund</td>
<td>1943 SOE exercise to determine equipment requirements for Jedburgh teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dakota</td>
<td>General code name for an air operation in which a Dakota or C-47 aircraft landed behind enemy lines to deliver or pick up men and materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Illegalen</td>
<td>Dutch word for the underground; resistance groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLM</td>
<td>Dutch Liaison Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Liaison Mission</td>
<td>The four Jedburgh teams which supported the Market Garden Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DZ</td>
<td>Drop zone; area designated for parachute landings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETO</td>
<td>European Theater of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETOUSA</td>
<td>European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eureka Marker</td>
<td>Radio navigational device used by the resistance and deployed agents on the ground to mark a drop zone for aerial drop of personnel or equipment. Ground operators transmitted signal letters to aircraft with their Eureka beacon (by varying frequency of the signal) which an aircraft radar air-ground instrument recorded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.A.N.Y.</td>
<td>Female Auxiliary Nursing Yeomanry. SOE organization responsible for training Morse Code and encryption procedures to Jedburgh radio operators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.O.P. Albrect Group</td>
<td>Highly classified Dutch intelligence organization with resistance contacts throughout Holland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFI</td>
<td>Forces Francaises de l'Interieure. French Forces of the Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-Section</td>
<td>Section of the Western European Directorate of SFHQ entirely controlled by SOE/SO and operating independently of the FFI, which introduced and directed undercover agents into France.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUSAG</td>
<td>First United States Army Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G1</td>
<td>U.S. Army designation for personnel staff section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2</td>
<td>U.S. Army designation for intelligence staff section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3</td>
<td>U.S. Army designation for operations staff section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G4</td>
<td>U.S. Army designation for logistics staff section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G5</td>
<td>U.S. Army designation for civil affairs staff section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garden</td>
<td>Code word for British Second Army operations support of the airborne forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gestapo</td>
<td>Acronym for Die Geheime Staatspolizei, Nazi Germany’s Secret State Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groen Polizei</td>
<td>Dutch organization which worked closely with the SS, SD, and Gestapo. Participated on razzia operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jedburgh</td>
<td>British and American code name for specially trained three man team to work with resistance units behind enemy lines</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Jed Set

SOE designed radio exclusively for Jedburgh use. This five watt device weighed 5.5 pounds and, when stored in a specially designed suitcase with its accessories, weighed a total of 9 pounds. Range: approximately 500 miles.

Knockploegen

Dutch resistance groups (translation: knocking groups) which worked in conjunction with the LO, providing identity and ration cards for the underground. The KP also carried out some sabotage missions.

KP

Acronym for the Knockploegen groups.

Ladelijke Organisatie

Dutch resistance organization (translation: National Organization) which safeguarded refugees and downed airmen sought by the Gestapo.

Landwacht

NSB organization with duties similar to the German SD.

Lash

Code name for Jedburgh exercise, commencing 31 May 1944 and ending 8 June 1944. This required Jedburgh teams to contact a resistance group and direct its attack of enemy rail communications and other targets as indicated through W/T at a later time.

Levee

Code name for joint SOE/SO command post exercise held in March 1944 in which the Americans acted as the SO staffs with the Field Armies and the British ran the control.

LO

See Ladelijke Organisatie.

LOCs

Lines of Communication.

Luftwaffe

The German air force of World War II.

LZ

Landing Zone.

Manifest

To assign a load or individual to a particular aircraft for an airborne mission.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maquis</td>
<td>Also known as the Maquisards, French resistance fighters who took their name from the tough and thorny bush in Corsica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>Code word for the operations of the three airborne divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MB/85</td>
<td>Cover name for Milton Hall, Jedburgh training school in Peterborough, England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI-5</td>
<td>British counterintelligence and security service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI-6</td>
<td>The British secret intelligence service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MID</td>
<td>The Dutch Military Intelligence Section of SOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moffen</td>
<td>Dutch derogatory term for the Germans, especially those forces occupying the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSB</td>
<td>National-Sozialistische-Bewegung. The organization of the Dutch national socialists. The founder and leader Mussert was executed in the Netherlands after the war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OD</td>
<td>See Orde Dienst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OKW</td>
<td>The German High Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP</td>
<td>Observation Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORDE DIENST</td>
<td>A widespread underground organization which operated in Holland during the war. It was composed principally of officials and former officers. SOE believed the Germans had penetrated this organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORPO</td>
<td>Ordnungspolizei, or Regulating Police. The German force responsible in Holland between 1940 and 1945 for suppressing clandestine radio links.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>OT</td>
<td>Organisation Todt. Nazi organization for construction of large building projects; e.g. autobahns, West Wall, Atlantic Wall, fortifications, airfields, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSS</td>
<td>Office of Strategic Services, the U.S. secret intelligence and operations service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OG</td>
<td>Operational Groups, OSS teams consisting of 4 officers and 30 enlisted men deployed in Brittany and Southern France to support the D-Day Invasion on missions of sabotage and guerrilla fighting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pannier</td>
<td>Special bag designed for airborne drops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raad Van Vertz</td>
<td>Otherwise known as the Council of the Resistance (RVV). Paramilitary Dutch resistance organization with factions throughout Holland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Razzia</td>
<td>German forced labor and deportation of Dutch male population, employed in reprisals against Dutch populace for their support of Allies in Operation Market Garden.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF-Section</td>
<td>Section of the Western European Directorate of SFHQ dealing with existing independent resistance groups which maintained liaison between BCRA and French resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSHA</td>
<td>Reichsicherheitshauptamt. The headquarters of Himmler's intelligence services, the STAPO, SIPO, and SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RVV</td>
<td>See Raad van Vertz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAB</td>
<td>Student Assessment Board; reviewed qualifications of Jedburgh recruits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sally</td>
<td>Cover name for joint SOE/SD command post exercise held 24 March 1944, in which the British acted as SOE staffs with the field armies and the Americans ran the control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAS</td>
<td>Special Air Service, Britain's uniformed Special operations forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Sicherheitsdienst. Security Service. An organization of the Himmler police force for the suppression of &quot;internal resistance.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>Special Fund, normally established to provide finances necessary to maintain an agent's cover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFHQ</td>
<td>Special Forces Headquarters. A joint SOE/OSS headquarters in SHAEF. Designated a branch of the G3, SHAEF, responsible for coordination of resistance groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAEF</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPO</td>
<td>Sicherheitspolizei. Himmler's Security Police. Section IV of the SIPO was responsible for the liquidation of hostile agents. As services, SIPO and SD worked independently—but both of them were directed by the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (Commander of SIPO and SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO</td>
<td>Special Operations Branch of SOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOE</td>
<td>Special Operations Executive, the British secret intelligence and operations service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S Phone</td>
<td>Small portable radio with a range of eight to ten miles that permitted communications with an aircraft an operator on the ground (weight: approximately ten pounds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spartan</td>
<td>Code name for General Headquarters exercise of a simulated invasion of the continent of western Europe in which agents and Jedburghs participated. Held between the Salisbury Plain and Huntington from 3 March to 11 March 1944.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spur</td>
<td>Jedburgh exercise of an ambush of a German General Staff by partisans staged for General Koenig on 24 and 25 April 1944.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STAPO</td>
<td>Staatspolizei or Secret State Police, also known as the Gestapo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sten</td>
<td>A light, simple 9 millimeter machine carbine named after its inventor, British Major Sheppard Sten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stoottrophen</td>
<td>Dutch resistance volunteers formed into conventional companies to support Allied operations. Responsible to Prince Bernhard's HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stostroeppen</td>
<td>&quot;shock troops,&quot; armed members of the resistance with some military training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STS</td>
<td>Special Training Schools of SOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STS-40</td>
<td>Jedburgh training school at Gumley Hall, Lancashire, England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STS-45</td>
<td>Jedburgh t.training school at Fairford, Gloucester, England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STS-51</td>
<td>Parachute training school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STS-54</td>
<td>Training area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triangle</td>
<td>The triumvirate of resistance groups, the RVV, the KP, and the OD, unified under the command of Prince Bernhard (BBS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vet</td>
<td>To identify and establish the credibility of an individual. To clear for information. Jedburghs &quot;vetted&quot; members of the resistance prior to employing them in support of the airborne divisions, for example</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wehrmacht</td>
<td>The German Army of World War II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W/T</td>
<td>Wireless telegraphy; radio</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Western European Directorate

Western European Section

The portion of SOE or SFHQ dealing with operations in Western Europe.

The sections of SO Branch dealing with operations in Western Europe.
Books


OSS/London Special Operations Branch and Secret Intelligence Branch War Diaries. Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, Microfilm Publications.


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Woods, Christopher M. Chairman Historical sub-Committee, Special Forces Club 8 Herbert Crescent, Knightsbridge, London SW1X 0EZ, Letter to the Author dated 28 September 1989.
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   Synchronization of Combat Power at the Task Force Level

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