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THE JEDBURGHS:
Combat Operations Conducted in the Finistere Region of
Brittany, France from July - September 1944

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

Elliot J. Rosner, MAJ, USA
B.A., United States Military Academy, 1976

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1990

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### The Jedburghs: Combat Operations Conducted in the French Region of Brittany, France from July - September 1944

**Author(s):**
Major Elliot J. Roane

**Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es):**
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
ATTN: ATTL - SPD - GP
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6000

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An historical narrative of Jedburgh Teams Giles, Gilbert, Ronald, Horace, Hilar, and Francis. The Jedburghs consisted of three-man allied teams trained to conduct guerrilla warfare in conjunction with the French Resistance in support of the Allied invasion of France. These teams consisting of French, British, and American men comprised of two officers, one always being French, and an enlisted wire telegraph operator, were uniformed soldiers who volunteered in 1943 for this hazardous work behind enemy lines. Jedburgh or "Jed" teams were but one weapon available to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) and its Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower for this covert mission. This study examines the origins, purpose, and training of the special operations personnel in England. Additionally, the actual operations conducted by these six teams in the western most corner of the Brittany peninsula are discussed. As a forerunner to Special Forces, this paper also examines the validity of the Jedburgh concept and its actual application and utility in the summer of 1944, as well as the lessons learned from these campaigns which are still applicable to warfare today.

**Subject Terms:**
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Approved By:

Samuel J. Lewis, Ph.D.
Thesis Committee Chairman

MAJ Robert C. Leicht, M.A.
Member; Graduate Faculty

Accepted this 1st day of June 1990 by:

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.
Director, Graduate Degree Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of
the student author and not necessarily represent the views
of the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College or any
other governmental agency. (References to this study should
include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

THE JEDBURGHS - COMBAT OPERATIONS CONDUCTED IN THE FINISTERE REGION OF BRITTANY, FRANCE FROM JULY - SEPTEMBER 1944:

The Jedburghs consisted of three man allied teams trained to conduct guerilla warfare in conjunction with the French Resistance in support of the allied invasion of France. These teams consisting of French, British, and American men comprised of two officers, one always being French, and an enlisted wireless telegraph radio operator, were uniformed soldiers who volunteered in 1943 for this hazardous work behind enemy lines. Jedburgh or "Jed" teams were but one weapon available to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) and its Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower for this covert mission.

This study examines the origins, purpose, and training of the special operations personnel in England. Additionally, the actual operations conducted by these six teams in the western most corner of the Brittany peninsula are discussed. As a forerunner to Special Forces, this paper also examines the validity of the Jedburgh concept and its actual application and utility in the summer of 1944, as well as, the lessons to be learned from those campaigns which are still applicable to warfare today. Keywords: Special Forces, France.
Due to the complexity of modern warfare, I have focused my attention in this study on the actual operations conducted by the six Jedburgh teams in the Finistere region of Brittany, France. Additionally, this paper examines the combat operations performed in conjunction with the French Resistance, their missions, command and control set up, and relationship with other allied organizations. Therefore, the inclusion of individual agents, inter-allied missions, Special Air Service (SAS) troops and operational groups (OGs), as well as, items of peripheral importance such as food consumed, usage of captured enemy weaponry and equipment, the diverse nature and internal problems of the French Resistance forces, and the Axis opposition have been cited only when they actually influence the mission. I have employed the nom de guerre of each French Jedburgh in the text. However, the individual's real name (as well as can be determined) and each member's operational code name are mentioned in the appropriate footnote.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank Dr. Samuel J. Lewis and MAJ Robert C. Leicht, my thesis committee, for their invaluable assistance, encouragement and personal efforts to ensure I would complete this project. Additionally, to MAJ Robert Gutjahr, who like myself, chose to write on the "Jeds" and provided me some tremendous insight into the subject.

I would like to acknowledge the staff of the Combined Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth for their selfless devotion to their jobs and the assistance they provided me in my research efforts.

I would be remiss if I did not thank the members of the Jedburghs teams, especially those who provided me with personal wisdom and information on the tremendous activities they performed during the war. They were true heroes of their time, however, not many people have ever heard of them. Hopefully, this essay will do them the justice they so rightly deserve.

Lastly, to my wife Vallie, and daughter Regina, thank you from the bottom of my heart for having the patience and understanding in enabling me to accomplish this endeavor. They sacrificed their family time in support of my goal and I will always be grateful to them. I love you both dearly.
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CHAPTER ONE

"INTRODUCTION"

"... In no previous war, and in no other theatre during this war, have resistance forces been so closely harnessed to the main military effort."

General Dwight D. Eisenhower
Supreme Allied Commander - 31 May 1945

This study will recount and document the operations conducted by the specially selected allied officers and enlisted men of the Jedburgh teams in Finistere. The Special Forces Headquarters (SFHQ), an allied organization under the command of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), dispatched these three-man teams to France, Belgium and Holland. A creation of the British operated Special Operations Executive (SOE), who hoped to dominate it while continuing the illusion of allied unity, it based its operations in London, England during World War II. Their very important and strategically critical mission was to organize, provide arms and equipment, train, and assist the Forces Françaises de
L'interieure (FFI), an umbrella organization of many diverse resistance groups in France, more commonly known as the Maquis. Additionally, during their covert operations from July through September 1944, it was necessary for them to maintain continuous communications with SFHQ to coordinate and relay the desires of the Supreme Allied Commander to the Resistance leaders.

This essay will analyze first, the initial concept and subsequent development of the Jedburghs, concentrating on the joint and combined efforts of the United States, United Kingdom, and France. It will also look at their organizational structure doctrine, selection process, and training. Secondly, this narrative will examine the exploits of six Jedburgh teams that parachuted into the Finistere region in Brittany, France (Maps 1 and 2). In so doing, it will evaluate the particular actions conducted by Jedburgh teams Giles, Francis, Gilbert, Horace, Hilary, and Ronald in chronological sequence from their insertions to extractions. The account of the daily operations of these teams furnishes the reader with an account of their interaction with and influence on the French Resistance. It also provides the reader a tool to evaluate their effectiveness.

Finally, this study will look at the origins of a new branch of service, the Special Forces. However, more importantly, it will look for insights into methods for
improving the command and control, link-up, and communications problems between our conventional and special operations forces today.

"BACKGROUND"

CONCEPT

The Organization of Strategic Services (OSS), commanded by General William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan (Retired), identified the need for and role of a Special Operations Branch (SO) in war as early as August 1941. The purpose of this branch would be solely of a military nature and terminate with the cessation of hostilities. Therefore, with the planning procedures for Operation Overlord (the invasion of France) underway, SO moved their principal base of operations from Washington, D.C. to London (Table 1). This allowed for close coordination and cooperation with the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and by June 1942 such activities were already underway.4

SO and SOE signed an agreement in June 1942 wherein SO, London joined SOE in a combined organization for the support and direction of resistance groups in German occupied countries. Consequently, on 6 July 1942, Major General Colin McV. Gubbins, the Head of SOE, London wrote:

"A project is under construction for the dropping behind of the enemy lines, in cooperation
with an Allied invasion of the Continent, of small parties of officers and men to raise and arm the civilian population to carry out guerilla activities against the enemy's lines of communications. These men are to be recruited and trained by SOE. It is requested that "jumpers" or some other appropriate code name be allotted to these personnel."

1 July 1942, the chief security officer codenamed this project "JEDBURGH". To validate this concept, SO/SOE developed some situational exercises to test the concept of the Jedburghs. The military leaders of the European Theater of Operations, USA (ETOUSA) and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) had to be convinced of their importance and possible combat contributions.

One such exercise, "SPARTAN", lasted from midnight 3 March until midday 11 March 1943. It simulated the invasion of the European continent. The allies, in the scenario, had just secured their initial bridgehead and were preparing to expand their lodgement area. The insertion of eleven teams into the exercise assisted the operations of the British 2nd Army. SOE personnel simulated Resistance groups and agents during the exercise. Lieutenant Colonel (then Captain) Franklin O. Canfield represented the American SO Branch during the exercise.

The SOE/SO personnel successfully accomplished all their assigned tactical missions. Specifically, the primary missions consisted of blowing up five targets, preventing three demolitions, severing two enemy lines of communications systems, and one attack on an enemy
headquarters. Secondary missions included general guerilla attacks against small enemy detachments, staff officers in cars and dispatch riders. From these achievements, performed by specifically selected teams during exercise "Spartan", the SOE/SO branches reached the following conclusions.

They concluded that the Jedburgh concept was a valid one and its continuance was necessary for the success of the upcoming invasion of France. However, there were also some conclusions drawn from the exercise. To prevent detection by the enemy, it was crucial that the personnel be parachuted in at night and at least 40 miles behind the German lines. The exercise also revealed that the teams would operate against enemy lines of communications and carry out guerilla warfare. However, in order for these missions to succeed, it was necessary to insert agents, well in advance of the Jedburghs, to arrange for their reception and to prepare the local resistance groups for the Jedburgh operations.

Once overrun by advancing allied ground forces these teams would be incorporated as guides and intelligence personnel. Therefore, staffs from the SOE/SO and signal sections would be required to be attached to any army and army group headquarters operating in the vicinity of these teams, to maintain communications with and coordinate their
efforts. If the requirement for additional teams arose, it would require at least 72 hours from the approval until the team was ready to insert. Therefore, SOE/SO advised that no immediate mission of tactical importance should be given to these teams.

On 6 April 1943, SOE produced a paper, discussing the lessons learned from the exercise. Submitted to the Chief of Staff for the Supreme Allied Commander's (COSSAC) approval, this document was written by Lieutenant Colonel M. W. Rowlandson, Chief of SOE Planning Section. In the paper, Lieutenant Colonel Rowlandson recommended that the formulated and tested methods of employment and control of resistance groups be accepted. The project also required approval for the necessary personnel and equipment, so planning could commence immediately. As an assurance that both agencies (SOE and SO) agreed on this subject, Lieutenant Colonel Franklin O. Canfield, appointed 15 April 1943 as Chief of the Planning Section of SO Branch, OSS London, submitted an identical American document addressing the same recommendations on 23 April 1943.

OSS routed their report (bearing the same title as the SOE paper), to the commanding general, ETOUSA for approval. The document recommended general approval for the Jedburgh plan and for SO detachments assigned at each US army and army group headquarters, (as well as at Supreme Allied Headquarters, and SOE/SO Headquarters London) to
coordinate the activities of resistance groups with allied military operations. On 17 July 1943, Major General R. W. Barker, Deputy Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (SAC) in a memorandum to the chief of staff, ETOUSA endorsed the OSS proposals. Two days later, Lieutenant General Frederick E. Morgan, COSSAC, approved the SOE proposals.

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph F. Haskell, Chief of SO Branch, prepared a memorandum for distribution. It contained the recommendation that specially trained US officers comprise the SO staffs of the US headquarters in order to coordinate and control, through SOE/SO Headquarters (SFHQ), all the activities of the resistance groups. This was necessary to coincide the efforts of the Jedburgh teams with the desires of the army commanders. In areas where US armies would operate, SFHQ made a determination that Jedburgh teams be led by US officers. Due primarily to time considerations, approval for the OSS proposal needed to be granted immediately.

To facilitate their endeavors, the necessity arose for coordination efforts between the OSS, G-2 and G-3, ETOUSA in order to work out the organization of the Jedburghs. Additionally, OSS, SOE and G-5, ETOUSA, with representation from COSSAC, would have to determine the required number of US teams for the upcoming operations.
Lastly, training of these specialized teams would continue simultaneously as the exercises were ongoing. Once these staffs determined the required number of teams, the need to locate an area in which to secure these personnel and proceed on with their training would be of extreme importance.  

Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers, Commanding General, ETOUSA approved the memorandum on 24 August 1943. A directive issued on 29 August 1943, to the Commanding Officer, OSS, ETOUSA, Colonel David K. E. Bruce ordering plans for the implementation of resistance group activities coordination supported this memorandum. Additionally, the War Department received full support to recruit specially qualified personnel. The commanding general, ETOUSA concurred with the request for 35 US teams and 15 reserve teams for operations in support of Allied forces invading the continent.  

RECRUITMENT  

Major (then Captain) John Tyson, Chief of SO Training Section, London assumed the position and subsequent responsibility for the training of all US personnel on 1 September 1943. Lieutenant Colonel Canfield left London on 4 September 1943 for Washington, D.C. with the specific mission of recruiting personnel for the project.
The importance of this recruitment trip depended on one important item; the identification of adequate numbers of qualified personnel to carry out the Jedburgh missions. OSS Washington, after much debate and discussion, finally authorized 100 officer personnel slots for the European theater. These 100 slots were further broken down into 50 personnel for the Jedburgh mission, 34 to fill positions on SO army staffs, and 16 for required staff positions in the SOE/SO Headquarters.1*

The selection criteria was extremely competitive and therefore difficult. To qualify as a Jedburgh, officers needed qualities of leadership and daring, ability to speak and understand French and be in good all-around physical condition. They wanted combat veterans, even though there were not too many available, or at least required experience in handling men, preferably in an active theater of operations, and be prepared to parachute in uniform behind enemy lines to operate independently for some length of time. There was a desire that the personnel selected as a minimum meet the requirements of at least basic military training and preferably, an aptitude for the use of small arms.

Qualifications for the enlisted radio operators were of course less demanding. They required a passing knowledge of French. In addition to the necessity of having good radio telephone operator (RTO) skills, the non-commissioned
officers also needed to be in exceptionally good physical condition in order to stand up to the required training and fieldwork. As was the case with all personnel, parachuting behind enemy lines to operate their wireless radio sets in the open under war conditions was also a requirement. To be accepted, the RTOs had to attain the minimum allowable speed of 15 words per minute, both transmitting and receiving via MORSE, on the W/T radio set.\textsuperscript{17}

A 1 October 1943 meeting determined 50 officers, 50 enlisted RTOs, and 50 army staff officers would be required. By the end of November 1943, recruiting of United States Jedburgh candidates was complete.

Upon his return to London on 28 November 1943, Lieutenant Colonel Canfield had succeeded in securing the following personnel: 55 officers, 60 RTOs, 54 army staff officers, 27 enlisted men for army staff, and 10 French army officers (who did not count in the US quota) as volunteers for the Jedburgh project.\textsuperscript{18}

SOE personnel requirements for recruiting were similar to those in the United States. SOE required 105 men in 35 teams available in the United Kingdom, 70 transferred from UK home forces, and another 35 from other allied governments. SOE had to provide 90 trained officers and enlisted men for staffs and 90 men for special signal
sections attached to the 2nd British and 1st Canadian Armies in the field.  

The basic Jedburgh Directive issued on 20 December 1943, stated that the Jedburghs were:

"To provide a strategic reserve for creating and controlling offensive actions behind the enemy lines, on and after D-DAY where existing communications, leadership, organization, or supplies are inadequate, and for carrying out additional specific tasks demanded by the military situation."  

After eighteen months of hard work, the Jedburgh concept was finally approved and its importance established. Its principle function was to provide the necessary liaison with resistance groups in areas where there were actual or potential resistance elements. Developed for use in a strategic role, the Jedburghs (once inserted) would have to operate some distance behind enemy lines. Their actual tasks however would be tactical; to harass and hinder the enemy’s movement in the rear, as well as his lines of communications.

Jedburghs in the field were not to act as intelligence agents. Instead, their mission was strictly to keep their eyes open and pass back to SOE/SO HQ London, any information on enemy troop movements, locations of enemy headquarters, military dumps and installations. It was necessary for them to report on what they saw, and not to draw any deductions or conclusions from their observations."
By the close of 1943, 55 American officers and 62 radio operators had arrived in England to begin their indoctrination and training. Training began on 3 January 1944 and by 1 April 1944, all of the Jedburgh teams had been organized. Each team consisted of either a Frenchman, an American and/or an Englishman, of whom two were officers and the third a sergeant wireless operator. In all, a target figure of one hundred of these three man inter-allied Jedburgh teams, were to be ready for their mission and covert insertion into Europe."

COMMAND AND CONTROL.

The problem of command and control developed, especially since there were different countries involved in the Jedburgh actions. As a result, on 1 May 1944, SOE/SO London renamed its' headquarters, Special Force Headquarters (SFHQ). A tripartite staff evolved from this headquarters on 1 July 1944, almost a month after the invasion of Normandy (Operation Overlord)."

French General Marie-Pierre J. F. Koenig (1898-1970), one of General de Gaulle's best fighting generals, commanded this staff called the *Etat-Major des Forces Francaises de L'Interieure* (EMFFI), established to handle all active forces of resistance in France. This allied staff was a subordinate organization to both SHAEF and SFHQ.
The EMFFI, as a result of the inexperience of its members, encountered four main troubles in their work. The staff had to start off working immediately at full speed, with no time to develop. A fair portion of these staff personnel had never experienced any dealings in this specialized field and were therefore inadequately prepared for their positions. Additionally, until the day they joined the organization many members had regarded their fellow officers from other nations with suspicious rivalry. Lastly, many of the French members focused their main attention on the political future of France. This made concentration on their daily tasks quite difficult. Therefore, these factors plus EMFFI's inability to introduce any agents or equipment without the assistance of the Royal Air Force (RAF) or United States Army Air Force (USAAF) squadrons added to its ineffectiveness. Anything planned by the EMFFI with marked political implications was subject to possible veto by the British or Americans. EMFFI Headquarters was in Bryanston Square, London. Lieutenant Colonel Carleton-Smith, United Kingdom and Lieutenant Colonel Henry Coxe, USA manned the Jedburgh office of EMFFI.

In June and July with the successful allied invasion of Normandy, Jedburgh teams parachuted behind enemy lines, mostly entering Brittany, France. Each team established contact with the local resistance leader, communicated to
SFHQ in London via W/T and arranged to arm and equip the Maquis in its specific area of operations. General Koenig's staff finally signalled, by use of a prearranged phrase over the radio on 2 August 1944, for an increase in guerilla activities. The role of the Jedburghs, therefore, became increasingly more important. The Jedburghs passed important bombing targets to the RAF, as well as evacuating allied airmen back to the United Kingdom. As teams were overrun by allied armies, they became guides and intelligence officers for the armies."

All US/UK Jedburgh personnel received orders on 13 October 1944 to return to home station even though work was not complete.** Withdrawal of other Jedburgh teams prior to this message resulted from being overrun or mission completion. Each team, excluding French personnel who remained behind, received instructions to return to England via Paris. At home station, Jedburgh members underwent debriefings and frequently wrote after action reports. By the end of November, all Jedburgh teams were out of France, completed their debriefing actions and dispatched back to their home units.**

EMFFI Headquarters closed on 1 December 1944 and resumed work at #64 Baker Street.** All in all, 276 Jedburghs parachuted into France, Belgium, and Holland, between June and September 1944: 83 Americans, 90 British
and 103 French. These soldiers, most in Army uniforms, had no cover story. If captured, SFHQ instructed them to: give their name, rank, and serial number only and claim POW treatment under military law. The Jedburghs suffered 86 casualties: killed, captured, wounded, or MIA. The damage these teams inflicted upon the enemy however, was tremendous.¹¹

However, had their doctrine been adequately tested prior to their insertion? Had these brave men been properly trained? The remainder of this narrative will address these issues.
FINISTERE REGION OF BRITTANY PENINSULA, FRANCE
TABLE ONE
Outline SOE chain of command, January 1944
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

FRENCH PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

SHAEF

SO/ SOE

SFHQ

EMFFI

1ST ADMIN

2ND INTEL

3RD OPNS

4TH STORES

5TH SIGNAL

6TH BUREAU SPECIAL UNITS

JEDBURGHS

MISSIONS

OGS

TABLE TWO
Outline Chain of Command, July 1944
CHAPTER ONE

ENDNOTES

1 In March 1944, de Gaulle decreed the formation of the FFI, the Forces Francaises de l'Interieure, the army of the new France that was to be. "Local clandestine activities," he said later, "had to take on at the right moment the character of a national effort; had to become consistent enough to play a part in allied strategy; and, lastly, had to lead the army of the shadows to fuse with the rest into a single French army." M. R. D. Foot, SOE In France: An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in France 1940-1944, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1966), p. 380, hereafter cited as SOE In France.


* William "Wild Bill" Joseph Donovan (1883-1959) was a US lawyer who was head of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services), the forerunner of the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). In 1940 Donovan was the unofficial observer for the Secretary of the Navy, KNOX in Great Britain. Sent by President Roosevelt to observe resistance movements he was made the coordinator of intelligence and on June 13, 1942 became the director of the newly created OSS. The OSS had three branches - intelligence, operations and research - and had many influential people working for it. On 1 October 1945, OSS was terminated by an executive order and its functions were distributed to the Department of State and War Department. John Keegan, editor, Who's Who in World War II, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Publishers, 1978), p. 69.
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* Ibid.

Jedburgh, is the name of a small Scottish bordertown located in the Cheviot Hills, southeast of Edinburgh. Personnel were not considered "JEDS" unless they passed all the training requirements and jumped behind enemy lines.


* Ibid., 62.

* Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, Volume 3, p. xii.


1 General Sir Frederick Morgan (1894-1967). Chief planner of the allied invasion of Normandy. In January 1943, he was appointed COSSAC. who was not yet appointed, and was ordered to produce a detailed plan for an invasion of Europe. Morgan was not given sufficient resources, especially landing craft and could not get any until Eisenhower was appointed SAC. Morgan's final plan was adopted at a conference in June-July 1943 and for the next year, until D-Day 4 June 44, the plans for Operation Overlord were worked out in great detail under Morgan. Keegan, Who's Who in World War II, p. 150.

12 The title of the memorandum was "Direction and Support of Resistance Groups in Enemy Occupied countries subsequent to the Initiation of Operations on the Continent." Hymoff, The OSS in World War II, p. 245.

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18 Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, Volume 3, p. xvii.


20 Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, Volume 3, pp. xviii-xix.

21 Ibid., xx.


23 Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, Volume 3, p. ii.


25 100 teams was the target figure, however they never achieved it. By deploying several teams twice and adding Milton Hall training personnel, SFHQ managed to deploy 99 teams to France and the Netherlands. M. R. D. Foot, SOE in France, p. 33.

26 Hymoff, The OSS in World War II, p. 308.

27 General Marie-Pierre Koenig (1898-1970) gained some of his military expertise in the French colonial wars and served as a captain in the Norway campaign in 1940. When the allies were forced to withdraw from Norway he returned only to be compelled to retire to England when France fell. He joined De Gaulle's Free French Army and was sent to N. Africa to command a force largely made up of members of the French Legion. An enthusiastic and dynamic leader he conducted the defense of Bir Hacheim in 1941. Although he was forced to withdraw, his stand versus Rommel's Panzers was considered by the allies to be a victory as he had held
the fort from 10 days versus overwhelming odds and had been able to save most of his troops from being captured. After the invasion of Europe he became commander of the Forces of the Interior. His major task in this post was to bring the Resistance groups under the control of the government of de Gaulle. When Paris was liberated he became military governor of the city and it fell to him to restore law and order to the beleaguered city. Keegan, Who's Who in World War II, p. 131. R. Harris-Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 188.

** M. R. D. Foot, SOE, p. 228.

** Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, Volume 3, p. 61.

' Blind transmission broadcasts were inserted into normal BBC programs. From these broadcasts, the resistance was notified of exact drop times and locations. Roosevelt, The Overseas Targets, p. 204.

** Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, Volume 3, p. 62.

** Ibid.


** Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, 1940-45, p. 165.
MISSIONS

The Jedburgh Directive dated 20 December 1943, issued jointly by the SOE/SD, outlined to the recently recruited American and British officers and enlisted men several tasks. These missions would require extensive training and preparation time from the candidates. Additionally, it assigned a specific order of priority to these tasks for training purposes. This was necessary to ensure that the teams had attained an appropriate level of proficiency in those areas which the advancing allied armies required. These tasks, in their order of priority, were:

| A | 1 | Rail cutting |
|   | 2 | Attacks on enemy road vehicles, including transport parks |
|   | 3 | Misdirection and dislocation of road traffic |
|   | 4 | Misdirection, delaying and dislocating of Panzer Division movements |

| B | 1 | Destruction of telecommunications |
|   | 2 | Liquidation of enemy commands and staffs |
|   | 3 | Interference with enemy supplies |
|   | 4 | Neutralizing Luftwaffe, sabotage of enemy aircraft |
C 1 Destruction of electric power points used for military power  
   2 Demolition of minor bridges  
   3 Prevention of final demolition on vital points for later use by allied armies  
   4 Observing and reporting enemy positions, headquarters, military dumps and installations

D 1 Attacks on railroad installations  
   2 Attacks on railroad engines and rolling stock without lasting damage

SFHQ prohibited Jedburgh teams from blowing up industrial targets; public utility installations, other than electric power used for military purposes; shipping; demolition of major bridges not already prepared for demolition by the enemy; and those targets which caused lasting damage to railroad engines and rolling stock.

The mission of the newly formed SFHQ was to train these allied volunteers, so they could plan and control the resistance groups actions. The teams were to plan these actions in coordination with the Supreme Commander's sphere and related areas in order to conform with the operational plans for a return to western Europe. The Jedburgh trainees numbered 50 British, 62 American, 62 French, 9 Belgian, and 9 Dutch officers; and 35 British, 50 American, and 15 French W/T operators. SFHQ administered these volunteers a Student Assessment Board (SAB), immediately upon arrival in England (28 December 1943 - 5 January 1944). This test examined their motivation, intelligence,
aptitudes, emotional stability, initiative, discipline, leadership, self-confidence, physical coordination and stamina. Those who passed advanced to the Special Training Schools (STS) located in Scotland (37 of 55 American officers), while those not scoring as high joined the Operations staffs of the OSS or SFHQ.

In late December 1943, the administrative structure to train the Jedburghs evolved. Lieutenant Colonel Frank V. Spooner of the British Army appointed as the 1st Commandant of the Jedburgh School, selected Major Horace W. Fuller, USMC, as his Deputy Commandant and Major O. H. Brown, British Army as the Chief Instructor. Together, they established a curriculum geared to prepare the Jedburghs for deployment and the missions required by 1 April 1944. This agenda later became the foundation for the United States Army Special Forces training program of instruction.

The officers selected as team leaders and second in commands trained in three STS locations throughout the Scottish countryside. The W/T operators, on the other hand, trained separately at the communications school, STS-54, located at Henley-on-Thames, just outside London. For approximately a month, these radio telephone operators underwent intensive instruction on radio skills taught to them by uniformed females of the Women's Transport Service (WTS), also known as FANYs, Female Auxiliary Nursing Yeomanry. Operating solely in Morse code, they trained on
British radio equipment. This radio consisted of three component parts; the receiver, transmitter and hand generator each which was separately wired together. Combined the weight of the radio set totalled about twenty pounds.

**TRAINING AT MILTON HALL**

When Milton Hall, a private estate leased by SOE approximately five miles north of Peterborough, England (60 miles north of London), opened on 5 February 1944, 46 of the 62 Jedburgh W/T operators joined the remainder of the Jedburghs. Organized here equally into three separate companies, a comprehensive 12 week training program awaited these successful Jedburgh volunteers.

Divided into two major parts, the training consisted of six weeks of basic paramilitary training at Milton Hall, followed by six additional weeks of operational training in the countryside of Leichestire. Major John Tyson, AUS, Chief SO Training Officer and Colonel James Young, British, Chief SOE Training Officer agreed to use the existing SOE schools, however, SO augmented the training cadre with 20 additional instructors. While training was ongoing, it was necessary to continue recruiting, as the necessary French personnel had not been acquired. The remainder of the French Jedburghs arrived at Milton Hall in mid-March.
Officers from "L'Infantrie de l'Aire", a battalion based in the United Kingdom and from the Middle East rounded out the personnel requirements.

The subject areas covered during the basic training phase were varied and plentiful, although language training was continuously studied and practiced throughout. The courses consisted of demolition, physical training, map reading, fieldcraft, anti-tank mines, street fighting, motorcycle and car driving. Weapons training, instructed by Major Ferberg, Chief of Police Shanghai, included both knowledge and firing of American, British, French and German small arms. Expertise in both guerilla and German tactics was essential, as well as, intelligence training which included intensive uniform recognition classes. Finally, classes on operations orders along with the fundamentals of reception committee work rounded out the formal classroom instruction. Additional subject areas taught to the Jedburghs' officers were a general history of resistance movements in northwest Europe, an outline in which resistance movements could assist an invasion, and lectures on the various functions of Jedburghs. First aid, practical W/T for non-operators, the geography of France, and observation/memory training supplemented this well balanced program.

A typical day started with a 0600 hours wake up followed by a strenuous physical training (PT) session for
about thirty minutes led by a British sergeant major. A cold shower followed, prior to a traditional British breakfast, which took some adjusting to by both the Americans and French, and then off to the classroom. The morning session usually included language, weapons, explosives, and hand-to-hand training followed by lunch. The afternoon session started with a second PT session, prior to movement to the range, where practical application involved both plastic demolitions and weapons firing. Following supper, the Jeds devoted some time to additional reading and studying.¹³

After the first month of training, 50 Jedburghs at a time travelled to Altringham, Manchester to attend STS-51 for their parachute training and qualification. This was a condensed course which required the soldiers to make a minimum of three parachute jumps. Their first was a balloon jump from an altitude of 700 feet using a British parachute and no reserve parachute. Executed primarily during periods of limited visibility, six man groups or sticks dropped consecutively through an opening in the bottom of a barrage balloon gondola suspended beneath the balloon. The final jumps, performed in ten man sticks, were daylight operations from Lancaster bombers.¹⁴

Operational training commenced on 21 February 1944 and continued until D-Day. In order to provide a cover
story for the Jedburghs throughout their training in the United Kingdom and in case of capture, SFHQ labeled Milton Hall as ME/65 and the Jeds as "Allied Commandoes."\textsuperscript{16}

Analyzing the situation in northwest Europe, SOE developed four major plans involving resistance coordination. Plan Vert, concentrated sabotage against the railroads, Plan Tortue, similar actions against bridges and highways, Plan Blue, destruction of the Wehrmacht's electrical supply system, and Plan Violet, disruption of the German's telecommunications system, were the basis for a series of exercises which the Jedburghs participated in during the spring of 1944.\textsuperscript{16}

The purpose of these exercises was to evaluate the current status of the Jedburghs and validate the Special Forces detachments. These small staffs, designed to provide direct liaison between the army groups in the field and the deployed Jedburgh team, proved to be a successful method to effect coordination of efforts. Lasting in duration from 36 hours to ten days, the exercises overall proved to be a success. The major exercises were SPILL OUT, LEVEE, and SALLY. SPILL OUT, the first exercise conducted, identified some problems with the tactics and techniques used by the Jedburghs. During LEVEE, a four day exercise, US SO personnel portrayed the SF detachments in the field, while the UK SOE personnel controlled the exercise. SALLY, originally named VERMILLION, employed the UK SF staffs from
21-25 March 1944, while the US SO personnel controlled the exercise. SALLY revealed a problem in the briefing procedures that the Jedburghs received prior to deployment. A decision to adopt the standard Air Corps briefing solved this issue, which will be discussed later.17

Duplicating realistic conditions remained a primary concern throughout these important test periods. Inserted by parachute into regions of the United Kingdom, which portrayed similar distances to their proposed actual destinations, the Jedburgh communications procedures proved adequate. Additionally, long, arduous forced marches and escape routes caused the team members to appreciate the dangers of their mission.18

Administrative problems also began to surface around this time. The American Jedburgh personnel felt they deserved to receive the additional parachute "hazardous duty" pay. The War Department denied this request. The enlisted soldiers, promised promotion to officer status, felt betrayed when this could not be delivered. Regardless, morale remained high and the training continued.19

Throughout all of this training, individuals starting jelling into groups and soon operational teams began to form. The only limitation placed on the individuals was the requirement for each team to have an officer of the country to which deployment would occur.
Most of the time, this officer was either a native of the region or extremely familiar with its people and customs. Finally, by early April, the majority of the teams had organized and the marriages, as they were commonly referred to, solemnized by Lieutenant Colonel Spooner and Lieutenant Colonel Musgrave, who became commandant on 8 April 1944. These selections appeared in the publication of daily orders. The use of forenames, spices, drugs, and plants provided the Jedburgh teams codenames during their operations.18

With all of this training ongoing and the decision to delay D-Day until June, preparations for the reception of the teams in France began. Captain W. Millett travelled to France to organize what became the Mitchell Plan. It involved the discovery of safe houses, organization of reception committees, and the creation of small groups to form the nucleus of larger forces to be put at the disposal of the Jedburgh teams on and after D-Day. Along with 2 1/2 million francs, Captain Millett was able to accomplish the first two tasks. The latter would be accomplished by the Bureau des recherches et d'actions a Londre, (BRAL) military delegates.19

DEPLOYMENT PROCEDURES

The French Forces of the Interior (FFI) developed their phased plan to complement the allied invasion of
northwest Europe. This six phase operation involved first, delaying the moves of enemy reserves to Normandy and dislocation of their communications, secondly, the liberation of Brittany followed by, the assistance (in terms of tactical intelligence) to the allied advance to the Seine River, fourthly, the support of allied forces in southern France, and the liberation of Paris, and finally the harassment of German withdrawal from western and southern France was critical.

With the eventual deployment of Jedburgh teams to France to support the above mentioned operation, it was necessary to document procedures for dispatching Jedburgh teams. These methods were in "Operational Procedures of SF Headquarters, 12 May 1944." The request for a team had to be initiated from SO/SF staffs in the field or SOE/SO liaison officers (LNOs) attached to SHAEF with the wishes of BRAL. After consultation with the country section, a recommendation to or not to dispatch occurred. A warning order was sent to the appropriate team as the country section prepared briefings and made all the necessary arrangements. These consisted of aircraft requisitions from the US 8th Air Force group, known as "Carpetbaggers", based at Harrington Aerodrome, Kettering, as well as, parachutes, packages and ordering of containers. When the decision to deploy arrived, the Jedburgh team would travel from Milton
Hall to London to receive their final briefings and preparations.

The formal briefings, conducted solely by the country section, were similar to the Air Corps briefings and normally lasted three to four hours. Provided with a current Michelin road map, the Jedburghs, for the first time, learned their final destination. Given the name of their DZ, their instructions were to report back to SFHQ immediately and request subsequent dropping grounds in the following manner; the number of the Michelin map, section number, and the coordinates. A code letter designation (provided to the members of the Jeds and AF aircraft) on the DZ, displayed either by small fires or blinking flashlights in Morse code, or the signal from the Eureka beacon informed the Jedburghs that the area was clear. Codewords known only to the reception committee on the ground also alerted the members if something was wrong, once on the ground.

Locations of nearby safe towns and houses, by a bearing and distance in kilometers from the DZ, allowed for safe refuge in the operational area.

Each Jedburgh had in his possession a series of false documents. They were an identity card, ration card, demobilization paper, textile ration card, certificate of domicile, work permit and driving license. These all seemed authentic, as they had been produced by the resistance in
France and shipped back to the SFHQ in England. Since the members were to remain in uniform, so they could claim POW rights, these papers offered them the opportunity, if a decision to wear civilian clothes was made, to at least have a reputable cover story.28

JEDBURGH OPERATIONS

In all, SFHQ dispatched 72 Jedburgh teams from the United Kingdom into northwest Europe. The personnel breakdown for a total of 209 bodies was as follows: United States-62, France-75, United Kingdom-67, Belgium-1, Netherlands-4. In the months of July-August 1944 close to 9000 tons of supplies dropped to the French Resistance through the efforts of these Jedburgh teams.29

In the next chapters, I will discuss the operations of each of the teams dropped into the Finistere region of Brittany, France. This will include their initial link up with the resistance parties and their small guerilla actions until General Koenig's message, "Le chapeau de Napoleon, est-il toujours a Perros-Guirec?", sent over BBC informing the resistance in the Brittany peninsula to commence large scale operations on 2 August 1944. Napoleon's hat was the local name of a famous rose-red granite rock at the holiday resort of Perros-Guirec.37
On 3 August, General Koenig declared the following call to arms for all Frenchmen.

"French people of Brittany, the hour of your liberation has come! The provisional government of the French Republic calls for the national uprising! French people of Brittany, workers, peasants, official employees! The time has come for you to take part, with or without weapons, in the last battle. . . . French people of Brittany! The whole of France salutes you! The whole of France will follow you in the national insurrection."**

This speech, broadcast over BBC, was followed by the "Marseillaise" (France's national anthem), signalling the French to "Formez-vous vos battalions" (French - form your battalions). From this point forward, the Maquisards sought out individual or small parties of Germans and eliminated them in what would become known as the "joys of liberation."**

I will also examine the attempted coordination efforts of all the Jedburgh teams by the ALOES mission, commanded by Colonel Eono. Placed in charge of all resistance actions in Brittany, this EMFFI Headquarters communicated directly to SFHQ back in London.**
CHAPTER TWO

ENDNOTES

1 Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, Volume 3, p. vi.

2 Ibid., p. iii.


4 Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, Volume 3, pp. xx-xxiii.

5 Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, Volume 3, p. 1.


7 The schools and locations of Jedburgh training facilities are as follows:
   STS - 6 Walsingham, Surrey
   STS - 40 Gumley Hall, Lancashire
   STS - 45 Fairford, Gloucestire
   Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, Volume 3, p. xxii.

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Milton Hall was an ancestral home of the Fitzwilliam family. It was partly Elizabethan and partly XVIIIth century. Jedburghs conducted their training throughout the estate, for instance weapons training occurred in the sunken garden, where as, Morse code training occurred in the dairy. Stanley Cannicott, *Journey of a Jed,* (Cheddar, Somerset: Cheddar Valley Press, 1986), p. 22.


11 Ibid., p. 8.


13 Bob Kehoe interview.

14 Ibid.

15 Mendelsohn, *Covert Warfare*, Volume 3, p. xxv.


The containers used were a strong metal or plastic cylindrical case under six feet in length containing supplies to be parachuted to resistance groups of SOF teams.
The H container consisted of five metal cells, while the C container simply had one large compartment.

** Ibid., pp. 32-35. The country section team conducted the briefings in a flat on Baker Street. Cannicott, *Journey of a Jed*, p. 27.

** Ibid.

** Ibid.


** Ibid., 780.

** Ibid., 781.

CHAPTER THREE

"TEAM GILES"

SFHQ dispatched team Giles to the Finistere area on the evening of 8/9 July 1944. As the seventh team sent to France from the United Kingdom, its specific mission was to organize resistance in the Finistere area. No offensive action could occur against the Germans, however, unless directed to do so by SFHQ. Operating in the vicinity of the SAS team Dingson, the team consisted of Captain Bernard M. W. Knox (US), Captain Paul Lebel (French) and Sergeant Gordon H. Tack (United Kingdom).1

Alerted on 16 June 1944, Giles travelled to London to receive their briefing. General Koenig, Commander of EMFFI, spoke to the team before its departure to stress the importance of their mission and especially in sending back information, since very little was known regarding the strength or status of the resistance in the Finistere area. Captain Lebel, when called back to London, agreed with SFHQ that the BBC message authorizing large-scale attacks on the Germans in Brittany be "Le Chapeau de Napoleon est-il
Toujours a Perros-Guirec?" The team departed for France on 4 July, however, as a result of mechanical problems they returned to England. At 2300 hours 8 July, in a black painted B-24 Liberator, they flew from Harrington Aerodrome, this time dropping as planned.

At approximately 0100 hours 9 July, the hole opened in the floor of the aircraft as the pilot reported seeing the reception committee's lights on the DZ. After circling around the area for another twenty minutes in an attempt to relocate the lights, they dropped; first Captain Knox, then Sergeant Tack, and finally Captain Lebel. Landing fairly close to each other on the DZ, the team was immediately welcomed by the reception committee. This group of very young and excited Frenchmen, all greeted the Jeds in turn and started to collect the stores and equipment that had been dropped along with the team. Finally, M. Arzel, the organizer of the committee, introduced himself and informed the team of the status of the Maquis in the area. He explained that the extremely disorganized state of the FFI in the region resulted from the capture and execution of twelve of their leaders during the past week. Among those lost was "Poussin", the man the team was instructed to contact. M. Arzel suggested they travel to Chateauneuf-du-Faou, where the local Maquis leader awaited them.

At 0430 hours, mounted in three cars and a large truck, the group departed on back roads in the direction of
Chateauneuf. Travelling part of the journey during daylight, they arrived in a small wood approximately three kilometers west of Laz, where the 50 man Maquis group was hiding. The chief was in Cote-du-Nord trying to get arms, so the second-in-command, a peasant and former regular soldier, was in charge and welcomed them. This Maquis appeared to be well organized and the distribution of arms and supplies went quickly. Captains Knox and Lebel soon thereafter established a defensive perimeter around the command post (CP). The remainder of the first day consisted of inspections and periods of instruction to the men on the operations of their new weapons.

That afternoon, a BBC "crack signal" message (blind transmission broadcast from London) instructed them to return to their original DZ to receive additional parachuted supplies. The drop was a successful one, however, once back at the CP, they learned that some 300 German paratroopers had searched the entire area surrounding Laz during their absence. The Germans were also capable of DFing (direction finding) the W/T transmissions. In this instance therefore, the radio set was not used. Instead they dispatched a carrier pigeon back to SFHQ, however the message never reached London.

The leader of the Maquis, Yues Legal, returned on 11 July and turned out to be the leader of the FTP (Francs-
tireurs et partisans) for the department. The FTP were the communist controlled paramilitary resistance groups which operated independently of the FFI. The team explained their mission and the need for adequate and safe drop grounds, especially areas where two more Jedburgh teams would be inserted. Giles informed SFHQ of the need to insert these additional teams: one for Brest and the other for Morlaix. They provided drop zones that were later used also for the dropping of equipment. One of the teams (Francis or Gilbert) that jumped on the evening of 9-10 July, dropped into Giles' first pre-arranged DZ. This resulted in their drop being detected and ambushed by the Germans, causing casualties and loss of equipment. Team Giles informed SFHQ of this and instructed them to stop using that drop zone.

As team Giles radioed drop zone locations to SFHQ, the BBC transmitted messages, designating exact drop times and locations for the Maquis. The resistance elements then proceeded to these locations in order to recover the canisters and containers from the drops. In all circumstances except the one stated above, the parachute drops were successful with no loss of equipment from German interference. The DZs used were Poire, Cerise, Framboise, Orange, Abricot, Raisin, and Amande (see Map 1).

On 12 July, the chief of the FFI of Finistere, Colonel Berthaud, visited the team's CP outside Laz. The team explained their plans and actions, and indicated they
would maintain liaison with him through their Maquis leader. As a result of his second visit, one of the passengers in Colonel Berthaud's car had to be shot. The individual was a known Gestapo agent and had followed Colonel Berthaud into the CP area. Team Giles therefore decided to maintain minimal liaison with Colonel Berthaud as possible. They relayed this decision to SFHQ, which concurred with their precautions.

On 13 July, the mayor of Laz informed the team that the Germans were looking for the team and the Maquis company. The Germans also had a map with the locations of the farms frequented by the Maquis. They therefore moved to Kernour, a very high plateau in the vicinity of St. Thois, where they remained until 20 July.

While in their new location, two departmental FTP chiefs visited the team. These individuals provided the team with some interesting facts about the history of the resistance in the region. After some time, the team revealed their policy and role and were able to win these two influential leaders into their confidence. The most difficult task was to convince these partisans of the need to wait until the message for escalation arrived before using their new weapons in offensive operations. In addition, they provided team Giles with additional DZ locations, which were transmitted to London. These new DZs
received parachute drops from SFHQ containing the much needed equipment and supplies.

Team Giles participated in the reception of Jedburgh teams Horace and Hilary. Once on the ground, they arranged for transportation to move the teams to their respective areas, Horace to Brest and Hilary to Morlaix. Additionally they informed the new arrivals that when they arrived at their new locations they would then link-up with their Maquis leaders and groups. On 17 July, a downed Canadian pilot, Flight Lieutenant Brown, linked up with team Giles and remained with them, assisting Sergeant Tack in the deciphering and transmitting of messages. He stayed with the team until handed over to the American troops in early August.

As a result of the escape of a prisoner, it was necessary for the team to move again. This time they moved to a valley, about three kilometers from Lennon. While in this hiding area, they organized a medical service. This organization consequently saved many lives in the region. The service consisted of two physicians; a doctor (who established a hospital in his quarters) in Briec and a surgeon from Quimper. Both of these doctors were extremely reliable and available whenever needed. They operated and tended for wounded resistance personnel in an area that was vastly occupied by German soldiers.
Team Francis, shortly after their insertion into the area, came to visit Giles to determine zones of action. After some discussion they divided the entire area of Finistere among the six teams that had been inserted. Giles' area of operation and responsibility consisted of the area within Douarnez-Brie-Gourin in the south, the departmental boundary to Carhaix in the east, and Brienon-Sizun-Daoulas in the north (see Map 4). With the requests for drops successfully being accomplished, as well as the RAF destroying targets from the information sent by the team, the Germans mounted a serious attempt to eliminate the teams. Giles consequently moved again, this time to a farm near Langolen.

That evening Germans searching the area captured five men from the group. It became necessary therefore to move again. Since the terrain to the north was unfavorable, the team decided to return south of the Pleyben-Chateauneuf road. Along the way, several German patrols caused the group to separate and the Maquis soldiers, lacking in physical stamina, began falling behind and hiding in barns along the way. Finally they arrived back at their original location at Kernour. This area however was dominated by a chateau occupied by the Germans as an observation post. They relayed this location to SFHQ and the RAF on 30 July.
bombed it. As a result of increased activity in the area, the team was once again forced to move.

The village of Plessis, their original location west of Laz, was to be their final relocation. From this location they planned and executed an attack in the sector of the German 2nd Parachute Division. On 2 August Giles received a transmission informing them of the death of Major Colin M. Ogden-Smith, from team Francis. The message also stated that his papers containing important information and DZ locations had been compromised. They consequently informed SFHQ to cancel all of his drops. Giles' drops however, continued. From this location, team Giles received supplies on the following uncompromised DZs: Groselle, Noisette, Noix, Ananas, Prune, Mandarine, and Fraise (see Map 1).

Finally on 2 August, the long awaited message arrived over the BBC allowing armed revolt. The attack on the 2nd Parachute Division therefore began. By this time, the Maquis group had grown to some seven companies. They immediately began ambushing the Germans along roads. As a result of these attacks, they took a large number of prisoners. Most of the individuals captured were young paratroop soldiers, who believed in their cause and had several unexplained belongings of French personnel on them. The FFI subsequently shot them all, and even if Giles had wanted to stop these killings, it could not have been
prevented. The French resistance personnel hated these German soldiers. They viewed them in the same vain as those that had burned farms and murdered farmers, along with their wives and children, throughout their countryside.

One of the transmissions received by Giles, on 4 August, instructed them to send guides out to link up with the advancing American ground forces. Additionally, they received instructions to seek out and immediately inform the G-2 with vital information on first, preparations of fortified lines of defense; second, troop concentrations with identification if possible; third, permanent type targets; fourth, artillery emplacements; fifth, tank concentrations; sixth, defended points; seventh, machine gun emplacements; eighth, petrol dumps; ninth, ammunition dumps; and tenth, enemy headquarters. If asked, the password provided them in order to see the G-2, would be "Angouleme". On 5 August members of the 86th Reconnaissance Squadron (US) approached the CP in two jeeps. Meanwhile, their main column had been ambushed by the Germans. As a result, the Germans indiscriminately killed portions of the civilian population. These villagers had already started flying French flags with the arrival of the Americans and the Germans reinforced their presence with these actions.

This event should never have occurred. SFHQ was aware the entire time of the location of the Jedburgh teams.
In addition, they had communications with the advancing American forces through the Special Forces detachment assigned to each army headquarters. Therefore, the unit should have contacted team Giles to find out the exact locations of the Germans and the situation in the area. As it turned out, American ground forces did not even know of their existence or the fact that there were allied parachutists operating in the Finistere area.

On 7 August, Giles occupied the bombed out chateau and made contact with the Aloes mission, inserted into the Finistere region the evening of 4/5 August to consolidate and centralize all resistance efforts in the area. Colonel Eono, the leader of the group, and his staff established their headquarters in the Chateau de Kerrion, near the city of Pleyben. By this time, all of Giles' area had been liberated with the exception of the Fresqu'ile de Crozon (Crozon peninsula). The Americans entered the area and prepared to conduct a major attack on the city of Brest. They therefore requested that the primary route of Rostrenen-Carhaix-Brest and the secondary route Pontluy-Gourin-Carhaix-Chateaulin-Brest (see Map 2) be cleared and protected by organized resistance groups.*

Captain Knox and Colonel Eono travelled to Plabannec to meet with team Horace to discuss the attack. Upon arrival, they met Major General Troy H. Middleton, the Commanding General of VIII Corps. During the conversation,
Captain Knox convinced the Americans that American forces should assist in taking the Crozon peninsula, since it contained 12,000 organized German soldiers armed with artillery and mortars. The 17th Cavalry Squadron (US), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Lindquist, reinforced by the 15th Cavalry Squadron, and backed up by the FFI began their offensive on the peninsula by reducing Menezhom and St. Nic (German strongpoints). With team Giles working as the liaison between the US cavalry and the FFI, the operation was extremely successful and specifically, the cooperation worked well.

On 9 September, team Giles left the Finistere area, returning to SFHQ in London. Boarding a Royal Navy minesweeper in Quimper, they returned to Dartmouth on the south coast of England where they proceeded to board a train bearing signs "German POWs". When they left, the entire peninsula of Crozon up to Telgrec-sur-Mer was in allied hands.

Upon return to England, Captain Knox had the following to say reference his mission:

"While we were wonderfully trained in the most advanced techniques of clandestine work, we were not privy to what the high command planned. We never quite knew what our function was, beyond the mission prescribed for us in our operational orders. If we were part of some larger strategical scheme, we did not know it. Neither was it desirable that we should have known; we might have been captured and forced into talking. But it was quite clear to us that our unit commanders did not
expect us to come back. But this was very carefully camouflaged; had we known perhaps some of us would have had second thoughts about going in at all. These were, at the same time, indications that we were sacrifices of some sort. You know how careful the military is in making you sign for anything of value—binoculars, prismatic compasses, special watches, rum, wireless sets, special pistols, sovereigns, fishing gear, that sort of thing? When I went to the stores to draw my special equipment, the officer concerned said he was not too bothered about a signature as it would not mean much. That was a sign that we were regarded as lost— together with our equipment—the moment we got on the plane. But none of us had the slightest doubt that what we were doing was absolutely right and, of course, that carried us through; nobody, not one man, bugged out. They were baying to get into the field."
TEAM GILES' AREA OF OPERATIONS
CHAPTER THREE

ENDNOTES

The real names and operational codenames of the members of team Giles are as follows:

Captain Bernard M. W. Knox KENTUCKY

Born 24 November 1914. He received his education in England attending high school for four years at Battersea, London and three years at St. John's College, Cambridge. Captain Knox served in the Spanish Republican Army from August 1936 - February 1937. He was commissioned a 2nd Lieutenant on 14 November 1943 and promoted to 1st Lieutenant on 1 October 1943. From 30 October 1943 - 31 December 1943, he served as an Instructor for the OSS Detachment, ETOUSA and served with SO from 1 January 1944 until 1 July 1944. Additionally, he attended OSS Parachute Training School Jump Course, Lawry Field from 1 January - 1 March 1944. Following the war, Bernard Knox became an eminent professor of Greek philosophy and published the following books; "A Front-Line Classicist" and "Essays Ancient and Modern." He currently resides in Darnestown, Maryland.

Captain Paul Grall LOIRE

Survived the war to retire in Nice, France.

Sergeant Gordon H. Tack TICKIE

Survived the war to retire in Hampshire, England.

The remainder of the information contained within this chapter is cited from the official "Giles" Jedburgh team report. Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, Volume 3, pp. 323-360.
CHAPTER THREE

ENDNOTES (CON’T)


4 Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, Volume 3, p. 343.

5 Ibid., 333.

6 Ibid., 350.

7 Ibid., 334.

8 Ibid., 336.

9 This information cited from a personal letter written to the author by Mr. Gordon H. Tack, dated 22 February 1950.

10 Anthony Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies, p. 579.
CHAPTER FOUR

"TEAM FRANCIS"

Jedburgh team Francis was the ninth team to drop into France from the United Kingdom. Inserted into the Finistere Region on the night of 9/10 July 1944, the team consisted of Major Colin M. Ogden-Smith (British), Captain Guy le Zachmeur (French), and Sergeant Arthur J. Dallow (British). Francis' mission was to organize resistance groups in the Finistere area. One of the six teams dispatched to the Finistere region, SFHQ provided them with a specific sector of the region to establish their resistance groups and operate in. Their principle task was to find a minimum of three DZs and to set up reception committees capable of receiving arms and stores. Additionally, it was critical for them to select areas suitable for glider operations, as well as beach areas for sea supply operations.

SFHQ directed the team to organize small groups of approximately one hundred men and disperse them throughout the region. The size of these groups however was mainly
dependent on the quantity of arms they received from SFHQ for the resistance. This effect would create more havoc to the German occupation forces by allowing for greater dispersion throughout the region. However, as was the case with all of the teams in the area, attacks against the Germans were momentarily to be avoided. General guerilla action would not commence in Brittany until the BBC's transmission of the SFHQ message, "Le chapeau de Napoleon est-il toujours a Perros-Guirec?"

Francis, along with teams Hilary, Horace, and Gilbert, (discussed later in Chapters 7, 6, and 5, respectively) received their briefing from Major Horton (SO, country team section) on the 8th and 9th of July. The teams agreed on their zones of activity; however, team Giles, which had departed a day earlier, remained unaware of these zoning restrictions. Departing from Harrington Aerodrome, the team jumped at 0210 hours the 10th of July. The members of team Francis experienced a bad drop. The aircraft failed to slow down its speed to that prescribed for dropping paratroopers, causing the team's members to land in the woods. Additionally, the drop destroyed much of the equipment they brought with them. Major Ogden-Smith separated from the team as a result of the bad parachute drop, did not return to team Francis until 14 July. Hiding at a prearranged rendez-vous point in St. Fiacre near Le Faouet, he waited for the resistance forces to find him. He
was unaware however that the latter town was the local center for the anti-terrorist movement. As a result, his recovery took some time because of the extensive patrolling by these German units.

The remainder of team Francis, however, made immediate contact with the departmental resistance chiefs. They made initial contact with SFHQ finally on 11 July. This delay resulted from damage done to the radio set, which required some repair. They requested replacements for the damaged equipment in this transmission. Additionally, team Francis recommended drop zones for Gilbert, whose radio set was also damaged, as well as their own DZs. Subsequently, aircraft began delivering stores of equipment and the region began to develop an effective resistance movement capable of doing some damage to the enemy.

As a result of the dispersion of the German garrisons throughout their sector, team Francis subdivided their zone. Zone "A" consisted of the area north of the Rosporden-Bannalec-Quimperle-Lorient road. Within this zone the Germans maintained several garrisons whose presence restricted resistance operations. The majority of these personnel came from the 265th Infantry Division (German). The organized Maquis groups totalled about 1300 men, most of whom were armed. The Zone "B", south of the Rosporden-Lorient road and closer to the Atlantic Wall, also contained
several garrisons, comprised mainly of Russian auxiliaries. However, as a result of minimal maneuver space the area could not shelter maquis groups. For this reason, a total of only 210 personnel, scattered in small teams throughout the zone, constituted the only organized resistance.

Since it was easier to supply Zone A because of available DZs and security, there was a need for internal reorganization. Francis, along with some SAS and French agents operating in the area of operations, decided to operate their headquarters close to the dividing line of the two zones. From this location they could receive drops in the northern area and then transport them by ground to Zone B. This particular method became necessary when the Germans interceded and captured drops near Bannalec and Pontaven. As a result of the necessity to travel extensive distances to deliver their arms as a result of this change, several small skirmishes with the enemy resulted. These contacts incurred additional losses of equipment.

On 29 July, near the city of Querrien, one of these contacts took place. Hiding in a farmhouse, approximately 100 French and Germans, including two companies of Russian SS, surrounded the team (Francis, an SAS agent Maurice Myoden, and three other French resistance fighters). These French personnel had switched their allegiance against the resistance cause and brought the Germans to the team's known
hideout. Following a short firefight Captain le Zachmeur, Sergeant Dallow, and the French personnei escaped. The SAS agent and Major Ogden-Smith however were seriously wounded and when they surrendered the Germans executed them. Both in military uniform, they were due prisoner of war status. The Germans, however, submachine gunned the SAS agent in the chest and finally shot him in the temple. Major Ogden-Smith was also summarily executed. Additionally, the Germans killed the farmer, burned his farm, drove off the cattle, and robbed his goods. The Germans stole everything of value from the corpses, (jewelry, money and boots) and lay their dead bodies in front of the farm, forbidding burial until the next day.

Finally, on 31 July, team Francis, after escaping, rejoined forces in Guiscriff and continued operations as normal. With the receipt of several drops, the strength of the resistance totalled close to 3000 armed men. The team informed SFHQ of the circumstances surrounding Major Ogden-Smith's death and cancelled drops in their region, since vital documents had been found on his body.

2 August arrived along with the message signalling the start of full scale guerrilla activity in Brittany. The following day, General Koenig transmitted orders to all of the commanders in Brittany giving them instructions on assisting advancing allied ground forces from the US VIII
Corps. In this region in particular, the US 6th Armored Division was fast approaching. The Maquis dispatched guides to link up with the advancing forces and assist them in their advance.

Francis, notified on 5 August that teams Gilbert and Ronald (chapter 8) were in the Quimper area preparing a major attack on the city, relocated there. Finally, after several battles with the Germans, the city was liberated and on 6 August all three teams entered Quimper. By this time, the Aloes mission, under Colonel Eono in charge of all resistance activities, was in the area. Team Francis received instructions to gather information in their assigned zone and pass it to team Ronald, which would collect it all, and then forward it to Aloes. As a result, zones A and B were reorganized into four sectors: Carhaix, Scaer, Bannalec, and Quimperle.

These sectors proved to be extremely important, as the Jedburgh teams provided the exact location of approximately 80 defensive gun sites to US forces as they advanced toward Lorient. This continued for some time and finally on 28 August, team Francis requested permission to return to the United Kingdom. On 9 September, the team embarked a ship at Benodet and finally sailed for England, their mission in France complete.
During their debriefings, upon returning home, the team had several suggestions and criticisms which they passed to SFHQ. In reference to the air deliveries, they felt that it was impossible to keep their locations a secret. The aircraft usually arrived late and separately, with breaks of up to two hours between drops. They also circled around the DZ several times and sent traffic via Morse, both which invited the Germans to come searching for the reception committees.

The equipment that did arrive for the most part was not what was asked for. The W/T radio set on the other hand was satisfactory overall. They experienced minor transmission and broadcast receptions problems at night but were always able to transmit. However, the team felt as a whole that all of the Jedburgh equipment was excellent. The organization of the FFI worked well. The FTP and FFI worked in unison throughout the zone and it was therefore easy to unite them.

The biggest problem the team members had was with the manner in which German prisoners were treated. Since the Germans virtually refused to take prisoners and subsequently would burn or destroy the countryside as they searched for "parachutists", the French forces' reacted in kind. The maquis would question and then shoot all prisoners. For this reason, the Germans refused to
surrender to the resistance forces and fought to the last man. However, even though the fear of death existed among the people if caught assisting the allies, the amount of support they received from the French people was incredible.

The relationship between the FFI and the US forces as a result was excellent. Their information proved to be invaluable and as the US troops liberated cities, the armament captured was turned over to the resistance. However, the manner in which the US forces treated German prisoners did not please the French. They could not understand how the Americans could possibly take such good care of them. All in all though, team Francis was successful in their mission and contributed to the resistance movement in the Finistere region of Brittany.
CHAPTER FOUR

ENDNOTES

1 The real names and operational codenames of the members of team Francis are as follows:

Major Colin M. Ogden-Smith DORSET

Served with the British Commandoes combatting in Crete prior to becoming a Jedburgh.

Captain Guy Le Borgne DURANCE

Attended St. Cyr (French Military Academy) from 1939-1940. In addition to France, he jumped into IndoChina to work with the resistance forces there. He retired as a General having commanded the French 11th Airborne Division as well as all of the airborne forces in France. His final assignment was as the French Chief of Staff of the Army. General Le Borgne currently resides in Paris, France.

Sergeant Arthur J. Dallow GROAT

Survived the war to retire in Avon, England.

The remainder of the information contained within this chapter is cited from the official "Francis" Jedburgh team report. Mendelssohn, Covert Warfare, Volume 3, pp. 382-407.

* The Germans used captured Russian soldiers for their coastal defense force mission. Beginning in 1941, these soldiers were put in German uniform and shipped to western Europe, independent battalions. By 1944 most German infantry divisions fielded at least one such battalion.

* This information cited from a personal letter written to the author by General Guy Le Borgne, dated 24 February 1990.
CHAPTER FIVE

"TEAM GILBERT"

SFHQ dispatched team Gilbert as the tenth Jedburgh team from the United Kingdom to France. One of the six teams sent to the Finistere region, its specific mission was to organize the resistance forces in southwest Finistere. In addition, they were to locate DZs, LZs and beaches which could be used as entry points for the equipment and arms delivered for the resistance groups. The team, as per instructions from SFHQ, limited the size of these Maquis units to 100 men for security reasons.

Team Gilbert consisted of Captain Christopher G. Blathwayt (British), Captain Paul Charron (French), and Sergeant Neville Wood (British). They received their briefing in London by SO, Country Section Chief Major Horton, as did all Finistere teams, on Saturday and Sunday, 8 and 9 July 1944. SFHQ provided them the locations of SAS establishments in Brittany, the resistance elements and enemy troops in Finistere, and their specific zone of activity. The team then departed for Harrington Aerodrome.
At 2300 hours on the 9th of July, they were airborne and at 0100 hours on the 10th of July, dropped not where scheduled at a DZ southwest of Coray, but rather at Coadri on DZ Guide. The reception committee, organized by team Giles, numbered 200 men of whom 100 were armed. The parachute drop did not go well as a result of the excessive speed and low altitude of the aircraft. As a result, the impact of the drop smashed all of the equipment packages with the exception of the Eureka. This beacon is what the Jedburgh teams used to guide in the aircraft to their DZs. The team's transmitter and one receiver were broken as well as their carbines.

During the night as the resistance forces cleared the DZ, two truckloads of Germans drove within 150 yards of their location. The team as well as the reception committee however, were not detected. While clearing the area of the debris from the parachute drop, several of the resistance members talked, smoked, and used their flashlights freely. This was a sign of their strength and confidence in the region and portrayed to the team the high level of morale. By daylight, with all equipment gathered, team Gilbert instructed the leaders of the Maquis groups of the restrictions placed on them for taking offensive measures until notified. Understanding these orders, they departed the area.
The first headquarters established by team Gilbert was in a chateau five kilometers southwest of Quimper, the center of all resistance and communications in the region. From this location entry into Quimper to visit the resistance departmental chief, Colonel Berthaud, was rather easy, without raising suspicions from the Germans. The area was under a 9 o’clock curfew and every house had to show a list of the persons living there. The chateau belonged to a French resistance fighter. Since he spoke fluent German it appeared as if he was a German collaborator. As a result, he provided the resistance with invaluable intelligence.

The team’s first credibility test occurred 10 July. Confronted with three sets of civilian clothes and a car to travel through the country, the English members declined use of the auto opting to walk instead. At first, the Jedburghs lost some respect from the French because of this decision, but when the Germans stopped the car to check identification cards, this attitude changed. The resistance respected the Jedburghs’ caution from that time forward.

The following day began by meeting the chief of the resistance in Finistere, Colonel Berthaud. During this encounter, they discussed all of the team’s anticipated plans and actions for their specific region. The resistance network in the area, which was well established, provided DZ locations which Gilbert relayed to SFHQ London. All of this
was done through teams Francis and Giles, since their own radio transmitter was still not functioning. SFHQ never received the transmission requesting new radio equipment relayed by the other teams, therefore Gilbert did not receive the needed equipment. After spending some time repairing the equipment, they contacted SFHQ for the first time on 25 July.

At this time Gilbert joined up with one of the more powerful Maquis groups, consisting of about 200 men. Situated near Moulin l'Abbe, they received several parachute drops and conducted some minor guerilla operations. The team distributed equipment (gun-running) at night and during the day conducted training where necessary while organizing new Maquis companies. As a result of German troop movements, they relocated their camp to Keroret, west of Coray. From this location Gilbert received a drop on 26 July near Pont Croix "Munster". A traitor to the resistance however informed the Germans of this drop. Gilbert, nonetheless, managed to save approximately one third of the equipment dropped, after a battle with the Germans. However, eventually, as a result of ambushing throughout the region, they recovered the entire loan.

The evening of 2 August, team Gilbert received the go ahead to commence open guerrilla action against the Germans with the BBC transmission of "Le chapeau de Napoleon est-il toujours a Ferros-Guirec?". Earlier that afternoon,
Gilbert deployed to Langolen to receive a drop that evening, a drop with the equipment necessary to equip 400 men from Concarneau and Quimper. The aircraft however failed to appear that evening.

About this time the German's method of operations changed. They restricted travel near towns on the coastline and travelled only in large groups. The Maquis had attacked and destroyed many small patrols therefore they sought security in numbers. As a result, the countryside was virtually free of the enemy and parachute drops proved extremely successful. The Maquis sent a 100 man security force for each drop, which proved quite adequate.

Once in Langolen, on 3 August, the team acquired a new Maquis organization. The Quimper Maquis numbered 1,100 men organized into eleven companies. With the headquarters area secure, they formed an arms dump to clean and distribute incoming arms and equipment. Team Ronald (chapter 8) joined the Finistere Jeds the night of 4/5 August. The following evening, they travelled to Quimper to meet with Colonel Berthaud.

By this time, the Germans had secluded themselves in small pockets within the towns. The Maquis now set out to destroy them one by one. In close coordination with the resistance groups, ambushes took place and an area German hunt ensued. At the request of Colonel Berthaud, Lieutenant
Trump (Ronald), Captains Charron and Blathwayt (US, French and British respectively), wrote a surrender demand to the Germans. Of course, they did not accept it. However, as a result of the ultimatum, the Germans established a truce until the allied ground forces arrived, at which time, they stated they would surrender. The ultimatum simply implied that if the Germans continued to damage the towns or mistreat any more civilians or prisoners, they would all be shot as criminals once captured.

The only city which remained occupied by the Germans was Quimper. All the other garrisons had already consolidated in Brest. It was here therefore that Colonel Berthaud, decided to consolidate all forces to overthrow the Germans and liberate the city. The Germans numbered 400 and the resistance's supplies were scarce. Informed of their predicament, SFHQ dispatched several planes containing supplies, however, they all missed the designated DZ. Rather than dropping on the secure Quimper–Coray road, one load landed at Carhaix, one near Tourch, and the last at Rosporden. Giles gathered the first, however, the Maquis near Rosporden (same unit with whom Gilbert initially contacted) recovered the remaining two the following day.

That evening, 8 August, the team received a message from the Germans in Quimper. It informed them that they would be vacating Quimper for Brest and knew that the resistance had allied officers assisting them. The
following morning a tremendous battle ensued as the Maquis established an ambush along the road. The day's activities ended with team Francis joining Gilbert in Quimper - now a liberated city. They had successfully eliminated the Germans in their area.

From this time forward, the resistance had full reign of the region, even though several small skirmishes and occasional battles took place. On 11 August the Pluguffan Airfield was ready to have Dakota (Glider) size aircraft land and take-off from it. Several messages transmitted to London continued asking for arms and ammunition. Since the Americans had not yet arrived in Gilbert's zone, the German's morale improved and as a result they attempted to join more of their forces. For the most part they were unsuccessful, being destroyed by the resistance. Finally 18 August the 3rd US Army liaison officer arrived at Quimper along with a civil affairs team.

The arrival of the Americans on 16 August in Concarneau proved to be an interesting time for the resistance fighters. Providing the Germans with the opportunity to surrender, the American tanks and propaganda unit waited. The following morning the Americans fired some shells into the city and departed. The resistance force was livid by these actions, as the Germans were now able to concentrate their forces. In an attempt to discuss the
situation with the Germans, Gilbert and Ronald planned a rendezvous with the Concarneau commander. Once at the designated meeting place in no man’s land, they were fired upon by mortars and anti-tank rounds, with Lieutenant Ray Trumps (team Ronald) being wounded by mortar shrapnel. After being bandaged by his radio operator, Sergeant Elmer Esch, they escaped. That same evening the German commander surrendered to the French, apologizing for the day’s actions. A Gestapo officer had taken command of his garrison and ordered the fusilade. The Americans returned late that night with more tanks and reinforcements, which explained their sudden departure the day prior.

The next few days, 18-24 August, consisted of intensive fighting by US Army and French resistance troops. They were involved in the battle of Concarneau and the liberation of the surrounding area. Several German units surrendered (200 near Audierne) and slowly the German pockets of resistance began to disintegrate.

On 29 August, with the southern area under complete control, team Gilbert moved to Plouven, the headquarters of the resistance forces fighting the Brest-Crozon area. With the arrival of Task Force "A" under the command of US General Ernest, the team reverted to liaison duties between the US and resistance forces. The move to secure the Crozon peninsula was now ready to commence.
3 September proved to be one of the saddest days of the war for team Gilbert. As the attack was progressing successfully near the city of Telgruc, a bombing raid by US Fortresses (B-24s) and Marauders (B-26s) took place. The results were: 60 Americans, 25 FFI, and 20 civilians killed. The occurrence indeed seemed impossible, because team Gilbert had previously cancelled the mission and the Army Air Corps acknowledged it in return on 1 September.

Secondly, after disregarding the orange smoke and panels, which identified the friendly's forward line, the bombers (which were flying too high) bombed and then returned an hour later to bomb and machine gun the area, just as ambulances were collecting the wounded from the first sortie.

On 8 September equipment (arms and medical supplies) arrived by boat in the port of Benodet. Additionally, the US 8th Infantry Division began moving up to assist in the attack on the Crozon peninsula. With the introduction of US troops, the team changed the resistance's mission to flank security and patrols. Each of these units numbered roughly 200 men and even though the French were more interested in fighting the Germans, they understood and accepted their new mission. The fighting continued until finally, on 20 September, the area was clear of Germans.
Captain Charron and Sergeant Wood were injured in a car accident 21 September, which angered the team's withdrawal plans. Instead of departing by boat on the 24th of September as scheduled, the team received orders to return via 9th Army. This was through Paris in coordination with the Special Forces detachment, part of the 12th Army Group assigned there. Since Captain Charron was to be hospitalized in an American hospital for two months, Captain Blathwayt and Sergeant Wood left for Paris, returning to Hendon, England 28 September 1944.

Upon return to England, team Gilbert made the following comments in reference to the political situation in Brittany. The communists in Finistere were always true patriots, firstly, French, secondly, Breton. Secondly, everyone was for de Gaulle, for he was the true spirit and represented France in the early days. Lastly, the Bretons were 200% pro-British.
TEAM GILBERT'S AREA OF OPERATIONS
CHAPTER FIVE

ENDNOTES

1 The real names and operational code names for the members of team Gilbert are as follows:

Captain Christopher G. W. Blainwayt SURREY
Survived the war to retire in Avon, England.

Captain Paul Carron de la Carriere ARDECHE
Attended St. Cyr (French Military Academy) 1939-40. After France, he jumped into IndoChina to assist resistance forces in that region.

Sergeant Neville Wood DOUBLOON
Survived the war to retire in Lancashire, England.

The remainder of the information contained within this chapter is cited from the official "Gilbert" Jedburgh team report. Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare. Volume 4, pp. 408-443.

Information reference Captain Carron de la Carriere is cited from a personal letter to the author from General Guy Le Borgne, dated 24 February 1990.
CHAPTER SIX

"TEAM HORACE"

Team Horace was the fifteenth Jedburgh team inserted to France from the United Kingdom. Dispatched on the night of 17/18 July 1944 to the Finistere area of Brittany, it consisted of Major John W. Summers (US), Lieutenant Georges Levalois (French), and T/3 William L. Zielske (US). Their mission was to organize and arm the resistance of the region. Additionally, this entailed locating and establishing dropping zones in the area as well as sending to SFHQ, London by radio the necessary requests of arms and equipment needed by the resistance.

After a complete briefing by the country section, team Horace proceeded to the Harrington Aerodrome for final preparations. They then boarded a Halifax aircraft manned by a Canadian crew and flew to their designated DZ. Along the way they encountered a thunderstorm and lightening hit the aircraft's tail assembly, which caused no damage to the plane. Major Summers jumped first followed by the remainder of the team, all of whom had good landings on the correct
DZ. All of the containers and packages landed fairly close together and upon examination were without any damage. Team Giles' Captain Lebel met the team on the ground and once the area was clear of all debris, moved the team by auto to a Maquis approximately ten miles south of Huelgoat.

Once at their initial camp, team Horace immediately established radio contact with SFHQ, London. The resistance dispatched a female messenger to team Giles' camp to contact Captain Knox in order to arrange for their transportation. Additionally, they requested the names of the necessary contacts of the resistance groups in their area. When the young woman returned not having completed the mission, Captain Lebel opted to perform the mission himself. The team finally began to make contacts on their own and after two days without word from Giles became somewhat worried. The Germans in the meantime were aware of their presence and were increasing patrols in the area. The Germans also posted a bounty of one million francs for any information leading to the death or capture of the team's members. As team Horace prepared to depart the area, Captain Knox arrived and, again by auto, they travelled to a Maquis further north. Unable to locate this new group, because of German patrols, Captain Knox returned the entire group to his camp.

The following day, again after being unable to reach the new Maquis's location due to an enemy patrol in the
area, the resistance leader arrived in his auto at Giles' headquarters. Team Horace left that evening and reached its new destination without incident. The following two days consisted of futile attempts to make contacts in the Brest area by the resistance leader. Team Horace decided therefore to contact Colonel Berthaud, the departmental resistance chief, who in turn contacted the Brest area commander, Commandant Somm-py.

The evening of 25 July, two Frenchmen unknown to the Maquis arrived. Commandant Somm-py instructed them to transport the team to their designated area near Brest. Major Summers decided that the team would travel with these men and the team placed themselves in the three empty wine barrels bound for the German command post in Brest. Two and a half hours and forty miles later, they arrived in a wooded area five miles northwest of Brest, where they spent the night in a foxhole. Commandant Somm-py visited the following morning with a drop zone location, which 1st Sergeant Zielske transmitted immediately to London.

Travelling again by wine barrel, Horace moved that evening to a safe house three miles northeast of Lesneven. During the trip, the vehicle carrying the barrels suffered a flat tire. Oddly, a German patrol offered assistance and finally the team reached their destination. Donning civilian clothes, they walked the remainder of the way to
the safehouse. After two days of waiting, a messenger from Colonel Berthaud arrived, with more information on drop zones, resistance elements and preliminary plans for an attack on Brest. Again, lst Sergeant Zielske informed SFHQ of this and that the Germans planned on sinking two tankers in order to block the Brest channel. If this occurred, it would prevent any resupply by water to the resistance forces. As a result, allied air forces sank these tankers before the German could block the channel.

On 31 July, the team received word from SFHQ denying the requested DZs as a result of anti-aircraft guns in the area. This very much worried Horace, for there was not much time remaining to arm the resistance forces in their sector. To transmit new DZs would take several days, therefore, their only alternative was to convince SFHQ of the severity of the problem and the necessity of the drops. On 3 August, the resistance received arms on several of the DZs and their plan for the liberation of the city of Brest with the advancing allies appeared to have a good chance of success.

As a result of the parachute drops, several close to Horace’s headquarters, enemy patrols increased tremendously in the area. One such patrol forced the team to rapidly flee during a radio transmission to London. The following day, at their new location, Horace finally deciphered the messages and learned that an SAS team had landed the previous evening. The BBC transmitted the particulars of
the drop and a resistance reception committee greeted the SAS on the DZ and bid them.

On 2 August, team Horace received instructions from SFHQ to coordinate all resistance west of the railway line Plouescat, Sizun road to Le Faou. Along with this came the added mission of preventing enemy demolitions in the port of Brest as well as the preservation of the Brest-Morlaix road. That same night BBC action messages allowed for concentrated offensive activity.

With the authority to conduct open guerilla warfare against the Germans, with the transmission of the prearranged signal "Le chapeau de Napoleon est-il toujours à Perros-Guirec?" resistance groups attacked German patrols with reasonable success. At the same time, notification arrived to send out guides to meet the advancing ground forces of the US Third Army. That evening (6 August), the Germans surrounded Horace's headquarters, but the team managed to evade them. The following morning, the sound of tanks aroused their attention and they soon learned that the noise was the arrival of the Americans.

Major Summers reported to the commanding officer and provided him with the locations of known enemy positions, road blocks, and the best routes to use to get to his destination. He also provided all of the team's maps and detailed reports to the 6th Armored Division's G-2,
Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell. When 2nd Lieutenant Rutherford T. Walsh, the Special Forces staff officer assigned to the 6th Division, became aware of the situation and link-up, preparations to withdraw Horace began. However, Major Summers refused, since Horace's mission in the area was far from completed. He therefore assigned his team to the G-2 section to act as liaison between the FFI and the American commander.

By 9 August the 8th Armored Division in the area realized they had German elements in their rear creating a 360 degree front. That evening, a Russian captain in German service, entered Horace's perimeter and surrendered his entire company to the resistance. He deserted from the German force on the north coast and desired to fight for the Americans. Captured in 1941, these Russians had been put into uniform in 1943 and shipped off to France to act as coastal defense troops. Later proving to be the best fighting force in the resistance group, the Russian captain had been in contact with the resistance and was awaiting the right time to desert.

Since Plabanne was now under US control, the FFI established its headquarters there. Lieutenant Levalois remained at this location to translate intelligence reports and relay them to Major Summers, who in turn informed the division G-2. From these reports, the American G-2 was able to convince the commander of the St. Pabu garrison to
surrender his with 280 men. Insistent that they would surrender only to Americans, they did so on 12 August without any fighting.

The 6th Armored Division on 14 August departed the area, leaving a four battalion (2 infantry and 2 artillery battalions) Task Force behind. Major Summers and 1st Sergeant Zieliske transferred to this organization. Concerned with the need to prevent the 30,000 man German force from obtaining any information which would inform them of the small allied force, resistance ambushes increased. This kept the Germans stationary and also denied the Germans valuable intelligence. As a result, the G-2 gave Major Summers command of the military intelligence unit to further coordinate efforts with the resistance. When the VIIIth US Corps arrived on 22 August, Major Summers provided a complete detailed intelligence report prepared by his organization to their G-2. This in turn proved to be an invaluable document.

At this point, team Horace reverted to assisting the Corps G-3 with the coordination efforts for the actual tactical operation of attacking Brest. The resistance forces would assist the US 2nd Ranger Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel James E. Rudder in cutting off German forces west of Brest and capturing the Le Conquet area. The battle for Le Conquet lasted from 21 August to 9 September,
marked by intense fighting. The FFI mainly guarded the flanks and rear of the Rangers, who conducted the actual fighting to seize the fortifications. Throughout these operations, Major Summers and 1st Sergeant Zielske participated in several front line combat operations, including the main assault into the Graf Spee anti-aircraft position. This geographic position dominated the area and restricted any friendly aircraft to fly in the area. When the Rangers finally captured the concrete bunkers, 1,230 Germans surrendered to the 300 American Rangers.

With the Le Conquet peninsula under allied control, the Rangers turned the position over to the FFI. Along with this action, the resistance forces' mission in Horace's area also terminated. Team Horace's mission was complete, so they arranged through VIIth Corps to be returned to the 9th Army. Enroute, Lieutenant Levalois joined team Horace once again. On 15 September they flew to England.

Upon their return from the field, the members of team Horace made the following general comments regarding their completed mission. As far as their equipment went, Major Summers and 1st Sergeant Zielske as a matter of preference chose to carry the M-1 rifle rather than the issued carbine. Additionally, the radio did everything it was set out to do. Their uniform, a one-piece jumpsuit, worked well but they felt that civilian clothes should have been issued.
The organization of the 5000 man Maquis group was excellent. Each town had its own leader who organized all the activities in the area. When the Germans identified these important people, they subsequently executed them. However, the seconds-in-command immediately took over and continued to carry out their missions. As a result, the productivity of the resistance in team Horace's area of operation increased. Of greatest importance to the US forces became the detailed and accurate intelligence the Jedburghs could provide them. This proved extremely useful and greatly contributed to the success the 2nd Ranger Battalion had in the Le Conquet area.

In conclusion, the members of the team felt that the armed forces could never fully appreciate the value of the French resistance until they had to fight in an area where there were none.
TEAM HORACE'S AREA OF OPERATIONS
CHAPTER SIX

ENDNOTES

1 The real names and operational code names for the members of team Horace are as follows:

Major John W. Summers (Cavalry) WYOMING

Lieutenant Georges LeClerq SOMME

Tech Sergeant/3 William L Zielske, Jr. DIME

The remainder of the information contained within this chapter is cited from the official "Horace" Jedburgh team report. Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, Volume 4, pp. 512-540.
CHAPTER SEVEN

"TEAM HILARY"

SFHQ dispatched Jedburgh team Hilary as the sixteenth team to France from the United Kingdom. Alerted at Milton Hall on 2 July 1944 for insertion initially into the department of Ille et Villaine in Brittany, on 6 July their area of operation changed to the Finistere area. While in London receiving their briefings and specific orders, weather delayed their insertion for over a week. Finally, the night of 17/18 July, Lieutenant Edgar Marchant (French), 1st Lieutenant Phillip H. Chadbourn (U.S.), and Lieutenant Roger Pariselle (French), the members of team Hilary, departed England for France. Their mission was to organize and arm the resistance, as well as identifying DZs and sending their locations to London by radio, as well as their requests for arms and supplies. ¹

After an uneventful three hour flight and an aborted pass over the drop zone, due to mechanical problems with the jump caution lights, they dropped. The jump went well considering they lost their radio and Lieutenant Marchant
broke his jaw on landing (not diagnosed until his return to England). The reception committee arranged by team Giles greeted them along with several enthusiastic and noisy Maquisards. Captain Lebel of team Giles as well was on the drop zone and escorted the team to their local Maquis. When team Hilary requested that the French keep their noise level down, so as not to arouse suspicion from German patrols in the area, the resistance members informed them that the Germans in the area were afraid of the resistance.

Remaining with this Maquis near Coat-Cod, the team finally managed to find the radio which they had lost on the drop. Team Hilary made initial radio contact with SFHQ the evening of 18 July. Unable to make contact with the resistance elements in the northern area of Finistere, they drove in the car of a resistance doctor to a secure farm outside of Paulhoven. From this location contacts with the North slowly became available and transmissions to London continued containing drop zone and glider landing locations. As a result of increased German patrols in the area, team Hilary relocated to a FTP Maquis just south of Querlesquin. Remaining at this safehouse for four days, the members were able to contact all the local Maquis leaders. Those leaders identified additional landing and drop zones, which Hilary transmitted to London. However, the Germans again located their hideout and after being nearly surrounded, the team managed to hide and then escaped.
As a result, the necessity arose once again to find a new resistance group. The team traveled overnight to an area three miles north of Le Puettron. This particular Maquis had not been properly organized or equipped, therefore, Hilary's greatest efforts in arming, training and organizing occurred in this area. Several leaders and resistance agents filtered in and out of their area of operation, providing extremely valuable information. This continued throughout the end of July and the beginning of August.

With 2 August's BBC broadcast "Le chapeau de Napoleon est-il toujours à Perros-Guirec?", open offensive guerilla activities against the Germans commenced. Team Hilary's specific instructions from London included the hindrance of German forces retreating to Brest, to prevent any enemy demolitions of bridges, viaducts, railways, or roads, and to disorganize German units by use of guerilla warfare. Additionally, SFHQ changed their area of operation from a north-south axis to an area bound by Belle-Isle-en-Terre, Landivisseau, Lannion, and Plouescat. This created some discontent among the team's members. It signified that Hilary would have to leave the Maquis groups they trusted and had assisted.

The Americans arrived soon thereafter. German units combatting French resistance began surrendering in
mass and soon the area started to become tranquil. When the advancing American ground troops overran team Hilary, they travelled to Morlaix. At this location, for approximately three weeks they worked in close coordination with the United States 17th and 15th Cavalry Squadrons, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Lindquist. Lieutenant Colonel Lindquist appointed Lieutenant Marchant the French military governor of the area dominated by the city of Morlaix.

This turned out to be quite interesting for Lieutenant Marchant. The town's people basically revolted. They wanted to kill all collaborationists they could find immediately, wanted to hand over the mayor and to change their local government. To resolve this matter, Lieutenant Marchant organized the resistance into companies and battalions. Additionally, he dispatched these units alongside the Americans as tank infantry in order to keep them involved. The Americans turned over the responsibility of guarding the city, the viaduct, the prison, and the German hospital to the French, so their troops could concentrate on rounding up the isolated pockets of German resistance throughout the countryside.

The port Quartermasters and salvage workers in turn relieved the 17th Cavalry of the town of Morlaix. This action completed team Hilary's mission. They therefore moved all of their resistance forces, numbering nearly two thousand, toward Brest and the Daoulas Peninsula to assist
in the attack on the German garrison. In the vicinity of Brest, team Hilary provided liaison between French and American forces until the areas assigned to them were clear of the enemy.

Once Hilary completed this additional mission, SFHQ recalled them to London. SFHQ instructed them to locate the Third Army's 12th Special Forces Detachment with the 12th Army Group. They departed the Finistere area and travelled to Versailles to locate the SF detachment. When, after being in the field escaping and evading Germans for two months, the detachment offered them a tent to sleep in, the members opted to go to Paris. Returning the following day, they received further instructions to travel to Bayeux where they would fly to England. Team Hilary did so and on 2 September 1944, completing their mission in France.

Upon their return to England the members of team Hilary reported that they felt they were one of the few Jedburgh teams which had a true "Jedburgh" mission. Had they arrived any later, they could not have made all of the necessary contacts and thereby located, armed and organized the numbers of resistance forces they did. Generally, they unilaterally felt that the poor people of the region provided them with the most assistance. It appeared that the rich people had too much at stake to risk destruction by the Germans. Finally, they formed an opinion that the
Bretons were either all for you or all against you, however, they were all wonderful people.
TEAM HILARY'S AREA OF OPERATIONS
MEMORIAL FOR TEAM HILARY LOCATED IN PLOUEGAT - GUERAND
CHAPTER SEVEN

ENDNOTES

* The real names and operational code names of the members of team Hilary are as follows:

Lieutenant Edgar Mautaint CHARENTE

After France, he jumped into Indochina in 1945 to assist resistance forces there. He survived the war to retire in Angers, France.

1st Lieutenant Phillip H. Chadbourn NEVADA

Survived the war to retire in LaJolla, California.

Lieutenant Roger Hervouet KOPEK

The remainder of the information contained within this chapter is cited from the official "Hilary" Jedburgh team report. Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, Volume 4, pp. 541-557.

* This information cited from a personal letter written to the author by Mr. Edgar Mautaint, dated 10 March 1980.
The nineteenth team dispatched from the United Kingdom to France was also the final team inserted into the Finistere area of Brittany. With the implicit mission of providing the required liaison between the Aloes mission, commanded by Colonel Eono, and the commander of the Finistere resistance department, Colonel Berthaud, they dropped on the night of 4/5 August 1944. Team Ronald consisted of 1st Lieutenant Shirley R. Trumps (US), Lieutenant J. Dartiques (French), and Technical Sergeant Elmer B. Esch (US).

Lieutenant Dumas, an additional French officer, joined team Ronald at the airport prior to their departure, with the specific purpose of being the radio operator responsible for making all required radio contacts with the Aloes mission. The flight to France lasted three hours and the parachute jump passed without incident. Only one slight detail changed however they parachuted on the wrong drop zone. Instead of linking up with a reception committee
established by Giles, they landed on one organized by Gilbert, awaiting an arms and supply drop. That evening, the team remained in the woods and the following morning travelled to Quimper where they contacted Colonel Berthaud.

Remaining in this location for several days, they were unable to establish radio contact with the Aloes mission. Finally, liaison became possible with Aloes through the use of motor transport. However, in addition to simply liaising with the Aloes mission, as a result of their close proximity to team Gilbert, team Ronald became involved in several combat engagements.

Lieutenant Trumps involved himself in the siege of Quimper. Since the 460 Germans, surrounded in the town by the FFI, refused to surrender except to the Americans, Lieutenant Trumps wrote a letter to the German commander indicating that he was the commander of an advance guard of the advancing armor unit. He further indicated that his tanks were on the outskirts of town preparing to attack and unless they answered within two hours, the attack would commence. After sending out patrols and realizing that Lieutenant Trumps’ comments in the ultimatum were all false, the German commander replied, “We will surrender only to the Americans when they arrive.” The FFI therefore began their attack on the city. Three days later, the Germans attempted to breakout to join forces in Brest only to be ambushed. Their attempt failed as they suffered numerous casualties.
As a result of this actions, the battle for the city was complete and Quimper once again fell under French control.

A similar situation occurred during the battle of Concarneau. When 300 Germans surrounded by the FFI refused to surrender, an American task force fired some tanks rounds into the city. When the Germans continued to refuse surrender, the task force left. Captain Blathwayt of team Gilbert and Lieutenant Trumps then arranged a rendezvous with the German commander, who requested to speak with the American officer. No sooner had the two allied officers and their radio operators arrived at the designated meeting place, when they themselves became involved in an ambush. Lieutenant Trumps received a mortar shrapnel wound on his forehead. Sergeant Esch, his radio operator, administered first aid on the spot until they were able to retreat back to friendly lines. Taken to a hospital in Quimper, Lieutenant Trump received proper medical care.

The following day the American unit returned with additional tanks and reinforcements. Informed of the actual location of every German gun emplacement, the commander of the unit requested Maquis support for his tanks since he had no infantry. The Maquis organized two units, consisting of thirty men each, to provide flank security for the Americans. Lieutenant Trumps commanded one, Captain Blathwayt the other. The Germans however were able to repel
this attack, but retreated three days later. As a result of an aircraft which flew over the city, coupled with flares be fired throughout the countryside, the Germans became confused. Sensing this as being a large coordinated attack on the city, they boarded ships and sailed for Lorient.

All in all, however, the team provided invaluable intelligence to both the Americans and French in the area. Lieutenant Dartiques established a system of reconnaissance and information gathering, with agents throughout the area reporting to him. He in turn consolidated the intelligence and made it available to the advancing allied ground forces. This first hand information proved helpful in locating and destroying the enemy in the area.

Lieutenant Trumps served as the liaison between US General Ernest's forces and Colonel Eono of Aloes mission during the attack on the Crozon Peninsula. He assisted the G-2 section in interpreting and obtaining information from the French personnel who had penetrated enemy lines.

When SFHQ informed Ronald that they could return, Lieutenant Dartiques opted to remain with Colonel Eono, who was to perform another mission for General Koenig. On 7 September 1944, Lieutenant Trumps and Sergeant Each began their return to England.
CHAPTER EIGHT

ENDNOTES

1 The real names and operational code names of the members of team Ronald are as follows:

1st Lieutenant Shirley Ray Trumps BOURSIER

Lieutenant Trumps was born 14 October 1921. He received his education at Breaux Bridge, Louisiana (4 years-1940) and from Lafayette, Louisiana College (1940). He attended Infantry Officer Candidate School from 16 June 1942 to 9 November 1942, when he was commissioned a 2nd Lieutenant. Lieutenant Trumps completed Parachute School ABC jump course in July 1943. He was assigned to OSS Washington D.C. on 11 September 1943 and to SO Branch on 24 December 1943. Lieutenant Trumps retired from the US Army as a Colonel and currently resides in Annandale, Virginia.

Lieutenant George Desseilligny BOUTTON

Technical Sergeant Elmer B. Esch POUND

Following France, he jumped into IndoChina to assist resistance forces there. He was a POW in China. He survived the war and currently resides in Lansing, Michigan.

The remainder of the information contained within this chapter is cited from the official "Ronald" Jedburgh team report. Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, Volume 4, pp. 606-614.

2 This information cited from a personal letter written to the author by Mr. Elmer B. Esch, dated 22 January 1990.
CHAPTE R N I N E

"CONCLUSIONS/MODERN IMPLICATIONS"

The operations conducted by the six Jedburgh teams inserted into the Finistere region of the Brittany peninsula in France from June - September 1944 present the reader with some interesting historical insights. The crucial question is whether these teams played a vital role in the success of military operations conducted in this area.

In this examination it is necessary to not only concentrate on the efforts and accomplishments of these teams, but also the strategical, operational and tactical value they offered to the conventional forces in the region. After researching these teams and the operations they conducted in conjunction with the French resistance forces, I have concluded that they were successful and played a vital role.

In a world war, which basically consisted of massive mobile armies, large quantities of aerial platforms such as strategic bombers, huge navies, and eventually the introduction of the atomic bomb, special operations forces demonstrated their importance on the battlefield. They
provided the commanders at all levels, some of the intelligence and preparation of the battlefield they required to properly conduct combat operations.

The U.S. Army's doctrinal manual on the conduct of operations, FM 100-5, states the following reference deep operations.

"Deep operations at any echelon comprise activities directed against enemy forces not in contact designed to influence the conditions in which future close operations will be conducted. At the operational level, deep operations include efforts to isolate current battles and to influence where, when, and against whom future battles will be fought. At the tactical level, deep operations are designed to shape the battlefield to assure advantage in subsequent engagements. At both levels, successful deep operations create the conditions for future victory... The concept of interdicting the enemy's supplies, follow-on forces, reserves, and communications to impede his ability to commit these at times and places of his choosing is a familiar feature of modern war."

In light of this definition, one must agree that the Jedburgh teams were one integral and important part of the concept that provided the commanders all that is quoted above. They operated well behind enemy lines in organizing, arming and training local resistance forces that would be capable of conducting portions of the aforementioned operations. True, not all of the missions, which the Jedburghs attempted, were successful, however, they created havoc and confusion within the German command structure. Did this assist the advancing American ground forces?
mere fact that the Jedburgh teams dispatched volunteers from their resistance groups to guide the Americans through enemy territory speaks for itself. Additionally, the quantity and quality of intelligence which they provided to the G-2s of the units assisted the American commanders in planning their future operations.

The assistance provided to the Americans, not only in terms of intelligence but also in interpreting and in several cases providing security forces for the advancing ground forces, illustrates the Jedburghs efforts and accentuates their success. However, the Jedburghs are not well documented and not until recently, as a result of its security classification, have any documents been released. Their accomplishments, as far as the assistance they provided to the ground force commanders, have not been cited either. For this reason possibly, today we are still suffering from the same circumstances that the Jedburghs did nearly 50 years ago.

The joint and combined efforts of the special operations community during this period were fairly new. Organized in early 1944, SFHQ and even more so EMFFI, organized after D-Day, were still experiencing growing pains as they dispatched operational teams into combat. This
created some of the problems which the teams experienced. I will address those of command and control, and link-up operations.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The problems with the command and control structure existed not only down at the team level in their interface with the resistance forces, but at higher headquarters also. In their dealings with the maquis leaders and the departmental resistance chiefs, the members of the Jedburgh teams were merely advisors. They were not able to openly direct the activities of the resistance and this created some problems. Most of the FFI forces were in agreement with the policies of the EMFFI, however, the FTP operated on a different political agenda. The FTP therefore conducted several operations that were not coordinated with the overall plan for the capture of the peninsula. Eventually, these factions joined forces with the FFI and assisted in liberating the majority of the region with the arrival of the American ground forces. The Germans, as a result, withdrew back into their fortified ports, mainly Brest, which prevented them from being overrun by the rampaging 3rd Army.

At the army and army group level, the use of the special forces detachments failed. They were not able to maintain proper contact with SFHQ to ascertain the location
and status of the teams operating in their area of operations. As evidenced throughout the team reports, very few advancing ground forces were aware that there were allied parachutists operating to their front and in some cases this resulted in small firefights. Once these columns overran the Jedburgh teams, their first inclination was to return them to England. The team leaders however, aware that their work was incomplete, attached themselves to the intelligence and operations sections, acting as liaison officers between the French and Americans.

As stated earlier, SFHQ was newly organized and inventing the wheel and therefore going through growing pains. For this reason, their problems in the command and control arena were numerous. The area which caused the most concern during the operations was in the communications arena. With the volume of traffic between teams and London, SFHQ was not able to receive daily messages, decipher, analyze them, and then act appropriately on them. This created, as evidenced throughout the team reports, confusion on the part of the teams. Aircraft flew to wrong locations, at wrong times and presented considerable danger to the men on the ground. This circumstance was no fault of the personnel working in London. They were simply inundated with traffic and messages and did the very best they could.
The organization had not sufficiently staffed the signal sections to properly support this volume of message traffic.¹

These issues were more organizational than operational and must therefore not detract from the positive actions SFHQ performed. They dropped massive amounts of arms and supplies to the Jedburgh teams, creating a viable armed resistance.² Aircraft flew daily not only to the Brittany peninsula, but throughout France, Belgium and Holland. One must keep in mind that the operations studied in this essay were but a small part of the overall Jedburgh operation, consisting of 99 teams.

It is necessary, having researched and studied these historical operations, to examine how today one can gain insight from the experiences of these teams. In considering the Jedburgh teams as models for the methods special operation forces should operate, the lessons learned from them have been forgotten for some time. Special operation forces even though they played an extremely important part in the Vietnam conflict, with the birth of Special Forces, did not conduct many operations with conventional forces. Not until Grenada in 1983 and, more recently, Panama in December 1989, has the need for the interoperability and importance of a heavy-light-special operation force mix on the airland battlefield become evident. In considering the impact of technology towards warfare and the systems
available to the commander, which can provide him with a clear and detailed picture of the battlefield, the preferred method is still human intelligence.

The only accurate and reliable source available remains the individuals who can place "eyes on the target" and create the circumstances quoted from FM 100-5. For this specific reason, we are witnessing increases in special operations forces. However, more important than the actual forces are the headquarters and organizations being created to command and control these personnel. The radios may be different, the weapons more accurate and destructive, and their equipment more sophisticated, however, the basic concept remains the same.

I would be remiss if I did not express the sentiments of the Jedburgh personnel that wrote letters to me expressing how they felt toward the entire operation. Of the eighteen personnel from the six teams I wrote about, ten are still alive today. Three live in England, three in France, and the remaining four in the United States. I received letters from six of these men.

To the man, they all felt that their operations were successful and played a vital role in the operations conducted in the Brittany peninsula. They also believed that this was due in part to the training they received at Milton Hall and more so, to the fact that they were able to
select their own team members. This comradery lasted not only through the war, but is present even to date. They felt that the organization itself was good and that the countries contributing placed professional, qualified personnel in the program. As a result, each man could be counted on to perform his particular portion of the mission without much supervision. Lastly, the people of the Finistere region impressed the Jedburgh members tremendously. Occupied by German coastal defense forces since 1941, their freedom and desire to return their country to the hands of its people, made the mission all worthwhile. They were true nationalists and many died trying to restore their nation. One of the French Jedburghs best described their actions as follows: "When one fights for his country, one can sacrifice all. They are ready!"*

However, the members also had a few disagreements with the operations. The major one consisted of the timing of their insertion. Most felt that SFHQ inserted them too late. In Finistere, by the time the Jedburgh teams were on the ground the majority of German troops (especially the 2nd German Parachute Division) had already retreated to Brest where they held off for several months." Therefore, with the American VIII Corps rapidly advancing, the Jedburghs felt the need to rapidly organize and train their resistance groups. This precluded them from being able to truly perform all the tasks they felt they should have.
In conclusion, one must reflect on exactly what these brave men did. They volunteered to join a new organization promising them adventure and duty behind enemy lines. Operating covertly, they trained, parachuted, and studied the language of their target country, in preparation to face the unknown. To parachute into foreign soil completely occupied by the enemy, having only a codeword as your identification, made brave men out of all of them. However, they all had one thing in common. The desire to defeat the German forces occupying Finistere and liberate the French people focused all of their efforts.

To label the "JEDS" as heroes of their times may be elaborating their accomplishments. However, it is safe to say, that they were dedicated professional soldiers with one common goal: the restoration and subsequent preservation of freedom for an oppressed people. Their actions were evolutionary in establishing a new method of combatting the enemy. This method, now known as guerilla warfare, is one that the world has learned to understand more and more. The impact of the guerilla and the strength of a united population against their oppressors can be studied throughout history. However, the Jeds were unusual, highly intelligent and devoted people. They knew when to play, when to work and when to be serious. During their training they adopted a saying which became their motto. When any
situation arose which created tension, they would simply say, "48, 49, 50 ... some shit!"

In this historical essay, my goal has been to tell a story that because of National Security procedures did not allow documentary research or free expression until recently. Therefore, it is more a story that has not been fully told, a jigsaw puzzle in which many pieces are missing and that, even now, lacks several important pieces. It is intended to give credit to a few brave and daring soldiers, who as forerunners, started a branch of service, which plays a key role in all military operations today. Hopefully, the reader will gain some insight into an area that has not been well documented and analyze the Jedburghs successes or failures accordingly.
CHAPTER NINE

ENDNOTES


² The following chart depicts the overall traffic SFHQ received from the field.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Msgs</th>
<th>Total groups</th>
<th>Signal Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>77,057</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>2,180</td>
<td>147,123</td>
<td>240</td>
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<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>7,912</td>
<td>497,024</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>7,358</td>
<td>445,376</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OSS/London Special Operations Branch and Secret Intelligence Branch War Diaries, (University Publications of America, Frederick, Maryland Microfilm Publication), (hereafter OSS/London SO Branch micro.), roll 3, frame 354.

² The following chart depicts the tonnage of supplies dropped to the Jedburgh teams.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTAINERS</th>
<th>PACKAGES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>3115.70</td>
<td>246.30</td>
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<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>3314.53</td>
<td>201.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>1877.53</td>
<td>165.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OSS/London SO Branch micro., roll 3, frame 355.

² This information cited from a personal letter written to the author by Mr. Edgar Mautaint, dated 10 March 1990.

² This information cited from a personal letter written to the author by COL (Ret) Ray Trumps, dated 10 January 1990.

² This information cited from a telephone conversation between the author and Mr. Elmer B. Esch on 22 January 1990.
GLOSSARY
A C OF S - Assistant Chief of Staff of the Army

BBC - British Broadcasting Company, the national radio system of the United Kingdom used to transmit blind transmission broadcasts to the resistance forces and Jedburghs in France.

BCRA (BCRAL) - Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action, (Central Bureau of Information and Action) Central Intelligence and Operations Bureau of de Gaulle's National Committee in London, which cooperated with the special section of British SOE that supplied Gaullist resistance forces in France.

BOCHE - French slang word for Germans

BRAL - Bureau des recherches et d'actions a Londre, which cooperated with the special section of the British SOE that supplied Gaullist resistance forces in France.

COSSAC - Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command (Western Europe)

DZ - Dropping zone or grounds (for personnel and material)


ETO - European Theater of Operations

EUREKA - Navigational device (beacon) used by the Jedburghs to direct aircraft.

ETOUSA - European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army. A command headquarters which controlled the area of operations in France.

FANY - Female Auxiliary Nursing Yeomanry (British). Female personnel used to assist in instructions during training conducted in England.

FCUL - French Committee of National Liberation

GLOSSARY (CON'T)

FTP - Francs - tireurs et Partisans, communist controlled resistance group. Paramilitary units which operated independently of the FFI.

GESTAPO - Acronym for GEHEIME STAATS POLIZEI, Nazi Germany's Secret State Police

G-1 - U.S. Army Personnel Division
G-2 - U.S. Army Intelligence Division
G-3 - U.S. Army Operations Division
G-4 - U.S. Army Logistics Division
G-5 - U.S. Army Civil Affairs Division

GPRF - Gouvernement Provisoire de la Republique Francaise, Provisional Government of the French Republic

HALIFAX - Bomber Aircraft used to transport Jedburgh teams to France.

JERRY - English slang word for Germans

LO - Liaison Officer

LUFTWAFFE - German Air Force

LZ - Landing zone

MAQUIS - Name given to French guerilla bands. Also known as Maquisards, French Resistance fighters who took their name from the tough and thorny bush in southeastern France.

MUR - Movement Unies de la Resistance, United Movement of the Resistance

OG - Operational Groups, OSS teams consisting of 4 officers and 30 enlisted men inserted for specific missions

OSS - Office of Strategic Services

SAB - Student Assessment Board

SAS - Special Air Service, set up by the British to work similar to OSS/OG teams

SF - Special Fund, normally established to provide finances necessary to maintain an agent's cover
GLOSSARY (CON'T)

SFHQ - Special Forces Headquarters, joint OSS/SOE SF Headquarters in London

SHAEF - Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, allied headquarters in London

SO - Special Operations Branch of SOE

SOE - Special Operations - Executive, British Intelligence gathering organization. The OG and SO half of British Intelligence Service, also called Baker Street.

SO 1 - Propaganda Branch of SOE

SO 2 - Operations Branch of SOE

SO 3 - Planning Branch of SOE

SS - Schlitzstaffen

STS - Special Training Schools of SOE

WEHRMACHT - The German Armed Forces of World War II

W/T - Wireless telegraphy or radio
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BIBLIOGRAPHY (CON’T)


**GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS**


**PERIODICALS AND ARTICLES**

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**UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS**


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Videocassette interview of Donald Spears. Interview conducted by USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, N.C. 28307. Part of library of USAJFKSWCS.

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Mr. Elmer B. Esch 22 January 1990

Mrs. Daphne Friele

Mr. Guy Le Borgne, General, ret. 24 February 1990

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SUBJECT: Change in Distribution

1. Request a distribution statement change to the following documents:


ADB148370, Rosner, Elliot J., "JEDBURGHS: Combat Operations Conducted in the Finistere Region of Brittany, France from July-September 1944" dated 01 June 1990.

The distribution statement change, effective 10 November 2004 per Dr. Samuel Lewis, Military History Department, US Army Command and General Staff College, subject matter expert and Reviewer, should read the following: (A) Approved for public release: Distribution unlimited.


The distribution statement change, effective 4 October 1995 per LTC Dan Karis, US Army Command and General Staff College, subject matter expert and Reviewer, should read the following: (A) Approved for public release: Distribution unlimited.

2. POC for this request is Rusty Rafferty or John Rogers, Reference Librarians Classified Documents Section, DSN 585-3128 or COM 913-758-3128 or FAX: DSN 585-3014 or COM 913-758-3014.

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