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
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REGIONALISM AND THE STUDY OF CRISES**

Jack M. Schick

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REGIONALISM AND THE STUDY OF CRISES

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Center for Naval Analyses

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CONFLICT AND INTEGRATION IN THE NEAR EAST:
REGIONALISM AND THE STUDY OF CRISES*

Jack M. Schick

THE NEAR EAST AS A FOCUS OF REGIONALISM

The Near East as a subordinate system within the international system has been variously defined in recent studies concerned with the boundaries, actors, and patterns of interaction in the region. Studies differ about what criteria to use for delimiting the region, which countries to include as core actors and which as peripheral ones, and what significance or weight to give to the role of external powers in the Near East.

Bruce Russett uses five criteria for defining an international region: 1) social and cultural homogeneity; 2) shared political attitudes and behavior; 3) shared institutional memberships; 4) economic interdependence; and 5) geographical proximity.¹ In defining a subordinate system, Michael Brecher suggests these criteria: 1) delimited scope or geography; 2) at least three actors; 3) recognition by external powers as a distinctive region; 4) self-identification; 5) units of power inferior to units in the dominant system; and 6) greater penetration by the dominant system than the reverse.² Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel define an international region in terms of geography; social, economic, political, and organizational bonds; communications; levels of power; and structure of relations.³ Frederic Pearson argues for a definition of a region based strictly on a clustering of interactions, although he begins with a geographical core for convenience.⁴

*The opinions and/or assertions contained herein are the private ones of the author and are not to be construed as those of the Navy Department, the Department of Defense, or the Center for Naval Analyses.

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¹Bruce Russett, International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), chapters 1, 11, 12, 13.

²Michael Brecher, "The Middle East Subordinate System and Its Impact on Israel's Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly 13 (June, 1969), p. 117.

³Louis Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, "International Regions: A Comparative Approach to Five Subordinate Systems," International Studies Quarterly 13 (December, 1969), p. 362.

⁴Frederic Pearson, "Interaction in an International Political Subsystem: The 'Middle East,' 1963-1964," Paper presented at the Conference on Middle East Conflict, Peace Research Society International, Cambridge, Massachusetts, June 4-5, 1970, pp. 14-15.

This proliferation of criteria reflects the growing pains of the study of regions. Scholarship in this field is still evolving and performance is constructive and creative because the objective referents under study - the movement for European unity, the Arab League, the Asian Development Bank - are evolving. One thing the study of regions is not. It is not primarily interested in nations or states, most of which are settled, fixed political units. It is interested in new political bodies--either organized or forming--and in the genetic substances of political life from which new political organs grow. The study of regions and the regional movements studied share a dissatisfaction with the past and present international system which is rooted in the discrete sovereignty of states. The interest in regionalism dates back to hopes expressed before and after the First World War for reforming a fragmented international system in the direction of wider cooperation and unity among states. Regions were viewed as building-blocks for a supra-national system of world order. The study and practice of regionalism has changed dramatically under the impact of functionalism, integration theory, and systems theory.⁵ But the nagging problems of how to define, describe, and create regions within a higher system than the state system remain to nettle scholars and statesmen.

Drawing a line around a group of states for definitional purposes to set it apart sufficiently to recognize it as a region requires some theoretical conception of what regions consist of. The criteria that Russett uses suggest that regions share social mores, cultural heritage, political expectations, memberships, goods and services, and borders. These criteria are the substantive elements of homogeneity and interdependence.⁶ They fit the Arab world, for example. Brecher's definition by contrast is almost quantitative composed of lines, numbers, perceptions, and power. Theoretically, Israel is part of a region so defined, and indeed he counts Israel as a core unit of the Near East subsystem.⁷ Cantori's and Spiegel's definition is more substantive again, suggesting in addition to the criteria Russett uses that anti-colonialism or anti-imperialism may be what holds a region together.⁸ Pearson's definition is quantitative and, as a result, solely on a basis of interactions, can include Britain and the United States as core units in the region, homogeneity and geographic proximity aside.⁹ In the study of regions, regions may consist of shared values, delimited or weighted relationships, or clusters of interactions. A range of definitions exists, therefore,

⁵Michael Banks, "Systems Analysis and the Study of Regions," International Studies Quarterly 13 (December, 1969), pp. 335-360.

⁶Bruce Russett, "Delineating International Regions," Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence (ed. J. David Singer) (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 317-352.

⁷Brecher, op. cit., p. 118.

⁸Cantori and Spiegel, op. cit., p. 362.

⁹Pearson, op. cit., pp. 16-18.

running from tight homogeneity at one end to loose heterogeneity at the other, from a Near East without Israel, to one including Israel, and finally to one embracing the presence of external powers in the region.

Once a definition is set out, then core, peripheral, and external units can be identified. And who is in or who is out, in turn, clarifies and lends recognition to a region. Israel does not cluster among the Arab states in Russett's factor analyses because he uses an economic development factor in which Israel is more like highly developed Western states than underdeveloped Afro-Asian ones.¹⁰ Brecher views the Near East in terms of Israel's foreign policy. He defines the Near East core as comprised of Israel, her immediate neighbors, and Iraq because these six states have generated and sustained what he calls the "system-shaping conflict" between Israel and the Arabs. Less conflict characterizes Israel's interaction with the periphery - Turkey, Iran, Ethiopia, Cyprus, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Algeria. Israel has normal diplomatic relations with the first four. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have not actively participated in the core conflict. The outer ring, consisting of Somalia, South Yemen, Sudan, Yemen, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco, are those distant states with whom Israel simply has not interacted to any significant degree.¹¹

Israel does not count as a core state for Cantori and Spiegel since they describe the core primarily as one of religious, political, and economic cohesion. Israel is among the peripheral states who are included in the subsystem, but who are alienated from the core. Powers external to the subsystem comprise the "intrusive system."¹² Pearson's interaction analysis measures the intensity of interaction through conflict; policy consideration; participation, e.g., trade, diplomacy; and aid between actors as a means of letting the Near East define itself. He begins with a core of eight Arab states and Israel, but finds that core and periphery change over time. In 1963, on the conflict dimension, for example, Iran, the U.S., and U.K. rank as core states and Kuwait and Lebanon as peripheral. By 1964, however, the U.S. was peripheral, Lebanon core, Kuwait still peripheral, and Iran neither core nor peripheral. Pearson's approach allows him to assess the dynamism of a system whose membership is constantly changing.¹³

Thus, the identity of the Near East as a subordinate system varies as much as the criteria for defining what regions consist of. The study of regions includes so many dimensions by which to attach that state or this state that many Near Easts appear all of which are reasonably configured in line with the dimensions selected for analysis. Israel

¹⁰Russett, "Delineating International Regions," op. cit., p. 333.

¹¹Brecher, op. cit., pp. 118-119.

¹²Cantori and Spiegel, op. cit., p. 362.

¹³Pearson, op. cit., pp. 19-25.

is all these things: highly developed, in conflict with its neighbors, non-Arab, and intensely interactive with Arab and non-Arab powers in the area. This variety of identities is a fascinating aspect of the study of regions. It fits a region as historically complex as the Near East. Yet, of course, to the scholar or political leader interested in regionalism, comparisons between studies for the purpose of generating more powerful theory or practical steps toward unity are difficult to make.

One of the most vexing issues for regionalism is the role of great powers external to the subsystem. This issue is considered only by those analyses in which a multi-level international system implicitly or explicitly figures. The first level in this international system is the dominant system of superpowers or global powers who affect several or all regions of the globe. The second level comprises regional subsystems in which powers act primarily with themselves and less extensively or only occasionally with other regions or external powers. The third level is the nation or state.

Russett does not treat this issue. All powers are either in one region or another. The U.S., for example, is part of the Western community and the USSR part of Eastern Europe.¹⁴ Brecher's emphasis in defining a subordinate system as consisting of units of power inferior to units in the dominant system and, therefore, penetrable by the latter, leads him to discuss at length external power penetration in the Near East.¹⁵ But he confines his analysis to a distinction between dominance and subordination, stressing the external powers' contributions to the regional military balance. Taken literally, this distinction raises a question about the autonomy of the Near East. If the Near East is so dependent and so subordinate to the external powers, perhaps it should not be viewed as a distinct region. Perhaps it is really only an extension of external power conflicts. For example, at what point does military dependency upon the Soviet Union cause the UAR to lose control over its own destiny? Cantori and Spiegel avoid this question because their analysis is a little broader in scope. They note, for example, the difficulty "intrusive systems" have in creating social cohesion between themselves and indigenous populations.¹⁶

Pearson tries to answer the question directly. He treats external powers as regional actors concerned with local matters. They are neither dominant nor external. Intensity of interaction above a certain level between geographically distant powers and local powers or between local powers identifies the Near East as a system. He is on sound ground in systems theory which rudimentarily defines a system as any set of units in interaction.¹⁷ The trouble with Pearson's solution is that it levels

¹⁴Russett, op. cit., pp. 328-334.

¹⁵Brecher, op. cit., pp. 129-139.

¹⁶Cantori and Spiegel, op. cit., pp. 376-377.

¹⁷Banks, op. cit., p. 347.

all powers. They are merely interactors. Important information about the actors -- whether influence is a two-way flow or all in one direction, whether some actors are more easily distracted than others by conflicts outside the region, or whether some are rich and others poor -- is omitted. Dominance and subordination may be too crude a distinction to make between external and local powers. But it seems equally heavy-handed to eliminate all distinctions, particularly for the Near East where the role of external powers is in practice a controversial issue.

The role of external powers in the Near East subordinate system has two dimensions. In the Six Day War of 1967, for example, the U.S. and USSR acted to restrain Israel and the UAR with some success, primarily by setting limits which confined the freedom of maneuver of local powers. And Israel and the UAR respected those limits. Thus, there were elements of dominance and subordination present in the relationship between the external powers and their respective proteges. But the limits were so broad that Israel believed it could defeat the UAR before the external powers could coalesce to impose a cease-fire. And the UAR successfully ignored the external powers' known preference for the status quo in a series of faits accomplis creating a situation to which Israel had to respond. The elements of dominance and subordination were not so pervasive as to cripple either one of the local powers. The U.S. and USSR were, in a sense, merely interactors with Israel and the UAR. Nevertheless, both dominance-subordination and local free-play were working ingredients in the crisis.

This mixed state of affairs has typified the Near East since the end of the Second World War. The reason for this mixed state is that the subsystem is in transition from a region formerly ruled by external European powers and, therefore proud and sensitive about state sovereignty, to one less nationalistic and more willing to restore relations with Western Europe. Former colonial powers and their successor states in the area presently are moving toward a flexible set of agreements, creating new forms of interaction as they go along. The U.S. and the USSR entered the region originally in the 1940's on the side of anti-colonialism. Now they are a focus of anti-colonialism which portrays them as imperialist powers. The Near East is a region of rapid change where external control and local autonomy currently coexist.

Deciding what regions consist of, who is in or who is out as units of the subsystem, and what the role of external powers is, are three of the more important issues in the study of regions. Russett, Brecher, Cantori and Spiegel, and Pearson each approach them differently, each illuminating a dimension of a multi-dimensional problem. They have not quite captured the complexity of the Near East analytically especially the dynamism of change pervading the area. Yet they have created building-blocks with the analytical tools available and, by describing the interdependencies that exist in the region and sketching the benefits of regionalism, have contributed to the process of dampening the intense nationalism that periodically enflames the Near East.

THE NEAR EAST AS A FOCUS FOR THE STUDY OF CRISES

The study of international crises and the literature it has spawned can supplement regionalism in perhaps unexpected ways. The study of crises emphasizes conflict control and reduction and the Near East currently suffers an excess of conflict. The literature makes a point lucidly and in detail: crises need not be simply regarded as clashes of brute force. In fact, they may not lead to violence at all. Salient features of crises embrace non-violent behavior including intensive planning, bargaining, and gamesmanship.¹⁸ An international crisis embraces a range of political actions: visits, negotiations, protests, warnings, emergency meetings, demands, evacuation, mobilization, threats, intrusion, blockade, general offensive and cease-fire. Any one crisis may or may not proceed through the whole range of possible moves and counter-moves. A crisis, as defined by the literature, is perceived by actors to be a sharp break in the ordinary, day-by-day management of foreign policy. And, as further defined, it is short, intense, and nerve-wracking because of the implication it bears for system-wide conflict in a region or the globe.

One analytical use of crises for the study of regions is in clarifying criteria for defining a region. Crises may serve to tear away obfuscations that hide elemental relationships in a system. The Near East subordinate system consists of shared values, as appears in the criteria Russett uses. But elements of homogeneity in the Arab world appear to be easily displaced by impassioned rivalries in times of crisis. By Brecher's criteria, the Near East seems to lose self-identification and recognition by external powers as a separate entity when local powers begin to seek quarrelsome revenge against each other in the midst of or because of, an international crisis in the Near East. For example, the period of May-June, 1967 threw light upon the depth of the antagonism between the Arab nationalist states and the Arab monarchies, the ineffectiveness of Arab League institutions, the limited utility of embargoing oil exports to the U.S. and U.K., the quite cautious attitude of the USSR toward the UAR, and the real state of the military balance between Israel and the UAR. The Six Day War -- a sensitivity session of unusual proportions -- taught all the participants something about themselves and they engaged in considerable soul-searching after the cease-fire. For the first time since the late 1940's, the idea of a bi-national state surfaced in Israel. And in the UAR, the Egyptian press candidly assessed the shortcomings of Egypt's army and society.

Successive crises in the Near East since Britain withdrew from Egypt in 1954 reveal a decreasing emphasis on regionalism. New criteria seem necessary for supplementing criteria rooted in that concept. After an initial burst of nationalistic fervor in the wake of independence, the new nations of the Near East are aligning themselves more, not less, with Western European countries. Regionalism has not stood up well in crises.

¹⁸Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963); Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Oran R. Young, The Politics of Force, Bargaining During International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968); Charles F. Hermann, Crises in Foreign Policy, A Simulation Analysis (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1969); Glenn Snyder, "Crisis Bargaining," Contemporary Research in International Crises, (ed.) Charles F. Hermann (forthcoming.)

A trend is in evidence, for example, of increasing technical assistance and trade developing in a pragmatic style between Europe and the Near East.¹⁹ The Palestinian refugee organizations are presently the most nationalistic elements in the Near East. The UAR, now rather conventional by comparison, enjoys amicable relations with Britain and France, its old enemies at Suez. New criteria should reflect the changing state of nationalism in the Near East and the re-entry of Western powers into the region.

Another aspect of crises useful for the study of regions is that crises help to identify core, peripheral, and external units of a subordinate system. In the Six Day War the issue was between Israel and the UAR - all the other Arab powers were peripheral. Having the military wherewithal, the UAR took an initiative against Israel no other Arab power could take. Israel fixed its attention and efforts on undoing the UAR's move. The core of interaction was between the two prime antagonists. Moreover, the U.S. and USSR proved themselves external powers in their reluctance to intervene physically, motivated more by their fear of each other than by the possible defeat of a client. Brecher suggests a region must have at least three actors. It should be added that it probably cannot tolerate more than two core actors if these two are armed camps arrayed against each other. The "system-shaping conflict" he ascribes to Israel and her immediate neighbors and Iraq really is sustained by Israel and the UAR as the three wars of 1948, 1956, and 1967 have demonstrated.

Finally, the role of external powers in the region of the Near East can be clarified by examining their roles in crises in the area. In the Suez War of 1956, Britain and France tried to reassert regional dominance and were thwarted by the U.S. and USSR. The Lebanon landing in 1958 illustrated a more successful penetration of the subsystem by an external power, in this case, the U.S. In the Cyprus crisis of 1964, the U.S. confined its penetration to intensive diplomacy in Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia and at the U.N. in New York. By 1967, no external power was prepared to intervene with military force in the region, as Britain and France did at Suez. The autonomy of local powers has increased in step with the declining dominance of external powers. The external powers have not been Near Eastern powers in the immediate sense that Pearson uses as a perspective for understanding their role because they have either attempted to dominate the region or, more recently, have gone to great lengths to avoid irretrievable entanglement in the Arab-Israeli dispute.

The study of crises highlights change. This dimension is a useful one for regionalism because it requires an adaptation to trends in the referent system. Crises in the Near East have overturned regional

¹⁹The Common Market recently entered into preferential trade agreements with Israel, Tunisia, Morocco, and Yugoslavia and has made contacts for trade agreements with the UAR, Lebanon, and Algeria. The New York Times, June 30, 1970. The UAR has permitted new oil concessions for Western European firms. The New Middle East, January, 1970, p. 12. Japan has expanded its investments and trade with Near Eastern countries. Sevinc Carlson, "Japan's Inroads into the Middle East and North Africa," The New Middle East July, 1970, pp. 14-17. Also see the table of major identified arms agreements in The Military Balance, 1969-1970, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1969, pp. 60-61.

status quo affecting the whole future direction of the region. Already since 1945, three rather different regions have appeared or disappeared in response to region-wide crises. From 1945 - 1956, the Near East was heavily penetrated by external powers, particularly the U.S., Britain, and France. It lacked autonomy and appeared imperceptible as a region. Israel, although victor in the Palestine War, remained in a precarious strategic position with the British trained Arab Legion on the West Bank and Egypt in control of the Straits of Tiran and Gaza.

The fires of Arab nationalism were not lit until 1954 when Colonel Nasser formally assumed power in Egypt and did not begin to spread until after Suez when Britain and France were humiliated. In the period 1957-1967, Arab nationalism, characterized by Egypt's quarrel with Britain and France; the war in Algeria; revolutions and coup d' etat achieved or threatened in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Jordan, and Lebanon; and independence for the Sudan, Cyprus, and Kuwait generated a spirit of regionalism in the Near East. The USSR rode the wave of anti-colonialism, serving as a source of arms and trade to new Arab states. Brecher observes that in this period, the non-aligned bloc of nations made its influence felt in the international system.²⁰ Perhaps the last year of significant Western penetration was 1958 when the U.S. landed troops in Lebanon and the U.K. in Jordan. The settlement of the Suez War, however, provided stability for Israel's frontiers throughout the period.

Since 1967, violations of the cease-fire terminating the Six Day War have required the U.S. and USSR to become involved again in the Arab-Israeli dispute. But they are reluctant intervenors concerned more about hazards for the international system in the absence of a settlement rather than about any desire to dominate the region. While Israel and the UAR remain locked in low-level combat, other Arab states - and Israel and the UAR as well - are constructing mutually beneficial relationships with Western European powers. Neither great power dominance nor Arab-nationalist autonomy characterize the post-1967 period. Pragmatic rapprochement is shaping new patterns of interaction in an outward-looking phase for the Near East.

A MODEL FOR CRISIS ANALYSIS

The study of regions is holistic, systems oriented. The study of crises is also systems-oriented in suggesting criteria for region definition; identifying core, peripheral, and external units; and describing the role of external powers in a subordinate system. Crisis studies offer pertinent details of interactions for regional studies. Crisis studies can be used to spot the significance for regional studies of rapid system change.

The research reported here attempts to supplement regional studies about the Near East in two ways. First, it is a study of the regional effects of four Near East crises as well as of actors' decision-making which is a frequent focus of crisis studies. The effects of external actors upon other external actors in a Near East crisis, of external powers upon

²⁰Brecher, op. cit., p. 134.

local actors, and of local powers upon each other are considered. Secondly, as a comparative study of four crises over a period of ten years, it identifies changes in the crisis roles of actors in the Near East. Comparability is ensured by appropriate scaling methods. The study used the mediated stimulus-response (S-O-R) model employed extensively by the Stanford studies in international conflict and integration.²¹ This model lends itself to systems studies and need not be identified exclusively with analyses of decision-making. It sorts out decision maker to decision-maker relationships. But the actions and perceptions of decision-makers are not independent of the roles they play within their governments, countries, or regions.²² For example, Arab nationalist actors consciously role-play regional decision-making individually and collectively. As long as state sovereignties persist in the Near East, the study of regions stands to gain from information about patterns of interaction between country decision-makers. The model was used as extensively as possible. Where it did not lend itself to the issues of regionalism, the literature on specific Near East crises was drawn upon to complete the discussion.


The model is portrayed in Figure 1.²³ S serves as the independent variable, r and s as intermediate variables, and R as the dependent variable. In the Stanford studies, r and s are defined as expressed perceptions and intentions respectively. They require a finer distinction between A's statements about itself as a target for B and A's statements about itself as an agent for actions toward B than the data in this study allowed. The Stanford project investigated the summer crisis of 1914 leading to the First World War. With the exception of Serbia, the state papers concerning that crisis have been published. The present study, however, was dependent upon the press and the published literature on the four Near East crises examined. The Arab press is remarkably candid about decision-making after a regional crisis has passed. But state papers are not available. Post-hoc statements of perceptions (r) were not as rare as statements of intentions (s). Decision-makers in the four crises appeared to have only the most general goals at the outset of a crisis or changed them in the course of a crisis. In crises, decision-makers frequently are victims of events and demonstrate quite erratic behavior. They seem to sense this problem and are reluctant to state their intentions in any precise manner.

²¹Ole R. Holsti, Robert C. North, and Richard A. Brody, "Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis," Quantitative International Politics, Insights and Evidence (ed.) J. David Singer (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 123-58.

²²Ibid., p. 128.

²³In Country A, an initial event stimulus (S) is filtered by decision-makers perceptions of B's attitudes and behavior toward A (r) resulting in an expression of A's plans and intentions toward B (s) and an action response (R). Country A's output is Country B's input which is filtered by B's decision-makers who, in turn, generate plans and action to cope with their event stimulus. S and R are drawn from event action data, r and s from verbal data. Ibid., p. 133.

FIGURE 1
S-O-R MODEL



In the present study, the two intermediate variables r and s were combined into a single O variable. This variable consists of statements representing A's expressed attitude toward B. It has greater generality and flexibility than r and s. As a "soft" variable, it is a little less embroiled in the issue of whether data statements reflect "real" perceptions and intentions.²⁴ The O sector of the model is used to assess two crisis dimensions. Correlating S and O indicates A's reaction to B. Correlating O with R registers the difference between A's reaction and its actual behavior toward B.

In addition to standard works and journals describing the crises and recent history of the Near East, heaviest use was made of three sources: the British Broadcasting Corporation's Summary of World Broadcasts, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service's Reports, and The New York Times. These sources provided highly detailed information with little overlap. Event data were coded into a format specifying the source, date, agent, action, and target. Attitude data were coded by source, date, speaker, who was spoken about (if appropriate) attitude, and target. About 1500 items were thus collected and coded.²⁵

Event data were scaled by a 15 point scale ranging from least to most violent and attitude data by a 10 point scale of least to most hostile. The scales are reproduced in Table 1. These scales were constructed with the assistance of five political scientists who, acting as judges sorting the 15 and the 10 scaling cards, achieved agreement: coefficient of concordance - .93 for the 15 and .95 for the 10. The coefficient is very high because, after several trials, the judges initially ranked the cards into sets of three, then sorted the cards within each set.

The value of an action (1-15) or attitude (1-10) is the value of the scale category into which it was sorted. Standard marker cards were also sorted with the data cards. The marker cards describe actions and attitudes of sufficient generality that could appear in any international crisis. They provide a ruler by which to compare cases, across time or geography.²⁶ These cards appear as the categories of Table 1, e.g., visits, protest, emergency meetings. Data cards and marker cards were scaled together for each crisis. After being scaled, they were averaged on a

²⁴Robert Jervis argues that a country's statements of its perceptions should not be taken at face value because they may be manipulated at will by the speaker. It is interesting to note that his conclusion follows from the minor premise rather than from the major premise of this syllogism: country can manipulate statements of its perceptions; it really has other perceptions it does not admit; therefore, statements of its perceptions should not be taken at face value. Change the minor premise to read: it regards its statements as a means of conveying policy decisions and official thinking. Then the conclusion becomes just the opposite: statements of the perceptions should be taken at face value. In other words, a controlled press can be used to inform as well as to mislead. Jervis confuses official speech with mere propaganda. "The Costs of the Quantitative Study of International Relations," Contending Approaches to International Politics (eds.) Klans Kuorrand James N. Rosenau (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 180-195.

²⁵The content analysis was considerably helped by Ole Holsti's Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley Publishing Co., 1969).

²⁶Lincoln E. Moses, Richard A. Brody, Ole R. Holsti, Joseph B. Kadane, and Jeffrey S. Milstein, "Scaling Data on Internat Action," Science, May 26, 1967, pp. 1054-1059.

TABLE 1

BEHAVIOR AND ATTITUDE SCALES

Scale of behavior: least to most violent	Scale of attitude: least to most hostile
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Alliance 2. Economic or military assistance 3. Visits, good relations 4. Negotiations over differences 5. Diplomatic or popular protest 6. Rejects charge, provocative acts 7. Emergency meetings, evacuation 8. Military units alerted, strenghtened 9. Military forces deploy 10. Breaks relations, closes borders 11. Threats, warnings, alarm 12. Subversion, border incidents 13. Air intrusion, harassment 14. Blockade, embargo 15. Combat operations 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Respects strength 2. Aware of costs 3. Cool relationship 4. Tolerates enemies 5. Agitating 6. Conspiring 7. Making demands, blaming 8. Menacing, threatening 9. Moving to attack, mobilizing 10. Attacks

weekly basis.²⁷ Numbers derived were used to map the profiles of violence and hostility in four cases: Suez in 1956, Lebanon in 1958, Cyprus in 1964, and the Six Day War in 1967.

Analyses were performed organized by the sectors of the S-O-R model. Spearman's rank correlation coefficient was used to infer relationships between countries.²⁸ Four types of relationship were possible. First, the relationship between the behaviors of two countries, the R vs. R correlation, was constructed. This correlation may suggest the presence or absence of influence, power, or dominance of A over B. Secondly, one country's stimulation of another and the other's attitude toward the stimulating country was examined. This relationship, reflected in the S vs. O correlation, may be described as A's reaction - the statements of its leaders, public media, and figures associated with the government - to B. Thirdly, the O vs. R correlation expresses the difference between one country's attitude toward another and its action toward that other country. This correlation is a measure of A's credibility with B. The attitudes of two countries, O vs. O, were also examined. High correlations here seemed to infer an emotional linkage between A and B. The two could be emotionally involved enemies or they could be emotionally involved allies.²⁹ The O vs. O correlations are not closely relevant to this paper and will not be presented in the discussion of the four cases.

The S-O-R model, as used in this study, provides a framework for assessing the flow of behavior and attitudes from country A toward country B. A attempts to change B's crisis posture and B, as A's target, resists A. A rank correlation coefficient does not by itself

²⁷In his study of conflict and cooperation in the Near East, Robert Burrowes laments the difficulty in multiple time series analysis of using a time unit appropriate both for theoretical reasons and for data availability. If the unit is too small, data are not available; if too large, important interactions occurring in short time intervals are missed through aggregation. He found this problem was accentuated for domestic events data. Working with crisis periods and international events data, the present study aggregated data on a weekly basis with satisfactory results. Robert Burrowes, "Conflict and Cooperation Within and Among Nations: Enumerative Profiles of Syria, Jordan, and the United Arab Republic, January 1965-May 1967," Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, April 2-4, 1970, p. 10.

²⁸Spearman's rank correlation coefficient is defined by the equation:
$$\rho = 1 - \frac{6\sum(d^2)}{N^3 - N}$$
 See Maurice G. Kendall, Rank Correlation Methods (London: Charles Griffin, 1962), p. 8.

²⁹In the Suez crisis, for example, Egypt's attitudes correlated with those of the other actors in the following order: France .75; Britain .73; U.S., .69; USSR, .64; Israel, .22. Egypt was more involved with its enemies, France and Britain, than with its temporary allies, the U.S. and USSR. Its involvement with Israel is low for two reasons: a) Israel yielded the stage to Britain and France early in the crisis period, and thus, was not for long the central object of Egypt's anger; b) Kol Yisrael was reticent in expressing its feelings compared to the vehemence of Radio Cairo.

indicate whether B has acted against A or A against B. Correlation coefficients should be examined in the context of the map of each crisis. The map usually indicates that A's behavior has risen to a level equal to or superceding B's level of behavior in order to move B in a direction desired by A. This pattern characterizes a crisis situation. Rank correlations of R's taken-together with other facts and assumptions about countries' relationships drawn from the literature of each crisis -- help to indicate the magnitude and extent of relationships in a crisis.

Observations were lagged to determine the extent of delay which achieved the maximum correlation between two sectors of the S-O-R model. The optimum response time was considered to be the lag which produced the maximum correlation. Lags of one and two weeks were used for this test. A high correlation in the unlagged case suggests an immediate relationship between the elements examined. A lower correlation suggests indecision, unawareness, or a lack of certainty that an action by one party has achieved its objective. However, increasing the lag between elements reduces confidence in any inferences drawn because of the smaller number of observation pairs available. It also affects the identification of phases of a crisis. Large lags can produce a spurious identification because phases may be bridged by observation pairs taken from two phases.

FOUR CASES OF NEAR EAST CRISES

The cases discussed here are crises which accelerated or accentuated system change in the Near East. In each case, the pattern of interaction supports: 1) a specific definition of the region; 2) identification of certain core and peripheral units; and 3) specific roles of external powers. These three categories serve to relate crisis studies to the study of regions. The S-O-R model was most helpful in the discussion of the roles of external powers and helpful in defining the region. It could not be used, except indirectly, to identify core and peripheral actors. Discussion of the second category relies on the maps and literature of each crisis. Comparisons between cases are made in the discussion of each case.


SUEZ 1956

The first case, the Suez War of 1956, has a highly complicated set of profiles because of the unusual number of major actors participating in the crisis. Israel, Egypt, Britain, France, the U.S., and USSR all played significant roles.³⁰ Figure 2 is a composite map of the crisis. Violence levels were plotted over a 12 week period: October 1 - December 22, 1956. Israel initiated the crisis being the first whose behavior - in the second week - reached a high level. Isreal attacked in week 5. By week 6, Israel had settled

³⁰ Background history will be found in Kennett Love, Suez, The Twice Fought War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), and Merry and Serge Bromberger, Secrets of Suez (trans. James Cameron)(London: Pan Books, 1957), probably the most comprehensive sources on the subject.

SUEZ CRISIS OCT 1956 00000006 PARTICIPANTS ACTUAL VIOLENCE

FIGURE 2



into a mid-to-lower level of activity, the first power to do so in the crisis. Britain was the second power to move. Britain peaked in week 5. Actually, Britain attacked in week 6, but the average level of its behavior in that week was lower than in the 5th because it also agreed to a cease-fire and negotiations in the 6th week. Thereafter its behavior settled into a much lower level. France was not far behind and its behavior, as Britain's ally, was almost identical to Britain's. Egypt rose to meet its attackers, but was more reluctant to retreat to lower levels after the cease-fire in week 6. The U.S. did not react very sharply to the crisis until Israel actually attacked in week 5. The U.S. sustained a high level of activity during the Anglo-French invasion in week 6 and reached even a higher level in weeks 7 and 8 because the U.S. did not rule out intervention by the USSR. The USSR was the slowest to react in the crisis, threw its verbal missiles at Britain and France in week 6 and, in spite of U.S. expectations, let its behavior fall off beginning in week 7.

The jumbled pattern of external power interaction here should not obscure the display of dominance by Britain and France. Spearman's rank correlation coefficients (R-R) for Britain's and France's attack on Egypt are .54 at lag 0, increasing to .70 at lag 2, and .76 at lag 0, increasing to .81 at lag 1, respectively.³¹ However, rho for Israel's attack on Egypt is .25 at lag 0, increasing to .74 at lag 2, which qualifies Britain's and France's dominance. They were substantially assisted by Israel in their attack on Egypt. Indeed, Israel emerges as the dominant power in the crisis in so far as neither the U.S. nor the USSR had much influence on Israel's behavior suggested by the correlation of .12 at lag 0 and .04 at lag 0, respectively. U.S. and USSR influence on Britain and France, by contrast, is higher: U.S. vs. U.K., .36 at lag 0; U.S. vs. France, .54 at lag 0; USSR vs. U.K., .32 at lag 0; USSR vs. France, .52 at lag 0.

The Suez literature concludes that as a display of dominance, Suez was nonetheless, the end of empire for Britain and France. The other two external powers, the U.S. and USSR, temporarily collaborated as friends of Egypt to thwart Anglo-French dominance. In so doing, they laid the foundations of an era of Arab nationalism. Egypt survived to gain prestige and to actively encourage other states to model themselves after its regime. The Near East became an identifiable region centered on Cairo, spurred on by the humiliation of Britain and France and by the achievements of the anti-colonial movement. The settlement the U.S. and USSR arranged by activating U.N. machinery muddied Israel's victory over Egypt even as it ensured Israel stable borders for ten years. The Near East appearing in the Suez War was in transition from a state of dominance in which the region itself was amorphous to an identifiable region of independent states, perceived as such by themselves and by external powers -- to use Brecher's terms.

³¹See Table 2.

The core of the new region founded at Suez was the Arab states led by Egypt, soon to be the United Arab Republic.³² This core fits the criteria used by Russett, and Cantor and Spiegel, that a region is defined by homogeneity and interdependence, in this case provided by Arab nationalism and the growing number of new states after 1956 that joined the nationalist movement. These criteria tend to exclude Israel. In the period after Suez, Israel sat on the periphery as the Arab states around her underwent nationalist coups and revolutions. The pattern of interaction at Suez does not, of course, identify this new region as clearly as it would eventually emerge. But it does provide signs of transition to greater regionalism.

For example, the U.S. supported Egypt in the crisis. But by week 7 or 8, the Near East was rife with rumors about a coup in Syria, plotted presumably by Turkey and Iraq and intended to produce a pro-Western government. Egypt perceived the hand of the U.S. in Turkey's and Iraq's threatening behavior. Partly for this reason, the level of Egypt's behavior remained in mid-range after the cease-fire. This behavior was an assertion of Egyptian solidarity with pro-Cairo forces in Syria. In 1957, a successful Baathist coup occurred in Damascus, and Syria took steps to become the northern region of the UAR ruled by Egypt.³³ Thus an element of Arab nationalist homogeneity appeared even before the last Anglo-French troops departed the canal zone in week 12.

The external powers acted very much as external actors. Britain and France momentarily displayed dominance. But more to the point, the external powers played their own game at Suez. Each was terribly concerned about what other external powers could do to them as well as about the Near East itself. The U.S. in particular demonstrated its extra-regional role at Suez. It sharply objected to any possibility of USSR intervention in the Near East context which would affect the international system as a whole. The S-O correlation coefficient for the U.S. reaction to the USSR is .79 at lag 0.

The correlation of S with O illustrates the external powers' concern about themselves. S-O registered Britain's concern about the USSR role in the crisis: .78 at lag 0. The French reaction was a little less: .54 at lag 0. They both reacted rather strongly to U.S. behavior: .69 at lag 0 for the U.K.; .78 at lag 0 for France. The U.S. reacted with about the same intensity toward them, although with more delay perhaps because of surprise at their behavior: .61 at lag 2 toward Britain, .75 at lag 1 toward France. The Suez literature also concludes that the U.S. and France felt more bitter toward each other than the U.S.

³²The core eventually included Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria and Yemen for the period 1957-1967.

³³U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, A Select Chronology and Background Documents Relating to the Middle East, 91st Cong., 1st Session, May, 1969, p. 10.

and U.K. Bitterness among the external powers, however, was not less than their reaction toward Egypt. Britain and France reacted strongly to Egypt's behavior: .87 at lag 0 for Britain; .70 at lag 0 for France. And Egypt reciprocated with hostile concern reflected by correlations of .78 at lag 1 toward Britain and an extreme .92 at lag 1 toward France.

The correlation of O with R measures the credibility of an actor's crisis role, an important aspect of an external power's niche in the structure of a region. The higher the correlation, the greater the credibility. One might expect that the USSR had a greater credibility problem than any other actor because of its threat to destroy Britain and France with nuclear weapons and to dispatch volunteers to Egypt. Actually, its words never got very far ahead of its actions, correlating .88 at lag 0. Of course, the USSR was not in a position of having embarked on a large undertaking and failed. Israel, Britain, and France were in that position.

Israel, whose Sinai victory one would expect to have given it more credibility than any other power in the crisis, had more of a credibility problem than any other, suggested by an O-R correlation of .45 at lag 0. What Israel said and what it did were discrepant in at least two respects. First, secrecy and a lack of candor before the attack on Egypt belied the preparations Israel took beforehand. Secondly, after the attack the U.S. and USSR generated pressure on Israel to withdraw to which Israel felt compelled to accommodate, although protesting and blustering. Thus, in one case Israel's actions outpaced its words and, in the other, its words exceeded its actions. In both cases, its actions were a better guide to its intentions than its words. The O-R correlation for Britain is similar to Israel's .53 at lag 0. For France it is a little higher, .69 at lag 0. For the U.S. rather high, .77 at lag 1. The U.S., in fact, acted overwhelmingly, talking, and insisting as it acted. Egypt's words and actions correlated even more highly, .82 at lag 0, reflecting one reason why Egypt survived and acquired prestige and credibility in the Arab world.


LEBANON 1958

The Lebanon crisis of 1958 pitted the U.S. directly against the UAR in a much less complex pattern than Suez.³⁴ Figure 3 traces UAR and U.S. behavior through a 25 week period, May 4 - October 25, 1958. The crisis was a protracted one beginning with riots in Beirut on May 9, extending through U.S. troop landings on July 15, and terminating with the last troop withdrawal on October 25. The UAR initiated the crisis acting from Syria, her northern region, to assist the Government opposition in Lebanon. The U.S. responded to the May riots but chose not to intervene with troops. UAR behavior continued at a high level until week 13, two weeks after U.S. troop landings. Both U.S. and UAR activity fell to mid-range after the landings but continued to erupt

³⁴The most helpful book is Fahim I. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1961).

FIGURE 3

VARIABLE VALUES LEBANON MAY 1958 US ACTUAL VIOLENCE VS WAR ACTUAL VIOLENCE



12
 11
 10
 9
 8
 7
 6
 5
 4
 3
 2
 1
 0
 -1
 -2
 -3
 -4
 -5
 -6
 -7
 -8
 -9
 -10
 -11
 -12
 -13
 -14
 -15
 -16
 -17
 -18
 -19

sporadically. The UAR perceived an imminent Israeli attack on Syria in week 15 and on Jordan in week 22. U.S. behavior rose and fell as bargaining between the Government and opposition progressed in Beirut. A settlement was achieved in early October, after which both the U.S. and UAR rapidly withdrew.

The rank correlation coefficients for U.S. intervention (R-R) is .58 at lag 0 rising to .76 at lag 1.³⁵ By this measure, the U.S. was remarkably successful in Lebanon. The crisis literature reports that the intervention not only defeated UAR hopes for adding Lebanon to a lengthening list of Arab nationalist states. It also imposed a cease-fire on riot-torn Beirut and created conditions in which Government and opposition leaders could negotiate a settlement of the issue which generated conflict in Lebanon: the issue of presidential succession. The longer the U.S. remained in Beirut, however, the greater the risk of becoming bogged down in a country suited for guerilla warfare and becoming entangled in Lebanese politics. Announcing its intention to withdraw as early as week 15 and beginning the withdrawal process in the same week may account for the high correlation of UAR behavior with the U.S. intervention as much as the intervention itself.

The record of the crisis implies that in this crisis, a regional power, the UAR acted like an external power, not as a power external or peripheral to the region, but as one external to Lebanon. The UAR provided military training, guns, and currency to Lebanese opposition forces. It criticized the Lebanese Government and through Radio Cairo encouraged the spread of Arab nationalism, although it did not call for overthrowing the Government. When an army coup d'etat overthrew the Iraqi monarchy in July, 1958 - initially appearing to be a great gain for Arab nationalism - King Hussein in Jordan felt his throne threatened and the Lebanese Government feared a coup in Beirut. The U.S. perceived Arab nationalism led by Cairo running at flood tide through the Near East. It intervened in what it considered a trend toward dominance of the region by the UAR. It also perceived USSR influence increasing in proportion to the spread of Arab nationalism because of the new relationship between the USSR and Egypt signified by Moscow's military assistance to Egypt. Thus, again, as in 1956, the U.S. acted to thwart dominance of the region, this time against the UAR and, indirectly, the USSR.

U.S. intervention in Lebanon did not destroy the role of Egypt as a model of nationalism in the region. But it did qualify the boost Egypt got in 1956 from the humiliation of Britain and France. The Near East in the Lebanon crisis appeared very much as an identifiable region particularly because the UAR acted so visibly as the successful leader of Arab nationalism. Yet an additional factor was added to the settlement at Suez, mitigating the euphoria of that earlier achievement. The UAR lost prestige. The Suez core of the new region remained after the Lebanon crisis and grew with the addition of Iraq and the Sudan to the list of nationalist revolutions. The new strength found by Lebanon

³⁵See Table 3.

and Jordan in the 1958 crisis, however, prevented a complete sweep of the region by Arab nationalism. The heterogeneity of the Near East, still visible in the political fabric of Lebanon particularly, persisted as a constraint on the developing regionalism. Israel continued its peripheral role.

Consistent with the concern displayed at Suez about USSR influence, the U.S. acted in an anti-USSR role in Lebanon. It tended to identify a gain for the UAR with a gain for the USSR. Here again, as at Suez, the USSR intervened loudly at the side of the UAR which, however, reinforced the U.S. perception that the USSR was deeply committed to the UAR. The U.S. reaction to the crisis, the S-0 correlation, was a high .80 at lag 0. The UAR reaction was not as strong as at Suez, .47 at lag 0, compared to .78 at lag 1 toward Britain in 1956, perhaps because U.S. intervention proved limited in scope over time. In fact, in the first two weeks after troops landed in Beirut, Egypt had expected an attack on Iraq and Syria.

In the Lebanon crisis, the UAR had a credibility problem. The O-R correlation supports this assertion with .41 at lag 0. This figure is slightly worse than Israel's at Suez, .45 at lag 0. Compared to the U.S., .68 at lag 0 increasing to .72 at lag 1, the UAR was in trouble. This problem reveals one reason why Egypt did not appear as impressive after Lebanon as it did after Suez and why it lost prestige. The record of the crisis reveals its actions ran slightly ahead of its words in the first 6 weeks. It was, after all, embarrassing for Cairo, espousing the cause of all Arabs, to be working to overthrow another Arab government, and it publically denied its involvement. Even before landing, it vigorously protested increasing U.S. involvement without, however, really rising to challenge the U.S. in Lebanon. The U.S., by contrast, impressed its Near East audience with its willingness to act on its declared intentions. It mounted a sustained high level of warning before the landing. Afterwards, it held to a rather steady bargaining posture until termination of the crisis. Only in weeks 21 and 22, during a mini-crisis in Beirut over the composition of a new cabinet, did the U.S. act more strongly than it admitted. The announced policy of the U.S. in the Lebanon crisis was an accurate guide to its actions.

CYPRUS 1964

The Cyprus crisis of 1963-1964 is the most ambiguous of the four cases.³⁶ Several factors account for the ambiguity. First, it was a crisis between allies, the U.S. and Turkey, which was awkward for both.

³⁶Background books to which one can turn with profit are Thomas W. Adams and Alvin J. Cottrell, Cyprus Between East and West (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968); Roger H. Stephens, Cyprus, A Place of Arms (New York: Praeger, 1966); Edward Weintal and Charles Bartlett, Facing the Brink (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1967) chapter 2. Philip Windsor, NATO and the Cyprus Crisis, Adelphi Paper Number 14, Institute for Strategic Studies, London, November, 1964, is probably the most useful single source available.

Secondly, the U.S. refrained from using force, preferring to intervene with intensive diplomacy instead. Third, Turkey seemed indecisive because it lacked sea transportation for the troop landing it repeatedly threatened. And fourth, the settlement both powers probably preferred was subject to veto by the Greek Cypriots. Figure 4 is a map of the erratic behavior of both powers as they tread their way through the high emotions of a shattering crisis less than four years after the island gained independence in 1960. Longer than the Lebanon crisis, the Cyprus crisis stretched into a 27 week period, December 23, 1963 - June 28, 1964.

Neither the U.S. nor Turkey initiated the crisis. They both responded to Greek Cypriot attacks on the Turkish Cypriot population in Christmas week 1963. U.S. behavior remained at a substantial level all winter as the U.S. worked to create a multilateral peace-keeping force to be deployed to the island to police a cease-fire. The first peak in U.S. behavior at week 8 is George Ball's first mission in February attempting to achieve a three-way settlement between Turkey, Greece, and the Greek Cypriots. The arrival in week 14 of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) achieved the first substantial drop in the behavior of both Turkey and the U.S. The second U.S. peak at week 24 is the U.S. reaction in June to Turkey's planned troop landing and the second Ball mission. Turkey's behavior throughout the period tended to be a function of the presence or absence of Turkish Cypriot fatalities or insecurity. Turkey also peaked in week 24 when it finally lost all patience and decided to conduct a landing with the sea transports available.


U.S. intervention by diplomatic means does not correlate very highly (R-R) with Turkey's behavior.³⁷ The rank correlation coefficient is only .44 at lag 0. The literature explains that the U.S. did not wish to apply more pressure than it did which in June the Turks believed was excessive anyway. The U.S. tried to talk the Turks out of making a troop landing acknowledging nonetheless that Turkey had the right to intervene. Turkey, Greece, and Britain were guarantor powers -- with the right to intervene -- in the settlement of 1959 which enabled Cyprus to become an independent state in 1960. The correlation is as high as it is probably because Turkey did not go against U.S. preferences and did not make a landing in Cyprus. It did not wish to damage its relations with the U.S. beyond repair. Mutual pressure mixed with trust locked the U.S. and Turkey into a tightly constrained relationship. U.S. behavior here is quite unlike the pressure it exerted on its allies Britain and France at Suez or on the UAR over Lebanon.

In the literature, it appears that Turkey, similar to the UAR in the Lebanon crisis, acted like an external power to the country at issue, in this case Cyprus. Turkey supported the Turkish Cypriot opposition to the Greek Cypriot Government after the Greek Cypriots assumed

³⁷ See Table 4.

VARIABLE VALUES CYPRUS DEC 1963 US ACTUAL VIOLENCE VS TURKEY ACTUAL VIOLENCE

FIGURE 4



control of the island's administration. And the U.S. moved to thwart Turkish dominance to be established through troop landings. In the Cyprus crisis, however, the U.S. was more sympathetic to Turkey's role. As in the Lebanon crisis, the U.S. perceived the influence of the USSR increasing, this time on the Government, Greek Cypriot, side. In week 2 and later, the USSR publically assured the Greek Cypriots of military assistance.³⁸ The U.S. also estimated that the USSR would gain from the loss to NATO of a war between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. Thus, for the third time in eight years, the U.S. acted to thwart dominance of the region by the USSR which seemed possible if Turkey's landing caused Greece to go to war.

Certainly Cyprus lies outside the Near East core of Arab nationalist states. But the crisis was important to the core because it was perceived by them as a nationalist struggle in the Near East against external powers. The UAR considered the Greek Cypriot Government a member of the neutralist bloc in the international system and promised military assistance to the Government.³⁹ Greek Cypriot nationalism was treated as an extension of the core nationalism just as much as the revolution in Yemen also in progress by 1964. Regional homogeneity, in this case, took precedence over the heterogeneous ingredients of a Greek Christian-Arab Muslim relationship. The Greek Cypriot Government reciprocated the UAR's friendly behavior.⁴⁰ Thus, Greek Cypriot nationalism reinforced the identity of the Near East as an autonomous region.

The U.S. was and acted like an external power in the crisis. Its behavior was consistent with an anti-USSR role just as at Suez and in Lebanon, although its behavior was decidedly more restrained than in the earlier crises.⁴¹ Cyprus has a large Communist Party. This factor together with USSR support for the Greek Cypriot government encouraged the U.S. to believe Cyprus might develop a relationship with the USSR comparable to the UAR's. And, of course, UAR encouragement of the Greek Cypriots strengthened this impression. The U.S. reaction to the crisis (S-0) a correlation of .65 at lag 0, reflects the concerns about the USSR influence and Turkey's moves. For the U.S., in fact, Turkey was the key. To keep the USSR out of Cyprus as a friend of the Greek Cypriots, the U.S. had to prevent Turkey from placing the Greek Cypriots in a position from which only the USSR could extract them. Turkey reacted to the U.S. rather moderately on the whole perhaps because U.S. pressure on Turkey was always accompanied by U.S. pressure on the Greek Cypriots: .29 at lag 0.

The 0-R correlation representing credibility is strong for the U.S., .76 at lag 0. And as a matter of record, the U.S. did not talk of doing more in the crisis than it did. It did not threaten to use force. It confined itself to the search for a settlement. The 0-R correlation for Turkey is also strong, .89 at lag 0. Even

³⁸The New York Times, January 1, 1964,

³⁹Ibid., February 23, 1964; May 21, 1964; August 12, 1964; September 1, 1964.

⁴⁰Ibid., August 29, 1964.

⁴¹Compare Figure 4 with Figures 2 and 3.

though it threatened repeatedly to use force and never did put troops ashore, it displayed its military power each time it made the threat. Turkish military aircraft overflowed the island, troops moved within Turkey, and Turkish naval forces went on alert. These moves helped to prevent a serious credibility problem.

SIX DAY WAR 1967

The Six Day War between Israel and the UAR has a classic crisis profile: the behavior of the actors underwent a sharp rise, peak, and falling off. Figure 5 illustrates this pattern. The crisis was a short seven weeks. It took everybody by surprise, including the UAR which became a victim of events. It was dramatic, beginning with a sudden military move by the UAR and terminating with a sensational summit meeting between U.S. and USSR leaders. For purposes of analysis, the period May 1 - July 1, 1967, will serve as the crisis period.⁴²

The UAR initiated the crisis early in week 3 by moving a large military force into the Sinai peninsula opposite Israel's southern border. It accelerated the crisis later in week 3 by demanding the withdrawal of the United Nations Expeditionary Force (UNEF) which had provided stability on the UAR-Israel border for 10 years after Suez. By closing the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping in week 4, the UAR moved past a point of no return. An alliance with Jordan in week 5 created an encirclement of Israel. Israel struck hard in week 6 causing a serious internal crisis within the UAR. UAR behavior remained in mid-range after the war as Cairo urged the Arab nationalist core states to break relations with the U.S. and U.K.

Israel did not react very sharply until the UAR closed the Strait of Tiran in week 4. In week 5, it assumed a war posture. The average level of Israeli behavior for week 6 appears lower than week 5 because the attack against the UAR in week 6 concluded so quickly that Israel went back to a peace-time footing before the end of the week. And after week 6, Israel's level of violence fell more rapidly than the other actors'. The U.S., alarmed by the removal of UNEF, intervened, as in Cyprus, with intensive diplomacy in weeks 3 and 4. The presence of that effort is reflected particularly in the plateau between weeks 4 and 6. The U.S. and USSR achieved a cease-fire in week 6. Thereafter, the U.S. engaged in another round of intensive diplomacy climaxed by the summit meeting.

Israel and the UAR were both targets of U.S. energies. U.S. behavior correlated highly with the behavior of each (R-R). The correlation for the

⁴²Background references for this study's purposes were primarily Michael Howard and Robert Hunter, Israel and the Arab World, The Crisis of 1967, Adelphi Paper Number 41, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, October, 1967; Hal Kosut (ed.), Israel and the Arabs: The June 1967 War (New York: Facts on File, 1968); Walter Z. Laqueur, The Road to War 1967, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968; and Nadav Safran, From War to War, The Arab-Israeli Confrontation 1948-1967 (New York: Pegasus, 1969).

SIX DAY CRISIS MAY 1967

00000003 PARTICIPANTS

ACTUAL VIOLENCE




FIGURE 5

U.S. vs. Israel is .67 at lag 0 and for the U.S. vs. the UAR, .98 at lag 0.⁴³ The latter correlation is so high simply because the two actors moved in rough parallel to each other. This pattern of movement reflects the U.S. and UAR belief before week 6 that Israel would not attack because of the intensive diplomacy at work on all sides. Israel's behavior is controlling. In weeks 4 and 5, it delayed the attack, waiting for U.S. diplomatic efforts to pay off. Attacking in week 6, it achieved such a decisive victory so quickly that the behavior of the other actors had no where to go but down. Israel, the target of U.S. and UAR behavior in the first six weeks, turned the situation around so that the U.S. and UAR were really the targets of Israel's action from week 4 through the remainder of the crisis period. The correlations for Israel's action toward the UAR and U.S. is very high, .83 at lag 1 with the UAR, and .83 at lag 1 with the U.S. These correlations place the correlations for U.S. behavior in better perspective.

The Arab nationalist core reached a proud peak of influence in weeks 3-5. The record demonstrates that the UAR's dramatic moves against Israel received popular acclaim throughout the Arab world -- and in Muslim non-Arab countries as well -- greater than at any other time since Suez. Every Arab country in the Near East, core and peripheral alike, publically supported the UAR, many with material assistance. Other Near East powers -- Greece, Turkey, and Iran, -- felt compelled to support Cairo publically. After its defeat, the UAR was able to command broad regional support for its accusations of U.S. and U.K. duplicity with Israel. Core and non-core Arab states severed diplomatic relations with the U.S. and U.K., embargoed oil and gas shipments, banned TWA's and BOAC's use of commercial airports, withdrew sterling from London banks, and expelled U.S. and British nationals. This protest had lost some vigor by week 8 as the Arab monarchies began to resume relations with the West. But the Arab nationalist states achieved an impressive display of regional homogeneity through the entire crisis period.

This display did not lead to a new, great era of Arab nationalism as occurred after Suez. The crisis literature clearly shows that the Six Day War was a defeat for Arab nationalism. A different Near East began to appear after the crisis period. The autonomy of the region became less distinct because the UAR grew more dependent upon the USSR for defending itself. USSR influence has increased in Lebanon and Jordan as well. The UAR is keenly aware of its dependence and has tried to balance it by encouraging the return of French influence through diplomacy and military sales to the Arab core. The Palestinian Arab movement, while vigorously nationalistic, detracts somewhat from the homogeneity of the region by attacking other Arab governments. The UAR itself is not immune from Palestinian criticism for the conventional military methods it uses in combating Israel. Moreover, the UAR has been criticized by other core states for its defeat in the Six Day War. Algeria, for example, accused the UAR of military incompetence.⁴⁴ Unlike the Suez defeat, the UAR lost prestige with its allies and with its own population after the Six Day War.

⁴³ See Table 5.

⁴⁴ Agence France Presse reporting a story in Revolution Africain, June 24, 1967.

The U.S. role as an external power in the Six Day War period was no exception to its role in the other three crises. It acted to prevent a war initiated either by Israel or the UAR because it perceived that any war would polarize the region, pushing the USSR into the role of Egypt's defender and the U.S. onto Israel's side. Such a stark confrontation between the U.S. and USSR would endanger the international system. The U.S. considered maintenance of that system its first responsibility. When Israel attacked, the U.S. had no choice but to warn the USSR not to move against Israel. But the U.S. also worked intensively to arrange a cease-fire as quickly as possible. The U.S. reaction to the crisis, the S-O correlation, illustrates the great worry with which the U.S. perceived it: .83 at lag 0 toward the UAR and .67 toward Israel.

One would expect that the U.S. emerged from the crisis with a credibility problem both in relation to Israel and to the UAR. In fact, Israel derived little comfort from U.S. diplomacy before week 6 because it believed the delay merely gave the UAR additional time to cause an encirclement of Israel. The UAR really believed, however erroneously, that it had been defeated by the combined forces of Israel, the U.S., and U.K. The tripartite attack on Suez struck the UAR as a close analogy to the Six Day War. But the O-R correlation for the U.S., .80 at lag 0, does not reflect a credibility problem. Although U.S. words exceeded U.S. acts in every week of the crisis except week 1, indicated by Figure 6, the two factors generally ran parallel. This pattern evidences the U.S. emphasis on diplomacy in the crisis and the intensity of that effort. And at the time of the crisis, both Israel and the UAR went along with U.S. and USSR diplomacy. They both deferred to the desire of the external powers, first, for a settlement and, secondly, for a cease-fire. Thus, Israel would not be expected to have a credibility problem and with the correlation .93 at lag 0 does not appear to have one. Similarly, for the UAR, .86 at lag 0, a credibility problem does not appear. The UAR did not shrink from riding out events it had not anticipated.

THE STRUCTURE OF NEAR EAST CRISES

The Near East is crisis prone. Four major crises in 10 years denotes persistent instability. This tendency reflects the development of regional consciousness stirred by Arab nationalism and may be construed as a healthy sign. Recurrent clashes between the Arab-core states and Israel, however, reveal a chronic disorder which disrupts region-wide cooperation and growth. War with Israel puts Arab nationalism to a test which it cannot manage, discrediting the UAR and causing divisions among the core states.

The frequency of crises in the Near East underscores the importance of understanding structural and functional aspects of Near East crises. Figure 7, for example, plots the contribution each pair of weeks observed makes to the correlation for U.S. and UAR behavior in the Six Day War. Using rho - the mean value in the entire crisis period - and one standard deviation as a visual guide from the mean, rho components for each pair of weeks are

FIGURE 6





FIGURE 7

RHO COMPONENTS FOR PAIR PERIODS



SIX DEC 1967
STIMULUS PERIOD
RESPONSE PERIOD
12
00000000

plotted on a scale of rho components ranging from 1 to -5.⁴⁵ Large rho components infer times when U.S. and UAR behaviors were similar in rank of violence. Smaller rho components signify times when the two behaviors were dissimilar in rank. Crises are commonly thought of as periods of a rapid rise in behavior, peak, and fall. The three phases -- rise, peak, and fall -- vary in the kinds of rho component correlations present. In a phase of rising behavior, all behaviors can be expected to rise, producing high rho components. In the peak phase, as actors are turning around, often one behavior level continues to rise after the other has started to descend. The rho components in this phase probably will be near a minimum as a result. The third phase with all behavior levels tapering off should produce high correlations again. The Six Day War had a profile which fits the common conception of a crisis. In Figure 7, the peak phase appears as a deep trough on the rho component scale. It is over two standard deviations to the negative side of the mean. The mean is -0.32 and the rho component for the peak -3.50.

The profile of a crisis stands out most clearly using a lag of two. The target's behavior changes when it is the object of the other actor's actions. Typically, A continues its high level of activity until it is certain B is responding with a lower level. This process accounts for the high level of A's behavior and the low level of B's a number of weeks later which yields the large negative component. The amount of lag chosen is an indicator of the duration of the crisis turn-around phase. However, increasing lag also decreases the number of available observations and, therefore, the level of confidence in the inferences derived from the rho component statistic.

In the Six Day War, Figure 7, the peak occurred in week 6. The trough in week 2 reflects a lull in U.S. behavior while the UAR became increasingly agitated about Israeli reprisals against Syria.

⁴⁵If we define $\Delta_i = 1 - \frac{6d_i^2}{N^2-1}$, it follows that Δ_i is the component of Spearman's rho contributed by the i^{th} pair of observations because

$$r = 1 - \frac{6 \sum_{i=1}^N d_i^2}{N(N^2-1)} = \frac{N - \frac{6 \sum_{i=1}^N d_i^2}{N^2-1}}{N} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N \left[1 - \frac{6d_i^2}{N^2-1} \right]}{N} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N \Delta_i}{N},$$

where d_i = the difference in the rank of the members of the i^{th} pair, and N = the number of observation pairs.

Whereas $-1 < \rho < 1$, $1 - \frac{6(N-1)}{N^2-1} < \Delta_i < 1$. For large N the lower bound on Δ_i approaches -5 .

Neither of these troughs is apparent at lag 0 shown in Figure 8. At lag 1, Figure 9, they appear equally deep which does not identify the peak as occurring in week 6. At lag 3, Figure 10, the profile of the nine week crisis is truncated to six weeks and is, therefore, unusable.

Negative rho component profiles at lag 2 seem to be more useful indicators of when the peak phase occurred than the maps of levels of behavior, Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5 shown earlier. In the Six Day War, all three actors turned around in week 6 and the map of the crisis, Figure 5, portrays this event as clearly as the rho component profile. But in the Cyprus crisis, only the rho component profile at lag 2, Figure 11, clearly shows that week 24 is the turn around week. The map of the Cyprus crisis, Figure 4, shows a conjunction of U.S. and Turkey's behavior at a high level in week 8 as well as in week 24. During the Lebanon crisis, Figure 3, the U.S. peaked in week 11 and the UAR in week 12. The rho component profile at lag 2 shows the peak at week 12, Figure 12. Suez had two peaks at first glance: week 5 for the U.S. confrontation with Israel, Britain, and France, and week 6 for the U.S. vs. USSR, Figure 2. In the rho component profile at lag 2, the peak for the first clash is with Israel only in week 7 and for the second clash with Britain, France, and USSR in week 8, Figures 13 and 14.

The rho component profile points to the period in which both sides have turned around. In none of the cases did the turn-around phase last more than two weeks.⁴⁶ Even in the Six Day War, the pace at which the three powers turned around varied as shown by the levels where their behavior rested two weeks later.⁴⁷

Comparing the four cases, the second phase of a Near East crisis lasts from one to two weeks, an average of 1.5; the first phase from 5-23 weeks an average of 10.7; and the third from 3-13 weeks, an average of 5.7. Phase two varies less than the others and is short. Phase one varies more and is longer than phase three.

The first phase of rising behavior usually begins with a lurch upward out of normal patterns. It is a warning phase. Usually within a week, all the actors who will figure significantly in the crisis all rise to the occasion. If the first phase is protracted, behavior is not sustained at a constant high level. It rises and falls within the phase before rising finally into phase two. Even as a warning phase, phase one is an uncertain period. Near Eastern powers usually resolve uncertainties by assuming that intentions are a function of deployed military capabilities. Bluffing is inconceivable to them. Every move is for keeps. It is difficult to recall a crisis in the Near East in which two opposing actors settled the issue which gave rise to the crisis without resorting to force. No equivalent of the Cuban missile crisis between the U.S. and USSR, settled without resort to force, comes to mind.


⁴⁶Counting Suez's two clashes separately.

⁴⁷See Figure 5.

FIGURE 8

RHO COMPONENTS FOR PAIR PERIODS

US ACT VIOL VS UAR ACT VIOL



RESPONSE LAG = 00000000


STIMULUS PERIOD

SIX DAY CRISIS MAY 1967

-33- RHO COMPONENT VALUE

FIGURE 9


RHO COMPONENTS FOR PAIR PERIODS



SIX EAR TRISIS MAR 1967
STIMULUS PERIOD
RESPONSE LAC = 00000001

FIGURE 10

RHO COMPONENTS FOR PAIR PERIODS



SIX DAY CRISIS MAY 1967 RESPONSE LAG = 00000003


FIGURE 11

RHO COMPONENTS FOR PAIR PERIODS VS TURKEY ACT VIOL

US ACT VIOL

VS

TURKEY ACT VIOL



CRISIS (CRISIS DEC 1963)

STIMULUS PERIOD

15 16

19

22

25

28

31

RESPONSE LOG : 00000002

FIGURE 12

RHO COMPONENTS FOR PAIR PERIODS

US ACT VIOL UAR ACT VIOL VS

RESPONSE LAG = 00000002

STIMULUS PERIOD

LEBANON CRISIS MAY 1958




FIGURE 13




FIGURE 14

RHO COMPONENTS FOR PAIR PERIODS


US ACT VIOL

VS

UK ACT VIOL

VS

UK ACT VIOL



STIMULUS PERIOD

RESPONSE LAG = 00000002

CRISIS OCT-1956

SUE7

Phase three begins with a lurch downward from very high levels. It is even more abrupt at the outset than phase one. Behaviors slide more rapidly down than they climbed up. It is remarkable how quickly and sharply Near East crises fall off. This pattern is probably related to the tendency to culminate in the use of force characteristic of Near East crises. After the battle, the powers seem exhausted and retreat into normal patterns. Amphibious landings and desert warfare, of course, are methods of conventional warfare which in contrast to guerilla wars are won or lost rather quickly.

Phase two, the peak period, is not the only decisive one in a crisis. Phase one is just as decisive. It requires a sharp break with normal, non-crisis patterns and generates an extraordinary rush of activity. Phase three is a terminal phase, but the process of termination also requires a break with previous patterns, frequently a more difficult one than in the other phases. Normal patterns are not as easily restored as they are initially departed from. Each phase requires the actors to turn around: in the first phase, from normal to crisis behavior; in the second phase, from intensifying to declining crisis behavior; and in the third phase, from crisis to normal behavior. Each phase has a decisiveness which helps to explain why an entire crisis period is so short, intense, and nerve-wracking.

CONCLUSION

This study has suggested ways of relating crisis studies to the study of regions. The S-O-R model was not completely adaptable for this purpose. Its strongest contribution related to the interactions between external powers and between external powers and local powers in Near East crises. Karl Kaiser notes that the study of regions has neglected external factors and the role of superpowers in the development of regions, and has emphasized internal factors including integration. He argues that this neglect represents a gap between "present theory of international regional integration and political realities."⁴⁸ The S-O-R model serves to demonstrate the extent of external power penetration in a region and is, therefore, one approach to examining a neglected aspect of regional studies. The model seems to relate less directly to the internal development of a region. But it can contribute to an analysis of interactions between local powers, identifying the extent of cooperation between Arab nationalist countries, for example. And perhaps the process of decision-making can be matched to the process of integration if the two are dis-assembled and their sub-processes examined. This kind of inquiry would probably be more productive in a study of non-crisis situations. And it would be useful to compare patterns of interaction in crisis and non-crisis periods to further substantiate or qualify the claim of the present study that crisis studies are a useful supplement to the study of regions.

⁴⁸Karl Kaiser, "The Interaction of Regional Subsystems, Some Preliminary Notes on Recurrent Patterns and the Role of Superpowers," World Politics 21 (October, 1968) pp. 84, 84-107.

TABLE 2

RANK CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: SUEZ 1956

	R-R			S-O			O-R		
	Lag 0	1	2	Lag 0	1	2	Lag 0	1	2
US/UK	.36	-.30	-.66	.69	.32	-.40			
US/France	.54	.17	-.45	.78	.20	-.23			
US/USSR	.85	.69	.25	.79	.84	.54			
US/Israel	.12	-.48	.58	.13	-.17	-.33			
US/Egypt	.71	.44	.17	.79	.48	-.03			
US/US							.76	.77	.55
UK/US	.36	.65	.80	.31	.49	.61			
UK/France	.76	.85	.66	.68	.67	.83			
UK/USSR	.32	.63	.52	.06	.34	.53			
UK/Israel	.72	.47	.47	.32	.30	.18			
UK/Egypt	.54	.67	.70	.61	.78	.65			
UK/UK							.53	.13	-.15
France/US	.54	.79	.94	.48	.75	.58			
France/UK	.76	.54	.19	.77	.73	.52			
France/USSR	.52	.73	.83	.29	.65	.80			
France/Israel	.59	.40	.07	.40	.13	-.28			
France/Egypt	.76	.81	.50	.80	.92	.75			
France/France							.69	.55	-.03
USSR/US	.85	.64	.27	.69	.55	.06			
USSR/UK	.32	-.41	-.54	.78	.32	-.20			
USSR/France	.52	.05	-.03	.54	.28	-.09			
USSR/Israel	.04	-.32	-.63	.40	-.27	-.60			
USSR/Egypt	.77	.25	.00	.82	.32	-.01			
USSR/USSR							.88	.54	-.09
Israel/US	.12	.46	.65	.09	.39	.72			
Israel/UK	.72	.79	.45	.39	.84	.66			
Israel/France	.59	.85	.72	.71	.81	.52			
Israel/USSR	.04	.49	.53	.23	.25	.38			
Israel/Egypt	.25	.70	.74	.31	.61	.80			
Israel/Israel							.45	.27	.16
Egypt/US	.71	.85	.68	.80	.88	.44			
Egypt/UK	.54	.11	-.31	.87	.58	.19			
Egypt/France	.76	.41	-.02	.70	.57	.36			
Egypt/USSR	.77	.83	.49	.73	.85	.77			
Egypt/Israel	.25	.05	.31	.45	-.05	-.60			
Egypt/Egypt							.82	.43	.15

TABLE 3

RANK CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: LEBANON 1958

	R-R			S-0			0-R		
	Lag 0	1	2	Lag 0	1	2	Lag 0	1	2
US/UAR US/US	.58	.76	.44	.47	.43	.21	.68	.72	.64
UAR/US UAR/UAR	.58	.56	.59	.80	.75	.74	.41	.13	.004

TABLE 4

RANK CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: CYPRUS 1964

	R-R			S-0			0-R		
	Lag 0	1	2	Lag 0	1	2	Lag 0	1	2
US/Turkey US/US	.44	-.24	-.30	.29	-.28	-.29	.76	.39	.89
Turkey/US Turkey/Turkey	.44	.41	.58	.65	.53	.52	.89	.26	.13

TABLE 5

RANK CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: SIX DAY WAR 1967

	R-R			S-O			O-R		
	Lag 0	1	2	Lag 0	1	2	Lag 0	1	2
US/UAR	.98	.60	-.32	.85	.89	.40			
US/Israel	.67	.17	-.54	.53	.17	-.39			
US/US							.80	.74	.29
Israel/US	.67	.83	.14	.67	.69	-.04			
Israel/UAR	.68	.83	-.14	.39	.76	.71			
Israel/Israel							.93	.69	-.14
UAR/US	.98	.67	-.25	.83	.31	-.54			
UAR/Israel	.68	.19	-.50	.57	.14	-.36			
UAR/UAR							.86	.38	-.43

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