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SECTIONS (CONTINUED):
US REDEPLOYMENTS - Concerns Planning for FY72 Redeployments, 1971
Reductions in Redeployment, Air Support Considerations, Transitional Force, FWMAF Redeployment Planning Considerations (Pages TSS-7 - TSS-12).
RVNAF FORCE STRUCTURE - RVNAF Force Structure Review for FY 73 (Pages TSS-13).
CURRENT MACV PLANS - As described by Number and Plan (Pages TSS-14 - TSS-22).
MACJ031

25 April 1972

SUBJECT: Promulgation of the USMACV 1971 Command History (RCS CINCPAC 5000-4)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

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FOR THE COMMANDER:

DONALD H. COWLES
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

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UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM

1971
COMMAND HISTORY SUPPLEMENT

Prepared by the Military History Branch
Office of the Secretary, Joint Staff
Headquarters, USMACV, APO San Francisco 96222
Saigon, Vietnam
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iv
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

(TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTION</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AIR OPERATIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-52 Sorties</td>
<td>TSS-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
<td>TSS-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Air Efforts in Laos</td>
<td>TSS-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOP Organization and Change</td>
<td>TSS-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamization of PSYOP</td>
<td>TSS-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOP Activities: LAM SON 719</td>
<td>TSS-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOP Themes</td>
<td>TSS-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>US REDEPLOYMENTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning for FY72 Redeployments</td>
<td>TSS-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Considerations for Redeployment After 30 Apr 71</td>
<td>TSS-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Announces Further 1971 Reductions</td>
<td>TSS-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Support Considerations</td>
<td>TSS-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Transitional Force</td>
<td>TSS-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FWMAF Redeployment Planning Considerations</td>
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<tr>
<td>RVNAF Force Structure Review for FY73</td>
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**CURRENT MACV PLANS**

TSS-14
AIR OPERATIONS

(U) The following provides TOP SECRET information amplifying material on these subjects contained in Chapter VI, Air Operations.

B-52 SORTIES

(TS) B-52 sorties were limited to 1,000 per month in July 1970 except for unusual circumstances, in which case the JCS authorized MACV to order strikes on lucrative targets with B-52 aircraft without regard to sortie limitations. The primary reason for sortie limitation was the high cost of flying the B-52s, estimated at $33,000 per sortie. The US Strategic Air Command (SAC) agreed in February 1971 that the daily B-52 sortie rate of 30 per day could be increased to 40 per day for a 30-day period. At the time of LAM SON 719, increased sorties were requested because it appeared that this operation had the distinct possibility of becoming one of the most decisive operations of the SEA conflict. With the heavy commitment in both Laos and Cambodia, COMUSMACV felt that a maximum use of all available air resources was warranted, and requested that a surge capability of 40 sorties per day through May 1971 be developed. Always in mind was the use of ARC LIGHT missions to compensate for the reduced military potential during the troop withdrawal. For this reason the number of B-52 sorties did not show the usual winddown decrease of other US military activities and organizations during 1971. See Figure VI-5.¹

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

(TS) Rules of engagement (ROE) surrounding aerial activities in the BARREL ROLL area of northern Laos were among the most stringent in SEA, covering both tactics and geographic areas. FACs were carefully and constantly briefed on their own areas. Strikes could not be made closer than 500 meters to an active village or to noncombatants, except when hostile ground fire was received from such an area or when in direct support of friendly troops.¹ During 1971 new accuracy in bombing permitted a redefinition of the strict ROE that established an all-weather ordnance delivery restriction of no strike within 3,000 meters of a known PW camp or friendly position. The advent of LORAN-equipped aircraft and the dramatic increase in accuracy of the LORAN-guided bombs caused COMUSMACV to approve a reduction in the distance from 3,000 to 1,000 meters.²

US AIR EFFORT IN LAOS

(TS) Figure TSS-1 shows the importance of the effort expended over Laos as a percent of the total SEA sorties flown, as shown for each month in the total columns. From September 1970 through December 1971 the majority of TACAIR sorties were flown over Laos.

¹ US AIR EFFORT IN LAOS

² US AIR EFFORT IN LAOS
## US Air Effort in Laos 1970 - 1971

### US TACAIR Sorties

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total SEA</th>
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<th>Percent in Laos</th>
<th>Total SEA</th>
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<td>1,382</td>
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Source: MACJ3072 SEACORDS Book

Figure TSS - 1
(U) This section on psychological operations augments other material on operations contained in Chapter IV, Plans and Operations.

(S) Psychological operations (PSYOP) traditionally included psychological warfare operations and other political, military, economic, and ideological actions designed to modify beliefs or actions of a selected group of people. The PSYOP challenge in Southeast Asia was to undermine enemy troop morale, counter his propaganda, and bolster support for non-Communist governments and their forces. The Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army (VC/NVA) were a particularly difficult PSYOP target: they had long been inculcated with beliefs which reinforced their commitment to a cause, and efforts to alter these beliefs had to be credible. On the other hand, VC sympathizers and recruited workers who assisted the VC/NVA were vulnerable to PSYOP techniques contrived to cause defection and curtail their will to continue supporting the Communist cause. Psychological operations, especially leaflet-drops and loudspeaker broadcasts, exploited themes which reached both groups. 3

PSYOP ORGANIZATION AND CHANGE

(S) The organization for psychological operations in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) at the end of 1971 was as shown in Figure TSS-2. Overall responsibility for PSYOP policy was vested

US PSYOP ORGANIZATION IN RVN
(As of 31 Dec 71)

![Diagram of PSYOP organization in RVN]

Legend: --- Coordination/Command
-------- Support

Source: MACJ3, 7AF

Figure TSS-2
in the US embassy, whose control organ was the Mission PSYOP Committee. Meeting monthly to discuss significant public affairs and PSYOP matters, the Committee was composed of representatives of the Embassy, MACV, MACV ACoS for Civil Operations and Rural Development (CORDS), Office of the Special Assistant to the Ambassador, US Agency for International Development (USAID), and Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO). It was responsible for public affairs/PSYOP/political warfare (POLWAR) guidance originating in or approved for issuance in Vietnam. 4 COMUSMACV was responsible for the execution of all US military PSYOP programs at strategic national level and in both tactical and pacification/development areas at military region and lower levels. 5 MACV was also responsible for providing operations plans, specific leaflet mix and type, target location, and number of missions, whereas 7AF was responsible for mission instructions and orders and for providing aircraft and aircrews. The 7th PSYOP Group provided out-of-country printing support for leaflets and other PSYOP related material. The 4th PSYOP Group underwent a progressive year-long drawdown (completed before the end of the year), and the US mission of in-country development of leaflets and related PSYOP material was terminated on 31 December. 6

(TS) Two other organizational developments of importance during 1971 which affected future PSYOP organization in RVN were: (1) a recommendation by the National Security Council Ad Hoc Group on Vietnam that JUSPAO deactivate and revert to a normal United States Information Service organization on 30 Jun 72, and (2) the decision to transfer operational responsibility for strategic PSYOP from COMUSMACV to CINCPAC on 30 Jun 72. Both actions were interrelated in that a proposal by the United States Information Agency to dissolve JUSPAO resulted in CINCPAC's ultimately agreeing that it could assume responsibility for out-of-country PSYOP programs. 7

(TS) The deactivation of JUSPAO, and an associated action by JUSPAO of not renewing, on 1 Dec 71, a contract with a private firm engaged in leaflet research and development would have degraded the strategic PSYOP effort. A new method of directing the PSYOP program was needed. COMUSMACV therefore recommended that CINCPAC assume operational responsibility for all strategic PSYOP in Southeast Asia. The recommendation was also based on the fact that PSYOP campaigns fostered US national interests, were carried out in several countries, and reinforced in-country tactical programs. As a result of a PSYOP/POLWAR conference, CINCPAC concluded that:

-- the basis for all strategic PSYOP programs was adequate research and intelligence;

-- that only Southeast Asia Research Associates (SEARA), a private corporation, had the capability to produce the timely required analysis and development of propaganda to support CINCPAC's strategic program;

-- the requirement existed for an in-country military element to insure day-to-day review of the PSYOP/POLWAR situation, to coordinate required intelligence efforts, and for targeting.

CINCPAC agreed on 28 October to assume responsibility for strategic PSYOP, the date of assumption contingent upon establishment of a small military element in RVN to manage collection of PSYOP research/intelligence, conduct liaison, and coordinate operations of the private firm which would, effective 1 Dec 71, be given a US Army contract. CINCUSARPAC was directed by CINCPAC to establish a five-man military element in Saigon and negotiate a contract with SEARA. 8 On 11 November MACV notified CINCPAC that a MACV staff element currently existed which was in fact managing strategic PSYOP in Southeast Asia, hence the five-man team would not be needed. Further, this staff element could, as an interim arrangement (until 30 Jun 72), manage the effort until an out-of-country capability was developed. 9 CINCPAC approved the MACV offer to supervise (for CINCPAC) strategic PSYOP until 30 Jun 72, which included renegotiation of the SEARA contract. 10
VIETNAMIZATION OF PSYOP

(S) Vietnamization of the war effort in Southeast Asia brought a concurrent decline in US support for PSYOP and resulted in major transfers of operations to Government of Vietnam (GVN) control and support. A support force structure was planned to follow as major US redeployments were completed. The PSYOP requirements would be met by Vietnamese agencies, assets, and resources through the progressive augmentation of existing RVN PSYOP capabilities. There had always been cooperation and combined actions, but by 31 Dec 71, with the reduction of USAF PSYOP air assets and the transfer of leaflet printing facilities from JUSPAO to the GVN, the advisory role of the US increased while air support decreased. The GVN, even though it had received additional printing presses, lacked resources to support a comprehensive PSYOP program at the previous US level. 11

PSYOP ACTIVITIES: LAM SON 719

(S) Full scale PSYOP exploitation of LAM SON 719 began immediately with an 8 Feb 71 proclamation by President Thieu. Three basic themes were directed against enemy audiences in the RVN: (1) a combination of LAM SON and earlier Cambodian incursions meant that enemy supply lines leading into the RVN were in great jeopardy; (2) major ARVN units continued operations in the Khmer Republic, thus denying that particular supply and escape route to the enemy; and (3) Hanoi's claims concerning high RVN casualties over the years, plus the added Communist claim of control of major portions of South Vietnam, were exposed as false in view of GVN ability to conduct an out-of-country two-front offensive. All themes led to an appeal to rally or surrender before it was too late. In the meantime, friendly audiences were informed of GVN successes as well as the fact that LAM SON 719 was an ARVN endeavor. 12

PSYOP THEMES

(S) The US PSYOP activities in Vietnam were designed to support objectives and themes in five broad sectors:

-- encourage the enemy to rally, thus weakening the enemy infrastructure;

-- promote the morale, loyalty and support of RVN citizens;

-- generate disaffection and apprehension of enemy personnel during the infiltration process, lower morale, and reduce enemy combat effectiveness while denying him the support of the local populace;

-- convince the people of the RVN that US/FWMAF personnel were interested only in helping the people defeat aggression and achieve an improved and more stable economy, and that the forces would be removed when aims were accomplished;

-- inform the citizens in NVN of the true conditions in RVN. 13

(S) Various objectives and themes were translated into specific PSYOP programs which, for the most part, were on-going from previous years. These were in effect for at least a portion of 1971. Of importance were the following:
-- PSYOP efforts supported the Chieu Hoi program. A decline in the rate of Chieu Hoi returnees toward the end of the year was attributed, in part, to a decline in information/PSYOP support of the inducement phase of the program due to GVN failure to maintain the momentum of programs turned over by Mission agencies. A specific campaign supporting this theme was the NGUYEN TRAI IV Campaign, a National Chieu Hoi Campaign conducted 17 Apr - 15 Dec 71 by the GVN with US printing and aerial PSYOP support. Leaflets, posters, and loudspeaker broadcasts were used throughout RVN in the campaign. The original objective of the campaign to induce 9,000 of the enemy to rally was almost met with the rallying of 8,255 persons. 14

-- NVA troops in the RVN were targets of PSYOP efforts designed to create doubts and fears and encourage defections.

-- The Laotian infiltration trail complex contained approximately 30,000 static NVA personnel and provided for infiltration of up to 100,000 persons annually: it was a prime PSYOP target. PSYOP objectives were to lower enemy morale; create friction between cadre and soldiers; encourage malingering, desertion, or defection; spoil impending enemy operations; and counter Hanoi claims of VC/NVA "victories and liberations" of large portions of the South. Included in the program were public safety messages to Cambodian citizens who were possibly endangered by Allied air interdiction. 15

-- To secure the safe return of captured/missing US/FWMAF personnel or information concerning their status or whereabouts, PSYOP programs were embodied in BUFFALO TRACK (the Khmer Republic), ELEPHANT WALK (Vietnam), and BROWN STALLION (Laos). The primary objective was to enlist assistance of the local populace.

-- The Thong Cam magazine, a PSYOP publication, was designed to promote harmonious relationships between the indigenous population and US personnel in Vietnam. 16

(5) Measurement of PSYOP effectiveness in 1971, even with data processing equipment, continued to be impractical due to a myriad of difficulties. Further, with the on-going phase-down, long-range studies of effectiveness could not be planned. 17
US REDEPLOYMENTS

PLANNING FOR FY72 REDEPLOYMENTS

(U) As detailed in Annex F, reduction of the US force level in RVN was carried out in a series of increments, each keyed to a Presidential announcement on withdrawal. The first announced withdrawal began 1 Jul 69. Continuing his policy of withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam, President Nixon announced on 2 Apr 70 that a drawdown of 150,000 men would take place to be completed by 30 Apr 71. Completion of this withdrawal would bring the MACV strength to 284,000, approximately half of the number authorized (549,500) at the 1969 peak period. The last of three increments of this drawdown was Increment VI which began on 1 Jan 71 and terminated 30 Apr 71.

(TS) In the on-going planning for further reduction of US force levels, on 23 Dec 70 the JCS requested MACV comments on a 200,000-space force level for end FY72. Recommendations were required by CINCPAC no later than 11 Jan 71 regarding the minimum authorizations and composition by service, to include the number of maneuver and combat support battalions. Planning guidance furnished by the JCS recommended a force level for end FY72, by service, of 152,000 Army, 3,400 Navy/Coast Guard, 38,000 Air Force, and 700 USMC.

(TS) Considerations by MACV planning staffs in arriving at a 200,000 force level package included:

- A balanced combat force to be maintained which would be capable of providing security during successive stages of redeployment.
- The enemy was expected to take advantage of withdrawals to expand infrastructure, disperse small units into voids left by departing US and FWMAF units, and buildup main force in border areas.
- Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program (CRIMP) was expected to be adversely affected by any accelerated withdrawals which would prematurely turnover equipment and facilities.

(TS) MACV proposed strategy for RVN through FY72 was closely interrelated with redeployment planning considerations. The strategy was three-fold:

- To build RVN self-sufficiency to a degree compatible with the Nixon Doctrine.
- To raise the price of aggression for the enemy to a degree that would cause him to abandon his objective of achieving domination over the RVN by force, due to unacceptable attrition rates.
- To prepare the RVN for assumption of a leading role in improved regional cooperation and development.

This strategy was designed as a total effort to build and strengthen the RVN while further defeating the enemy and his system. It was designed to permit the RVN to continue the struggle for self-determination and contribute to the SEA regional effort.
In consonance with these considerations and strategy, on 9 Jan 71 COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC and the JCS that a force level of 200,000 would be adequate for end-FY72 to accomplish Presidential Vietnamization goals. The minimum end-FY72 authorizations and composition of forces by service would be as follows:

**Army strength of 151,945 containing:**
- 25 Maneuver Bns
- 15 FA Bns
- 4 Engr Bns
- 18 Hel Cos
- 11 FW Avn Cos
- 12 Sig Bns

**Navy and Coast Guard Strength of 8,400 containing:**
- 4 Navy SEAL teams
- 4 SEAL support teams
- 1 Light Hel Atk Sqdn
- 1 Light Atk Sqdn
- 1 Weather Sqdn
- 1 Electronic Sqdn
- 1 Patrol Sqdn

**USAF strength of 38,506 containing:**
- 6 Tactical Fighter Sqdn (TFS)
- 9 Tactical Airlift Sqdn (TAS)
- 3 Tactical Air Support Sqdns (TASS)
- 4 Special Operations Sqdns (SOS)
- 4 Tactical Recon Sqdns (TRS)

**USMC remaining strength of 522 (no tactical units)**

These levels were recommended as the minimum requirements to continue the effective pursuit of US goals in SEA. Subsequent to submission of this plan, the Presidential decision on accelerated withdrawal served to nullify the planning. By 1 Dec 71, the strength authorization of MACV had already been reduced to 184,000, well below the end-FY72 planning level of 200,000.

**CONSIDERATIONS FOR REDEPLOYMENT AFTER 30 APR 71**

In further consideration of reducing the force level during 1971-1972, the CJCS on 7 Mar 71 asked COMUSMACV the following questions:

-- What is the maximum number of US troops which can be withdrawn between 1 May and 31 Dec 71, and what should be the nature of the announcement?

-- What should be the phasing of the May-Dec 71 drawdown?
-- What is the maximum number which can be withdrawn between 1 Jan 72 and 31 Aug 72, and what should be the nature of that announcement?

-- In the above options, is one announcement preferred to cover the period between May - Dec 71, or should it be for a longer period?

-- When will US ground forces be able to assume what essentially is a noncombat role?

-- When can we go to an all-volunteer US ground force in Vietnam?

(TS) In addition to the above questions, the CJCS requested the best estimate as to the maximum practical withdrawal by August 1972, considering success of Vietnamization and the President's press conference commitment of 4 Mar 71. In the press conference a newsmen had queried, "We understand there are some difficulties that the South Vietnamese Army has encountered in Laos in recent weeks. Is this going to cause you to slow down the rate of American troop withdrawals?" In reply the President stated:

No, as a matter of fact what has already been accomplished in Laos at this time has insured even more the plan for withdrawal of American troops. I will make another announcement in April as I have previously indicated. The disruption of the supply lines of the enemy through Laos, which has now occurred for three weeks, has very seriously damaged the enemy's ability to wage effective action against our remaining forces in Vietnam which assures even more the success of our troop withdrawal program.

(TS) MACV replied to the JCS request by stating that a MACV briefing team would present the MACV concept for attaining redeployments through 31 Dec 71 to CINCPAC and JCS. The message further provided comments on options requested in the JCS message of 7 Mar 71. Option A would redeploy 29,000 spaces between 1 May and 30 Jun 71. Option B would deploy 60,000 spaces during the period 1 May to 31 Oct 71. Option C would redeploy 90,000 spaces in two phases: 29,000 between 1 May and 30 Jun 71 and an additional 61,000 between 1 Jul and 31 Dec 71. These options were analyzed as follows: Option A posed no problems and was in line with the then current MACV Increment VII redeployment planning which would bring forces ceilings to the JCS approved 255,000 level on 1 Jul 71. Alternative (Option) B was not recommended. It appeared to redeploy an excessive number of spaces for the period in question. MACV favored a reduced redeployment rate between 1 Jul - 15 Oct 71 to provide stability through the GVN national elections on 3 Oct 71, to permit a period of accelerated retrograde of excess stockages, and to facilitate the redeployment of one Thai brigade in August 1971. Alternative (Option) C was seen as manageable in that actual redeployments could be slowed during the 1 Jul - 15 Oct 71 period to accomplish the above three tasks. In summary MACV stated that Option A reflected current Increment VII planning and had been coordinated with MACV service components. In view of the close hold and tentative nature of the requirement (Option B and C), service components had not been consulted in preparing the detailed force packages to support Options B and C.

(TS) With respect to the questions on assumption of a noncombat role COMUSMACV replied as follows:

As long as US Forces are stationed in a hostile environment, they must not be placed under the restriction that they cannot engage in offensive combat operations. Instead of restrictions on participating in combat, the degree of participation should be considered as a function of forces available. At the present time in MR 4 there are relatively few US combat
and combat support forces and they engage in offensive combat in support of the RVNAF. By 1 May 71, the level of US participation in offensive combat in MRs 2 and 3 will be reduced in scope due to the fewer combat and combat support forces available in those regions. In MR 1 the level of combat activity by US forces will decrease as combat elements redeploy from that region in future increments. Both combat and combat support elements remaining in-country must participate actively in combat operations consistent with their capabilities. To assume a guard-type security posture would be detrimental to the security of the command.  

In response to the JCS question "When can we go to an all-volunteer ground force in Vietnam?" COMUSMACV declined to comment stating that this was a matter of major concern to service components and beyond the purview of MACV.

PRESIDENT ANNOUNCES FURTHER 1971 REDUCTIONS

(U) In a speech on 7 Apr 71, President Nixon announced a new withdrawal of 100,000 spaces to a new authorized level of 184,000 by 1 Dec 71. This became the basis for redeployment increments VII, VIII, and IX. The authorized force level upon completion of this 100,000 reduction was 184,000. The President reemphasized US intentions by stating:

The American involvement in Vietnam is coming to an end. The day the South Vietnamese can take over their own defense is in sight. Our goal is total American withdrawal from Vietnam. We can and we will reach that goal through our program of Vietnamization.

(TS) In view of the President's announcement, on 8 Apr 71 the CJCS authorized initiation of detailed redeployment planning with participation and coordination of JGS RVNAF, component and subordinate commanders as appropriate. This coordinated planning effort was concerned with developing detailed troop lists of units to redeploy, with the Vietnamization goals a prime factor. MACV was requested to make recommendations on the phasing of the announced redeployment. MACV offered the previously planned Increment VII troop list of 29,000 spaces during the period 1 May to 30 Jun 71 as being appropriate for the first phase of the new reduction. In order to allow maximum flexibility in logistics planning and provide stability through the GVN national elections, the remaining 71,000 was recommended to be split into two increments with the largest increment phasing out as close to the end of the announced period as practicable. Increment VIII was to redeploy 29,000 spaces during July and August. Increment IX, the largest and final segment of the programmed 100,000 reduction was planned for the period 1 Sep to 30 Nov 71.

(TS) On 10 Apr 71, the JCS passed a SECDEF memorandum to COMUSMACV which confirmed MACV force level milestones as follows:

-- No more than 254,700 authorized spaces at end-FY71.
-- No less than 205,000 on 1 Oct 71.
-- No more than 184,000 by 1 Dec 71.

These milestones required a very small modification of the MACV plan. By adding 300 spaces to the planned Increment VII (29,000 to 29,300), the end-April 1971 level of 284,000 would be
reduced as required to 254, 700 by end-FY71 (end-Increment VII). A concurrent decrease was made in the Increment VIII package (29,000 to 28,700). As thus modified, the redeployment of 100,000 spaces was carried out by MACV in accordance with the President's announcement.

AIR SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS

(TS) As US redeployments continued, air power was the most important means left for denying the enemy the capability to maintain and resupply his forces. From the beginning of force reduction planning, limitations of the US defense budget were major factors in determining the level of B-52 and TACAIR support. These limitations in turn became pivotal factors in redeployment planning. The interrelation of air support and reduction of ground forces was a major consideration in each redeployment increment. On numerous occasions COMUSMACV urged the JCS and OSD to refrain from reducing B-52 and TACAIR sorties, as the continued support was considered vital to Vietnamization. A high level of TACAIR support was required to support expanding ARVN operations. B-52 attacks limited the enemy's ability to launch, heighten, sustain or prolong offensives; in other instances they were effective in preempting attacks.

(TS) In answer to a CJCS request for recommendations on US force level including TACAIR and B-52 sortie requirements through 1972, COMUSMACV responded on 22 Mar 71 that the air support must be maintained at a level of 10,000 TACAIR sorties per month through FY72, and 8,000 per month in FY73, 1,000 B-52 sorties per month through FY73, and lastly, the single air war concept must remain in effect throughout the period. This single air war concept vested in COMUSMACV responsibility for all air operations in the RVN, Cambodia, Laos, and specified areas of NVN. Responsibility was delegated to DEPCOMUSMACV for Air who in this capacity was the single manager for air operations.

(TS) On 30 Apr 71, CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV to provide a detailed justification of air activity levels to include a concept of air operations to justify the requested FY72 - FY73 sortie levels. The justification furnished on 22 May 71 in essence stated that the required sortie levels of 10,000 TACAIR, 1,000 B-52, and 700 gunship sorties per month throughout FY72, and 8,000 TACAIR, 1,000 B-52, and 700 gunship sorties per month throughout FY73 were essential to providing the support considered necessary to secure US forces redeployment; sustain an interdiction of enemy LOC in Laos and Cambodia; augment the capabilities of the VNAF, KAF (Cambodia), and RLAF (Laos) for close air support during periods of increased enemy activity; and insure continued progress toward programmed goals in the CRIMP. These sortie levels for air support were approved, emergency conditions a surge above this monthly ceiling was permitted subject to COMUSMACV approval. For further details on sortie levels see Chapter VI, Air Operations in SEA.

THE TRANSITIONAL FORCE

(TS) On 17 Mar 71, after COMUSMACV had recommended proposals for troop reduction to 164,000 in-country by 1 Dec 71, CINCPAC had asked for further recommendations on force level planning through 1 Sep 72. COMUSMACV replied that a force level ranging between 60,000 to 90,000 should be planned at this time for 1 Sep 72. The rationale for force planning included realistic tailoring of the residual force which would maintain the best balance of forces capable of providing security, while continuing follow-through on materiel retrograde. US combat forces in the residual force would assume a "dynamic defense" role.

(TS) It was recognized that due to redeployments, a point would be reached when US ground combat forces would be at a level where they would be unable to materially influence the situation.
This point was estimated to be October 1971. The role of US ground combat forces remaining in RVN would then be one of dynamic defense of US installations, security of equipment and supplies to be retrograded, and further assisting in the improvement of the RVNAF. The dynamic defense concept was not to be misconstrued to imply a static garrison-type defense posture. The dynamic defense concept envisioned US forces conducting combat operations well out from vital installations and in concert with RF/PF units, keeping the enemy off balance and disrupting his system. While US forces were accomplishing the above, improved RF/PF and National Police were to assume an increasing responsibility for local security of sensitive US installations.

MACV proposals were considered by the JCS and SECDEF during the remainder of 1971. On 13 Jan 72 President Nixon announced plans to reduce the in-country force level to 69,000 by 1 May 1972.

FWMAF REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

As the US continued to redeploy its forces from RVN, the other troop contributing countries (TCC) began to make their plans in consonance with the US and GVN planning. In order to put the entire redeployment of forces picture into proper perspective, JCS requested that CINCPAC evaluate the role and level of participation of the troop contributing countries. In this regard, CINCPAC in turn asked that MACV provide an evaluation with emphasis on the importance and role of the ROK forces and the reaction of the GVN to ROK combat force withdrawals. Based on input received from COMUSMACV and other PACOM commanders, on 26 Feb 71, CINCPAC responded to JCS as follows:

Ideally, cooperative measures between SEA nations will continue to flourish as Vietnamization continues. TCC military forces, however, should phase down roughly parallel to US force reduction. Phase-out of Australian, New Zealand, and Thai Forces appears to have little impact on current plans concerning Vietnamization. On the other hand, withdrawal of ROK forces will impact in a number of areas. Basically, ROK redeployments should be subjected to the same planning factors as US redeployments, i.e., redeployment should be based upon RVN capability to assume the areas of responsibility without serious degradation in overall security.

CINCPAC further stated:

Assumption of greater responsibilities by TCC and other Asian countries would demonstrate the willingness of Asian countries to contribute to regional security and lend credence to the Nixon doctrine. It should be pointed out to these countries that such demonstration could be an important factor as Congress examines US assistance programs and could generate the necessary support in the US for President Nixon's programs. It should be readily apparent that it is in each country's self interest to actively cooperate in regional measures of mutual support.

CINCPAC informed COMUSMACV on 22 Jul 71, that the US Government had made a decision to continue to support two ROK divisions in RVN after redeployment of 10,000 ROK personnel during late 1971 and early 1972. COMUSMACV was further advised that the ROK and GVN had reached a working agreement and that there was no requirement for direct US involvement except to encourage both countries in their endeavors and assist where possible.
RVNAF FORCE STRUCTURE REVIEW FOR FY73

(TS) In October 1971, MACV was asked by CINCPAC to review the RVNAF force structure to ascertain that the RVNAF would have the necessary capabilities as other Free World Forces redeployed. Within the parameters already established, especially the 1.1 million manpower level, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV to address such areas as: providing RVNAF a capability to assume responsibility for interdiction; reinforcing MRs 1 and 2; developing an air cavalry capability; increasing medium-lift helicopter support; and increasing the amount of self-propelled artillery. CINCPAC also directed that COMUSMACV consider faster activation of units; improvements in command and control, leadership and morale, logistics, and individual and unit training; and finally, an assessment of the current manpower resources' ability to maintain the 1.1 million man force level.

(TS) CINCPAC's concern over interdiction was particularly evident. He requested that COMUSMACV include comments on not only new or improved methods of interdiction but also an expanded sensor/radar capability including delivery and readout, additional AC-119 aircraft, a mini-gunship concept, and finally the modification of the A-37 for interdiction.

(TS) After discussion with RVNAF JGS, COMUSMACV on 15 Jan 72 forwarded a recommended FY73 force structure to CINCPAC. This was approved by CINCPAC on 21 January and by the JCS on 18 Feb 72. In addition to the reinforcement of MR 1 with the newly-created 3d Inf Div and the 20th Tank Squadron, RVNAF would be provided with a significant interdiction capability, to include a Maritime Air Patrol of eight additional aircraft, conversion of one C-47 squadron to an AC-47 gunship squadron, and the addition of a forward looking infrared sensor (FLIR) maintenance capability. Also approved were five squadrons of STOL aircraft and 50 photo intelligence personnel to permit swift exploitation of acquired targets. Debate still continued over which tradeoffs should be made to permit RVNAF to remain within the 1.1 million man level. Until this question was resolved, COMUSMACV requested and CINCPAC approved a temporary ceiling increase of 17,000 spaces.
The following list of plans is published as an aid to researchers. These are essentially the plans which guided the MACV effort during 1971, to include some prepared as guidance to meet various contingencies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PLAN NUMBER AND TITLE</th>
<th>RESUME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMUSMACV OPLAN 5020f: Rapid Reinforcement - Korea (C)</td>
<td>(TS) Close Hold.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUSMACV OPLAN 5022: Support of Internal Uprisings and Revolutions (S)</td>
<td>(TS) Close Hold.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUSMACV OPLAN 5027: Defense of Korea and SVN (C)</td>
<td>(TS) Close Hold.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUSMACV OPLAN 5060: Noncombatant Emergency and Evacuation Plan (U)</td>
<td>(C) A plan for the evacuation of US noncombatants and certain designated aliens from RVN. (C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUSMACV OPLAN 5060B: Noncombatant Emergency and Evacuation Plan (U)</td>
<td>(S) A plan for the evacuation of US citizens and key indigenous personnel from Cambodia. (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUSMACV OPLAN 5065: Security of Selected Personnel and Equipment (U)</td>
<td>(S/NF) A plan providing for and assigning tasks to appropriate military commands in SVN and NSAPAC Representative (Vietnam) (C); in order to insure the security and evacuation of selected personnel and equipment located in RVN. (S/NF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUSMACV OPLAN 5071: Accelerated Redeployment Under Ceasefire Conditions (TS/NF)</td>
<td>(TS/NF) A plan to provide for accelerated redeployment of US/FWMAF from RVN under ceasefire conditions. (TS/NF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUSMACV OPLAN 5072: ROKFV (U)</td>
<td>(TS) This unilateral capabilities plan provides for the relief and return of ROK military forces in SVN to Korea in the shortest time possible should hostilities break out in ROK. (TS)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 5001: General War Plan (U)

(TS) A unilateral US general war plan for South-east Asia in support of CINCPAC OPLAN 5001; upon execution of the plan COMUSMACV becomes COMUSSEASIA with responsibilities for Mainland SEA consisting of Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and that portion of Malaysia located in the Malay Peninsula and Singapore. (TS)

COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 5032: Phase III and IV (U)

(TS) A unilateral capabilities plan providing for US Forces participation in the defense of SEA. (The plan was inactive, but was available for use as a post-hostilities situation. All normal actions were held in abeyance.) (TS)

COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 5043: COMUSMACV/COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 43-69 (U)

(TS) A unilateral capabilities plan providing for COMUSMACV/COMUSSEASIA actions in the event of a NATO/WARSAW PACT conflict requiring the redeployment of selected US forces from SEA to reinforce Europe. (TS)

COMUSMACV J171: A Plan for the Post-withdrawal Phase of Post-hostilities Planning in RVN (U)

(S) Provides for activities after withdrawal and support of GVN in efforts to extend its control within RVN. (S)

COMUSMACV OPLAN J185: General Plan for the Reduction of US Forces in RVN Prior to Cessation of Hostilities (S/NF)

(TS/NF) Title is self-explanatory.

COMUSMACV OPLAN J186: Transitional Support Force (TSF) Plan (C)

(TS/NF) A US plan for reduction in force (TS/NF)
COMUSMACV PLAN J190: Repatriation of US Prisoners of War (U)

(C) A plan addressing procedures to be followed in recovery of US PW. (C)

COMUSMACV Restoral Plan J193: Communications Restoral Plan, RVN (U)

(C) A plan describing procedures and tasks for US commands and agencies in the RVN to prepare for and implement the restoral of critical communications systems and facilities in case of unplanned disruption. (C)

COMUSMACV OPLAN J196: Contingency Mining Plan for Kompong Som, Cambodia (S)

(TS) The plan provides for mining the port of Kompong Som, Cambodia using RVNAF Forces to deny the enemy the use of this port as a logistic support entry point. (TS)

COMUSMACV OPLAN J199: Airdrop Resupply Plan (U)

(S) This is a plan to deliver by emergency airdrop up to 150 tons per day to friendly forces in isolated areas. (S)

COMUSMACV OPLAN J200: Plan for Cease-Fire (U)

(S) Plan addresses situation wherein negotiations result in a ceasefire. (S)

COMUSMACV OPLAN J201: BRIGHT LIGHT (U)

(TS) A plan for the establishment of operational procedures and plans to be used as a guideline in securing US and FWMAF PWs from the enemy. (TS)

COMUSMACV OPLAN J202: TIGHT JAW (U)

(C) A plan to Vietnamize the sensor plan in RVN. (C)

COMUSMACV OPLAN J203: Vietnam Assistance Group (U)

(TS) Close Hold

COMUSMACV OPLAN J204: Repatriation of North Vietnam Prisoners of War (U)

(C) This plan provides guidance for US Forces in the repatriation of North Vietnam prisoners of war (NVN PW). (C)

COMUSMACV OPLAN J210: Actions for Countering Enemy-Initiated Offensives in the RVN (TS/NF)

(TS/NF) This plan describes appropriate courses of action in response to possible enemy-initiated offensives designed to impair Vietnamization or impede US redeployments. (TS/NF)

COMUSMACV OPLAN J211: Redeployment of the Republic of Korea Forces Vietnam ROKFV (C)

(C) Provides for the redeployment of the 2d ROK Marine Bde and elements of the 100th Log Comd from RVN to ROK. (C)

CCP 1971, AB146: Combined Campaign Plan, 1971 (U)

(S) A plan for the defeat of the VC/NVA and participation in the GVN 1971 Pacification and Development Plan. (S) (Update CCP 1970 AB145)

CCP 1972, AB147: Combined Campaign Plan, 1972 (U)

(S) This plan establishes policies, provides guidance, and establishes objectives and tasks for conduct of the war by RVNAF and FWMAF. (S) (Supercedes CCP 1971, AB146)
SEATO Field Forces OPLAN 6/70: SFF
OPLAN 6/70 (U)

1971 Community Defense and Local Development Plan (U)

CLIP: Country Logistics Improvement Plan (U)

IV CTZ Transportation Plan (U)

Source: MACJ3042

(TS) A plan providing for the defense of the protocol states against major aggression by the armed forces of NVA by inflicting a quick and decisive defeat on those forces. (TS)

(C) A GVN plan which is being supported by MACCORDS and USAID. (C)

(C) A plan providing a coordinated long-range program of major objectives and courses of action for improving the logistics operations of RVNAF. (C)

(C) A joint MACV/USAID plan providing transportation during an emergency (land lines severed in IV CTZ). (C)
1. Msg (TS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 201215Z Feb 71, Subj: Additional Arc Light Sorties (U), Gp-1.

2. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CJCS, 200755Z Apr 71, Subj: ROE/Operating Authorities in Laos (U), Gp-1; Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 290247Z Sep 71, Subj: All Weather Delivery Restriction (U), Gp-1.


4. Embtel (S), Amemb to SECSTATE, 19444/150405Z Dec 71, Subj: Policy Coordination of Information/PSYOP/POLWAR Activities (U), Op-Not stated.

5. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV et al., 260318Z Sep 71, Subj: CINCPAC Indochina PSYOP/POLWAR Conference (U), Gp-4.

6. Same as #3, Figure 2; Rpt (U), J303, undated Subj: Weekly Summary Increment IX; and Msg (U), CG USARV to COMUSMACV et al., 022350Z Dec 71, Subj: Increment X Standdown.

7. Msg (S), JCS to CINCPAC et al., 170053Z Feb 72, Subj: Future of PSYOP/POLWAR in Indochina (U), Gp-3; and Msg (TS), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV et al., 200350Z Nov 71, Subj: Strategic PSYOP in SEA (U), Gp-4.

8. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV et al., 280305Z Oct 71, Subj: Strategic PSYOP in SEA (Command, Control, and Development) (U), Gp-4; Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 160210Z Oct 71, Subj: Disestablishment of JUSPAO (U), Gp-4.

9. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 111108Z Nov 71, Subj: Strategic PSYOP in SEA (U), Gp-4.

10. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV et al., 200350Z Nov 71, Subj: Strategic PSYOP in SEA (U), Gp-4; Msg (TS), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV et al., 270414Z Nov 71, Subj: Strategic PSYOP in SEA (U), Gp-4.

11. Same as #3, p 17; Fact Sheet (S), MACJ3-06, 5 Jul 71, Subj: Contingency Plans for Conduct of PSYOP (U), Gp-Not stated; Memo (U), MACQI, 15 Feb 72, Subj: Troop Redeployment, 9th Special Operations Group; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CDR, 7AF, 270051Z May 71, Subj: 9th Special Operations Squadron (U), Gp-4.


13. Fact Sheet (S), MACJ3-11, 1 Jun 71, Subj: PSYOP Objectives and Themes (Current Effort) (U), Gp-Not stated.

14. Same as #13; Embtel (C), SECSTATE to Amemb Saigon, 511/062357Z Dec 71, Subj: Chieu Hoi (U), Gp-Not stated; Bklt (U), USMACV, 29 Feb 71, Subj: PSYOP/POLWAR Newsletter.

15. Same as #13; Fact Sheet (S), MACJ3-11, 4 Jun 71, Subj: RICE RIVER Program (C), Gp-Not stated; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 171109Z Dec 71, Subj: MACV PSYOP Budget FY73-74 (U), Gp-4.

16. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 171109Z Dec 71, Subj: MACV PSYOP Budget FY73-74 (U), Gp-4.

17. Memo (C), MACJ3-0, 19 Nov 71, Subj: PSYOP Effectiveness (U), Gp-4.

18. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 091223Z Jan 71, Subj: US Force and Activity Levels in SE Asia (U), Gp-4; Brief (TS), MACJ5, 1 Dec 71, Subj: NSSM-99 and Military Strategy in Southeast Asia (U), Tab C, Gp-3.
19. Msg (TS SPECAT), COMUSMACV to CJCS, 081135Z Mar 71, Redeployment/All Volunteer Force (U), Gp-1.


22. Msg (TS SPECAT), CINCPAC to JCS, 262309Z Feb 71, Subj: TCC Forces and Roles (U), Gp-1.


24. Same as #23.


26. Interview (U), LTC O'Bryan, MACJ031, and MAJ Klein, MACJ303, 25 Apr 72.