THE BUILDING AND TRAINING OF INFANTRY DIVISIONS

Study No. 12

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

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The Army Ground Forces

THE BUILDING AND TRAINING OF INFANTRY DIVISIONS
Study No. 12

By
Major Bell I. Wiley

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1946

HEADQUARTERS ARMY GROUND FORCES

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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SUBJECT: Studies in the History of Army Ground Forces

TO: All Interested Agencies

1. The history of the Army Ground Forces as a command was prepared during the course of the war and completed immediately thereafter. The studies prepared in Headquarters Army Ground Forces, were written by professional historians, three of whom served as commissioned officers, and one as a civilian. The histories of the subordinate commands were prepared by historical officers, who except in Second Army, acted as such in addition to other duties.

2. From the first, the history was designed primarily for the Army. Its object is to give an account of what was done from the point of view of the command preparing the history, including a candid, and factual account of difficulties, mistakes recognized as such, the means by which, in the opinion of those concerned, they might have been avoided, the measures used to overcome them, and the effectiveness of such measures. The history is not intended to be laudatory.

3. The history of the Army Ground Forces is composed of monographs on the subjects selected, and of two volumes in which an overall history is presented. A separate volume is devoted to the activities of each of the major subordinate commands.

4. In order that the studies may be made available to interested agencies at the earliest possible date, they are being reproduced and distributed in manuscript form. As such they must be regarded as drafts subject to final editing and revision. Persons finding errors of fact or important omissions are encouraged to communicate with the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, Attention: Historical Section, in order that corrections may be made prior to publication in printed form by the War Department.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL DEVERS:

J. L. Tarr

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Colonel, AGD
Acting Ground Adj General

1 Incl:
Historical Study

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PREPATORY NOTE

This study was prepared in the Historical Section, Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, by Major Bell I. Wiley.

The study in draft form was read and criticized by various officers of Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, and subordinate commands whose experience and position gave them a special knowledge of the building and training of divisions. Among these officers were:

Lt. Gen. Ben Lear	Commanding General of Second Army, October 1940 - April 1943 and CG AGF, July - December 1944
Maj. Gen. Charles L. Bolte	Commanding General of 69th Division during most of the training period of that unit (later Commanding General of 34th Division in MTO)
Col. E. C. Bergquist	Chief of Staff, 94th Division in 1944-45, (formerly head of New Divisions Division, G-1 Section, Headquarters, Army Ground Forces)
Col. Frank Ward	G-3 Section, Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, August 1942 - August 1944; February - December 1945
Col. H. R. Matthews	G-3 Section, Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, 1944 - 1945

Since the study was projected on the level of Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, the bulk of the material used in its preparation came from the files and the oral testimony of officers of that headquarters. But to avoid over-emphasis on the headquarters point of view and acquire insight into the impact of AGF policies on units in the field, a number of divisions were visited for the puspose of observing training and interviewing key officers. Among divisions visited were the 63d, 65th, 69th, 75th, 84th, 86th, and 95th. As the 65th Division was the last division activated, and as the period of its training paralleled the preparation of this study, it was visited three times, at well-spaced intervals, and representative officers from the division commander on down to platoon leaders were interviewed on each visit. The object sought was a close-up view of the progress of one division from activation to shipment overseas. Records of observations and interviews were filed in the Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, for inclusion in the records of the Headquarters.

THE BUILDING AND TRAINING OF INFANTRY DIVISIONS

Divisions at the Inception of the Army Ground Forces

When the Army Ground Forces Headquarters was created on 9 March 1942, 29 infantry divisions were in existence. Of these, 10 were Regular Army, 18 were National Guard, and 1 was Army of the United States.[1] The Regular Army divisions had been constituted and activated prior to September 1940 while the National Guard divisions had been inducted into Federal service during the period September 1940 - November 1941.[2] Both the Regular Army and the National Guard units were commonly referred to after 1941 as "old divisions" in contrast to "new divisions" activated in 1942 and 1943.

The old divisions had, with one exception, been converted from the square to the triangular organization when the Army Ground Forces (AGF) came into being, though triangularization of the National Guard units had not been effected until the early weeks of 1942.[3] A few of the divisions were stationed at posts outside the United States, others had been assigned to defensive missions along the country's borders. Nineteen of them were in various stages of training.[4] Most of the divisions that had taken part in the 1941 maneuvers were engaged in a four-month program designed to remove deficiencies revealed in the GHQ exercises of the previous fall.[5]

Divisions of all types activated before the end of 1941 aggregated 36. The outbreak of war caused the launching in January 1942 of an expansion program for the Armed Forces which contemplated the creation before the year's end of 35 new divisions, 26 of which were to be infantry.[6] It was planned also that activation should proceed on schedule of 3 or 4 divisions a month. As a result of subsequent modifications of the mobilization objective, a total of 38 divisions - 9 armored, 2 airborne, and 27 infantry - were activated in 1942. Seventeen more divisions, of which 11 were infantry, were created in 1943.[7] This brought the total of divisions in existence in World War II to 91, but the net number was only 90,[8] as the 2d Cavalry had two careers, first as a white division (disbanded in July 1942) and second as a colored division. The schedule of activations is shown on the accompanying charts.

Plan for Building and Training Divisions

The new divisions were created and trained in accordance with a system promulgated during the final weeks of General Headquarters, U. S. Army (GHQ)[9] The plan for bringing new units into existence as developed in January and applied, insofar as circumstances permitted, to divisions activated prior to June, was set forth graphically in a chart captioned "Building an Infantry Triangular Division." (Chart 1).[10] This plan, which General John M. Palmer called the "finest piece of large-scale planning" that he had seen in fifty years of army service,[11] provided for construction of each new division around a cadre of 172 officers and 1,190 enlisted men drawn from a parent division. The cadre was selected from two to three months prior to activation date and launched on a special program of training. Enlisted cadre-men were chosen by the commander of the parent division, promoted to the positions which they were to fill in the new unit, and given preliminary training for their forthcoming duties by officers of the parent division. Further preparatory training was given by cadre officers after the men arrived at their new camp.[12]

The division commander, assistant division commander, and division artillery commanders were designated by the War Department not later than seventy-eight days prior to activation and brought to General Headquarters for a week of orientation. The division commander then went to Ft. Leavenworth for a month of special instruction at the Command and General Staff School, while the assistant division commander took a special course at the Infantry School and the artillery commander at the Field Artillery School. The General Staff officers and Special Staff heads, designated also by

TABLE I

DIVISIONS - CLASSIFICATION (BY ORIGIN) AND MONTH OF ACTIVATION[1]

Div.	Class.	Activated
INFANTRY DIVISIONS		
1	RA	May 1917
2	RA	Sept. 1917
3	RA	Nov. 1917
4	RA	June 1940
5	RA	Oct. 1939
6	RA	Oct. 1939
7	RA	July 1940
8	RA	July 1940
9	RA	Aug. 1940
10[2]	AUS	July 1943
24[3]	RA	Feb. 1921
25[4]	AUS	Oct. 1941
26	NG	Jan. 1941
27	NG	Oct. 1940
28	NG	Feb. 1941
29	NG	Feb. 1941
30	NG	Sept. 1940
31	NG	Nov. 1940
32	NG	Oct. 1940
33	NG	Mar. 1941
34	NG	Feb. 1941
35	NG	Dec. 1940
36	NG	Nov. 1940
37	NG	Oct. 1940
38	NG	Jan. 1941
40	NG	Mar. 1941
41	NG	Sept. 1940
42	AUS	July 1943
43	NG	Feb. 1941
44	NG	Sept. 1940
45	NG	Sept. 1940
63	AUS	June 1943
65	AUS	Aug. 1943
66	AUS	April 1943
69	AUS	May 1943
70	AUS	June 1943
71	AUS	July 1943
75	AUS	April 1943
76	OR	June 1942
77	OR	Mar. 1942
78	OR	Aug. 1942
79	OR	June 1942
80	OR	July 1942
81	OR	June 1942
83	OR	Aug. 1942
84	OR	Oct. 1942
85	OR	May 1942
86	OR	Dec. 1942
87	OR	Dec. 1942
88	OR	July 1942
89	OR	July 1942
90	OR	Mar. 1942
91	OR	Aug. 1942
92*	AUS	Oct. 1942
93*	AUS	May 1942
94	OR	Sept. 1942
95	OR	July 1942
96	OR	Aug. 1942
97	OR	Feb. 1943
98	OR	Sept. 1942
99	OR	Nov. 1942
100	OR	Nov. 1942
102	OR	Sept. 1942
103	OR	Nov. 1942
104	OR	Sept. 1942
106	AUS	Mar. 1943
Americal - 5		May 1942

Recapitulation

Infantry	- 67
Cavalry	- 3
Armored	- 16
Airborne	- 5
Total	91

TABLE I (cont'd.)

DIVISIONS - CLASSIFICATION (BY ORIGIN) AND MONTH OF ACTIVATION

Div.	Class.	Activated
CAVALRY DIVISIONS		
1	RA	Aug. 1921
2 (1st time)	RA	April 1941
2* (2nd time)	RA	Feb. 1943
ARMORED DIVISIONS		
1	RA	July 1940
2	RA	July 1940
3	RA	April 1941
4	RA	April 1941
5	AUS	Oct. 1941
6	AUS	Feb. 1942
7	AUS	Mar. 1942
8	AUS	April 1942
9	AUS	July 1942
10	AUS	July 1942
11	AUS	Aug. 1942
12	AUS	Sept. 1942
13	AUS	Oct. 1942
14	AUS	Nov. 1942
16	AUS	July 1943
20	AUS	Mar. 1943
AIRBORNE DIVISIONS		
11	AUS	Feb. 1943
13	AUS	Aug. 1943
17	AUS	April 1943
82 [5]	OR	Mar. 1942
101	AUS	Aug. 1942

Notes to Table I

1. (a) Date of Activation, except for the 24th, 25th, and Americal Divisions, was obtained from the "Division Book" of the D/CS of AGF. Information concerning the activation of the 24th, 25th, and Americal Divisions came from the Organization and Directory Section, Operations Branch, The Adjutant General's Office.

   (b) Information concerning the classification of divisions was obtained from the Organization and Directory Section, Operations Branch, TAGO

2. A "Light or "Mountain" Division.

3. When activated in 1921 (in the Hawaiian Department) this was known as the Hawaiian Division. In August, 1941, the Hawaiian Division was broken up; parts of it were redesignated as the 24th Infantry Division; other elements became the nucleus for the 25th Infantry Division. Information furnished by the Organization and Directory Section, Operations Branch, TAGO

4. Organized in Hawaii.

5. Organized in New Caledonia from miscellaneous AUS and National Guard units. Information furnished by the Organization and Directory Section, Operations Branch, TAGO

6. Activated originally as an infantry division. Redesignated as Airborne in August, 1942

TABLE II

ACTIVATION OF DIVISIONS BY MONTH

1917-1939, Inclusive

Month	Division
May, 1917	1st Infantry
September, 1917	2nd Infantry
November, 1917	3rd Infantry
February, 1921	24th Infantry
August, 1921	1st Cavalry
October, 1939	5th Infantry
October, 1939	6th Infantry

Total, 1917-1939:

Infantry	6
Cavalry	1
	7

1940

June	4th Infantry
July	7th Infantry
	8th Infantry
	1st Armored
	2nd Armored
August	9th Infantry
September	30th Infantry
	44th Infantry
	45th Infantry
	41st Infantry
October	32nd Infantry
	37th Infantry
	27th Infantry
November	36th Infantry
	31st Infantry
December	35th Infantry

Total, 1940:

Infantry	14
Armored	2
	16

1941

January	26th Infantry
	38th Infantry
February	26th Infantry
	29th Infantry
	34th Infantry
	43rd Infantry

TABLE II (cont'd)

1941, Cont.

Month	Division
March	33rd Infantry
April	2nd Cavalry (1st time)
	3rd Armored
	4th Armored
October	5th Armored
	25th Infantry
November	40th Infantry

1942

Month	Division
February	6th Armored
March	77th Infantry
	90th Infantry
	82nd (Infantry, redesignated A/B, Aug. '42)
	7th Armored
April	8th Armored
	Americal
May	85th Infantry
	93rd* Infantry
June	76th Infantry
	79th Infantry
	81st Infantry
July	80th Infantry
	88th Infantry
	89th Infantry
	95th Infantry
	9th Armored
	10th Armored
August	78th Infantry
	83rd Infantry
	91st Infantry
	96th Infantry
	11th Armored
	82nd Airborne, by redesignation of 82nd Infantry
	101st Airborne
September	94th Infantry
	98th Infantry
	102nd Infantry
	104th Infantry
	12th Armored

Total, 1941:

Infantry	9
Cavalry	1
Armored	3
	13

Total, 1942:

Infantry	27
Armored	9
Airborne	2
	38

TABLE II (cont'd)

1942 Cont.

Month	Division
October	84th Infantry
	92nd* Infantry
	13th Armored
November	99th Infantry
	100th Infantry
	103rd Infantry
	14th Armored
December	86th Infantry
	87th Infantry
	1943
February	97th Infantry
	2nd* Cavalry (2nd time)
	11th Airborne
March	106th Infantry
	20th Armored
April	66th Infantry
	75th Infantry
	17th Airborne
May	69th Infantry
June	63rd Infantry
	70th Infantry
July	71st Infantry
	16th Armored
	42nd Infantry
	10th Infantry (Light)
August	13th Airborne
	65th Infantry.

Total, 1943:

Infantry	11
Cavalry	1
Armored	2
Airborne	3
	17

Grand Total, 1917-1943, incl:

Infantry	67	
Cavalry	3	(1 div.act. twice)
Armored	16	
Airborne	5	
	91	

the War Department, joined the division commander at Leavenworth for the special Command and General Staff School course. Forty-four key officers of the infantry, artillery, engineer, quartermaster, medical, signal, and cavalry components were designated by the War Department, on the recommendation of the chiefs of their respective branches and services, and sent to appropriate branch or service schools for special courses running concurrently with that of the commander and his staff at Leavenworth. The remainder of the officer cadre, designated by an army commander, followed the same procedure.[13]

The commander and the principal officers of his staff arrived at the division camp thirty-seven days before activation. A week later they were joined by the remainder of the officer cadre and all the enlisted cadre. During the next few days the complement of 452 officers, provided by the War Department from graduates of officer candidate and service schools and the officer replacement pool, reached the camp. On "D" Day the division was formally activated. During the next fifteen days the enlisted filler, consisting of 13,425 men (authorized), came in from reception centers.[14]

In the meantime the division had, under optimum conditions, received about 50 percent of the training equipment authorized by tables of basic allowance (T/BA's). Immediately after arrival of the last installment of fillers, the division was ready to begin the routine of training.[15]

New infantry divisions activated prior to November 1942 initiated training on a schedule promulgated by the G-3 Section, GHQ, on 16 February of that year. This program contemplated the preparation of units for combat within the space of a year. The first 17 weeks of the year were allotted to basic and small-unit training up to the battalion. During this period, War Department Mobilization training programs (MTP's) were used as guides. The MTP's were drawn on a 13-week basis, but the framers of the new division schedule deemed it wise to allow 4 weeks of extra time as an offset for delays in receipt of fillers and equipment, and to permit a thorough testing at the end by higher command.[16]

The second period consisted of 13 weeks of progressive unit training, from the squad to the regiment, inclusive. The objective of this phase was "to develop each unit into a fighting team capable of taking its place in the division team and fulfilling its own particular role in battle." At some time during the 13 weeks infantry and cavalry platoons and field artillery battalions were to be tested in combat firing proficiency by corps commanders. Field exercises were to be stresses throughout the period.[17]

The unit phase was to be followed by 14 weeks of combined arms training, the objective of which was "to weld the several units of the division into a division team capable of acting as a concerted whole and maintaining itself under any and all battle conditions." The period was to begin with regimental combat team excerises, in which a battalion of field artillery functioned in support of an infantry regiment, and to end with maneuvers of one division against another. All exercises except command post exercises (CPX's) were to be directed by the next higher commander.[18]

The February directive for new divisions made specific provision for tests that had been introduced earlier in the GHQ period. MTP tests, prepared by army or corps, were to be given the entire division in the last week of individual training.[19] During the unit training period infantry and cavalry platoons were to take platoon combat firing proficiency tests prepared by GHQ, and artillery units were to be given GHQ battery and battalion tests.[20] Infantry batallion field exercise tests prepared by GHQ, were prescribed for the combined training period.[21]

For convenience and guidance of the division commander and staff, G-3 of GHQ prepared a diagram covering each of the three periods of training. These charts showed at a glance the week-by-week routine to be followed by each major component at the division.[22]

An important feature of the training plan was the requirement that troop schools for officers and noncommissioned officers be conducted concurrently with other activities during every period of training.[23] The primary purpose of these schools was to refresh instructional personnel in subjects that they were scheduled to teach in the immediate future. It was provided that schools normally would be held at night to prepare instructors for their duties of the next day. General McNair consistently opposed schools "so extensive as to deprive units unduly of officers and non-commissioned officers needed for troop training."[24]

It was contemplated that divisions, on completion of the three periods of training prescribed in the February directive, should participate in large-scale maneuvers directed by a higher headquarters.[25]

Modifications of Activation and Training Procedure, March - September 1942

When the Army Ground Forces superseded GHQ on 9 March 1942, 5 infantry divisions scheduled for activation in March and May were already in process of formation.[26] The new G-1 Section, which was actually a reduced edition of G-1, GHQ, entered busily into the task of preparing other units for activation. One of the first steps was the setting up of a New Divisions Division in G-1 composed of Major (later Col.) Earl C. Bergquist and Lt. (later Maj.) Roy L. Leinster. These officers were given the task of coordinating and supervising all activities pertaining to the creation of new divisions.[27]

One of the first matters requiring attention was the revision of activation procedure. Some changes came as a result of the War Department reorganization; others were suggested by experience gleaned from building the first new divisions. Modifications made in March for the June divisions - the first to be tailored from start to finish by the Army Ground Forces - provided that only the division commander and his two principal assistants should be designated by the War Department. Key infantry and artillery officers originally selected by the War Department were now named by the Army Ground Forces, while the principal officers in service components were designated by Army Service Forces (ASF), on recommendation of the respective chiefs. The size of the officer cadre was increased from 172 to 185, so that new divisions might have a larger nucleus of leaders specially schooled for their duties. The remainder of the officer cadre was designated by army or corps, and the officer complement was provided by the Army Ground Forces and the Army Service Forces instead of the War Department. Among additions to the cadre were antitank officers, who "preferably should have had experience and knowledge of antitank operations and defense," and an assistant G-4 charged with the supervision of automotive affairs. The former was sent to Leavenworth for the special command and staff course and the latter to the Quartermaster Motor Transport School at Holabird, Md., for instruction in automotive maintenance. Other changes provided that housekeeping elements of the enlisted cadre should reach camp at about the same time as the command and staff, so as to prepare the way for the coming of the remaining cadre and the filler.[28]

Activation procedure was modified further in the spring and summer. The most significant changes were those pertaining to motor maintenance. In April the policy was initiated of requiring the division commander, the assistant division commander, and the artillery commander to attend the Quartermaster Motor Transport School at Holabird, Md., for a five day "refresher course" in automotive maintenance before proceeding to the Command and General Staff School.[29] The G-4 automotive officer,

BUILDING AN INFANTF





UILDING AN INFANTRY TRIANGULAR DIVISION



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



General Headquarters US Army
Army War College
Washington, D. C.
January 17, 1942

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instead of being ordered to the QMMT School as formerly, was sent to an older division for practical instruction by officers in charge of motor maintenance;[30] in June, the practice was modified further to provide for his attendance upon the short course at Holabird with the division commander before beginning the division motor course.[31]

Another change made in June provided for selection of that portion of the officer cadre not designated by the War Department, the Army Ground Forces or the Army Service Forces, by the parent division instead of by army or corps.[32] The previously noted tendency toward larger cadres continued throughout the summer. By autumn the officer cadre had increased to 216 and the enlisted cadre had grown from the lean March figure of 1,190 to the fat number of 1,460. The latter included an augmentation of 98 clerks, stenographers, and mechanics to meet a specialist deficiency revealed by experience; an ordnance maintenance platoon to assist with the ever-pressing problem of automotive upkeep; and a postal section, provided by The Adjutant General, to facilitate handling of the large volume of mail. Additions to the officer cadre included an assistant G-4, a division chaplain and assistant, and a special service officer.[33]

Concurrently with the refinement of technique for launching new divisions, the Army Ground Forces Headquarters was carrying forward plans for completing the training of old ones. On 23 April a training directive outlining the 1942 maneuvers was issued. This directive, which placed prime emphasis on air-ground and infantry-mechanized phases of training, stated that all units completing maneuvers were to be deemed ready for combat.[34] In July a directive was issued covering training in staging areas.[35]

Training Obstacles, March - September 1942

Despite the well-laid plans of headquarters, the training of divisions both old and new encountered many obstacles. Difficulties were particularly great during the summer and fall of 1942 when expansion of the armed forces was proceeding at such a breathtaking pace as to aggravate more or less normal growing pains.

One of the most distressing difficulties was the shortage and obsolescence of equipment. Revised tables of organization (T/O's) published in April 1942 listed improved types of weapons and vehicles for divisions, including Browning Automatic Rifles, .50 caliber machine guns, carbines to replace most of the service pistols, and 1/4-ton trucks, or "jeeps."[36] Current regulations, as previously noted, contemplated outfitting divisions with about 50 percent of the equipment prescribed in tables of basic allowance. But inspection reports, and correspondence of officers in the field, indicated a wide divergence between equipment authorized and that actually provided. Deficiencies were attributable not only to the inability of industry to keep pace with the rapid expansion of the armed forces but also to the effort to provide arms and other equipment for Allied Powers, particularly for Russia and France. The increase of alerted units in the summer in anticipation of "Bolero" - the cross-channel invasion of Europe then planned for the spring of 1943 - and other special missions also was a factor, for these units had to be fully equipped regardless of the consequences to those in less advanced stages of training. After a visit of inspection to seven division camps, at the end of July, G-4 of the Army Ground Forces observed: "The shortage of equipment in new units is becoming more critical with each month's new activations."[37] About a month later, after inspecting four other divisions, he wrote that his observations "showed a continuance of the tightening-up of equipment."[38]

The Army Ground Forces Headquarters attempted to alleviate this situation by (1) prescribing a rotative system which permitted successive groups of trainees to use the same equipment, (2) redoubling efforts to prevent deterioration of that which was at hand, (3) requiring strict economy in the expenditure of ammunition, and (4) encouraging improvisations on the part of subordinate commanders.[39] But these efforts met with only partial success.

Personnel deficiencies were as serious as those of equipment. A principal cause of the shortage of manpower for divisions during the summer and fall of 1942 was the attempt to meet unexpected requirements of "Bolero" and of task forces in the Pacific, and at the same time to maintain the scheduled flow of activations. Divisions in advanced stages of training suffered more during this period than did those activated in 1942.[40] Some of the old divisions not only were required to furnish several cadres but also were subjected to repeated strippings to fill alerted units. On 30 June 1942, the 27 divisions under the Army Ground Forces jurisdiction reported an understrength of 4,150 officers and 42,880 enlisted men.[41] Later the situation was even worse. General McNair remarked to General Lear on 31 July that "thousands" of service units not on the troop basis were being formed and that old divisions would probably have to supply some of the men for them.[42] His apprehension proved to be well founded. Three National Guard divisions, the 30th, 31st, and 33d, virtually became ASF pools. The 30th declined from a strength of 12,400 in June 1942 to 3,000 in August; the 31st from 15,200 to 7,200; and the 33d from 13,200 to 8,400. The 35th, 38th and 44th suffered losses almost as great.[43]

Little wonder that General Lear remarked to General McNair in August that some of the National Guard units were "low in their minds," since recurrent depletions to fill other units meant continuing postponement of the opportunity for combat.[44] Even when replacements were received promptly, which was usually not the case, the effect on training was disruptive. Some divisions had to keep several programs running concurrently to accommodate replacements received at various stages of training. This practice strained instructional personnel - already sparse from repeated turnover - almost to the breaking point. Most of the older divisions adopted the scheme of segregating replacements in special training units until they reached a level that made admixture with other troops practicable. But some were so reduced as to necessitate beginning the training cycle all over again.[45]

General Lear repeatedly urged AGF Headquarters to desist from piecemeal robbing of divisions. "If you have to take men," he said, "take large numbers from a few units rather than a few men from many units, and take them in hunks rather than in driblets." Units reduced to cadres, he added, could begin training again while the others could proceed without interruption.[46]

General McNair admitted the soundness of General Lear's advice but he expressed doubt as to being able to follow it. "It is very difficult to shape and to stick to a policy," he said, "since the demands made are entirely at variance with what we have been told previously would be the situation."[47] He finally was able in August to get the War Department to postpone activation of one of the December divisions, for, as he remarked to General Lear, there was obviously "no sense in building new units while old ones sit around in a mangled condition."[48] In the fall of 1942, the 30th, 31st, and 33d divisions were promised immunity from further stripping and two new divisions, the 76th and 78th, were allotted an overstrength of 33-1/3 percent and earmarked as replacement pools.[49]

A third deterrent to divisional training during the early AGF period was the paucity, inexperience, and incompetence of officer personnel. The problem of division command was not as great as it was during the GHQ period, but even so, responsible authorities found it necessary to replace several major generals and a larger number of brigadiers because of defective leadership qualities.[50] Most of those affected belonged to National Guard organizations. In political circles the hue and cry was revived that National Guard officers were being victimized by the prejudice of the Regular Army group. The War Department felt constrained to allay this feeling by attempting to search out a few of the more capable National Guard colonels for promotion to brigadiers.[51] But when the request for recommendations was passed down the line it elicited a cool response. General Lear said that the matter reduced itself

to one of recommending the advancement of National Guard officers to positions of command over Regular Army officers who were their superiors in ability, and this he refused to do.[52]

The rapid expansion of the Army created a demand for trained staff officers that was considerably greater than the supply. During the early months of 1942 it was sometimes necessary to designate persons for high staff positions who had not taken the regular course in the Command and General Staff School and who had an utterly inadequate background for the responsible duties required of them. The results were disruptive and distressing.[53]

There was also a dearth of competent regimental and battalion commanders and of other field grade officers. But the junior and noncommissioned officer situation was even more disturbing. Reports of AGF inspection of divisions were replete with such statements as "hesitant uncertain leadership by platoon and squad leaders," "poor troop leadership by junior commanders," and "squad and platoon leaders were lax in correcting errors."[54]

The deplorable state as to officers, both commissioned and noncommissioned, to which some of the old divisions were reduced was recorded vividly in a Third Army inspection report of the 28th Division in late July 1942. "There is an acute shortage of officers," the inspectors said; "of the 706 authorized by the T/O the division has 440 assigned, and of this number 106 are on special duty and detached service, several of the companies and most of the platoons are commanded by noncommissioned officers: many of the best officers have been sent on cadres. This has left company officers who are inexperienced, and at present incapable of properly instructing their men."[55]

"Over eight hundred noncommissioned officers," the report continued, "have been sent to Officers Candidate Schools, many have been sent on cadres, and those who are left are below the desired standard ... some of the battalion commanders are over age." It is not surprising in view of this situation that the inspectors found that "the spirit of the division has showed a lack of objective and the will to do."[56]

Personnel shortages were aggravated by the failure of service commands to provide adequate station complements. This necessitated detail of officers and men from tactical units to perform security and housekeeping functions that were the special responsibility of post commanders.[57]

A few of the divisions had their administrative burdens multiplied during the early AGF period by attachment of nondivisional "spare parts" for supervision. In April 1942, Lt. Col. H. M. Monroe of the Army Ground Forces listed the following units as being attached to the 6th Division at Fort Leonard Wood:

72d Field Artillery Brigade
2 Tank Destroyer Battalions
Hq & Hq Detachment, 56th QM Regiment
3d Battalion, 56th QM Regiment
Hq & Hq Detachment, 87th QM Battalion
3 Companies of 87th QM Battalion
49th QM Regiment
2 Engineer Battalions
1 Engineer Company
1 Evacuation Hospital
1 Medical Sanitary Company
Hq & Hq Detachment, 42d Ordnance Battalion
3 Ordnance Companies
162d Signal Photo Company Detachment

"These attached units throw a heavy burden of paper work and inspection on the G-3 Section of the 6th Division," said Lt. Col. Monroe. "Army reviews all training memoranda and then calls on 6th Division for correction. 6th Division has to inspect all cadres from these units in minute detail. Consequently, G-3, who has no additional help to take care of these units, is tied to his desk constantly."[58]

The provision by the Army Ground Forces of Headquarters and Headquarters Detachments, Special Troops, in May 1942 relieved divisions of "spare parts" responsibilities,[59] but excessive paper work bedevilled most of them throughout 1942. This difficulty was in part of their own making. The 6th Division, for instance, issued 27 numbered and 22 unnumbered training memoranda in the first six weeks of 1942.[60] Additional paper was issued by higher headquarters. The mass of material was passed on down to regimental and other commanders - already overburdened with a plethora of responsibilities - to be digested and applied. In the early part of 1942 the 6th Division artillery was operating under an accumulation of 77 training directives or memoranda.[61] There was a tendency for paper to beget paper; many of the directives issuing from higher headquarters called for the preparation of tests and the making of reports.

A considerable amount of the instructional material showered upon divisions and their components was necessary or helpful. Likewise were many of the tests and reports. But there was too much overlapping and duplication by the various headquarters in the chain of command. Some of the excess was due to an effort of staff officers to substitute the mimeograph for personal visitation; and some, in the words of General McNair, was attributable to the fact "that some individual feels that he can write a better manual than the War Department publication."[62]

Early in 1942 a battalion commander wrote:

> We are actually swamped with typed and mimeographed literature. More than 90% of it is utterly useless. Trite exhortations and repetition of much of the information found in field and technical manuals. Each general and special staff officer, all the way down the line, tries to amplify and expand his own department. It would take me 6 to 8 hours a day to read and digest all the stuff that reaches this battalion. The --Army and the --Army Corps are shoving it out by the ream, and this division shoves it on down ... We have training programs, master schedules, weekly schedules, progress charts, and so on ad infinitum. I have had 6 clerks busy day and night since we received our typewriters. The field manuals and the unit training program put out by GHQ are all we need to turn out a good battalion. But we don't have time to read the former, and the latter is so bastardized when the staffs get through changing that it is useless.[63]

The paper menace eventually reached such dire proportions that General McNair personally prepared a stinging letter on the subject: staff officers who presumed to improve upon War Department manuals were sharply rebuked; army and corps were enjoined from sending their training literature to units lower than divisions; and division commanders were reminded of the fact that they and their staffs were within daily reach of their unit commanders and that personal instruction was preferable to written communication. General McNair directed further that "periodic, written, training-progress reports will not be required of units lower than the division." He also ordered a restriction of the number and elaborateness of tests.[64] Results of the General's philippic were immediate.[65]

Difficulties of less frequent occurrence, applicable mainly to the first groups of new divisions, included inadequacy of post facilities, particularly of housing, and inclusion of undesirables in cadres. GHQ and its successor the Army Ground Forces spared no effort to assure selection of the highest type personnel as nuclei

for the new divisions. But the temptation to use cadres as dumping grounds for substandards and misfits sometimes proved irresistible. The designation of some unsatisfactory officers, especially battery and company commanders, for the March divisions, was the subject of a pungent letter from General Marshall to General Lear in which The Chief of Staff said: "I have directed GHQ to make arbitrary selections of officers on duty with units of your army in the event that there is a recurrence of the apparently perfunctory attention to this matter in the future."[66]

Difficulties in the spring of 1942 might have been lessened had the Army Ground Forces been able to exercise a close supervision over the affairs of its components. But the disorganization and the accumulation of activities which naturally came in the wake of the transition from GHQ to the Army Ground Forces made intensive checking an impossibility for a time. In May, General Lear asked that AGF staff members send him informal reports of their visits to Second Army units, remarking that he had not received any comment for some time. When this request was passed on to Col. L. W. Rocks, (later Maj. Gen.), Chief of the AGF Training Division, he observed: "General Lear has heard little from this headquarters of late ... for the reason that few visits of inspection have been made ... The press of business here in the office has been such that I have been loath to recommend any extensive activity along that line. However, just as for any other commander, I believe our job is only half done with the issuance of orders. We must get out and see that they are faithfully executed."[67]

At the time of Colonel Rooks' comment a check list was in process of preparation by the AGF G-4, from data submitted by the various general staff sections. The result was a standard form, carried by AGF officers on their field trips, which covered information on points of prime interest to headquarters as a whole as well as to the section making the inspection.[68] In the summer and fall, AGF officers, with General McNair often in the vanguard, appeared with increasing frequency at the stations which dotted the far-flung training domain to observe tests, maneuvers, and routine activities, along with equipment and camp facilities. Reports improved in both form and content.[69]

Despite the shortage of equipment, the fluctuations and depletion of enlisted personnel, the inexperience, incompetency, and scarcity of officers, the overburden of paper work, the drag of "spare parts," abuses in cadre selection, and initial deficiencies in AGF supervision, the divisions as a whole made discernible progress during the period of "growing pains." Old divisions gave a good account of themselves in the 1942 maneuvers.[70] Of the new March divisions, General McNair said in November: "The President, the Secretary of War, and the Chief of Staff of the Army have all pronounced you good, at least so far as you have gone. After over seven months of training you are well on your way toward fitness for battle."[71] Many deficiencies remained, which General McNair did not fail to specify, but shortcomings that persisted appeared less formidable than those that had been overcome.

Reorganization and Adjustment, October 1942 - July 1943

The closing months of 1942 produced changes that suggested the anticipation of stability in the activation and training of divisions. The AGF training directive put into effect on 1 November was in the words of Colonel John B. Sherman a "directive to end all training directives."[72] Previously the practice had been followed of issuing directives periodically, for stipulated intervals or phases. The new directive had no terminal limits, but was designed to guide all existing and future units through the complete cycle of preparation for combat. The training period for divisions was reduced from 44 to 35 weeks with allotments for the various phases as follows: basic, 13 weeks; unit, 11 weeks; and combined, 11 weeks.[73] Reduction of the basic phase from 17 to 13 weeks seemed feasible in view of the belief that accelerated draft inductions would make possible the filling of divisions and the beginning of training immediately after

activation. Shortening of the training cycle as a whole was deemed necessary because of the likelihood of heavy requirements in 1943 for overseas operations. General McNair thought it better to hurry divisions through an abbreviated cycle than to take a chance of having them snatched away before completing one of greater duration; if more time should be available, it might be devoted to review of weak points.[74]

A significant provision of the new training directive was the extension of the testing program. A physical training test was added to unit training and an infantry battalion combat firing test to combined training. Both of these tests were prepared by the Army Ground Forces. The complete schedule of division tests was then as follows:

1. First Period:
   a. Individual (MTP) Test, by corps or army commander.

2. Second Period:
   a. Physical Training Test, by corps or army commander.
   b. Infantry (and Cavalry) Platoon Combat Firing Test, by division commander.
   c. Field Artillery Battery Test, by division artillery commander.
   d. Field Artillery Battalion Test, by corps or army commander.

3. Third Period:
   a. Infantry Battalion (Horse Squadron) Field Exercise Tests, by corps or army commander.
   b. Infantry Battalion (Horse Squadron) Combat Firing Tests, by corps or army commander.[75]

In 1943 this list was extended by the addition of (1) Combat Intelligence tests, (2) Air-Ground tests, and for divisions that had completed maneuvers, (3) Squad test, (4) Platoon Leadership Test and (5) Division Test.[76]

Another significant change made in the fall of 1942 which had the earmarks of anticipated stability was the provision that divisions be given an overstrength of 15 percent, to offset cadre and attrition losses, at the time they received their enlisted filler.[77] Army Ground Forces had been aware of the desirability of this arrangement for some time,[78] and General Lear of Second Army had recommended it,[79] but limitations of available manpower and the difficulty of revising activation schedules, had hitherto prevented its adoption. Under the old procedure, it had been necessary for divisions to receive a cadre increment of some 1,200 men about three months after activation and to fit the newcomers into the training program.[80] The new plan proposed to make it possible for a division to run the gamut of training without this interruption and to arrive at the staging area with a full strength of personnel habitated by long association to work together as a team.

The impression that the building of divisions was approaching a routine basis caused consideration in late 1942 and early 1943 of the possibility of abolishing the New Divisions Division and delegating activation matters to army and corps. When the Third Army was approached in December as to its ability to furnish general staff officers for its proposed allotments of 1943 divisions the response was pessimistic.[81] Investigation in January and February of other phases of the question indicated that loss of the coordination and guidance customarily provided by the New Divisions Division would produce confusion and inefficiency.[82] One phase of the decentralization scheme - the proposal that army commanders designate chiefs of special staff sections and other officers previously chosen on recommendation of heads of the various services - elicited frowns from those whose appointive prerogatives were threatened.[83] These and other considerations caused the idea of decentralizing activations to be dropped.[84]

A significant change in divisional organization was made in late 1942 as a result of the transfer of automotive maintenance from quartermaster to ordnance jurisdiction. A light ordnance maintenance company was added to the divisional T/O, and the quartermaster battalion was replaced by a company. About the same time the procedure was adopted of activating ordnance and quartermaster companies separately, and requiring them to report to divisional camps four weeks before activation day.[85] The division commander, the assistant division commander, the artillery commander, and the G-4 - plus the chief of staff who was added to the group in November - henceforth went to the Ordnance Automotive School at Holabird (taken over from the quartermaster) for eight days' instruction and then to the Ordnance School at Aberdeen for a three-day course in half-track vehicles and small arms before proceeding to their respective courses at Ft. Leavenworth, Ft. Benning, and Ft. Sill.[86] The concept was growing stronger that motor maintenance, which had been a sore spot in both the 1941 and the 1942 maneuvers, was primarily a responsibility of command.[87] It was hoped that increased instruction in vehicular maintenance would make the division commander and his principal assistants more motor-minded than they had been in the past.[88]

The spring and summer of 1943 brought changes in the organization and composition of divisions almost as significant as those effected by triangularization. The impulse for the metamorphosis came from the desire to reduce overhead, to conserve transportation, and to streamline the division into a leaner, harder-hitting force. There had been a tendency in 1942 toward fatter tables of organization and more lavish equipment, particularly trucks. Limited shipping facilities and the necessity of economizing manpower made retrenchment imperative.[89] General McNair summed up the situation aptly in his address to Armored Command Officer Candidate School graduates, 21 November 1942. "All in all the grim fact stands out," he said, "that we must economize in both personnel and materiel. We must weigh carefully what will be included in cargoes going overseas, and what will be omitted. Military luxuries must go by the board. All must be eliminated that does not pay its way in fighting power."[90]

A Reduction Board was created at the Army Ground Forces in November 1942 to pare down the size and equipage of divisions and other units.[91] Instructions forbade reductions in weapons intended primarily for offensive combat, but directed elimination of surplusages.[92] In the weeks following, the Reduction Board, in consultation with the various staff sections, subjected the infantry division to a severe whittling. General McNair followed the proceedings closely, quick to prune away any sergeant or "jeep" that bore the slightest tinge of superfluity.[93]

The organization which first emerged from the AGF operating room was indeed a "reduced division." Aggregate strength (officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men) provided by T/O 7, (a mimeographed summary of tables published 1 March 1943), stood at 13,412 as compared with 15,514 of the T/O rescinded.[94] Cannon platoons, placed in the regimental headquarters company, were substituted for the old independent cannon companies of the infantry regiments. Transportation was made lighter and sparser, the most important change being the replacement of 2½-ton trucks by 1½-ton models.[95]

When the new T/O & E's were announced, a vigorous protest arose from the field. General Eisenhower was apprehensive that the revision would have a deleterious effect on operations and he urged that it be suspended.[96] General McNair, in a memorandum for The Chief of Staff, dated 3 June 1943, took sharp issue with General Eisenhower's position. "Our theaters now are developed sufficiently," he said, "to make it quite apparent that there is gross extravagance in both human and material resources everywhere ... It is to be emphasized that the proposed organization in this and other similar cases does not weaken the fighting power of the unit ... The issue ... is whether we are to base our military organization on comfort and convenience or on offensive fighting power."[97]

The result of the conflict of opinion between headquarters and field was a compromise. The T/O & E's published on 1 March were not put into effect.[98] Revised tables published on 15 July provided less drastic reductions. Aggregate strength was fixed at 14,253, a reduction of 8 percent from the old T/O as compared to that of 13 percent prescribed by the 1 March edition. Transportation was also increased from the 1 March allotment, though it was still considerably below that prescribed by the old tables. Two and one-half ton trucks regained preference over 1½-ton types. Independent cannon companies were also restored.[99]

The 15 July T/O & E's made other important changes in divisional equipment and organization. The 37 mm antitank gun, which had come into disfavor as a result of theater experience, was replaced by the 57 mm. The 75 mm howitzer was dropped. The towed version of the 105 mm howitzer was substituted for the self-propelled type. The latter had proved too heavy for ordinary bridges and it was deemed undesirable to have engineers rushing ahead to prepare the way for them. Moreover, the Germans had proved the effectiveness of towing. The M-1 (Garand) was specified the principal rifle weapon, and the Rocket Launcher AT 2.36 inch (Bazooka) was introduced to the number of 557 for use against tanks. "Jeeps" and 1/4-ton trailers were prescribed in increased quantities as a substitute for heavier types of transportation.[100]

The most significant organizational innovation was the creation within the division of a Headquarters, Special Troops, consisting of a lieutenant colonel, a captain, and seven enlisted men. The function of this group was to coordinate and supervise the activities of the division headquarters company, military police platoon, ordnance light maintenance company, quartermaster company and signal company.[101] At least two division commanders had recommended provision of a special troops headquarters in the spring and summer of 1943, but the Army Ground Forces had turned them down on the ground that such a step was unnecessary and in opposition to current policies of reducing overhead.[102] But the War Department evidently was of the opinion that AGF objections in this instance should yield to other considerations.[103]

Efforts to achieve a more compact and economical organization during the early months of 1943 were matched by steps further to improve the selection and training of officer cadres with a view to raising the quality of leadership. In January seven Field Artillery liaison officers were added to the cadre and sent to Ft. Benning for four weeks of schooling in infantry tactics and techniques.[104] The following month saw initiation of the policy requiring that all General Staff appointees be graduates of the regular Command and General Staff School course; in choosing special staff heads and assistant G's, preference was to be given to Command and General Staff School graduates.[105] In March completion of the regular course at Leavenworth was made a requirement for assistant G's. At the same time four field artillery battalion assistant S-2's, graduates of the field artillery survey course at Ft. Sill, were added to the cadre.[106]

AGF headquarters continued to check closely the selection of enlisted cadres, and with good results.[107] But occasionally there was complaint of reprehensible practice. A regimental commander of the 97th Division wrote a friend at AGF headquarters in the spring: "My cadre officers were about fifty percent castoffs as were my cadre NCO's ... Lots of men (were) pulled out of (the) guard house and sent to us ... one corporal ... sixty one years old ... Another corporal above 50 ... In other words, we got the undesirables of many posts, camps, and stations. We are even having to teach master and tech sergeants how to do right and left face, proper military courtesy, how to roll a pack, etc."[108]

The requirement that commanding officers select cadremen from among their best men put them to a severe test. The feeling of most of them must have approximated closely that expressed by a regimental commander to a close friend in March 1943: "I

will have to furnish a cadre and I want that to be a good one," he wrote, "but I do not intend to send to it my best officers or noncommissioned officers if I can avoid it."[109] When this attitude - an entirely human one - is taken into consideration, it appears remarkable that the Army Ground Forces was able to obtain the selection of a very high percentage of superior personnel as nuclei for the new divisions.

Efforts of the Army Ground Forces to provide competent command for divisions received a considerable boost from two steps initiated in the spring and summer of 1943 by the War Department. First was the practice of choosing division commanders, assistant commanders, and artillery commanders from officers who had successfully filled command positions in a theater of operations. Between 1 June and 22 October 1943 six AGF divisions received commanders from overseas as follows:[110]

Division	Commander (Major General)
10 (Light)	Jones
71	Spragins
87	Landrum
91	Livesay
104	Allen

During the same period the following divisions received overseas brigadiers as assistant or artillery commanders:

Division	Brigadier
10 (Light)	Culin
35	Sebree
69	Marsist
77	Randle
79	Greer
89	Monnen
93	Boyd

Second was the requirement that the division commander and his two principal assistants serve an apprenticeship of two or three months in the respective grades of brigadier general and colonel before becoming eligible for promotion to the rank authorized by tables of organization.[111] In July 1944, because of the poor showing made by some division commanders in their baptism of fire in Normandy, the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, directed that in the case of brigadiers commanding divisions in training, promotions be withheld until they had proved their competency in combat.[112]

Changes in activation procedure were modified only slightly in 1943. The ultimate refinement attained in the procedure was exemplified in the 65th Infantry Division, last of the divisions created in World War II, activated at Camp Shelby on 16 August 1943. The plan followed in the building of this division is set forth in Chart II.

Persistent Training Difficulties, October 1942 - July 1943

Despite the general improvement of conditions affecting the activation and training of divisions in the latter part of 1942 and the early months of 1943, several difficulties remained outstanding. One of these was a shortage of equipment, particularly of late model automatic rifles, ammunition, and other training equipment. Reports from division artillery officers protested against the meagerness of the ammunition allotment and the system by which it was meted out to them. A corps artillery commander called the plan of annual allowances an absurdity, and urged adoption of distribution by training periods, with reserve supplies available at all times at training camps. "It is discouraging," he said, "... to be forced to postpone certain types of training for a month or six weeks awaiting the shipment of ammunition."[113] The

artillery officer of the 90th Division said, in April, that existing allowances should be increased from three to six times. "I do not believe," he wrote, "... that anywhere near sufficient ammunition is provided for either the Infantry or the Artillery, or the others, to become really proficient with their weapons."[114] An AGF staff officer replied: "We are, of course, in entire agreement with you on ammunition. We keep after the War Department all we can, and will get every round they will let us have."[115]

In a retrospective summary, made in July 1944 on the eve of departure from the Army Ground Forces, of training problems encountered by the 94th Division, mainly in 1943, Maj. Gen. Harry J. Malony stated:[116]

* * *

b. Small Arms -- Our rifles and carbines (approximately 11367) were issued initially on a 25% and 20% basis. Of necessity they were rotated between and among units. The very important sense of individual responsibility was not established in the first instance and it became very difficult to establish later, in view of the fact that many men were fully aware that they were carrying arms not combat serviceable, and rejected by the 8th Division for that reason, which would be replaced before they went into combat.

c. Mortars -- The mortars are worthy of special mention, since the 45% initially received were in such bad shape as to be of very limited value. Mortar ammunition and rocket launcher ammunition were late and scarce.

* * *

e. Deficiencies.

(1) We never had enough practice mines. As a result, again we had to keep shuttling the material in inadequate amounts between units.

(2) We lacked enough explosive to carry out all the jobs for which it was required. The allowances in AR 775-10 are too small.

(3) By reason of never having received the equipment, our Artillery had no practical training in Net Sets, Camouflage No. 2. Our Engineers had some experience with Shop, Motorized, General Purpose, but when it went out of the T/O, we turned it in and when it was restored to the T/O we could not get it back. It was never again supplied. We never received our Engineer Diesel engined tractors nor the Semi-trailers, 20-ton.

f. Radio -- We were able to train with the radios and radio substitutes but when during maneuvers we were confronted by divisions completely equipped with better radio equipment, we were badly handicapped in communications.

g. Flame Throwers -- We should have had more flame throwers available.

Following inspection of an armored division in February 1943, an AGF representative observed: "The general shortage of equipment is a serious handicap to training ... Groups working on single weapons were so large that individuals were receiving scant instruction."[117] Two weeks later another staff member reported observing a lieutenant of an infantry division conducting a bayonet exercise in which "sticks were used in the absence of rifles."[118] Such conditions were exceptional, but as late as 26 July 1943 training equipment was still not available in the quantity needed.[119]

Tragic consequences of persistent shortages in training materiel were soon manifested on the field of combat. Elements of the 45th Division, which left the United States in May 1943, met with disaster in an engagement near Persano, Italy, 13 September 1943. In commenting on this action to AGF observers in November, the commanding

ACTIVA



NEW DIVISIONS DIV.
G-1 SECTION, AGF

ACTIVATION OF 65 TH INFANTR

CAMP SHELBY, MISSISSIPPI

CADRE



IONS DIV.
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

REMAINDER OF COMPLEMENT

INFANTRY

Arlcoo (4); Liaison O's (2); Div Hq Co O's (3); Regtl Hq Co O's (21); Cannon Plat O's (8); Regtl Ser Co O's (21); Regtl AT Co O's (16); Bn Hq & Hq Co O's (34); Rifle Co O's (135); Heavy Weapons Co O's (36).

FIELD ARTILLERY

Arlcoo (3); Hq Btry Div Arty Asst Con O; FA Liaison Pilot-observers (2); Hq & Hq & Ser Btry FA Bn (3) O's (2); Firing Btry FA Bn (3) O's (27); Hq & Hq Ser Btry FA Bn (3) O's (3), Firing Btry FA Bn (3) O's (8).

SPECIAL SERVICE

Div Hq Ser O; Regtl Hq Ser O's (3).

VETERINARY

Div Hq Med Sect O's (1); Med Bn O's (2); Attchd Med O's (29).

DENTAL

Dental Surgn for Inf Regts (3).

MILITARY POLICE

MP Platoon O's (2)

ENGINEERS

Engineer Bn O's (10).

CHEMICAL

Chemical Officer

ASSISTANT GENERAL

AG Section O's (2).

INSPECTOR GENERAL

Inspector General Officer

QUARTERMASTER

Quartmaster O's (2).

FIELD ARTILLERY

FA Section O's (1).

3

It was at the field grade level that divisions could least afford to lose officers. The commanding general of the 84th Division wrote to General McNair in March 1943:

> We have the best company officers we have ever had in time of war, but they have their shortcomings. They are splendid technicians. They really know their technique. They are less well-qualified in minor tactics, but they are passable in that department. However, as to handling men in the mass - in leadership, their ignorance is abysmal.
>
> The majors and lieutenant colonels (the battalion echelon) comprise the weakest strata in an army today. Their development into satisfactory commanders is the division commander's biggest problem. He can expect, and will get, very little help from them in improving the quality of his company officer group. This is particularly true in the field of leadership.[128]

The unsatisfactoriness as manifested in training was reflected shortly in theater of operations. In December 1943, the commanding general of the 45th Division stated:

> The battalion commander problem is serious. It is our weakest link. The replacements for them are nil. The only way a senior captain can get training as a battalion commander is by being put in as a battalion executive, and that job is usually held by some deadhead, some major who has been promoted because he is good company or something like that. My battalion executives are no good.[129]

Despite repeated efforts of the Army Ground Forces to keep officers with their units, there were occasional complaints in 1943 of heavy inroads on commissioned personnel for nontraining functions. A Third Army testing team in reporting an inspection of the 84th Division in July observed:

> Some platoons were found to have poor discipline ... An incomplete investigation revealed that the greater portion of these platoons were without a commissioned leader most of the time ... Most companies have the proper number of officers assigned but so many of them are detailed on special duty by higher headquarters and away to schools that normally there is not more than two or three for duty with the company. In some instances companies had to borrow officers to witness the pay.[130]

Both new and old divisions were adversely affected by the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP).[131] Trainees selected for this program were the choicest of the enlisted group and the loss of scores of intelligent men from personnel already picked over by the Air Corps and depleted by cadre and officer candidate school drafts reduced noncommissioned officer sources to disastrously low levels - not to mention the disruption produced by replacing these men in the midst of the training program. An assistant G-3 at the AGF headquarters estimated that Army Specialized Training Program losses suffered by the 75th Division just after completion of the MTP Test had set back training from four to six months.[132] The 104th Division faced the prospect of losing 767 men to ASTP in June 1943; over 300 of them had been trained as cadre.[133]

The loss of men to the ASTP was felt the more keenly in view of the fact that many of them had been trained as specialists. The 44th Division Surgeon reported in August 1943 that technical training had been set back seriously "when practically all the trained medical, surgical and dental technicians were lost to A.S.T.P.[134] The commanding general of the 94th Division stated about the same time that because of withdrawals for ASTP of trained artillery specialists, "survey teams and fire direction centers have had to be reorganized as many as 5 times."[135]

general of the Division, said:

> During out training period ... there was a definite lack of training ammunition for the antitank rifle grenade and bazooka. The men did not have the ammunition or proper targets, such as old German tanks, at which at fire in order to give them the necessary confidence that is vital in repelling a tank attack. I believe that the lack of this confidence in the antitank rifle grenade and the bazooka was a determining factor in the fight near Persano.[120]

There was considerable improvement in the ammunition situation after the spring of 1943. On 30 July the War Department published a revision of AR 775-10, increasing allowances for training purposes and providing for allocation on a monthly basis.[121] But at the same time OPD rejected General McNair's renewed plea that the equipment allotment of divisions be raised from 50 to 100 percent at the end of the sixth month of training on the ground of the greater urgency of building up stock piles in Great Britain.[122]

Personnel problems, which seemed to be nearing solution in the latter part of 1942, continued to hamper training. In the early part of 1943 some of the recently activated divisions complained of receiving their fillers in driblets, thus necessitating conduct of training on several levels at the same time. An AGF G-3 officer wrote sympathetically on 22 February 1943 to a division artillery officer who was struggling with four echelons of training. "The delay in filling our draft requirements played hell with the training program. We understand your predicament. It is tough having to contend with men in several stages of training and still meet the program."[123] The filler situation grew worse in the summer and fall. The 63d Division, activated 15 June, had received only about half of its T/O strength in mid-September; and the 65th Division, activated 15 August, was short ten thousand men on 30 November.[124]

Officer candidate schools were turning out an adequate number of junior officers by the spring of 1943, and after a period of seasoning the great majority of them were making excellent platoon leaders. But there was a persistent shortage of competent officers of field grade. Demands for cadre and for overseas loss replacements produced a rate of turnover in some units that was distressing and disruptive. An AGF staff member reported on 25 May 1943, after an inspection trip to Ft. Jackson and Camp Forrest: "In both the 80th and the 100th Divisions the turn over of personnel has been one of the chief obstacles to training. In the 80th Division the officer losses have amounted to 450 in six months. Although many field officers have been taken, the replacements have been second lieutenants ... Over a period of 10 months, each of two of the infantry regiments had had three regimental commanders and the third one had four. Changes in battalion commanders have been even more frequent."[125]

Part of the turnover was due to the apparently common practice of "stealing" officers who attended Command and General Staff School. Several division commanders complained to an AGF inspector in the spring of 1943 that "there is no use trying to educate and train a young staff officer by sending him to Leavenworth for that is the surest means of losing him."[126]

Some commanders were reluctant to requisition replacements in field grades from other units for fear of having undesirables dumped on them. The commanding general of the 44th Division wrote to General McNair 27 February 1943: "My commissioned personnel problem is quite difficult of solution. I have the vacancies. In fact, if I promote to fill all vacancies of Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels ... I would need fifteen infantry Majors ... I can now get officers from divisions nearby, but such a selection would be officers that the current division commanders are willing to lose. I will do better struggling along with what I have, rather than import men 'selected out' of other combat units."[127]

Air Forces recruiting officers took away other choice personnel. The commanding general of the 75th Division complained in July 1943 that "there are two officers of the Air Corps stationed at Camp Leonard Wood, whose duty is to proselyte and procure Air Corps Cadets."[136] After a visit to the 104 Division in August 1943, G-1 of the Army Ground Forces stated: "It was reported that the Air Forces attempt to recruit enlisted personnel assigned this division when men go on pass to Portland, Oregon. I directed the division to disregard requests from Air Forces to have men report for physical examinations unless the individual concerned made application for air crew training."[137]

The transfer to reduced T/O's after 15 July 1943 improved the divisional manpower picture for a time. But the growing need for trained men to replace overseas losses caused heavy drafts on the older organizations.[138] By late fall many divisions in advanced stages of training had fallen considerably below authorized strength.[139]

Progress of Training in 1943

But in 1943, as in 1942, training steadily improved in spite of accumulated difficulties, and the divisions which reached the end of the AGF production line in the latter part of the year seemed better prepared for battle than were their predecessors. Early in December 1943, G-3 of the Army Ground Forces in a personal letter to General Marcus Bell of the 81st Division, stated:

> "While we have many weak spots, and a hell of a lot remains to be done, yet in general, I am convinced that we have been turning out soundly trained and well trained divisions. Some of them, I believe sincerely, equal anything the Germans ever turned out, at least so far as training is concerned. Lacking the necessity for defending our homes and a certain national softness that does not develop a keen desire to fight, our individual fighting spirit may not be too hot, but I still think the training is there."[140]

Several factors contributed to the improvement of divisional training in 1943, but three were outstanding.

First was the inclusion in the training program of lessons learned from American experience in combat theaters. AGF headquarters kept close tab on the battle performance of ground units, first through observer teams - made up in part of personnel of subordinate headquarters - and later through observer boards. Moreover, participants returning from theaters were sometimes brought to the War College for personal interview. Important lessons from these reports and conferences were disseminated to subordinate commanders through the medium of letters and conferences. On 1 June 1943 a training letter, supplementing the directive effective 1 November 1942, was issued for the guidance of AGF components approaching combat readiness. This directive was based almost exclusively on lessons learned in battle. It provided for approximately two months training after maneuvers in mine removal, scouting, patrolling, night fighting, infiltration, physical hardening, small unit leadership, and progressive field exercises from the squad to the division. This program was interspersed with frequent tests.[141]

Further utilization of battle experience was secured by employment of overseas personnel as officers and cadremen in training units.[142]

The second important factor conducing to better prepared divisions in 1943 was the infusion of a greater degree of realism into the training program. The directive which became effective 1 November 1942 laid the basis for this improvement by suggesting that obstacle courses be made to "resemble the battlefield, rather than the gymnasium," and providing for attack of fortified areas, combat in cities, and

infiltration exercises.[143] These general requirements were effectuated in 1943 by specific directives covering each of the prescribed activities. On 5 January 1943 a letter was issued outlining a schedule of divisional exercises which had as their objective "the production of trained infantry-artillery-engineer teams capable of operating effectively with other arms as a task force in the attack of fortified localities." The training was to include attack by combat teams composed of divisional units, supported where practicable by tank, tank destroyer, antiaircraft, and chemical battalions, upon defensive installations featuring replicas and mock-ups of pill boxes. At least one battalion of each infantry regiment participating in the assault was to use live ammunition in all its weapons. To assure sufficient time for these exercises the combined training period was extended from eleven to twelve weeks.[144]

On 4 February 1943, the Army Ground Forces issued a lengthy letter laying down requirements for exercises in infiltration, close combat firing, and combat in cities. The objective of these exercises was to subject the trainee "to every sight, sound, and sensation of battle," and to train him "to act calmly with sound judgment regardless of noise, confusion, and surprise." The infiltration exercise required that troops crawl about 100 yards over ground traversed by wire entanglements and dotted by bomb craters and slit-trenches, and with machine gun bullets whistling closely overhead, and explosive charges throwing up dirt about them. The close combat firing course, designed "to teach men to fire small arms with speed and accuracy at surprise targets and while negotiating broken terrain," provided for the advance of troops over a considerable expanse of rough, wire-traversed terrain, with explosives going off about them, and with targets, controlled by pulleys, bobbing up unexpectedly at ranges varying from five to fifty yards. The combat-in-cities exercise consisted of small units moving through mock villages and clearing streets and houses of hostile forces simulated by pulley-controlled dummies, some of which were made to appear suddenly on stairways or to jump from closets. Sketches of the various type courses, based mainly on installations already in use by some training units, were attached to the letter prescribing battle course training. The unit training period was extended from eleven to twelve weeks to accommodate the scheduled activities.[145]

The letter outlining these special battle courses also directed coordination of other phases of training so that artillery practice might be utilized for accustoming infantrymen to overhead shell fire. Another activity prescribed was the overrunning of infantrymen in slit trenches by tanks.[146] In April 1943, four light tanks were issued to each division to facilitate this training.[147]

Experience revealed that the gap between firing under ordinary conditions and shooting amidst the hurly-burly of simulated combat was too formidable for soldiers to take in one leap. Men who performed creditably in qualification and familiarization firing were prone, when they came to combat courses, to flagrant failures in assuming position, adjusting sights and taking aim. The result was a low percentage of hits and a waste of ammunition. To remedy this situation, the Army Ground Forces on 28 April 1943 issued a directive requiring all troops to complete a course in transition firing as outlined by the War Department before attempting combat exercises. The transition course involved adjusting sights and firing at silhouettes that were made to appear in quick succession at varying distances. A fourteenth week was added to the individual training period to afford ample time for the transition program.[148]

Realism in divisional training received further accentuation from conversion of the California-Arizona Maneuver Area (C-AMA) to a model theater of operations. For this arrangement permitted divisions, after they completed regularly scheduled maneuvers, to devote thirteen weeks to "post-graduate" training under a play of influences bearing the closest possible resemblance to combat conditions.[149]

The third salient factor in the production of better trained divisions in 1943 was the continuing improvement of AGF supervision. Inspections became more thorough if not more frequent. Preparation of new tests and revision of old ones afforded a more satisfactory check on the quality and progress of training. Furthermore, there was evidently a tendency, as the headquarters command and staff obtained more experience in their duties, for the Army Ground Forces to become more positive and exacting in its relations with its major components. Certainly this seems to be the implication of such forceful correctives as the "Conduct of Training" letter of 1 January 1943 and a letter to the commanding general of the Second Army, dated 1 April 1943, condemning severely the way in which III Corps tested 80th Division units in battalion combat firing.[150]

Continuing Effort to Improve Divisional Training in 1944

Near the end of 1943, G-3 of the Army Ground Forces wrote to an assistant division commander:

> (Combat firing) is our major weakness. It is the one phase about which I am discouraged ... Officers with years of background and peacetime safety concern simply will not cut loose with realistic combat firing as a general thing. There are so damn many flags and umpires and control they no more resemble a battlefield than a kindergarten.[151]

Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, concentrated attention on the problem. In February 1944 it directed commanders "at every opportunity" to conduct combat firing exercises for squads, platoons, companies, battalions and regimental combat teams. The directive sought to loosen the control to which firing exercises had been subjected. Umpires and safety officers were ordered to permit units to advance in uneven lines as on the battlefield, to restrict the use of flags, and, in advanced training, to eliminate them altogether. Artillery and mortars were not to be restricted to the delivery of prepared fires, but were to engage unforeseen targets on call of supported units and forward observers. Ammunition in unprecedentedly generous quantities was made available to effectuate the new program.[152]

The Army Ground Forces also revised the Infantry Battalion Combat Firing Tests. The new tests required a battalion to attack a defensive position prepared by another battalion rather than by its own troops, and in general was far more realistic than the old problem.[153]

Recurrently in 1944 the Army Ground Forces issued directives providing for participation of artillery, tanks, and tank destroyers with infantry in combat firing.[154] Commanders were urged to bring into play every weapon at their disposal and to use an abundance of live ammunition in both organic and supporting elements.[155]

In the fall of 1944 the close combat course which had been used since February 1943 was replaced by a more realistic exercise which featured the "buddy system." The new set-up provided for running of the course by teams of three or four men, each of whom filled alternately the roles of the soldier moving forward and the soldier providing cover.[156]

As General Lentz had foreseen in December 1943, many unit commanders were reluctant to "let go" in combat firing to the extent desired. Inspecting officers noted squeamishness in the use of live ammunition, particularly by supporting tanks, and failure to bring all weapons into play: and they found control officers still hovering too closely over men running close combat courses.[157] At a conference following inspection of the 86th Division in October 1944, General Ben Lear, Commanding General of the Army

Ground Forces, said:

> Yesterday I saw a close combat course. It started out by having a 2d Lieutenant in charge, cautioning four men. A little later on I found a captain attempting to caution them. A second or two later a couple of sergeants were trying to influence the team and when they got about two-thirds of the way through, there was a field officer up on the hill controlling it.[158]

On another occasion General Lear observed control personnel in a Close Combat exercise walking with their hands on the backs of the men running the course.[159]

Instances of over-control became less frequent as time went by. On the whole combat firing in divisions was much more realistic in the latter part of 1944.[160]

The intensification of AGF supervision improved divisional training in 1944. The stepping up of overseas movement (see accompanying Table III) reduced the number of divisions in training,. and made possible more frequent visits to those remaining under AGF control. Supervision was brought closer by changes in inspection procedure instituted by General Ben Lear after he assumed command of the Army Ground Forces. Beginning in September 1944, the size of the Commanding General's inspecting party was practically doubled by the addition of a second plane-load of officers to each trip. As a rule, occupants of the first plane, consisting of the Commanding General and higher ranking members of his staff, attended ceremonies and sought to get an over-all picture of the division's problems and activities - including discipline and housekeeping - while the other group of officers, some of whom laughingly dubbed themselves the "second team," made a more detailed inspection of personnel, equipment, and training. The second group consisted usually of representatives of the Infantry and Artillery Branches of G-3, Maintenance and Supply Divisions of G-4, and Engineer, Signal, Ordnance and Quartermaster Sections. This system made it possible for the AGF party to give a division a comprehensive going over in two or three days.[161]

Prior to the summer of 1944 AGF inspectors followed the practice of withholding their findings - other than minor deficiencies corrected on the spot - until their return to Washington, where comments were consolidated, edited and transmitted through channels in an official letter. In August 1944 General Lear instituted a new procedure. After each inspection he assembled the division commander, the principal officers of the division staff, and the regimental commanders, and gave them a full oral report of observations, both favorable and unfavorable. General Lear himself presided over the conference. After a very brief statement of the purpose of the meeting, he introduced in succession members of the AGF party, each of whom gave a succinct summary of his observations and made suggestions for the correction of deficiencies. General Lear concluded with a statement of his own impressions. Stenographers made a shorthand record of the conference, copies of which usually were mailed by the Army Ground Forces to army, corps, and division.[162]

The tenor of these oral comments differed little if any from that of the written communications which they superseded. But there can be little doubt that a prompt face-to-face presentation of the inspection report in a meeting presided over by the Commanding General of the Army Ground Forces made a greater impression on the division commander and his staff than the delivery of a written report through channels after a lapse of several days.[163]

Between 21 July 1944 (the date when the new plan was initiated) and 5 December 1944, General Lear and members of his staff applied the team-conference method of inspection to 19 infantry divisions, 5 armored divisions, and 1 airborne division. These inspections included all of the infantry divisions activated in 1943.[164]

TABLE III
SHIPMENT OF DIVISIONS BY MONTH
(Compiled from information in DCofS', AGF, "Division Book" and files in Reports Branch, Installations and Movements Division, G-3, AGF, Section)

DATE	INFANTRY	ARMORED	AIRBORNE	CAVALRY
1942				
Jan.	34th 43d			
Mar.	32d 41st			Total: 1942
April	27th			11 Infantry 2 Armored 13
May	37th	1st		
June	1st 5th			
Aug.	40th			
Sept.	9th 3rd 29th	2d		
1943				
April	36th		82d	
May	45th			1st
June	33d			
July	7th			
Aug.		3d		Total: 1943 12 Infantry 2 Armored 2 Airborne 1 Cavalry 17
Sept.	28th 6th		101st	
Oct.	2d			
Nov.	8th			
Dec.	38th 85th 88th	4th		
1944				
Jan.	4th	5th 6th		
Feb.	30th 31st 93d			2d

DATE	INFANTRY	ARMORED	AIRBORNE	CAVALRY
1944 (cont'd)				
April	79th	7th	11th	
	91st			
	98th			
May	35th			
June	80th			
	81st			
July	94th			
	95th			
	96th			
Aug.	26th	9th	17th	
	44th			
	104th			
Sept.	84th	10th		
	92d	11th		
	99th	12th		
	100th			
	102d			
	103d			
Oct.	78th	8th		
	87th	14th		
	106th			
Nov.	66th			
	69th			
	75th			
	76th			
Dec.	10th (Mtn)			
	42d			
	63d			
	70th			
1945				
Jan.	65th	13th	13th	
	71st	16th		
	89th	20th		
Feb.	86th			
	97th			

Total: 1944
36 Infantry
9 Armored
2 Airborne
1 Cavalry
48

Total: 1945
5 Infantry
3 Armored
1 Airborne
9

At some time during the inspection visit, General Lear assembled the junior officers and noncommissioned officers of the division and talked to them about their responsibilities as leaders. The purpose of the talks was to impress on small-unit leaders the importance of their work and to stimulate determination and aggressiveness.[165]

Disruption Pursuant to Unexpected Overseas Requirements

Benefits accruing from refinement of the training program, provision of more generous allotments of ammunition, and intensification of higher supervision were in large measure offset by the disruption resulting from unforeseen requirements of units and individuals for overseas theaters. In April 1944, mainly because heavy drafts for overseas operations left an insufficiency of service units for support of divisions in the field, the California-Arizona Maneuver Area was closed.[166] Discontinuance of this graduate school of combined training was a serious blow to the divisional program. Of the 64 infantry divisions trained in the United States, only 13 had training in C-AMA, and of the 26 activated after July 1942, only 1. Of the 87 divisions of all types trained in the United States, only 20 had tours in C-AMA.[167]

Urgent calls for units overseas necessitated discontinuance of maneuvers in Tennessee in March and Louisiana in April. Plans were made for resumption of Louisiana maneuvers in the summer, but advance of the readiness dates of the divisions scheduled for participation necessitated their abandonment.[168] A few divisions received, in lieu of the cancelled maneuvers, a month of exercises at or near their home stations, with each division less a combat team maneuvering against the detached team, but these exercises were a poor substitute for "big maneuvers."[169]

Of the 11 infantry divisions activated in 1943, only 4 participated in maneuvers against other divisions.[170] Four noninfantry divisions activated in 1943 and 2 divisions activated prior to that time also were denied participation in division versus division exercises. This meant that commanders of 13 of the 87 divisions of all types trained in the United States took their commands overseas without ever having had the opportunity of maneuvering them as a unit in the field.[171] The loss of training in staff [illegible]ioning, logistics, maintenance, supply, teamwork with supporting units, and [illegible] under higher command was incalculable.[172]

In the fall of 1944, as the struggle of the armies halted at the West Wall was intensified, it became necessary to alert seven divisions whose training had been planned on the assumption that they would not be moved from the United States until after June 1945.[173] Some of the youngest of these were not only denied experience in maneuvers but had other phases of their training curtailed as well. The 42d and the 65th Divisions activated respectively in July and August 1943 received no combined training of regiments with their supporting battalions of field artillery.[174]

The War Department not only had to take divisions from the strategic reserve in the United States but also had to meet overseas calls for individual replacements, particularly infantrymen, far in excess of the output of replacement training centers and officer candidate schools.[175] This necessity imposed the most serious difficulties experienced by divisions in 1943-44. To meet these calls lower priority divisions were stripped and replenished repeatedly, becoming in effect replacement training centers. The sad story of 1942 was enacted all over again.

Inroads on the immediately available supply of enlisted infantry personnel began in the fall of 1943.[176] Before the end of the year, 24,541 men were withdrawn from fourteen infantry divisions for transfer either to overseas replacement depots or to alerted units.[177] The effect of the withdrawals was to reduce each of the divisions

to a strength in infantry approximately 1,800 below that prescribed in tables of organization.[178] Details of the transfer are set forth below:

Division	Withdrawal for overseas replacements		Withdrawal for transfer to alerted divisions		Transfer to	Total Withdrawal
	No.	Mo.	No.	Mo.		
66th	3300	Sept.	191	Sept.	28th Div.	3491
75th	1870	Sept.	191	Sept.	28th Div.	2061
106th	1800	Sept.	956	Sept.	28th Div. 31st Div.	2756
97th	1234	Sept.	509	Sept.	8th Div.	1743
86th	750	Sept.	1700	Sept.	88th Div.	2450
87th	2583	Sept.	--	Sept.		2583
69th	3000	Oct.				3000
100th	500	Oct.				500
94th	1700	Oct.				1700
84th	300	Oct.	500	Oct.	85th Div.	800
99th			1180	Oct.	85th Div.	1180
103d			357	Oct.	88th Div.	357
83d			820	Oct	4th Div.	820
78th	1100	Dec.				1100
						24541

In 1944 low priority divisions were subjected to three major drafts for enlisted replacements. In February the 63d Division lost about 3,200 men and the 70th lost about 3,000; losses apparently were suffered at this time by seven other divisions.[179] In the late spring and early summer seventeen infantry divisions lost 66,411 men and a final draft in July-August took away 12,057 more.[180] (See accompanying Tables IV and V.) These losses represent only withdrawals directed by Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, for overseas loss replacements. Additional men were withdrawn to fill high priority units, to meet parachute and OCS requirements, and for sundry other purposes. As in 1942, withdrawals were often in driblets, thus accentuating the disruption to training. The following is a summary of withdrawals (for overseas replacements only) from the 106th Division.[181]

8 Sept. 1943	1800 Inf.
10 Mar. 1944	600 Inf.
6 Apr. 1944	101 Inf.
26 Apr. 1944	2125 Inf.
27 Apr. 1944	434 Inf.
28 Apr. 1944	240 Inf.
25 May 1944	45 Cav.
26 May 1944	35 Inf.
4 June 1944	780 F.A.
9 June 1944	52 Inf.
16 June 1944	25 Inf.
9 Aug. 1944	150 Inf.
15 Aug. 1944	64 Inf.
29 Aug. 1944	1150 Inf.
TOTAL	6,776 Inf.
	780 F.A.
	45 Cav.

TABLE IV
ENLISTED LOSSES FOR OVERSEAS REPLACEMENTS
15 April - 15 July 1944

DIVISION	INFANTRY	FIELD ARTILLERY	CAVALRY	TOTAL
100	2550			2550
103	2550			2550
86	2550	720	40	3310
87	2550	720	40	3310
97	3400	720	40	4160
78	3398	760	45	4223
106	2925	780	45	3750
75	2959	780	45	3784
76	4746	780	45	5571
66	3192	840	43	4075
69	4204	840	45	5089
70	2695	480	25	3200
63	3408	579	38	4025
42	3786	840	45	4671
89	2700	360		3060
65	5222	314	45	5581
71	3172	330		3502
TOTAL	55,007	9,863	541	66,411

TABLE V
ENLISTED LOSSES FOR OVERSEAS REPLACEMENTS
15 July - 31 August 1944

DIVISION	ENLISTED MEN WITHDRAWN
100	1000
103	0
86	1500
87	1300
97	1300
78	1300
106	1300
75	1500
76	1500
66	807
69	150
70	150
63	100
42	150
89	0
65	0
71	0
Total	12057

The aggregate of withdrawals for all purposes was tremendous. The 94th Division, from activation to departure for port of embarkation, lost 8,890 enlisted men; the 65th Division, 11,782; the 106th Division, 12,442; and the 100th Division, 14,787.[182] The 69th Division which apparently had the greatest turnover of personnel of any division activated during the AGF period except possibly those specifically designated as replacement divisions in 1942 (and for which complete figures on turnover are not available) lost 22,230 enlisted men;[183] to put it another way, the staff of the 69th Division (activated in May 1943) trained approximately three divisions -- that one went to port in late 1944 and the two that previously had gone out as replacements and transfers.

Officer losses were insignificant in the early months of 1944, but beginning in the late spring they became increasingly heavy. The turnover was greatest among infantry officers, particularly among leaders of companies and platoons. An experience typical of a number of regiments was that summarized by the commanding officer of the 260th Infantry, 65th Division, a few weeks before that unit moved to port. "The turnover of commissioned personnel in this regiment since the activation has been about 150 per cent," he said. "The turnover has been heaviest among junior officers," he added, "principally among the lieutenants. Some companies have had as many as seven commanders and some platoons have had sixteen leaders. Battalions have had as high as five commanders.[184] The regiment had had two commanding officers." In June 1944 Gen. Harry J. Malony, Commanding General of the 94th Division, reported that there was not a second lieutenant in his command who had been on duty with the division in maneuvers seven months before. The infantry officer of a low priority division who stayed with his unit longer than three months during the period April-September 1944, apparently was an exception.[185]

Losses of medical officers, engineers and chaplains also were unusually heavy - often more than 100 percent of the T/O allotment. The 94th Division during the entirety of its training period, but mainly in 1944, lost 54 medical officers (T/O 52), 32 engineers (T/O 27) and 16 chaplains (T/O 13).[186]

Officer losses in all categories aggregated 873 in the 94th Division, 1,088 in the 65th Division, 1,215 in the 106th Division, and 1,336 in the 69th Division. Distribution of officers transferred from the 65th Division by branch and rank is tabulated below. (See Table VI.)[187]

Officers and men going out from divisions were replaced by personnel from various sources and of diverse background. Sometimes the replacements came in large hunks, but more frequently they came in driblets.[188]

A substantial number of the enlisted replacements were from replacement training centers, with basic training completed in their arm. Others came from service installations, antiaircraft battalions, and tank destroyer organizations, with basic training completed, but not in the arm of the unit to which they were being assigned. Further diversity was offered by men from the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) some of whom had little military training, and men sent back from overseas garrisons whose training had become somewhat obsolete.[189]

Sundry means were adopted to bring this miscellany to something approaching a common denominator of training. In some divisions the newcomers were segregated, as in 1942, in several special training units, varying in stages of advancement, and given intensive instruction according to the committee plan used in replacement training centers, while the divisions' old-timers reviewed earlier training or proceeded at retarded tempo. In other instances the replacements were thrown into their companies immediately on reaching the division and the level of training adjusted to meet the needs of the majority.[190]

TABLE VI

TURNOVER OF OFFICERS IN 65TH DIVISION

(From activation until 31 Oct. 1944)

	General	Colonel	Lt Colonel	Major	Captain	1st Lt	2d Lt	Total
Inf	1	4	9	17	64	219	407	721
FA	1	1	3	6	20	43	70	144
QMC			1	1	3	4	7	16
CE			1		3	3	26	33
SC			1			6	14	21
GSC			1					1
MC				3	24	60		87
D				1		1	4	6
MAC					2	2	9	13
DC					2	8		10
Ch					12	7	1	20
IGD					2			2
Cav						3	6	9
Ord							3	3
CMP							2	2
Total:	2	5	16	28	132	356	549	1088

On 27 April 1944 the Army Ground Forces issued a special directive for the guidance of the 22 divisions (17 of which were infantry) designated to bear the principal burden of stripping and replenishment. This directive, based on a careful computation by General McNair of the maximum stripping which divisions could stand,[190a] provided for the adjustment of training on the basis of the division's readiness date and the sources of its filler replacements. The following "typical distribution of training time" was suggested:

(1) Six weeks of individual training time and tests for replacements received from other units or replacement training centers of an arm or service other than that to which assigned.

(2) Thirteen weeks of individual training and tests for replacements received from reception centers.

(3) Five weeks of unit training.

(4) Four weeks of combined training.

(5) Seven weeks of maneuvers.

(6) Six weeks of post maneuver training.

The directive also stated: "The periods indicated will be adapted to the time available so as best to meet training needs. Where total time availble is insufficient, maneuvers will be either curtailed or omitted; individual and small unit training must not be slighted."[191] Supplementary instructions provided that divisions were to initiate this "modified" or "retraining" program as soon as they had obtained 80 percent of their authorized enlisted strength.[192] Subsequent events prevented the attainment of the full course of training outlined in this directive by any of the 22 divisions.[193] Each of the 17 infantry divisions, with one exception, received increments of fillers after being alerted, varying in round numbers from 1,000 to 4,000.[194] Requirements of POM (Preparation for Overseas Movement) and limitations of time made it impossible for division commanders to give the eleventh-hour replacements very much in the way of unit training, much less combined training.[195]

On the eve of their departure from the Army Ground Forces these 17 divisions, which included all but one of the infantry divisions activated after November 1942 and which roughly were the last divisions to go overseas, contained a considerable portion of personnel that had not progressed far beyond the level of basic training. Data on the unit and combined training of personnel in the divisions just before they moved to port are summarized in the accompanying chart (Chart II).

Difficulties arising from the repeated swapping of seasoned riflemen for men with little infantry training were enhanced by exchange concurrently of experienced officers for those of meager infantry background. Officer replacements frequently were "retreads" from antiaircraft and tank destroyer units or instructors from replacement training centers who had grown rusty in broad infantry knowledge as a result of specialization for long periods of time in a few subjects under the committee system. Occasionally divisions received as replacements for company commanders or battalion executives officers who had risen to the grade of captain or major as mess supervisors or in other administrative capacities, and who had little or no experience in unit command. Some times the newcomers were able after a few weeks to overcome the handicap of inexperience by observing subordinates and taking refresher courses under the supervision of regimental or battalion commanders, but in many instances they had to be reassigned or reclassified. In either case there was a considerable period when the unit concerned suffered from ineffective leadership.[196]

Some division commanders thought that the men whom they took to port were inferior to those who had been lost, not only in training but also in stamina and other qualities essential to effectiveness on the battlefield.[197] This may not have been true, but the opinion merits examination. Exception was made of replacements received from ASTP and the Air Corps who generally were recognized as superior in all respects save training to the men whom they replaced, though some of the air cadets for a while manifested keen disappointment at having to forsake dreams of darting through clouds in P-38's for the lowlier role of mud-sloshing doughboys.[198] But the typical division subjected to large-scale stripping in 1944 received only about 3,000 replacements from these sources[199] and in some instances a portion of this choice personnel had shortly to be given to nondivisional units.[200]

Newcomers from replacement training centers were for the most part men inducted into the Army late in the mobilization period when the stock of first-class manpower was running low, though this disadvantage was offset to some extent by the discontinuance of the preferred status enjoyed by the Air Forces in initial assignment of selectees. Some of the personnel converted from other branches compared favorably in soldierly qualities with the men they replaced, but others were broken-down creatures and ne'er-do-wells who had been kicked about from one organization to another.[201] In February 1944 the commanding general of the 94th Division said to G-3 of the Army Ground Forces: "The quality of this personnel we are getting is awful. Busted down parachutists, guard house addicts from McCellan and Bragg and various other replacement training centers. Less than 50 percent are physically qualified."

Particularly disappointing were the men who came into divisions as infantry volunteers. Some of these volunteers proved to be incompetents and troublemakers who had been forced out of their units on threat of loss of ratings. Others came to the infantry in hope of getting soft jobs in headquarters.[202]

Some divisions received as replacements considerable numbers of men returned from overseas. A portion of these troops proved to be of great value to units in training, particularly as instructors and as speakers at orientation sessions. But others, taking the attitude that they had already done their part in the war effort, or that overseas service gave them a privileged status, particularly with reference to uniform regulations, fatigue duties, and routine matters of discipline, were an unwholesome influence. Soldiers with battle experience were as a rule less troublesome than those whose overseas service had consisted mainly of noncombatant duties.[203]

A substantial portion of the men transferred into divisions as replacements for privates and privates first class were noncommissioned specialists. This resulted in a piling up of a large surplus of noncommissioned officers in most divisions. In July 1944 seven divisions reported NCO surplusages as follows:[204]

97th	259	70th	340	75th	493	76th	793
87th	293	100th	410	78th	594		

The 76th Division in July had 1,228 excess NCO's distributed as follows:[205]

6	master sergeants
8	first sergeants
12	technical sergeants
31	staff sergeants
112	sergeants
377	corporals
9	technicians, 3d grade
96	technicians, 4th grade
577	technicians, 5th grade

This situation had an unhappy effect on the morale of old-timers who, after working long and hard for advancement, found promotion blocked by an influx of men possessed of many stripes but little if any experience in infantry positions. Unhappiness was also rife among the newcomers, who specialist ratings did not prevent their being required to serve in the ranks as riflemen, frequently under men who wore fewer stripes.[206] The NCO situation in the 63d Division in July 1944 was summarized by the G-3 thus:

> The transfer to us of so many men with chevrons - particularly from the Army Air Forces - has given us a heavy surplus of NCO's. The surplus NCO's wear the chevrons and draw NCP pay, but they have to perform all the duties of privates. The newcomers kick about having to do KP. We have so many men wearing chevrons that we had to devise some way of distinguishing those who actually filled the T/O positions from those who were surplus. We had a quantity of orange dye on hand. So we made up a large number of orange bands for the T/O NCO's to wear on the arms of their fatigue clothes. A corporal leading a squad frequently has T/4's serving as riflemen under him and sometimes, though rarely, he commands staff sergeants.[207]

After a period of orientation the noncommissioned newcomers were usually given a trial in infantry positions corresponding to their specialist ratings. Some of them made good and were able to retain their chevrons. A larger number, being unable to make the transition, had to forfeit their stripes. "This has played hell with their morale," said a division G-3, "and they havent't made good riflemen. It's too much to expect us to take mavericks and make doughboys out of them in three months."[208]

There was apparently an increase in venereal cases, absence without leave, and other disciplinary offenses in divisions in 1944.[209] The jump in venereals and AWOL's was attributable in part, no doubt, to the unusually large number of furloughs granted in anticipation of overseas movement, but it seems probable that another factor was the hasty conversion of men and officers of other arms and services into infantrymen and the scraping of the manpower barrel for inductees.[210] The story of the increase of court-martial cases and of venereals in the 65th, youngest division of the Army Ground Forces (activated in August 1943 but not filled until January 1944), is told in the accompanying chart (Chart III).[211] In commenting on the court-martial cases the division Judge Advocate said:

> Our court-martial rate remained consistently low until near the end of unit training. Up to that time training had proceeded intensively without interruption, and there had been little turnover of personnel. Then the stripping of the division began. There was much repetition of training until the division was alerted. Morale was adversely affected by recurrent rumors that ours was a replacement division. As the men lost hope of going overseas there was an increasing tendency for them to get into trouble. But if there is any single factor that accounts for the climb of the court-martial rate more than any other, it is the quality of the replacements that we received - many were culls from other outfits. Men coming to us from Central American bases and from Alaska have had a particularly high court-martial rate. Those coming from the paratroopers also have been frequent offenders.[212]

Pertinent also in this connection is the observation of a regimental commander of the 65th Division near the end of the training period:

> The quality of enlisted replacements has not been as good as that of the original fillers. The AGCT is up a bit, but physical quality and attitude toward soldiering is down. Some of the recently received replacements have been in as many as six divisions prior to coming to us. They have gone through a culling process.

CHART

PERSONNEL AND TRAINING DATA ON 17 INFANTRY DIVIS
(ROUGHLY THE LAST INFANTRY D

DIVISION	DATE ACTI-VATED (2)	DATE LEFT AGF (3)	PERSONNEL RECEIVED AFTER ALERT (4)	PERCENT OF PERSONNEL COMPLETING VARIOUS STAGES OF UNIT TRAINING	PERCENT OF PERSONNEL COMPLETING VARIOUS STAGES OF COMBINED TRAINING
76 (Inf Regts)	JUNE 42	NOV 44	1700	70.8 completed 12 weeks 7.5 " 3- 7 " 21.7 " 0- 3 "	27.4 completed 10 weeks 72.6 " 0-11 "
89	JULY 42	JAN 45	2396	86.5 " 5 " or more 4.2 " 3 " 9.3 " 1 "	32.0 " 17 " 68.0 " 0 "
78	AUG 42	OCT 44	2459	60.0 " 12 " 25.0 " 6 " 15.0 " 0 "	49.0 " 12 " 36.0 " 3 " 15.0 " 0 "
100	NOV 42	SEPT 44	1053	61.0 " 12 " 38.0 " 6 " 1.0 " 0 "	49.0 " 13 " 41.0 " 5 " 10.0 " 0 "
103	NOV 42	SEPT 44	0	70.0 " 12 " 30.0 " 5 "	60.0 " 14 " 40.0 " 4 "
86	DEC 42	FEB 45	1278	94.0 " 12 " 5.0 " 6 " 1.0 " 3 "	85.0 " 11 " 10.0 " 4 " 5.0 " 3 "
87	DEC 42	OCT 44	1500	79.1 " 12 " 6.2 " 8 " 5.9 " 4 " 8.8 " 0- 4 "	58.2 " 12 " 7.3 " 6 " 34.5 " 0- 6 "
97	FEB 43	FEB 45	1660 (5)	92.6 " 12 " 4.5 " 8 " 2.9 " 4 "	96.0 " 4 " 4.0 " 0- 3 "
106	MAR 43	OCT 44	3446	84.0 " 12 " 10.0 " 5 " 6.0 " 0 "	77.8 " 12 " 10.1 " 4 " 12.1 " 0 "
66 (Inf Regts)	APR 43	NOV 44	2017	82.3 " 12 " 8.2 " 8- 10 " 9.5 " 0- 8 "	38.0 " 12 " 62.0 " 0- 8 "
75	APR 43	NOV 44	2588	67.4 " 12 " 16.6 " 8 " 16.0 " 4 "	67.1 " 12 " 32.9 " 4 "
69 (Inf Regts)	MAY 43	NOV 44	1318	90.6 " 12 " 8.5 " 6- 12 " 0.9 " 0 "	90.6 " 12 " 9.1 " 6- 12 " 0.3 " 0- 6 "
63 (Inf Regts)	JUNE 43	DEC 44	1374	91.4 " 12 " 5.4 " 1- 6 " 3.2 " 0 "	93.8 " 5 " or more 6.2 " 1- 4 "
70 (Inf Regts)	JUNE 43	DEC 44	3871	67.7 " 12 " 9.8 " 4- 8 " 22.5 " 0- 4 "	73.9 " 5- 10 " 26.1 " 0- 5 "
71	JULY 43	JAN 45	1992	57.0 " 12 " 33.0 " 7 " 10.0 " 3 "	30.0 " 20 " 25.0 " 12 " 45.0 " 0 "
42 (Inf Regts)	JULY 43	DEC 44	1758	1.0 " 12 " 30.5 " 9 " 38.5 " 6 " 30.0 " 1- 5 "	88.8 " 1 " (9) 11.2 " 0 "
65	AUG 43	JAN 45	1409	96.5 " 12 " 2.4 " 10 " 1.1 " 6 "	NONE (8)(10)

CHART III

L AND TRAINING DATA ON 17 INFANTRY DIVISIONS THAT BORE THE BRUNT OF STRIPPING IN 1944.
(ROUGHLY THE LAST INFANTRY DIVISIONS TO LEAVE AGF) (1)

T OF PERSONNEL 3TING VARIOUS 3ES OF UNIT TRAINING	PERCENT OF PERSONNEL COMPLETING VARIOUS STAGES OF COMBINED TRAINING	DIVISION VS DIVISION MANEUVERS			OTHER MANEUVERS		
		PLACE	DATE	% OF PRESENT PERSONNEL(11) PARTICIPATING	PLACE	DATE	PA
eted 12 weeks 3- 7 " 0- 3 "	27.4 completed 10 weeks 72.6 " 0-11 "		NONE		a. Waters-meet (Mich) b. Cp McCoy	14 FEB-16 MAR 44 1-14 OCT 44	LES
5 " or more 3 " 1 "	32.0 " 17 " 68.0 " 0 "	a. Tenn b. Calif (Hunter-Liggett Area)	15 NOV 43-24 JAN 44 23 FEB 44-15 APR 44	32% 32%	(6)		
12 " 5 " 0 "	49.0 " 12 " 36.0 " 3 " 15.0 " 0 "	Tenn	28 JAN 44-31 MAR 44	38%	(6)		
12 " 6 " 0 "	49.0 " 13 " 41.0 " 5 " 10.0 " 0 "	Tenn	22 NOV 43-17 JAN 44	56%	(6)		
12 " 5 "	60.0 " 14 " 40.0 " 4 "	La	16 SEPT 43-15 NOV 43	61%	(6)		
12 " 6 " 3 "	85.0 " 11 " 10.0 " 4 " 5.0 " 3 "	La	28 NOV 43-24 JAN 44	48%	La Man Area	29 JULY-30 AUG 44	?
12 " 8 " 4 " 0- 4 "	58.2 " 12 " 7.3 " 6 " 34.5 " 0- 6 "	Tenn	2 DEC 43-12 JAN 44	45%	(6)		
12 " 8 " 4 "	96.0 " 4 " 4.0 " 0- 3 "	La	29 NOV 43-24 JAN 44	36.3%	(6)		
12 " 5 " 0 "	77.8 " 12 " 10.1 " 4 " 12.1 " 0 "	Tenn	31 JAN-23 MAR 44	49.4%	(6)		
12 " 8- 10 " 0- 8 "	38.0 " 12 " 62.0 " 0- 8 "		NONE		Home Station	18 SEPT-14 OCT 44	9
12 " 8 " 4 "	67.1 " 12 " 32.9 " 4 "	La	3 FEB- 3 APR 44	51%	(6)		
12 " 5- 12 " 0 "	90.6 " 12 " 9.1 " 6- 12 " 0.3 " 0- 6 "		NONE		De Soto National Forest	17 SEPT-14 OCT 44 (Miss)	94
12 " - 6 " 0 "	93.8 " 5 " or more 6.2 " 1- 4 "		NONE		Home Station	9-14 OCT 44	100
12 " - 8 " - 4 "	73.9 " 5- 10 " 26.1 " 0- 5 "		NONE		(7)		
12 " 7 " 3 "	30.0 " 20 " 25.0 " 12 " 45.0 " 0 "	Calif (Hunter-Liggett Area)	9 FEB-15 APR 44	55%	Camp Carson	7 NOV 43-29 JAN 44	30%
12 " 9 " 6 " 5 "	88.8 " 1 " (9) 11.2 " 0 "		NONE				
12 " 10 " 6 "	NONE (8)(10)		NONE		(8)		

MANEUVERS	% OF PRESENT PERSONNEL PARTICIPATING (11)	AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISES
44	LESS THAN 50% 85% (Approx)	NONE
		NONE
		NONE
		NONE
		NONE
44	76%	YES
		NONE
		YES
		NONE
44	99.6%	NONE
		NONE
44	94%	NONE
	100%	NONE
		NONE
44	30%	NONE
		NONE
		NONE

NOTES

1. a. This list includes all infantry divisions activated after 1 Nov 1942 except the 10th (Light) and the 99th, neither of which was stripped in 1944.

   b. Data for this chart was compiled mainly from the divisions' final status reports. These reports are filed in the G-3 shipment files (Gd AG Records) (S) numbered as follows:

Div	File	Div	File	Div	File	Div	File
76	8912	86	0288	66	9550	70	1508
89	0981	87	1816	75	5002	71	1606
78	8268	97	5520	69	9515	42	0629
100	2206	106	2001	63	0960	65	4848
103	6299						

   As a rule there were two status reports, one prepared by army or separate corps about a month before the division left AGF and the other prepared by AGF (Task Force Division) approximately two weeks before the date of departure from information contained in the army or corps report supplemented (clarified and brought up to date) by telephone conversations with lower hq. In preparing the chart, the AGF status reports were given preference because they were more recent and seemed to be more accurate. Occasionally, for details not available in the AGF report, reference was made to the army or corps reports. Officers of the G-3 Task Force Division were consulted when necessary for clarification of obscure or confusing points.

2. Information from "Division Book" of D/CS of AGF.

3. Information from files Installations and Movements Division, Reports Branch, Gd G-3 Section.

4. These figures are for new personnel received during the period from the issuance of "Alert Instructions" (about 60-90 days prior to movement to port) to completion of the AGF status report (about two weeks prior to movement).

5. This fugure is for personnel received after unit's first alert, 27 August 1944. The unit was later re-alerted for another theater.

6. Maneuvers at home station not required because of recency of "big maneuvers".

7. The 70th Division engaged in field training at home station 12-26 June 1944 and 18-23 Sept 1944.

8. The 65th Division had battalion field exercises (each infantry battalion supported by artillery and infantry cannon) 19 Oct-5 Nov 1944 and battalion combat firing exercises (each infantry battalion supported by artillery, infantry cannon, and 4.2 chemical mortars) 15 Nov-2 Dec 1944.

9. This training consisted of battalion exercises only. "No combined training was conducted." Transcript of telephone conversation between Maj Gen H. J. Collins, CG 42nd Division, and Col S. E. Paine, G-3 Section, AGF, 14 Nov 44, in G-3 Shipment Files 0629 (S).

10. RCT exercises were begun in July, 1944, but participating units were at such reduced strength and training was so hampered by the processing of outgoing and incoming personnel that none of the personnel was credited with combined training in the status reports.

11. Present personnel here means personnel in the division at time of status report.

CHART IV
COURT-MARTIAL CASES
65th Division
Jan-Oct 1944



Form E-

The decline in the quality of our enlisted personnel has enhanced our disciplinary problem immensely. We've had an increase of AWOL and of cases involving moral turpitude - theft, robbery, etc. Many men brought before courts-martial were previous offenders; some have been through rehabilitation centers.[213]

Even if the turnover experienced by divisions in 1943-1944 had improved the quality of their personnel, they would still have been the losers. For the continual coming and going of men and officers made it extremely difficult for the divisions affected to develop unit esprit and teamwork. The Army Ground Forces from the beginning attached great importance to unit integrity and to the training of the members of fighting teams in their "normal associations" as against the mass production of individuals and small units in training centers. The division was viewed somewhat in the light of the ideal team, and from the beginning the perfection of this team was the focal point of the AGF training program.

But the development of unit pride and of effective teamwork required that officers know their men; that the men know each other; and that doughboys develop confidence in teammates of other branches - in the artillerymen to place supporting fire in the right place at the right time, in the quartermaster company to get supplies to them, in the engineer battalion to clear roads for their advance, in the ordnance company to keep their weapons if fighting condition, in the signal company to maintain the flow of communications, and in the medics to treat their wounds. This confidence could come only from long acquaintance and from working together on various levels from individual training to large-scale maneuvers. In setting up the training program, the Army Ground Forces fixed a year as the minimum time required for the development of the divisional team.

All the divisions turn out by the Army Ground Forces had a year or more in training, but, in the case of the youngest ones, the divisional organizations were hardly more than frames - and loose ones at that - in which successive instalments of infantrymen were processed for service overseas as individual replacements. And when finally they were sent overseas, these divisions, far from being groups of individuals welded by a year's collaborative training into smoothly functioning teams, were to a regrettable extent crazy-quilt conglomerations hastily assembled from sundry sources, given a smattering of training and loaded on transports. A general idea of their patchwork character may be had from the following summary of the infantry composition of nine of the last divisions sent to the European Theater of Operations (ETO):[214]

Div.	EM in Regts since Jan 44	EM from IRTC's during past 30 days	EM from AAF or ASTP with approx 5 mo inf tng in div	EM of other arms, principally AAA with approx 4 mos inf tng
69th	25%	25%	25%	25%
76th	20%	30%	15%	35%
66th	20%	20%	30%	30%
63d	40%	20%	15%	25%
70th	25%	35%	15%	25%
42d	25%	20%	20%	35%
89th	23%	17%	20%	40%
65th	30%	20%	10%	40%
71st	25%	20%	15%	40%

It is a sad bit of irony that these divisions, which passed through the Army Ground Forces at a time when the training program had been brought to its highest degree of refinement, when equipment was most ample and ammunition most abundant, because of a personnel situation over which the Army Ground Forces had no control, had to go overseas with many of their men unassimilated and partially trained.

The Impact of Personnel Changes on the 65th Infantry Division

On Christmas Eve, 1944, just as von Rundstedt's drive through the Ardennes was getting into full swing, men of the 65th Division began to board trains at Camp Shelby, Miss., for movement to the New York Port of Embarkation.[215] Since the 65th was the last division to be activated and one of the last to move overseas, its experience may appropriately be used to illustrate the impact of personnel changes on the final group of divisions produced by the Army Ground Forces.[216] (For order of shipment of divisions overseas, see Table III, page 29.)

The 65th Division was activated on 16 August 1943. But because at that time inductions were lagging behind mobilization requirements, the complete quota of fillers was not received until the end of the year.[217]

Individual training began early in January 1944. The division made a good showing on its Mobilization Training Test given by the IX Corps the first week in April.[218] Training proceeded satisfactorily through the first few weeks of the unit period. Personnel turnover was inconsequential, equipment was plentiful, morale was good, and squads and platoons were beginning to take shape as teams.

In the latter part of May, while infantry units were engaged in company exercises and taking the AGF Platoon Proficiency Tests, an order came down from higher headquarters to begin furloughing infantry privates in preparation for their movement to overseas replacement depots. Furloughs were staggered over a period of several weeks but, even so, the disruption to training was great. One battalion was so depleted that some of its platoons had only 15 to 20 men when they took the platoon tests.[219] About the middle of June shipments to Ft. Meade began. Before the end of the month, 4,394 men were lost to replacement depots and 468 more were transferred to other organizations.[220] July losses to these sources aggregated 1,851 and 279 respectively. This brought total enlisted losses in June and July to about 7,000.[221]

Officer losses for overseas replacements during the period April - July inclusive exceeded 250.[222] These and other withdrawals almost cleaned out the division's infantry lieutenants and captains. In mid-July the commander of an infantry battalion remarked: "We didn't keep platoon leaders very long. We have had about four complete turnovers since January. In one of my companies the 2d Platoon had had three commanders and the 1st Platoon has had six. In another company two platoons haven't had an officer for two months; platoon sergeants have been in command."[223]

About the same time the division G-1 reported a 100 percent turnover in regimental and battalion commanders since activation and a 50 percent turnover in general staff officers. "In one of the regiments," he said, "one battalion is commanded by a major, in another, two, and in the third, all three."[224]

Shipping out of men and officers was interspersed with the reception of replacements. The processing of incoming and departing men placed a heavy burden on the dwindling corps of experienced officers and NCO's. Lights frequently burned far after midnight in the office of the division G-1 and Adjutant General, and regimental personnel staffs worked in shifts on a twenty-four hour basis. Platoon and company leaders worked many "extra hours" at night and on Saturday afternoons to get outgoing men through prescribed firing courses, to complete immunizations, and to clear the vast pile of paper which POR (Preparation for Overseas Replacement) laid on their desks. They had to find time also for interview and assignment of new men received in their units.

The first large "hunk" of replacements were the 100 Air Corps cadets who came to the Division in May.[225] These were bright, brawny youngsters, and after a period of

adjustment, most of them made excellent soldiers. Youthful and strong also were the thousand-odd 18-year-olds who came to the division in July from replacement training centers in exchange for a like number of soldiers 19 and over which the Division sent to a replacement depot. These boys were not as smart as the cadets.[226] About 3,000 other replacements from miscellaneous sources trickled into the Division in June and July, bringing the total influx of enlisted men during the period May - July to something over 5,000[227]

A substantial portion of the miscellaneous group came from disbanded antiaircraft artillery and tank destroyer units. About 700 were men sent back from overseas; of these the assistant division commander said: "Some are a definite benefit to the division, others are a detriment. The majority come within the former category. But if I had my choice of 700 of our original fillers and the 700 replacements that have come to us, I should take the original fillers."[228] The Division G-1 took a less favorable view. "Overseas commanders send their 'eight-balls' to us under the rotation plan," he said. "Most of the men are very bitter. They feel like they've done their share. They are a bad influence on the other men."[229]

Over 300 of the replacements were "infantry volunteers." Of these the G-1 said: "In every case ... (they) have been men who were dissatisfied in other branches -- men who did not like their commanding officers, who wanted a change of station, or who were falling down on their jobs. In some instances pressure has been put on them to volunteer ... An officer will say to a misfit or ne'er-do-well: 'You're apt to lose your rating if you stay here. You've got a good chance to keep your stripes by joining the doughboys. My advice is for you to take it."[230]

Because the Division was overstrength when the ASTP was curtailed, it did not receive an allotment of this choice personnel.[231]

Of replacements in general, except those from the Air Forces, the Division G-1 said: "As they come along the line they are picked over. When they get to us they're a sorry lot."[232] The Division commander made this comment: "Replacements have been inferior in quality to the original fillers. Some of them have been kicked about from unit to unit. We did not have an opportunity to indoctrinate them as we did the original fillers, to imbue them with the spirit of the organization." The division commander observed that the replacements as a group were younger than the original fillers, but this he deemed a doubtful gain. "Our original fillers had a considerable sprinkling of older men, 'PPHP's' we called them (Pre-Pearl-Harbor Papas). These older men had a stabilizing influence on the youngsters - helped to keep them out of trouble."[233]

Enlisted losses in the artillery and the special units, except the engineers, were small in comparison to those in the infantry, but such turnover as was experienced usually resulted in the exchange of novices for trained technicians.

When they first came to the Division, replacements were given a test in basic subjects to determine their level of training. Those who demonstrated a passable knowledge of individual training were sent immediately to their units. Others were organized into special training groups under regimental supervision and trained in fundamentals until they were able to pass an MTP Test prepared by the Division.

An attempt was made to continue the regular program of unit training concurrently with the "POR-ing" of departing men and the instruction of replacements. But the depletion of personnel and the heavy burden of running a multi-level program made progress difficult. Unit training was completed after a fashion early in July, but some of the battalion exercises were run with less than 200 men and the few regimental programs that were undertaken were not deserving of the name.

In July infantry and artillery went through the motions of combined training for a period of approximately two weeks, but strength was so low and many of the officers so inexperienced that the RCT exercises bore little resemblance to the real thing. The operations were so limited indeed, that when later the Division's final status report was submitted none of the personnel was credited with any combined training.

Late in July the Division, having reached approximately 80 percent of its T/O strength, initiated the six-weeks program of modified individual training directed by the Army Ground Forces. Under this plan, the new men and the old-timers were lumped into the units and given an intensive "refresher course" in basic training. Special schools were set up under the Division G-3 to train the new officers, an increasing number of whom were coming from units of other arms.

But even after retraining was initiated the Division continued to lose men. Withdrawals of infantrymen were lighter than formerly, but drafts on specialists of other branches were heavier. Enlisted losses in all categories during August aggregated 1,173.[234]

From 3 September to 14 October the Division participated in modified unit training. During the fourth week of this period word came from Second Army that the Division had been placed on alert status with readiness dates of 3 January 1945 for equipment and 18 January 1945 for personnel.[235] This news came as a bombshell, for until the alert the Division had no indication that overseas movement was likely before the summer of 1945.

The alert gave a definite boost to morale. Efforts to meet individual and unit POM requirements were intensified immediately.

The alert, and the change about the same time of War Department regulations concerning physically deficient personnel, made it possible for the Division to get rid of about a thousand "cripples." The worse cases were discharged. Those deemed capable of service in noncombatant capacities were transferred to the Air Forces or the Fourth Service Command.[236] The Division was eminently pleased to be relieved of this dead weight, but the postponement of housecleaning until the eleventh hour caused a setback to the development of teamwork. All in all the Division received more than 2,000 replacements in the three months preceding embarkation. The prior training of many of the last-minute replacements left much to be desired. Moreover, a considerable number of men originally received in response to emergency requisitions could not be retained because of disqualifying physical defects.[237] This caused additional delay and disruption.

Another startling bit of news came on 13 October in the form of a telephone call from Second Army stating that because of pressing overseas needs, the Division must get its infantry regiments ready for movement to port by 13 November; organizational equipment was to be ready by 28 October; packing was to begin immediately.[238]

This notice prevented initiation of modified combined training. In the regiments efforts were concentrated on POR-ing late arrivals and putting the battalions through infantry-tank exercises as previously directed by the Army Ground Forces. Noninfantry components pitched in to assist the doughboys in their packing.

On 24 October the regiments completed the packing of their organizational equipment and began to load the boxes on freight cars. The next day a telephone call from Second Army directed that all loading cease as the movement order had been temporarily suspended.[239] Several days later instructions were received moving the personnel readiness date back to 24 December and the equipment date to 10 December. The revised instructions also provided that infantry regiments should move with other parts of the Division (except for the usual advance detachment).[240]

The Division staff, in telephone conferences with higher headquarters, worked out an interim training program designed to fill in major gaps without making heavy demands on organizational equipment. Mortars, heavy machine guns, and other essential equipment were borrowed in considerable quantities from nondivisional units stationed at Camp Shelby, but in spite of these and other emergency measures, the Division had to go through the heartbreaking task of unpacking some of the equipment that had been so carefully processed and stored away in the shipping boxes.[241]

The highlights of the interim training were battalion field exercises (each infantry battalion supported by elements of a 4.2 chemical mortar battlion and the Division artillery) and battalion combat firing exercises (each infantry battalion supported by infantry cannon artillery and chemical mortars).[242]

The last element of the Division cleared Camp Shelby on New Year's Eve.[243] If the plans for the building and training of this Division had been carried out as originally laid down by General McNair and his staff, the 65th when it moved overseas in 1945 might have been the most battleworthy of the long line of divisions produced by the Army Ground Forces. It should have been, for into the planning of the organization, training and equipment of this unit was poured the accumulated experience of four years' intensive effort. But mainly because of personnel exigencies the control of which lay beyond the jurisdiction of the Army Ground Forces, the 65th was about the least ready for combat of all divisions trained in World War II. Its regiments had never worked with their supporting battalions of artillery in field exercises. The Division commander had never maneuvered his command as a unit - in fact, the Division had never been together, except for reviews and demonstrations (and its composition had changed greatly from one assembly to another). In the infantry regiments only one man in four had been with the Division for a year and almost every fourth man had joined his unit in the past three months.[244] The Division was more of a hodge-podge than it was a team.

Near the end of the training period the Division commander said to an AGF staff officer:

> The Division that I gave basic training to is no longer here ... The last time I checked up on personnel turnover, this Division had furnished over 10,000 men for other duties and had sent out enough officers to fill one and one-half divisions ... Personnel turnover prevented the making of a team out of this Division. Our situation is comparable to that of a football coach who has to turn his team to other institutions a few weeks before the playing season starts. He wires for replacements. He gets two players from one college, three from another, and so on down the line. The pickings are so bad at this late date that he gets a miscellany of misfits and culls. He has to put backfield men in the line and linemen in the backfield. He can't be expected to make a team under such circumstances.[245]

Achievement in Spite of Difficulty

This general's lament was very much like that which had risen from divisions in 1942. But in his case as in that of many commanders who experienced similar difficulties, the complaining was the obverse of a magnificent morale. The commanders protested often to higher headquarters against the woes that befell them and sometimes they exaggerated their miseries. But of the overwhelming majority it cannot be said that they used their tribulations as pretexts for evasion of command responsibilities. Because their minds were set on having battleworthy organizations, these leaders in the best tradition of the Army, as often as was necessary, rebuilt their broken teams with the material at hand, and in spite of enormous difficulties took them in port in a far better condition than seemed possible when the flood of stripping and replenishing was at its height.

Study No. 12

Footnotes on The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions

1. The AUS Division was the 25th, activated in Hawaii, 1 Oct 41. Information obtained from Organization & Directory Section, Opns Br, TAGO, 5 Mar 45.

2. This information was compiled from the "Division Book" kept by the AGF DCofS. The "Division Book" contained key information gleaned from records of the various staff sections and the War Department about each division, including: date of activation; date of reorganization; commanding general, assistant commander, and artillery commander; date of completing major phases of training; inspections by AGF; graphic representation of strength; and remarks, telling of unusual circumstances or events. Information is not complete for all divisions. The 24th and 25th Divisions activated in Hawaii are not listed; information concerning these units was obtained from the Org & Dir Sec, Opns Br, TAGO.

3. See Studies in the History of AGF No 8, Organization of the Ground Troops for Combat.

4. (1) Ibid. (2) Speech of Gen McNair to West Point Graduating Class, 5 May 42. Army War College (AWC) Library's Collection of McNair Speeches.

5. GHQ ltr 353/652-C to Army Comdrs and the CofAF, 30 Oct 41, sub: Post-Maneuver Tng.

6. Studies in the History of AGF No 4, Mobilization of the Ground Army.

7. "Division Book" of the DCofS.

8. Only 87 of these divisions were trained as divisions in the United States. The 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions were organized in Hawaii and the Americal Division in New Caledonia.

9. General McNair credited his Deputy Chief of Staff, General Mark W. Clark, with the development of this plan. Personal ltr Gen McNair to Gen John M. Palmer, 25 Mar 42. McNair Correspondence.

10. See Chart I.

11. Personal ltr of Gen John M. Palmer to Gen McNair, 24 Mar 42. McNair Correspondence.

12. (1) See Chart III. (2) WD ltr AG 320.2 (1-4-42) OP-A-M to CGs, 6 Jan 42, sub: Commissioned Pers of the 77th, 82d and 90th Inf Divs. AGF G-1 Records Sec.

13. See Chart I.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. GHQ ltr 353/21 (Inf)-H to Army Comdrs, 16 Feb 42, sub: Tng of Newly Activated Inf Divs.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Copies of the platoon and battery tests may be found as inclosures 1 and 2, GHQ ltr 353/652-C (10-30-41), 30,Oct 41, sub: Post-Maneuver Tng. The artillery battalion tests are in GHQ ltr 353.4/3-C (9-5-41), 5 Sep 41, sub: Field Arty (FA) Firing.

21. For Infantry Battalion Field Exercise Tests, see Incl 3, GHQ ltr 353/652-C (10-30-41), 30 Oct 41, sub: Post-Maneuver Tng.

22. Incls 1, 2, and 3, GHQ ltr 353/21 (Inf)-H to CGs, 16 Feb 42, sub: Tng of Newly Activated Inf Divs.

23. See Studies in the History of AGF No 10, Principles and Methods of Training in AGF.

24. GHQ ltr 353/21 (Inf)-H to CGs, 16 Feb 42, sub: Tng of Newly Activated Inf Divs.

25. AGF ltr to CGs, 23 Apr 42, sub: Tng Dir for the Period Jun 1 - Oct 31, 1942. 353/1043.

26. No infantry divisions were scheduled for activation in April 1942.

27. Information furnished AGF Historical Officer by W/O R. P. Grahamer, AGF G-1 Sec Offs Div, from files of Offs Div.

28. WD ltr AG 320.2 (3-6-42) OD-A-M to CGs concerned, 11 Mar 42, sub: Commissioned Pers for the 76th, 79th and 81st Inf Divs. AGF G-1 Records Sec.

29. WD ltr AG 210.31 (4-8-42) OD-M to CGs concerned, 8 Apr 42, sub: Commissioned Pers for the 80th, 88th and 89th Divs. G-1 Records Sec.

30. Ibid.

31. WD ltr AG 210.31 (6-20-42) SPXOD-TS-M to CGs concerned, 21 Jun 42, sub: Commissioned Pers for the 84th and 92d Inf Divs. G-1 Records Sec.

32. Ibid.

33. WD memo W605-3-42, 28 Aug 42, sub: Commissioned Pers for the 86th and 87th Inf Divs. AGF G-1 Records Sec, 210.31 Assignment, (Officers).

34. AGF ltr to CGs, 23 Apr 42, sub: Tng Dir for the Period 1 Jun - 31 Oct 42. 353/1043.

35. AGF ltr to CGs, 10 Jul 42, sub: Tng Dir for Units during the Period from Arrival at Staging Areas to Departure for Ports of Embarkation (PE). 353/1515.

36. T/O 7, Inf Div, 1 Aug 42. This was a recapitulation of T/O's of division components published 1 April 42.

37. AGF memo, G-4 for CofS, 5 Aug 42, sub: Rpt of G-4 Inspection Trip, 26 Jul - 1 1 Aug 42. 333.1/1250(sep file).

38. AGF memo, G-4 for CofS, 8 Sep 42, sub: Rpt of G-4 Inspection Trip, 31 Aug - 4 Sep 42. 333.1/1355.

39. (1) Par 6 b, AGF ltr to CGs, 19 Oct 42, sub: Tng Dir Effective No 1, 1942. 353/52 (Tng Dir). (2) AGF ltr to CGs, 4 Feb 42, sub: Special Battle Courses. 353.01/61.

40. See Studies in the History of AGF No 4, Mobilization of the Ground Army. (S).

41. Incl 2 to memo (S) of Gen McNair for the CofS USA, 3 Aug 42, sub: Pers and Tng Status of Units of the AGF. 320.2/283 (S).

42. Record of telephone conversation between Gens McNair and Lear, 31 Jul 42. Personal files of Gen Lear.

43. (1) "Division Book" of DCofS AGF. (2) Record of telephone conversations between Gens McNair and Lear, 31 Jul, 11 Aug, 1942. Personal files of Gen Lear.

44. Record of telephone conversation between Gens McNair and Lear, 11 Aug 42. Ibid.

45. (1) Personal ltrs of Brig Gen J. F. Brittingham, 89th Div to Col Edmund W Searby, Asst G-3 AGF, 3 Feb, 12 May, 1943. (2) Memo of Col Burns Beall, Asst G-3 AGF for G-3 AGF, 7 Feb 43, sub: Obsns on Tng Activities, 3 - 5 Jan 43. Both in AGF G-3 Tng Div files, 333.1.

46. (1) Record of telephone conversation between Gens McNair and Lear, 11 Aug 42. Personal files of Gen Lear. (2) Personal ltr Gen Lear to Gen McNair, 11 Sep 42. McNair Correspondence.

47. Personal ltr Gen McNair to Gen Lear, 19 Sep 42. McNair Correspondence.

48. Ibid, 20 Aug 42.

49. (1) Statement of Gen Ben Lear to AGF Hist Off, 14 Oct 43. (2) AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 2 Oct 42, sub: Replacement Pools. 320.2/105(R).

50. (1) Statement of Lt Col R. H. Booth, AGF G-1 Sec to AGF Hist Off, 25 Nov 43. (2) Personal ltrs Gen McNair to Gen Lear, 10 Apr 42; Gen Lear to Gen McNair, 17 Apr 42. McNair Correspondence.

51. (1) Memo (C) of Gen McNair for Gen Lear, 11 Aug 42, sub: Promotion of Natl Guard Offs. McNair Correspondence. (C). (2) Memo (C) of Gen Lear for Gen McNair, 18 Aug 42, sub: Promotion of Natl Guard Offs. Personal files of Gen Lear (C). (3) For evidence of persistence of feeling that the War Department discriminated against National Guard generals, see Congressional Record, 20 May 43, Vol 89, pp 4745-4755, Speech of Sen Clark.

52. Memo (C) of Gen Lear for Gen McNair, 18 Aug 42, sub: Promotion of Natl Guard Offs. Personal files of Gen Lear (C).

53. (1) AGF M-S of G-1 FA Br, Offs Div, to Misc Div, 13 Feb 43, sub: Notice for Wkly Dir. (2) AGF memo, ExO, G-1 to New Divs Div, 30 Nov 42, sub: Policy to be Followed in Selecting Gen Staff Offs. (Both originally consulted in G-1 New Divs Div Policy File; this file was later broken up, and at date of final revision the documents could not be located.)

54. (1) 90th Div ltr to AGF, 14 Oct 42, sub: Plat Combat Proficiency Tests. AGF G-3 Tng Div Files, 90th Div Binder. (2) IV Corps ltr to AGF, 28 Jun 43, sub: Bn Combat Firing Test of 91st Inf Div. in ibid, 91st Div Binder. (3) VIII Corps ltr to

Third Army, 7 Dec 42, sub: Rpt of Inspection, 95th Inf Div, Cp Swift, Tex. In ibid. 95th Div Binder.

55. Third Army ltr to AGF, 17 Aug 42, sub: Rpt of Inspection, 28th Inf Div. AGF G-3 Tng Div files, 333.1, 28th Div Binder.

56. Ibid.

57. AGF ltr to CGs, 31 Jan 43, sub: Interferences with Tng. 353.02/78 (AGF).

58. Memo of Lt Col H. M. Monroe, Asst G-3 AGF for CofS AGF, 7 Apr 42, sub: Visit to Ft. Leonard Wood, Mo. - the 6th Div and the 72d FA Brig. (Originally consulted in AGF G-3 Tng Div files. 333.1, 6th Div Binder; document missing in records at date of final revision.)

59. See Studies in the History of AGF No 14, The Activation and Training of Non-divisional Units. (S).

60. Memo of Lt Col (later Brig Gen) John M. Lentz for G-3 GHQ, 23 Feb 42, sub: Obsns at Ft Leonard Wood, Mo, 19-21 Feb 42. AGF G-3 Tng Div Files, 333.1, 6th Div Binder.

61. Ibid.

62. Ltr of Gen McNair to CGs, 1 Jan 43, sub: Conduct of Tng. 319.22/22.

63. AGF ltr to CGs, 25 Jun 42, sub: Paper work. 312.11/82.

64. AGF ltr to CGs, 1 Jan 43, sub: Conduct of Tng. 319.22/22.

65. Personal ltr (C) Gen Lear to Gen McNair, 11 Jan 43. Personal files of Gen Lear (C).

66. Personal ltr (C) Gen Marshall to Gen Lear, 20 Feb 42. Ibid.

67. Memo of Col Lowell W. Rooks, Chief of Tng Div AGF, for Gen McNair, 21 May 42, sub: Comment on Ltr of Gen Lear, 18 May 42. AGF G-3 files, McNair 201 Binder.

68. Ibid.

69. This statement is based on a study of numerous inspection reports in the 333.1 files of the G-3 Section(some of which are in the central files of the G-3 Section and some in the files of the Section's Training Division)and in AG Section.

70. Statement of Gen McNair on maneuvers of AGF, 12 Oct 42. AWC Library collection of McNair speeches.

71. Radio speech of Gen McNair on the "Pass in Review" Program, Mutual Network, 10 Nov 42. Ibid.

72. Statement of Col John B. Sherman, Plans Sec AGF to AGF Hist Off, 12 Oct 43.

73. AGF ltr to CGs, 19 Oct 42, sub: Tng Dir effective 1 Nov 42. 353/52 (Tng Dir).

74. Personal ltr (C) Gen McNair to Gen Lear, 19 Sep 42. Personal files of Gen Lear. (C)

The 31st Division affords a good example of the triumph of determined leadership over the most formidable obstacles. This Division was in training from November 1940 until January 1944. On two occasions prior to its final filling it reached full strength and completed prescribed training only to be stripped of its officers and men. All in all it trained and sent out to other organizations 22,511 enlisted men and 1,435 officers; in addition, 1,606 of its enlisted men graduated from officer candidate schools. Its signal, engineers, and other noninfantry elements reproduced themselves several times in technical specialists.[246]

In forwarding a final report of the Division's accomplishments to General George C. Marshall, just before the unit left the Army Ground Forces, General McNair stated:

> The division has done far more than train itself ...; it has contributed much to our war Army as a whole.
>
> The division has been peculiarly self-reliant, taking distinct pride in this aspect. Today there are but three regular officers in the division - the chief of staff and two infantry regimental commanders.
>
> * * *
>
> The division's record in tests is outstanding ...
>
> The division has character and individuality. It mirrors its commander who is a most effective leader ... Its spirit under stress and disappointment has been above praise.
>
> If this division does not fight well, I shall incline to believe that there is no merit in training ...[247]

That so much could be accomplished as was achieved in the face of tremendous difficulties was a tribute not only to the commanders, but to their officers, to the men in the ranks, and to the ability of higher headquarters to make all the adjustments required by shortages of industrial production, deficiencies in the inflow of manpower, and shifts in operational requirements.

94. For analysis of the T/O & E's of 1 Mar 43 and 15 Jul 43, see Studies in the History of AGF No 8, Organization of Ground Troops for Combat.

95. (1) T/O 7, Inf Div, 1 Mar 43. Mimeographed copy in files of AGF Rqt Sec, Org Div. (2) T/O 7-11, Inf Regt, 1 Mar 43. In ibid.

96. Memo (S) of Gen McNair for G-3 WD, 3 Jun 43, sub: Reduced Inf Div. 322/2 (Divs) (S).

97. Ibid.

98. Statement of Maj R. N. Nye, Rqt Sec AGF to AGF Hist Off, 9 Nov 45.

99. T/O & E 7, Inf Div, 15 Jul 43.

100. Ibid.

101. Ibid. This organization is not to be confused with the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Special Troops, instituted in 1942 for the training of "spare parts." See Studies in the History of AGF No 14, The Activation and Training of Non-divisional Units. (S).

102. (1) 104th Div ltr to AGF, 20 Mar 43, sub: Change in T/Os, Hq Inf Div. 320.3/176 (Inf). (2) AGF memo (S) for G-3 WD, 1 Jun 43, sub: Recommended Changes in T/Os. 322/3 (Divs) (S).

103. WD memo WDGCT 320.2 T/O (6-18-43) for CG AGF, 18 Jun 43, sub: Revision of T/O & E for the Inf Div.

104. WD ltr (R) AG 210.31 (1-26-43) PO-A-GNGAP-M to CGs concerned, 30 Jan 43, sub: Commissioned Pers for the 69th Inf Div. AGF G-1 Records Sec files.

105. WD ltr (R) AG 210.31 (27 Feb 43) PO-A-GNGAP-M to CGs concerned, 17 Feb 43, sub: Commissioned Pers for the 63d and 70th Inf Divs. In ibid.

106. WD ltr (R) AG 210.31 (30 Mar 43) PO-A-GNGAP-M to CGs concerned, 30 Mar 43, sub: Commissioned Pers for the 42d Inf Div. In ibid.

107. AGF memo, G-3 for CofS, 13 Mar 43, sub: Obsns during Visit to Cp Atterbury, Ind, 10-11 Mar 43. 353.02/119 (AGF). This memo explained and commended highly methods used by CG 83d Div in choosing and training cadre for 75th Div.

108. Undated extract inclosed in memo of Col Burns Beall, Asst G-3 AGF for G-3 AGF, 2 Apr 43. G-3 Tng files, 333.1, 97th Div Binder.

109. Personal ltr of a regtl comdr to the col of a newly activated regt, 22 Mar 43. (Originally consulted in G-1 New Divs Div Policy File; document missing in records at date of final revision.)

110. AGF memo (C) for CofS USA, 22 Oct 43, sub: Battle Experienced High Comdrs. 211.311/524 (C).

111. Statement of Lt Col R. H. Booth, Asst G-1 AGF to AGF Hist Off, 18 Dec 43.

112. (1) Memo (C) of CofS USA for CG AGF, 6 Jul 44, sub: Gen Offs. McNair Personal Correspondence. (2) Statement of G-3 AGF to AGF Hist Off, 19 Feb 45.

75. (1) Par 7, AGF ltr to CGs, 19 Oct 42, sub: Tng Dir Effective 1 Nov 42. Copies of the test, except the MTP Test, are attached to this letter as inclosures. 353/52 (Trg Dir).

76. (1) For Combat Intelligence Tests see AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 26 Aug 43, sub: Combat Int Tng Tests. 350.09/1 (R). (2) For Air-Ground Tests see AGF ltr to CGs, 20 Apr 43, sub: Air-Ground Tng Tests; also Studies in the History of AGF No 34, Air-Ground Cooperation. (S). (3) For Squad, Platoon Leadership, and Division Tests see AGF ltr to CGs, 7 Jun 43, sub: Supplement to Tng Dir Effective 1 Nov 42. 353/52 (Trg Dir).

77. AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 25 Sep 42, sub: Policies Concerning Mob. 320.2/80 (R)

78. AGF 1st ind, 5 Aug 42, on WD ltr WDGCT Gen (7-28-42), 28 Jul 42, sub: Allocation of Additional RTC Capacity to be Provided under the Mobilization Plan, 1943. AGF G-1 Records, Stayback file of Gen Edward Barber.

79. Personal ltr Gen Lear to Gen McNair, 11 Sep 42. Personal files of Gen Lear.

80. (1) AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 23 Apr 42, sub: Cadre Pers for New Divs. 320.2/9 (Trg Div). (2) AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 10 Sep 42, sub: Cadre Pers for New Divs. 320.2/9 (Trg Div) (R).

81. AGF M/S, New Divs Div to G-1, 1 Feb 43, sub: Decentralization of Activation of New Divs. (Orginally consulted in G-1 New Divs Div Policy File: document missing in records at date of final revision.)

82. Ibid.

83. AGF memo for Chiefs of Administrative and Supply Agencies, SOS (undated, but apparently late Dec 42), sub: Decentralization of Officer Cadre Selection, and 2d ind thereto by Mil Pers Div, SOS, 14 Jan 43. (For location see note 81 above).

84. Statement of WO R. P. Grabauer, G-1 AGF to AGF Hist Off, 25 Nov 43.

85. WD Memo W605-24-42, 22 Nov 42, sub: Commissioned Pers for the 97th Inf Div. AGF G-1 Record Sec files.

86. Ibid.

87. Memo of Capt Robert P. Cotter, Dept of Motor Transport, FAS, 30 Oct 42, sub: Observer's Rpt on La Maneuvers, Cp Polk, La, 28 Sep - 4 Oct 42. 354.2/252 (La '42).

88. Statement of Maj H. Conner, Ord Sec AGF to AGF Hist Off, 26 Nov 43.

89. See Studies in the History of AGF No 8, Organization of Ground Troops for Combat.

90. In AWC Library collection of McNair speeches.

91. For discussion of the work of the Reduction Board, see Studies in the History of AGF No 8, Organization of Ground Troops for Combat.

92. Office memo, Org Div, Rqts Section, AGF for Reduction Board, 6 Nov 42, sub: Reduction of Equip. In files of Maj R. N. Nye, AGF Rqts Sec.

93. M/Ss, various dates. 320.2/166 (Inf).

113. Personal ltr of Arty Off III Corps to Lt. Col John C. Oakes, Asst G-3 AGF, 9 Apr 43. G-3 Tng Files 333.1, 96th Div Binder.

114. Personal ltr of Arty Comdr 90th Div to Brig Gen John M. Lentz, G-3 AGF, 12 Apr 43. G-3 Tng Files 333.1 90th Div Binder.

115. Personal ltr of Lt Col John C. Oakes, Asst G-3 AGF to Army Comdr 90th Div, 30 Apr 43. In ibid.

116. Personal ltr of Maj Gen Harry J. Maloney, CG 94th Div to Maj Gen John P. Lucas, CG Fourth Army, 22 Jul 44. 322/39 (94th Div).

117. Incl 19 to AGF ltr to CGs, 21 Oct 43, sub: Inspection Comments. 333.1/1505.

118. Incl 24, ibid.

119. AGF ltr (S) to Procurement Review Board, 31 Jul 43, sub: Status of Equipment, Army Ground Forces. 401.1/25 (S).

120. Incl 4 to AGF Bd ltr (S) to CG AGF, 21 Nov 43, sub: Rpt 82 AGF Bd, AFHQ-NATO. 319.1 (NATO) (S).

121. (1) AR 775-10, 30 Jul 43. (2) AGF M/S G-3 to CofS, 10 Nov 43. 471/1790,

122. (1) Memo (S) of Gen McNair for CofS USA, 3 Jul 43, sub: Policies Governing Issues of Equipment. 320.2/22 (TUB 43) (S). (2) OPD memo 400 (19 Jun 43) for CG AGF, 26 Jul 43, sub: Pre-Shipment. Ibid.

123. Personal ltr of Arty Comdr, 89th Div to Col Edmund W. Searby, Asst G-3 AGF, 3 Feb 43, and answer of Col Searby, 22 Feb 43. G-3 Tng files, 333.1, 89th Div Binder.

124. (1) Personal ltr of Arty Comdr, 63d Div to Col John C. Oakes, Asst G-3 AGF, 18 Sep 43. G-3 Tng files, 333.1, 63d Div Binder. (2) Master Card for 65th Div, dead files, AGF C&RD.

125. AGF memo of Lt Col R. L. Baughman, Asst G-3 for ACofSG-3, 25 May 43, sub: Inspection Trip to Ft Jackson and Cp Forrest, 20-22 May 43. G-3 Tng files, 333.1, 100th Div Binder.

126. Ibid.

127. Personal ltr of Maj Gen James I. Muir to Gen McNair, 27 Feb 43. AGF G-3 files, McNair 201 Binder.

128. "Notes on Training" by Maj Gen J.H. Hilldring. Incl to ltr of Gen Hilldring to Gen McNair, 29 Mar 43. McNair Personal Correspondence.

129. Incl 1 to AGF Bd AFHQ-NATO Rpt 91 (S), 9 Dec 43. Statement of Maj Gen Troy H. Middleton. 319.1 (NATO).

130. Third Army Testing Team ltr for CG Third Army, 19 Jul 43, sub: Rpts of Combat Bn Firing Tests, 84th Inf Div, Cp Howze, Tex. G-3 Tng file, 333.1, 84th Div Binder.

131. Studies in the History of AGF No 5, Procurement of Enlisted Personnel for the AGF: the Problem of Quality.

132. Memo of Lt Col Carl H. Jark, Asst G-3 AGF for G-3 WD, 31 Jul 43, sub: Observations during Visit to Cp Phillips, Ft Leonard Wood, and Cp Campbell, 27-30 Jul 43, inclusive. G-3 Tng files, 333.1, 94th Div Binder.

133. Ibid., 2 Jun 43, sub: Rpt of Observations on Inspection Trip, 23-30 May incl. G-3 Tng files, 333.1, 104th Div Binder.

134. Memo of Col Wm. E. Shambora for G-3 AGF, 31 Aug 43, sub: Inspection Rpt of Units at Ft Lewis, Bend (Maneuver Area), Cp Adair, Cp White, Cp Beale, and DTC. AGF G-3 files, 333.1/44 (Inspections by AGF Staff Offs).

135. MIS of Lt Col W. S. Renshaw for G-3 AGF, 2 Aug 43, sub: G-I's Rpt of Inspection Trip made 27 Jul - 30 Jul. AGF G-3 files, 333.1/37 (Inspections by AGF Staff Offs).

136. Ibid.

137. Memo of Brig Gen C. L. Hyssong for G-3 AGF, 31 Aug 43, sub: Rpt of Inspection. AGF G-3 files, 333.1/44 (Inspections by AGF Staff Offs).

138. AGF M/S, G-3 to Tng Div, 10 Sep 43. G-3 Tng files, 333.1, 97th Div Binder.

139. DCofS's "Division Book."

140. Personal ltr of Brig Gen John M. Lentz to Brig Gen Marcus W. Bell, 4 Dec 43. Lentz 201 File (Personal).

141. AGF ltr to CGs, 7 Jun 43, sub: Supplement to Tng Dir Effective 1 Nov 42. 353/52 (Tng Dir).

142. Telg of Gen McNair to CG IRTC, Cp Wheeler, Ga., 29 Sep 43. 220.3 (106 Div).

143. AGF ltr to CGs, 19 Oct 43, sub: Tng Dir Effective 1 Nov 42. 353/52 (Tng Dir).

144. AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 5 Jan 43, sub: Tng in Operations against Permanent Land Fortifications. 353/2 (Assault)(R). A course in operations against permanent land fortifications was established at the Engineer School, Ft Belvior, Va, to train selected officers as unit instructors in assault operations. Each division was given a quota of about twenty students for this course. Ibid.

145. AGF ltr to CGs, 4 Feb 43, sub: Special Battle Courses. 353.01/61.

146. Ibid.

147. Par 14, AGF Wkly Dir 15, 13 Apr 43.

148. (1) AGF ltr to CGs, 26 Apr 43, sub: Tng Ammunition, Marksmanship Courses, Familiarization and Combat Firing. 471/1719. (2) Training Circular (TC) 30, WD, 10 Mar 43.

149. See below, P. 41.

150. (1) AGF ltr to CGs, 1 Jan 43, sub: Conduct of Tng. 319.22/22. (2) AGF ltr to Second Army, 1 Apr 43, sub: Inf Bn Combat Firing Tests. 353.02/121 (AGF).

151. Personal ltr of Brig Gen John M. Lentz to Brig Gen Marcus Bell, 81st Inf Div, 4 Dec 43. Lentz 201 File (Personal).

152. AGF ltr to CGs, 11 Feb 44, sub: Combat Firing. 471/1907.

153. (1) AGF M/S, G-3 to CofS, 26 Feb 44, sub: Inf Bn and Horse Cav Sq Combat Firing Test. 353/52 (Tng Dir). (2) Memo of Lt Col B. A. Ford for G-3 AGF, 7 Jun 44, sub: Observation during Visit to Cp Howze, Tex; Cp Swift, Tex: Cp Van Dorn, Miss, 29 May - 3 Jun 44. AGF G-3 files, 333.1/33 (Inspections by AGF Staff Offs).

154. (1) AGF ltr to CGs, 11 Feb 44, sub: Combat Firing. 471/1907. (2) AGF ltr to CGs, 14 Jun 44, sub: Combined Tng for Tanks and Tank Destroyer (TD) Units with Inf Divs. 353/2311. (3) Ibid, 16 Aug 44. (4) Ibid, 17 Aug 44.

155. Record of telephone conversations, Col S. E. Paine, AGF and staff offs of Second Army, Fourth Army, and XXII Corps, 21 Aug 44. AGF G-3 files, 333.1/338 (Inspections by AGF Staff Offs).

156. AGF ltr to CGs, 6 Oct 44, sub: Special Battle Courses. 353.01/61.

157. Reference as in note 155 above.

158. Transcript of Notes on Conference of CG AGF and Staff at 86th Inf Div, 28 Oct 44. AGF G-3 files, 333.1/461 (Inspections by AGF Staff Offs).

159. Statement of Ben Lear to AGF Hist Off, 20 Dec 44.

160. Statement of Col J. K. Bush, G-3 Sec, AGF to AGF Hist Off, 7 Feb 44.

161. Statement of Lt Col D. I. Devoren, AGF Gen Staff Secretariat to AGF Hist Off, 8 Feb 44.

162. This description of inspection procedure is based on (1) a study of transcripts of inspection conferences in AGF G-3 files, 333.1 (Inspections by AGF Staff Offs), (2) Statement of Brig Gen Leo Donovan, G-3 AGF to AGF Hist Off, 19 Feb 45, and (3) Personal observations of the AGF Hist Off.

163. (1) Statement of Brig Gen Leo Donovan to AGF Hist Off, 19 Feb 45. (2) Statement of Col J. K. Bush, G-3 Sec AGF to AGF Hist Off, 8 Feb 44.

164. Information compiled from AGF G-3 files, 333.1 (Inspections by AGF Staff Offs).

165. Statement of Brig Gen Leo Donovan to AGF Hist Off, 19 Feb 45.

166. AGF memo (C) for CofS USA, 24 Dec 45, sub: C-AMA. 320.2/104 (CAMA) (C).

167. (1) Information gleaned from DCofS's "Division Book." (2) AGF G-3 Chart, "AGF Maneuvers," dated 13 Apr 44. 3147 (AGF Hist). The divisions having tours in C-AMA were:

Infantry	Armored
6	3
7	4
8	5
33	6
77	7
79	9
80	11
81	
85	
90	
93	
95	
104	

180. Figures furnished by AGF AG Sec, C&RD.

181. Information from Lt Col B. V. Bryant's "Division Book," Mob Div, G-3, AGF Section.

182. (1) 94th Div memo G-1 to CG, 14 Jul 44, no subject. Files of AGF Hist Off. (2) Statement of G-1 65th Div to AGF Hist Off, 3 Nov 44. (3) TIG memo (R) for DCofS USA, 29 Sep 44, sub: Overseas Readiness Status of the 106th Inf Div. 353/992 (Readiness)(R). (4) TIG memo (R) for DCofS USA, 20 Sep 44, sub: Overseas Readiness Status of 100th Inf Div. Ibid.

183. Information furnished AGF Hist Off by Ag 69th Div, 2 Nov 44, at Cp Shelby, Miss. The 31st Div, inducted in Nov 1940, had a slightly larger loss of enlisted personnel than the 69th (22,511 as against 22,235), but the 31st losses extended over a considerably longer period (38 months as against 17 months). Officer losses of the 31st and 69th Divisions were 1,453 and 1,336 respectively. For figures on 31st Division see personal ltr of Maj Gen John C. Persons to Gen McNair, 31 Jan 44. 353/45 (31st Div).

184. Statement of Col Dunkley, CO 260th Inf Regt, 65th Inf Div to AGF Hist Off, 1 Nov 44.

185. Maj Gen Harry J. Malony, "Unit Commander's Six Month Report to Higher Headquarters," 20 Jun 44.

186. Ibid.

187. (1) Personal ltr of Maj Gen Harry J. Malony, CG 94th Div to Maj Gen John P. Lucas, CG Fourth Army, 22 Jul 44. 322/39 (94th Div). (2) Statement of G-1 65th Div to AGF Hist Off, 3 Nov 44. (3) TIG memo (R) for DCofS USA, 29 Sep 44, sub: Overseas Readiness Status of 106th Inf Div. 353/992 (Readiness)(R). (4) Information furnished AGF Hist Off by AG 69th Div, 2 Nov 44. (5) data furnished AGF Hist Off by G-1 65th Div, 3 Nov 44.

188. This statement is based on personal interviews by the AGF Hist Off with officers of the 86th, 84th, 63d, 65th, 69th, and 94th Inf Divs in June - July, 1944, and officers of the 65th and 69th Inf Divs in Oct - Nov, 1944. This source will be cited hereinafter as "Interviews with Division Officers." Notes of the interviews are in 314.7(AGF Hist).

189. Ibid.

190. Ibid.

190a. AGF M/S (S) to CofS, 7 Mar 44. 353/206 (S). General McNair's computation included this statement:

"It is manifest that the more completely a division is stripped, the greater the time required to retain the division as a unit. The following graduated scale of training is established:

Percent of maximum stripping	Weeks of retraining with RTC graduates	Weeks of retraining with Inductees
100	32	49
90	29	46
80	26	43
70	23	40
60	20	37

Percent of maximum stripping	Weeks of retraining with RTC graduates	Weeks of retraining with Inductees
50	17	34
40	14	31
30	11	28
20	8	25

As an example, let us assume that a division has 23 weeks remaining before its readiness date. Then its infantry may be stripped 70% of its maximum and the division refilled with RTC graduates. The maximum of course is all privates plus 5% NCO's. If RTC graduates were not available the division might be stripped only by 20% of the maximum, since it would be refilled by inductees."

191. AGF ltr to CGs, 27 Apr 44, sub: Supplemental Trng Dir for Specially Designated Divs. 353.01/114.

192. Statement of Gen Leo Donovan, G-3 AGF Hist Off, 19 Feb 45.

193. This statement is based on a study of the Status Reports of all the divisions concerned. Status Reports are filed in AGF AG Records G-3 Shipment Files (S). These reports give a summary of the divisions' training from activation until date of the report, which usually is within a month of movement to port.

194. Ibid.

195. Ibid.

196. Interviews with Div Offs.

197. (1) Statement of Maj Gen Harry J. Malony, CG 94th Div to AGF Hist Off, 18 Jul 44. (2) Statement of CofS 69th Div to AGF Hist Off, 16 Jul 44. (3) Statement of Maj Gen S. E. Reinhart, CG 65th Div to AGF Hist Off, 3 Nov 44.

198. Interviews with Div Offs.

199. (1) Tabulation, "Status of Divisions" in Lt Col B.V. Bryant's "Division Book," AGF G-3 Mob Div. (2) Studies in the History of AGF No 5, Procurement of Enlisted Personnel for AGF: the Problem of Quality, p 103.

200. Tabulation, "Status of Divisions" (dated 23 Sep 44) in Lt Col B. V. Bryant's "Division Book," AGF G-3 Mob Div. This table shows a total of 14,700 ASTP trainees removed from 36 divisions and given to nondivisional units.

201. Interviews with Div Offs.

202. Ibid.

203. Ibid.

204. C & RD M/S to G-3, 7 Aug 44, sub: Disposition of Surplus Inf NCOs. 220.3/9(NCOs).

205. AGF memo G-1 for G-3, 10 Jul 44, sub: Inspection Trip to Cp Carson and Cp McCoy, 6-8 Jul 44. AGF G-3 files, 333.1 (Sep Binder).

206. Interviews with Div Offs.

207. Statement of G-3 63d Div to AGF Hist Off, 6 Jul 44.

208. Statement of G-3 65th Div to AGF Hist Off, 3 Nov 44.

209. Interviews with Div Offs.

210. Memo of Maj G. H. Murphy, G-1 Sec AGF for G-3 AGF, 8 Sep 44, sub: Rpt of Visit of Inspection to 75th Inf Div and to Hq & Hq Dets Sp Trs, Second Army, Cp Breckenridge, Ky. Originally consulted in AGF G-3 files, 333.1 (Inspections by AGF Staff Offs); document missing in records at date of final revision.

211. This chart was prepared by the Judge Advocate of the 65th Div.

212. Statement of Judge Advocate 65th Div to AGF Hist Off, 2 Nov 44.

213. Statement of Col Dunkley, CO 260th Inf Rgt, 65th Inf Div to AGF Hist Off, 1 Nov 44.

214. AGF M/S (S) G-3 to CofS, 17 Oct 44, sub: Pers Status of Certain Divs. 320.2/760 (S).

215. Statement of Lt Col J. A. Hanson, G-4 Task Force Div to AGF Hist Off, 23 Feb 45.

216. This summary of the experiences of the 65th Div, unless otherwise indicated, is based on statements of staff officers and unit commanders of the Division to the AGF Hist Off on three visits to the 65th Div in 1944 as follows: (1) 30 Mar - 10 Apr, (2) 8 - 17 Jul, (3) 31 Oct - 3 Nov.

217. Master Card, 65th Inf Div, in files of AGF AG Sec, CARD.

218. This statement is based on observations of the MTP Test of the 65th Div by AGF Hist Off (including attendance of final critique), 3 - 7 Apr 44.

219. Statement of Lt Col Hunt, CO 2d Bn, 259th Inf Regt, 65th Inf Div to AGF Hist Off, 15 Jul 44.

220. Tab A to AGF M/S (S), G-3 Mob Div to G-3 Opns Div, 13 Oct 44, sub: Status of Pers in Divs. Lt Col B. V. Bryant's "Division Book."

221. Ibid.

222. Ibid, Tab B.

223. Statement of Lt Col C. G. Cooper, Co 3d Bn, 261st Inf Regt, 65th Inf Div to AGF Hist Off, 15 Jul 44.

224. Statement of Lt Col D. H. Arp, G-1 65th Div to AGF Hist Off, 14 Jul 44.

225. Ibid.

226. Ibid.

227. (1) Ibid. This exchange resulted from the War Department's decision to discontinue sending 18-year-old men overseas as individual replacements. See studies in the History of AGF No 4, Mobilization of the Ground Army. (2) Tab A to AGF M/S (S)

G-3 Mob Div to G-3 Opns Div, 13 Oct 44, sub: Status of Pers in Divs. Lt Col B. V. Bryant's "Division Book."

228. Statement of Brig Gen John E. Copeland, Asst Div Comdr 65th Div to AGF Hist Off, 11 Jul 44.

229. Statement of Lt Col D. H. Arp, G-1 65th Div to AGF Off, 14 Jul 44.

230. Ibid, 16 Jul 44.

231. Ibid, 14 Jul 44.

232. Ibid.

233. Statement of Maj Gen S. E. Reinhart, CG 65th Div to AGF Hist Off, 3 Nov 44.

234. Information furnished AGF Hist Off by G-1 65th Div, 3 Nov 44.

235. (1) ltr (R) to CG Second Army, 20 Sep 44, sub: Preparation of Unit for Overseas Serv (Alert Instructions). 353/729 (Int Tng)(R). (2) For the character and meaning of the alert status, see Studies in the History of AGF No 21, Preparation of Units for Overseas Movement.

236. TIG memo (R) for DCofS USA, 15 Dec 44, sub: Overseas Readiness Status of the 65th Inf Div. 353/1220 (Readiness)(R).

237. Statement of Capt Robert Farber, Classification Off 65th Div to AGF Hist Off, 2 Nov 44. Capt Farber said that about half of a shipment of 400 men transferred to the 65th Div by the 71st Div on 22 Oct 44 (they were supposed to be POR qualified) had to be sent back to the 71st Div because they could not meet physical or other requirements for overseas service.

238. (1) Ibid. (2) WD ltr (R) 370.5 (15 Oct 44) OP-S-E-M to CGs, 15 Oct 44, sub: Movement Orders Shipment 4848. 370.5/1054 (MO)(R).

239. Memo (C) of Lt Col J. S. Hardin, G-4 65th Div for Lt Col J. A. Hanson, G-4 Task Force Div, AGF, 31 Oct 44 (no subject). AG Files, G-4 Movement Orders, Shipment 4848.

240. AGF memo(R) to CofS USA, 6 Nov 44, sub: Amendment to Movement Orders. Shipment 4848 (Memo for Record). 370.5/1366 (MO)(S).

241. Statement of Maj H. B. Dominick, G-4 Task Force Div to AGF Hist Off, 24 Feb 45.

242. 65th Div Status Report (C) (prepared by Second Army) dated 7 Dec 44. AGF G-3, Shipment File 4848 (S).

243. Information furnished AGF Hist Off by G-4 AGF Task Force Div, 24 Feb 45.

244. AGF M/S (S) G-3 for CofS, 17 Oct 44, sub: Pers Status of Certain Divs. 320.2/760 (S).

245. Statement of Maj Gen S. E. Reinhart, CG 65th Div to AGF Hist Off, 3 Nov 44.

246. Personal ltr of Maj Gen John C. Persons, CG 31st Div to Gen McNair, 31 Jan 45. 353/45 (31st Div).

247. AGF memo for CofS USA, 3 Feb 44, sub: Tng Performance of the 31st Inf Div. 353/45 (31st Div).