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2. The Civic Action Statistical Summary includes data which applies to the period 25 June through 25 July.

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OPERATION SEA LORDS SUMMARY

During the month of August, operation SEA LORDS, combining the efforts of elements of the Coastal Surveillance, River Patrol, and Mobile Riverine Forces (the latter for the last time since it was disestablished on 25 August) in coordination with other U.S. and Vietnamese Forces, placed increased emphasis on interdicting enemy infiltration routes from Cambodia. At the same time these forces continued to pacify vital trans-Delta waterways and to harass the enemy in his base areas.

Several changes were made in the various campaigns during the month, the first of which was on 6 August when CTG 116.1 assumed the designator CTG 194.3 and became commander of the Search Turn (Rach Gia) Campaign. At the same time, CORIVDIV 513 vacated CTU 116.1.3 and assumed 194.3.2 as did COM RIVDIV 553 when he assumed 194.3.2 from CTU 116.1.0. Hal 3 DET 8 assumed 194.3.3 in another change. The 07-10's previously under the operational control of SEA LORDS reverted back to TF 116 although they continued to support SEA LORDS forces. Finally, TF 117 was disestablished on 25 August with the remaining Navy components being redesignated the Riverine Strike Group under Commander Task Group 194.7 and taking over the responsibility for the Song Van Co patrol on 28 August and for the Cho Gao Canal on the last of the month.

Overall activity for the SEA LORDS campaigns increased significantly in August with 585 enemy killed by all the SEA LORDS forces this month, August ranks higher than any other previous month in terms of enemy casualties inflicted and is significantly greater than July when 354 enemy were killed (excluding Search Turn). The same is true for hostile fire incidents which increased from 217 in July to 253 in August. These increased results were not without cost to USN and VVN forces as their casualties doubled from 6 killed and 43 wounded in July to 13 killed and 90 wounded in August.
U.S. NAVY UNITS

ARMORED TROOP CARRIER

US-18 GUNSHIP

OPERATION "GIANT SLINGSHOT"

MONITOR

RIVER PATROL BOAT

CAMBODIA

ASSAULT SUPPORT PATROL BOAT
Operation Giant Slingshot was initiated to interdict the enemy's infiltration of men and supplies from the "Parrot's Beak" area of Cambodia into Vietnam. It is a combined operation involving the efforts of the three major U. S. Navy Task Forces (until TF 117 was disestablished on 25 August), Vietnamese River Assault Groups, and U. S. and ARVN ground troops. During August, an average of 72 PBR's, 29 RAC's, 3 HSM's, and 49 VN4t craft (for a total of 153) were committed to Giant Slingshot.

Despite the fact that the number of hostile fire incidents (122 in August versus 118 in July) and the number of two boat patrols conducted (1752 in August versus 1765 in July) were similar for the two months, casualties for both sides were up significantly during August. Enemy killed by USN and VN units increased from 147 in July to 216 in August. Similarly, casualties for the Navy forces increased from four killed and twenty-three wounded to ten killed and sixty-nine wounded.

The TACR's for most 194.9 Task Units were modified at the end of July and were in effect throughout the month of August. The realignment was made taking into consideration district boundaries, Army AO's, and artillery fans in the respective areas in order to provide the optimum in coordination and to eliminate any problems of mutual interference. On 28 August, CTG 194.7 (Riverine Strike Force) assumed the TACR for the Song Van Co between the confluence Van Co Dong/Van Co Tay and the juncture of the Van Co/Soi Rap formerly patrolled by 1 ASPB's of TE 194.9.1. The new boundaries are delineated on the asset locator that follows the incident narrative and SEA LEXIS statistics.
The incident narratives which follow have been chosen to provide an overview of activity/combats operations in the Giant Slingshot area of operations:

On the morning of 3 August, WNU RAID 73 units picked up the Duc Hoa District Chief, the Assistant District Chief, the Duc Hoa RF Company 362, and the Duc Hoa District CRIP Platoon from District Headquarters and inserted them on the west bank of the Van Co Dong River across from Hiep Hoa. The CRIP platoon with the District Chief and the Assistant Chief patrolled south into a recently vacated VC base camp located approximately two miles southeast of Hiep Hoa. With the aid of a metal detector, the CRIP platoon recovered a well preserved cache containing 32 82mm mortar rounds, 12 60mm mortar rounds, 12 B-40 rockets and propellant charges, 6 cases of detonators, 2 cases of Chicom grenades, 1 40 lb anti-tank mine, and 1 Chicom dish type claymore mine.

Just prior to midnight on 5 August, two PBR's of TV 194.9.2 were in waterborne guardpost positions ten miles northwest of Tan An (XS 459 732) on the Van Co Tay River when they observed movement on the beach. The PBR's took the area under fire with unknown results and without receiving return fire. The following day, local intelligence sources reported that four VC/VA were killed in the action, one of whom was shot in the head and another in the abdomen. This information corresponds to troop reports of intestines and blood trails in the area.

In an operation based on intelligence reports of an enemy com-bi-laison station located approximately ten miles southeast of Ben Luc (XS 698 625), U.S. Navy SEAL's accompanied by two WNU LDHN's were inserted on the west bank of the Van Co Dong River about a mile east of their objective by LCPL in the evening on 6 August. Taking up positions around the target area, the SEAL's observed a two man armed roving patrol and 16-20 men conversing...
in hootches. At five minutes after midnight, the SEAL’s initiated action and ceased fire after 15 minutes to allow firing runs by Seawolves and Black Pony aircraft that had been called in and were holding in the area. Artillery was called in after the airstrikes for illumination of the site while a search was conducted that revealed four VC/NVA bodies along with numerous blood trails, two AK-47’s, two K-54 pistols, and 30 kilos of documents. There were no friendly casualties.

In the early evening on 6 August, an Army observation aircraft spotted VC running along a small canal off the west bank of the Van Co Dong River two miles south of Hiêp Hoa (XT 140 042). Seawolves on patrol nearby were vectored to the area and coordinated with a PBR patrol from RTN-DIV 552. A LRRP team in ambush positions nearby and the aircraft fired into the area with automatic weapons. The LRRP monitored a burst of AK-47 fire directed at the gunships from a treeline 200 meters to the south and the PBR patrol that was standing by proceeded to the area and placed M-60 fire and 60mm grenades into the treeline. As the gunships departed to rearm and refuel at Duc Hoa, the FAC observed three more VC running from the area. Artillery was called in (reaction time of 6 minutes) resulting in one VC killed and two VC probably killed. At this time, the PBR’s received 2 or 3 rounds of small arms fire from the east bank of the river and closing the bank returned fire with 60mm and CS grenades. One man seen running away was taken under fire and was observed as he fell into the canal by the PBR patrol and the FAC. By now, two additional patrols of PBR’s had moved in to assist, one of which had a LRRP team embarked which was inserted to search for bodies. After insertion, the team heard movement and voices very near their position and initiated contact with claymores and automatic weapons. The
team marked its flanks for extraction and immediately thereafter experienced a large explosion - possibly a booby trap or mine set off when the team shifted positions. One of the PBR patrols placed fire on the team's flanks and moved in for extraction. Due to personnel casualties among the LRRP's, they could not be immediately extracted. Another patrol of boats moved in and PBR sailors jumped ashore to establish a landing zone for the dust off helo while other crewmen administered first aid. Air evacuation of seriously wounded personnel was accomplished with the now returned LHPT providing overhead cover and later placing an additional strike on the contact area. Upon completion of the strike, additional LRRP's returned to the contact area and retrieved the field gear of the wounded in action. Friendly casualties amounted to two U. S. Army troops killed and four wounded (two serious). Enemy casualties were one NVA killed and three NVA probably killed.

On 10 August, U. S. Navy SEAL's led by a Hoi Chan attempted recovery of two reported intelligence caches. After insertion by LSSC and PBR six miles northwest of Ben Luc on the east bank of the Van Co Dong River (XS 556 822), the SEAL's patrolled 300 meters to the south where they found 70 82mm mortar rounds in a bomb crater. After extraction, the SEAL's were reinserted 35 miles down river and found the second reported cache site, however, it had been emptied within the past 72 hours.

In the morning on 12 August, two Seawolves of TU 194.9.8 were placing a strike for U. S. Army Special Forces at Duc Hoa when they were called to support TU 194.9.3 units in contact two miles north of Hiep Hoa on the Van Co Dong River (XT 415 105). The LHPT expended remaining ammunition, returned to base and refueled, and sortied to the contact area to cover troop
insertion, receiving and suppressing small arms fire in the process. Upon release by CTG 194.9.3, the Seawolves proceeded to assist U. S. Army units four miles southeast of Duc Hoa, placing a strike on a bunker complex with assistance from a "SEAF TAC. "While rearming, the Seawolves were again scrambled, this time to support TU 194.9.4 units who had spotted 8-10 VC on the river bank of the Van Co Tay five miles west northwest of Tuyen Hhon where they placed a strike. The two Seawolves, during the morning's operations, expended 27,000 rounds of 7.62mm and 70 2.75" rockets. Later in the day, OV-10's from TU 116.4.9 placed an airstrike in a wooded area 8 miles west of Duc Hoa (LS 910 915). Ground units broke contact to allow the airstrike, and heliborne units observed the strike devastate the main enemy position which resulted in 15 VC probably killed.

Just after midnight on the 14th of August, TE 194.9.5.1 units consisting of a VN CCB and two USN ATO's were on routine patrol of the V. o Dong 6 miles southwest of Tay Ninh with one platoon of ARVN Airborne Ready Reaction Troops when they were called to respond to an enemy attack on an ARVN Airborne base camp. The units made approximately ten firing runs and provided constant illumination for the base camp. Receiving return fire on all runs, it was quickly suppressed. The USA advisor at the base camp coordinated TACAIR, gunship, and artillery strikes in the area where an estimated three enemy battalions were assaulting the base. The Navy was credited with 20 out of the 73 VC killed by body count while suffering no casualties. The ARVN lost 14 killed and had 43 personnel wounded. In addition, the ARVN captured two VC and 12 enemy weapons.

Four PBR's of RIVDIV 592, on routine patrol of the Van Co Dong River ten miles southeast of Tay Ninh, were ambushed just before midnight on 13
August receiving heavy recoiler rifle fire. The units took several hits, suffered personnel casualties, and attempted to clear to the south. Due to communications difficulties, the patrol officer transferred to the cover boat which soon began sinking. The wounded personnel were taken off the cover boat, but the patrol officer was not recovered. Listed as missing in action, he was subsequently declared killed in action. Bronco aircraft were called in and received heavy automatic weapons fire over the target. TACAIR was then requested and placed strikes. An additional PBR patrol was dispatched to assist, and when they arrived on the scene, they received heavy enemy fire which resulted in one of the boats having to beach due to excessive flooding. Weapons and personnel were removed from the beached craft without sustaining casualties. Artillery was called in and RF troops were lifted to the area to provide security. Salvage operations began at first light and by that afternoon, both boats had been recovered and one was helo-lifted to Tra Cu, and the other was towed to Go Dau Ha. Friendly casualties were one USN killed and eight USN and three VN wounded. Enemy casualties were unknown.

Two PBR's of RVN Navy 531 were on routine patrol of the Vam Co Dong River eight miles south southwest of Tay Ninh (KT 288 377) when they received four B-40 rockets and automatic weapons fire at 2025 on 14 August. One of the boats took a B-40 hit which ruptured a fuel tank followed by another hit which ignited the fuel. Crew members managed to extinguish the blaze, but in spite of their efforts, the boat sank in about five minutes. Both boats were able to clear the kill zone prior to the sinking. Sea wolves, Broncos, and artillery were called in on the area and alternated strikes. Additional PBR's with RF troops embarked were sent.
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To the scene to secure the area around the sunken craft, which was later salvaged and sent to Ban Luc. In the action, two US (one serious) and one VN were wounded. Enemy casualties are unknown.

While in transit on the Van Co Dong River 12 miles southwest of Saigon, one of the two WACs with ARVN and USA troops embarked took a direct hit in the well dock just after midnight on the fifteenth of August. The boats beached, and the army units secured the area for dust-off helos. Later analysis of the shell fragments identified the round as a 75mm recoiless rifle round. Friendly casualties amounted to six ARVN killed and 11 ARVN and three USA wounded. There were no enemy casualties.

The following morning at 0222, two WAC and a U.S. Zippo on patrol with 77 troops embarked received several hits from enemy rocket and automatic weapons fire 13 miles south of Tay Ninh on the Van Co Dong River (KT 312 270). The units returned fire and cleared with the exception of the Zippo which flared down the contact area while the other units returned to Go Dau Ha to medevac their casualties. Seawolves and Broncos were called in and placed airstrikes in the area followed by artillery. TACAIR was requested but was unable to put in a strike due to the low ceiling. Friendly casualties in the action were 2 VN killed, two USN wounded (one serious), 6 VN wounded (two serious), and four RF wounded (serious). Enemy casualties are unknown.

On the morning of 17 August, PBS's and WAC provided support for a troop sweep along the Van Co Dong River eight miles south southeast of Tay Ninh City, the site of a previous ambush. During the sweep, the troops found one B-ho launcher, five B-ho rockets, two B-ho boosters, one backpack and the burned and mangled remains of three VC. Heavy wood trails in the area indicated that at least three more bodies had been dragged off. There was no enemy contact.
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Comm 1214.9-5.1 MAC were in waterborne guardpost positions on the Van Co Dong River west-southwest of Tay Ninh when an ARVN airborne base camp nearby (KT 113 h33) reported they were under mortar, automatic weapons, and rifle grenade fire at 0205 on 17 August. The units immediately commenced flanking fire north of the camp and a nearby TBR patrol moved into position south of the camp and began flanking fire while two additional TBR patrols were scrambled to ensure against an enemy river crossing attempt. U. S. Army advisors at the camp coordinated fire from afloat units, artillery, and Bronco aircraft. At 0410, the enemy broke contact and retreated to the west, however, the afloat units continued to provide illumination until daylight. A sweep of the battlefield at first light turned up 15 NVA bodies. Two VN ARVN were killed and three wounded in the action along with one USN slightly wounded. General Henderson visited Ben Gio after the battle and expressed his "well done" to TE 194.9-5.1 and OV-10's for assisting the ARVN airborne in repelling the attack. A debrief by Airborne Advisors revealed that the OV-10's were responsible for repulsing a counter attack by the VC at about 0400.

Four VCMAC of RAID 71 acted as a blocking force for a sweep by the 795th 5/60th Infantry Battalion troops of the 9th Division along the Van Co Dong River 15 miles southwest of Saigon (IS 630 709). While in position at 1730 on 18 August, the boats observed 6 VC/NVA at the water's edge pretending to be dead and who attempted to evade as the boats approached to investigate. The units beached and took the enemy under fire killing three and wounding one but were unable to fire on two of the evaders due to the close proximity of friendly troops. However, they were later killed by Army personnel. Upon completion of the sweep, troops ashore had accounted
for 36 VC killed by body count, 6 VC prisoners, and one Hoi Chan. Friendly casualties were one USA killed and 6 USA wounded. Ground units also captured 17 AK-47's, one B-40 launcher, two M-54 pistols, and six 7.62mm rounds.

Beginning at 0500 on the 20th of August, VN 3AC of RAID 70 inserted, supported, and extracted 300 troops from the 25th ARVN Division 16 miles southwest of Saigon on the Van Co Tay River (XS 635 62h). The troops had light contact which resulted in 7 VC killed by body count and one ARVN wounded (minor). Five AK-47's were also captured in the action.

In the evening on 21 August, two PBR's of 194.9.2 inserted a seven man Ranger team from the 9th Division, 19 miles southwest of Saigon on the Van Co Tay River (XS 700 580). A little over an hour later, the team made contact with approximately two squads of VC, and Seawolves were requested on a standby basis. The team had come across a large complex which was later found to be a VC hospital containing 15 beds, a mess hall, and other accommodations. Shortly afterward, the troops came under heavy enemy fire, and Seawolves put in airstrikes along with Broncos that had been scrambled. A second seven man Ranger team was inserted by two more PBR's and still two more PBR's moved in to provide a blocking force. Three additional squads of Rangers were inserted by helo following by airstrikes when one of the squads heard movements on three sides of their position. There was no further action during the night, and at first light, a sweep proved enemy casualties to be four VC killed by body count. Two were credited to the Army and two to Seawolves. There were no friendly casualties.

Late in the morning on 26 August, PBR's were approached by children who showed them the location of one B-40 rocket on the bank of the Van Co Dong River 12 miles southeast of Tay Ninh (XT 346 315). Later in the
PCF's conduct high speed river incursion during SEA LCRDS operations.
afternoon, the units discovered three more B-40's and a number of spider holes in the same area, which is directly across the river from a location which Go Dau Ha units use to medevac casualties. Apparently, the enemy was setting up to attack the boats during a dust-off.

Acting on intelligence reports and led by a Hoi Chan, SEAL's were inserted on the Van Co Dong 16 miles southwest of Saigon (XS 574 776) on 28 August in search of an enemy cache. Among the articles recovered were: 25 boxes of fuse ignitors and detonators, 21 grenades, 20 batteries, 50 electric blasting caps, 100 ordinary blasting caps, 18 cans of 60mm propellant, 12 mines, five satchel charges, 1,000 rounds of 30 caliber ammunition. It is believed that the area was used extensively as a rear service supply depot for local water sapper units and that the supplies were possibly targeted against the boats that patrol this section of river and for use against Ben Luc Bridge. Also on 28 August, two PBR's of TU 19h.9.3 inserted, supported, and extracted LRRP Team 21 on the Van Co Dong River approximately 2 miles north of Tra Cu. The LRRP's initiated contact with eight VC who were evading an Army troop sweep to the northwest. Three VC were killed by body count, and there were no friendly casualties.

On the 31st of August, PBR's of RITDIV 573 were conducting a routine canal incursion when they sighted a 55 gallon oil drum at the water's edge seven miles east of Tuyen Nhon just off the Van Co Tay River (XS 388 774). The barrel contained 227 Chicom 'Potato Masher' grenades.
Lang Thit-Nicholai/Cho Gao Canal

Although 1st Lani (I N D I V 535) and Tu 196.6.2 (I N D I V 572) were committed to it, activity in the Lang Thit-Nicholai/Cho Gao Canal area of operations (A0) was relatively light throughout the month with only four hostile fire fights recorded. U.S. Navy activity was aimed primarily at establishing a PMI presence on this vital north-south waterway through the use of routine patrols for traffic checks, night waterborne guardposts, psyops, and medcaps in order to bring about firmer GVN control of the area. Support of U.S. Army and Vietnamese forces in the way of transport and blocking forces was also provided. Navy SEAL’s participated in a series of operations in response to intelligence on suspected VC PAVN camps in the area but achieved no success in locating them. There were no US casualties during the period and enemy casualties were 19 killed (two probable), one wounded, and four captured. Specific incident narratives for this campaign will be found in the River Patrol Force section of this summary.

Border Interdiction Campaign
Tran Hung Dao and Barrier Reef West

Redeployment of two U.S. 9th Infantry Brigades, activation of new VJR RAID's, and restructuring of TF 117 to become TG 194.7 prompted a review of Navy assets in III and IV Corps to enhance the interdiction of infiltration from Cambodia at a time when the enemy is possibly attempting to fortify his logistics base capability and to rebuild his personnel structure throughout the Delta. As a result, the Border Interdiction Campaign, an inclusive term for the Tran Hung Dao and Barrier

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The first night in August, four PBR's from CTJ 194.4.4 and 20 Special Forces troops in a waterborne guardpost on the Vinh Te Canal 16 miles north-
east of Ha Tien (VS 630 635) spotted seven VC 100 meters north of their position. Fire was initiated by the US sniper and followed by fire from the PBR's and SF troops prior to a sweep of the area. During the sweep, a wounded VC threw a grenade which injured the US sniper and two SF troops, and while trying to assist the injured, a VN was killed and a USN wounded by a second enemy grenade. After all enemy fire was suppressed, Seawolves out of Vinh MIA evacuated all wounded personnel to Chau Doc. Army gunships and Navy Seawolves placed rocket and machine gun strikes into the contact area, and a sweep at first light revealed two VC bodies bringing the total enemy casualties to four VC killed and three VC probably killed. In addition, two AK-47's were captured in the action.

At just after midnight on 5 August, four VI junk in waterborne guard-post nine miles northeast of Ha Tien (VS 530 597) reported receiving B-40 and automatic weapons fire from the south bank of the Rach Giang Thanh. The VN Officer in Charge ordered the junk to open fire, and this return fire landed in close proximity to another waterborne guardpost manned by two USN PGP's and 20 PF troops who were one mile to the south around a bend in the river. The PGP's returned fire and cleared to the south. The situation was quickly resolved without friendly casualties. A reaction team swept the area of initial enemy contact with negative results.

Late at night on the 15th of August, five Coastal Group 42 junk and 20 SF troops sighted 30 VC moving toward their position on the north bank of the Vinh Te Canal 79 miles northeast of Ha Tien (VS 710 620). The SF troops took the enemy under fire and were supported by the VN junk. Negative return fire was received, and there were no friendly casualties. Enemy casualties are unknown.
In 21 August, two VSR's in waterborne guardpost positions nine miles northeast of Ha Tien on the Rach Giang Thanh (VS 552 583) observed one individual approaching from the east late at night. The units commenced fire at a range of 50 feet killing the enemy. A few minutes later a white light and cigarette glow were seen on the west bank of the river which extinguished as the units approached. A firing run was made on the area, and two enemy were probably killed. There were no friendly casualties.

The following evening, just prior to dawn, VSR units in waterborne guardpost 16 miles northwest of Ha Tien (VS 600 710) on the Vinh Te Canal received B-40 and AK-47 fire from an estimated 12 VC. As fire was returned, four of the VC were spotted on the north bank. A sweep at first light revealed two blood trails on the north bank and numerous footprints on the south bank. Enemy casualties were three VC probably wounded while there were no friendly casualties.

At 0115 on the 26th of August, a CIDG advisor reported the presence of an estimated battalion size VC force adjacent to the Rach Giang Thanh eight miles northeast of Ha Tien. Two FSR's and one PCP from TE 194.1 moved into the area to act as a blocking force while Navy gunships placed strikes in the area. There was no return fire from the area, and a sweep produced negative results. One CIDG trooper was wounded slightly by helo fire.

At 0615 on 31 August, two FSR's from the Vinh Te Canal Patrol Unit "A" were proceeding east on the canal when they observed two persons waving and heading toward them. One was carrying two AK-47's and the other an ax. The two stated that they desired to Chieu Hoi and that there were nine more in Cambodia who wished to do the same. One of the Hoi Chans asked to fire into the air to signal the other nine, who came to the boats after the signal was
All eleven Hoi Chans were disarmed, searched, and embarked for Chau Doc where they were turned over to NLC for disposition.

On the morning of 6 August, at the request of the An Phu District Senior Advisor, two PBR's of TU 154.4.6 inserted ten TF troops and a U. S. Army advisor ten miles north of Chau Doc where the Rach Co Lau branches off the Upper Bassac (LT 10° 020'). The operation was an immediate response to intelligence reports that three VC had just moved into a small village at the location. As a result, two VC (one male, one female) were captured, and one VC suspect was detained. There were no friendly casualties.

Late at night on 9 August, two TE 154.4.8.1 Seawolves using night observation devices sighted two enemy sampans on the Rach So Ha just east of the Upper Mekong, 18 miles northeast of Chau Doc (MS 600 95F). Five VC spotted on this known enemy infiltration route were probably killed when taken under fire by the helos.

Just after midnight on the 17th of August, PBR's reacting to intelligence provided by Vietnamese authorities were in waterborne guardpost positions nine and one half miles east of An Long (MS 566 803). Observing the approach of two enemy sampans, the PBR's called in Seawolves and together they opened fire on the enemy craft killing four VC. The following day during a sweep of the area by TF troops, two VC were captured. There were no friendly casualties.
After a considerable period of relative inactivity, the area around the city of Rach Gia and the group of mountains to the north known as the "Three Sisters" has been the site of continued and recently increased enemy infiltration. To counter this building and to interdict the enemy's movement into the delta, CTU 19h.3, consisting of two Interpretation, a Seawolf team, and an IH, was formed and tasked to dedicate 50% of its assets to offshore day and night patrols since intelligence reports indicated seaward infiltration into the shoreline between the "Three Sisters" and the shoreline south of the mouth of the Song Cal Ion. The remaining 50% were available to respond to Province and ARVN requests for support and operated in the Ha Tien-Rach Gia, Tri Ton, Ba The, Van Ray, and various other adjoining waterways. To reduce travel time to the northern part of the AO, a new ATSP was established at Tri Ton 16 miles northwest of Rach Gia at the intersection of the Ha Tien-Rach Gia and 1st Ton Canals. During July, Search Turn came under the operational control of CTU 196, but since it has once again become an interdiction barrier, the task designator was changed in August to 19h.3 as Search Turn returned to Operation SEA LORDS.

The first significant action of the month occurred on 4 August when two Seawolves from CTU 19h.3.3 accounted for five VC killed and one armed VC junk destroyed as they took the junk under fire one mile off the beach 17 miles west northwest of Rach Gia (VS 150 160). At the termination of the flight, two small arms hits were discovered in one of the aircraft.

Just after dark on the following evening, three CTU 19h.3.2 PBR's were in guardpost positions on the Van Ray Canal which leads from the Gulf of Thailand to the Ha Tien-Rach Gia Canal, 27 miles northwest of Rach Gia (VS 796 377), when two sampans were sighted. When hailed, the two sampans
opened fire which was then suppressed by PBR's. As they broke their guard-
posts to inspect the sampans, the PBR's received and suppressed fire from
the south bank and then cleared to the north. After airstrikes by Broncos,
Shadow and Spooky aircraft, and a troop sweep, the results of the action
were five NVA VC killed, two AC-130's, one rifle grenade, one nine, and
2,000 rounds of AC-130 ammunition captured. There were no friendly casu-
alties.

In the same general area on the Song Hot Canal (VS 797 355) during the
early morning hours on 8 August, three sampans were sighted and taken under
fire by CTU 194.3 PBR's. Under continuous illumination provided by Sha-
dow aircraft, the PBR crewmen inspected the sunken sampans that had gone down
in shallow water. Twelve 107mm rockets and fuzes were recovered along with
four grenades and a large medical kit. In all, three VC were killed, and
three more were probably killed while friendly forces suffered no casualties.
One female was detained who was suspected of being a scout for a large enemy
unit. She was turned over to the Fourth Coastal Zone Intelligence Officer
for interrogation.

Back on the Van Bay Canal (VS 773 296) at just after midnight the fol-
lowing day, two PBR's of CTU 194.3 observed a sampan with three personnel
approaching their position. Two of the occupants were holding weapons while
the third was paddling. At a range of twenty feet, the PBR's took the enemy
under fire, and all of the enemy personnel were observed to fall into the
water where their bodies were swept away by the fast current. The bodies
were not recovered, but it is highly probable that all three VC were killed.

During the night on 12 August, the ATSB and the RF compound nearby at
Vinh Son received a total of nine rounds of 75 mm recoilless rifle fire.
After the initial four rounds, all units, including the CCB which acts as the operation center, dispersed along the canals in the area. IHPT's were scrambled and were overhead in eight minutes for strikes on Kui Soc Son, a mountain to the southwest believed to be the origin of the hostile fire (VS 223 260). Results of the enemy shelling were one RF trooper killed and three civilians wounded.

The ATSB at Kien Son was hit again by enemy fire along with the RF compound just after midnight on the 16th of August. In addition to 107mm rounds, they also received two 8-ho rockets and small arms fire from northeast of the base. Seawolves and Black Pony aircraft were scrambled and placed strikes in the area from which the enemy fire was emanating. Some of the underway PBR's received automatic weapons fire from both banks of the Tri Ton Canal (VS 223 260) which they returned and suppressed while other PBR's reconnoitered by fire along the northeast bank of the Ha Tien-Rach Gia Canal (vic VS 936 280). Enemy casualties as a result of the action were two VC killed while friendly casualties amounted to two RF killed and two wounded and one civilian killed. Later in the morning at 0620, the ATSB was hit again with two 107mm rounds followed that night by six 8-ho rockets and small arms fire at 2330. Seawolves and Broncos were called in to place strikes in the area from which the attack had originated. The only casualty was one J. S. advisor wounded by small arms fire.

Four PBR's of CTU 14-3.2 were conducting BUSWACK (combination land and waterborne guardposts) operations with 35 Kien Son RF troops on the night of 16 August when they sighted two sampans on the Luynh Quynh Canal, 19 miles northwest of Rach Gia (VS 662 2h0). The sampans, with three passengers each, were taken under fire killing three VC while the others
evaded upstream. Seawolves were scrambled and placed a strike in the area and departed. Several hours later, the units started receiving incoming mortar fire and support was again requested. Seawolves, Spooky, and Delta HaNX aircraft placed strikes into the suspected enemy positions. A troop sweep was conducted at first light with negative results. Items recovered from the captured sampans included 25 homemade grenades, two rifles, a metal container of explosives, three back packs, and some documents.

In the early evening on the 23rd of August, during a single ship visual recon by a Seawolf from CTU 194.3.3, several sampans were sighted beneath a tree, and 14 blue-uniformed men were seen running from the area located 20 miles northwest of Rach Gia (VS 675 293). A second Seawolf was scrambled, clearance was obtained to place a strike in the area, and the results were two VC killed, nine probably killed, two sampans sunk, and three sampans damaged. A short while later, while providing overhead cover for PBR's four miles to the southeast, the Seawolves spotted some bunkers, a lean-to area, and several enemy scurrying for cover. A second strike was placed which resulted in five probable kills.

Late at night on the 29th of August, two PBR's of TJ 194.3.2 were in guardpost positions on the Ha Tien-Rach Gia Canal 13 miles northwest of Rach Gia (VS 973 226) when they observed 12 VC approaching from the northeast. They had closed to 150 meters, they were taken under fire by the PBR's who received return fire not only from the approaching element but also from a security element located 150 meters to the southeast. Suppressing the enemy fire, the PBR's called in Seawolves, and the patrol officer directed the strike into the target area. At this time, the CCB from Kien Son arrived on the scene and reconnoitered the area by fire. A troop sweep of the area revealed
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Four U.S. soldiers killed and provided the capture of one rifle and assorted personal documents. Two U.S. Navy sailors were wounded in the action from a double load explosion of an M-60 machine gun, and one was wounded as a result of a 160 grenade launcher fire. All the wounded were treated on board and returned to duty.
PCF's backed up by Huey gunships set out on a SEA LORDS mission.
MARKET TIME Raider operations consisting of two or more PCF's and supported by helicopters, OV-10, and OV-6A aircraft and U.S. Coast Guard WFP's continued to strike heavily at enemy base areas along the rivers and canals of the III and IV Corp areas during August. The Third and Fourth Coastal Zone Raiders conducted almost 90 separate missions in support of Operations SEA LORUS and SEA FLOAT. The swift boats in addition to conducting H and I fire, and responding to requests for urgent gunfire support and manning of waterborne guardposts, inserted, extracted, and supported ground forces consisting of Underwater Demolition Teams, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Teams, SEALS, PHU's, HN/FP troops and ARVN soldiers. Enemy initiated hostile fire incidents increased again over July with 43 incidents reported. There were eight USN and one VNM Swift boats and three aircraft damaged in the firefights. Friendly casualties were one U.S. sailor and one Vietnamese sailor killed and eleven U.S. and four Vietnamese sailors wounded.

Enemy personnel losses by combined allied forces increased over July with 93 Viet Cong killed (70 body count and 23 probable), seven wounded, and eleven captured. Enemy material losses also increased over the previous month with 214 watercraft and 445 structures destroyed, 17 craft and 261 structures heavily damaged and two craft captured.

Although these operations continued to achieve maximum damage in secret zones and enemy base areas, the primary emphasis continued to center on the pacification of the Ca Mau Peninsula under Operation SEA FLOAT/TRAN HUNG DAO III.
MARKET TIME Raiders, consisting of PCF's 32, 98, and 100 on the morning of 6 August took targets of opportunity under fire along the banks of the Rach Sau (XS 733028), Rach Bang Cung (XR 760962) and Rach Eo Loi (XR 729880) in the area about 17 miles east of Phu Vinh in Vinh Binh Province. The targets had sector clearance and visual recon was provided by the IV Corp Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer (NGLO). The Swift boats scored heavily as they destroyed 41 structures and 14 watercraft while heavily damaging 20 structures and 28 bunkers. There were no friendly casualties and enemy casualties are unknown.

On the morning of 8 August, five PCF's and four PRR's conducted area prep fire on Hon Lio Lio Island about 11 miles southeast of Go Cong (XS 9650) prior to the insertion of airborne troops. During the prep fire several secondary explosions were observed. The PRR troops were inserted at 0930 and immediately came in contact with the enemy. Throughout the day and night the Swift boats provided H and I fire and blocking force and received intermittent A/W fire. At 2230 07-10 aircraft arrived in the op area and the PCF's provided targets and illumination. The Swift boats and PRR's were detached the morning of 9 August following a prep of the area for another troop insertion. PCF 103 received S/A fire hits causing only minor damage and slightly wounding a U.S. sailor. The LHPT and PRR troops killed 55 Viet Cong and captured numerous weapons, ammunition, and documents.
On the morning of 7 August PCF’s 32, 59, and 102 entered the Song Lang Nuoc, Bach Sau, Song Ba Dong and Bach Can Ban in Vinh Binh Province taking targets of opportunity under fire about 25 miles southeast of Phu Vinh (XH 7372). The probe of the canals was unopposed and targets consisted of sampans, bunkers, trench lines and small villages. The operation netted 15 watercraft, and two structures destroyed, ten bunkers, two structures damaged and 70 ft of trench line caved in.

In the early morning hours of 15 August, PCF’s 37 and 100 with 20 PRU’s from Huong My moved in for insertion about six miles north of Phu Vinh (XS 470082). While the PRU’s swept their objective area the Swift boats provided cover. Although there was no gun damage assessment reported for the PCF’s the PRU’s killed 10 Viet Cong and captured one VC with several documents. There were no friendly casualties.

The PT MARINE (USCG WPB) and PT PARTRIDGE (USCG WPB) supported by OV-10 aircraft, took targets of opportunity under fire along the Song Ganh Hao about 35 miles northeast of the SEA FLOAT MSTB (MQ 464960) on the morning of 29 August. Firing at a range of 10-1500 yards, the WPB’s and OV-10’s achieved maximum results. The Bronco airstrikes resulted in four structures and eight sampans destroyed, three structures damaged and one large secondary explosion. The WPB’s destroyed 61 sampans, five structures and heavily damaged 60 structures. One Coast Guardsman was slightly wounded by a weapon malfunction while enemy casualties are unknown.
### Operation Sea Lords Statistical Summary by Campaign (By USN & VNN Forces)

**August 1969**

#### Enemy Casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Gia T Slingshot</th>
<th>Barrier Reef</th>
<th>Tran Hong Dao</th>
<th>Search Turn</th>
<th>Market Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>11 BC &amp; 98 EST</td>
<td>4 BC &amp; 25 EST</td>
<td>12 BC &amp; 11 EST</td>
<td>35 BC &amp; 25 EST</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Captured</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
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#### Enemy Material Losses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Captured</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Junks &amp; sampans</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Enemy Ammunition:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Captured</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice (tons)</td>
<td>0.08</td>
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<td></td>
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#### USN & VNN Material Losses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface craft</td>
<td>8 USN &amp; 8 VNN</td>
<td>1 USN &amp; 8 USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>0</td>
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</table>

#### Hostile Fire Incidents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>108</th>
<th>3</th>
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</thead>
</table>
## OPERATION SEA LORDS STATISTICAL SURVEY BY CAMPAIGN

(Combined results by all friendly forces involved)

AUGUST 1969

### Enemy casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>OTA'S SLINGSHOT</th>
<th>BARRIERS REEF</th>
<th>TRANG HUNG DAO</th>
<th>SEARCH TURN</th>
<th>MARKET TIME</th>
<th>MANG TIT /</th>
<th>RAIDER /</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Killed</td>
<td>258 BC 105 EST.</td>
<td>4 BC 25 EST.</td>
<td>12 BC 15 EST.</td>
<td>43 BC 31 EST</td>
<td>70 BC 23 EST 320 BC 2 EST</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Wounded</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Captured</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
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### Friendly casualties:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>OTA'S SLINGSHOT</th>
<th>BARRIERS REEF</th>
<th>TRANG HUNG DAO</th>
<th>SEARCH TURN</th>
<th>MARKET TIME</th>
<th>MANG TIT /</th>
<th>RAIDER /</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Killed</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Wounded</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Captured</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Missing</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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### Enemy material losses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>OTA'S SLINGSHOT</th>
<th>BARRIERS REEF</th>
<th>TRANG HUNG DAO</th>
<th>SEARCH TURN</th>
<th>MARKET TIME</th>
<th>MANG TIT /</th>
<th>RAIDER /</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Destroyed</td>
<td>(1) Junk &amp; sampans 27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Captured</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Junk &amp; sampans 2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Weapons</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>(3) Ammunition</td>
<td>6000</td>
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<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(rains)</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) Rice (tons)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Junk &amp; sampans 5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Structures</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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### USA material losses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>OTA'S SLINGSHOT</th>
<th>BARRIERS REEF</th>
<th>TRANG HUNG DAO</th>
<th>SEARCH TURN</th>
<th>MARKET TIME</th>
<th>MANG TIT /</th>
<th>RAIDER /</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Destroyed</td>
<td>(1) Surface craft 1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Damaged</td>
<td>(2) Aircraft</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Surface craft</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Aircraft</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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### Hostile fire incidents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OTA'S SLINGSHOT</th>
<th>BARRIERS REEF</th>
<th>TRANG HUNG DAO</th>
<th>SEARCH TURN</th>
<th>MARKET TIME</th>
<th>MANG TIT /</th>
<th>RAIDER /</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Routine operations continued for Market Time and Stable Door forces during August. The weather was generally good and did not effect surveillance operations during the month. Market Time units retained patrol responsibility in the Game Warden area of operation for the lower Bassac and Co Chien Rivers during the entire month, detecting over 5,000 watercraft, inspecting 2,322 and boarding another 2,233. There were four craft detained and 15 persons detained while seven craft evaded. Task Force 115 surveillance units detected 142,484 craft in their patrol areas along the coast and in the harbors of the Republic of Vietnam. A total of 47,936 were inspected and another 24,331 were boarded. As a result of those checks, 280 craft and 1,734 persons were detained for violation of restricted areas, possession of contraband, improper personal or craft papers, and other suspicious activities. There were also 59 Viet Cong suspects detained.

Enemy initiated activity remained at a relatively low level during August, the same as the previous month. Although there were intelligence reports citing several significant dates for possible enemy offensive action there were no major engagements. There was a marked improvement in enemy weaponry and marksmanship as 75mm recoilless rifles were used against Sea Tiger forces in the 1st Coastal Zone and heavy concentrations of claymores and RPG were used against the KSF and "Swift" boats in the Sea Float area of operations. The enemy was hard to find and his general tactics were to cause as much damage as possible.
with the least expenditure of personnel. The general indications at month's end were that the VC/NVA are moving out of the III Corps Tactical Zone and into the IV Corps Tactical Zone. There were no known infiltration attempts of men or supplies by sea during the month.

Task Force 115 units continued to provide naval gunfire and blocking patrols in support of friendly ground operations along the coast and in the rivers and canals. During August one Navyman, two U.S.CG men and one 25X were killed and 14 U.S. sailors, three USCG's, two VN/NS, 11 K.P's and one U.S. soldier wounded in combined operations. Enemy losses were 107 confirmed killed, the highest total to date, 42 probably killed, 21 wounded and nine captured.

On 5 August, CDR Paul A. Yost, USCG, relieved CDR Paul P Connolly, USN, as Third Coastal Zone Advisor and CG 115.3.
During August there were 614 naval gunfire support, SEA LORDS, SEA FLOT and SEA TIGER missions conducted, approximately 100 less than in July. Gun damage assessment on these missions was 38.3 percent, up from 31.5 percent for July and comparable to the high of 42.3 percent in May 1969, with the following results being attained:

149 Viet Cong killed (107 body count, 42 probable).
21 Viet Cong wounded.
9 Viet Cong captured.
228 Junks/Sampans destroyed.
732 Structures/bunkers destroyed.
20 Junks/Sampans damaged.
423 Structures/bunkers damaged.

There were 15 incidents of evading craft and personnel reported and taken under fire resulting in 18 watercraft destroyed and 13 VC killed (9 body count, 4 probable), one VC wounded and two VC captured.

Surveillance operations resulted in the detection of 76,265 watercraft. Of these 40,254 were inspected and another 17,974 were boarded. Detection of steel hulled vessels in Market Time areas totalled 669 with 511 being inspected and another 28 boarded and determined to be non-suspicious.
Swift boats conducting Operations SEA FLOT and SEA LANDS river and canal incursions (Market Time Raiders) in the III and IV CTZ continued to score heavily against the enemy with 88 multi-craft missions being conducted during August. In addition, when the Swift boats in the IV CTZ were not engaged in SEA LANDS missions they were involved in the SEA FLOT/TRAN HUNG DAO III PT SOPS campaign in the lower Ca Mau Peninsula. These operations are discussed under Market Time Raiders in the Operation SEA LANDS summary and Operation SEA FLOT summary.

SEAL units attached to Task Force 115 continued routine operation during August, primarily in the IV CTZ in support of Operation SEA FLOT.

Surfliner operations continued in August in Areas 1, 4 and 6. There were no significant events reported.
Weather remained excellent in areas 1 and 2 of the First Coastal Zone during the entire month of August. There were 21,306 detections of watercraft by patrol units, not including detections by Vietnamese Navy units assigned to the First Coastal Zone. Of these craft, 8,148 were inspected and another 6,710 were boarded. There were 42 craft detained and 294 persons detained for violation of restricted areas, improper personal or craft papers and curfew violations.

First Coastal Zone patrols carried out more than 170 naval gunfire missions during August. Of these, 90 were SEA TIGER missions or patrols with 48 reporting no gun damage assessment due to darkness, heavy foliage or no troops available to sweep the area.

A SEA TIGER mission was conducted near the mouth of the Truong Giang River (BY 158536) on the morning of 2 August with UDT 13, Det B, EOD Team 70 and Duffel Bag Team (GTE 115.1.5.1) embarked in RRF's 15 and 39 while the security force, RAG-32 were embarked in Coastal Group 14 junks. The operation commenced with helo gunships prepping the area and was followed by the insertion of the security force and the EOD, UDT and Duffel Bag Teams. The ground forces swept to the south destroying major bunker complexes as spotted by an O-1 observation aircraft. One bunker was destroyed with two VC inside after they could not be convinced to come out. A small amount of fresh food and cooking utensils were found and destroyed. The Duffel Bag Team implanted a sensor field along a known VC infiltration...
point. Also destroyed were 20 major bunker complexes, one claymore
nine and two fishing nets. There were no friendly casualties while
two VC were probably killed.

On the night of 6 August PCF 75 and PCF 79, while on normal SEA
TIGER patrol established a night observation/waterborne guardpost on
the Truong Giang River about 15 miles southeast of Danang (ST 168544).
Shortly after the post was established four VC trying to sneak up on
PCF 75 were taken under fire and probably killed. Heavy A/W fire was
then received and suppressed as the Swift boats exited to the north-
east. After reversing course, the PCF's sighted six VC in uniform and
took them under fire while heavy enemy A/J and S/A fire was again
received and quickly suppressed. The PCF's then cleared the area
safely with only minor material damage. There were no friendly
casualties while seven VC were killed (2 body count, 5 probable).

PCF's 75 and 79, EOD Team 70, UDT 13 Det H, CG-14, RAG 32 and
helicopter gunships participated in a SEA TIGER mission on 7 August to
conduct a sweep of the eastern tip of Lang Dong Island and a smaller
island to east about 14 miles south-southeast of Danang (BT 170539/
BT 159537). The EOD and UDT Teams were inserted on the small island
and they destroyed several bunkers without any enemy opposition.
They were then extracted and reinserted along with the CG-14 security
force on the eastern tip of Lang Dong Island. The security force
swept to the west and provided a blocking line while the EOD and UDT
Teams destroyed bunkers and various fishing equipment. The ground
forces were extracted at 1500H without incident. There were no
friendly casualties while two VC were probably killed. The day
operation netted 54 bunkers, two structures and numerous fishing
weirs, traps and nets destroyed.

Early on the morning of 20 August PCF 61 responded to a request
from an AC-119 aircraft for a SAR operation for a reported downed
aircraft about 33 miles southeast of Danang (DT 5848). A systematic
search of the area and questioning of Vietnamese civilians fishing in
the area failed to reveal any trace of the aircraft and the mission
was terminated.

A SEA TIGER mission commenced at noon on 22 August when PCF's
39 and 65 inserted an EOD, UDT and VNH Landing Teams about 16 miles
southeast of Danang on Lang Dong Island (DT 168542). The VNH Landing
team swept the area while the EOD and UDT Teams conducted beach
reconnaissance and fired at targets spotted by a helicopter gunship.
The UDT and EOD Teams were extracted while the VNH Team established a
night observation post. One VC walked into the observation post at
1800 and was killed. The team then withdrew to the north and were
extracted. The afternoon operation resulted in 18 bunkers, 14 structures,
two sampans and a fishing trap destroyed, and one M-16 rifle and 50
pounds of rice captured. Two large fires were ignited and there were
no friendly casualties.

While on normal SEA TIGER patrol of the Truong Giang River on
23 August, PCF 39 and PCF 65 took targets of opportunity under fire
about 16 miles southeast of Danang (ST 161128). The "Swift" boats
accounted for 20 watercraft and two structures destroyed and three
bunkers damaged. There were no friendly casualties while enemy
casualties are unknown.

On the morning of 27 August a SEA TIGER mission was conducted
utilizing POF's 15 and 101, UDT 125et H, an EOD and, Duffel Bag Team
and a VNN Landing Team with helo gunships providing air cover. The
VNN Landing Team was inserted on Lang Dong Island about 16 miles
south-southeast east of Danang (ST 143531) to establish a security
perimeter. The EOD, UDT and Duffel Bag Teams were then inserted and
destroyed bunker complexes along the shoreline while the Duffel Bag
Team implanted sensors. The troops were then extracted and reinserted
about one mile to the southeast to allow Duffel Bag personnel to
perform maintenance on a sensor string implanted on a previous opera-
tion. The troops were then extracted without incident while the helo
gunships returned to the first location and took uniformed VC under
fire killing nine (7 body count, 2 probable). The return of close
support aircraft to an AO shortly after the departure of friendly
forces proved to be a lucrative tactic and will be used in the future.
The morning operation resulted in the destruction of 61 bunkers,
four structures, four fishing weirs, four fishing traps, one 250-
pound bomb and numerous food supplies and utensils. In addition,
there were two large secondary explosions. There were no friendly
casualties.
On the afternoon of 30 August, the PT DARI (USCG WPB) responded to a U.S. Army request for an emergency gunfire support mission on bunkers and people on the beach about 10 miles southeast of Quang Ngai (BS 763603). The mission was cleared by the Sector Advisor from No Duc and spotted by the Army. There were no friendly casualties while three Viet Cong were killed (body count). In addition, 11 structures and eight watercraft were destroyed and two bunkers heavily damaged.
OPERATIONS IN THE FIRST COASTAL ZONE

A. Sea Tiger - 2 Aug
B. Sea Tiger - 6 Aug
C. Sea Tiger - 7 Aug
D. SAR - 20 Aug
E. Sea Tiger - 22 Aug
F. Sea Tiger - 23 Aug
G. Sea Tiger - 27 Aug
H. FT BUN NQFU - 30 Aug

LEGEND:
□ - Coastal Surveillance Center
X - Hostile Fire/Evasion Incident
# - SAR/REDEVAC Incident

SCALE:

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SECOND COASTAL ZONE

Good weather prevailed throughout August in the Second Coastal Zone as patrol units detected a total of 41,919 watercraft. Of these, 24,649 were inspected and another 6,656 were boarded while five craft evaded. There were 42 craft and 256 persons detained for lack of or faulty identification papers, curfew or restricted zone violations, draft dodge, incorrect or faulty manifests and possession of contraband.

There were 81 naval gunfire missions reported in the Second Coastal Zone during August with a minimum amount of gun damage assessment reported. On the night of 15 August, PCF 47, while on normal Market Time patrol, received information of known VC coastal transit routes from the Tuy Phong Intelligence Officer. The Swift boat proceeded to a point about five miles northeast of Tuy Phong (BN 5647), shut down its engine and established a surveillance position close to the beach. Shortly a craft was detected on radar and later captured, resulting in four persons being detained. One offered 2,500 piasters for their release. A later report from the Tuy Phong Intelligence Officer stated that one detainee was the Binh Hai District Head VC Recruiting Officer and the other three detainees had just been recruited.

On the morning of 19 August, the PT HUDSON while on normal Market Time patrol conducted a gunfire support mission on a fortified VC village about 20 miles southeast of Quang Ngai (BS 8244). The mission
was requested, cleared and spotted by an Army gunfire liaison officer in an observation aircraft. The spotter reported good coverage of the target area with the following damage reported: two bunkers destroyed and three bunkers damaged; four structures destroyed and eight structures heavily damaged.

From 19 to 21 August, Market Time PCF's provided gunfire support, illumination and acted as a blocking force in support of Korean forces in a combined operation. The objective of the ROK sweep was the Viet Cong Secret Base 19 located about nine miles northeast of Phan Rang (BH 9484). Although there was no gun damage assessment reported for the "Swift" boats, the ROK forces killed 51 Viet Cong and captured 45 individual weapons, seven crew served weapons, 100 hand grenades, four bangalore torpedoes, 38 documents and various food, uniforms and small arms ammunition. There were no friendly casualties reported.

PCF's 11, 23 and 91 and INGW 1 - Det 3 skimmers provided a waterborne blocking force for the ROK Capital (Tiger) Division from 23 to 26 August in the vicinity of Qui Nhon (CR 06.25.). The results of the ROK sweep were 51 VC killed and two VC captured. In addition, 26 individual weapons, one crew served weapon and various documents were captured. The ROK forces suffered seven killed and eight wounded. The operation was considered extremely successful as battalion size operations had not previously been conducted in this area. The blocking force was very effective, preventing all escape by sea.
In the afternoon of 28 August, the UGOG TAPEK (T48D 37) fired a gunfire support mission at a Viet Cong base camp and infiltration route about 17 miles north of Qui Nhơn (CR 095506). The mission was requested and spotted by the ROK Capital Infantry Division. The results of the mission were one bunker destroyed, 200 meters of supply route interdicted, a base camp completely destroyed, and two large secondary fires started.
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OPERATIONS IN THE SECOND COASTAL ZONE

A. PCF L7 - 15 Aug
B. PT HUDSON - 15 Aug
C. OPS - 15-21 Aug
D. OPS - 23-26 Aug
E. USCGC TAZEX - 26 Aug
THIRD COASTAL ZONE

Surveillance operations in the Third Coastal Zone reflected an increase in indigenous coastal traffic with 6,923 detections of watercraft during August. Patrol effectiveness remained high with 3,473 inspections and 2,130 boardings of detected craft. There were no incidents of evading craft along the coast, while 14 craft and 117 persons were detained. In addition, Swift boats patrolling the lower Bassac and Co Chien Rivers detected 5,016 craft and of these 2,322 were inspected and 2,233 were boarded resulting in four craft and 15 persons being detained. Seven craft attempted to evade on the Bassac River.

There were 160 naval gunfire support missions conducted during August in response to requests for naval gunfire support, targets of opportunity, H&I or in pre-planned river and canal incursions. These missions accounted for 42 enemy killed (30 body count, 12 probable), six wounded and two captured. In addition, there were 137 structures and 61 watercraft destroyed and another 248 structures and 4 craft heavily damaged and 10 large secondary explosions.

On the afternoon of 1 August, the PT 1104 (USSG JPB) fired on two VC-occupied villages at the mouth of the Bassac River about 45 miles southeast of Can Tho (XR 435 615 and XR 440 615). The missions had sector clearance and were spotted by an army observer. The afternoon operation resulted in six structures destroyed and
12 heavily damaged with three large fires ignited. There were no
friendly casualties and enemy casualties are unknown.

Again on 3 August, the FT 147463 scored heavily on two more VC
hamlets about 47 miles southeast of Can Tho (Xi: 442610 and Xi: 439609).
Firing at a range of less than 2,000 yards the 37Ds destroyed seven
structures and damaged 16 more and ignited three fires.

PCF's 28 and 92 and two Coastal Group junks inserted 100 Regional
Force troops from Long Phu about 30 miles southeast of Can Tho
(Xii: 236 743) on the morning of 4 August. The Swift boats and Coastal
Group units stood by to provide fire support and act as a blocking
force. Prior to completion of the operation PCF's 60 and 11 relieved
PCF's 38 and 92 on station. The RF troops completed their sweep and
were extracted at noon having captured 11 Viet Cong. There was no
gun damage assessment for this operation and there were no friendly
casualties.

Early on the morning of 6 August, PCF 11 picked up a Long Phu
PRU platoon and a Long Phu National Police platoon for a ground sweep
of a suspected VC POW camp located about 36 miles southeast of Can Tho
(Xii: 356 630) on the Bassac River. The troops made a covert landing
at CS20, utilizing two junks that were towed to the area by the Swift
boat. Two hours later the troops were extracted when they were unable
to locate the POW camp; however, they captured one Viet Cong and six
guerrillas. There were no friendly casualties.
On 12 and 13 August the USS SPENCER (HLS 36) in two missions accounted for three VC killed (body count), six bunkers destroyed, 20 structures destroyed, 34 structures damaged, four secondary fires and one VC base camp completely destroyed. The missions were requested and cleared by the IV Corps Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer (KING) from Can Tho and were spotted by the IV Corps spotter from Tra Vinh. The targets were located in the vicinity of XR 689 633 about 25 miles southeast of Phu Vinh.

The F7 IAP/ONE conducted a Naval Gunfire Support mission on the evening of 18 August on a Viet Cong occupied village about 46 miles southeast of Can Tho on the Bassac River (XR 445 615). The mission was fired with sector clearance and no friendly forces in the area. The WPB accounts for eight structures damaged, five structures destroyed and one secondary fire.

On the morning of 22 August, FGF 17 escorted four Coastal Group 36 (CG 36) craft with troops embarked into a canal off the Bassac River about 40 miles southeast of Can Tho (XR 365 615). The troops were inserted as part of a combined amphibious haliborne assault while the Swift boat stood by for fire support. The senior advisor from Long Phu requested and spotted a gunfire support mission at a suspected VC concentration. The troops were extracted about noon and exited the canal without incident. The troops captured one VC and detained 10 VC suspects. The FGF destroyed two structures. Enemy casualties are unknown; however, VC were confirmed as being in the impact area. There were no friendly casualties.
On 26 August PCF 95 was hailed while passing the LSCO
BASSAC Y-45 in the Bassac River about 45 miles southeast of Can
Tho. The ship, of Philippine registry, was en route Vinh Long to
Long Xuyen and then to USS HUNTERDON COUNTY (LST 838) at Chau Doc.
The Philippine ship had sustained a B-40 rocket hit in the pilot
house killing the first officer and a seaman and wounding the 2nd
Officer. The wounded man was given first aid and medevaced by
DUST-OFF Helo to the 29th Evacuation Hospital at Binh Tuy. The
Swift boat then passed through the area of the sapper attack without
incident, finding only a populated area.

On the evening of 29 August, PCF 64 was called on to serve as
a blocking force for the 14th Regiment of the 9th ARVN Division for
an operation already in progress about 25 miles southeast of Can Tho
(KR 189 516). The Swift boat patrolled the adjacent area and served
as a communications relay station. The PCF did not detect any evading
craft and was not called on for fire support. The ground troops killed
seven VC., captured two VC suspects and liberated 17 civilian prisoners.
In addition, air support for the operation killed another seven VC.
OPERATION SEA FLOAT/THAN HUNG DAO III

Operation SEA FLOAT/THAN HUNG DAO III in the second full month of its existence enjoyed the same success as during the month of July. There were over 60 SEA FLOAT missions conducted during August utilizing from two to seven PCF's and supported by a PG, SEAL, EOD, and UDT Teams, Seawolves, Slicks, and OV-10 aircraft. The SEA FLOAT missions were designed to maximize damage to known or suspected enemy base areas, secret zones, and extortion stations. The Swift boats conducted day and night psyops patrols along the waterways of the SEA FLOAT operating area. In those areas inaccessible to the Swifts, psyops missions were carried out by airborne units. In addition the PCF's inserted SEALs, EOD, UDT, and MSF troops, provided waterborne guardposts, blocking forces, and escort service for logistics craft along the Bo De and Cua Lon Rivers and adjacent canals. The six to ten Swiftboats assigned to SEAQUAL also participated in SEALORDS missions in areas adjacent to the SEA FLOAT AO. In addition, the Mobile Advance Tactical Support Base, PCF's and the PG conducted nightly H and I fire during the month of August into known VC base camps and extortion areas. (Psychological operations aspects of Seafloat are discussed in Psyops)

On 1 August, the first MSF troops arrived at SEA FLOAT by C-177 helicopter. On 15 August these troops departed and were replaced with 228 MSF troops including a combat recon platoon. The USS GALLUP (PG 85) arrived SEA FLOAT on 16 August and assumed the PG duties.

The Vietnamese Navy on 23 August proceeded to Pt. Foxtrot (VQ05720) and established the SEA FLOAT Annex, consisting of
a VNN LSIL H327, VNN LSH(H) HQAD1, KCS, VNN PHD Team and VNN reaction force. The units remained on station all day making the Sea FLOAT Annex an all VN psyops effort for the first time.

Training for the second TF 115 SEA FLOAT team commenced on 4 August and topics include two days of Duffel Bag indoctrination, first aid training, weapons training, SEA FLOAT mission, personal response, psychological warfare, PCF and SEAL operations.

The number of Kit Carson Scouts (KCS) aboard SEA FLOAT will be maintained at the current level of 15 although a total of 50 are authorized and will be available depending on the needs of SEA FLOAT and the status of the Old Nam Can settlement. The KCS have been employed in a variety of jobs since arriving at SEA FLOAT. These include:

- **Intelligence**: four had operated with the VC in the SEA FLOAT AO and provided operational intelligence support.

- **Reconnaissance**: three to five had been employed on a daily basis to conduct periodic sweeps of the immediate area and to check for booby traps.

- **Population/Resources Control**: used at both SEA FLOAT and SEA Flop Annex to inspect sampans and evaluate VC suspects.

- **Combat Patrols**: Operated with SEAL's and on five operations have killed eight VC.

- **Interrogation**: The older and more experienced KCS have effectively interrogated and interviewed POW's and detainees.

- **Psyops**: KCS have circulated among visitors on an informal basis and participated enthusiastically in the psyops program.
Tapes have been prepared to be played by PCF’s and helos drawing on their knowledge of local conditions and VC vulnerabilities in the region.

The KCS have shown themselves to be well disciplined, aggressive and eager for contact.

14th LAR units attached to SEA FLOAT (CTG 115.7) were active during the month of August. Operations included setting up observation/listening posts, interdiction of VC supply routes and extortion sites, night probes along possible VC supply/infiltration routes, combat and combat recon patrols, locating and taking prisoners and reacting to NINJ’s intelligence reports on VC activity in the SEA FLOAT AO.

Commander T.R.H. Berry, USN, relieved Commander Paul A. Yost, USEC as commander of SEA FLOAT (CTG 115.7) on 1 August.

On 3 August a COMPHLTRAPAC representative and the NAVFORV Base Defense Officer visited SEA FLOAT for briefings and discussion on the defense of the SEA FLOAT complex.

Commander Task Force 115, CORLANSHPRON NINE, the NAVFORV Communication and Psyops Officers visited SEA FLOAT on 5 August for briefings and an update on SEA FLOAT operations and problem areas.

On 10 August the Deputy IV Corps Commander, Major General R. Wetherill, U.S. Army received a briefing and tour.

The Vietnamese Navy Chief of Naval Operations, Commodore Tran Van Can and party in company with the An Auyen and Bac Lieu Sector advisors and assistants received briefings and tours of SEA FLOAT on 22 August.
On 6 August, Market Time units conducted a mission utilizing 105 MSF troops for ground sweeps west of the Hach Cai Nhap about four miles northeast of the SEA FLOAT MASTB (WQ 045693). The troops were inserted by PCF's 35 and 96. The initial 35 troops swept to the north while 70 troops inserted in the Hach Cai Nhap moved west. PCF's 31 and 45 were called in to provide gunfire support for the 35 troops who had made contact with the enemy. When the enemy fire had been suppressed the two MSF groups joined and swept east to the Rach Cai Nhap destroying a VC village containing fifty multi-room structures and adjoining bunkers. The village was devoid of people, weapons and documents and indications were that the entire populace had departed approximately twelve hours earlier. The day operation resulted in 50 structures, 50 bunkers, and eight craft destroyed. There were no friendly casualties.

Based on intelligence obtained from the SEA FLOAT Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer (Kilo) and a SEA FLOAT Kit Carson Scout, SEAL team Det. Golf departed SEA FLOAT aboard PCF 94 at 0800 on 8 August to interdict a VC extortionist station along the Cai Nhap Canal in An Xuyen Province. At 1030 the SEAL’s were transferred to a VN junk and first proceeded north on the Cai Nhap Canal with negative contact. The SEAL’s were then inserted and patrolled north toward the place where the extortionist was last reported and arrived at 1415 and found a hooch; however, it had been abandoned. At 1440 a sampan with four occupants was sighted approaching the area and attempted to evade. After warning shots were fired two of these were killed while one escaped into the treeline. One female was recovered from the water and detained.

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After destroying the hooch the SEAL's were extracted by a Seawolf. Miscellaneous documents and photos and a small amount of ammunition were captured and one sampan and motor destroyed. Interrogation of the detainee indicated that she had worked for the VC as a message passer and that the three men were confirmed VC.

On 9 August, a SEA FLOAT mission was conducted with seven PCF's, USS Gallup (PG 85) USS Asheville(PG 84), EOD and UDT 13 Det. Golf, MSF troops and Seawolves participating. The operation commenced with the Swift boats inserting the troops on the Ba Than (WQ055680) and Bong (W070682) about five miles east of SEAFLAT for sweeps south. During a day of frequent contact PCF elements were ambushed on five separate occasions with rockets, S/A fire and a mine resulting in PCF's 5, 40, and 31 receiving minor damage. One U.S. sailor and three MSF troops were wounded. The ground troops later swept the ambush areas and captured 58 booby traps, two large charges, 60 Japanese knee mortar grenades, and three hundred rounds of ammunition. Ten bunkers, three structures, and one barricade were destroyed and two VC were killed.

On 11 August, PCF's inserted MSF troops, UDT and EOD personnel in the area west of the Cai Nhap Canal about six miles northeast of Sea Float (WQ 082970). The troops swept west to a VC village taking 11 detainees and firing on four escaping VC. During an assault on a bunker a woman and a child were killed. Sweeping further west the MSF troops detained 40 additional persons.
Six VC were killed and one VC wounded, 13 sampans and three structures were destroyed and four sampans damaged during the sweeps. The MSP and EOD captured 750 pages of documents, one Russian bolt action carbine, three CHICOM claymore mines and three CHICOM grenades. At 2000 the PCF's inserted 15 MSP's on the east bank of the Cai Nhap Canal to remain as a night observation post while the remainder of the troops and the detainees returned to SEA FLOAT. The troops on the night observation post accounted for five VC killed and one VC wounded, and captured one Russian carbine and three CHICOM grenades, seven CHICOM claymore mines and 10 kilos of documents. The documents indicated that one of the VC killed was a high ranking political cadre. There were no friendly casualties in this operation.

At noon on 13 August, two Seawolves on a reconnaissance flight spotted three VC in a bunker complex west of Cai Nhap Canal (WQ 075755). With sector clearance air strikes were put in the area. MSP troops were scrambled and inserted by PCF's and captured two pounds of documents, one CHICOM grenade, and one CHICOM claymore mine. The Seawolves destroyed six sampans, five bunkers and 25 structures while killing two Viet Cong. There were no friendly casualties.

On the afternoon of 16 August, three SEAL's and two Kit Carson Scouts departed SEA FLOAT aboard PCF's 52 and 62 to locate and take prisoners from a Viet Cong Indoctrination Center and from Lo Cal VC hamlet located about six miles northeast of SEA FLOAT. The SEAL's were transferred to a sampan and travelled north on the Cai Nhap Canal and were inserted in the vicinity of
the VC Indoctrination Center. They patrolled 700 meters to a hooch and searched it with negative results. Upon arriving at the south end of Lo Cal hamlet five males were observed running into the treeline. In the ensuing battle, two VC were killed and one captured. After the fire was suppressed the patrol moved into the treeline and destroyed two camouflaged sampans with motors and 10 kilos of rice. The patrol then returned to the Cai Nha and were extracted. Interrogation of the detainee indicated that he had served as a VC guerrilla and he provided information concerning VC plans and meeting places which will be used for future operations.

On the night of 19 August, three SEAL's and three Kit Carson Scouts (KCS) departed SEA FLOAT aboard two PCF's to conduct a 12 hour interdiction post of a VC supply route about six miles west of SEA FLOAT (VQ 984664). At 2045 the team embarked on a skimmer for insertion; however while enroute to the area they heard four shots and observed a large unlighted junk, approximately the size of a PCF approaching four other lighted junk. It was determined by the KCS that the large junk was operated by VC who were making claims on the lighted junk. As the VC Junk pulled away with the two sampans in tow it was taken under skimmer fire with LAW rockets, M-79 grenade launchers and M-60 machine guns. The junk returned the fire but this was suppressed quickly. At 2320 the team departed the area, boarded the PCF's and were returned to SEA FLOAT. There were no friendly casualties while five VC were killed and 3
wounded. One large junk was severely damaged.

On the morning of 20 August, PCF's 56, 35, and 9 with 120 HSF troops embarked, entered the Cai Nhap Canal and inserted the troops at three locations along the bank about seven miles northeast of SEA FLOAT (WQ 085730), WQ 082748, WQ 081756). Two Swift boats exited the canal while PCF's 36 and 56 established a waterborne guard post for support of the troops. The troops sweeping west made contact and received and suppressed 60mm mortar and small arms fire and destroyed four bunkers, three structures and numerous digging tools. The second group found several antipersonnel mines and captured two VC suspects at a VC base camp and detained 26 women and children. This group also received 60mm mortar, small arms, and A/W fire. Troops and detainees then moved back to the canal and all were extracted except 20 HSF ambush troops who took up positions along the bank. At 2045, the troops observed three sampans travelling north on the Bach Cai Nhap which stopped to pick up 3-4 persons 200 yards south of the HSF troop site. When the boats passed the ambush site they were illuminated and taken under fire at point blank range; eight VC were killed and the sampans destroyed. About 20 minutes later another sampan with four males came to search for the bodies. It was also taken under fire at point blank range and four VC were killed. The HSF troops were then extracted and returned to SEA FLOAT. The operation resulted in 12 VC killed and 30 personnel detained. Four sampans, three structures, and four bunkers were destroyed. One HSF troop was slightly wounded.
as the only friendly casualty.

Seven PCF's conducted a SEA FLOAT mission on 25 August when they inserted 115 MSF troops and UDT 13 Det GULF in two groups along the Rach Cai Nhap about seven miles northeast of SEA FLOAT (WQ085732) for a sweep to the west. The troops made contact with the enemy on two occasions and Slicks and Seawolves were called in for air strikes. The MSF troops established a night camp which came under fire. Night air strikes were made by Seawolves and OV-10A's in the area around the camp. At first light on the 26 of August the MSF broke camp and continued the sweep. The Swift boats embarked an additional 35 MSF troops to establish a northern blocking force, but received B-40 and recoilless rifle fire from an ambush position on the Rach Cai Nhap. The PCF's beached and suppressed the enemy fire and then proceeded to insert the troops. The troops uncovered many structures, bunkers, and food caches which indicated that the area was used as a VC base camp. The troops were extracted on the afternoon of 26 August and were returned to SEA FLOAT. The two day operation resulted in four VC killed and eight VC wounded. There were 48 bunkers and 39 structures destroyed along with 1,000 kilos of salt, 200 kilos of rice, several 57mm recoilless rifle rounds and one CHICOM mine. There were four MSF and one U.S. sailor wounded while one PCF received minor damage.

On 29 and 30 August, six PCF's with 70 MSF troops embarked, inserted them in Kinh Ngang (WQ 010574) with the simultaneous insertion of 35 MSF troops at WQ 050 758 by Slick
helicopter. The troops made sweeps into known VC base area between the two insertion points, making contact with the enemy at 1330. At the same time, helos providing air cover and troop lifts received heavy a/w fire slightly wounding the left door gunner of the Slick. A short time later, Seawolf 12 also received heavy a/w weapons fire seriously wounding the door gunner. At the same time MSF troops were receiving heavy s/a, a/n, and 60mm mortar fire, when OV-10 aircraft were called in and suppressed the enemy fire. The Swift boats extracted 35 MSF troops in late afternoon without incident leaving 70 troops to establish a night surveillance camp. At 2000 two VC attempting to probe the camp were taken under fire, killing one VC. At first light on the 30th, the troops broke camp and continued their sweep and captured one man whose house was protected by four claymore mines. In another structure several VC documents were found indicating that the area was being held by the Viet Cong Luan-Luu Mobile Guerrilla Force. In the afternoon, a VC base camp was discovered along with an arms cache. The sweep continued to the Cai Nhap Canal and the troops were extracted by the PGP's without making any contact with the enemy on the last day of the operation. The two day operation resulted in 32 structures, 13 sampans, and 29 bunkers destroyed along with 1,000 pounds of rice, 3100 pounds of salt, and 300 pounds of new punji stakes.

The MSF troops captured seven 12 kilo CHICOM mines, five CHICOM grenades, two M-26 grenades, 500 rounds of small arms ammo
and 20 pounds of VC documents. There were seven VC killed (four body count, three probable) and one VC captured. Friendly casualties were one USN, one USA and one MSF wounded. One Seawolf and one Slick were damaged.
SEA FLOAT

OPERATIONS IN THE FOURTH COASTAL ZONE

A. Sea Float - 6 Aug
B. SEAL's - 8 Aug
C. Sea Float - 9 Aug
D. Sea Float - 11 Aug
E. Semolves - 13 Aug
F. SEAL's - 16 Aug
G. SEAL's - 17 Aug
H. Sea Float - 20 Aug
I. Sea Float - 25 Aug
J. Sea Float - 29-30 Aug

SCALE:

0 NAUTICAL MILES

CONFIDENTIAL 68
**MARKET TIME UNITS**

Patrol aircraft detachments from five Navy patrol squadrons manned the Market Time air barrier patrols during August. Patrol Squadron SIX (VP-6) operated out of U- Tuyao, Thailand. Detachments from VP-2, VP-9, VP-50 and VP-17 operated from Cam Ranh Bay.

Average number of U.S. ships/craft on patrol during August:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USO</th>
<th>NSC</th>
<th>WFR</th>
<th>PCF</th>
<th>LST</th>
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<td>AVG</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average number VN ships/junks employed during August:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SEA FORCE</th>
<th>RIVER FORCE</th>
<th>COASTAL FORCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**U.S. ACTIVITY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Night</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Detected Wood</td>
<td>32,241</td>
<td>43,355</td>
<td>76,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Inspected Wood</td>
<td>14,441</td>
<td>24,266</td>
<td>38,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>547</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Boarded Wood</td>
<td>11,666</td>
<td>7,183</td>
<td>18,849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Detained Junks</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>Persons</td>
<td>976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>59 VC suspects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**VN ACTIVITY**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Junks Searched</td>
<td>80,582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons Searched</td>
<td>264,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junks Detained</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons Detained</td>
<td>766</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

69 CONFIDENTIAL
TOTAL CONFLICT

Total Missions: 614 (Includes 120 cases of hostile fire suppression)

ENEMY CASUALTIES

107 Killed plus 42 Probable
21 Wounded
9 Captured

ENEMY MATERIAL LOSSES

228 Junks/Sampans Destroyed
732 Structures/Bunkers Destroyed
20 Junks/Sampans Damaged
423 Structures/Bunkers Damaged

The following Seventh Fleet ships operated in market time during the month of August:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USS CONFLICT (MSC 426)</td>
<td>1 - 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS EXCEL (MSC 439)</td>
<td>4 - 6 10 - 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS CROCKETT (PG 88)</td>
<td>20 - 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS GALLANT (MSC 489)</td>
<td>23 - 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCGC SEBAGO (WHEC 42)</td>
<td>1 - 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCGC TANEY (WHEC 37)</td>
<td>14 - 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS WOODFLECKER (MSC 209)</td>
<td>22 - 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS WIDGEON (MSC 208)</td>
<td>1 - 3 25 - 31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
USCGC SPENCER (MCC 36) 1 - 24
USGS LOYALTY (KSO 457) 5 - 31
USCGC VEKOTA (MCC 69) 1 - 6 25 - 31
USGS JASPER COUNTY (LT 1165) 1 - 8
USCGC HUNGH (MCC 66) 8 - 31
USGS -NIDHUM COUNTY (CST 1270) 9 - 31
USGS WASHINGTON (PG 85) 21 - 31

PCP's were assigned to the following Coastal Divisions on 31 August:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coastal Div</th>
<th>ELEVEN-in Thoi</th>
<th>Coastal Div</th>
<th>THIRTEEN-Cat Lo</th>
<th>Coastal Div</th>
<th>FOURTEEN Can Banh Bay</th>
<th>Coastal Div</th>
<th>FIFTEEN Qui Phan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>45 13</td>
<td>17 63</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>50 15</td>
<td>21 64</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>23</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>51 20</td>
<td>24 87</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>49</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>52 39</td>
<td>25 95</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>55 61</td>
<td>28 98</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>56 65</td>
<td>32 102</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>89</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>62 70</td>
<td>37 103</td>
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<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>72 75</td>
<td>46 73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>82 78</td>
<td>53 88</td>
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<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>94 79</td>
<td>54 90</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>96 80</td>
<td>59 97</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>81 60</td>
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<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>99</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>101</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(24)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(19) (11)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
Total Assigned PCF - 76

# - Six PCF's assigned to Chu Lat Detachment

Non assigned PCF’s:

- VNN PCF Training
- PCF 6

PCF’s in Overhaul

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PCF</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Commenced</th>
<th>ETD</th>
<th>EOT Length</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>8 Jul 69</td>
<td>31 Aug 69</td>
<td>53 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>22 Jul 69</td>
<td>15 Sep 69</td>
<td>56 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>13 Aug 69</td>
<td>2 Oct 69</td>
<td>50 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>Cat Lo</td>
<td>12 Aug 69</td>
<td>27 Sep 69</td>
<td>46 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>Cat Lo</td>
<td>19 Aug 69</td>
<td>18 Nov 69</td>
<td>90 days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Non-assigned PCF - 6

Grand Total 82
craft accounted for over 890 flight hours in combat missions in addition to normal surveillance patrols. A breakdown of these hours follows (Game Warden/SEA LORDS):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UH-1B /</th>
<th>CT-10A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preplanned Strikes</td>
<td>12/140</td>
<td>5/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaction Strikes</td>
<td>13/108</td>
<td>13/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targets of Opportunity</td>
<td>66/112</td>
<td>147/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Missions</td>
<td>41/151</td>
<td>56/0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Although no SEA LORDS missions are listed to OV-10A's they nonetheless did support SEA LORDS operations while under the OPCON of CTF 116; some of the missions listed for UH-1B's in support of SEA LORDS are also in support of Game Warden operations, this disparity arises as a result of the split responsibility of TG 116.3/TG 194.6.

The Rung Sat Special Zone continued to receive special attention. In addition to joint operations conducted with Vietnamese forces, two named joint operations were conducted with other free world forces. The first of these, Operation Friendship I (2-4 August) involved TG 116.9 support of Royal Thai Army volunteer forces in the southern Kphon Trach District of Bien Hoa Province. Navy support consisted of PER/ASPB blocking forces, waterborne guardposts, and lift of Thai troops; SEAL reconnaissance and guardpost; and Seawolf patrols/strikes. The second operation, Operation Platypus (10-14 August) found TG 116.9 forces supporting units of the 1st Armored Regiment, of the 1st Australian Task Force (ATF) in western Phouc.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UH-1B</th>
<th>OV-10A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREPLANNED STRIKES</td>
<td>12/140</td>
<td>3/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REACTION STRIKES</td>
<td>13/108</td>
<td>43/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY</td>
<td>66/112</td>
<td>147/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPPORT MISSIONS</td>
<td>41/151</td>
<td>56/0</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Note: Although no SEA LOMDS missions are listed to OV-10A's they nonetheless did support SEA LOMDS operations while under the OPCON of TG 116. Some of the missions listed for UH-1B's in support of SEA LOMDS are also in support of Game Warden operations, this disparity arises as a result of the split responsibility of TG 116-1/194.6.

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Some with NU Scouts set guardposts and conducted actions and PHC/ASPB's conducted traffic checks, canal incursions, and provided waterborne blocking forces. Both of these operations were aimed at cutting enemy comms liaison routes into the Rung Sat Special Zone.

On 11 August, RIVDIV 574 was turned over to the Vietnamese Navy at Nha Be, marking the first ACTOV Program turnover of a PBR Division. On the same day RIVDIV 571 moved its area of operation from Nha Be to Phu Cuong on the upper Saigon River thereby doubling the number of PBR Divisions operating in that area.

*Case Warden PBR, I-13, And CV-10A Operations*

On the evening of 1 August, Army units called for an air strike on a bunker and four people in a sampan next to the bunker about 15 miles south of Vinh Long (LK 131 179). Bronco's of TU 116.4.8 were diverted from their patrol to place the strikes. Army observers credited the strikes with four VC killed, two houses destroyed and one bunker damaged. There were no U.S. casualties.

Two PBR's of TE 116.9.1.3 inserted a six man U.S. Army team 12½ miles northwest of Phu Cuong (XT 645 315) on the night of 2 August and then assumed waterborne guardpost positions nearby. At 2045 the soldiers engaged a four man VC point element of an enemy platoon (35-50 VC). The main enemy unit returned automatic and B-40/41 rocket fire resulting in three U.S. soldiers killed and the other three
The troops then requested immediate emergency extraction and assistance. The F11Fs returned and suppressed the enemy fire, and then put ashore a three man landing party to move the dead and wounded to safer positions. Dust-off and artillery illumination were requested. Additional F11Fs arrived on the scene and three more sailors were put ashore as naval units and personnel continued to suppress the enemy fire and provided security until the dust-off was completed. The F11Fs then safely extracted their own men and withdrew from the area. Enemy casualties were one killed and six others probably killed. There were no Navy casualties.

In the Rung Sat Special Zone, shortly after midnight on 8 August, PBRs in waterborne guardpost 16 miles southeast of Nha Be (L 176 719) took an enemy sampan under fire. The four occupants of the sampan answered the PBRs with small arms fire which was suppressed. Enemy casualties were placed at four probably killed and one sampan destroyed. There were no U.S. casualties.

Seawolves were cleared by CTG 116.3 to place strikes on an estimated company of VC, ten miles northwest of Go Cay (X 383 235) on the afternoon of 10 August. The strikes resulted in eight structures destroyed, an additional five others damaged, and six of the enemy probably killed.

Broncos of TU 116.4.8 were scrambled late afternoon of 12 August to go to the aid of an Army forward air controller (FAC) who was receiving ground fire at a point 25 miles northwest of Tra Vinh (X 249080-X 260025). The aircraft arrived on the scene and placed all of their ordnance on the target and received light automatic
weapon fire from the enemy position. The enemy fire was silenced and the Army Air Forces credited the CH-47's with four enemy killed, four structures destroyed and three damaged. There were no friendly casualties.

Seawolves were requested to provide air cover for U.S. Army troops in contact with the enemy on the afternoon of 15 August, 15 miles southwest of Ben Tre (N 39° 25'). The helos placed their strikes on an estimated company of Viet Cong and received sporadic sniper fire during their runs. Enemy casualties were listed as 12 probably killed, five structures destroyed, and five other damaged. There were no U.S. casualties.

On the upper Saigon River, five miles northwest of Phu Cuong (N 16° 7'S 1760'), on the night of 17 August FGR's in night guardpost positions sighted a column of approximately 40-50 VC/NVA troops moving south on the bank of the river carrying heavy packs and equipment. When the enemy closed to 40-60 feet the FGR's opened fire, killing three of the enemy. Two more FGR's sped to the scene from their guardpost positions to give support. The enemy initially fired rockets and automatic weapons at the boats but scored no hits. On their second firing run, the FGR's suppressed the enemy fire and then withdrew to allow LHTF and artillery strikes to be placed in the area. While the support firing was going on, the FGR's sighted an additional 20-30 enemy troops on the north bank of the river and killed five of them. Additional aircraft strikes were credited with killing nine of the enemy. No friendly casualties were sustained.
On 19 August, PBR's of TU 194.6.1 were transporting U.S. Army troops on the upper Mekong River about two miles northwest of Phu Cung (K1 760 155). After inserting the last of the troops, the PBR's remained in the area to provide support and act as a blocking force and found a cache of 15 81mm rockets lying on the west bank of the river in back of a tree. The rockets were all in individual plastic covers and in good new condition. The entire cache had been covered with a green plastic tarpaulin. There was no contact with enemy forces.

Just before dawn on 21 August, PBR's of TU 194.6.1 were drifting in the Hung Thit River approximately 15 miles southwest of Cai Rhum (K1 145 149) when they came upon an unlighted sampan proceeding along the east bank of the river. Four armed men in the sampan evaded to the bank of the river when called alongside. The PBR's took the men under fire, two men were observed to be hit and the other two abandoned the sampan and went below the surface of the water. Hand grenades were dropped in the area but none of the bodies surfaced. All four are listed as killed.

Seawolves on a Hung Thit River patrol on the evening of 24 August were directed to strike a VC staging area about ten miles southeast of Vinh Long (K1 1629). The helos brought fire to bear on six evading sampans but received no return fire. Enemy casualties were ten killed, two sampans destroyed and four others heavily damaged.

PBR's on patrol seven miles southeast of Dau Tieng (K1 555 351) on the night of 26-27 August sighted approximately 20 VC attempting
to cross the Ogain River from north to south. When the VC were in
the water, the boats illuminated and opened fire. AK-47 fire was
received from both banks and support was requested from fire support
Base Mahone. Mortar illumination was received from FSB Froda. The
enemy then fired two 8-40/41 rockets from the north bank but both
missed and the PBR's then suppressed the enemy fire. Shadow aircraft
(C-47) and LST placed strikes in the area. When the aircraft departed,
the PBR's continued with EAI fire throughout the night to prevent enemy
rescue and body recovery efforts. Fifteen of the enemy were killed in
the encounter and an additional five were listed as probably killed.
There were no friendly casualties.

Two Bronco's of TU 116.4.6 were scrambled to assist friendly
ground forces in heavy contact with the enemy about 22 miles southeast
of Soc Trang (MR 904 425). The enemy forces were armed with at least
two crew served weapons. A ground sweep after the aircraft strikes
revealed 25 of the enemy killed, three structures destroyed, and two
crew served weapons destroyed. The enemy was also estimated to have
suffered ten others probably killed and three probably wounded. There
were no U.S. casualties. This action took place in mid morning
27 August.

On 28 August, Bronco's were called on once again to support troops
in heavy contact with an estimated two platoons of VC 20 miles south-
east of Soc Trang (MR 935 457). Their air strikes resulted in ten
of the enemy killed. There were no Navy casualties.
CONFIDENTIAL

While conducting a PBR recon of Bo Cap Canal, 15 miles north-west of Huu Cuong (LT 652 213) on the afternoon of 31 August, a VC was sighted walking on the bank carrying a bag. When the PBR's took the VC under fire, six other VC broke from cover at the canal crossing and ran west. The boats immediately took the additional VC under fire and killed four of them. The other three were wounded and captured. Also recovered was VC personal gear and documents. A readout of the documents revealed that the VC were returning from a mission to purchase rice in Chu Chi and that at least one VC was in Chu Chi. The VC were identified as members of the 294 VC Regiment. There were no U.S. casualties.

GATE WARDEN SEAL OPERATIONS

Just prior to midnight on 1 August, SEAL's were inserted by LSSG approximately 14 miles east of Nha Be (IS 155 774) in support of operation Friendship I. After establishing a guardpost position, they waited almost five hours before sighting 15 Viet Cong in three sampans. They took the sampans under fire and received heavy automatic fire in return. Seawolves were scrambled and placed strikes on the surrounding river banks. At the end of the encounter 10 VC were listed as probably killed, one sampan was destroyed, four personal weapons were captured and approximately four kilos of documents concerning rocket/mine use and manufacture were taken into custody. There were no U.S. casualties.

Reacting to intelligence received from detainees, seven SEAL's and one LDNN were inserted by LSSG 12 miles west of Ny Tho (IS 305 400)
in the pre-dawn hours of 5 August. They patrolled south 100 meters to a designated VC hootch and searched it with negative results. Patrolling to the west they detained three males in another hootch. When one of the detainees attempted to escape, he was taken under fire and killed. The two remaining detainees were questioned, classified VC, and then turned over to authorities at Dong Tam. This was a TG 194.4 operation.

Chieu Hoi and combined intelligence concerning alleged POW camps triggered a series of TU 194.6.8 SEAL operations on 9 August in an area 32 miles southeast of Ben Tre (X2 76 90, XR 82 43). The SEALs operating with LDNN's and PRU's were inserted by Army slicks and searched for the three suspected sites with no success. They did however, discover two VC base camps/work areas and a VC dispensary. The workshops and numerous hand grenades that were stockpiled there were destroyed. Three VC were killed at the first site when an air strike was called in to destroy the enemy structure. Three VC commo-liaison personnel and one VC worker were captured at the dispensary. After destroying the buildings at the second site, all friendly forces and prisoners were extracted. Upon successful extraction HAI fire from the USS FRITCHETT was placed in the area of the workshops. Interrogations of the prisoners provided only one person who had heard of POW's in the area within the last month. There were no friendly casualties.

Acting on intelligence gathered from previous operations, SEAL's of TU 194.6.8 with four LDNN's and three Hoi Chans were inserted by
On 121 miles west of My Tho (K3 324 493) on the afternoon of 11 August. The objective was a possible arms/weapon cache in a suspected VC base camp. Seawolves were scrambled to cover the operation and the entire objective area was prepped with mini-guns from the LCM. Four VC hooches, three VC sampans, and a 1,000 pound rice cache were destroyed and 1,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, two kilos of documents and some clothing and medical gear were captured.

In Long An Province eight miles southwest of Nha Be (K3 863 764) a combined operation involving 12 SEAL's, 26 PHU's, two LCM's, two LUF's, Bronco's, Seawolves, and U.S. Army slicks took place on the afternoon of 19 August. SEAL's and PHU's were inserted by slick and took cover awaiting the arrival of VC. Five VC met in a hooch and three more were seen approaching in a sampan. Those in the sampan were taken under fire and additional forces were landed by PBR's and LSCO's. After the VC had fled, the friendly forces began boarding the boats; but during extraction, additional VC were sighted in a nipa palm area and taken under fire by the PBR's and LSCO's. When return fire was received from the enemy positions, SEAL's and PHU's were inserted for a sweep of the area, at which point the enemy fled. Seawolves and Bronco's were scrambled to place strikes in the target area and cover extraction.

There were no U.S. casualties. Enemy casualties were seven killed, one captured and an additional five listed as probably killed.

In the pre-dawn hours of 27 August, SEAL's and PHU's in waterborne guard-post position sighted three VC in a sampan traveling east on a canal.
The only case of enemy harassment of merchant shipping on the vital Long Tau shipping channel to Saigon occurred on 29 August when the 33 HEIDIA of Panamanian registry came under rocket fire. The rocket missed the target and there was no damage or personnel casualties.

There were two cases of enemy mining of ships and one possible mining attempt during August. On 20 August, the Japanese ship HIJMS ISAN was mined with 200–250 pounds of high explosive that blew a hole 8 ft. through the entire bottom of the stern. One crewman was killed and two others injured. The ship maintained its watertight integrity and empty tanks provided sufficient buoyancy to keep the ship afloat. The mining occurred in the vicinity of the Nha Be Tank Farm (ES 325 825). On 28 August the Dutch ship KENIA at the Nha Be Tank Farm was checked by U.S. Army PBR's between 0315–0330 and found to be secure. At 0345 Army PBR's sighted a white nylon line attached to KENIA's anchor chain and VH6 divers were sent to the scene. Just as the divers were to enter the water the mine detonated. It was estimated to have been a 400 pound explosive charge. The explosion caused a 15 ft. by 20 ft. hole in the port side of the ship but once again the watertight integrity of the ship prevented it from sinking.
Three hours later another white nylon line was sighted attached to the J5 Allied vessel but no object was attached to it. It was believed that the jack of the ship's propeller had cut loose a mine which then drifted away. In all cases attempts by Allied Forces to locate persons responsible were unsuccessful.

**TASK FORCE CLEARWATER**

Task Force Clearwater consists of two river security groups made up of ten FBR's each. River Division 521, the Hue River security group is based at Mobile Base I at Tam My Lagoon and River Division 543, based at Gia Viet, makes up the Dong Ha River security group. Enemy activity was light throughout the month with only seven hostile fire incidents. All river transits of the Gia Viet and Perfume Rivers were made without incident. Enemy casualties were three killed, one wounded and one captured. Navy casualties for this area were one killed and nine wounded; only one of these was the result of a fire-fight involving FBR's. Enemy rocket attacks on U.S. installations accounted for one killed and six of the wounded.

On 9 August, the pier security guard at Gia Viet using random scare charges observed a secondary explosion that produced a water spout approximately 60 feet in height. The explosion occurred about 30 feet from the end of the pier. Based on the size of the water spout and discussion with EOD personnel, it was believed to have been a mine of an unknown type.
Gun 71 received approximately ten rounds of 140mm rockets shortly after C303 on 11 August. About 15 minutes later 3 Battery 1/40 artillery fired 43 rounds of 105mm counter battery. The attack killed one Navyman and wounded two others and one soldier. The results of the counter battery are unknown. There was no damage to Clearwater assets and operations on the Gun Viet were unaffected.

A logistic craft transiting the Gun Viet River on 16 August sighted a possible water mine floating on the surface three miles from the mouth of the river (ID 296 667). PBR and EOD personnel investigated and found the mine to be pressure-influence type with two delay pencils and 82mm chemical long fuse attached. The pressure bulb and pressure chamber were lost during recovery. No explosion occurred. EOD personnel estimated that it contained 150-200 pounds of explosive, the arming circuit had functioned, both blasting caps had fired, and the mine was either a dud or a low order explosion detonated the previous day.
The Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force phased out of existence as
COMMANDIME/CSOR/JGV/SUCCESS SEVEN/CTF 117 were disestablished on
25 August after operating in the Mekong Delta since February 1967. The
redeployment of units of the U.S. Ninth Division from Dong Tam
in consequence of the previously announced 25,000 personnel strength
reduction, along with previous and planned turnover of river assault
craft to the Vietnamese Navy, were major factors in the phase out.
Remaining Navy components of the NSF have been designated the Riverine
Strike Group and placed under the command of Commander Task Group
194.7, a component of the Operation SEA LORDS task organization.
River assault squadron 13 and 15 remain intact under CTG 194.7. USS
BENEFAC (APB 35), flagship of the NSF, moved from its usual station
on the Ny Tho River near Dong Tam to the vicinity of French Fort
(XS 885 535) on the Van Go River.

Otherwise during the month, the NSF continued the limited opera-
tions which have been characteristic since the stand-down of 9th
Division began. Primary emphasis was again given to local security
operations in defense of Dong Tam and the preemption of rocket and
mortar attacks against the base. Tactics to accomplish these goals,
and which involved use of river assault craft, included daily insertion
of 6/31 Infantry Battalion troops for interdiction sweeps in the vicinity
of Dong Tam, night interdiction and sniper patrols, burn defoliation
missions along the Xang Canal, water mobile guardposts, sampan and

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personnel inspection, and harassment and interdiction fire into the southern Dong Tam defensive perimeter and reaction fire to Duffel F-4 sensor indications.

Operations outside the Dong Tam area were diversified and widespread. Numerous riverine assault operations throughout Kien Hoa Province took place on almost a daily basis as RAC supported various ARVN, Tiger Scout, MNPF, Maritime National Police and RP/PP activities. The majority of these operations were initiated along the Ham Luong and Dai Le Rivers. Interdiction patrols involving about 8 FAC were conducted in the vicinity of Sa Dec and Football Island (25° 90 40') in the Mekong River. Operations in the Can Gio area of Long An Province, targeted against the Viet Cong Dong Phu 265 and 506 Battalions continued as RAC supported the 3/7th Infantry Battalion of the Third Brigade. On the 28th of the month, the newly founded Riverine Strike Group assumed patrol/interdiction responsibilities for the Van Co River and its tributaries. After the BENSAH shifted locales to French Fort, RAC also augmented TG 116.9 patrol units on the Hia Be River and supported TG 116.3 as a ready reaction force on the Cho Gao Canal. Inspections of sampans and personnel received special attention in all areas throughout the month.

Significant contingents of RAC supported various SEA LORDS and other operations, i.e. GIANT SLINGSHOT, Tran Bong Dao and the RSSZ. Further details are given in the Operation SEA LORDS summary. The table below illustrates the deployment of RAC at month's end - of
particular note is the significant reduction in boats assigned to Kien Hoa Province operations as compared to other months:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Source of Dec</th>
<th>ATG</th>
<th>ASPR</th>
<th>MDF</th>
<th>CCB</th>
<th>RF1</th>
<th>INS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Giant Slingshot</td>
<td>RAD 152, 153</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3(F)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rung Sat Special Zone</td>
<td>RAD 152, 153</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1(F)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tran Hung Deo</td>
<td>RAD 131</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>Rach Soi</td>
<td>RAD 131</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Van Go River Patrol</td>
<td>RAD 151</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Defense</td>
<td>RAD 151</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kien Hoa Province Ops</td>
<td>RAD 132</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2(F)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair &amp; Overhaul</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2(F)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>54</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>13(F)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>117</td>
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</table>

(1) F - flame thrower configured monitor
(2) 4 NSI's utilized in utility role

Enemy contact was inconsequential in all MIF operating areas during the month. Of the 14 hostile fire incidents (HFI) reported, only two were enemy initiated firefight involving an exchange of fire. One friendly initiated firefight took place while the balance of the HFIs were cases of unilateral fire. No U.S. casualties were sustained while 1 HRU and 1 RF were killed and 2 HRU and 7 RF were wounded. Enemy casualties were 23 killed (2 probable). These casualty figures are the lowest on record.

The Honorable John M. Warner, Under Secretary of the Navy, accompanied by Vice Admiral Zumalt, COMNAVFORV, visited the MIF on 17 August during his tour of Naval activities. As the Secretary observed an HRF fire demonstra-
tion on the south bank of the Ry Tho, 4 Viet Cong were sighted in a
free fire zone by the helo gunships participating in the demonstration.
The IRF boats joined in the shoot and the 4 VC were killed.

The final contingent of some 330 U.S. Navymen from the IRF departed
Vietnam on 25 August. All were part of the 1,200 Navy personnel included
in the 25,000 troops being redeployed by the end of August.
The enemy's ability to avoid contact yet harass Dong Tam and the N2B was again demonstrated as Dong Tam received rocket and/or mortar fire on at least 7 occasions, but no damage to Naval units was reported. Reaction fire by N2B units and LMT were poured on the enemy positions as the attacks occurred with undetermined effect.

A mining attempt against USS NUGIES was believed to have been thwarted by minesweeping activity of the Mobile Riverine Base defense patrol or by the anti-mine protective sleeve which is run up and down N2B anchor chains at 30 minute intervals. At 0623 in the morning of 11 August, as NUGIES was preparing to get underway from its overnight anchorage in the My Tho River 4½ miles southeast of My Tho (21°56'40"N), personnel on board spotted a large flotation device, consisting of a rubber inner tube with a solid object suspended from the center, secured to the port anchor chain. A Navy ECD team was dispatched from Dong Tam aboard ASPB 12 and at 0730 confirmed the presence of a swimmer placed water mine. As the ASPB made an approach to attempt to cut the mine loose and tow it away from the ship, the boat's wake apparently dislodged the mine from the flotation device causing it to sink. Divers later entered the water to recover what was believed to be a command detonated mine, but met with negative results. A conductor wire was recovered. A subsequent inspection of the ship's hull produced negative results and a search of the south bank for evidence of wire or detonators also produced nothing. The NUGIES got underway at 0830.
A boat on base defense patrol in the Dong Tam anchorage on the Ny Tho River received about 2 rounds of small arms fire at 0050 on 12 August from the north bank 2 miles west of Dong Tam (L3 316 416). No damage was sustained.

At 0320 on 12 August, ATC 35 and 45, while on routine patrol with a 6/31 infantry sniper team embarked, received 3 B-40 rounds from the south bank of the Ny Tho River 4 miles west of Dong Tam (L3 343 408). ATC 45 took 1 B-40 hit with no personnel casualties and light damage. A LHF strike was placed on the estimated squad size enemy force at 0345 with unknown results. Fire had not been returned by the RAC due to the civilian population in the area.

At 0320 on 14 August, ATC 30 & 34 while conducting routine night interdiction patrol with a Navy sniper team embarked, observed two Viet Cong moving on the south bank of the Ny Tho River 4 miles west of Dong Tam (L3 343 411). The ATC took the VC under fire with 20mm, resulting in two KIA. The unit then continued on interdiction patrol. This was the same location from which ATC 35 & 45 received B-40 fire on 12 August.

At 0500 on 16 July, two R&D 151 LSPZ's in support of the operation extracted a platoon of Ny Tho District FRU's from the bank of the Ba Lai River 4 miles northeast of Ben Tre (L3 581 351). The FRU's had been inserted on an intelligence target at 2030 15 August and gained contact with a squad of VC near the extraction point resulting in 5 VC killed. One FRU was killed and another two wounded in the encounter.
A.M. on the 17th, a monitor, 2 GBS and 7 ATC's inserted the troops along the Song Cam Tieu (northern branch of the My Tho) 9 miles southeast of My Tho. As insertion was completed, contact was made with 15 Viet Cong who immediately cleared the area without exchanging fire.

After inserting two RF companies along the Rach Cai Can at 0300 on 21 August at positions 5 miles west and 3½ miles southwest of Ben Tre respectively (X5 413 323, X5 445 306), RAC received rocket, A/R and small arms fire from an enemy position about a half mile inland from the second landing position (vicinity X5 441 302). The RAC returned and suppressed the fire, killing two VC. The RF's gained contact accounting for 3 more VC killed and were extracted at 1630. There were no friendly casualties. Commander R. G. Murphy, Commander RAS 13 and the Don Mon district chief controlled the operation from the CCB present.

Executed to an inspection point with the Don Mon District Chief aboard, RAC came under B-40, A/R and small arms fire from the south bank of the Cai Can River in Kien Hoa Province, 4 miles southwest of Ben Tre (X5 441 302) at 0930 on 21 August. Fire was returned and suppressed resulting in 2 VC killed by ASP39. RF/RF troops were inserted and accounted for 3 additional VC killed and 4 kilos of documents and medical supplies captured.

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USH Statistical Summary
August 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MARKET TIME</th>
<th>CAM WARDEN</th>
<th>Mobile Riverine Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Detections</td>
<td>76,265</td>
<td>105,715</td>
<td>(2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inspections</td>
<td>10,254</td>
<td>33,586</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boardings</td>
<td>17,974</td>
<td>25,648</td>
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<tr>
<td>Craft detained</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Persons detained</td>
<td>1,604</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>47</td>
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<tr>
<td>Viet Cong suspects</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hostile fire incidents</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>14 (3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enemy casualties:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Killed</td>
<td>149h (1076C, HEST)</td>
<td>99h (BCM117HPROB)</td>
<td>25 (2 prob)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Wounded</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Captured</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA casualties:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Killed</td>
<td>1h (1USH,1USCG,1VNN)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Wounded</td>
<td>31 (1USH,1USCG,1USA,1USP)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0 USN, 1 PRC, 1 RF</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Captured</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Missing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Damaged:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Destroyed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Junks or sampans</td>
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<td>79</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>(2) Structures</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Captured</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Junks or sampans</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Weapons</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>(3) Ammunition (rounds)</td>
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<td>1415</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Rice (tons)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>(Destroyed) 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Damaged</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Junks or sampans</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Structures</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN material losses:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Destroyed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Surface craft</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Helicopters</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Damaged</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Surface craft</td>
<td>13 (12PCF, 1WPB)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Helicopters</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAR missions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remarks:

X - Information not available or not applicable
(1) Riverines Strike Group as of 25 August
(2) Information unknown or unavailable at this time
(3) Two enemy initiated and one friendly initiated, eleven cases of enemy unilateral fire which was not returned.
FLEET COMMAND

Fleet Command units actively patrolled 19 Market Time stations in August. This included two in the First Coastal Zone (1E, 1G), two in the Second Coastal Zone (4C, 4D), two in the Third Coastal Zone (6D, 6F), and all the stations in the Fourth Coastal Zone (areas 8 and 9). Although there was a slight decrease in the number of junks searched from 5,528 in July to 5,059 in August, there was a substantial recovery in the number of people searched from 13,903 in July to 19,516 in August. Detainment figures which normally are rather meager for the Fleet Command ships showed a marked increase in August. There were 27 junks and 51 people detained in August in comparison to negative detainments in July.

In addition to Market Time patrols the Fleet Command ships fired 44 NGFS missions, and conducted logistic lifts, river escorts, PSYOPS and Civic Action, and river missions. Generally H and I missions are performed with little knowledge of the effectiveness of the fire support. However, on the evening of 5 August LSIL 330 expended 2,841 rounds of 3"/50, 40mm, 20mm, .50 cal. and .30 cal. ammunition on suspected VC positions eleven miles southeast of Can Theo on the southern bank of the Hau Giang River (E 013592, N 019947, N 016904, W 994915, N 001936). Several days later a local friendly Vietnamese sampan owner reported to the commanding officer of the LSIL that his sister...
lived near the target area and that after the ship ceased firing VC entered her home and took a blanket to be used in improvising a medical stretcher. Before the VC left her home they told her that as a result of the ISIL’s destructive fire sixteen of their comrades had been killed and 27 wounded.

On 22 August ISIL 330 was instrumental in turning back a VC attack when it fired 3"/50 and 40mm rounds at VC who were sighted in an area five miles southeast of Can Tho adjacent to the Hau Giang River (4" 916012).

On the morning of 27 August, the VMN LSH(H) HQ401 (Hospital Ship) was enroute from S3A FLOAT to the S3A FLOAT Annex (both on the Cua Lon River). Approximately one and one half miles northeast of Nam Can City (4" 015687) the ship was attacked with 57mm recoilless rifle, B-40 rocket, and automatic weapons fire. One 57mm round and three B-40 rocket rounds found their mark and caused extensive damage to the dental van and the ships galley. Hull damage consisted of one hole one foot in diameter, two holes two feet in diameter, and superficial shrapnel damage to the forward gun mount. The VMN responded almost immediately with a heavy blanket of devastating fire directed at the enemy positions. One Vietnamese sailor with massive shrapnel wounds to both legs was medevaced to the evacuation hospital at Binh Thuy. Two other sailors that were wounded were treated on board. Four U.S. PCF’s were already proceeding to the MSF base to pick up troops for a scheduled operation when the hospital ship came under fire. Within
twenty minutes the troops were aboard the PBR's and the strike force was enroute to the scene of the ambush. Five minutes after the ambush was initiated the Huey had struck the ambush positions with 81mm mortar fire. A single Seawolf that was already airborne lashed out at the enemy with her machine guns and rockets. Once the MSF troops had reached the scene of the incident, they were inserted 200 to 300 yards either side of the ambush point and commenced a sweep operation. Approaching the ambush site the ground troops found six double tube homemade B-40 launchers along with three B-40 rockets still in the tubes. The troops continued to search the area until noon with negative results.

At the end of four runs on the Dong Hai River, the minesweepers of RAG 91 recovered electrical wire having a total length of 540 feet. On all four occasions the lengths of wire had some configuration of a plug, detonator, or blasting fuse attached to at least one end.

RIVER PATROL GROUP 51

An average of sixteen of the nineteen boats assigned to RPG 51 performed the routine patrols on the Long Tao and Saigon Rivers during the month of August. The PBR sailors were fired upon three times in August (AT 15 055925, 15 062944, and 15 064950) resulting in no VN casualties or damage. Highlights of the month occurred on 30 August while two PBR's were conducting a routine patrol on the Dong Hai River ten miles east northeast of Saigon (15 064958). When a sampan was detected emerging from a nearby canal, the PBR's fired warning shots.
One of the occupants disappeared in the dense undergrowth along the bank and the other one closed the PRR's and expressed his desire to Chieu Hoi to the PRR's. The VC and his gear and weapon were delivered to Cat Lai.

COASTAL JUNK FORCES

Coastal surveillance figures for the Coastal Group Junk Forces were comparable to those reported in July as there were 63,951 junks (62,797 in July) and 197,318 people (205,562 in July) searched in August. The detention figures reflected a significant increase in the number of junks detained in the Second and Fourth Coastal Zones and a larger decrease in the number of people detained in the First Coastal Zone partially compensated by increases in the Second, Third, and Fourth Coastal Zones. The totals in August were 314 junks (247 in July) and 825 people (862 in July) detained.

First Coastal Zone

The number of enemy initiated incidents remained at a low level for Coastal Forces during the month with the exception of the evening of 11-12 August when there was increased enemy activity reported throughout the Republic of South Vietnam. In comparison to the other coastal forces Coastal Group 14, operating with U.S. units in the Cua Dai River area of the First Coastal Zone, were involved in the largest number of incidents with the enemy. On the first day of the month a surveillance team from CG14 observed sampan activity in the vicinity of the CG14 base near the mouth of the Cua Dai River (BT 189553). The team took
early on the morning of 9 August the C116 base east of Xung Ngai (V T 75°735) received six rounds of 60mm mortar fire. All six rounds landed in the water and there was no further contact with the enemy. Later the same day a lone Yabuta junk attached to C32 was hit by a single 57mm recoilless rifle round and some small arms fire approximately one mile southwest of the C32 base on the Cua Dai River. The 57mm recoilless rifle round ripped holes in the port and starboard side between the waterline and the main deck and in the process slightly wounded two VN sailors. Artillery was promptly supplied by the U.S. Americal Division and CTU 115.1.0 with unknown results. A third significant incident occurred on 9 August in the First Coastal Zone when a surveillance team of R16-32 found and intercepted a floating mine of a very crude design two and one half miles southwest of Ho An on the Thu Bon River (BT 102557). The components of the line were styrofoam, bamboo, and deteriorated C-4 explosives. A pulley system was used for maneuvering the mine with badly deteriorated wire which was probably the reason the mine had not detonated.

One surveillance team of CGL4 made contact with an unknown number of VC on Barrier Island situated in the center of the Cua Dai River (BT 188544) during the evening hours of darkness on 14 August. Contact
was light however one VC was killed and another one wounded. Three VC were confirmed dead and one AK-47 was captured.

Second Coastal Zone

Coastal Group 27 located near Phan Rang in the Second Coastal Zone was involved in a firefight on the evening of 9 August when the CG27 reaction team reacted to intelligence reports that VC were entering the Ny An and Khanh Hoi Hamlets for the purpose of extorting money, food, and conscripts. Traveling inland and to the north of Phan Rang the team was ambushed by an estimated two squads of VC in green uniforms (SW 885822). The firefight continued for approximately thirty minutes with a steady flow of illumination fire being provided by the CG27 mortars and the Than Wai artillery. When the CG27 team withdrew, they accounted for nine VC killed (8 probable) and one AN-47 and some documents captured. The CG27 force followed up their extraction from the area with random H and I fire throughout the night. A sweep of the area the following morning uncovered blood trails and retreating foot prints.

Third Coastal Zone

On 6 August twenty miles upstream from the mouth of the co Chien River CG35 provided transportation and blocking for 50 PF troops that were inserted on the south bank of the river (NS 465055). The CG35 units received sniper fire approximately one mile south of the insertion point (NS 465055) but had no further contact. When the PF’s were extracted from the area, they reported that they had
light contact which resulted in the death of two VC and the capture of two hand grenades.

While patrolling the lower Bassac River on 15 August 29 miles southeast of Can Tho, two CG36 junks observed a sampan crossing from the southern bank of the river (KR 225680) to Dung Island (KR 225680). When the junks gave chase, they were greeted with automatic weapons fire which they returned and suppressed. Pursuing the enemy ashore a fifteen-man CG36 reaction team came under fire from two locations. This fire was silenced and the ambush team later returned to the junks without gaining any further contact. Total results for the brief incident were two bunkers destroyed and one sampan captured.

After inserting members of the CG36 reaction team on the banks of the My Thanh River on 21 August 42 miles southeast of Can Tho, two U.S. PCF's and one U.S. VBP proceeded farther up the river to set up a mortar support position. Shortly after 1000 the reaction team surprised a small group of VC who were returning to an extortionist station. In the brief skirmish that followed one VC was killed and four VC, assorted documents, and some ammunition were captured. Before the reaction team returned to the afloat units, they destroyed six VC sampans and the extortion station.

Fourth Coastal Zone

The 56 Vietnamese junks assigned to Coastal Groups 41, 42, 43, and 44 carried out river and Market Time patrols, base defense and Sea FLAT operations in the Fourth Coastal Zone. Since the coastal groups
operated as an integrated force, there were junks from almost every coastal group operating out of Ha Tien, Old Nam Can, An Thai, Hon Tre Island, and Poulo Obi Island. (See discussion of Tran Hung Dao Campaign in Border Indictment Campaign within Operation SEA LORDS Summation and discussion of SEA FLOAT in Coastal Surveillance Force Summation for further details.)

RIVER ASSAULT GROUPS

In the Third and Fourth Riverine Areas the VN RAG's conducted a total of 2,161 amphibious assaults and 1,335 river patrols. The RAG's were also employed in routine troop lifts, escort missions, NGFS, and PSYOPS and Civic Action operations.

Supporting a VC National Police reaction force and VN LDNN on 4-5 August, riverine craft of RAG 31 of the Fourth Riverine patrolled the river/canal from the northern end of the Mang Thit-Nicholai waterway (XS 276237) to the small village of Tan Binh twelve miles south of Vinh Long (XS 103107). Late in the afternoon of 4 August the RAG's fired their guns in preparation for a sweep by the National Police one mile east of Tan Binh (XS 138137). There were negative results from the sweep and the RAG continued to patrol until just after midnight when they inserted the seven LDNN for a night guardpost. In the morning the LDNN returned to the RAG boats with the report that they had killed one VC and wounded two others during the night. They also had destroyed two hooches and captured one grenade.
RAG 24 units departed Phu Cuong (XII 806138) on the morning of 7 August with elements of the 5th ARVN Division embarked. While they transited the Saigon River towards Ben Suc, 26 miles northwest of Saigon and eighteen miles upstream from Phu Cuong (XII 754354), they received a single B-40 rocket from the west bank. As the rocket fell harmlessly in the river, the RAG's released their batteries on a VC who was leaving the scene of the incident. The force completed their transit to the northwest without further interruptions. A ground search by the ARVN units the following day three miles southeast of Ben Suc (XII 620318) yielded two three-day old VC bodies, one AK-47 and 100 kilograms of rice. The rice and the AK-47 were in a separate location.

After ARVN and RF troops were loaded aboard RAG 25/29 units on 24 August at Ca Mau (WR 165145), the amphibious force got underway and proceeded west on the narrow Ganh Hao River to the intersection of the Ong Doe River. Turning south on the Ong Doe River, the riverine craft traveled another six miles (WR 048076) before they stopped in order to put the soldiers ashore. Continuing south the VNN paralleled the troop sweep. Sniper fire was received during this part of the operation which wounded one VNN. One company returned to the boats that afternoon while the rest remained ashore. The RAG beached their craft for the evening (WR 004042). The following morning they traveled farther south (WR 998040) where the one company was put ashore after the VNN had prepared the beach with their armament. Throughout the day the VNN extracted the ground units; once they were all on board.
the boats returned to Ca Iau. The ground units accounted for 30 dead VC, three VC suspects, eleven personal weapons, and 500 rounds of AK-47 ammunition. Four A.N.V.I. were killed and two others wounded. One U.S. advisor attached to the ground units was also wounded.

RIVER ASSAULT AND INTERDICTIVE LIVING 70-75

A higher degree of utilization of RAID's 70 through 75 was evidenced in August as compared with July with increases in the number of river patrols and amphibious operations from 962 to 1,007 and from 365 to 624 respectively. RAID's 70, 71, and 73 were heavily committed to GIANT SLINGSHOT operations with RAID 70 operation from Mobile Base II on the Van Go Tay River at Tan An and AID's 71 and 73 operating from Ben Lux on the Van Go Dong. Light to moderate contact for the RAID's during the month accounted for 26 hostile fire incidents. The VNN were credited with eighteen VC killed (three probable) at the loss of eight VNN killed and 43 VNN wounded. (See discussion of GIANT SLINGSHOT campaign in Operation SEA LORDS Summary section for further details).

RAID 72 was stationed at Chau Doc and was employed in river operations on the Vinh Te Canal. (See discussion of Border Interdiction Campaign in Operation SEA LORDS Summary section for further details.)

RAID's 74 and 75 supported Brigade "A" of the VNRD under the operational control of the 21st ARVN Division in the northeastern portion of Base Area 483 in Chuong Thian Province. RAID 74 units in company with three river craft of the 18th RF Boat Company were enroute on 13 August from Vi Thanh on the Cai Tu River to the VNRD fire support base at the intersection of the Cai Tu and Cai Lon Rivers (GR 369693)
when they were assailed with four hand detonated mines, fifteen .50 rounds, and automatic weapons fire from both banks. The unit returned the fire and cleared the area. Enemy casualties were unimpaired and friendly casualties were limited to three WACs slightly wounded and minor shrapnel holes in the s.w. structure of one .50.

In 16 August FID 74 conducted a troop lift eleven miles northwest of Vi Thanh on the Cai Lon River (from .R353670 to .R372702). From 17-20 August the amphibious operations moved to the northeast and the Rash Noc Trong (from .R376707 to .R453670). While searching the river banks on the 19th, the WAC wounded one evading VC and uncovered three .50 rounds in crude wooden and pipe launchers, six grenades, four mines of various types, and 400 feet of electrical wire.
During the month the Vietnamese Marine Corps and their U.S. Marine Corps advisors continued operations in the Third and Fourth CID with the employment of personnel assigned to the six infantry battalions as follows: combat operations - 50%, security operations - 20%, reserve status - 15%, and training - 15%. The negligible to light contact that all units experienced was reflected in the low number of enemy casualties in comparison to the July figure. A total of 23 VC were killed (20 in July), eighteen VC were captured, and one VC rallied. Marine casualties were almost identical to those of July with fifteen marines killed and another 83 wounded. Enemy mines continued to take their toll as 50% of all marine casualties were caused by mines.

From 1-30 August Brigade "A" including the Brigade Headquarters, the Second and Fourth Infantry Battalions, and Battery I of the First Artillery Battalion conducted reconnaissance in force operations in the northeastern portion of Base Area 483 in Chuong Thien Province, IV CID. The mission of the Brigade was to open the East-West route between Vi Tuan and Rach Gia and to open the North-South portion of Route 12 in their area of operation. Under the operational control of the 21st ARVN Division, the Marines, who were supported by the VNNAID's 74 and 75, Province Reconnaissance Units, National Field Police, and Revolutionary Development Cadre, had negligible activity until 15 August when the First Battalion, which had been at the Thu Duc
Late Aug until 2 August when they relieved the Fourth Battalion, established contact with an estimated VC platoon. Three VC were killed and one AK-40 was captured while three marines were wounded by mines. The same day the Second Battalion captured two VC at the loss of one marine killed and two wounded. Three days later on 16 August the First Battalion sustained two marines killed and seventeen wounded during an engagement with an estimated VC company. Enemy casualties were not determined. Twelve miles southwest of Vị Thanh (N31°26'22") on 26 August the Second Battalion discovered a 30 bed dispensary which they subsequently destroyed. They also captured 250 82mm mortar rounds, two 3-40 rounds, and two rolls of communication wire. During the same operation one VNN was killed and one VNN and one USN were wounded when two 11D boats were taken under fire while they were attempting to recover three RPG rounds and three launchers that they had sighted along the bank. With the operation concluded on 30 August, the Brigade returned to Thu Duc for a period of stand-down.

Brigade "B" which includes the Third and Fifth Infantry Battalions, and Battery E of the Second Artillery Battalion continued reconnaissance in force operations in Bien Hoa Province under the operational control of the II Corps Tactical Zone until 15 August when the Brigade returned to Thu Duc and Saigon in order to stand-down for the remainder of the month. The only significant incident occurred on 2 August (Y3225899) when the Fifth Battalion killed eight VC in a fight with a company size force of VC.
The Fifth Battalion was detached from Brigade "B" on 8 August and began carrying out reconnaissance operations under the control of the Long Bien Special Zone in the vicinity of Bien Hoa air base. There was negative contact through 15 August. The Battalion returned to their Thu Duc base camp and was placed in a one hour standby to 21.

When the Third Battalion relieved the Fifth Battalion on 31 August, the Fifth Battalion reverted to a stand-down status for the remainder of the month.

The Fourth Battalion, which returned to its base camp at Vung Tau on 8 August, was in a reserve status through 31 August.

With one platoon of Battery D providing the artillery support, the Sixth Battalion performed reconnaissance in force and security operations north of Bien Hoa under the control of the Long Bien Special Zone. Light contact on 10 August with a VC squad resulted in two VC killed. During a night guardpost on 16 August the marines confronted another VC squad. Four VC were killed and two B-40 rounds, three B-40 fuses, and 100 rounds of AK-47 ammunition were taken into custody.

With no further contact the Sixth Battalion moved to the vicinity of Highway 1 between Bien Hoa and Long Binh (T7038126) on 25 August and assumed the III CTZ standby reserve assignment.

Batteries B and C of the First Artillery Battalion remained at the Thu Duc base camp for the entire month. Battery B joined Batteries B and C after completing operations with Brigade "B" on 15 August.
Two platoons of Battery D provided gunfire support from their positions at Cat Lai. The remaining platoon was stationed at Thu Duc. Battery F spent a second month supporting operations in the RVN.
**CONFIDENTIAL**

**VNN/VNMC STATISTICAL SUMMARY**

**VIETNAMESE NAVY:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Daily Average</th>
<th>Searched</th>
<th>Detained</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oper</td>
<td>Junks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COASTAL FORCE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>20,532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>26,593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>46.0</td>
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<td>IV</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>7,556</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-totals</td>
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* FLEET COMMAND

| PATROL SHIPS | 26.1 | 2,677   | 11,007 | 11 | 36 |
| PCP/MPB’s    | 17.5 | 2,382   | 8,509  | 16 | 15 |

**RIVERINE AREA**

<p>| | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>121.9</td>
<td>5,928</td>
<td>24,120</td>
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**RAG CRAFT**

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<td>65.0</td>
<td>4,228</td>
<td>9,582</td>
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**#CENTRAL TASK FORCE**

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<td>70.8</td>
<td>5,400</td>
<td>14,005</td>
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**TOTALS:**

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<tr>
<td>81,566</td>
<td>265,041</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>890</td>
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**VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VC/NAV</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>Captured</th>
<th>Subjects Detained</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>VNMC</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>81</td>
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<table>
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<th>HJ1 CHANH</th>
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</table>

* Provided 44 gunfire support missions.

# Includes RAG 27, RAG 81, RAG 91, and RPG 51.

**GROUP 4**
Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years

**CONFIDENTIAL** 114
Although not as significant as the record Chieu Ho rate of 208 in July, a total of fifteen Ho Chi Chanh rallied to U.S. and Vietnamese Navy craft during August. Hunger and heavy personnel losses were generally the reasons most returnees gave for abdicating. One Ho Chi Chanh was reported to have led a U.S. unit to a VC hospital complex where he had worked as a medic.

The PSYOPS and Civic Action effort in the RSSZ has continued at a high level with regular aerial leaflet drops, loudspeaker operations, and 120s. Seabee units working in the area have completed repairs on three VNAF artillery sites and construction of several community projects in An Thoi Dong Village (vicinity X999640). During one U.S. Navy LH7 PSYOPS mission conducted on 13 August fourteen miles southeast of Saigon (Y3070770 to X390750), there were 65,000 Chieu Ho passes and 28,000 safe conduct passes dropped from the helos. The small village of Tan Thanh twenty three miles southeast of Saigon (Y5114506) was the scene of a U.S./VN MEDCAB on 24 August. The U.S. medical personnel treated 233 patients and dusted off one seriously ill VN child to the 36th Evacuation Hospital at Vung Tau. Other U.S. and VN talked with the people and distributed 200 health kits, 150 Republic of Vietnam flags, 75 Rural Life magazines, 500 "Today" newspapers, and 100 balloons.

Operation SEA FLOAT, the joint USN/VN pacification effort on the lower Ca Mau Peninsula near Old Nam Can City (V992673), was expanded.
again in August with the arrival of 12F Montagnard troops and U.S. Navy SEALs at the beginning of the month and 78 Coastal Group JI junks at the end of the month. The U.S. Navy SEALs and Seawolves at SEA FLOAT were employed extensively with the troops and this resulted in a reduction in their FSK-45 effort. This situation was partially relieved with the arrival of the VNS junks. As of 31 August a total of 314 hours of FSK-45 broadcasts has been logged by SEA FLOAT forces.

There were 1,677 new visitors to SEA FLOAT in August, since the inception of the operation 15,345 people have visited the complex, and 720 families have indicated a desire to resettle, while 146 families have actually returned to Nha Trang. A thriving woodcutting community has developed in the vicinity of the Cai Mlap Canal (0380874). Along approximately eight small canals off the Cua Lon River and just west of the Cai Mlap 25 hooches have been constructed housing approximately 160 people. An estimated 15:7 junks which stay from three to five days are nestled within the canals. In order to set aside a safe area for use by the woodcutters a no fire zone has been established which generally coincides with the area in which most of the woodcutters have settled.

The good news of SEA FLOAT and the protection in the area has been spreading fast as junks and sampans from as far away as Vinh Long, Rach Gia, Ha Tien, and Chau Doc have arrived in the area.

Seabee Team 7102 located at Phuoc Le City (5380616), completed the construction of three sets of playground equipment to be utilized in the Phuoc Tuy Province schools. Five more sets are scheduled for
In a similar project two swing sets were fabricated by Seabee Team 114 stationed at Phu Vinh (TY32732) and were donated to the local school. Villagers of the tiny hamlet of Phu Vinh thirty-five miles east-northeast of Daigon (TY472117) had no convenient method by which to cross a canal in order to get to their farmlands. Seabee Team 3104 working out of Xuan Loc (TY403206) responded to their request and constructed a single two meter by seven meter single span wooden bridge.

The Naval Support Activity Danang medical personnel conducted voluntary work at the Stella Maris Dispensary and the Halteser Hospital in Danang. Dermatology, orthopedic, surgical, and urology clinics were held weekly at the U.S. hospital. More than 35,000 Vietnamese civilians were treated by USN and VN MEDCAP teams throughout the Republic of Vietnam. A typical MEDCAP operation took place on 6 August at the Ly Bang Ban Dau Catholic Orphanage (YD768251) just southeast of Hue. One USN corpsman and Clearwater FE3 sailors including VN ACTOV trainees treated thirty children and distributed 200 school kits, 200 bars of soap, and 80 plastic food trays. Following the MEDCAP the Vietnamese children serenaded the USN and VN sailors as a demonstration of their appreciation.
USN CIVIC ACTION STATISTICAL SUMMARY
25 JUNE - 25 JULY 1969

TOTAL NUMBER OF MAN-DAYS (10 hr. days) PERSONNEL OF UNITS ENGAGED IN CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS:

4665

COST OF SUPPLIES CONTRIBUTED BY MILITARY RESOURCES FOR CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS:

VNS 5,845,210

EXPENDITURES FROM THE US/FWAF CIVIC ACTION PSYOP FUND:

VNS 972,130

VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS:

VNS 406,602

PERCENTAGE OF US MILITARY CIVIC ACTION ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED JOINTLY WITH:

Percent

Other FWAF

RVNAP

U.S. Civilian voluntary agencies

Average percent of self-help by VN civilians

a. Labor

b. Material

71%

64%

6%

9%

24%

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

460

70,126

EDUCATION

535

203,098

SOCIAL WELFARE

2,724

5,226,619

TRANSPORTATION

578

265,124

REFUGEE

428

261,165

INSTITUTES ASSISTED:

Number

60

Schools

24

Hospitals/Dispensaries

57

Orphanages

27

Others

115

UNCLASSIFIED
ACCELERATED TURNOVER PROGRAM AND TRAINING SCHEDULE

On 11 August, ten PT's formally assigned to River Division 574 of TF 116 were unofficially turned over to the Vietnamese Navy during a brief ceremony at Nu 3e. The newly acquired PT's joined three other units to bring the total number of boats assigned to RPD 52 up to thirteen PT's. Twelve of the units are assigned to the operational control of the VNS Commander of the 133Z; the last boat is responsible to the Capital Military District for night patrols on the Saigon River. The units assigned to the 133Z are in the process of relieving U.S. PT's that are operating in the 133Z.

The LCU 1475 was decommissioned and turned over to the Vietnamese Navy during formal ceremonies on 30 August at the First Coastal Zone Headquarters located at the Danang Naval Base. Rear Admiral Bonner, Commander U.S. Naval Support Activity Danang, represented the United States and presented the craft to Commander Thom, Commander First Coastal Zone. The acceptance of the LCU by Commander Thom culminated for the new Vietnamese crew weeks of import indoctrinations and underway training which included local cargo operations and familiarization trips to other ports in II CTZ.

The first phase-in of VNN personnel into the ACTV/LOG Craft Maintenance System began near the end of July and the first part of August with the arrival of the VNN personnel to the various NSA activities throughout the Republic of Vietnam. The concept of this program is
to provide the Vietnamese on the job training which will lead to their eventual assumption of all the work of the repair departments. As of 31 August there were 402 VNN personnel undergoing on the job training for craft maintenance; there were 255 enrolled in VNN class "A" schools of craft maintenance.

The VNN logistics organization which is in the initial stages of development had 35 VNN enrolled in base maintenance schools or in training and there were 50 SK's and 50 SK's attending "A" school at the end of the month.

Within the training program the large drawdown of VNN personnel from operating forces to man turnover craft has caused a general lowering of the maintenance readiness. This situation is expected to improve as school and OJT graduates become available during the next twelve months. A stronger emphasis is being placed on publication translation, procurement of training aids, leadership training and recruiting.
### Glossary of Abbreviations

The following abbreviations and terms are commonly used in the combat zone by all agencies and are listed here in amplification of those used in the text:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABF</td>
<td>Attack by fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APLT</td>
<td>A multi-purpose barge, standard size is twenty-eight feet by ninety feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>Army of the Republic of Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASPB</td>
<td>Assault Support Patrol Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATC</td>
<td>Armored Troop Carrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATSB</td>
<td>Advance Tactical Support Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/W</td>
<td>Automatic Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Pony/Bronco</td>
<td>CV-10 Twin Engine Turboprop Counterinsurgency Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCB</td>
<td>Command and Communications Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Coastal Group (VNM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHICOM</td>
<td>Chinese Communist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDG</td>
<td>Civilian Irregular Defense Groups - mercenaries of Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian descent who fight primarily around own villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMI</td>
<td>Capital Military District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRIP</td>
<td>Civilian Reconnaissance Intelligence Platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Tear gas grenades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTZ</td>
<td>Corps Tactical Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Coastal Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta Hawk</td>
<td>Mohawk OV-1C aircraft</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dirt off

EMF

FSS

FFM

GDA

GVI

HMI

JGS

KIA

Kit Carson Scouts

Light Attack Fire Team (CV-10's)

Light Anti-tank Weapon

Landing Craft, Personnel, Large

Vietnamese equivalent of USN underwater demolition team

Light Helo Fire Team

CH-6 Light Observation Helicopter

Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

Mobile Advance Tactical Support Base

Medical Civic Action Program

Heavily armored LCM-6 (40mm cannon or 105mm howitzer)

Mobile Riverine Base

Mobile Riverine Force

Minesweeper, Boat

Minesweeper, Drone

Saigon government and serve with allied military units
Mobile Strike Force - mercenaries who deploy anywhere

C.S
Naval Gunfire Support

KIL
Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer

MOD
Night Observation Device

NVA
North Vietnamese Army

POB
Patrol Boat, River

FCP
Patrol Craft, Fast (SWIFT Boat)

PC
Patrol Gunboat

PRU
Provincial Reconnaissance Unit

PSA
Provincial Sector Advisor

Psyops
Psychological Operations

RAD
River Assault Division

RAG
River Assault Group (VNN)

RAID
River Assault and Interdiction Division (VNN)

RAS
River Assault Squadron

RF/PF
Regional Forces/Popular Forces

RPG
Rocket Propelled Grenade

RSSZ
Rung Sat Special Zone

SAR
Search and Rescue

SEAWOLF
UH-1B Helo, heavily armed, USN operated

SHADOW
C-119 aircraft

SKIMMER
20' fiberglass rowboat

SLICK
UH-1B Helo

SPooky
C-47 aircraft

SSB
Swimmer Support Boat (skimmer)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STAB</td>
<td>SEAL Team Assault Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TALR</td>
<td>Tactical Area of Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA-V</td>
<td>United States Army, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMCG</td>
<td>Vietnamese Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNNAV</td>
<td>Vietnamese Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIPPO</td>
<td>Flame thrower equipped ATC or MGITOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBP</td>
<td>Waterborne Guarposts</td>
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