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From: Chief, Naval Advisory Group, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
To: Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

Subj: Historical Review, Naval Advisory Group Activities, August 1965

Ref: (a) COMUSMACV Staff Memo 870-1

Encl: (1) Historical Review, Naval Advisory Group Activities, August 1965

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded to Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Secretary Joint Staff), in accordance with reference (a).

*J. T. Shepherd*  
J. T. SHEPHERD  
By direction

AD-A954 004

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Historical Review, Naval Advisory Group Activities, AUGUST 1965

Preparing Agency: NAVADVGRP MACV

LCDR MULTER: Tel 40634

OUTLINE OF AUGUST 1965 HISTORICAL REVIEW :

1. (S) Operation MARKET TIME
  - a. (C) General.
  - b. (S) Continual Expansion of Market Time Activities.
2. (C) Operational Assistance
  - a. (C) Minesweeping of the Long Tau River,
3. (C) Maintenance/Material Assistance
  - a. (C) Strengthening of the River Force,
  - b. (C) Junk Construction Program,
  - c. (C) Guam Ship Rehabilitation Schedule,
4. (S) Planning
  - a. (C) Port Security,
  - b. (C) Cam Ranh Bay Development,
  - c. (S) SWIFT and PACV assignment.
5. (U) Marine Advisory Unit Activities.

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ENCLOSURES:

- (1) A Study Developed by NAVADVGRP to Determine DRV Course of Action for Infiltration by Sea, (SECRET) *hypothetical was same*
- (2) Detailed Discussions of the Tasks; Combat, Combat Support, Advisory, and Psywar, (SECRET)
- (3) Strength Increase Summary.
- (4) H&S Company.
- (5) Disbursing Platoon

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- (6) Signal Company.
- (7) Engineer Company.
- (8) Transportation Company.
- (9) Medical Company.
- (10) Recommendation for Increase on Communications Personnel in the Rifle Company, Infantry Battalion.

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1. (S) OPERATION MARKET TIME.

a. (C) General. Task Force 115, under the command of RADM N. G. WARD, USN, CHNAVADVGRP, as Commander Coastal Surveillance Force (CTF 115), was activated at 301000H July 1965 (See July Historical Report). Market Time Operations encompass the sea area off the RVN between the 17th parallel, dividing the boundary of DRV and RVN, along the coastline to the Gulf of Thailand, where the Brevie Line extends to seaward from the border of Cambodia and RVN. This area is divided into nine patrol areas 30 to 40 miles in depth and 80 to 120 miles in length. Normally DERs are assigned to each patrol area. In the event nine DERs are not available, COMSEVENTHFLT is assigning MSOs as substitutes.

Coast Guard Squadron ONE provided units on sea barrier patrol along the 17th parallel and in the Gulf of Thailand. Coast Guard Division 12 consisting of 8 WPB (82 foot cutters) based at Danang and operated near the 17th parallel. Coast Guard Division 11 consisting of 9 WPBs based at An Thoi, southern coast of Phu Quoc Island, operated in the Gulf of Thailand. LST's provided support for WPB's at both Danang and An Thoi.

Five combined manned Coastal Surveillance Centers (CSC's) at Danang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Vung Tau, and An Thoi coordinate US-VNN patrols. The entire MARKET TIME Operations are controlled from the CTF 115 Surveillance Operations Center located in the Naval Advisory Group, Headquarters in Saigon while the VNN patrol operations are controlled from the CSC's mentioned above.

Aerial surveillance along the coastline and off-shore was provided by 7 SP-2H aircraft based at Tan Son Nhut, covering the sea area between Vung

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Tau and the Brevie Line, and by CTF 72 P3A aircraft based at Sangley Point, Philippine Island, covering the sea area between Vung Tau to the 17th parallel. Naval gunfire support was provided by COMSEVENTHFLT units and coordinated by CTU 70.8.9. TF 115 DER's were available for NGFS missions on a not-to-interfere basis with their primary mission in support of Market Time Objectives.

b. (S) Continual Expansion of Market Time Activities. A program is underway to provide for unilateral, joint and combined surveillance operations and alternate actions toward the expansion of Market Time activities and the improvement of the Vietnamese Navy. This program includes:

- (1) The improvement of Coastal Force Effectiveness.
- (2) The development of a Ho Chi Minh Infiltration-Plan
- (3) The reappraisal of Market Time Objectives.
- (4) The detailed plan for the development of various courses of action formulated.

Improvement of the Coastal Force Effectiveness will be developed by the following: the consolidation of Junk Bases, the provision of dependent housing for Junk Base personnel, the improvement of Junk Base defenses, the improvement of Coastal Force Motivation, the enlargement of the Coastal Force Psywar effects, the expansion of the Commando Force, the revision of the VNN Command organization, the enforcement of Coastal Curfews, the reappraisal of the Coastal Force Mission, and the increase in advisory needs.

As to the development of a Ho Chi Minh Infiltration Plan, enclosure (1) is a study into the DKV supply network and how it might be executed.

With the primary mission of Market Time "to conduct surveillance gunfire support, visit and search, and other operations as directed along the

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coast of RVN in order to assist the RVN in detection and prevention of Communist infiltration from the sea," an alternate mission for TF 115 has been developed around the broad grouping of tasks into four pacification categories: Combat, Combat Support, Advisory, and Psywar. The alternate mission is to "improve the Vietnamese Navy's counter-insurgency capabilities and assist Vietnamese and U.S. Forces to secure the coastal regions and major rivers in order to defeat the Communist Insurgency in Vietnam" (CHNAVADVGRP ltr 3121 ser 00100-65 of 25 August 1965). Enclosure (2) provides the detailed discussions of the above tasks.

2. (C) OPERATIONAL ASSISTANCE

a. (C) Minesweeping of the Long Tau River. VNN efforts in Mine-counter-measures of the major rivers have been of a low priority. For use in the major rivers in the RVN, the VNN has 12 MMS (Motor Launch Minesweepers) capable of limited minesweeping operations.

To date, there are no indications that the VC have mined the major rivers in the RVN in an attempt to block large ship movements to major sea ports. The VC have the capability of conducting small scale mine warfare in the RVN. During the past several months, several R/G craft and Coastal Force Junks have been placed out-of-action because of VC mines planted in waterways which transit VC controlled areas.

Due to the possible mining of the Long Tau River, the only deep channel water route to the Port of Saigon, the need for an increased mine warfare posture is required by the VNN. Advisory efforts were increased during the month towards the improvement of the mine-countermeasures capability of the

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VNN. CHNAVADVGRP made a recommendation to VNN CNO concerning the importance of mine-countermeasures and particularly in the control of mining in the Saigon main ship channel. Until the middle of August 1965, sparse mine-sweeping operations were conducted by the VNN and only in the Long Tau River. Based on CHNAVADVGRP recommendation, the VNN assigned the 12 MLMS the duty of sweeping the Long Tau River twice daily between Saigon and Vung Tau. This operation commenced in mid-August and has been continued on a daily basis with no positive results. Since the VC primarily use a typical electrically detonated moored mine, a chain drag sweep concept is employed to break the wire used by the VC, to actuate the charge, from a position on the river bank. Therefore, the MLMSs are operated in pairs dragging near both banks of the river.

3. (C) Maintenance/Material Assistance.

a. (C) Strengthening of the River Force. The "beef up" of two RAGs by the addition of 2 Monitors, 1 Commandant, 5 LCM-6s (See March Historical Report) plus 3 RPCs has not taken any substantial form to date. The earlier deliveries of these craft had to be used to fill vacancies created by battle casualties. The "beef up" increments will still be assigned to RAG 22 and RAG 25. Three monitors will arrive in-country the first week of September 1965.

b. (C) Junk Construction Program. The Yabuta construction program continues to proceed as scheduled with the first increment of 90 junks to be completed by the end of December 1965, at which time immediate construction of 30 additional junks will begin of the same design. As of

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2 September 1965, 42 Yabuta Junks had been assigned to Junk Divisions in the First, Second, and Third Coastal Districts. Thirteen additional junks have been completed and have undergone sea trials, 4 more have been launched and 23 more keels have been laid.

c. (C) Guam Ship Rehabilitation Schedule. Final arrangements were made for the major overhaul and rehabilitation of certain VNN ships at the Ship Repair Facility, Guam. The overhaul schedule, recommended by CHNAVADVGRP (CHNAVADVGRP ltr 4700 ser 02/19 of 14 May 1965), was confirmed during this month. The overhaul schedule for VNN ships at the Ship Repair Facility, Guam is as follows:

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>COMMENCE OVERHAUL</u>	<u>END OVERHAUL</u>
LSM 402	1 Oct 1965	31 Jan 1966
LSM 402	1 Jan 1966	30 Apr 1966
LSM 401	1 May 1966	31 Aug 1966
LSM 402	1 Jul 1966	31 Oct 1966
LSM 400	1 Mar 1967	30 Jun 1967
LSIL 330	1 Feb 1966	31 May 1966
LSIL 327	1 Sep 1966	31 Dec 1966
LSIL 328	1 Jan 1967	30 Apr 1967
LSSL 225	1 Nov 1966	28 Feb 1967
LST 500	1 May 1967	31 Aug 1967

Other ships of the same types will be scheduled later.

The U.S. Government will defray the expense of these overhauls and new equipment installed through military assistance funds. Personal expenses such as pay, allowances, per diem, food, and other personal support will be borne by the GVN. The NAVADVGRP will support the overhaul and rehabilitation with a U.S. Navy liaison team. A Vietnamese Officer with Naval Shipyard experience will be assigned to the Repair Facility in Guam as liaison throughout the overhaul and rehabilitation schedule.

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4. (S) Planning.

a. (C) Port Security. Steps were initiated by CHNAVADVGRP to improve the security of the Saigon Harbor. The responsibility for Port Security of Saigon Harbor falls on the shoulders of the Commander Capital Military District. A Vietnamese Naval Officer is assigned to the district with full authority to coordinate and direct necessary actions to effect proper security of the river, along the waterfront, and in the port. Since the U.S. Coast Guard is responsible for port security in the United States, CHNAVADVGRP requested the assignment to his staff, on temporary duty for a period of three months, an experienced U. S. Coast Guard Officer in port security work. The Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard has agreed to the assignment of this officer. He is expected to arrive in South Vietnam in early September. This officer will advise the RVN in port security matters.

b. (C) Cam Ranh Bay Development. The initial planning requirements for VNN and U.S. Market Time operations at Cam Ranh Bay were submitted in June 1965 (See June Historical Report). Since that time the requirements have increased as additional crews will be provided for the SWIFTs and U.S. Coast Guard WPBs. Also the requirement for a Ship Repair Facility is needed at Cam Ranh Bay (CHNAVADVGRP ltr 4000.2 ser 0310 of 4 Aug 1965). At the present time the only major ship repair capability in the RVN is at the VNN Shipyard in Saigon. If the VC deny access to the Saigon Shipyard by blocking the Saigon River Ship Channel, the closest U.S. ship repair facility able to accomplish major repair work is at Subic Bay, Philippine Islands. To provide the VNN and U.S. Market Time units in the RVN area with in-country ship repair facilities, if the VC successfully block the Saigon River Ship

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Channel, provisions should be made to provide for closer and adequate repair facilities. Therefore, the future expansion of Cam Ranh Bay should be made to encompass a Ship Repair Facility. This facility must have the capability of handling FGH, WPB, and DER type vessels.

It is planned that Market Time Base Operations will commence from Cam Ranh on 1 January 1966. This will require that all base activities supporting this operation must be completed prior to 15 December 1965. Sufficient land on the South Eastern tip of Cam Ranh Peninsula east of grid line 080 and south of grid line 135 has been requested and forwarded to the Cam Ranh Bay Planning Committee in order to provide for these support activities and the future repair expansion. The following buildings will be required and construction is planned to be completed by 15 December 1965; 3 semi-permanent BOQs with heads; 10 semi-permanent BEQs with heads; 1 semi-permanent mess and kitchen; 1 semi-permanent storage area for frozen, fresh, and dry stores; 2 semi-permanent work shops; 1 administration building; 1 crane pad 70 ton capacity; a 60 meter pier with a short causeway to provide 3 meter depth throughout the length of the pier; lube oil storage area open; ammunition bunker - ready issue; 25,000 gallons water tank and wells and pumps for 9000 gallons/day. By 1 January 1966 the Marine Railway 70 tons will be required for repair operations.

c. (S) Swift and PACV Assignment. Plans were initiated in the formation of the operational and administrative organization of the SWIFTs and Air Cushion Vehicles (PACV) programmed to support Market Time Operations. The organization would ensure a proper chain of command through a parent Type Commander and Fleet Commander to CNO. It is planned that these units be formed as Boat Squadron ONE, homeported at San Diego, and would be assigned

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to COMPHIBPAC for administrative control and to CTF 115 for operational control. The proposed personnel structure is as follows:

BOAT SQUADRON STAFF

RONCOM 1 1100/2  
CSO 1 1100/3  
OPS 1 1100/4  
LOG &  
MAINT 1 6300/4  
PER 1 1100/5  
SUP 1 3100/5

ENLISTED STAFF

5 YN/SN  
3 SK  
1 DK  
1 RM  
1 QM  
2 SN

SWIFT DIVISION STAFF 1 officer, 5 enlisted.  
SWIFT MAINTENANCE TEAM 1 officer, 9 enlisted.  
SWIFT CREW 1 officer, 5 enlisted.

PACV DIVISION STAFF 1 officer, 3 enlisted.  
PACV MAINTENANCE TEAM 0 officer, 7 enlisted.  
PACV CREW 1 officer, 3 enlisted.

This proposed personnel structure permits the concept of 1½ crews per boat in lieu of 1 crew allowing more adequate crew rest and permitting 27 SWIFTS on station of the 54 boats programmed for Market Time Operations. Also this will provide at all times ample patrol alertness with minimum manning. Based on this concept of manning, Boat Squadron ONE personnel requirements will be as follows:

BOAT SQUADRON STAFF	8 officers	52 enlisted
BOAT DIVISION STAFF	6 officers	18 enlisted
SWIFT MAINTENANCE TEAM	8 officers	68 enlisted
SWIFT CREW	81 officers	405 enlisted
PACV MAINTENANCE TEAM	0 officers	14 enlisted
PACV CREW	5 officers	14 enlisted
TOTAL	<u>108</u> officers	<u>571</u> enlisted

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5. (U) MARINE ADVISORY UNIT ACTIVITIES

a. (U) COMUSMACV supported the opinion of Senior Marine Advisor concerning the organization of the 6th VNMC Battalion in calendar year 1965 and forwarded correspondence to JGS recommending that the expansion of the VNMC by one battalion be held in abeyance until CY 1966.

Initial studies on expansion of Amphibious Support Battalion to support a 6 battalion VNMC were prepared and initial discussions with MACV J3, Force Development were undertaken to program the recommended increases. The present concept provide for a total increase in amphibious support battalion of 276 personnel, raising its total authorized strenght to 1326. Enclosures (3) through (9) provides a breakdown of proposed T/O changes, a comparison with the present table of organisation and rationale behind proposals.

Proposed T/O changes include a small increase in communications personnel in the Rifle Company, Infantry Battalion. Enclosure (10) contains the detailed recommendation and justification.

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A STUDY DEVELOPED BY NAVADVGRP TO DETERMINE  
DRVN COURSES OF ACTION FOR INFILTRATION BY SEA

DIRV PLAN

Mission Analysis

- A. By order from HQ, we have been ordered to draw up a plan to infiltrate supplies from sea to South Vietnam.
- B. Such infiltration will be in support of the liberation movement currently in progress and will have, as its primary purposes, the building up of supplies for future large scale operations.
- C. Our objective is to deliver supplies to the coast of South Vietnam.
- D. There is no set time for delivery of specified amounts of cargo, rather a steady assured supply is desirable.

The nature of tasks assigned are:

- 1. Deliver 20-40 tons of cargo by small ship direct to the coast or to junks.
- 2. Deliver 40+ tons by submarine direct to the coast or to junks.
- 3. Deliver 3 to 6 tons direct to the coast by junk.
- 4. Deliver small amounts moving along the coast using small junks. Numbers and types of ships and aircraft used by the US - SVN Forces and their method of deployment will limit the usefulness of larger craft. Conditions of weather will hinder the movement of sea forces. Measures adopted to control sea movement and degree of SVN - US control of the coast will affect landing areas and losses inflicted on our forces.
- E. The task assigned to us complements the infiltration and in-country distribution of supplies by other commands.
- F. The mission of US - SVN naval forces is to hinder and prevent our delivery of supplies to SVN.
- G. In summary, we must deliver supplies to southern forces at minimum cost utilizing the means at our disposal.

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Enclosure (1)

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Considerations Affecting Possible Courses of Action.

A. Enemy forces are building up military strength in SVN. Through aerial bombing, they are attempting to interdict our inland supply routes to the north and divert effort to defend DRV. The US is attempting to enlist world opinion on its side and many countries are contributing aid to SVN, some military, some civilian.

The Soviet Union and China are providing us with means to defend DRV more successfully and with supplies for our fighting forces in the South.

Since the end result of our efforts is to incorporate SVN into DRV, forces not expended in this effort are of little value to us.

B. The enemy forces immediately opposing us are 9 DER/MSO type ships deployed on a 900 mile barrier, 30 to 40 miles long, U.S. Coast Guard WPBs on a northern barrier 40 miles long, U.S. Coast Guard WPBs on a southern barrier 64 miles long, 20 VNN ships and 200 junks on coastal patrol and one or two patrol planes on surveillance flights. We consider it likely that the numbers of ships on barrier patrol will increase to about 25, and about 54 SWIFTS will be added to be used in a random manner. The U.S. Seventh Fleet has numerous ships deployed in the sea around Vietnam. These can be used in any manner desired but due to various considerations, we do not anticipate their use in blockade, however, they report all contacts passing through their operations areas thus possibly alerting the U.S. and SVN ships to our penetration attempts.

Usually three or more ships are assigned as NGFS ships. Their presence cannot be discouraged either in a surveillance or intercept role.

Enemy ground forces deployed along the coast and air observers indirectly assist the blockading sea forces as they 1. Control stretches of the coast line. 2. Cooperate with coastal force personnel in local air surveillance and 3. Provide increased security for sea bases thus allowing increased patrol activity. The U.S. has sufficient forces available to greatly add to their blockade effort. In light of the output required for 100% disruption of our effort, significant increases are not considered likely for this year.

C. We have a multitude of 75' - 150' ships (20 - 100 tons cargo), large quantities of junks (3 - 6 tons cargo), junks (900 tons cargo), and several Singapore fish boats. The Chinese are manning several fishing trawlers, which will assist in our operations, are carrying cargo in their merchant ships for us and have allocated several submarines to deliver supplies. The Soviet Union is carrying cargo in their merchant ships and may use their submarines should the need arise.

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Our ground forces can assist us in a variety of ways which will be discussed later.

D. A continuous study will be made of where best we can deliver supplies. The dynamic nature of logistics needs in war time and the fluctuations in control of areas dictate against hard and fast rules.

E. We shall endeavor to enlist on our side those weather peculiarities which hamper enemy capabilities and enhance ours'.

F. Enemy forces have air and sea superiority; the greatest threat to us is presented by their installed radar and inherent visual capability. Capabilities are reduced by weather and the small radar target of our craft. A major weakness of enemy effort is the necessity of surveillance of all ships transiting their patrol zones and the tie-up of their craft in searching suspected vessels.

Our strengths are numerous small craft, control of large segments of the coast, willing cooperation of all segments of our armed forces, and the ability to use SVN organic craft for camouflage. We are hampered by lack of modern communications and have created conditions to overcome this lack. Our allies are reluctant to challenge them and have adopted the policy of reducing enemy force effectiveness by psychological measures as well as occasional small scale attacks on enemy forces.

#### Opposing Courses of Action.

A. The enemy capabilities are:

1. Use the anticipated ships and craft plus surveillance stations at various secure points, establish traffic control patterns and fishing convoys and enforce these measures, establish curfew laws and forbidden areas and enforce these measures. Control portions of the coast line and concentrate blocking efforts on areas we control. Reduce our degree of control of the coast line by amphibious raids and reduce our inland supply lines by control of lowland strong points and air bombardment. Increase the effectiveness of coastal patrol forces by assigning helicopters or light observation aircraft to small sections of the coast line directly working with coastal patrol forces.

2. Enemy capabilities are so vast that we consider him able, if he so desired, to destroy every ship or craft that floats off the SVN coast. Due to the effort required and loss of innocent life that would result, we consider measure (1) as the most probable course of action to yield optimum results.

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B. DRV Possible Courses of Action:

1. Submarines.

(a) Proceed submerged to suitable locations on the coast line or islands and offload cargo or drop off submerged cargo.

(b) Proceed submerged to predetermined area to rendezvous with junks and offload the cargo to them.

2. Small cargo ships.

(a) Proceed direct to suitable locations on the coast line or islands and offload cargo or proceed through the radar barrier and rendezvous with fishing fleets 15 miles or so from shore. In order to avoid radar detection and subsequent discovery decoy ship(s) can be used to draw patrol ships off station and attract aircraft attention, DF capabilities can be used to remain out of the patrol ships' radar envelope, diversionary attacks can be made on ships or bases, and "Dummy" infiltrators can be sent in to draw patrol ships off station and tie them up in searches. In the Vung Tau area penetration craft can take station in the radar shadow of larger merchant ships proceeding to port, then branching off to head for shore.

(b) Proceed to designated rendezvous points with junks and offload cargo.

3. Large Merchant Ships.

(a) Merchant ships friendly to our cause or bribed can drop off cargo on signal when transiting through fishing fleets, proceeding into port or in rivers.

(b) Rendezvous far out to sea can be affected with junks, submarines, or small cargo ships.

4. Junks.

Junks can be used in many ways. Since they are our least expensive vehicles and the most numerous, hard to detect, and difficult to classify and search, we have procured a number of each type of vessel. These junks, over a lengthy period of time, have established patterns of movement along the coast and out to sea which readily allow us to rendezvous and move cargo when and where we desire.

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Since junk movement is largely affected by weather, many of our methods of using them are seasonal; as a general rule, movement will be from North to South or South to North with the change in monsoon.

a. Through the northern border region, we will use four-cared junks with escort, remaining within five meters of the coast.

b. During the northeast monsoon from October to March, our junks with a cargo capacity of 3-6 tons will sail directly to the open sea for 24 hours, then head south a distance as directed (judge distance by wind, current, seas, and star position), then proceed on in to the coast until land is sighted. Proceed on to shore to desired location.

c. Thirty junks or more will filter out to sea when directed. They will proceed out 70 or more miles and a small craft or submarine will rendezvous with them and transfer cargo. The junks will then filter back to shore. Two junks should escort each loaded junk. Boats from the Vung Tau area proceed to Gulf of Thailand to fish during the Northeast monsoon. During the Southeast monsoon, Kieng Giang junks from the Gulf proceed north to fish. In both cases, the junks will proceed out to sea and pick up cargo, then follow their normal route to deliver the goods where needed. The Kieng Giang junk as a cargo craft proceeds as far north as Danang.

d. The fishing fleet at the tip of An Xuyen province sells their fish to Singapore fish dealers. We have some of these boats and are delivering goods to them which they then land. Our boats are manned with Chinese crews. The only inspection made of these boats is a cursory customs inspection when fish are purchased.

e. We will stockpile material on islands, not occupied by the GVN, during rough seas which hamper patrol craft and junk movement. When the weather and seas moderate, our junks proceed to the islands, pick up the cargo, and return.

Decision

A. Discussion of Course of Action.

Those courses of action which involve the costliest ships are the most likely to be detected. As enemy control and surveillance of the coast increases the risk in landing a ship may become unacceptable. Due to the large number of junks, the difficulty of their being searched, and their inexpensiveness, their use should continue to be successful.

B. All methods will continue in use. A program of continuous study will be initiated to find new and different methods. Primary reliance will be on junks.

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TASKS

COMBAT/COMBAT SUPPORT

I

a. Task: RSSZ Patrol and Support.

b. Discussion: The RSSZ straddles the river approaches to Saigon. The vulnerability of the river has caused NAVADVGRP to emphasize security of this area to the VIN over a long time period. However, the Vietnamese apparently will not cooperate with each other to provide adequate security in the urgent time frame required. TF 115 units can provide: River Patrol units (on arrival of PCF in October), gunfire support, river sweeping against conventional mines (if MSO are on Market Time Patrol), and a fast reaction capability to carry troops to besieged hamlets with River Patrol craft.

c. Requirements:

- (1) A study of types and numbers of craft needed.
- (2) Use of assets available in TF 115, and procurement of others needed.

d. Date Requirements will be met:

- (1) Completion of study 27 August.
- (2) Two LCPL manned by the USN have been assigned to the RSSZ. Two additional LCPL will be assigned on completion of engine overhaul.
- (3) Needed assets will be requested when study is complete.

II.

a. Task: UDT/Recon Team Support.

b. Discussion: The shallow water capability and high speed of the SWIFT (PCF) will allow them to drop UDT personnel along a beach and stand by at a distance for quick recovery. The UDT personnel could be assigned a mission of reconnaissance, coastwatching, or pre-assault survey.

c. Requirements:

- (1) Study of full requirements.
- (2) Arrival of SWIFT.
- (3) Approval of concept.

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d. Date Requirements will be met:

- (1) Study: October.
- (2) SWIFT available: October.

III.

a. Task: Blocking Actions in Support of Ground Operations.

b. Discussion: The VC are known to escape by water routes when hard pressed on land, usually under cover of darkness. TF 115 units have a capability to establish "blockades." This type of operation has been planned in COMCOSURVFOR OPOBORDER 10-65. With arrival of PCF, blocking capabilities will be greatly increased.

c. Requirements: Already operational, but full potential will not be available until arrival of PCF. Additional liaison with III MAF, USATPA, and other U.S./ARVN Commanders in planning operations is required on a continuing basis.

d. Date Requirements will be met: October.

IV.

a. Task: Commando Raid Support.

b. Discussion: TF 115 will soon receive the first boats of an eventual 54 SWIFT (PCF). These are fast, shallow draft craft that can carry Plastic Assault Boats (PAB) and about 40 troops. The VNN has requested permission to develop a Commando Force, but such a force will probably not be operational prior to six months. In the meantime, PCF could support either U.S. or VNN UDT landings, or land small parties of R.F. or U.S. troops. TF 115 DER could be scheduled to stand by for gunfire support. Commando raids would strike suspected infiltration points, and thus assist in carrying out TF 115's primary mission.

c. Requirements:

(1) Further study, in coordination with COMUSMACV, U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and VNN personnel.

(2) Arrival of PCF.

d. Date Requirements will be met: October.

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V.

a. Task: Naval Gunfire.

b. Discussion: Planning has been completed and is included in COMCOSURVFOR OPORDER 10-65. The arrival of the Coast Guard patrol boats (WPB) has generated a requirement to re-examine the Naval Gunfire rules as they apply to mortar fire from the WPB. USCG boats in the Gulf of Thailand have received a great many requests for mortar support, and it appears that specific rules applicable to WPB are in order. DER have given occasional 3-inch direct-fire support. Greater use of DER is encouraged.

c. Requirements:

(1) Study use of WPB mortar to determine if present requirements for "observed fire only" are applicable.

(2) Assign DER gunfire missions when other NCGFS ships are not available.

d. Date Requirements will be met: September.

VI.

a. Task: Helicopter Landing Support (night or inclement weather)

b. Discussion: DER have the capability of using their height finding radar to pinpoint a helicopter's position, and to assist in directing helicopters to a landing area at night or during inclement weather. DER can also illuminate a landing area by gunfire. Such an operation might be an excellent means of keeping the Viet Cong off balance.

c. Requirements: Liaison with U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force.

d. Date Requirements will be met: When such a task is approved, and in September.

VII.

a. Task: Harassing Fire on a Scheduled/Non-scheduled Basis.

b. Discussion: DER or WPB can harass the VC coastal areas nightly. This type of fire could continue on a regular basis, until the VC take the harassment for granted and perhaps take cover without remaining alert. The fire could be used as a cover for a night or day "amphibious raid" or "commando raid" type landing, with the fire distracting the VC and drowning the noise of the landing craft.

c. Requirements:

(1) Promulgate Free Fire Areas to all ships.

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(2) In each Corps area, coordinate harassment fires with Senior Corps Advisors before firing.

(3) Obtain approval from ARVN.

(4) Promulgate harassment fire instructions to TF 115.

d. Date Requirements will be met:

(1) Free Fire Area promulgation: Done.

(2) Coordination with Corps and ARVN, to be done through MACV J-3: December.

VIII.

a. Task: TACAN

b. Discussion: Most DER in TF 115 carry TACAN equipment, and can act as navigational reference points for air strikes along the coast at night or during inclement weather. The DER also carry air search and height-finding radar, which can be used for control assistance.

c. Requirements:

(1) Frequency allocation for DER recently reported from East-Coast.

(2) Liaison with U.S. Army and Air Force in Vietnam to determine use.

(3) Liaison with COMSEVENTHFLT for determination of Seventh Fleet need.

d. Date Requirements will be met: October.

IX.

a. Task: Diversionary/Decoy Operations.

b. Discussion: TF 115 units possess a capability to divert the attention of VC along the coast, covering the noise of an approaching helicopter flight, or causing the VC to fall back or dig-in by simulating an amphibious landing. The possible value of these and other actions are under study.

c. Requirements:

(1) Discussion with Corps Advisors.

(2) Arrival of the SWIFT (PCF) will allow a larger choice of diversionary actions.

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d. Date Requirements will be met: September, however continuous study for new measures will be maintained.

X.

a. Task: Logistic Support

b. Discussion: Rapid Logistic Support of besieged coastal areas is possible. Support of the U.S. Naval Advisory effort at Junk Bases, and stocking of PCF operating bases (way-stations) will be possible upon arrival of PCF in October.

c. Requirements:

(1) Stocking of supplies for quick reaction when rapid support is needed.

(2) Arrival of PCF.

d. Date Requirements will be met: October.

XI.

a. Task: River Mouth Patrol/Estuaries.

b. Discussion: Delta river mouths are proven sensitive points of possible infiltration by sea. These areas should be patrolled at all times. The VNN has not proven dependable in river mouth patrol efforts. TF 115, with PCF, will have the capability of providing continuous radar and visual surveillance in these shallow water areas.

c. Requirements: PCF.

d. Date Requirements will be met: October

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TASKS

PSYWAR

I.

a. Task: Distribution of Psywar Materials.

b. Discussion: Market Time forces come in close contact with a large segment of the population not touched by government influence. Distribution of psywar materials is a task of all Market Time units, with material provided by the NAVADVGRP psywar advisor.

c. Requirements: In progress now.

d. Date Requirements will be met: Done

II.

a. Task: Frequent Visits to Coastal Villages.

b. Discussion: With the arrival of the SWIFT (PCF), MARKET TIME forces will for the first time have units capable of mooring at most of the coastal villages. The frequent use of this capability will bring the surveillance effort into many areas hitherto unexamined. Furthermore, with the presence of a VNN liaison team, representatives of the Navy will show the "Vietnamese Flag".

c. Requirements: Liaison with VNN, Psywar indoctrination for Liaison Teams, Security measures for PCF.

d. Date Requirements are to be met: November.

III.

a. Task: Rescue and Assistance

b. Discussion: There will be frequent occasions when MARKET TIME ships and craft will encounter vessels in distress. This will most frequently occur in the near shore area in which PCF and WPB operate. On these occasions, rescue and assistance can be rendered without derogating the surveillance function. Care must be exercised that MARKET TIME ships and craft are not decoyed from patrol areas.

In the performance of this task, patrol aircraft can take part by reporting vessels or craft in distress to patrol ships in the area.

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c. Requirements: Guidance for MARKET TIME forces in the conduct of Rescue and Assistance Operations.

d. Date Requirements will be met: September

IV.

a. Task: Assist in Civic Action

b. Discussion: Because of the ability of the SWIFT (PCF) to reach many coastal villages previously inaccessible to larger patrol craft, Civic Action teams of the VNN could be easily transported to these areas. The effectiveness of this employment of MARKET TIME assets would depend largely on the Civic Action team. Notable uses would include officials of RVN who could issue Government I.D. cards, try criminal cases, or merely talk with the people.

c. Requirements: Liaison with VNN, planning

d. Date Requirements are to be met: January 1966.

V.

a. Task: Food, Medical Assistance to Local Populace.

b. Discussion: Because of their speed and ability to reach many coastal and river villages, the SWIFT (PCF) can be effectively used to deliver emergency food and medical supplies to areas not readily accessible to other craft.

c. Requirements: Planning

d. Date Requirements are to be met: November

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**UNCLASSIFIED**

TASKS

ADVISORY

I.

a. Task: Coordinated Patrol Operations

b. Discussion: Despite heavy Advisory pressure for at least one year, the VNN has not yet attempted to coordinate Sea or Coastal Force patrols. With persuasion and through demonstration, U.S. and U.S.C.G. craft can teach the VNN the advantages of coordinated action, and perhaps motivate the VNN to like action.

c. Requirements:

(1) None for Sea Force.

(2) Arrival of PCF for Coastal Force motivation.

d. Date Requirements will be met: October.

II.

a. Task: VNN Motivation and Training.

b. Discussion: With the arrival of the SWIFT (PCF) a real potential for improving VNN, particularly the Coastal Force, will be available. PCF can be used to illustrate the proper conduct of patrols. All TF 115 craft can be used as training and motivation platform, through promotion of exchange visits, etc.

c. Requirement: VNN Liaison, Coordination.

d. Date Requirement will be met: August.

III.

a. Task: Enforce Curfews Established Along the Coast.

b. Discussion: Show VNN, by example and enthusiasm, proper methods of patrolling at night and of enforcing the curfew. Certain areas along the coast are undoubtedly being used as V.C. transportation routes. TF 115 has the potential to interdict these routes during regular patrol operations, and set up "road blocks" at appropriate locations.

c. Requirements: Shallow water craft, such as PCF.

d. Date Requirements will be met: October.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

ENCLOSURE (2)

**UNCLASSIFIED**

IV.

a. Task: Support VNN Sea Force Ships on Patrol.

b. Discussion: Sea Force ships often develop casualties when deployed from Saigon which reduce their patrol effectiveness. SF 115 units now furnish considerable technical assistance to remedy derangements. CCMCOSURV-FCF OORDER 10-65 directs that such assistance be rendered.

c. Requirements: None.

d. Date Requirements will be met: Done.

V.

a. Task: Medical Evacuation.

b. Discussion: Large numbers of casualties, particularly those incurred at night or during inclement weather in coastal areas, may be picked up by boat and transferred by sea to hospitals.

c. Requirements: Junk Base river channel charting.

d. Date Requirements will be met: October.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**ENCLOSURE (2)**


STRENGTH INCREASE SUMMARY

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CURRENT</u>	<u>PROPOSED</u>	<u>INCREASE</u>
Headquarters and Service Company	111*	126	15
Signal Company	110	195	85
Reconnaissance Company	126	126	0
Landing Support Company	133	133	0
Engineer Company	126	165	39
Transportation Company	143	149	6
Medical Company	172	303	<u>131</u>
TOTAL INCREASE AMPHIBIOUS SUPPORT BATTALION			296

\* H&S Company minus AG Section.

Enclosure (3)

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CHANGES


- 1./ Disbursing Platoon increases by 11 enlisted. See addendum for detailed breakdown.
- 2./ Four enlisted personnel have been added to the Svc Section. These personnel are necessary to perform upkeep and maintenance functions for the company. They are: 1 carpenter, 1 bricklayer, 1 painter, and 1 electrician.
- 3./ No other changes are required.
- 4./ Total personnel increase:

<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
0	15	15

Enclosure (4)

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
DISBURSING PLATOON



CHANGES

- 1./ When 5th BN was formed, no complimenting increase was made in the Disbursing Plt. Thus, this change reflects increases for both the 5th & 6th Bn.
- 2./ The current T/O does not reflect Platoon organization. This T/O breaks the platoon down functionally along the lines that the platoon currently is working under. It proposes the addition of 2 Bn Pay Teams, 1 Decedent Affairs Tm, 1 Bridge Tm plus an increase in the Financial Accounting Section.
- 3./ Total increase: 11 enlisted.

SIGNAL COMPANY



CHANGES

- 1./ The recommended T/O reflects a different approach to unit organisation than does the current one. Where as the current T/O sought to group personnel


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according to the equipment they used, i.e. radio, wire, etc., this T/O groups personnel functionally in accordance with the specific Brigade element they are intended to support.

- 2./ The major increase results from the addition of a second task force communications element in order to permit the Brigade to operate two task forces in the field simultaneously. At the time a field operations platoon is provided to permit the Brigade Command elements to take the field as a tactical headquarters. Necessary personnel and equipment exist in the Command Operations Platoon to permit the establishment of a communicating rear echelon at Brigade headquarters.
- 3./ An increase of 15 personnel in the Company headquarters reflects primarily the addition of maintenance personnel required to support the additional equipment.
- 4./ Two officers and three enlisted have been added to the office of the Brigade Signal Officer. These increases are required to lend adequate operational flexibility to that office in event the Brigade Command element takes the field together with 2 Task Force.
- 5./ Total personnel increases:

<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Total</u>
3	82	85

ENGINEER COMPANY



CHANGES

- 1./ Equipment Plt added to company of 1 officer and 34 enlisted to operate and maintain following equipment:
  - 2 Bulldozers
  - 4 Dump trucks
  - %1 Road grader
  - %1 Lowboy

%(Not now in MAP, but required)
- 2./ One additional Engineer Squad of 10 enlisted added to the Engineer Plt.
- 3./ Total personnel increase:

Officer  
1 (2dLt)


Enlisted  
38

Total  
39

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Enclosure (7)

TRANSPORTATION COMPANY



CHANGES

- 1./ Six mechanics have been added to the Company Headquarters. These mechanics are required to perform 2d Echelon maintenance on motor transport material.
- 2./ No other changes are required.
- 3./ Total personnel increase:

<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>0</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>

Enclosure (5)

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CHANGES

1. The Medical Company Headquarters has been increased by a total of 1 officer and 13 enlisted. The Headquarters has been reorganized functionally into three sections. The increase reflects a recognition of medical supply, preventative medicine, motor transport maintenance and messing functions for the company not previously provided for.
2. An increase of 15 personnel in the Dispensary is recommended to provide for an additional 20 beds required by the Brigade force increase, and to provide a small dispensary at the Training Center.
3. The majority of the strength increase in the company is in the seven battalion medical platoons. Under the current T/O, each platoon has a strength of 1 officer and 15 corporals. This strength is inadequate to provide minimum medical services to the deployed battalions. Consequently, each platoon has been increased to 1 officer and 25 corporals. This will provide for 4 corporals with each rifle company and a battalion medical team of 1 doctor and 9 corporals. Total increase for 6 battalion medical platoons is 60 enlisted. A seventh platoon to support the sixth infantry battalion brings the total increase to 1 officer and 85 enlisted.
4. The strength of the Collecting and Clearing Platoon has been reduced from 2 officer and 44 enlisted to 1 officer and 30 enlisted. However, a second platoon has been added in order to perform collecting and clearing functions for a second Task Force.
5. Total Personnel increase:

<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Total</u>
2	129	131

**Recommendation for increase in Communication personnel in the Rifle Company, Infantry Battalion:**

Present Situation: The current T/O assigns as total of 4 field radio operators per each infantry company. Company Headquarters (1) and (1) in each rifle platoon.

Recommendation: That the T/O be changed to reflect an increase of 3 radio operators in the rifle company; 2 additional in Company Headquarters and 1 additional for assignment to the weapons platoon. This increase would raise the number of radio operators from 4 to 7 in each company, with a total Brigade procurement requirement of 72 communicators.

Justification: The Table of Equipment supports the requirement for 7 AN/PRC-10 radios in each Infantry Company; one in each rifle platoon, one in weapons platoon, and three in Company Headquarters (Battalion tactical, Battalion command and Company tactical sets). The simultaneous operation of these sets is essential to proper control during battalion operations and under the present structure, the Company does not have adequate communications personnel to meet this requirement.

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Enclosure (10)