COMMANDER
U.S. NAVAL FORCES
VIETNAM
MONTHLY HISTORICAL SUMMARY
October 1971

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THE DUFFLE BAG / TIGHT JAW PROGRAM

APPENDIX I - CHNAVADVGRP Task and Advisory Organization
APPENDIX II - Operational/Administrative Chains of Command
APPENDIX III - Glossary of Abbreviations
FOREWORD

Enemy activity increased sharply as expected throughout the Republic just prior to the 3 October Presidential Election. Rockets fell on both Saigon and Vung Tau during the early morning hours of the Election Day; however, fortunately, little damage resulted from the VC show of force.

U.S. Navy casualties rose slightly during October. One officer was killed, two officers wounded, and five enlisted men wounded in enemy initiated actions mainly in the Delta.

The VNN took steps on 1 October to strengthen its Coastal Surveillance Force by a staff reorganization. The Coastal Surveillance Force was centralized under command of the Mobile Operations Command (Sea), and the Commander, Coastal Surveillance Forces became an Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. This move considerably streamlined command and control of coastal surveillance.

As if to test this newly revised command structure, the North Vietnamese sent three trawlers to probe RVN defenses during the month. All three trawlers were tracked by MARKET TIME Forces; two of the vessels were scared off without attempting an infiltration, while the third was still being tracked at the end of the month.

While the North Vietnamese were not able to breach RVN coastal defenses in October, the same could not be said for Typhoon Hester. This storm, the worst in 27 years, struck the coast of MR 1 near Chu Lai on 23 October and then veered north. The storm sank many small patrol craft, destroyed the roofs of many dwellings throughout the First Coastal Zone, and flooded many areas with heavy rains. The storm brought all military activity virtually to a standstill. Salvage and rebuilding activities were still in progress at the month's close.

On the administrative, logistic side, the VNN Supply System continued its rapid improvement in October. During the month, the Brown Water spare supplies were turned over by NSA, Saigon to the VNN Supply Center. Thus, the Vietnamese now control all spare parts for their riverine craft in their own supply system. Also, the Accelerated Overhaul Program continued to progress at a moderate pace at the various LSBs throughout the Delta.

In addition, during the month, U.S. Navy Seabee assets continued to decrease as several details of the only remaining naval construction battalion in Vietnam, NMCB-5, finished up their projects and retrograded to CONUS. The remaining Seabees in Vietnam are now engaged primarily in civic action projects.
Overall Navy strength declined to 9,775 officers and men, a reduction of 175 men from last month's figures.
Rear Admiral D. N. Bagley, assistant chief of naval personnel for personnel affairs, and Warrant Officer Walter Gibson, special assistant for human relations to COMNAVFORV, review minutes of a recent human relations council session. Admiral Bagley visited Vietnam in October to discuss new Navy policies and "people" programs with junior Navymen and minority group representatives.
1 OCT-- Coastal Surveillance Forces reorganized into Mobile Operations Command (Sea).

2 OCT-- RADM W. R. Dowd, SC, USN, departed RVN after serving as special advisor to VNN Supply System.

-- TRAN HUNG DAO XXV AO enlarged to include new points of enemy activity.

3 OCT-- ENC William L. Alexander, USN, received multiple shrapnel wounds in both legs when the PBR on which he was riding as an advisor was ambushed on the Lower Cai Lon River.

-- Three 122mm rockets fired at Saigon during pre-election terrorist activities.

-- Three 122mm rockets fired at Vung Tau from Long Son Island.

-- Presidential Elections held.

-- NVN SL-3 trawler detected by M/T forces and tracked until it no longer posed an infiltration threat.

4 OCT-- Convoy TP-34 departed Tan Chau for Phnom Penh.

10 OCT-- USS KRISHNA (ARL-38), the last Landing Craft Repair Ship remaining in RVN, departed for the Philippines for turnover to the Philippine Navy.

12 OCT-- EN2 Johnny Fred Baldwin, USN, was seriously wounded when the truck in which he was riding was ambushed near Radar Site Six (Nui Chap Chai).

-- 200 pound watermine discovered at De Long Piers, Vung Tau, and disarmed by VNN EOD team.

13 OCT-- PCF 3905 ran aground near Bo De River mouth.

14 OCT-- LCDR David P. Micalchuck, USN, relieved LCDR Paul S. Gesswein, USN, as SA CTG 214.1 and as CTG 116.10.

15 OCT-- A command detonated mine was discovered at NOD Vung Tau and rendered safe by U.S. EOD team.

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17 OCT-- NVN SL-4 trawler detected by M/T forces and tracked until no longer an infiltration threat.

18 OCT-- Convoy TP-35 departed Tan Chau for Phnom Penh.

-- U.S. Navy SEALord Helicopter 11 crashed in the vicinity of WQ 234 656 while trying to salvage a mortar from grounded PCF 3905.

19 OCT-- Seals of SEAL Team One, Detachment Golf, Mike Platoon, killed two VC and wounded a third during a mission conducted in TRAN HUNG DAO XXIV AO.

-- ACTOVRAD Site Six (Nui Chap Chai) turned over to VNN.

-- Convoy TP-35 attacked at WT 264 620.

-- CAPT Nguyen Ngoc Quynh, VNN, assumed command of TRAN HUNG DAO XXVII.

20 OCT-- LCDR William J. Fogle, USN, received severe lacerations to both hands from a booby trapped sensor while conducting a sensor re-battery mission near Rach Gia.

-- HAL-3 Detachment 9 permanently transferred from Third Coastal Zone LST to Binh Thuy.

-- USS VERNON COUNTY (LST-1161) relieved by USS WASHTENAW COUNTY (LST-1166) as the Third Coastal Zone LST.

-- NMCB-5 Detail Bronco completed assigned tasks at ACTOVRAD Site Nui Ta Kou and returned to Bien Hoa, in order to retrograde men and equipment to CONUS.

21 OCT-- RAC ambushed on Upper Saigon River (TRAN HUNG DAO XXVII).

-- LT Paul R. Foltz, USN, killed by a B-40 rocket during an ambush of his salvage craft on the Trem Trem River (TRAN HUNG DAO XXI). Ens James H. McKenzie, EN1 Maxmillian M. Cook, DC2 Jimmy McGinnis, and FN Michael McVey wounded in the same action.

23 OCT-- Typhoon Hester devastated First Coastal Zone, bringing all military activity to a halt.

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24 OCT-- Seal Team One, Detachment Golf, Mike Platoon stood down.

-- NMCB-5 Detail Mustang returned to CONUS from Ca Mau.

25 OCT-- Combined sweep of Barrier Island in CHI LANG I AO.

27 OCT-- Claymore mine accidental firing at ATSB Phuoc Xuyen.

28 OCT-- Convoy TP-36 departed Tan Chau for Phnom Penh.

-- NVN SL-6 trawler detected by M/T forces. Surveillance continuing at month's close.

29 OCT-- OV-10 Black Pony aircraft shot down in Long Toan Secret Zone.

-- LSB Nha Be change of command.

-- Convoy TP-36 attacked at WT 235 661.
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MOBILE OPERATIONS COMMAND (RIVERINE) AND CTF 116 SUMMARY

After the sharp pre-election upswing in enemy activity in September, the pace of the action moderated in October. There was some mining and salvage activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO IV and XXI AOs, but in the other AOs, action was limited to small harassing attacks with minor casualties to personnel and equipment.

The Accelerated Overhaul Program continued to be the top priority item in the Delta, and it is showing definite signs of progress. After revising the schedule to reflect more realistic goals, the repair activities have been able to maintain the schedule and in a few cases, to better it.

Coastal VARS (Visual Aerial Reconnaissance Search) missions continued to be flown by CTF 116 assets. These flights, utilizing Black Pony OV-10A and Seawolf UH-1B aircraft, supplemented at times by U.S. Army assets, were intensified during October as three possible North Vietnamese trawlers were discovered in the South China Sea by U.S. Navy "Market Time" patrol aircraft. One identified as a SL-3 was detected on 3 October, and one identified as an SL-4 was detected on 17 October, and both eventually returned to North Vietnamese waters. An SL-6 trawler was identified on 28 October, and at the end of the month, still posed an infiltration threat to the southeastern coastline of the country.
Enemy activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO IV AO was moderately heavy during October. U.S. Navy Seawolves flew 22 missions in support of TRAN HUNG DAO IV assets and there were 13 incidents of naval interest. Of the 13 incidents, two were friendly initiated and 11 were enemy initiated. The enemy initiated incidents fell into the following major categories: one booby crap, seven boat ambushes, and three attacks on security forces. The total casualties were two VC and one RF killed; and one LDNN, one USN Seal advisor, one civilian girl, and seven VNN wounded.

On 5 October at 0016H, a possible probing attack on ISB Nam Can was thwarted. An alert VNN mortar crew and watch tower personnel directed mortar fire on 25 to 30 people moving in the treeline north of the base. Seawolves and Black Ponies were called in for support. Both the ISB and the support aircraft received small arms fire. The enemy broke contact at about 0200H. There were no friendly casualties, and enemy casualties were undetermined.

On 6 October, a CBU-55 drop was made by Black Ponies in the vicinity of WQ 042 652. The drop was conducted in a mangrove forest. The terrain was flat, and there had been repeated contacts with the VC. The evaluation of the drop was made by one company of VN Rangers inserted by RID craft, with no U.S. personnel accompanying the sweep. Eight secondary explosions were observed that were probably booby traps, but the source of the secondary explosions was not confirmed. The covering over eight fox holes and spider holes collapsed. Three huts and two sampans were destroyed. Finally, the CBU Drop cleared the densely foliated area with restricted visibility to a radius of approximately 100 meters. This drop and subsequent evaluation was conducted to continue the development of more effective weapons, and clearance for the drop was closely controlled.

The one U.S. casualty was sustained on 15 October, during woodcutter security operations. A force of 27 LDNNs and two U.S. advisors was attacked with B-40 rockets and AK-47 fire in the vicinity of WQ 108 677. One LDNN and one U.S. advisor were slightly wounded by shrapnel during the attack. The force suppressed the attack and continued the patrol. A bunker complex was discovered and destroyed during the operation.

A RID 47 ATC, on routine patrol, was ambushed with launch bombs in the vicinity of WQ 723 087 at 1710H on 18 October. The ATC returned suppressive fire, beached, and inserted troops to sweep the area. The one known casualty was a young girl who was standing on the river bank. She

1. SA THD IV Confidential message 061525Z OCT 71

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received slight shrapnel wounds and was taken by the ATC crew to ISB Nam Can for treatment.

Also on 18 October, Sealord II crashed in the vicinity of WQ 234 656 while engaged in salvage operations of PCF 3905. At 1335H, after inserting salvage personnel, Sealord II attempted to lift a mortar from the PCF using an external sling, lost power, and crashed. At 1600H that day, the force salvage officer and a U.S. EOD team departed for the crash site to recover weapons and communications equipment, and to inspect the salvage operations. Sealord II was eventually lifted out of the water by a Chinook helicopter and taken to Binh Thuy.

On 19 October, COMCOSFLOT Five, with four PCFs, departed ISB Nam Can enroute to the site of the PCF 3905 grounding. At 0855H the force was attacked with B-40 rockets, launch bombs, and small arms fire by an unknown size enemy force. The PCFs beached on the south bank of the Song Bo De (vic WQ 220 687) and returned suppressive fire. Seawolves were scrambled, and the enemy broke contact. Enemy casualties were unknown, and the VNN suffered six wounded, one seriously. PCF 3929 received one B-40 hit, sustaining hull damage and destruction of one engine. PCF 3901 received three B-40 hits, sustaining only hull damage. All six wounded VNN were aboard the PCF 3901. Both PCFs returned to ISB Nam Can under their own power.

On 20 October, the first attack on a PGM occurred since the commencement of CTF 235 operations in August 1971. At 2040H, PGM 600 was ambushed on the Song Bo De in the vicinity of WQ 215 695 with small arms fire. The PGM was transiting to its assigned patrol area, and had no difficulty in suppressing the hostile fire and clearing the area.

On 21 and 22 October, Seawolves conducted psyops broadcasts in the vicinity of WQ 15 70. The broadcasts were designed to support the Vietnamese Government's Chieu Hoi program.

1. See the Fourth Coastal Zone section of this Summary for the PCF 3905 grounding incident.
TRAN HUNG DAO VI

Enemy activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO VI AO was moderate during October. There were two ambushes, one terrorist incident, and one booby trapped sensor incident. U.S. Navy Seawolves of Detachment Eight flew 38 missions in the TRAN HUNG DAO VI AO.

The 20 boat saturation blockade of the lower Cai Lon River begun in September, continued through 8 October. Both ambushes involved boats of this blockade force, and consisted of B-40/41 and automatic weapons fire. All personnel casualties sustained during the month were taken in the 3 October ambush. At 0645H, PBR 7716 received multiple B-40/41 hits in the vicinity of WR 406 740. The boat caught fire and was a total loss. One USN and six VNN sailors were wounded in the encounter.

ENC William L. Alexander, USN received multiple shrapnel wounds in both legs and was medevaced to the Third Surgical Hospital in Binh Thuy.

The HAL-3 detachment at Rach Gia conducted a sensor recovery and battery replacment mission on 20 October. A magnetic intrusion detector (MID) sensor that was utilized for base defense was found to be booby trapped. A hand grenade with the pin pulled was located beneath the sensor. The sensor was pulled from the ground by a long line, after the area was cleared. The hand grenade failed to detonate, because its spoon spring was badly deteriorated. The grenade was destroyed and the mission continued. Two other sensors in a string of ten were missing.
Three Mekong convoys successfully transported vital POL and Military Assistance Program material to the Cambodian capital city, encountering only token resistance on two occasions.

The first convoy of the month, TP-34, departed the Tan Chau staging area with a convoy and escort typical for the month. The escort was composed of one VNN LSIL, one MNK CCB, 18 VNN and 11 MNK PBRs, five VNN ASPBs and six MNK LCM-6s. The convoy, transporting 1,959,520 gallons of POL, was composed of three cargo ships, six tankers, and four tugs towing five barges. The convoy left Tan Chau at 2300H on 4 October, and arrived at Phnom Penh 16 hours later, after an untroubled passage. The return convoy, similarly unharassed, left Phnom Penh at 1215H on 6 October and arrived six hours later at Tan Chau. The return convoy was composed of six cargo vessels, five tankers, and four tugs with one barge, and was attended by the upriver escort. A total of 68 sorties were flown for TP/PT-34 convoy air cover, with the USN Seawolves flying ten night sorties.

Due to inadequate POL storage facilities in Phnom Penh, a situation brought on by the 20 September attack on one of the city's POL farms, the second convoy of the month was delayed three days in departure. Convoy TP-35 departed Tan Chau on 18 October at 2350H, transporting 1,915,712 gallons of POL. Two cargo vessels, six tankers, and three tugs with four barges were escorted by the standard combined VNN/MNK escort force. At 1000H the following morning, the convoy came under attack 18 miles from Phnom Penh at WT 264 620. The enemy fire consisted of four B-40 rockets fired at a cargo ship, with no friendly damage or casualties reported. The nearby escort craft responded with suppressive fire with unknown results. Air clearance was not granted due to FANK troops and friendly civilians in the area. At 1515H, the convoy arrived at its destination without further incident. As there have been six attacks since 3 September in the same general vicinity, the VNN recommended that the 63rd FANK Battalion be reassigned and replaced by a new Battalion. At 1200H the following day, the return convoy departed Phnom Penh, escorting two cargo ships, seven empty tankers, and three tugs towing four barges, arriving at Tan Chau after an untroubled passage of five hours duration. There were 76 sorties flown for TP/PT-35 convoy, including six night sorties flown by USN Seawolves.

The third and last convoy of the month also came under a harassing barrage of fire. TP-36 departed Tan Chau at 2300H on 28 October, with a convoy composed of five cargo ships, four tankers with 886, 224 gallons of POL, three tugs towing four barges, and three LCM-8s, attended by the
standard escorting force. At 0103H early the next morning, SS PROSPERITY was forced to return to Tan Chau due to engine trouble which permitted only a two knot headway. At 0930H, 20 miles from Phnom Penh at WT 235 661, the convoy came under small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force, with no damage or casualties inflicted. Fire was returned by the escorting units with uncertain effects. Air cover was not utilized due to a 600 foot ceiling. The convoy continued on to Phnom Penh, arriving at 1530H without further incident. The harassing attack occurred during the passage of the stretch of the river patrolled by the 63rd FANK Battalion, despite the augmentation of two FANK companies into the area. Convoy PT-36 departed Phnom Penh at 1200H on 30 October, escorting three cargo ships, four tankers, and three tugs. The convoy arrived in Vietnam six hours later without incident. Sorties were flown for TP/PT-36 convoys on 41 occasions. Inclement weather did not permit full participation by USA /USN aircraft during the night portion of TP-36. Seawolves flew four escort missions, two of them at night.

Phnom Penh POL stowage facility problems continued throughout October, as the damages incurred during the 20 September attack on the Russei-Keo Tank farms could not yet be repaired. Each convoy delivered an average of 5,000 tons of POL, exceeding stowage capacities. However, Military Equipment Delivery Team Cambodia wanted to increase the number of convoys per month for MAP material, but there were the following restraints: 1) scheduled maintenance and overhaul for escort craft had to be conducted as the convoy duty could no longer be considered short termed; 2) there were also other operational commitments for craft assigned to CTF 218; and finally, 3) air assets were being used on an average of 210 sorties per month, already taxing the air assets. The extreme cost of escort support for an additional convoy was the greatest prohibiting factor.

As the high water increased on the Mekong, the ratio of escort craft to merchant vessels (EC/MV) per upriver convoy decreased. The ratio for the first 12 convoys was 8.1, while the middle 12 convoys (the low water phase) was 7.0, and the final ten convoys (the high water phase) was 3.1. It was apparent that as VNN expertise in running convoys increased, there was a decrease in the ratio, and that as high water limits the mobility of the enemy, a decreased number of escorts could be accepted. By mid-November, the level of the river drops rapidly, as does the counter-fire effectiveness of the PBRs. On about 15 December, the "historical" (based on the one annual cycle) enemy threat period commences and lasts until mid-July when the river has risen considerably. The last serious attack against a convoy occurred against TP-26 on 14 July. Since that time there have been only minor B-40 and B-41 rocket attacks.

The scheduled plan to turn over Mekong convoy operations to the MNK on 1 November was questioned by COMNAVFORV, with a recommendation that the turnover be delayed one month. The suggestion was due to several factors. Convoy TP-34 had 18 MNK craft out of 41 escort craft employed.
Six additional PBRs for the MNK from the FY 72 Military Assistance Program were at Vung Tau in October. Eleven more MNK PBRs were at NAVSHIPREPFAC Subic being readied for turnover. Considering that a minimum of 25 craft are generally required for proper convoy escort, it was evident that the MNK would not be able to assume the Mekong convoy operation until at least November.
Contact with the enemy in the TRAN HUNG DAO XX AO was very light during October. There were reports that insurgents had stopped civilian buses on the Ha Tien - Kien Luong Road and warned the civilians not to travel that road. This was probably a harassment tactic to exert control over the local populace, because no significant mining incidents or ambushes were reported.1

During a CG 44 Reaction Team sweep on 1 October, a small cache was uncovered. Near the cache a flagpole was discovered. Attached to the flagpole was a VC letter addressed to the Ha Tien VNN and RF/PF forces at the Tra Pho Outpost. It urged the government forces to not only dispute the elections and cease to support the US forces, but also to desert and join the revolutionist ranks of the VC.2

Throughout the month, sensor activity continued to be heavy, and reports of infiltration were received. Sweeps of suspected enemy crossing sites and artillery response to sensor activity were employed.3 The results of these artillery responses and sweeps were generally negative, often uncovering trampled grass and other signs of the enemy's crossings.

On 5 October, Commander CTF 234 ordered the withdrawal of all CG 42 junks attached to TRAN HUNG DAO XX. CG 42 reinforced the northern U Minh coastal operation under operational control of CTU 234.3.1. Before detaching, CG 42 released one team leader and a 12 man reaction team to TRAN HUNG DAO XX.

1. NILO Ha Tien msg 210800Z OCT 71
2. SA CTG 219.1 msg 071200Z OCT 71
3. SA CTG 219.1 msg 182015Z OCT 71
TRAN HUNG DAO XXI

Enemy contact in the TRAN HUNG DAO XXI AO was moderately heavy during October. There were nine enemy initiated incidents including five boat ambushes, three minings, and one attack on salvage operations. The mining incidents resulted in one VNN wounded, two RAC engine spaces flooded, and one civilian junk sunk. As a result of boat ambushes, two ASPBs and one LCM received minor damage, and one VNN was wounded. The attack on the salvage operations killed one and wounded four USN personnel. Additionally, there were 23 USN Seawolf missions flown in support of TRAN HUNG DAO XXI forces.

On 1 and 2 October, mine countermeasures became the subject of several messages. The very real danger presented by command detonated mines in the TRAN HUNG DAO XXI AO was reflected in the increased number of mining incidents in recent months. These incidents were a serious threat to CTF 210's convoy security mission. To ensure convoy security with the forces available, the following tactics were employed: fixed wing and helicopter air cover, pre-strikes by air on known and suspected danger areas, artillery sweeps on cleared areas prior to convoy transit, reconnaissance by fire by RAC, and chain-drag sweeps by two or more craft. Bank security had formerly been provided by 21st ARVN Division troops on sweeps, but with the recent U-Minh Forest operation and election security requirements, the bank security was provided by RF troops. The RF showed a reluctance to properly sweep the banks, and many of the mining incidents occurred in the vicinity of RF outposts. To counter the bank security problem, CTF 210 personally broached the subject of embarking 21st ARVN Division reaction teams during convoy operations with the CG 21st ARVN Division. The CG reiterated the non-availability of ARVN troops, but indicated he would personally direct the Province Chief and Sector Commander to take immediate action to correct the ineffectiveness of the RF troops on bank security.

U.S. Navy assets were directly involved in support roles during October. Seabees of NMCB-5, Detachment Mustang, were actively engaged in road improvement projects near ISB Ca Mau and Ca Mau City. Salvage teams completed operations on HQ 1231 and had it ready for tow on 14 October. Salvage operations were also completed on HQ 1255 on 18 October.

It is significant too that all five USN casualties in the TRAN HUNG DAO XXI AO, were sustained on a salvage operation. At 1305H
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on 21 October, two USN LCM(S), salvage crafts, were fired on from the west bank of the Trem Trem River in the vicinity of WR 076 388, during transit to a salvage site. An estimated three B-40/41 rockets were fired, one of which impacted in the coxswain's flat. LT Paul R. Foltz was killed in the engagement. ENS James H. McKenzie, EN1 Maxmillian M. Cook, III, DC2 Jimmy McGinnis, and FN Michael McVey were wounded in action. Two of the personnel were medevaced to the Third Surgical Hospital in Binh Thuy, and two remained aboard the salvage craft and were treated by the corpsman.

On 26 October, RAID 74 RAC transitted from Ca Mau to Hoa Binh and assumed RAID 75's interdiction and escort duties. RAID 75 returned to Ca Mau and commenced a stand-down period for repairs.
TRAN HUNG DAO XXIV

Enemy activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO XXIV AO was light during October. There were six enemy initiated naval incidents during the month. Three of the incidents were boat ambushes, resulting in no personnel casualties or material damage. Two of the incidents were attacks by fire on bases. The first ABF occurred on 1 October, three 82mm mortar rounds impacting approximately 300 meters from ATSB Ben Keo at 1630L No casualties or damage occurred, but three waterbuffaloes were killed by the incoming mortar fire. There was also no damage on 2 October, when ISB Ben Luc had four rounds of undetermined caliber impact about 100 meters outside the northwest corner of the base at 2110L Finally, the last incident was a booby trap explosion on 17 October. A VNN sailor of RPD-54 triggered a grenade booby trap when his PBR was operating close to the bank (vic XT 400 140). He was standing in the bow of the PBR when it proceeded to investigate a sampan. He brushed against an overhanging limb and the grenade detonated, traumatically amputating his right arm below the elbow. The sailor was taken to Tay Ninh Military Hospital, while a second PBR continued the investigation of the sampan, which contained innocent civilians with proper identification.

U.S. Navy Seals of Team One, Mike Platoon, were active on commo-liaison interdiction missions. Their most successful mission occurred on 19 October. The Seal patrol found a VC sapper squad base camp and set an ambush. At 1615H, three VC returned to the camp. Two VC were killed and one wounded. There were no friendly casualties.

On 14 October, LCDR David P. Micalchuck, USN, relieved LCDR Paul S. Gesswein, USN, as SA CTG 214.1, and CTG 116.10.

An unusual event occurred at ATSB Tra Cu on the evening of 21 October. Five perimeter defense claymore mines were accidentally exploded during an electrical storm. The mines were attached to individual steel stakes, which also anchored down concertina wire. Apparently, an electrical charge induced by lightning was transmitted through the concertina wire and steel stakes to the claymore mines. The electrical charge triggered the electric firing mechanism in the mines. The back blast from the claymore mines turned the steel stakes into shrapnel, damaging an adjacent building. The following preventive measures were recommended by COMNAVFORV:

1. Mount claymore mines on wooden stakes, at properly staggered
intervals.
2. Properly back claymores with sandbags to prevent back blast.
3. Do not anchor barbed wire, tanglefoot, or concertina wire with stakes on which mines are mounted.
4. Place wire between rows of claymores, not in the same row.
5. For interconnecting mine fields, electrical wiring should be strung over concertina wire with stakes, so that the electrical wire is not in contact with barbed or concertina wire.¹

These were the primary lessons learned from the incident; fortunately, no personnel were injured.

Also in October, LT H. O. Buzhardt, Jr., USN, relieved LT J. P. Sellinger, USNR, as NILO Tay Ninh on the first of the month.

¹. ADMIN COMNAVFORV 271132Z OCT 71
Contact with the enemy in the TRAN HUNG DAO XXV AO was light during October. There were three naval incidents, all boat ambushes, resulting in minor boat damage, five VNN wounded, and undetermined enemy casualties. U.S. Navy Seawolves were not extensively employed, flying only eight missions in the AO.

On 2 October, the AO was widened to encompass two new points of enemy activity. The operational area of RPD 63 was extended from WS 780 787 to WS 622 798, and from XS 152 726 to XS 200 610. The final seven PBRs of RPD 63 arrived at ATSB Phuoc Xuyen on 4 October, completing the final stage of the AO change to TRAN HUNG DAC XXV, and making coverage of the enlarged area feasible.

At 1625H on 27 October, a tragic claymore mine incident occurred involving accidental firing caused by lightning. It was the second such accident during the month, the first occurring on 21 October in TRAN HUNG DAO XXIV AO. In the incident on the 27th, two VNN were driving a steel post in about four feet of water. The post was for additional support of an anti-swimmer net at ATSB Phuoc Xuyen. The work area was about 50 feet from, and directly in line with one of the perimeter defense claymore mines. A PBR being used as a utility boat was 15 feet further away. A bolt of lightning either passed close by, or struck the lightning rod on Tower 6, where the firing pins for several claymore mines were located. One mine, under two feet of water, detonated wounding three VNN, one fatally, one seriously, and one slightly. The PBR received slight hull damage above the waterline, when peppered with claymore pellets.

VC canal crossing tactics were the subject of SA TRAN HUNG DAO XXV message 310210Z OCT 71. It described how the VC gained information on VNN ambush sites by moving into houses of friends or relatives on the canal bank, while the main party of VC remained one or two kilometers from the canal. Security flankers were stationed about 500 meters on each side of the crossing point. At the time for crossing, the VC attempted to trigger any ambushes by throwing rocks or mud into the canal, and finally by reconnoitering with one or two swimmers. Then the main party was called up and the surface of the water again disturbed to trigger any ambushes. The main party then crossed in one group by sampans or swimming. The normal size party was about 20 men, and took no more than two minutes to complete the crossing. This type of careful planning indicated why little contact was made by boats with infiltrating VC units. Some recommended countertactics for setting ambushes were: inserting troops with or without sampans while PBRs deceptively kept their engines running; drifting or poling PBRs to ambush sites; and using one PBR to tow a second PBR with its engines shut down to sling it into the ambush site.
Contact with the enemy was light in the TRAN HUNG DAO XXVI AO during October. There were three naval incidents, and U.S. Navy Seawolves flew 21 missions. The three incidents included one enemy initiated ambush, one interdiction of VC on the My Tho River, and one OV-10 crash. Friendly forces sustained eight VNN and three RF casualties wounded in action, and minor damage to a Monitor and an LCM-6. The VC suffered the loss of one 65 foot water taxi, with three VC troops captured.

On 5 October, the salvage of HQ 1503 and 1511, two RAG 21 LCM-6s, was completed in a 15 hour operation by two LCU salvage craft. The security force consisted of three infantry companies, 15 PBRs and RAG craft, and a USN OV-10.

Also on the 5th, an intrusion on a USN radio circuit occurred. Between 1650H and 1710H, Seawolves in support of a PF company in contact with the enemy were forced to delay a strike for ten minutes and a medevac mission for 15 minutes when their circuit was jammed. The intrusion consisted of a Vietnamese voice obscenely denouncing the Vietnamese and American people, and loud background noises from simultaneously broadcasting AFVN and a Vietnamese radio program. A frequency shift was passed to all units by circle wheel code encryption, and the new frequency remained free of jamming.

The OV-10 of CTG 116.8 crashed at 1745H on 29 October at XR 730 681. The aircraft was shot down by small arms fire, and both downed pilots were rescued. U.S. Navy Seals from Dong Tam and Seawolves were standing by to insert and provide security for the downed craft. Their assistance was not required, and they stood down when the downed Pony's wingman reported that the aircraft was a total loss. This incident is covered in more detail in the Third Coastal Zone section of this summary.

An intelligence report of interest was received on 30 October concerning a VC sapper training school. The NILO at Ben Tre received the report from a coded agent, which he classified as source usually reliable, but was unable to judge the accuracy of the information. The report stated that the VC were initiating a sapper training course in the vicinity of XS 628 314, close to the Ba Lai River and Ba Tri Canal. The course convening is alleged to be the second class, with the first class just completed. The first class was only half as long as originally scheduled, because the school was discovered and therefore moved to
the new location. The source also said the area would be closely guarded and travel through it forbidden. This was the first report of sapper training in Biong Trom District, but previous classes were held in other districts within the AO.¹

1. NILO Ben Tre msg 300250Z OCT 71
Contact with the enemy in the TRAN HUNG DAO XXVII AO was very light during the month of October. U.S. Navy Seawolves flew 23 missions in the AO, and there were only two naval incidents.

The first incident was an attempted mining of three units of RID 43 while in a WBGP in the vicinity of XT 632 320. At about 2300H on 18 October, crewmen of an ATC observed two swimmers close aboard, and took them under fire with small arms and grenades. The ATC and two ASPBs then broke their WBGP and repositioned. At first light, the ATC crew noticed a rubber float with ten meters of line attached to the ATC. Two PBRs from RPD 52 transported an EOD team from OP Base Phu Cuong to the ATC. There were no friendly casualties or damage. The two swimmers were believed killed, and no mines were attached to the RID 43 boats.

The second incident of the month was an ambush of a troop lift convoy on the Lower Saigon River in the vicinity of XT 720 220. At 1600H on 21 October, the convoy received an estimated 20 B-40 rockets and heavy small arms fire. Seven RFs and 2 VNNs were killed, and nine RFs and six VNN wounded in the engagement. Several boats were hit, but the heaviest damage was sustained by a Commandament and an LCM-6. Enemy casualties were undetermined.

On 7 October, a non-hostile injury was incurred at OP Base Phu Cuong. At about 1400H, BM1 Alvin T. Bohm, USN, shot himself in the hand while cleaning his .45 caliber pistol. The wound resulted in no bone damage, and an investigation was conducted.

One personnel change was made on 19 October. CAPT Nguyen Ngoc Quynh, VNN, was appointed Commander, Third Riverine Area, and assumed the duty of Commander, TRAN HUNG DAO XXVII.
Activity in the Rung Sat was particularly light in the month of October, and the Long Tau Shipping Channel enjoyed its twelfth month without a shipping attack or harassment. In that halcyon year, 3,468 ships transitted the Long Tau safely.

There were six Chuong-Duong airmobile/watermobile sweep operations conducted during October, along with numerous PRU/RF/TF inserts, resulting in a total of five of the enemy KBA (one probable), and one captured; and two basecamps and 23 bunkers destroyed. Only one PF was wounded during the sweeps. USN Seawolves of Detachment 2, staging out of Nha Be, accounted for one of the above kills in the Rung Sat, occurring during one of the ten missions flown in support of Rung Sat operations. The Seawolves also flew six air-strike missions, and flew several VARS flights around Vung Tau.

Chuong-Duong 60-71 was the final and most significant operation in the month, in which all but one of the kills occurred. The operation began at 1210H on 29 October, 24 kilometers east of Nha Be. At 1500H, a UH-1M from the 240th AHC contacted an unknown number of the enemy in the vicinity of YS 152 786 and took them under fire, resulting in four KBAs (one probable) while one of the enemy was wounded seriously and later captured. The helo was taken under ground fire and downed, but flew out under its own power later. A USN LHFT scrambled to the area to provide overhead cover. At 1520H, the RSSZ Intelligence Squad operating elsewhere was inserted into the area of the downed helo to provide security, and to sweep the area. In the sweep the squad destroyed a base camp and two bunkers. There were no friendly casualties incurred in the five hour operation.

The Rung Sat Intelligence Officer, in a 190846Z Oct 71 message, outlined the VC strategy in the RSSZ. As in the past, the VC were still trying to avoid any contact with allied forces. Apparently, the VC were waiting for reinforcements, and the withdrawals of Thai and Australian troops. With the expected large cutbacks of American troops and air assets in late 1971 in the area surrounding the Rung Sat and the departure of the Australians from Phuoc Tuy Province, the VC are probably preparing to reinforce Doan 10 [the VC Rung Sat Unit] around the end of 1971 or early 1972. When and if they are reinforced, a enemy highpoint can be expected in the Rung Sat area.
CATF 211

At the end of October, RAID units were based as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RAID</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>THD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>CTG 210.1</td>
<td>Kien An</td>
<td>XXI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>CTG 210.1</td>
<td>Kien An</td>
<td>XXI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>CTG 210.2</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
<td>XXI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>CTG 210.2</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
<td>XXI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>CTG 210.2</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
<td>XXI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>CTG 210.2</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
<td>XXI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each RAID is composed of approximately seven ATCs, five ASPBs, one MON, and one CCB. The RAIDs are reviewed in their respective operations.
At the end of October, RPD units were based as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RPD</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>THD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>CTF 227</td>
<td>Nha Be</td>
<td>CMD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>CTG 216.2</td>
<td>Phu Cuong</td>
<td>XXVII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>CTG 214.1</td>
<td>Ben Luc/ Tra Cu</td>
<td>XXV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>CTG 214.1</td>
<td>Go Dau Ha/ Ben Keo</td>
<td>XXIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>CTU 218.1.2</td>
<td>Tan Chau</td>
<td>XVIII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>CTU 217.1.4</td>
<td>My Tho</td>
<td>XXVI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>CTF 228</td>
<td>Nha Be</td>
<td>RSSZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>CTF 217</td>
<td>My Tho/ Dong Tam</td>
<td>XXVI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>CTU 218.2.1</td>
<td>Chau Doc</td>
<td>XVIII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>CTG 231.2/4</td>
<td>Hoi An/ Thuan An</td>
<td>FCZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>CTU 212.5.1</td>
<td>Rach Soi</td>
<td>VI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>CTU 212.5.2</td>
<td>Rach Soi</td>
<td>VI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>CTU 212.2.2</td>
<td>Phuoc Xuyen</td>
<td>XXV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>CTU 212.2.1</td>
<td>Tuyen Nhon</td>
<td>XXV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>Training</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each RPD is composed of approximately 20 PBRs and is reviewed in the operation in which it operates.
At the end of October, RID units were based as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RID</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>THD</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>214.1</td>
<td>Go Dau Ha/Tra Cu</td>
<td>XXIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>218.1.3</td>
<td>Tan Chau</td>
<td>XVIII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
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<td>Dong Tam</td>
<td>XXVI</td>
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<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>216.4</td>
<td>Phu Cuong</td>
<td>XXVII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>214.1</td>
<td>Ben Luc/Tan An</td>
<td>XXIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>214.2.1</td>
<td>Nam Can</td>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>212.2</td>
<td>Tuyen Nhon</td>
<td>XXV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>214.2.2</td>
<td>Nam Can</td>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>218.1.3</td>
<td>Tan Chau</td>
<td>XVIII</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each RID is generally composed of approximately five ATCs, one MON, six ASPBs, one CCB, one Zippo, one REF, and one RECH.

The RIDs are reviewed in their respective operations.
At the end of October, RAG units were based as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RAG</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>THD</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>CTF 227</td>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td>CMD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>CTG 216.1</td>
<td>Phu Cuong</td>
<td>XXVII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>CTG 210.3</td>
<td>Soc Trang</td>
<td>XXI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>CTG 210.3</td>
<td>Bac Lieu</td>
<td>XXI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>CTF 228</td>
<td>Nha Be</td>
<td>RSSZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>CTF 216</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>CTG 210.3</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
<td>XXI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>CTG 216.3</td>
<td>Phu Cuong</td>
<td>XXVII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>CTG 231.2</td>
<td>Hue</td>
<td>FCZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/33</td>
<td>CTG 217.1</td>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
<td>XXVI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/31</td>
<td>CTG 217.2</td>
<td>Vinh Long</td>
<td>XXVI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTED 81</td>
<td>Convoy Escort</td>
<td>Cat Lai</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each RAG is composed of approximately five LCM-6's, one MON, one CCB, three LCVPs and three FOMs. The RAGs are reviewed in their respective operations.
SPECIAL WARFARE

The following was the disposition of the Seal Detachments operating in a combat capacity throughout the country at the end of October:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Detachment</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>O-in-C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Team One</td>
<td>116.6.2</td>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
<td>LT Fletcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det Golf</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November Platoon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team One</td>
<td>116.10.2</td>
<td>Ben Luc</td>
<td>LT McCary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det Golf</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mike Platoon*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Seal units are reviewed in their respective operational areas.

* Mike Platoon stood down on 24 October.
The following was the disposition of HAL 3 Detachments at the end of October:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Det.</th>
<th>Task Org.</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>OIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>116.1.1</td>
<td>Nam Can</td>
<td>LT Mears</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>116.9.1</td>
<td>Nha Be</td>
<td>LCDR O'Neil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>116.13.1</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
<td>LCDR Morrison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>116.10.1</td>
<td>Ben Luc</td>
<td>LT Fulbright</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>116.15.1</td>
<td>Chau Doc</td>
<td>LCDR Hull</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>116.14.1</td>
<td>Phu Loi</td>
<td>LCDR Stoner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>116.6.1</td>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
<td>LCDR Venter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>116.5.1</td>
<td>Rach Gia</td>
<td>LCDR Henry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>116.17.1</td>
<td>Binh Thuy</td>
<td>LCDR Pellerin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During October, Helicopter Light Attack Squadron Three continued to be effective in both combat and combat support roles as they flew 740 total missions. The Seawolves killed 63 of the enemy while 30 bunkers, 19 sampans and 33 structures were either damaged or destroyed. The Sealord Logistics aircraft kept vital supplies and personnel moving to isolated outposts throughout the Delta.

VNAF pilots and door gunners continued to fly with HAL-3 Seawolves at all nine detachments with good results as a new group reported on 4 October. Weather hampered some detachments, but overall, the Vietnamese pilots and gunners were able to gain valuable experience in maintenance and in actual combat flying.

Several Seawolf aircraft were hit by hostile fire during the month, but no aircraft were shot down and no personnel were injured. One Sealord aircraft was lost at WQ 229 651 on 18 October at 1335Z while hovering over a grounded PCF. The helicopter, piloted by LCDR C. V. Christensen, spun to the right from a hover and impacted the water while engaged in salvage operations. LCDR Christensen suffered a dislocated shoulder and the remainder of the crew suffered cuts and bruises. The aircraft was a total loss.

Detachment 9 started the month embarked aboard USS VERNON COUNTY, was transferred temporarily to Ben Luc on 2 October, and then was permanently transferred to Binh Thuy on 20 October. The reason for their placement at Binh Thuy was to provide a backup capability for other detachments, specifically detachment 5 at Chau Doc, while retaining the capability to fly sorties into the Third Coastal Zone.
U.S. Navy OV-10A aircraft were credited with 232 KBAs while flying a total of 252 missions during the month of October. Black Ponies also accounted for the damage or destruction of 19 bunkers, 4 sampans, and 32 structures during the month.

Assistance to ground troops necessitated the aid of the "Ponies" on several occasions. On more than one occasion, OV-10s received heavy return fire from VC/NVA troops, although no personnel were injured on these missions. One assistance mission resulted in a two and a half hour cover for a naval convoy. On 24 October, after "Ponies" and Seawolves placed strikes on retreating enemy forces who had just attacked a friendly outpost while another nearby outpost was being attacked. The "Ponies" and Seawolves diverted and drove off the enemy forces.

During a coastal VARS in October, violations of restricted zones were noted by "Pony" pilots. Sampans fished, beached and transited in these zones at will. There even appeared to be a boat building area in one zone. Attempts at concealment by various craft threw suspicion on their activities.

On 29 October, while on a VARS mission in Vinh Binh Province, near XR 730 681, an OV-10 was struck by enemy fire and downed. Both pilot, LT Roy L. Segars, USN, and air observer, LT Edward A. Smith, USN, ejected safely. The aircraft crashed on the beach, exploded, and burned. As a U.S. Army UH-1 helo evacuated the pilot and observer, a Black Pony provided overhead cover and then made strikes on the downed aircraft to deny the enemy the use of the aircraft's equipment.
COASTAL SURVEILLANCE FORCES

U.S. MARKET TIME and VNN TRAN HUNG DAO XV Coastal Surveillance Forces maintained an effective barrier against sea-borne infiltration again in October, tracking three suspected North Vietnamese infiltration trawlers throughout the month. VARS flights were increased along the coast, and Vietnamese Riverine and ARVN units were alerted for a possible infiltration attempt in Coastal Zones Two through Five. However, the vessels made no attempt to enter South Vietnamese waters.

The first trawler, an SL-3 type, was detected by MARKET TIME Patrol Aircraft at 1338H, 3 October, at position 16-35N, 111-25E. The trawler was tracked to the Paracel Islands; there, it no longer posed an infiltration threat and surveillance was discontinued. At 1725H, 17 October, 1971, a possible SL-4 trawler was sighted at position 13-24N, 113-13E on a southerly course. This contact was also tracked to the vicinity of the Paracels, where surveillance was discontinued. Finally, the third trawler, an SL-6 type, was detected at 1000H, 28 October, at position 09-38N, 112-06E. Surveillance continued at the month's close.

Effective 1 October, CNO-VNN established the Headquarters Mobile Operations, Sea, temporarily located at Cam Ranh Bay until completion of the new VNN Headquarters Building and the installation of required supporting communications in Saigon, on about February 1972. This significant step is expected to centralize and streamline command and control of coastal surveillance, and, with CNO-VNN assuming the title of Commander, Mobile Operations, Sea, was finite recognition of the paramount importance to the VNN of their mission of interdiction of enemy sea-borne infiltration and coastal transshipment.

The present Coastal Zone Commanders assumed additional duties as respective Task Force Commanders of Sea Operations Command. The command system was fixed as follows:

- RADM Chon, CNO, VNN, assumed Commander Mobile Operations/Sea.
- CAPT Trang, VNN, Commander Coastal Surveillance Forces assumed additional duties as Assistant to CNO for Mobile Operations/Sea.
- CAPT Thoai, VNN, Commander First Coastal Zone, assumed additional duty as CTF 231.
- CAPT Khue, VNN, Commander Second Coastal Zone, assumed CTF 232.
- CDR Phong, VNN, Commander Third Coastal Zone, assumed CTF 233.
CAPT Kiem, VNN, Commander Fourth Coastal Zone, assumed CTF 234.
CAPT Thieu, VNN, CO TRAN HUNG DAO IV, assumed CTF 235.

The task designator CTF 213 (Commander, Coastal Surveillance Force) and subordinate designators were placed in reserve.
The First Coastal Zone is normally subject to typhoons from July through November. In July, Typhoons Harriet, Ivy, Kim, and Jean swept the coast causing light damage. However, it was a different story on 23 October, when Typhoon Hester devastated the First Coastal Zone, bringing virtually all military activity to a halt. The storm, the worst in 27 years, killed 70 people and left 300,000 homeless. The storm proceeded inland just south of Chu Lai, and then swept northwest along the coast carrying winds in excess of 85 knots, causing extensive structural damage to that base. At the First Coastal Zone Headquarters near DaNang, ten out of 13 COSFLOT ONE PCFs were sunk, as well as one Yabuta junk, one Vedette, an LCVP, and two skimmers belonging to the DaNang Harbor Security Force. The Harbor Entrance Control Point (HECP) antenna field was 50 percent demolished, as were the roofs of the First Coastal Zone Headquarters. NSF/LSB DaNang suffered 25 percent roof damage to the BOQ/barracks and to the dependent housing. The base was also left without power or phone communications.

Conditions were the same at many of the coastal groups; CGs 13, 14, 15, and 16 reported significant dwelling damage. However, salvage operations began almost immediately throughout the stricken zone. A U.S. Army 100 ton crane began salvage operations on the sunken VNN patrol craft at DaNang on the 24th. NAF Cam Ranh Bay Detachment Tan Son Nhut (Air Coaf) provided two CH-46 helicopters with crews to NSF DaNang for airlift support in connection with the damage restoration. Also, additional patrol craft were provided from the Third and Fourth Coastal Zones to restore some patrol capability in the First Coastal Zone. Furthermore, 7th Fleet P-3 aircraft flew special tracks to augment First Coastal Zone patrol coverage.

October also brought changes in Coastal Zone task force designation. On 1 October, Commander, First Coastal Zone assumed the designator CTF 231 in line with the new reorganization of Task Force 213/TRAN HUNG DAO XV into the Sea Operations Command. The First Coastal Zone cloud, TU 213.1.1 became TU 231.0.6. However, on 19 October, TU 231.0.6 was also disestablished, and two separate new task units were formed; TU 231.7.1 and 231.7.2. The senior commanding officer of the Fleet Command units assigned to the First Coastal Zone was designated CTG 231.7. The commanding officer of the unit assigned to Patrol Area 1B was designated CTU 231.7.1, while the Cloud OTC was designated CTU 231.7.2.

1. AFVN News Broadcast 24 OCT 71
In spite of the storm, there was heavy activity in the CHI LANG I AO in October. VNN units of CG 14 and RPD 60, supporting ARVN and RF/PF troops, gained contact with the enemy frequently throughout the month, killing 12 VC and destroying numerous bunkers, while suffering one VNN KIA, one VNN WIA, two RFs KIA and two RFs WIA. In one particularly noteworthy, well-coordinated operation on 25 October, PBRs of RPD 60, junks of CG 14, LDNN and EOD teams with U.S. advisors, participated with elements of the 5th ARVN Regiment in a ground sweep of Barrier Island, seven kilometers east south east of Hoi An (BT 20 54 and vicinity). U.S. Army gun ships provided air cover, while U.S.S. HENRY B. WILSON (DDG-7) provided NGFS, expending 274 rounds of 5 inch ammunition in preparing the area. The WILSON accounted for five VC KIA and ten bunkers destroyed. U.S. gunships killed three VC, while the EOD/LDNNs destroyed 26 bunkers and captured numerous documents, supplies, and some munitions. One LDNN was slightly wounded by a booby trap.

In the CHI LANG III AO, there were only a handful of mining incidents on the Cua Viet in October. All of these were mine recoveries, one a new type of pressure mine not seen before. On 10 October, 1.5 kilometers southwest of OP Base Cua Viet (YD 319 684), a fisherman reported a mine caught in his net. EOD units recovered the pressure mine which contained 60 pounds of C-4 explosive and a new type of firing mechanism. The mine was estimated to have been in the water two days prior to the recovery.
SECOND COASTAL ZONE

Enemy activity remained low throughout October, with a slight rise noted in small scale ground attacks and terrorism between the period 1-3 October, coinciding with the period of the Presidential Elections.

The most dangerous form of enemy activity in the Second Coastal Zone is that of the watersapper. The large shipping ports of Cam Ranh Bay, Nha Trang, and Qui Nhon provide the enemy watersapper with many lucrative targets. Of special concern is Qui Nhon, where enemy watersappers are especially professional and aggressive, sinking four merchant vessels over the past year and a half. Therefore, on 10 October, a combined COMNAVFORV, USARV and VNN survey team arrived to conduct a survey on Qui Nhon Harbor defense conditions. The survey encompassed the following areas:

A. Harbor Defense Boats
   1. type
   2. number assigned for swimmer/sapper defense
   3. availability
   4. armament

B. Towers
   1. numbers
   2. location on piers/waterfront
   3. weapons in towers

C. Pier, ships and waterfront lighting
   1. adequacy
   2. completeness of illumination

D. Sentries
   1. numbers (day and night)
   2. locations
   3. composition (US/VNN)
   4. armament
   5. communications
   6. training in duties

The team's recommendations were submitted to the cognizant commanders for action.

Elsewhere in the Second Coastal Zone, a VC unit ambushed three USN advisors on the evening of 12 October. At 2024H, the three were returning from the Tuy Hoa Airport in a quarter ton truck when they were fired on half way up the mountain road to Radar Site Six on Nui Chap Chai (CQ 138 500). The ambush was initiated with automatic weapons. The driver attempted to downshift the vehicle which subsequently stalled and
could not be started. At this time, the rate of fire increased followed by an explosion alongside the truck, seriously wounding EN2 Johnny Fred Baldwin, USN, 562701768/B84 29 51, in the chest, left wrist, and right leg. All personnel abandoned the vehicle which continued to receive fire. The incident lasted four to five minutes. All personnel were subsequently evacuated by helicopter. The wounded man's condition was reported as good at the 67th Evacuation Hospital. Information provided by a 525 Military Intelligence Group source indicated that the enemy unit involved was an element of the 96th LF Battalion, the unit reported to be planning an attack on Coastal Surveillance Station Chap Chai during the period 11-21 October.

1. Second Coastal Zone I0 191330Z October 1971

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EOD divers go over the side of their skimmer to conduct underwater checks of a merchant ship's hull. Checks are made periodically each day to ensure that enemy sappers have not attached explosive charges to vessels in Cam·Rahn Bay's inner and outer harbor or piers.
THIRD COASTAL ZONE

Third Coastal Zone operations continued successfully in October despite unpredictable weather caused by the shift from the Southwest to the Northeast Monsoon, the considerable cloud cover, reduced visibility, high winds, and moderate to heavy sea states curtailing friendly and enemy operations alike.

On 6 October, USS VERNON COUNTY (LST-1161), completing TRAN HUNG DAO IV resupply duties, chopped from CNSAS to CTF 115 for duties in support of coastal surveillance operations in the Third Coastal Zone. These duties included supporting the embarked HAL-3 Detachment 9, with a secondary mission of support to TRAN HUNG DAO IV. However, on 16 October, HAL-3 Detachment 9 (TU 116.17.1) changed operational control from CTG 116.17 and relocated to Binh Thuy. Also, throughout the remainder of the month, the Third Coastal Zone LST was mainly employed in a barrier role to supplement other Third Coastal Zone patrol craft due to the high infiltration trawler threat during the month, rather than with cloud operations. As a result, there was no real need for an embarked cloud staff on the LST, hence TU 233.0.6 (formerly TU 213.3.1) was accordingly disestablished and disembarked on 18 October. The VERNON COUNTY was relieved by the WASHTENAW COUNTY (LST-1166) on 20 October, and outchopped on that date.

Possible coastal infiltration around the Ba Lai River mouth (XS 866 112) aroused concern during the month. VNN intelligence sources reported sighting three junks carrying munitions in the area on 4 October. While the report was not substantiated, CTF 233 initiated active inner barrier operations off the Ba Lai, implemented by CG-34 junk patrols of the river mouth. However, these operations were hampered by sea conditions. The key to stopping this infiltration lay in integrated operations between U.S., VNN Third Coastal Zone, VNN TRAN HUNG DAO XXVI, and the 7th ARVN Division units. At the month's close, coordination efforts were still being planned.

Lack of helicopter support was another problem area in Third Coastal Zone operations during the month. On 21 October, the U.S. Army Third Regional Assistance Command (TRAC) terminated direct helicopter support of Third Coastal Zone Navy units. These helicopter services were needed to provide liaison and operational visits to district towns.
in the zone inaccessible by boat, and liaison visits to coastal groups
and the Ta Kou Radar Site. The SA CTF 233 cited these district contacts
as the most significant factor leading to the success of Third Coastal
Zone operations during the late May—September period. Also, the re-
location of the Seawolf detachment from the LST to Binh Thuy consider-
ably reduced scramble response time, although not affecting the level of
overall helicopter operations which were still being conducted in the
secret zones. As a partial solution to this problem, SA CTF 233 and his
counterpart were trying at the month's end to initiate a VNAF supported pro-
gram of dedicated helo VARS flights (approximately five flights weekly).

The Third Coastal Zone also lost an air unit as a result of enemy
action during October. At 1745H on 29 October, 51 miles southeast of
Dong Tam, a Black Pony VARS flight, which had joined up with two other
Black Ponies placing strikes in the Long Toan Secret Zone, received
intense ground fire and was hit at XR 700 360. Both the pilot and the
CTF 116 Intelligence Officer, acting as observer, ejected safely before
the plane crashed at XR 730 681. As the Ponies flew cover, an Army
Dustoff Helicopter extracted the two crewmen at 1808H, and evacuated
them to Binh Thuy. The pilot was uninjured and the IO suffered a
sprained ankle and superficial cuts. After the extraction was completed,
Black Pony strikes were placed on the wreckage to destroy the aircraft
completely. At the completion of the last strike at 2045H, incoming
tides completely submerged the wreckage.

Vung Tau had its share of incidents during the month. The VC made
their presence felt on Presidential Election Day, 3 October, with three
rockets fired at the Vung Tau area from Long Son Island (vic YS 280 546).
The ABF occurred at 0539H, one 122mm rocket impacting in the Nation-
al Police Training Center (YS 307 486) destroying one small classroom
building and slightly wounding two persons. The other two rounds impact-
ed in the water (vic YS 300 495) near CG 33. (The coastal group was also
hit with a rocket ABF on 30 September, sinking two junks.) CG 33 junks
on patrol in the vicinity of Long Son Island observed the rocket firing
and immediately took the launch site under fire with .50 caliber machine
guns. Enemy casualties were undetermined.

Enemy activity in the Vung Tau area was not solely confined to ABFs;
enemy sappers were also active. On 12 October, 1971, at approximately
1600H, three members of the VNN EOD team at Cat Lo responded to a
call from the De Long Pier, concerning an unidentified object tied to the
pier. After arriving at the scene via jeep, subsequent investigation re-
vealed the object to be a Viet Cong improvised underwater mine. The
team procured a skimmer, cut the line securing the mine to the pier,
them towed it away from the pier/ship area across the river to a remote
place, and rendered safe a 200 pound, fully armed, and extremely dangerous
Viet Cong underwater mine. The entire operation, including the render safe procedure, was conducted in such a professional manner that the entire amount of explosives, including detonation cord and blasting caps, along with the float material and securing line, were recovered for further analysis. For his part in the operation, the VNN EOD team leader Thieu-Uy Tanh has been recommended for the Bronze Star Medal.

The above incident did not represent the only mining incident in Vung Tau. On 15 October, at approximately 0930H, U.S. personnel at the Naval Ordnance Depot, Vung Tau, noticed a suspicious wire running along a ravine and disappearing under the surface of the dirt road. A U.S. EOD team was called, and subsequently discovered and rendered safe a command detonated land mine.

These incidents caused a reinspection of harbor security at Vung Tau on 16 October by the COMNAVFORV Harbor Defense Officer. Some of his recommendations were: increasing the number of harbor patrol craft by augmentation with CG 33 junks, improvement in positions of pier fenders, removal of Irish Pennants (loose line and cables etc.) dangling from the pier, installation of waterline lighting, and increasing the number of pier sentries. COMNAVFORV further stated in a message that "Vung Tau remains the most vulnerable harbor in RVN. With the expected increase in shipping, the actions recommended ... are considered to be urgent in nature". The situation could grow worse with possible increases in enemy activity allowed by the Australian troop withdrawal from the Vung Tau Special Zone and Phuoc Tuy Province in the near future.

1. COMNAVFORV/CHNAVADVGRP MACV msg dtg 171306Z October 1971

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OPERATIONS IN THE THIRD COASTAL ZONE

X Rockets fired at Vung Tau from Long Son Island
3 October, 1971

Coastal infiltration reported
Ba Lai River Mouth

OV-10 Black Pony shot down
29 October, 1971

LEGEND:
☐ - Coastal Surveillance Center
X - Hostile Fire/Evasion Incident
# - SAR/MEDEVAC Incident

SCALE:
0 30
Nautical Miles
FOURTH COASTAL/SOUTHERN SPECIAL SURVEILLANCE ZONES

Cloud units continued to maintain an effective barrier against enemy transshipment/infiltration during October. COMNAVFORV designated the period 18-22 October as a possible highpoint for enemy coastal infiltration. As a result, VARS flights were increased, Seawolf helicopters and Black Pony OV-10s aiding in the effort. At the month’s close, no enemy craft had been detected attempting to infiltrate into the Southern Special Surveillance Zones, although several trawlers were being tracked by MARKET TIME forces on the high seas.

On 1 October, in line with the formation of the new Sea Operations Command, Fourth Zone/Southern Special Surveillance Zone task groups were redesignated. CTGs 213.4 and 213.5 became CTFs 234 and 235 respectively. The individual clouds were also redesignated. CTUs 213.4.1 and 213.4.2 became CTUs 234.3.1 and 234.4.1 respectively. Similarly, CTUs 213.5.1 and 213.5.2 became 235.0.2 and 235.0.3 respectively.

On 13 October, CTF 235 lost one of his PCFs. PCF 3905, conducting patrol sweeps in the vicinity of the Bo De River mouth, suffered an engine casualty and moored to a buoy to effect repairs. Meanwhile, the weather worsened. The craft slipped its moorings and was driven hard aground at WQ 234 656. A USN salvage team was air lifted in on the morning of 15 October, and reported that the vessel could not be salvaged with in-country assets. All VNN efforts at salvage failed. Finally, the craft was stripped of all armaments and other useful items, and the PCF was abandoned.

An Thoi, on Phu Quoc Island, was the focal point of much interest during October. On 4 October, RADM David H. Jackson, USN, Pacific Fleet and Service Force Pacific Maintenance Officer, visited An Thoi for discussions on operations, maintenance, repair and logistics of patrol craft. Also during the month, COMNAVFORV expressed concern over the deteriorating condition of An Thoi’s airfield, closed to all but light traffic since 9 August. This meant that U.S. Navy and Army advisors would be without direct air logistics support when the USAF unit located there stands down. The source of the problem was whether the Army or Navy had the repair responsibilities for the airfield. Therefore, COMNAVFORV requested from COMUSMACV “early resolution of the An Thoi Airfield repair responsibilities in order to expedite repairs and preclude unacceptable reduction in basic advisor support” (COMNAVFORV msg 020545Z Oct 71).

Also on 6 October, 1971, LT A.L. Perkins, USN, relieved LT Ambobring, USNR, as NILO, Ha Tien.
OPERATIONS IN THE FOURTH COASTAL ZONE

SCALE:

0 NAUTICAL MILES 30

CA MAU POINT

CG 41 BASE

POULO OB1

X PCF 3905 grounding
During October, the Sister Ship Program continued its momentum as plans were furthered to allow several officers of RPD 56 and 58 to visit their Sister Ship Unit, DESRON 17, aboard the USS HENRY B. WILSON (DDG-7), presently located off the west coast of Military Region IV in a NGFS role. COMDESRON 17 planned to host the officers for an over-night stay aboard the flagship. The Vietnamese officers were to observe NGFS and an underway replenishment, typical evolutions for a gunline ship. The original visit was scheduled for mid-October, but had to be postponed until early November due to pressing incountry operations. COMDESRON 17 visited both RPD 56 and 58 in September in order to further two-way communication between the Sister Ship units.

On 14 October, 1971, Mr. Donald Whyte, Executive Director of the Helping Hand Foundation's Washington, D.C. office visited LSB Dong Tam to observe Operation Helping Hand projects. He was accompanied by two members of the Board of Directors of the Foundation, and by LCDR Jack Martin, USN, (OP 44V), the OPNAV coordinator for Operation Helping Hand.

USCGC COOK INLET was active in the field of civic action during October. She participated in two MEDCAPS on 8 and 12 October. On the former date, the ship's doctor, a corpsman, and nine other U.S. and VNN crewmembers provided medical assistance and treatment to approximately 59 Hon Nam Du (VR 31 69) civilians during a four hour period. On the latter date, the ship provided treatment for 54 civilians and VNN dependents on Hon Tre Island (VR 80 99).

The Dependent Shelter Program in Military Region I suffered a grave setback in October as a result of Typhoon Hester. The storm, the worst in 27 years, damaged many of the dependent housing roofs throughout MR I. At the month's close, temporary repairs were being effected to the roofs of the structures.

In the Delta, dependent shelter needs were being reevaluated at several bases. NAVCAT 20 of CBMU 302 was tasked by COMNAVFORV to build only 40 units vice 100 units originally planned at ISB Nam Can. The reduction was predicated on predicted low occupancy of the programmed shelters. A similar situation existed at OP Base My Tho. COMNAVFORV envisaged building only 50 of 100 planned units, again due to predicted low occupancy brought about by unit reassignments.
ACCELERATED TURNOVER PROGRAM AND TRAINING SUMMARY

By the end of October, the U.S. Navy's ACTOV program was drawing to a conclusion, with 943 ships and craft having been transferred to date and only 21 Navy craft remaining to be turned over. Of the 33 Navy bases in the Republic of Vietnam, 29 had been turned over, and three of the four remaining bases had been shifted to VNN command. The remaining 21 craft and four bases are scheduled for transfer to the VNN prior to mid-1972. The craft remaining consist of two WHECs, eight yard craft, and 11 Boston Whalers.

During the month, three Boston Whalers, one LCM, and an LCM Pusher were turned over at various bases in Vietnam. Each craft is put into excellent working condition before turnover.

On 29 October, the command of Logistic Support Base, Nha Be, shifted to a VNN officer. The base, located 15 miles south of Saigon, is due for turnover in January of 1972.

On October 19, the fourth in a series of 16 radar stations was turned over to the VNN. The US Navy is building or modernizing the ACTOVRAD stations, as well as training the VNN personnel who will man them. The station turned over, at Nui Chap Chai, is 240 miles northeast of Saigon, and serves as one link in the network of radar stations which will eventually cover the entire 1200 mile coastline of South Vietnam. Three USN personnel serve as advisors to the station.

During October there was extensive shakedown training for the VNN crews of the WHECs COOK INLET and CASTLE ROCK in Subic Bay, Philippines. The tender USS AJAX, situated in Vung Tau, conducted repair and damage control training for all VNN crews of craft coming alongside during the month.

The month saw the commencement of the two-year academic curriculum at the VNN Naval Academy at Nha Trang. The changeover to a two-year academic curriculum began with the arrival of the members of Class 24. Classes started on 15 October, with an enrollment of 279 midshipmen. The faculty increased to 19 full-time members, but was still well short of the authorized strength of 37.

Also on October 15, the first VNN class in the RVN to be conducted entirely by VNN personnel was graduated at U.S. Naval Support Facility Da Nang. The class was composed of 23 senior navymen, and the instruction covered numerous repair fields.

At NTC Cam Ranh Bay on 9 October, a graduation ceremony was held.
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for classes 5C/71 and 3C/71 with 139 and 338 students respectively. On 19 October, Recruit Class 81 with 300 students was graduated.
NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY, SAIGON

The aggressive VNN Supply Support Improvement Program continued to meet its milestone deadlines in October, while the program's protagonist, RADM W. R. Dowd, left Vietnam on 2 October. The Accelerated Overhaul Program, under a revised schedule, ironed out many of the initial problems and was proceeding satisfactorily and on schedule at the month's end.

The Accelerated Overhaul Program, begun in July, came under review during mid-October, which led to a more realistic revised schedule, as well as to some shifts in emphasis. During the week of 11 October, a review of the manpower utilization at the overhaul bases was conducted revealing that an average of 59 percent of the repair personnel were utilized in the overhaul program. Since the manning of the repair departments of the bases involved averages of only 57.5 percent, the study indicated that only about 33 percent of the programmed craft maintenance manpower was supporting the repair effort. Also, none of the bases involved in the program had achieved the scheduled RAC overhaul duration of 45 days, and only one of the bases, Rach Soi, had achieved a 15 day overhaul duration for PBRs. It was noted that the original objectives for the program called for restoration of the entire craft to an as-built or brand new condition, rather than to correct those deficiencies required to provide the craft with a dependable engineering plant, reliable ordnance and communications system, and a maximum degree of watertight integrity. Undue emphasis was placed on cosmetic repairs or engine overhauls where engine repairs would have sufficed. With the revised schedule, the proposed increase in manning and manpower utilization of repair departments, and the change of the overhaul objective to emphasize only the work necessary to provide operationally ready craft, the program took on brighter prospects.

The last USN Landing Craft Repair Ship in RVN, USS KRISHNA (ARL-38), departed Binh Thuy on 10 October enroute to the Philippines for transfer to the Philippine Navy on 30 October. The 26-year old ship was the first ARL to serve in Vietnam, arriving in June 1965. Except for periodic overhauls, she remained in the Vietnam area ever since, primarily in the Mekong Delta and the Gulf of Thailand. Other ARLs to serve in Vietnam were the ASKARI, SATYR, and SPHINX. All were sister ships of KRISHNA, and were converted from WWII Tank Landing Ships (LST). The major advantage of the ARLs as repair ships was a heavy lift capability for lifting small craft out of the water onto barges. This permitted full service to the underwater body, hull, screws, and shafting of the craft. ARLs also provided full repair to diesel engines, auxiliary machinery, electrical, electronic and ordnance systems.

During the month of October, RADM David H. Jackson, Fleet Maintenance
Officer for CINCPACFLT, visited support bases and ACTOVRAD 
stations throughout Vietnam. RADM Jackson inspected the ACTOVLOG/ 
ACTOVRAD programs to evaluate progress, and discussed the VNN 
overhaul and maintenance progress. Also during the month, RADM Bagley, 
Pers-P, and his retinue, toured USN facilities throughout Vietnam and spoke 
to all hands about programs, on-going studies, paybills, retention, Z-grams, 
and items of general interest.

In another area of general interest, the Fiscal and Disbursing functions 
were transferred to the Force Comptroller on 15 October. The Force 
Comptroller became responsible for all NAVFORV financial accounting and 
disbursing matters.

Also in October, a number of milestones of Phase II of the VNN Supply 
Support Improvement Program were completed: a failsafe plan at the 
VNN Supply Center was implemented to provide computer and record back up 
in case of loss/destruction; and a system was placed in operation at the 
VNNSC for reporting the workload in the warehouse operation.

The NAVSUPPACT Saigon Program Management and Expediting Unit 
moved to the VNN Supply Center on 21 October. This unit will serve as 
a nucleus VNNSC expediting unit and will train and assist VNNSC personnel.

The VNN Shipping Center became a part of the VNN Supply Center on 
29 October. The shipping unit had previously been an independent unit. This 
transfer placed all material shipment responsibilities under the VNNSC.

The Brown Water repair part stock records were transferred from 
NAVSUPPACT to the VNNSC on 31 October. The VNNSC thereby assumed 
management control of all Brown Water material in-country.

The Field Supply Assistance Teams (FAST) commenced inspecting the 
field supply activities (LSB/ISB/Ships). There were 12 activities inspected 
in October with the following grade assignments: three excellent, three 
good, five satisfactory and one unsatisfactory.
## PERFORMANCE FACTORS - RAC OVERHAUL ACTIVITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base</th>
<th>Repair Department Manning (% TO&amp;E)</th>
<th>Manpower Utilization (week of 11 OCT) (% of assigned)</th>
<th>% Programmed Craft Maintenance Manpower</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nha Be</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh Thuy</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Luc</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
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</table>
## Overhaul Duration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base</th>
<th>RAC</th>
<th>PBR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nha Be</td>
<td>46 days</td>
<td>24 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
<td>52 days</td>
<td>32 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh Thuy</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>31 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Luc</td>
<td>51 days</td>
<td>25 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rach Soi</td>
<td></td>
<td>13 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ 9610</td>
<td></td>
<td>31 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ 9613</td>
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<td>23 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Scheduled</td>
<td>Actual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nha Be</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Luc</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh Thuy</td>
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<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Another PBR is completed under the Accelerated Overhaul Program at LSB Binh Thuy, as Vietnamese sailors apply the finishing touches under the watchful eyes of BM3 Larry Malvasi.
NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCES

October marked a milestone in the Naval Construction Forces History as NMCB-5 finished all of its projects and departed from Vietnam. A small delay party of fifty personnel, charged with taking care of last minute details was scheduled to leave early in November. CBMU-302 remained in-country, the last major unit of Naval Construction Forces to be actively engaged. There were also six Seabee Teams in-country working in support of USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development].

Detail Mustang of NMCB-5 completed its task at ISB Ca Mau on 20 October, and all men and equipment redeployed on 24 October. The last two weeks in Ca Mau were spent building access roads with very wet conditions prevailing. Detail Bronco at Nui Ta Kou, ACTOVRAD Site Nine, completed all work on 20 October and redeployed all material and men to Bien Hoa on the same day. During October, Detail Bronco had finished road and culvert work, and, as had been the case in previous months, were harassed by VC implanted mines on the site's access roads. Luckily, no casualties were incurred.

CBMU-302, whose primary responsibility is the construction of dependent housing, is currently operating at 15 major sites in-country. CBMU-302 is organized into three companies, Echo Company in MR-1, Charlie Company in MR-2, and Delta Company, encompassing MRs 3 and 4. In October, Echo Company, commanded by LT Kovack, was engaged in dependent housing construction at Thu An, Danang, Chu Lai, and Cu Lao Re Island. In addition, small jobs such as Sea Huts and other support tasks are being completed in DaNang.

In MR-2, LT Scott Cross commands Charlie Company, composed of NAVCAT Two and Details Golf and Sparks. NAVCAT Two is currently tasked with the completion of dependent shelters at LSB Cam Ranh Bay, as well as maintenance of vehicles. Detail Golf supports the Naval Air Facility there, while Detail Sparks has been working in support of the VNN Training Center, also at Cam Ranh.

Delta Company, commanded by LT Wayne Tomiak, had the largest and most far-flung organization of the three. His NAVCATs worked on dependent housing at An Thoi, Hon Tre and Poulo Obi Islands, Nam Can, Cho Moi, Ha Tien, and recently completed and turned over to the VNN 34 units at the VNN shipyard at Cuu Long. They also made major modifications to the new Annapolis BOQ/BOQ and drainage improvements at Air Cofat. In addition, there were 225 men at the base camp at Bien Hoa serving as support for the scattered units.

Seven Seabees of Detail Sparks at Cam Ranh Bay received Letters of
Commendation for their work from the Commanding Officer, VNN Training Center, who cited their exemplary attitude, conduct, and industry, as well as their professional workmanship.

Two Seabee teams working for USAID were relieved in October. They were replaced by Teams 7107 and 7108, relieving teams 1019 and 1020 at My Tho and Go Cong respectively.
The above map shows the location of major CHMU 302 construction sites.
THE DUFFLE BAG/TIGHT JAW PROGRAM

DUFFLE BAG is the code name for the U.S. Navy's unattended ground sensor program. Similarly, TIGHT JAW is the code name for the VNN program. The U.S. Navy first began working with sensors in late 1963. The earliest sensors were modifications of sonobuoys. Other sensor types developed from these. Today, three basic sensor types are in use: seismic, activated by undulations in the ground near the sensor; magnetic, activated by metal objects disturbing the sensor's electromagnetic field; and finally, acoustic, a direct offshoot of the old sonobuoy, activated by sound sources near the sensor.

The U.S. Navy's sensors are primarily utilized in the Delta. USN sensor teams are located at Ha Tien, Tinh Binh, Tan Chau, Phuoc Xuyen, Tuyen Nhon, Tra Cu, and Nam Can. In addition, sensors are utilized for base defense at Kien An, ISB Ca Mau, and at HAL-3 Detachment 8 near Rach Gia. Recently, sensors have also been employed in I Corps at Coastal Group 14, near Hoi An.

On 15 January, 1970, all USN DUFFLE BAG sites were co-manned by VNN personnel, the beginning of an eventual turnover of the program to the Vietnamese. Prior to the co-manning, U.S. DUFFLE BAG teams consisted of, on the average, two officers and 20 enlisted men, all of whom received specialized training in counter-insurgency techniques, as well as maintenance and operation of the sensors and associated equipment. Presently, the U.S. advisor complement at a typical site is one officer and two enlisted, while the VNN teams consist of about four officers and 15 enlisted men. The U.S. has responsibility for all above ground equipment, while the VNN personnel have responsibility for all below ground assets. However, in November-December of this year, all U.S. advisors will be withdrawn to Binh Thuy, where some of them will be formed into a mobile repair team travelling to the various sites as needed.

The composition of the sensor sites vary as to size of the sensor field, the terrain to be monitored, and the capability for support. A basic site consists of an antenna system with pre-amps, a multicoupler, and a number of portatales to monitor the sensor field. The whole system must be powered by either an electric generator or by batteries.

The initial mission of the U.S. Navy sensor program was to support boat operations in the Delta on rivers and canals, and to provide warning for ATSBs. However, since enemy forces infiltrate and exfiltrate Corps Military Regions III and IV in South Vietnam along established routes, the Navy sensor program was expanded to include the detection and interdiction of these forces, especially since the Navy had the only sensor capability in the IV Corps Zone.
There are many different kinds of the three basic types of sensors. Also, there are different generations of the same basic sensors, called phases, the earliest being 'Phase I. Some of the various sensors are:

MINISID I (Mini Seismic Intrusion Detector)
This is a hand emplaced sensor which detects the seismic disturbances created by movement of personnel or vehicles into the area of the sensor. This sensor is 9"x7"x7" and weighs ten pounds, is buried in the ground, and has a 30 meter range for personnel detection, and a 300 meter range for vehicles. The sensor operates on batteries which must be replaced roughly every two months.

MAGID (Magnetic Intrusion Detector)
This is also a hand emplaced sensor which detects magnetic disturbances created by movement of ferrous metal, such as a rifle or vehicle into the area of the sensor. This unit has a similar range and battery life as described for the MINISID.

PIRID (Passive Infrared Intrusion Detector)
This is a hand emplaced sensor which detects body heat in its field of view, a bracket of from 5 to 50 feet from the sensor. The unit physically resembles a three inch piece of broomstick.

ACOUBUOY / SPIKE BUOY / ACOUSTIC BUOY
This sensor is either an airdropped or hand emplaced acoustic sensor detecting audible sounds within its detection range.

Sensors can be emplaced by a variety of methods: by hand, dropped from the air, or even fired from a mortar. The sensors can be used singly or in groups. They are normally planted in strings of three or four along a trail or stream. This enables the monitor team to determine directions and rates of enemy movement.

Employment of sensors requires a great deal of coordination with other units, both riverine and non-riverine. The monitor site is usually located in the NOC, where there is free access to tactical radio communications, first hand knowledge of friendly troop locations, and access to personnel who can grant necessary clearances for reaction fire. Permission for sensor employment normally comes from the Province, Sector, or Division level, and is necessary before commencing sensor operations. Implants are usually conducted concurrently with ground force operations to cover the fact that sensors are being planted.

Within the VNN chain of command, the Mobile Operations Command
(Riverine) designates the areas to be supported by TIGHT JAW teams on the request of task force commanders or as evaluated intelligence indicates. Task force commanding officers then assign TIGHT JAW teams to the task group commanding officers. The CTGs, in turn, provide berthing and logistics support, operational and intelligence direction, and guidance for coordination with friendly forces, and for the employment of the sensors. The TIGHT JAW team O-in-Cs, in turn, coordinate with U.S. advisors to procure equipment, set up and organize monitoring sites, and, in coordination with the CTGs, plan the sensor deployment to achieve desired goals while maintaining close liaison with local friendly forces. Prior to each implant mission, the team O-in-C conducts a visual reconnaissance to determine what kind of sensors to use, what are the security needs, and what will be the method used for the implant (air, hand, mortar, etc.). The team then carries out the implant mission. The O-in-C then supervises monitoring techniques and procedures. The O-in-C insures all sensor information is promptly passed to the CTG.

There are basically four types of implant missions. In the first type, sensors are implanted near streams, trails, roads, or possible enemy rest areas to determine enemy movement and infiltration routes. Another type of mission utilizes the sensor as a base defense aid. The sensors are planted along routes leading to the base to give early warning of enemy movement towards the base. In a third type of mission, sensors are planted as preplanned targets, and upon activation, artillery, air strikes, troop sweeps, or reaction by riverine craft is called. Finally, sensors can be used to aid ambushes. They can give early warning of enemy movement for an established friendly ambush, or give warning of an enemy ambush. They can be used in conjunction with a remote firing device, such as a claymore mine, in an unmanned ambush. Finally, they can provide the intelligence needed to set up friendly ambushes.

There are certain specific considerations which must be taken into account in planting the sensors. One of the most important of these is the location of the sensor itself. During a hand implant mission, this location must be determined in the field to take advantage of proper camouflage, soil density, and closeness to the trail. All sensors must be emplaced within line of sight distance from the receiving antenna. Another important consideration is the type of delivery to be used. The hand implant mission has the advantage of accuracy of sensor emplacement, but has the tactical limitation that you must have access to the area. Conversely, an air delivery mission can be used for areas which are inaccessible due to terrain features or enemy activity. This method is also more covert. However, the accuracy of emplacement of sensors suffers considerably.
Sensor implant missions, of course, can be very dangerous. Contact with the enemy is likely; that is why it is desirable to conduct implant missions in conjunction with other ground operations. The enemy by now also knows something about the sensors. He may not understand exactly how they work, but he pretty well understands their purpose. He has found a number of the sensors and realizes that they must be re-energized periodically. This fact has allowed him to devise clever booby traps which he sets under or near the sensors. For example, in one incident at 1300H on 20 October, 1971, U.S. DUFFLE BAG advisors were on a re-battery mission of the base defense sensor field near HAL-3 Detachment 8, 1500 meters north of Rach Gia (WS 101004). On arrival at the implant area, the advisors found the area had become heavily overgrown, and there were indications that unknown personnel had been in the area. The mission now became other than routine. The sensor field was vital to the security of the helicopter detachment, so the advisors had to enter the area, locate the sensors, and renew the batteries. Due to the changes in landscape and foliage growth, the team had extreme difficulty in locating the sensors. However, one by one, each sensor was located and removed from its resting place. One of the sensors was booby trapped with a grenade and sharpened bamboo spikes placed under it. LCDR William J. Fogle, USN, the team leader and also the Senior Advisor to the TIGHT JAW Program, aided by SN Timothy L. Fredricksen, USN, and EN2 Peter J. Strebe, USN, disarmed the booby trap. LCDR Fogle sustained severe lacerations to both of his hands from the sharpened grenade spoon and the bamboo spikes during this process. For their part in this action, LCDR Fogle and EN2 Strebe were recommended for the Bronze Star Medal, and SN Fredricksen for the Navy Commendation Medal.

In conclusion, U.S. Navy DUFFLE BAG teams have played a unique role in the Vietnam war. In a counterinsurgency situation, sensors have done an admirable job detecting enemy movements, where stealth, and the ability to fight the enemy in his own element is so important. On over a thousand occasions, boats on patrol or in WBGP were warned of enemy personnel either moving or waiting in ambush positions. This gave the boats a first strike capability. Furthermore, the Commanding Officer, ATS: Song Ong Doc, when the USN still occupied that base, situated astride the major infiltration route into the Lower Ca Mau Peninsula from the U-Minh Forest region, credited the DUFFLE BAG team in over six instances with thwarting enemy ground attacks by giving early warning of enemy movement. In another instance, strategically placed sensors at suspected mortar sites gave early warning of impending attacks on ATSB Tra Cu, two of which were aborted when friendly forces initiated fire on these positions. There are, of course, countless other illustrations of the effectiveness of DUFFLE BAG sensors.
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## APPENDIX I

### 1. (C) NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP ORGANIZATION

**CHNAVADVGRU U. S. MACV**  
**CHIEF OF STAFF**  
**RADM R. S. SALZER, USN**  
**CAPT R. A. PADDOCK, USN**  
**CAPT B. G. STONE, USN**

**SENAADV**  
**SENAADV, COMD NAVAL COMMAND (SA CTF 227)**  
**SAIGON**  
**Lcdr J. H. Gaul, USN (D)**  
**Lcdr J. Ferguson, USN (R)**

**TRAN HUNG DAO CAMPAIGN ADVISORY ORGANIZATION/AREA OPERATION COORDINATOR (AOC)**

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<tr>
<th>AOC COASTAL</th>
<th>SA MOBILE SEA OPERATIONS COMMAND CTF 116</th>
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**SENIOR ADVISOR, FLEET COMMAND, SAIGON**

**SENADV**

**FLEET COMMAND**

**CAPT J. F. DRAKE, USN**

**AMPHIBIOUS TYPE COMMAND ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (ATF 211)**

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**Mobile Sea Operations Command Advisory Organization (TG 213)**

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<td>SA RID FOUR THREE PHU CUONG</td>
<td>Ltjg T. B. Wagenseil</td>
<td>USN</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA RID FOUR FOUR BEN LUC/TAN AN</td>
<td>Lt G. C. Cooley</td>
<td>USN</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA RID FOUR FIVE NAM CAN</td>
<td>Lt C. F. Tibbetts</td>
<td>USN</td>
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<td>SA RID FOUR SIX DONG TAM</td>
<td>Lt W. C. Smith</td>
<td>USN</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA RID FOUR SEVEN NAM CAN</td>
<td>Lt W. Taylor</td>
<td>USN</td>
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</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

SA RAG TWO SEVEN
NHA BE

LT W. GOTTSCHALK, USN

FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 231)

SA FIRST CZ
DANANG

LT W. R. RUSLING, USN

CODR P. MCLAIRD, JR., USN (D)
CODR A. VIESSMAN, USN (R)

SA CG ONE ONE
CUA VIET

LT R. DUMINIAK, USNR (D)
LT R. ANDERSON, USN (R)

SA CG ONE TWO
THUAN AN

LT R. N. MYERS, USN

SA CG ONE THREE
CU TU HIEN

LT J. SCOTT, USN

SA CG ONE FOUR
HOI AN

LT JG R. G. MCCAIN, USN

SA CG ONE FIVE
CHU LAI

LT D. ROBINSON, USN (D)
LT J. TAYLOR, USN (R)

SA CG ONE SIX
QUANG NGAI

LT W. R. OWENS, USNR

SA RAG THREE TWO
HUE

LT G. L. MAGER, USN

SA HARDU DANANG

LT D. W. WIRICK, USNR

SA CSC DANANG

LT P. M. SCOTT, USN

SECOND COASTAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 230)

SA SECOND CZ
NHA TRANG

CDR A. S. JEFFERIS, USN

SA CG TWO ONE
DE GI

LT J. K. ENGELKEN, USN

SA CG TWO THREE
SONG CAU

LT E. L. SIWINSKI, USNR (D)
LT F. J. BLAKE, USN (R)

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SA CG TWO FIVE
DONG HAI
LT D. G. THOMAS, USN

SA CG TWO SIX
BINH BA ISLAND
LT J. P. MCGRATH, USN

SA CG TWO SEVEN
NING CHA
LTJG P. MILLER, USN

SA CG TWO EIGHT
PHAN THIET
LT G. NORDLAND, USN

SA HARDU NHA TRANG
LT J. E. BINGHAM, USN

SA HARDU QUI NHON
LT B. VALENTINE, USN

SA CSC NHA TRANG
LT S. C. AREY, USN

SA CSC QUI NHON
LCDR P. J. CISSEK, USN

THIRD COASTAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 233)

SA THIRD CZ
VUNG TAU
CDR J. G. SULLIVAN, USN

SA CG THREE THREE
VUNG TAU
LTJG C. JOHNSON, USN

SA CG THREE FOUR
THANH PHO
LT E. J. GIBSON, USN

SA CG THREE FIVE
THU VINH
LTJG T. E. ARNOLD, USN

SA CG THREE SIX
LONG PHU
LTJG D. C. BOGER, USN

SA HARDU VUNG TAU
LT N. BARBOUR, USN

SA CSC VUNG TAU
LT D. R. ROGUS, USN

FOURTH COASTAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 234)

SA FOURTH CZ
AN THOI
CDR M. J. SHINE, USN

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SA CG FOUR ONE
POULO OBI

SA CG FOUR TWO
AN THOI

SA CG FOUR THREE
HON TRE ISLAND

SA CG FOUR FOUR
HA TIEN

SA CSC AN THOI

SA THIRD RIVERINE AREA
LONG BINH

SA RAG TWO TWO/TWO SEVEN
NHA BE

SA RAG TWO EIGHT
LONG BINH

SA RAG THREE ZERO
PHU CUONG

SA REG FOR RPG
CUU LONG

FOURTH RIVERINE AREA

SA FOURTH RIVERINE AREA
CAN THO

SA RAG TWO ONE/THREE THREE
DONG TAM

SA RAG TWO THREE/THREE ONE
VINH LONG

SA RAG TWO FIVE/TWO NINE
CA MAU

SA RAG TWO SIX
CA MAU

CDR V. MCDONOUGH, USN
LT J. CALABOUGH, USN
LT R. M. ANDREWS, USN
LT R. M. ANDREWS, USN
LT C. E. ROBE, USN

CDR W. WARDELL, USN
LT K. J. PLIS, USN
LTJG R. E. BROWN, USN
LT R. J. GILLESKIE, USN
LTJG R. W. BASS, USNR

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RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 220)

SA RSSZ
NHA BE

CDR D. A. STEWART, USN

NAVAL TRAINING CENTER ADVISORY ORGANIZATION

SA NTC NHA TRANG

CDR P. R. FURNESS, USN

SA NTC CAM RANH BAY

CDR R. R. WARD, USN

SA NTC SAIC ON

CDR R. A. WILD, USN

LOGISTIC SUPPORT COMMAND ADVISORY ORGANIZATION

SA VNN LS' AND SA VNN DCOS LOG

RAUS P. S. MCNAUS, USN

SA VNS SY

CAPT F. T. SHAVER, USN

SA VNSSC

CDR C. H. BARSTAD, USN

SA LSB \N THO\I

LCDR R. W. HOTZ, USN

SA ISB NAM CAN

LCDR R. BLED SOE, USN

SA LSB BINH THUY

CDR R. J. COEN, USNR

SA ISB RACH SOI

LT D. E. WARD, USN

SA ISB CA MAU

LT D. CHALFANT, USN

SA ISB LONG XUYEN

LCDR A. THIEL, USN

SA LSB CAM RANH BAY

CDR C. MCINTOSH, USN

SA ISB QUI NHON

LCDR T. A. HEAD, USN

SA LSB CAT .0

LCDR S. UNGEMACH, USN

SA ISB LONG PHU

LT J. R. MURRAY, USN

SA LSB DANANG

CAPT E. MOUNTFORD, USN

SA ISB THUAN AN

LCDR J. STEVENS, USN

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SA LS B DONG TAM
SA ISB VINH LONG
SA ISB CHO MOI
SA LS B NHA BE
SA ISB BEN LUC
SA ISB CAT LAI
SA YRBM ALPHA UNIT

CDR R. E. GREER, USN
LCDR J. LASWELL, USN
LCDR B. BURGETT, USN
CDR A. L. BADER, USN
LCDR C. W. ALBAUGH, USN
LT J. F. MAYER, USN
LCDR G. CRAWFORD, USN

ENCLOSURE (1)
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APPENDIX III

Glossary of Abbreviations

The following abbreviations and terms are commonly used in the combat zone by all agencies and are listed here in amplification of those used in the text.

ABF  
Attack By Fire

AFVN  
American operated radio and television service in the Republic of Vietnam.

AMMI PONTOON  
A multi-purpose barge, standard size 28'x90'

AO  
Area of Operations

ARVN  
Army of the Republic of Vietnam

A/S  
Air Strike

ASPB  
Assault Support Patrol Boat

ATC  
Armored Troop Carrier

ATSB  
Advance Tactical Support Base

A/W  
Automatic Weapons

BDA  
Battle Damage Assessment

BLACK PONY  
OV-10 Aircraft, twin engine turboprop counter-insurgency.

CCB  
Command and Communications Boat

CG  
Coastal Group or Commanding General

CHICOM  
Chinese Communist

CMD  
Capital Military District
CONUS
Cords
CSR
CZ
DIW
DUSTOFF
ENIFF
EOD
FOM
FRIFF
FSB
FWMAF
GDA
GVN
H&I
ISB
JGS
KIA
LAW
LCPL
LDNN
LF

Continental United States
Civic Operations for Rural Development Support
Camp Sentinel Radar
Coastal Zone
Dead In the Water
Medical evacuation by helo
Enemy Initiated Firefight
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
French Patrol Boat
Friendly Initiated Firefight
Fire Support Base
Free World Military Assistance
Gun Damage Assessment
Government of Vietnam
Harassment and Interdiction fire
Intermediate Support Base
Joint General Staff (Vietnamese)
Killed In Action
Light Anti-tank Weapon
Landing Craft, Personnel, Large
Vietnamese equivalent of USN Underwater Demolition Team, and Seals.
Local Forces (VC terminology)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LHFT</td>
<td>Light Helo Fire Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOH</td>
<td>OH-6 Light Observation Helicopter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSSC</td>
<td>Light Seal Support Craft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACV</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDCAP</td>
<td>Medical Civic Action Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MID</td>
<td>Mining Interdiction Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNK</td>
<td>Cambodian Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONITOR</td>
<td>Heavily armed LCM-6 (40mm cannon or 105 Howitzer)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MR</td>
<td>Military Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSB</td>
<td>Minesweeper, boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSSC</td>
<td>Medium Seal Support Craft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVCAT</td>
<td>Naval Civic Action Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAVLEDRAH</td>
<td>Naval Liaison Delta Regional Assistance Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGFS</td>
<td>Naval Gunfire Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NILO</td>
<td>Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIOTC</td>
<td>Naval Inshore Operations Training Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMCB</td>
<td>Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (Seabees)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOD</td>
<td>Night Observation Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>Naval Support Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSAD</td>
<td>Naval Support Activity Detachment</td>
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<tr>
<td>NVA</td>
<td>North Vietnamese Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>OTC</td>
<td>Officer in Tactical Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBR</td>
<td>Patrol Boat, River</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCF</td>
<td>Patrol Craft, Fast</td>
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<tr>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Popular Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRU</td>
<td>Provincial Reconnaissance Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSA</td>
<td>Province Senior Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSDF</td>
<td>Popular Self-Defense Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSYOPS</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAC</td>
<td>River Assault Craft</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAG</td>
<td>River Assault Group (VNN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAID</td>
<td>River Assault and Interdiction Division (VNN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RECH</td>
<td>Recharger (boat)</td>
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<tr>
<td>REF</td>
<td>Refueler (boat)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RF/PF</td>
<td>Regional Forces/Popular Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPD</td>
<td>River Patrol Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPG</td>
<td>Rocket Propelled Grenade or River Patrol Group</td>
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<td>RSSZ</td>
<td>Rung Sat Special Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>RVNAF</td>
<td>Republic of Vietnam Air Force or Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Senior Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>Search And Rescue</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEAL</td>
<td>Navy commandos (Sea, Air, Land)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEAWOLF</td>
<td>UH-1B Helo, heavily armored, USN operated</td>
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</table>
SHADOW
C-119 Aircraft

SKIMMER
20-foot fiberglass motorboat

SLICK
UH-1B, U.S.A. operated

SSB
Swimmer Support Boat (Skimmer)

TAOR
Tactical Area Of Responsibility

TP/PT
Convoy designation for ships traveling up the Mekong River from Tan Chau to Phnom Penh and vice versa.

USARV
United States Army, Vietnam

VARS
Visual Air Reconnaissance Search

VNMC
Vietnamese Marine Corps

VNN
Vietnamese Navy

VNNLSC
Vietnamese Navy Logistic Supply Command

VNNSC
Vietnamese Navy Supply Center

VNNTC
Vietnamese Naval Training Center (Nha Trang)

WBGP
Waterborne Guard Post

WIA
Wounded In Action

ZIPPO
Flame thrower-equipped ATC or Monitor