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COMMANDER
U.S NAVAL FORCES
VIETNAM
MONTHLY HISTORICAL SUMMARY
August 1971

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FOREWORD

Enemy overt military activity has been low in the Delta for the past two months. The current lull in activity could be attributed to two factors: a general reconsolidation of forces during which time enemy units were training, refitting and resupplying; and a renewed emphasis on political maneuvering in an effort to influence the outcome of both the Lower House and Presidential elections. It was believed that the former was successfully completed to the point where enemy assets could then be directed toward political action involving increased propagandizing, indoctrination, and proselytizing. An attempt at disrupting the Lower House elections on 29 August did not materialize in the form of overt military activity. During the month, four AOs were essentially dormant, and two AOs made only minor contact with the enemy. Seawolves and Black Ponies readily upstaged other naval units in the tallies, accounting for 60 of the 63 kills recorded, though this was clearly not the whole story of Delta warfare.

On 1 August, further restructuring in operations occurred in the Delta as TRAN HUNG DAO II split into TRAN HUNG DAOs XXIV and XXV at the juncture of Military Regions III and IV to effect clearer and more efficient coordination of operations.
TRAN HUNG DAO XXIV remained under the OPCON of CTG 214.1, while TRAN HUNG DAO XXV fell under the OPCON of CTG 212.2.

On 17 August the SS GREEN BAY was sunk in Qui Nhon harbor, making her the fourth major ship mined in the last 17 months, and touching off a large scale review of harbor security in all the Coastal Zones by the Military Sealift Command, COMNAVFORV, and the Commanding General, USARV. The First Coastal Zone experienced the usual rash of incidents, with 13 mining incidents occurring during the month. In the Fourth Coastal Zone, TU 213.4.3 was scrapped and the cloud unit around the Ca Mau Peninsula was brought under a staff organization at Nam Can, TG 213.5, commanded by COMTHD IV, as he was considered privy to the vital infiltration intelligence. The clouds were considered improving all along the coast as the cloud OTCs gained experience, and increased detections for the month seemed to bear this out.

POL stocks at the Cambodian capital reached comfortable levels, as the number of ships per convoy was doubled in July, ending for the second month in a row a POL drought.

During August, the ACTOV program lulled as ten bases prepared for turnover in September. U.S. Navy in-country strength
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continued to reflect U.S. withdrawal status, decreasing to 9,971 men by 26 August, marking a normal reduction of 500 men for the month.
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On 1 August, TRAN HUNG DAO II was disestablished and replaced by TRAN HUNG DAO XXIV and XXV. The reason for this change was that the borderline between MR III and MR IV split the AO and made it hard to coordinate operations, especially if the operations were using assets from both regions.

The Di Mau Brevity Code, under evaluation for the past three months, was pronounced a success by DEPCOMTHD as it enabled VNN units to surmount the language barrier and direct U.S. Seawolf helicopters in accurate air strikes.

The combined U.S. and Vietnamese military forces in Vietnam were put on alert as the Lower House Elections, held on 29 August, approached, but enemy activity did not appreciably increase and the elections were held with few terrorist incidents to mar the balloting.

The Accelerated Overhaul Program continued into its second month and was considered to be progressing smoothly despite continued problems with boat crews not staying with their boats during overhaul, and poor damage control readiness resulting in the sinking of at least one PBR after arriving at the overhaul site.
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A careful watch was being kept on the Mekong River and its tributaries as flood waters continued to rise. Severe flooding was not predicted but all bases were warned to take prudent precautions.

In a reshuffling of command in the Delta, Captain W.J. Crowe, USN, was relieved as SA DEPCOMTHD and CTF.116 by Captain R.E. Spruit, USN, on 18 August. Captain Spruit was in turn relieved of his duties as DEPCOMTHD and CTF 116 by Captain R.S. Moore, USN, formerly Chief of Staff, COMNAVFORV.
TRAN HUNG DAO IV

Action was again light on TRAN HUNG DAO IV waterways during August, but troops of the 32nd and 41st ARVN Ranger applied constant pressure to the enemy forces in the form of daily sweeps. COMCOSRON 5 was moved to Nam Can on 15 August and this gave the TRAN HUNG DAO IV Commander the distinction of being the only naval commander to control riverine, coastal and naval air assets, as well as ARVN Rangers. On 16 August the 32nd ARVN Rangers were relieved by the 41st ARVN Rangers.

Seawolf helicopters continued to plague the An Xuyen guerrillas and their NVA allies, as they flew 36 missions, killing five soldiers, destroying seven structures, 21 sampans, and nine bunkers. In addition, 28 structures, two sampans, and 18 bunkers were damaged.

The TRAN HUNG DAO IV AO combined forces accounted for 16 enemy killed, and one captured during 36 separate firesights. The ARVN Rangers handled the bulk of the action with rivercraft and naval air assets providing invaluable assistance. Their performance proved once more the value of the combined concept in riverine warfare.

The month of August saw two new units arrive at Nam Can;
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HQ9611 (ex U.S. YR-71), a PCF repair craft, arrived on 28 August and anchored in the Cua Lon just off the ISB. On 15 August, COMCOSFLOT 5 reported and initiated cloud operations on both sides of the Ca Mau Peninsula using 24 PCFs, six junks from CG 41, and three PGMs. Minor problems of messing and berthing were encountered due to the influx of more than 80 personnel.

There was one attempted mining on the Cai Nhap Canal at WQ 077 774 at 2345H on 18 August, when enemy sappers attempted to float a command detonated mine down on Americans of HCU-1 and VNN sailors attached to RID 46 at the salvage site of ATC HQ 5162. The sappers miscalculated and detonated the mine early resulting in no friendly personnel or material casualties.

The salvage effort was unsuccessful however, due to many material casualties occurring on the salvage craft and the sheer weight of the lift, which proved to be heavier than the equipment provided could handle.

Accidents continued to take an appalling toll in Nam Can as one VNN sailor, three LDNN, six ARVN and one civilian were wounded due to careless handling of firearms and grenades. The LDNNs were involved in an accident involving the probable premature detonation of a concussion grenade while fishing. The

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HCU-1 dewatering/demudding VNN FOM on the Cai Nhap Canal in the TRAN HUNG DAO IV AO, 29 JUNE 1971
six ARVN troops and the civilian were wounded by a fragmentation
grenade that was mishandled, and the VNN sailor was shot by a ship-
mate who was cleaning his weapon while both were on watch.

Seals of Team One, Detachment Golf, Oscar Platoon engaged
in two operations in August. On 2 August they had to abort a reconnaissance
mission due to low water in the Kinh Ngang, although they did
use the opportunity to set a 45 minute waterborne ambush that was
also unfruitful.

On 23 August at 1900H, LT Walsh led a patrol consisting of
five Seals, three Australian Air Service Troops, a guide, and one
interpreter, on an intelligence collection mission. Operating in
support of the group were two Seawolf and two Sealord helicopters,
and Black Ponies from Binh Thuy, along with an MSSC. The Seals
departed by MSSC, switched to sampans due to low water, and
inserted at VQ 868 604. They then walked 200 meters to a hootch
and the point man, interpreter, and team leader entered the hootch
and were immediately engaged by the enemy. Hand to hand combat
with ten VC ensued as both sides used fists, clubs and fishing stakes.
Following this brief but deadly encounter, the Seals moved toward
their extraction point which was rendered unusable due to tide
changes and enemy movement. They then patrolled 800 meters
to another point (VQ 856 570) and were extracted by Sealord helos. Seawolf and Black Pony aircraft covered the entire operation and gave excellent support. The Seals killed eight VC and probably killed two more. Air assets on the scene probably accounted for a few more, although they were unable to confirm any kills. Seal casualties were one broken hand and various cuts and bruises.

The VC again carried out harassment and intimidation of woodcutters to undercut GVN gains in pacification and population control. On one occasion on 12 August in the vicinity of WQ 070 670, woodcutters were accosted by 16 armed VC, warned to stay out of the area, and when two males tried to escape, one was killed and one was wounded. On 27 August a village chief from the Rach Buong Canal area reported four woodcutters had been abducted by the VC. At 2100H on the same day, the four men were found dead, floating in the Rach Buong, a VC warning to the woodcutters.
Activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO V AO was again light in August as the Communist insurgents limited their activities to sporadic attacks and ABFs against isolated outposts. CTG 216.1, Commander, TRAN HUNG DAO V, reported only three incidents involving his waterborne assets. Two of these were firefights resulting in the killing of three VC and the serious wounding of one VNN sailor; the third involved the destruction of a watermine. U.S. Navy HAL-3 Detachment 6 Seawolves flew 16 strikes in support of TRAN HUNG DAO V assets resulting in two VC killed. VAL-4 Black Ponies flew one strike in the AO with unreported results.

RPD 52 and RAGs 24 and 30, and RID 43 patrolled the Upper Saigon River during August, attempting to interdict VC infiltration from the Angel's Wing area of Cambodia. Just after 1200H on 5 August, three PBRs of RPD 52 in transit north sighted three VC crossing from the west to the east bank of the Saigon River (XT 651 313). The boats opened fire, killing the men and capturing several weapons and documents.

On 6 August, three PBRs on patrol sighted a contact mine and three packets of plastic explosives floating separately down the river (XT 545 350). The boats had apparently interrupted an
attempted enemy river crossing. The boats recovered the packets
and destroyed the mine, laying down a covering fire while they
worked. No return fire was received, and the boats continued on
their patrol.

On 10 August at 1410H, the insurgents struck back at the
boats. Eight boats of RAG 30 were attacked 12 miles northwest
of Phu Cuong (XT 664 264) with four B-40 rockets and automatic
weapons from the west bank. All rockets missed their mark, and
the boats returned the fire with unknown results. The boats remained
in the area, and again took small arms fire at 1440H, this time
seriously wounding a VNN sailor. A VNAF Dustoff Helicopter was
dispatched from Bien Hoa Air Base, reaching the boat 40 minutes
later, evacuating the wounded man. The boats then continued on
their assigned mission with no further incidents.

Early in August, Commander CTG 216.1 established a
command post/relay station at Song Lo, in the Mushroom area.
This outpost replaced the relay station at FSB Phuoc and was
designed to assist in command and control functions of TRAN HUNG
DAO V boats in the northern portions of the AO. The command
post also provided liaison functions with the 25th ARVN Division
troops in the area.
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In an incident not connected with naval assets of this AO, but indicative of the continuing struggle between the guerrillas and the GVN for control of the outlying areas of Vietnam, three squads of VC attacked and overran the outpost of Thoi Moi (XT544 024) at 0331H on the morning of the 21st. The outpost, manned by PFs and PSDFs, just barely 18 miles northwest of the capital city, was quickly surrounded by two squads of VC while the third managed to penetrate, resulting in three PFs killed in action, two PFs wounded, one PSDF killed in action, six PSDFs wounded, one assistant hamlet chief killed, and six M-16 rifles, seven M-1 rifles, 26 M-1 carbines, and two HT-1 radios captured by the VC. There were no known enemy casualties.

A day later, RID 44 boats picked up seven PSDFs and one PF soldier (vic XS 497 960), claiming they had been kidnapped during the attack and had subsequently escaped. Initial interrogation revealed the enemy had contacted one PF and two of the PSDFs prior to the attack. These eight individuals had been released by the VC with the understanding that they would assist the VC in a second attack on the outpost.
ENEMY activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO VI AO in August remained light as CTG 212.5 assets still failed to readily contact the enemy. The Commanding Officer, TRAN HUNG DAO VI, reported his forces engaged in five firefights, killing eight enemy soldiers while suffering no friendly casualties. U.S. Navy Seawolf helicopters of HAL-3 Detachment 8, placed 34 strikes for CTG 212.5, killing four enemy, probably killing 13 others, and wounding one. During these strikes, the "Wolves" destroyed four sampans, two hootches, and one bunker; and damaged nine bunkers and 15 hootches.

Commander, TRAN HUNG DAO VI, continued to be plagued by fires during August. During the evening of 1 August, several LCM-8s containing JP-4, moored at ISB Rach Soi, caught fire. The boats belonged to the U.S. Army 1099th Medium Boat Company, stationed at Binh Thuy; both manned by Vietnamese crews. The two boats were gutted, and, in addition, the conflagration destroyed six civilian hootches, five sampans, and three PBRs erroneously reported destroyed by the 7 July fire in last month's summary.

As if two fires in the space of a month were not enough, a fire broke out in the engine compartment of RPD 63 PBR, HQ 7765, while on patrol in Kien Giang Province, seven kilometers southeast
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of Rach Gia (WS 14 02). The fire was apparently started by a fuel line leak. The crew was unable to extinguish the blaze with a CO₂ extinguisher, so they flooded the engine compartment by opening the jet pump covers while simultaneously removing the craft's weapons and radios. Upon successfully putting out the fire, the cover boats pumped out the water and towed the stricken craft to ISB Rach Soi, where it was lifted onto repair skids. This incident marked the fourth PBR from Rach Soi put out of action in less than a month, none by enemy hands.
Activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO VIII AO continued to be light, with the far ranging and elusive enemy avoiding all contact. During the month of August, TG 217.1 units engaged the enemy on one occasion while participating in 16 troop movements or support missions for the 7th ARVN Division, and RF or PF troops. Twelve special missions were conducted that consisted of four POLWAR operations, five convoy escorts, and three miscellaneous operations. TU 217.1.1 supported Dinh Tuong and Kien Phuong joint operation "Tuong Phuong" centered around the Wagonwheel (WS 99 55) for the entire month. CTG 217.1 in command of boats and one RF company conducted clearing and sweep operations on the lower Kinh Xang for four days. A monitor of RAG 21/33 was the only casualty of the month when it was mined resulting in slight damage to the bottom.

The most potent ground activity was established by Seal Team One, Detachment Golf, November Platoon, as they conducted three clandestine operations interdicting the enemy's lines of communication. Three VC were killed and assorted ammunition and weapons destroyed or captured while numerous bunker complexes were rendered useless. While the ground war remained quiet, the combined assets of

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TG 116.8 and TU 116.7.7 continued to hammer at the suspected enemy strongholds. Taking advantage of their quick response and mobility, CTG 217.1 was able to provide some lucrative targets that resulted in 34 VC being killed; 37 bunkers, 27 hootches, six structures, and 12 sampans were destroyed.

Intelligence reports for the month indicated that VC MR II directives called for a highpoint in My Tho City to celebrate the 23rd year of the VC struggle for the reunification of Vietnam.

Although the GVN elections were scheduled, and various candidates were proclaiming their messages, enemy water sapper activity targeted against these elections was confined to a very few sporadic incidents.

The only waterborne casualty for the month was on 14 August when a monitor of RAG 21/33, while on a patrol of the Tieng Giang, was mined about 25 kilometers west of Dong Tam (XS 172 406). The mine detonated under the port quarter aft of the screw, resulting in slight bottom damage to the boat. No friendly casualties were reported. This was the first boat mining incident in this area since 1 January. It was possible that the 341st Sappers Battalion, last reported in this area on 24 July, was responsible for the attack.
In another unrelated development, a possible attempt to infiltrate the Dong Tam Naval Base occurred on 9 August when five men in National Police field uniforms were stopped at the main gate. On being questioned why they were on foot, a satisfactory answer could not be given to the gate guard and when identification was requested, it could not be produced. The gate guard immediately called for reinforcements and the five individuals disappeared. The NILO at My Tho stated that reports of VC intentions to recon and penetrate the Dong Tam Base have been frequently received. Several reports have indicated that VC penetrators are working within the base. (CNFV INTSUM 199-71).

Seal Team One, Detachment Golf, November Platoon, continued to interdict the enemy's lines of communication during the month. On 9 August at 1445H, Seals and Luc Luong 66s conducted a quick reaction mission to capture enemy supplies that had been located by recent intelligence, 12 miles northwest of Dong Tam (XS 281 584). Seals were inserted by Sealord helicopters after the Seawolves placed preparatory strikes in the area. The Seawolves remained overhead for support as the Seals destroyed hootches and bunkers and removed enemy equipment. The Seals then extracted, and after additional Seawolf strikes inserted approximately 12 miles
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west of their first insertion point (XS 083 590). The Seals again extracted enemy equipment after investigating the area and destroying structures and bunkers. The Seals inserted again approximately one and one half miles northwest of the first insertion (XS 263 595), and again destroyed bunkers prior to extracting with enemy equipment. The Seals then inserted the fourth time approximately one mile north of the previous insertion (XS 266 664), and after destroying bunkers in the area, extracted. Results of the operation were two VC killed; one AK-47, three grenades, five knives, ten kilos of rice, eight raincoats, and one steel helmet captured; six bunkers, eight structures and two sampans destroyed. The Seal patrol leader, Lieutenant J. J. Fletcher, received second and third degree burns in the palm of his right hand when a smoke grenade exploded prematurely while he was in the process of marking a spot for the helo extraction of the Seal team. Initial treatment was provided at the Third Surgical Hospital at Binh Thuy where the prognosis was considered excellent.

On 21 August at 1810H, the Seal team, acting on intelligence received from a Hoi Chanh, conducted a recon and interdiction mission against a VC commo-liaison station, 21 kilometers northwest of Dong Tam (XS 085 568). The Seals inserted by Sealord helicopters with the second squad inserting 250 meters...
northwest of the first squad. Upon insertion, the second squad sighted four armed VC evading in the area. The Seals initiated fire and Seawolves placed strikes resulting in one VC killed by the Seals. Both squads then searched the area with negative results, and then extracted.

On 28 August at 0845H, two squads of Seals conducted a mission against a possible VC grenade factory, [21 kilometers northwest of Dong Tam (XS 094 571)] which had been located by police intelligence. The basis of the intelligence were residents of the area who revealed that an explosion in a hut three weeks before killed three of four VC. The Seals, after insertion, sighted two VC in a large tree, and with the aid of the Seawolves, killed both. Upon searching a graveyard suspected as a VC cache area, barrels were unearthed containing B-40 rockets, grenades, and other assorted weapons. Results of the operation were two VC killed; two sampans, seven hooches, and two bunkers destroyed; 14 B-40s and boosters, 13 VC made grenades, 10 blocks of C-4, two AK-47s, and two M-2 carbines captured.

During the month, RPD 58, assigned to TRAN HUNG DAO XIX, furnished four PBRs daily for TRAN HUNG DAO VIII operations. The RPD 58 PBRs were utilized for night ambushes along suspected VC supply routes in the vicinity of XS 325 400.
During the month of August, the three Mekong convoys brought substantial POL stocks to Phnom Penh, which put the POL supply there at comfortable levels for the second month in a row.

Mekong Convoy TP-28 departed Tan Chau on 1 August at 2000H, and split into the usual fast and slow elements. The escort, consisting of one LSSL flagship, seven PCFs, 24 PBRs, four MNK PBRs, four ASPBs, and four MSMs, preceded and flanked the spread out and split convoy, composed of five merchant ships, seven tankers, three tugs, and six LCM-8s. At 0330H the next morning, one of the escorting ASPBs collided with one of the convoy vessels, causing the escort craft to beach. The craft was later taken to Tan Chau where it was soon repaired. The convoy experienced no delay, and arrived at the Cambodian capital city at 1440H, bringing 2,437 tons of general cargo and 1,437,000 gallons of POL. During the trip upriver, continuous airborne cover for the convoy consisted of a USAF FAC and fixed wing gunship, a USA C&C with two Cobras, and two Aero Scouts. USN Seawolf gunships and Black Ponies were on ground alert. Sixty one sorties were required to provide typical continuous coverage for the convoys. The return convoy, composed of seven tankers and
three tugs, with the same escort as the upriver convoy, departed Phnom Penh at 1120H on 3 August, and arrived at Tan Chau seven hours later without incident.

At 2110H on 12 August, Convoy TP-29 departed the Tan Chau staging area with four merchant ships, four tankers, three tugs, two ammo barges, and a general cargo barge, as well as the normal escorting force. At 0035H the next morning one of the ships developed engine trouble and anchored approximately one half mile south of the border at WT 205 050, awaiting daylight to return to Tan Chau. At 0235H, approximately seven miles north of the border at WT 225 180, the convoy was attacked with two B-40 rockets, which nearly hit one of the merchant ships. The unscathed convoy proceeded without delay, as the surface escorts broke the enemy contact with heavy suppressive fire. At WT 311 418, two hours later and three miles south of Neak Luong, the convoy was again attacked with four B-40 rockets and small arms fire. A tanker received one B-40 hit just above the waterline, resulting in only minor damage. The surface escorts returned the enemy fire, but the FAC was denied clearance for strikes as friendlies were in the area. The convoy arrived at Phnom Penh at 1250H, with 3,797 cubic meters of POL. The two attacks which occurred were considered typical of the enemy effort for the
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remainder of the high-water season, though the two previous
convoys had not been attacked. The return convoy, composed
of three merchant ships and three tankers, with the upriver escorting
force, departed on 14 August at 1155H and arrived at Tan Chau five
hours later without incident.

TP-30 departed Tan Chau staging area on 22 August at 1900H,
with six merchant ships, six tankers, five tugs, and assorted barges.
At 0600H the next morning, 24 miles southeast of Phnom Penh
at WT 223 652, the convoy was attacked with five B-40 rockets
prematurely fired at an ambush team of two PCFs. Thirty minutes
later a tanker was fired at with four B-40 rockets and small arms
fire; all rockets missed their mark. In the two attacks on TP-30,
the PCFs constituting the ambush teams again proved their worth.
One such team prompted the enemy to open fire early and reveal
their position prior to the arrival of the convoy. The enemy fired
their B-40 rockets during the second attack from maximum range
and hence were ineffective. USAF planes also made strikes, and
FANK swept the area. With no further contact experienced, the
convoy arrived at Phnom Penh at 1130H with 3,209 cubic meters
of POL. This sizeable quantity of POL kept the stocks at comfortable
levels in Phnom Penh. The delivery was made possible by the

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increased number of vessels available since the first of July, when the new contract with Telakhmer permitted the expansion of the convoy. The POL drought of April, May, and June appeared ended. Convoy PT-30, composed of three merchant ships, five tankers, six tugs, and four barges, departed Phnom Penh at 1130H on 24 August, and arrived untroubled six hours later at Tan Chau.

A NAVFORV intelligence report of 4 August reported that the French owners of the oil refinery at Kompong Som had not ordered the parts necessary to repair the refinery. Reportedly, the owners decided to keep the refinery inoperative until the physical security of the area improved to the point that the refinery could be operated without further risk of enemy damage, and until POL produced could be safely transported up National Route 4 to the users in Phnom Penh. The refinery, Cambodia's only one, had been attacked on March 1971, resulting in the destruction of several storage tanks and much of the piping used for transfer of POL products throughout the refinery.
The lull that persisted in July continued in August in the TRAN HUNG DAO XIX AO and although enemy initiated activity increased during the latter part of the month, it still remained at a low level. The highpoints of the month occurred on the 16th and 17th of August with the mortar attack on Ben Tre City on the former date, when a total of seven rounds fell near the center of the city, close to the MACV compound where the advisors are located. On the 17th, the Cai Cam Bridge, located between Ben Tre City and Mo Cay District Town was partially damaged by a suspected command detonated mine. Bridge traffic was closed, seriously hampering the daily commercial activity of the inhabitants.

TRAN HUNG DAO XIX waterborne units continued to support the ARVN operations during the month of August. No firefights were recorded and activity centered around support of the Kien Hoa Regional Forces. RAG 23/31 craft carried supplies from the Ben Tre Ferry Landing (XS 483 298) to Phuoc Long Fire Support Base (XS 531 222), and during the period were stationed on the Ham Luong (vic XS 152 400 - XS 540 205). RID 45 boats continued to support the Regional Forces on the West Bai Lai River and were stationed on the upper Giao Hoa Canal (XS 580 348). Coastal Groups 34 and 35 junks,
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in addition to their patrols, transported men and material of the
7th Reconnaissance Battalion, 10th Regiment, in their many sweeps
in and around the Phuoc Long Fire Support Base. RPD 58 PBRs
operated in both TRAN HUNG DAO XIX and TRAN HUNG DAO
VIII AOs. In the TRAN HUNG DAO XIX AO, PBRs of RPD 58
patrolled and were in WBGP on the Phu Huu tributary of the
Giao Hoa Canal (XS 575 344) and the West Bai Lai River (XS 586 346).

Most of the activity, as in previous months, has been provided
by the highly mobile and devastating Black Ponies of CTG 116.8
and HAL-3 Seawolves of CTU 116.7.9. They combined to
support each other on many missions and during the month flew
approximately 33 sorties, killing 48 VC and destroying 88 sampans,
81 structures, 49 bunkers, and 26 junks.

The most serious incident of the month occurred on 5 August,
when a Seawolf helicopter, responding to a call for help from a
Vietnamese outpost under attack, fired a series of rockets at
coordinates XR 826 935. As a result of a malfunction, one of the
rockets veered off course and out of the target area, killing two
civilians and wounding two. The target was cleared by LT COL Duc,
District Chief, and reaffirmed prior to the initial assault. Ground
observers reported that all other rockets were on target which was

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marked from the ground by tracer fire. An investigation confirmed that the rocket was defective, and the incident was closed.

During the month, intelligence reports continued to be received of impending high points of enemy activity, intending to disrupt the GVN elections. Two incidents, directed at the civilian populace seemed to confirm these reports. On the morning of 16 August, Ben Tre City received seven 82 millimeter mortar rounds from an unknown VC unit, wounding one National Policeman. This was the first attack on Ben Tre City in approximately three months. The other incident happened on 17 August when the Cai Cam Bridge (XS 468 287) between Ben Tre City and Mo Cay District Town received medium damage resulting from the explosion of a suspected command detonated, floating watermine. The bridge was closed to all traffic, severely restricting civilian travel. The disruptions during the month placed a heavy burden on GVN officials to protect the local populace.

The continuing infiltration of supplies into Kien Hoa Province was again the subject of an intelligence report, indicating that a company of VC from an unknown location in Kien Hoa Province was being resupplied with arms and ammunition believed to have been transported from the Long Toan Secret Zone (XR 73 72 and
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Previous Black Pony strikes in these areas had produced numerous secondary explosions. In another report, a Hoi Chanh recently provided information on the waterborne infiltration of supplies in Thanh Phu District. The source, a former member of the Ben Tre Rear Services unit, stated that weapons and ammunition came from North Vietnam by fishing junks, and were offloaded at the mouth of the Song Ham Luong (XS 83 01). The source further stated that when the junks reached the mouth of the river, a PRC 25 or Chicom K-63 radio was used to signal sampans ashore to come out and offload the junks. This was the first report stating that junks coming into this area had originated in North Vietnam. (CNFV INTSUM 199-71)
TRAN HUNG DAO XX

The TRAN HUNG DAO XX AO was characterized by continued very light activity during August. There were no naval firefights. U.S. Navy Seawolves flew 16 missions in the AO, mostly in support of VNN ranger battalions. The strikes resulted in 23 structures destroyed, one M-16 captured, and 24 enemy KIA (body count).

The NILO at Chau Doc attributed the low level of enemy activity to concentration on reorganizing and reestablishing bases that were destroyed by earlier ARVN operations in the Seven Mountains Area. Further credence was added to this theory by U.S. Army Intelligence which stated that most of the low lying areas between Nui Giai and the Nui O base area in Cambodia were inundated to a depth of three feet by seasonal floods. Therefore, the enemy had to seek new base areas and resupply points. Visual aerial reconnaissance observed several people carrying supplies up trails in the Seven Mountains Area.

The one noteworthy incident occurred on the evening of 11/12 August. Audio sensor activations vic. (VS 505 547) were observed by USN and VNN personnel. Although conversations were not discernable, several nationalities were identified. Immediate response by 155mm artillery was initiated at 2120H on 11 August 71. The TRAN HUNG DAO XX forces cleared the area to the
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south during the artillery barrage. Attempts to call a sweep through the area resulted in delay. A sweep was finally conducted at 0900H of 12 August 1971, nearly 12 hours after the artillery barrage. Because of the long delay, the artillery results were undetermined. The Senior Advisor to CTF 219.1 recommended that VNN junks carry reaction teams or return to base and pick up reaction teams when artillery response to sensor activity begins. Hopefully, this would cut sweep reaction time to a more acceptable three hours maximum.
TRAN HUNG DAO XXI

Naval engagement with the enemy in the TRAN HUNG DAO XXI AO was light during the month of August. Only four waterborne firefights and one mining incident occurred. Enemy casualties and damage were undetermined in all cases. The mining incident occurred on 25 August at 0045H at the Kien An OP Base. The sapper attack accounted for the only VNN losses of the month. Two RAG boats were sunk and two VNN sailors drowned.

On 8 August at 0832H, 12 miles southwest of Ca Mau, a U.S. Army LCU was hit a foot above the water line with one B-40 rocket. Damage was light. Escorting units of RAG 26 returned fire, but had to break off the engagement because of the proximity of friendly civilians in the area.

On 29 August at 0215H, the Kien An OP Base was attacked by fire with an estimated two B-40s/41s or launch bombs. The attack was suppressed by a combination of base defensive fire and four Seawolf strikes. Only minor damage was sustained on the base and enemy casualties were undetermined.

Salvage operations became necessary on 18 August, when a five ton truck from NMCB-5 collapsed the Kinh My Bridge (vic WR 643 243).
The truck was enroute from Binh Thuy to Ca Mau and loaded with steel plating. A CSB craft from TF 214 raised the bridge and truck on 21 August. ARVN engineers began reconstruction of the vital bridge. An interim pontoon bridge was employed at the crossing during construction of the permanent bridge.

A PMS class conducted 2-10 August at Ca Mau, utilizing USN maintenance advisors as instructors. The class consisted of nine VNN junior officers from units of both TG 210.1 and TG 210.2. The goal of the course was to train VNN instructors who would return to their commands and commence training their own crews. The areas of instruction included the purpose and goals of PMS and the preparation of schedules. Practical work was received by the students as well as demonstrations of specific PMS checks on ATCs, ASPBs, and Monitors.
On 1 August TRAN HUNG DAO XXIV was formed when TRAN HUNG DAO II split into TRAN HUNG DAOs XXIV and XXV, the boundary of MRs III and IV at XS 354 812. The TRAN HUNG DAO XXIV AO consisted of the Vam Co Tay River from the confluence with the Vam Co Dong River at XS 710 610 to XS 354 812, and the Vam Co Dong River from the confluence to the VN-Cambodian border.

The operation's assets included: RID 40 with 13 river craft, RID 44 with 14 river craft, RPD 53 with 19 PBRs, and RPD 54 with 20 PBRs. The four river divisions were disposed into five task units.

TU 214.1.1 at Ben Luc included 10 PBRs of RPD 53. TU 214.1.2 at Tra Cu included 14 river craft of RID 44 and nine PBRs of RPD 53. TU 214.1.3 at Go Dau Ha included 13 river craft of RID 40. TU 214.1.4 at Ben Keo included 10 PBRs of RPD 54. TU 214.1.5 at Tan An included 10 PBRs of RPD 54. The CTUs coordinated with friendly units in organizing ambushes, patrols, and joint operations. The operational zone had been defined to correspond with territory of MR II, making coordination clearer and easier. The operational commander for TRAN HUNG DAO XXIV (CTG 214.1) was CDR Già, and the SA was LCDR Gesswein, both at Ben Luc.

Enemy activity directed at naval units was low in the AO.
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for the month, as the enemy directed their efforts at local force displays of populace control for the August 30 elections. Naval units engaged in only one FRIFF, five ENIFFs, and 12 unilateral firings. USN Seawolves made all the kills for the month, with ten of the enemy KBA, 13 probably KBA, and 11 WBA. The Seawolves flew support missions for combined units over 15 times, scrambled over seven times, and flew intelligence targeted missions approximately 36 times. With their involvement in so many aspects of the fighting, it is not surprising that they dominated the tallies. The sensor system at Tra Cu had 151 sensings for the month. Of these, 75 were determined as targets, with 61 artillery responses.

At 1500H on 3 August, four kilometers south of Go Dau Ha at XT 398 205, a refueling boat and an ASPB of RED 40 came under fire from seven B-40 rockets and A/W and small arms fire, from an estimated seven enemy on the west bank of the Vam Co Dong. One of the rockets lodged unexploded in the hull of one craft, with two other rocket hits as well, but the boat incurred only minor damage. One VN sailor was wounded. Fire was returned, with unknown results. This was the first enemy contact with boats operating from Go Dau Ha in over a year.

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Seawolves started the month off well when, on 4 August, at 2105H, Seawolves of Detachment 4 scrambled while placing a strike on an intelligence target for Tra Cu. They placed three strikes in a two kilometer radius from XT 430 085, and received light automatic weapons fire from the area. Later sweeps confirmed that the Seawolves killed four of the VC and wounded 11, with four sampans destroyed.

Units of RPD 54 were sent to investigate information gathered from the local populace on the possibility of a VC crossing and arms cache on 5 August. At 1100H the boats arrived at the area of XT 150 431 and, upon searching found two B-40 rockets, six 82mm and two 60mm mortar rounds, five U.S. rifles, and 30 homemade hand grenades.

On 8 August, at 1905H, four miles northwest of Ben Luc at XS 573 776, two ATCs of RID 40, on a troop extraction mission to Ben Luc, were attacked with B-40 rocket and AK-47 fire. One ATC received two B-40 rocket hits resulting in light damage. Two PBRs scrambled from Ben Luc and Seawolves placed strikes on enemy positions with unknown results. Two RFs were killed in the ambush, two fell off the boats and were presumed drowned, while 18 RFs and two VNNs were wounded, as the rockets found their lucrative targets. The Seawolf scramble probably killed five of the ambushers. This was the second attack in nine days on boats operating in the
Eagle's Beak area of the Vam Co Dong. It was apparently an effort to break friendly interdiction of enemy infiltration of men and supplies.

On the morning of 10 August, two PBR's of RPD 53 on routine patrol were attacked with two rockets and small arms fire from the west bank of the Vam Co Dong approximately 14 kilometers northwest of Tra Cu at XT 412 105. No hits or casualties were reported, and the PBR's made firing runs with unknown results. This was the second attack of the month on boats operating on that portion of the Vam Co Dong between Tra Cu and Go Dau Ha, with little prior activity in the area. One hundred B-40 rockets captured on two separate occasions near Go Dau Ha indicated the enemy was well armed in the area and presented a definite threat to naval units on the Vam Co Dong.

On the afternoon of 13 August, three PBR's of RPD 53, transiting from Ben Luc to Tra Cu on the Vam Co Dong were attacked with two B-40 rockets and small arms fire at XS530 935. No hits occurred, and the boats continued their transit. About 40 minutes later, the same unit received two more B-40s and more small arms fire at XS 486 970, a position approximately seven kilometers upriver from the previous attack. The PBR's made firing runs and Seawolves placed strikes during both attacks, with unknown results. The previous day's ground sweep had been conducted by RF forces in the area in response to intelligence.
that enemy units were targeted against boats in that area. During the sweeps three RFs were killed by booby traps.

On 19 August at 1015H, eight miles east of Tuyen Nhon at XS 420 765, two PBR's of RPD 64 enroute to Tan An for escort duties were ambushed with seven B-40 rockets from the north bank, wounding three sailors. Both PBR's received light damage. Four PBR's scrambled from Tuyen Nhon to complete the escort mission and insert ground sweep troops.

On the afternoon of 22 August, a civilian boat traveling on the Vam Co Dong approximately four kilometers south of Tra Cu at XT 425 093 was taken under fire by three B-40s. Six civilians were wounded in the incident, and the boat sank. This was the first attack on a civilian craft operating on the Vam Co Dong since early March, when a ferry boat was attacked just north of Ben Luc. A connection with the elections but a week off would seem clear.

On 25 August, Seawolves of Detachment 4 scrambled for an RF unit in contact with the enemy at XT 423 118, five kilometers north of Hiep Hoa. Contact was still hot upon arrival at 2110H, and Seawolves placed multiple rocket and machine gun strikes, and contact was broken. Two days later the Seawolves of Detachment 4
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scrambled for VN ground troops at XT 439 132, in heavy contact with the enemy. The helos placed rocket and machine gun strikes, resulting in three KBAs and five probable kills.

Intelligence deduced the current enemy use of a known Vam Co Dong crossing point at the Horseshoe in the vicinity of XS 535 929. This area, within the Ben Luc AO, had not seen a night time patrol or WBGP in several months, and apparently the enemy had found the hole.

A C-3 evaluated agent report rated the strength of VC/NVA in the Cu Chi District as 70% of the TET 68 forces. Estimates for 1969 and 1970 were as low as 25%. Intelligence reports of heavy infiltration gave credence to the above figures.
TRAN HUNG DAO XXV

The TRAN HUNG DAO IX campaign was disestablished and TRAN HUNG DAO XXV was initiated as of 0800H on 1 August 1971. The AO for TRAN HUNG DAO XXV was established within the following limits; the Vam Co Tay River from a point 4.8 miles northeast of the Tuyen Nhon Operating Base to the Cambodian Border; and the Dong Tien Canal from a point 4.2 miles west of Phuoc Xuyen (XS 354 812), the Kinh Cung merging into the Kinh Lagrange, to its confluence with the Vam Co Tay River. The operational commander for TRAN HUNG DAO XXV (CTG 212.2) was LCDR Linh and the Senior Advisor was LCDR Cousins; both were located at Tuyen Nhon.

During the month of August, contact with the enemy was very light. VNN craft engaged the VC in only one firefight, which was initiated by enemy ambush, resulting in one PF killed and one wounded. Enemy casualties were unknown.

U.S. Navy Seawolves flew only four missions in support of TRAN HUNG DAO XXV forces, one of which was a scramble to provide close air support for the ambushed VNN craft. The results of the missions flown were: two sampans, three bunkers, six structures and two ammunition caches destroyed, and two VC killed.
The assets assigned to CTG 212.2 were RPDs 62 and 64. RPD 62 was based at Phuoc Xuyen, and was supported for both logistics and repair by ISB Cho Moi. RPD 64 was based at Tuyen Nhon and was supported for repair by MoBase II. RPD 64 and CTG 212.2 were both logistically supported by ISB Ben Luc.
The enemy in the Rung Sat Special Zone kept entirely on the defensive again during the month of August, keeping mobile and dispersed, and breaking down to platoon and company sizes (less than 30 men per company). For the tenth month the Long Tau Shipping Channel remained tomb quiet, as a combined effort of four separate forces kept the channel under the strictest surveillance. Rung Sat forces during the month accounted for 19 VC killed or wounded (eight body count, and 11 captured), five sampans and 36 bunkers destroyed; but suffered one RF killed and ten friendlies wounded. Among the items captured were: six kilos of medical supplies, four B-40 rockets, five mines and 20 mine fuzes, as well as assorted quartermaster gear. To an enemy with a problem getting supplies, these losses could be considered significant.

While five CHUONG DUONG operations were conducted during the month, results were not impressive. With the loss of the VNN intelligence officer, Dai-Uy Dan, in a helo crash in June, the intelligence net, which fell apart at his death, was finally getting reconstructed in late August. Hence the Rung Sat operations were not acting on the same intelligence level as previously. The airmobile/watermobile CHUONG DUONG operations
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are characterized by a series of quick Slick inserts of troops,
with waterborne elements acting in a blocking and support capacity.

During the first ten days of August, a different approach was
taken by RFs in a sweep operation in Can Gio District at the
bottom of the Rung Sat, 25-35 kilometers southeast of LSB Nha Be.
On a sort of peninsula, the finite parcel of essentially dry land
allowed five RF companies to sweep thoroughly across the area,
with VNN craft, including coastal junks, acting as a blocking force
on the adjacent rivers. On 3 August the RFs experienced their only
contact, which cost them one man's life, and three wounded. The
RFs were able to kill two VC in return, and captured four kilos
of documents, clothing and medical supplies. The craft participating
did not encounter any enemy breaking out of the net during the sweeps.
The operation was low-keyed, with small-scale units operating, and
the slogging methodical footwork of the RF troopers proved effective
in uncovering the proverbial needle in the Rung Sat's watery haystack.

In the early hours of 22 August, 36 Rung Sat PRUs were inserted
by Slicks 60 kilometers northwest of LSB Nha Be, clearly outside
their normal operating area, but acting on excellent intelligence.
They made numerous inserts and captured eight VC in their
sophisticated tunnel complex which had five entrances.

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The most recent shipping incident on the Long Tau Shipping Channel occurred on 1 November, 1970, and originated from an area outside the RSSZ AO. Since the incident, 2,865 ships have transitted the Long Tau safely. Prime factors for the quiet ten months on the channel have been: complete defoliation on both sides of the channel, USN Seawolf and PBR escort of each ship transitting, constant minesweeping, and RF units daily patrolling the entire length of the channel for two kilometers on either side. Clearly the enemy has been hard pressed to take any action, though a sapper battalion has been reported in the area.
The following was the disposition of the RAID units at the end of August:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RAID</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>CTG 210.1</td>
<td>Kien An</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>CTG 210.1</td>
<td>Kien An</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>CTG 210.1</td>
<td>Kien An</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>CTG 210.1</td>
<td>Kien An</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>CTG 210.2</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>CTG 210.2</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each RAID is composed of approximately eight ATCs, five ASBPs, two MONs, one CCB, and one REF. The RAIDs are reviewed in their respective operations.
The following was the disposition of RPD units at the end of August:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RPD</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>CTF 227</td>
<td>Cat Lai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>CTG 216.1</td>
<td>Phu Cuong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>CTG 214.1</td>
<td>Ben Luc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>CTG 214.1</td>
<td>Ben Keo, Tan An, Ben Luc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>CTG 218.2</td>
<td>Tan Chau, Chau Doc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>CTG 212.2</td>
<td>Moc Hoa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>CTF 228</td>
<td>Nha Be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>CTG 217.1</td>
<td>My Tho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>CTG 218.2</td>
<td>Tan Chau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>CTG 221.1</td>
<td>Hoi An /Thuan An</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>CTG 212.5</td>
<td>Rach Soi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>CTG 212.6</td>
<td>Phuoc Xuyen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>CTG 212.5</td>
<td>Rach Soi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>CTG 214.1</td>
<td>Tuyen Nhon/Moc Hoa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Binh Thuy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each RPD is composed of approximately 20 PBRs and is reviewed in the operation in which it operates.
The following was the disposition of RID units at the end of August:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RID</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>CTG 214.1</td>
<td>Go Dau Ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>CTG 218.2</td>
<td>Tan Chau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>CTG 217.1</td>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>CTG 216.1</td>
<td>Phu Cuong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>CTG 214.1</td>
<td>Tra Cu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>CTG 217.2</td>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>CTG 214.2</td>
<td>Nam Can</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>CTG 214.2</td>
<td>Nam Can</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>CTG 218.2</td>
<td>Tan Chau</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each RID is generally composed of approximately five ATCs, one MON, six ASPBs, one CCB, one Zippo, one REF, and one RECH. The RIDs are reviewed in their respective operations.
RIVER ASSAULT GROUPS

The following was the disposition of RAG units at the end of August:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RAG</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>CTF 228</td>
<td>Nha Be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>CTG 216.1</td>
<td>Phu Cuong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>CTF 210</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>CTF 228</td>
<td>Nha Be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Commander, Third Riverine Area</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>CTG 216.1</td>
<td>Phu Cuong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Commander, First Coastal Zone</td>
<td>Hue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/33</td>
<td>CTG 217.1</td>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/31</td>
<td>CTG 217.2</td>
<td>Vinh Long</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/29</td>
<td>CTG 210.3</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>Convoy Escort Fourth Riverine Area</td>
<td>Cat Lai</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each RAG is composed of approximately five ATCs, one MON, one ASPB, four CCBs and six LCM-6s. The RAGs are reviewed in their respective operations.
SPECIAL WARFARE

The following was the disposition of the Seal Detachments operating in a combat capacity throughout the country at the end of August:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Detachment</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Officer-in-Charge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Team One</td>
<td>116.6.2</td>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
<td>LT Fletcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det Golf November Platoon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team One</td>
<td>116.10.2</td>
<td>Ben Luc</td>
<td>LTJG Taylor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det Golf Quebec Platoon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team One</td>
<td>116.1.2</td>
<td>Nam Can</td>
<td>LTJG Walsh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det Golf Oscar Platoon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Seal units are reviewed in their respective operational areas.
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CTG 116.7

The following was the disposition of HAL-3 Detachments at the end of August:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Det.</th>
<th>Task Org.</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>116.1.1</td>
<td>Nam Can</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>116.9.1</td>
<td>Nha Be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>116.13.1</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>116.10.1</td>
<td>Ben Luc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>116.15.1</td>
<td>Chau Doc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>116.14.1</td>
<td>Phu Loi</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>116.6.1</td>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>116.5.1</td>
<td>Rach Gia</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>116.17.1</td>
<td>USS WINDHAM COUNTY (LST-1177)</td>
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Seawolf units are reviewed as a part of the operations in which they participate. A detachment usually consists of nine pilots and nine enlisted door gunners and two UH-1B helicopters. Only routine maintenance is done at the detachments; major tasks are accomplished at Binh Thuy, the "home" of the squadron.

In August the Seawolves flew 1944 missions of which 144 missions were in contact with the enemy; 44 enemy were killed, 192 structures, 151 bunkers, and 176 sampans were damaged or destroyed.
On 1 August, LCDR R. A. Rucks, USN, was relieved as OIC of Detachment Two by LCDR L. L. O'Neil, USN.

Three aircraft were lost permanently due to accidents and hostile action. One UH-1M model was lost on 28 August in an incident described in the 3rd CZ section of this book. Two accidents, one each at Binh Thuy and Chau Doc accounted for one UH-1M and one UH-1B. Three other aircraft received minor damage, but were returned to duty.

CAPT. W. J. Crowe, USN, SSSPCOMTHD, sent the following message to HAL-3 on the occasion of his relief.

"On the brink of departing Vietnam I would like to express my deep appreciation for the outstanding combat support which the officers and enlisted men of HAL-3 have consistently furnished to the TRAN HUNG DAO Campaigns. My close association with HAL-3 has been one of the highpoints of my tour in Vietnam and I have developed the greatest respect for your organization's courage and professionalism. Certainly your peerless reputation has been justly earned and has added an illustrious chapter to the annals of naval air.

Please extend again my personal thanks to LT Spence.
Robbins of Detachment 8 for his skillful airmanship. He was the Helicopter Aircraft Commander of Sealord 05 back in January when we were flying together and involuntarily landed in the U Minh Forest."
During August the "Ponies" flew 556 missions, killing 115 enemy and damaging or destroying 135 structures, 21 sampans, and 280 bunkers.

The "Ponies" most significant action of the month occurred on 11 August at 1610H in Kien Phong Province, where the 986 RF Company, while sweeping through the area, encountered a heavily defended treeline. OV-10 aircraft were requested and they struck using 5 inch rockets, 2.75 inch rockets, and machine gun fire, killing 24 enemy soldiers and contributing to the capture of various individual weapons and an 82mm mortar.

Commander R. W. Porter, Commanding Officer of VAL-4, (Light Attack Squadron FOUR), led a two aircraft strike in Vinh Binh Province on 30 August, resulting in seven enemy killed, two bunkers, and one structure destroyed. Two secondary explosions were noted by the airmen, and intense ground fire was received.

CAPT W. J. Crowe, USN, SA DEPCOMTHD, sent the following message to VAL-4 on the occasion of his relief:

"On being relieved as SA DEPCOMTHD I wish to express my deep appreciation to the officers and enlisted..."
men of VAL-4 for their major contribution to the TRAN
HUNG DAO Campaigns. The work of the ever-ready and
willing Black Ponies in the Delta has carved a niche in
history of which the U.S. Navy can ever be proud. It has
been a genuine privilege to work and associate with your
wonderful outfit. Please convey these sentiments to all
concerned and extend my best wishes to them for the
future."
based at Bien Hoa, Republic of Vietnam.

The OV-10 COW Counter Insurgency Aircraft used by C^n. 16 was
US MARKET TIME and VNN TRAN HUNG DAO XV Coastal Surveillance Forces maintained an effective barrier against sea-borne infiltration again in August. MARKET TIME forces inspected 961 craft during day and night patrols, boarded 12, and detained no persons during the month. US forces averaged two MSOs, one LST, three PGs, two WHECs, and one DE on patrol in August. In addition, MARKET TIME units USCGCs CASTLE ROCK and COOK INLET provided naval gunfire support on call throughout the month, destroying 23 enemy structures, 15 bunkers, and four sampans.

VNN TRAN HUNG DAO XV units inspected 22,692 craft during day and night patrols, a significant increase over last month's figures, probably reflecting the increased barrier efficiency provided by cloud operations. The VNNs boarded 8,965 junks, and detained 32 personnel.

MARKET TIME VP aircraft continued to fly the advancing patrols between the RVN coast and dangerous infiltration areas off MR IV. However, after 14 August, an especially high threat period for trawler infiltration was deemed to exist for the Vung Ro Bay and Hon Heo Peninsula areas of the Second Coastal Zone; therefore, VP aircraft flew an additional leg to the advancing patrol, allowing

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approximately 50 miles more coverage north of the area presently covered. VP aircraft continued to fly ocean surveillance air patrols (OSAP) north and south of the AP to satisfy the Seventh Fleet requirements in the South China Sea, Bashi Channel, and the Gulf of Thailand. During OSAP flights, trawlers were still reported as they would be on a MARKET TIME dedicated flight. Furthermore, additional VARS flights were flown in the Second Coastal Zone during the late evening and early morning hours during the threat period.

On 16 August, CNO, VNN, announced a new operational command agency called the Sea Operations Command. This command, to be fully established by 1 October and to be located at VNN Headquarters in Saigon, was to exercise direct control over sea and coastal forces in order to improve command and control of coastal surveillance operations. The Sea Operations Command was to be composed of naval units chopped from Fleet Command, coastal flotillas, and coastal groups. The numerical task force designator of the Coastal Force (TF 213) was to be eliminated and replaced with the following Sea Operations Command designators:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Commander</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TF 230</td>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td>CNO, VNN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cloud operations were progressing satisfactorily in all coastal zones throughout the month. A new cloud was formed off the Ca Mau Peninsula, replacing TU 213.4.3. This new cloud was designated TG 213.5 and was commanded concurrently by the TRAN HUNG DAO IV Commander at Nam Can. Elsewhere, throughout the coastal zones, the problem of inexperienced cloud OTCs was partially solved. An experienced officer was assigned as OTC of the cloud units in Coastal Zones III and IV. Coastal Zone I utilized a PCE/DER coassigned to MARKET TIME Area 2B as CTU, while Coastal Zone V used PCE/DER/HEC coassigned to MARKET TIME Area 8B as CTU. Coastal Zone II assigned COMCOSFLOT 2 as CTU 213.2.2 in reaction to the increased threat in MR II in the later part of August. This was the first time a senior and independent officer was assigned as cloud commander in Coastal Zone II.
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On 20 August, CAPT T.I. Kolstad, USN, relieved CAPT C.R. Quanstrom, USN, as CTF 115.
The emphasis of enemy activity in the First Coastal Zone was on watermining during the month of August. Because of the close proximity to the DMZ, highly trained North Vietnamese watersapper battalions can infiltrate rather easily into the First Coastal Zone. The following intelligence report concerns watersappers of the North Vietnamese 471st Naval Sapper Battalion presently operating in Quang Nam Province, however, the report gives a good picture of the watersapper and his activities throughout the First Coastal Zone.

All personnel received three months infantry training and six months watersapper training in North Vietnam. They can assemble and place: land mines against fortifications, command detonated mines; and water magnetic acoustic mines. All company and battalion level cadre have had previous combat experience in the South... Each man has his own snorkel, some grenades, a dagger signal flare, and five meters of nylon line. Each sapper cell is equipped with one AK-47 with a folding stock. Each company has one B-40 and one B-41 rocket launcher with three rounds for each. The battalion has a total of approximately 30 water pressure mines, and a 15 watt radio... Although seemingly poorly equipped, he [watersapper] is trained to be patient, and
calculative, and to use his ingenuity. He has been known to use mild, fear inhibiting drugs when attacking. Each sapper is trained to reconnoiter a target thoroughly before launching an attack. A healthy swimmer with good endurance can stay in the water many hours. Research has shown that about six hours in the water is the maximum time a swimmer will need and is able to stay in the water. He will conserve his weapons, even to the extreme of making practice runs using dummy charges. It is not uncommon for a team leader to observe a target for 30 days or more until he discovers a weakness in defences. In many cases an attack will not be launched unless an exploitable flaw can be identified to the satisfaction of the team leader. The professional sapper is not suicidal. The hours of 2300 to 0400 are often mentioned by PWs and Hoi Chanhs; but the team leader will choose an attack time when he feels the target is most vulnerable. The sapper will favor the path of least resistance to the target, and will use distance and currents to his advantage. His approach will be on the surface up to about 200 yards of the target even if he has scuba gear. Frequently, swimmers will use debris to cover their approach to a target ship or bridge and as flotation. Where there is heavy sampan traffic in the vicinity...
of an anchorage, mines may be transported to the target
by boat. This is accomplished by slinging the mine under
the keel of the sampan and proceeding as close to the target
as possible before cutting the mine free. This method can
also be used to lay a mine in a channel. A swimmer's
maneuverability is one of his greatest assets. Not only
can he vary his course of attack, but also he can dive, tread
water, hide behind anchor chains, rest on a ship's rudder,
etc. In addition, he can move through water with virtually
no propulsion noise. However, low water temperature can
limit his endurance. Night time underwater navigation is
exceptionally difficult. A swimmer is often hampered with
the ordnance and miscellaneous gear he must bring with him.
Water currents and anti-swimmer defenses can be a critical
element in the execution of an attack.¹

This, then is the enemy.

There has been little change in enemy activity in the riverine
areas of Quang Nam Province with 57 incidents reported during the
period 2 August-15 August: 26 mining booby trap incidents, 23 ABFs,
and eight terrorist incidents. However, only four incidents of any
note occurred along the Cua Dai River complex, comprising the

¹ 1st Coastal Zone Intelligence Officer PERINTREP 16-71 msg
dtg 091505Z AUG 71.

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Vietnamese Navy's CHI LANG I AO (TG 221.1). Units of Coastal Group 14 and RPD 60 continued to increase pressure on local enemy elements, by frequent PBR/junk patrols, and ground sweeps. On 10 August, a CG 14 reconnaissance helo, with the SA CG 14 embarked, observed a bunker/trench complex at BT 124 543. Increased activity at this site had been noted since mid-June. The site particularly posed a threat of 82mm mortar fire, since the city of Hoi An to the northeast was within the 4,000 meter range, as was the Ba Ren Bridge to the southwest. The site contained bunkers large enough to afford protection from counter battery fire, and the complex could be utilized in a coordinated offensive to cover for ground probes elsewhere in the area. The recon helo also observed numerous bunkers on both sides of the Song Thu Bon, (vic. BT 14 54, BT 13 53), and in the area of the "foot print" (BT 15 51), the helo observed bunkers with uniforms and equipment lying in the open. The helo then continued east to BT 212 503, turned north and received .51 caliber, small arms, and M-60 machine gun fire for a short distance. The helo again received fire at BT 206 530, and returned fire with its M-60 machine gun. The helo then continued on to the CG 14 OP Base, where it was thoroughly inspected for damage. None was found.
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On the afternoon of 12 August, two PBRs of RPD 60, with four LDNN Seals of Team One, Detachment Sierra embarked, spotted a sampan emerging from a small canal into the Song Ba Ren (BT 143 512), seven kilometers south of Hoi An. As the boats approached the sampan, they received small arms fire from BT 143 516, on the opposite bank of the Song Ba Ren from the canal mouth. The PBRs suppressed the fire with their .50 caliber machine guns. Meanwhile, the sampan's occupants scuttled their craft before the LDNNs could reach the scene. However, the occupants, two girls, were captured, along with some food supplies. On the return trip, the boats observed large red, white, and black signs along the west bank of the Song Ba Ren stating "This is VC controlled territory". The signs also contained threats of death to trespassers.

On two other occasions, during the early morning and late afternoon hours of 27 August, VNN LDNNs from CG 14, supported by RPD 60 PBRs, inserted on missions with uncertain results.

Enemy activity in the CHI LANG II AO, the Thua Thien Province waterways (TG 221.2), was light, with only one incident reported. On 31 August, a CG 13 sampan was damaged by some kind of mine while returning to base. There were no personnel casualties.

However, enemy activity in the CHI LANG III AO, the Cua Viet CONFIDENTIAL
complex (TG 221.3), was moderate, with 13 mining incidents and one possible incident reported. Of these 13 incidents, four involved mine recoveries, six involved harmless mine detonations, while three explosions resulted in the sinking of a MID 92 LCM-6 during sweep operations; in the damaging of a rock barge; and in the sinking of two civilian sampans. The probable incident involved a fisherman catching a mine in his net and then losing it again. VNN EOD divers had no success relocating the mine.

The enemy mining activity revealed no particular pattern occurring along widely separated segments of the Cua Viet. The most serious incident of the month occurred on 16 August when MID 92 LCM-6, HQ 1574, struck a mine at YD 265 625, destroying the craft. The detonation lifted the boat out of the water. The craft subsequently landed upside down in the center of the channel, and rested on the river bottom. The blast killed the three VNN crew members. The channel to Dong Ha was closed as a result of the incident, since the channel could not be swept in the vicinity of the sunk LCM. Later in the month, on 22 AUGUST, U.S. barge security force personnel observed an explosion at YD 340 698, three kilometers northeast of OP Base Cua Viet. The blast destroyed three civilian sampans and severely damaged two others. Nine VN civilians were slightly wounded.
Finally, on 24 August, at YD 343 698, one kilometer northeast of CG 11 OP Base, enemy sappers succeeded in exploding two limpet mines under a rock barge, guarded by NSF security force personnel. The guards saw no swimmers in the area, even though they employed starlight scopes, concussion grenades, and illumination, attesting to the skill of the NVA watersapper. The barge had two holes blown in the stern. Two U.S. security personnel received slight scratches from flying metal.

The effectiveness of MID 92 and CG 11 operations prompted the enemy to strike at the OP Base on 12 August. Shortly past midnight, U.S. security force personnel, guarding barges at the LST ramp (YD 343 698) were taken under fire by snipers. One USN sailor, SN Langston, was wounded in the stomach. He was evacuated in fair condition. In addition, at 2340H, CG 11 received one B-40 rocket round approximately 50 meters from the pier. The rock barge security personnel were singled out again, receiving eight B-40 rockets and heavy small arms fire from 10-12 VC on the north bank of the Cua Viet. RFs immediately swept the area, and during the process, one RF was wounded. Enemy casualties were undetermined.

During the month, OP Base Cua Viet took steps to strengthen its
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defenses against the swimmer threat with the installation of the
Argus II Anti-Swimmer System. The system was in full operation at
the month's close; however, an evaluation of its effectiveness is
still pending.

Elsewhere in the First Coastal Zone, several other coastal
groups were also having difficulties with sappers. On 15 August,
an incident occurred involving two CG 16 junks; the circumstances
surrounding the incident were somewhat shrouded in mystery. Yabuta
Junk No. 74 on patrol on the river near Sa Huynh (near MR II border),
anchored midstream sometime during the afternoon. The junk had a
number of detainees aboard; no one seem to know why the people were
being detained. Meanwhile, Yabuta No. 60 entered the river and
moored alongside the first junk about 1600H at BS 935 213, one
kilometer east of Sa Huynh. During the early evening hours, all
but one of the crew of No. 60 boarded the other junk, engaging its
crew in a card game. At about 2300H, a tremendous detonation
occurred, completely demolishing the after portion of Yabuta
No. 74 from immediately forward of the deck house. Debris
from the explosion caused extensive damage to the deck house and
moderate damage to the gunwales of Yabuta No. 60. Five VNN
and nine civilian detainees were killed and one VNN was wounded.

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The charge was evidently sapper emplaced, and illustrates the inherent danger of the somewhat prevalent practice among VNN units, whether they be junks or PBRs, of ceasing patrol and tying up together in order to cook food, converse, etc., thereby presenting excellent targets for sapper charges or B-40 rockets.
OPERATIONS IN THE FIRST COASTAL ZONE

DEMILITARIZED ZONE

CHI LANG III AO

CHI LANG II AO

CHI LANG I AO

LEGEND:

□ Coastal Surveillance Center
X Hostile Fire/Evasion Incident
# SAR/MEDEVAC Incident

SCALE:
0 NAUTICAL MILES 30
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SECOND COASTAL ZONE

The enemy continued to maintain a moderate level of activities involving sapper probes, ambushes, standoff ABFs, and terrorist incidents in the Second Coastal Zone during August. Harbor security against the water sapper threat continued to be of prime concern as enemy sappers succeeded in mining yet another large ship in Qui Nhon Harbor on 17 August. Sometime between the hours of 2100H-2300H on 16 August, a swimmer silently floated a 400 pound charge on the incoming tide from the south end of the De Long Pier. He secured the charge to the underside of the pier support structure and caisson approximately 300 feet from the north end of berth N-2. Two USA and two ARVN sentries failed to notice anything unusual. So did the PADD (Portable Acoustic Doppler Detector) watch personnel, who had been permanently positioned on a barge attached to the north end of De Long Pier for approximately two weeks prior to that night. The swimmer also slipped past VNN waterborne assets on patrol in the vicinity of the De Long Pier.

At 0130H of the following morning, a tremendous explosion ripped the stillness at the De Long Pier, and the SS GREEN BAY went down by the stern with a hole 15 feet high and 45 feet wide torn in her starboard side. The blast was so violent that some cargo was thrown through the skin of the ship on the opposite side.

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The mine detonation slightly injured three personnel: two Korean stevedores, and a crew member. The Seventh Fleet salvage vessel, USS CURRENT (ARS-22) arrived in Qui Nhon at 2200H on 17 August to commence salvage operations.

The sinking, the fourth involving major ships in Qui Nhon Harbor in the past 17 months, caused COMNAVFORV, CG USARV, and COMSCFE to conduct a review of harbor security conditions, and to tighten harbor security measures throughout the coastal areas of Vietnam. Some of the newly instigated procedures were:

- All MSC interest vessels were directed to steam at night near Qui Nhon;
- CG USARV intensified port security by bringing the number of security guards up to full strength and by increasing their training;
- Waterline lighting was to be installed at the De Long Piers;
- Physical barriers to block underwater entry into the pier were to be constructed.
- Daily inspections of the underwater area of the pier and of ship's hulls were directed, along with increased surveillance of all craft in the harbor.
- In addition, camels used at berths N-1 and N-2 were to be improved to permit better visibility of the water area between ships and the pier.
- Finally, all unauthorized craft were barred from approaching the pier closer than one kilometer.

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Events in Cam Ranh Bay also focused concern on harbor security there. At 0250H 25 August, sappers were sighted east of the Naval Air Facility; and at 0330H, NAF received four rounds of unknown ordnance, one round impacting 150 meters outside the west perimeter, wounding two USAF personnel. At 0340H, sappers attacked the Army Alfa Ammunition Area 10,000 yards north northwest of NSF, destroying three ammo pads and causing structural damage and numerous shrapnel holes in the roof of a covered storage area and the personnel living quarters. One Navy truck was also damaged by shrapnel. The explosions also caused minor damage to the Naval Communications Station, CRB facilities, with a resulting temporary loss of communications.

In view of the sapper threat, CG USARV requested that the USN EOD Team 36 remain at CRB as long as US port operations are conducted, and requested expedited delivery of four PADD sonar devices for anti-swimmer detection. In addition, because of the extremely large area encompassed by Cam Ranh Bay, points are particularly vulnerable to land sapper attacks. CTU 115.9.1 expressed concern for land security for Army Pier Five, presently protected against swimmer sappers by Project Short Time. 1

Elsewhere in the Second Coastal Zone, CG 23 seemed to take

1. CTU 115.9.1 msg dtg 141008Z AUG '71

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the brunt of enemy activity. During ambush operations on 1 August between CQ 159 878 and CQ 160 870 VNN personnel encountered the VC DK-9 LF Company. The ambush team called in air and artillery strikes, resulting in six secondary explosions. One enemy was wounded in the encounter. However, on 26 August, the VC struck back at CG 23 with eight rounds of 82mm mortar directed at the base from CQ L 50 850. Friendly forces returned fire with 105mm artillery and 81mm mortars. No friendly casualties were reported. However, the VC struck again at 1000H on 27 August when a CG 23 2 1/2 ton truck, returning to base from Nha Trang, was ambushed at CQ 268 230 by a command detonated laymore mine, killing one VNN and wounding another. There were no enemy casualties.

Second Coastal Zone cloud operations experienced a few difficulties during the month. On 31 August, Commander, Second Coastal Zone, expanded the northern cloud area to include areas 3H and 4D in addition to areas 31 and 4C. Three additional PCFs were detailed to support the northern cloud and a new task organization was instituted. CTU 213.2.1 (northern cloud commander) was put in charge of two task elements, TE 213.2.1.1 and TE 213.2.1.2, each consisting of three PCFs. The efficacy of the clouds were threatened.
however, when the Second Coastal Zone Commander removed all Yabuta junks from cloud operations at the direction of higher authority and returned them to routine patrol in all areas. This action reduced the northern cloud by four units and the southern cloud by three units. In another action, PGM 605 was transferred to the Third Coastal Zone, leaving the Second Coastal Zone with only two PGMs with which to conduct all cloud operations. This left the unsatisfactory situation with one PGM as cloud unit commander and one PGM generally in port/transiting to station. One cloud must then serve under the control of a WPB commanding officer, generally too inexperienced to handle the job. Furthermore, the Second Coastal Zone was not able to utilize any VNN outer barrier units to act as cloud commander as do some of the other coastal zones.
OPERATIONS IN THE SECOND COASTAL ZONE

LEGEND:
☐ Coastal Surveillance Center
☒ Hostile Fire/Evasion Incident
(#) SAR/MEDEVAC Incident

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THIRD COASTAL ZONE

The major interest in the Third Coastal Zone during August was again the interdiction of enemy coastal transshipment operations between the VC secret zones off the mouths of the Mekong. On 7 August, the Senior Advisor, CTU 213.3.1 (cloud) was designated CTG 116.17, with tactical mission control of HAL-3 Detachment 9 (TU 116.7.9), which assumed the additional designator TU 116.17.1. The air operations with the cloud units were proceeding smoothly throughout the month; US Navy Seawolves placed 33 strikes in support of Third Coastal Zone cloud operations, destroying 48 sampans, 11 junks, 12 bunkers, two hootches, and six other structures. In surface operations, TU 213.3.1 searched 9,576 water craft throughout the month.

Since the implementation of the Cloud Concept in the Third Coastal Zone two months ago, results of surface units appeared mixed. The small numbers of suspicious boats and people detained relative to the high number of people and craft checked daily seemed to indicate that the enemy water traffic was successfully evading the cloud. The ability of patrol craft to rapidly respond to suspicious craft (e.g. intelligence from VARS flights) improved, but communications between the CTU and craft on patrol still appeared marginal at best. 1

1. III CZ IO msg dtg 260210Z AUG 71

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However, the cloud surface unit operations represented incursions into heretofore untouched VC sanctuaries, and were bound to take their toll on the enemy eventually.

Despite their excellent results in the VC secret zones, US Navy Seawolves had their difficulties throughout the month. At 0700H on 1 August, Seawolves on dawn patrol detected a large junk at XS 955 200, well within a known VC infested area, heading out of the area toward the open sea. Contact was reported to the US advisor at Binh Dai District Headquarters and attack clearance was granted from the district TOC by the District Chief and his US advisor. The junk was attacked at XS 969 191 still on an inland waterway in a 24 hour restricted area. The junk continued to evade seaward until 50 caliber hits in the cabin area caused a secondary explosion. The junk went dead in the water at XS 965 160 in coastal waters. Seawolves ceased fire and called COSFLOT 3 PCFs to board and capture. The PCFs arrived in the area within two hours after the initial attack and towed the junk to District Headquarters. Shortly after the Seawolves ceased fire, a small sampan approached the junk from the south. The sampan stopped and anchored after warning shots were fired ahead of the craft.

During this period, h-lo crews noticed the occupants of the junk bailing or discarding material over the side. Two men aboard the
junk were killed, one was wounded, and three were unharmed. All the men were of the age group 18-28. One man did not possess a military I.D. card. After interrogation by the Binh Dai Police, the men were released as fishermen. Subsequent investigation of the incident reaffirmed that the proper clearance procedures were followed. However, in order to limit the possibility of engaging innocent civilians, as happened in this incident, the Rules of Engagement (ROE) for armed helicopter operations were modified on 7 August to allow engaging waterborne craft on inland waterways only after being positively identified as hostile and, having clearance granted by the Province Chief, District Chief, Sector Commander, or Subsector Commander, and US/FWMAF/RVNAF battalion or higher commander. During the hours of announced curfews, any waterborne craft on inland waterways may be engaged after clearance, as above, has been granted. A few days later, on 5 August, Detachment 9 Seawolves again became involved in an incident in which a stray rocket killed two and injured two civilians. The incident is covered under the TRAN HUNG DAO XIX section of this month's summary.

Bad luck continued to haunt Detachment 9 Seawolves in August as

1. COMNAVFORV msg dtg 070808Z AUG 71

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they lost one of their aircraft on the 28th. At approximately 1500H, two helos were returning to their home base (WINDHAM COUNTY LST-1170) after a combat patrol. The helos left the beach for the ship with approximately 350 pounds of fuel remaining in each aircraft. The LST became obscured by a thunderstorm cell, and due to the helos' low fuel state, they returned to the beach at XR 704 775 and landed. The helo crews immediately set up a defensive perimeter and radioed for fuel, one aircraft had only 150 pounds of fuel remaining, while the other had 200 pounds. After approximately ten minutes time, the crews began taking small arms fire. The crews returned fire with personal weapons and door guns for five minutes while restarting engines. Aircraft 000610 took off and got approximately 100 meters off the beach, lost all power, and made a controlled ditching in a river. The aircraft sank, all crewmembers exiting safely. The crew remained in the water trying to avoid small arms fire from the beach. The other helo observed the ditching and landed on a mudflat above water in mid-river (XR 785 720), and unable to assist the other crew further due to the fuel situation, radioed for help. At 1552H, Detachment 7 Seawolf gunship 70 and Sealord Slick 07, with a Seal squad from Dong Tam embarked, scrambled to assist the stricken helos, along with Black Ponies from Binh Thuy. Seawolf 70 arrived at the scene at 1600H and took all crewmen from the river over to the
mudflat. Sealord 07 arrived at 1605H, placing the Seal squad on the mudflat to provide security for the remaining helo 015077. Crewmembers from the ditched helo were transferred to the Sealord and taken back to Binh Thuy. Meanwhile, fuel arrived and helo 015077 was refueled and flew back to the LST without injury to its crew or damage to the aircraft. The five crewmembers of helo 000610 sustained minor injuries in ditching. All were treated at Binh Thuy. The following day, the ditched aircraft was deemed non-salvageable and was destroyed by EOD personnel.

In miscellaneous incidents throughout the Third Coastal Zone, the Polish merchant ship JASTARNIA BOR, four miles south of Vung Tau, requested a medevac for a seriously injured crewmember. A U.S. Army PBR with a medical team embarked, rendezvoused with the merchant and evacuated the man to the First Australian Logistic Hospital, Vung Tau, for surgery. The man was later transferred to the U.S. Army 24th Evacuation Hospital at Long Binh.

Also, on 30 August, the SS SEATRAIN OHIO experienced a mine explosion in Vung Tau Harbor, while anchoring. The explosive device was on the bottom in 9 fathoms of water, not attached to the ship. No damage resulted to the vessel.
FOURTH COASTAL ZONE

A major reorganization took place in the Fourth Coastal Zone when on 15 August, a new southernmost cloud, TG 213.5, was established at the Naval Base, Nam Can, concomitant with the disestablishment of TU 213.4.3. The TRAN HUNG DAO IV Commander, CTG 214.2, CAPT. Thieu, VNN, became double hatted as CTG 213.5. CDR Luat, VNN, COMCOSFLOT 5, became the task group's deputy commander, and CDR H. V. Shores, USN, became Senior Advisor, CTG 213.5.

The new task group was to use primarily COSFLOT 5 assets and staff, and was to consist of a northern and a southern cloud under the tactical command of a PCE/HEC commanding officer, designated CTU 213.5.0A. The northern and southern clouds were initially composed of one PGM and two PCFs each; the senior officer of the northern cloud was designated CTU 213.5.1 and was responsible for the patrol of the Cua Ganh Hao on the eastern side of the Ca Mau Peninsula, while the senior officer of the southern cloud was designated CTU 213.5.2 and was responsible for patrol of the Rach Duong Keo at the southern tip of the Ca Mau Peninsula. Both of these officers were under direct tactical control of CTU 213.5.0A. Furthermore, as an aid to communications, the SOLID ANCHOR NOC at Nam Can was integrated into the Coastal
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Surveillance Communications System, in order to provide quick reaction by the cloud unit to timely intelligence.

In miscellaneous incidents throughout the Fourth Coastal Zone, the air strip at An Thoi was temporarily closed due to damage sustained by the runway matting when a C-130 aircraft landed the morning of 9 August. A Seabee team arrived the same day to effect repairs.

On 20 August, LT. M.S. Doctor, USN relieved LCDR D.G. Jessel, USN as the Fourth Coastal Zone Intelligence Officer.

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OPERATIONS IN THE FOURTH COASTAL ZONE

SCALE:

0 NAUTICAL MILES 30

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85
U.S. Navy PSYOPS efforts in Vietnam can be broken down into two broad categories: PSYWAR, encompassing all propaganda operations targeting the enemy and his infrastructure and those operations to gain the sympathies of the civilian populace; and VNN Welfare, encompassing a variety of programs such as the Food Supplement Program (pigs and chickens and fishing programs), the VNN Sister Ship and Buddy Base Program, the Dependent Shelter Program, and Project Handclasp.

Of these two categories, the latter is deemed the more important. The aim is to improve the living conditions of the VNN sailor and his dependents, and thereby, to improve his morale and willingness to prosecute the war. For example, the Food Supplement Program is designed to help supplement the diets of the Vietnamese with pigs, chickens, and fish. There are now 146 pig projects going at 49 bases. The chicken program is the most popular with the demand already over double the supply. A VNN unit begins this program with a free pilot shipment of 200 broiler chickens and/or two gilt pigs and six bags of feed. The Vietnamese must build their own pens and coops and care for the animals. After the pilot program is started, each additional animal must be paid for. As an indication of the success
A Vietnamese sailor "spoon feeds" a Cuu Long pig while its hungry pen tries to nose in.
of the chicken portion of this program, 25,000 broiler chickens
and 3,000 layer chickens were distributed on 11 August to VNN
units from the Delta to the DMZ. These agriculture, fishing, and
animal husbandry programs are designed to become self-sustaining
VNN projects. The U.S. Navy is therefore training VNN personnel
to assume management of these programs in the near future.

Another VNN Welfare project is the Sister Ship/ Buddy Base
Program. Each VNN unit has been assigned either a sister ship
or buddy base back in the United States. There are now 57 U.S.
bases participating in the program. The VNN units send a list of
badly needed items which the buddy base/sister ship attempts to
obtain for them. Items often requested include personal items such as
sheets, pillow cases, travel bags, men's clothing; office supplies;
furniture for dependent housing; athletic equipment; and mess hall
utensils and equipment. Fourteen bases have already sent shipments;
numerous bases are presently preparing their first shipment.

The Vietnamese Navy also derives aid from Project Handclasp.
This is a basic aid program for the Vietnamese with the VNN receiving
such badly needed items as kitchen utensils, school supplies, health
items, clothing and recreational equipment.
Vietnamese Navymen cut wood for door and window frames during construction of dependent housing units at Cat Lai.
Another project, the Dependent Shelter Program is a very important part of the VNN Welfare Program. In June, 1970, the Secretary of Defense formalized a plan whereby the U.S. would provide support, essentially in the form of construction materials and technical supervision, for the construction of 100,000 dependent shelters at the rate of 20,000 units per year over a five year period (1971-1975). The VNN/VNMC allocation was subsequently determined by JGS/MACV to be 2,000 units per year. A cost of $600 per unit was applied to the overall program. These units were to be built by Seabees, by VNN self help; and by lump sum and labor service contracting. However, the continued Seabee withdrawal from Vietnam and the limited VNN participation in the program due to operational and higher priority commitments, left contracting the best hope for meeting the new FY 72 Dependent Shelter Program goal of approximately 5000 total units. To date, the Seabees have completed 2528 units and are tasked to complete 972 additional units using labor service contracts to assist for 657 of these. Lump sum contracts will probably be used to complete the remaining 1500 units.

In August, the Seabees of CBMU 302 finished construction of the dependent housing at Rach Soi. By the end of the month, 26 families had moved into the new construction, with 10 more preparing to move.
The Seabees accomplished the main construction with the Vietnamese providing touch up work.

In the field of PSYWAR, as of 3 August, all Beach Jumper detachments ceased operations. All personnel and equipment was transferred to Binh Thuy. During the remainder of August, all BJU PSYOPS equipment underwent maintenance and then was turned over to the U.S. Navy POLWAR advisors throughout Vietnam, primarily in the Delta. Also during August, ATF 211 assumed POLWAR advisory responsibility for Ca’Mau, as well as Dong Tam, until the construction of ISB Ca Mau at which time a POLWAR advisor will be assigned to Ca Mau. The POLWAR advisory responsibility there was formerly held by SA RIVPACMD.
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ACCELERATED TURNOVER PROGRAM AND TRAINING SUMMARY

The month of August did not show great strides in the ACTOV Program, as ten of the support bases were busy preparing for turnover in September. However, ten logistics and support craft were turned over during the month, with 86 craft remaining, as 110 craft had already been turned over.

On 20 August, two LCM-8s, one a minidock, were turned over to the VNN LSC at DaNang. On 31 August a utility boat was also turned over at DaNang, and an LCM-8 minidock was turned over in "as is" condition, with overhaul repairs by the USN due to occur in the following three months. Again at the end of the month, the Logistic Support Base at Nha Be witnessed the turnover of six craft, including an LCM-8, an LCM-3, three LCM-6s, and an LCM-3 (pusher). The last of the USN LCM-8s for turnover was transferred at Nha Be.

Outside of the logistics arena, two Army PBRs and their portable support facilities were turned over to Harbor Defense at Cat Lai on 23 August. They kept their previous mission of waterborne security for Cat Lai Harbor area, but dropped the mission of armed escort for ammo barge tows. The Army kept the latter mission for the while, until a sufficient number of boats would be

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turned over to the VNN for them to assume the ammo escort mission.

On 18 August the U.S. Navy turned over the second in a series of ACTOV RAD radar sites it is building for the VNN. Located atop Monkey Mountain overlooking DaNang Harbor, the site is part of the network of radar stations which will eventually cover all of the 1,200 mile coastline of South Vietnam. The sites function as an early warning system against enemy attempts to infiltrate men and supplies from the sea. Naval vessels supplement the system by responding to calls to intercept and identify suspected vessels.

ACTOV RAD Site #2 has three American naval advisors on hand; otherwise, it is manned and operated by Vietnamese sailors.

During the Vietnamization of the naval war in Vietnam, the Vietnamese have been undermanned and undertrained for the tasks newly allotted them. Despite this handicap, they have proved sufficiently capable of meeting ACTOV deadlines, while the numerous schools continue to remove the deficit of trained men. On 12 August, at the Saigon Naval Training Center, 39 VNN LDOs were graduated in Class 6/70, with RADM Chon presiding. On 19 August, 69 graduates of Tran Hung Dao Class XI were graduated in Saigon with Commodore Tanh, Deputy CNO, VNN, presiding.

A total of 673 personnel have successfully completed the OCS
training program thus far out of a planned total of 750. On 27 August the OCS Class XII graduated at Newport, R.I.

The Naval Training Center at Cam Ranh Bay graduated 591 enlisted personnel from several schools during the month. 19 August marked the graduation of Petty Officer Class 2C/71, with 275 students. Recruit Class 79, with 306 students, graduated on 25 August. Class 4C/71, with 160 students, graduated on 27 August. Since VNN personnel are generally serving for the duration of the war, the new personnel assets can be considered to be filling gaps already existing in the Navy, as they rarely have to serve as replacements.
NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY, SAIGON

The VNN supply system received adrenalin from various U.S. Naval Advisory ideas during the month: The new VNN Field Supply Procedures were disseminated for implementation at the support bases; stock purification projects were completed on some bases; two more logistics support base supply departments were turned over in August; while requisition backlogs were eliminated by a new Delta trucking contract. The Accelerated PBR and RAC Overhaul Program, in its second month, was already slipping on the ambitious deadlines set, but the facilities were achieving notably beyond expectations.

The Accelerated River Patrol Boat and River Assault Craft Overhaul Program ambitiously programmed the VNN repair facilities to overhaul all rivercraft by 31 March 1972; one half of the rivercraft are scheduled to be repaired at the onset of the dry season in October. This required the systematic overhaul of 289 PBRs and 215 RACs. To complete the program, a total of 504 boats, or almost one-third of the total VNN floating assets, had to be overhauled by the end of March 1972. This entailed 56 overhauls every month, or two per day. It was planned to overhaul each PBR in 15 days, and each RAC in 45 days. In addition to the overhaul project, the repair facilities were still tasked with performing restricted availabilities and overhauls of U.S., Cambodian, and Thai craft. The overhaul effort came very
close to absorbing the total repair capability of the ISBs and LSBs concerned.

The overhaul program plowed through its second month, with slippage in deadlines already apparent, as many boats required something closer to "remanufacture" than to "overhaul". Still, the achievement of the repair facilities throughout the Delta was notable. At LSB Binh Thuy the advisors and the VNN sailors were both working overtime on the project. After specialists in fiberglass and wood hull repair, engine, pump, weapons, and electronics repair finished their jobs, the vessels were essentially like new. The VNN enginemen at the Binh Thuy shop rebuilt patrol boat engines to within tolerances of new engines (from 3 to 5 thousandths of an inch), an effort comparable to that of the American advisors. SA RPD 62 msg 060903Z AUG 71 cited the achievement: "The first PBRs...returned from overhaul at Binh Thuy on 31 July 1971 and were inspected on 02 August 1971...It is gratifying to originator that all five boats were in perfect material condition. The overhaul was complete and of excellent quality. Not one discrepancy was noted during the inspection. The advisor who remained with the boats during the overhaul reported that he received excellent cooperation from both the Vietnamese Navy repair organization and the Repair advisors.... It is a pleasure to observe
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the results of the excellent workmanship." DEPCOMTHD noted with concern that the deadlines were slipping at LSB Dong Tam by 18 August. Since initiation of the program, Dong Tam had completed 12 river boats and six PBRs, though their pace should have turned through 15 of each. Deadline slippage was a reality everywhere, and it was not without good reasons. At LSB Nha Be, for example, the repair department was manned at 57% of allowance, while the rest of the base enjoyed 100% manning levels. When Nha Be was a U.S. Naval Base, there were over 350 Americans at the repair facility, and overhaul of a PBR was scheduled for 30 days of work by these trained personnel. The undermanned and undertrained VNNs are now expected to tackle the same boat in one half the time. The Americans are helping now, with 90 advisors in the department at Nha Be remaining, but by January the withdrawals will sap their strength to 40 men. To overhaul both engines, both Jacuzzi pumps, and to take out all the electrical gear, all with a two week deadline, would be asking much in the best of circumstances. The overhaul program was begun with the understanding that its deadline was only marginally feasible, and with the improved supply support appearing, as well as some heartening VNN enthusiasm, the program appears to be headed for meaningful results.

On 2 August the Vietnamese National Railways began a regularly
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scheduled contractor operated a trucking delivery service to the LSBs and ISBs in MRs III and IV. This service operates on a seven day schedule and transports material from Saigon to the LSB/ISBs. All backlogs for Delta bases were thereby eliminated.

The rewarehousing and supply record improvement pilot project begun at LSB Dong Tam on 9 July was completed on 6 August. At the completion of the stock purification project, the new VNN Field Supply Procedures for LSB/ISBs were implemented following a week of training. As a fitting conclusion, the Supply Department was turned over to the VNN on 6 August. The same series of events occurred at LSB Binh Thuy, culminating with turnover of the Supply Department there on 18 August, and bringing the total VNN operated Supply Departments to 12 (4 LSBs/8 ISBs).

The VNN Field Supply Procedures for LSB/ISBs were distributed on 6 August during a joint USN/VNN Supply Conference in Saigon during which VNN supply officers and USN supply advisors were given instructions on the new procedures. Implementation was expected on all bases by 26 September, 1971. The procedure will be implemented following a week's on-site training by a USN/VNN Field Assistance Team (FAST) at each base. Instruction in the new Field Supply Procedures for SKs was begun on 27 August at the VNN Supply

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Center. These regularly scheduled formal classes include the use of a mock-up storeroom and issue control office. Eventually all VNN Supply Officers and SKs will be trained in this course prior to reporting to their duty stations.

Mechanization of stock control operations at the VNN Supply Center was completed on 24 August, three months ahead of schedule. This provides for the first time a single, efficient issue/receipt processing cycle which can be completely monitored and controlled by VNNSC management.

A review of existing Intermediate Support Base repair part load lists revealed they were inadequate. As a result, new Initial Outfitting Lists (IOLs) were developed. Each ISB had a demand based IOL tailored to its current boat population. Stock deficiencies were being corrected at all bases. By 31 August, over 93% of the IOL material was in country. Remaining deficiencies were ordered from CONUS. On 18 August the project to merge VNNSC Brown Water repair parts with USN parts at the Navy Newport facility was completed and all Brown Water parts were taken up on stock records of NAVSUPPACT Saigon. All Brown Water repair parts at Navy Newport will be turned over to the VNN in the near future.

On 10 August the USS ASKARI (ARL-30) outchopped from LSB
Dong Tam for Subic Bay, leaving NAVSUPPACT after having served in country since February 1967. The ASKARI received the Presidential Unit Citation and the Navy Unit Commendation for her support and repair of allied units throughout the Delta. The repair ship's crew were also good-will ambassadors to the people in the villages along the way, as they were free with gifts of food, clothing, and medical treatment.

NSAS support ships deployed during the month were as follows:

- USS WINDHAM COUNTY
- USS ASKARI (ARL-30)
- USS SATYR (ARL-23)
- USS TUTUILLA (ARG-4)
- USS KRISHNA (ARL-38)
- USS BRULE
- APL-21
- APL-30
- YRBM-21
- YF-866
- PBR MoBase II
- MAUNA KEA (AE-22)

Coastal support
Dong Tam (10 August outchop)
Long Xuyen
Nha Be
Binh Thuy
Delta resupply
Nha Be
Nha Be
Tan Chau
Nha Be, Dong Tam
Tan An
MR I

The Drug Rehabilitation Center on APL-30 at LSB Nha Be continued in its last month as a rehabilitation center. On 25 July the decision was made that when the NAS Miramar Hospital was ready, in a month, the rehabilitation phase of the drug program would be shifted there. On 25 August the rehab program began phasing out of the Nha Be center. The reasons were that the village outside of the base made access easy to the hard drugs, and the habitability on the APL
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was marginal, with plant breakdowns frequently denying flushing water, electricity for light and air conditioning, and fire pressure.

During the month there were 49 admissions to the rehab center from the five detoxification sites throughout Vietnam. Though the length of stay varied considerably according to each unique case, the average stay was about 40 days. Twelve of those persons admitted were considered fully rehabilitated and sent back to units in Vietnam. Eleven were sent to Miramar Hospital for psychiatric rehabilitation, nine of these for further transfer as rehabilitated, but not considered fully stable to remain in Vietnam where access to hard drugs was so easy. The rest of the 49 men were sent to Miramar for further rehabilitation. The entire staff at the APL 30 were considered counselors in their own right, and the program stressed non-definitive counseling, to maintain a positive attitude while voluntarily abstaining from drugs. This involved approach yielded the results that USN amnesty personnel returning stateside, were never involved in the aggressive outbreaks not uncommon with the drug users from other services.

After the mid-July statistical high (80 persons were on the APL-30, while about ten persons were at the detoxification centers elsewhere in-country), the trend was sharply curtailed. In August, the number
of persons entering the program was cut in half. The Navy's drug problem remained considerably below the Army's, though a glance at the number of persons at detoxification centers at any one time would appear otherwise. This was due to the fact that the Army was keeping their men at the centers for five days, while the Navy sent all their drug cases to the APL-30 for an average of 30 days.

On 21 August, RADM W. R. Dowd, Jr., S. C., called into country in June to assist in training and upgrading the VNN supply systems, visited the LSBs at Dong Tam and Ben Luc to survey supply matters. On the same day, the Senate Subcommittee of Drug Abuse visited the Drug Rehabilitation Center on the APL-30 at LSB Nha Be, and departed with a seemingly favorable reaction. On 26 August RADM McManus, DEPCOMNAVFORV for Logistics and Administration, visited MoBase II and LSBs Dong Tam and Binh Thuy, for informal discussions and logistics updates.
NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCES

Although the Seabees of CBMU-30Z and NMCB-5 were plagued with three small harassing attacks and several mining attempts, construction, repair, and maintenance continued at a frenetic pace.

The Seabees of NMCB-5 raced against time on the east coast to complete the ACTOVRA'D sites at Nui Ta Kou (Detail Bronco) and Mui Dinh (Detail Maverick) so that they would be ready to depart Vietnam in the fall when the other units of NMCB-5 are scheduled to return to Port Hueneme, California. Despite some minor problems with logistic support and the continual mining of Route 341 near Nui Ta Kou, both projects are on schedule and will probably be finished on schedule. At the ISB Ca Mau construction site (Detail Mustang), the work continued on schedule despite torrential rains caused by the southwest monsoon and terrific logistical problems caused by impassable roads, a paucity of Marine logistics assets, and the final straw, the collapse of the bridge near Gia Rai (WR 531 215) of Route QL-4, ironically caused by a Seabee truck.

The An Khanh Footbridge (Detail Colt), well underway at the end of August, is scheduled to be completed on 10 September. Detail Trotter, working on construction discrepancies at OP Bases Tan Chau and Chau Doc, and at ISB Cho Moi, completed all work and
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disestablished on 28 August. Detail Trotter performed well despite the death of Detail Leader, UTC W. L. Logan, in a vehicle accident 15 miles northwest of Binh Thuy, on 10 August at 1215H.

The big event for CBMU-302 was the change of command ceremony held on 2 August at Bien Hoa in which Commander Henry E. Keppel was relieved by Commander Dean G. Wilson. The senior officer present and principal speaker was Rear Admiral Spencer R. Smith, Commander, Construction Battalions, Pacific Fleet. Also in attendance was Rear Admiral Foster M. Lalor, Commander, Third Naval Construction Brigade.

CBMU-302 also had a busy month with NAVCATS (Naval Civic Action Teams) in almost every part of Vietnam where there is a naval presence. They also have men stationed at many bases performing self help projects and maintaining public works.

Seabees sustained three casualties due to hostile action during August. The wounded men came from Detail 4006 based at Tan An. In the first incident, CM3 M.S. Frandsen, driving from the team site to Tan An at 2200H on 8 August, came under small arms fire at XS 542 655, and was seriously wounded and evacuated to Saigon, Third Army Field Hospital. On 27 August, the enemy struck again, this time with a satchel charge which

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was heaved over the fence into the team compound located at XS 536 653. The charge detonated in the air, wounding two men, one seriously. EA2 James L. Wallace was medevaced to the Third Field Hospital in Saigon, with a good prognosis for a complete recovery.

In the other incident, on 28 August at 0347H, eight members of Team 6206, located in Binh Tuy Province at ZS 019 823, received an ABF consisting of one mortar shell, which landed 21 meters from their hootch, and sporadic small arms fire. There were no casualties and the enemy broke off the engagement at 0407H.

Seabees were called upon to begin two large projects without prior notice when the runway at LSB An Thoi became unusable for C-130 aircraft, and LSB Nam Can suddenly was informed that a huge ammunition bunker, capable of holding a 60 day supply for ISB Nam Can and HAL-3, Detachment One had to be constructed immediately. The Can Do "Bees" pitched in and by the end of the month, both projects were progressing satisfactorily.

CBMU-302 personnel became embroiled in a dispute at An Thoi when children began throwing rocks at three of the sailors. The men began chasing the children whereupon ARVN soldiers came to the defense of the children. A brief altercation started in
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which one Seabee and one ARVN received minor injuries. ARVN
Officers and townspeople quickly brought the fight to a halt and
meetings were held between ARVN and naval authorities to try and
prevent this type of incident from recurring.
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Appendix I

1. (C) NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP ORGANIZATION

CHNAADVGRU U. S. MACV
CHIEF OF STAFF
SENAADV
SENADV, FLEET COMMAND, SAIGON
SENADV, COMD NAVAL COMMAND (SA, CTF 227)
SAIGON

TRAN HUNG DAO CAMPAIGN ADVISORY ORGANIZATION/AREA OPERATION COORDINATORS (AOC)

AOC, COASTAL
SA, CTF 213
CAPT T. I. KOLSTAD, USN

SA, DEPCOMTHD
Binh Thuy
SA THD 24
Ben Luc
SA THD 5
Phu Cuong
SA THD 25
Tuyen Nhon

AOC, NORTHERN
Long Binh
SA THD 24
VNN TG 214.1
LCDR P. S. GESSWEIN, USN

SA THD 5
VNN TG 216.1
LCDR W. WERNDLI, USN (D)
LCDR R. RULE, USN (R)

SA THD 25
VNN TG 212.2
LCDR J. C. ROGERS, USN

AOC, EASTERN
Can Tho
SA THD 8
VNN TG 217.1
LT K. J. PLIS, USN

SA THD 19
VNN TG 217.2
LT R. E. BROWN, USN

AOC SOUTHERN
Dong Tam
SA THD 4
VNN TG 214.2
CDR H. V. SHORES, USN

SA THD 6
VNN TG 212.5
LCDR G. STEFENC AVAGE, USN

SA THD 21
SA CTF 210
CAPT F. C. GIBBONS, USN

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<th>Base</th>
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<td>AOC, Western</td>
<td>SA, COMTHD 18</td>
<td>CDR A. Wright, USN</td>
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<td>TAN CHAU</td>
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**AMPHIBIOUS TYPE COMMAND ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (ATF 211)**

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<td>SA PHIBCOMD</td>
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<td>Lt R. J. Lendstedt, II, USN</td>
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<td>Lt R. C. Monson, USN</td>
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<td>SA RAID SEVEN FOUR</td>
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<td>CA MAU</td>
<td>Lt J. Glutting, USN (D)</td>
<td>LTjg R. Boller, USN (R)</td>
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**RIVER PATROL TYPE COMMAND ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 212)**

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<td>Capt R. E. Spruit, USN (D)</td>
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<td>SA RPD FIVE ONE</td>
<td>CAT LAI</td>
<td>Lt J. M. Lawless, USN (D)</td>
<td>LTjg J. R. Frondorf, USN (R)</td>
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<td>SA RPD FIVE TWO</td>
<td>PHU CUONG</td>
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<td>BEN LUC</td>
<td>Lt J. R. Jones, USN</td>
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<td>Lt R. Armitage, USN</td>
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<td>TAN CHAU</td>
<td>Lt R. E. Moore, USN</td>
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SA RPD FIVE SIX
MOCHOA
LT J. B. GIBNEY, USN

SA RPD FIVE SEVEN
NHA BE
LTJG E. HENDRICKSON, USNR

SA RPD FIVE EIGHT
MY THO
LT H. M. HIGHLAND, USN

SA RPD FIVE NINE
TAN CHAU
LT W. A. GOODWIN, USN

SA RPD SIX ZERO
THUAN AN
LT B. WATERMAN, USN

SA RPD SIX ONE
RACH SOI
LT J. SCOYILL, USN

SA RPD SIX TWO
PHOUC XUYGEN
LT P. J. GASKIN, USN

SA RPD SIX THREE
RACH SOI
LT R. B. FIORE, USNR

SA RPD SIX FOUR
TUEN NHON
LTJG J. D. COLE, USNR

COASTAL SURVEILLANCE TYPE COMMAND ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 213)

SA CSCMD
CAM RANH BAY
CAPT T. I. KOLSTAD, USN

SA COSFLOT ONE
DANANG
LCDR D. C. WILSON, USN

SEN ADV COSRON TWO ONE
QUI NHON
LT G. H. ROBERTS, USN

SA COSFLOT THREE
VUNG TAU
LCDR R. S. WATKINS, USN

SA COSFLOT FOUR
AN THOI
LCDR J. G. TONTI, USN

SA COSFLOT FIVE
NAM CAN
LCDR J. MCCORMICK, USN

SA HARDU CRB
CAM RANH BAY
LT J. L. JAHSEN, USNR (D)
LT F. A. LINTON, USN (R)
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<td>SA GENRESCOMD CAT LAI</td>
<td>Capt L. A. Dwyer, USN</td>
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<td>SA RTE DIV EIGHT ONE CAT LAI</td>
<td>Lt J. M. Steussy, USN</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA MID NINE ONE CUA LUONG</td>
<td>Lt J. W. Hamilton, USN</td>
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<td>Lt T. A. Comer, USN</td>
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<td>SA MID NINE THREE NHA BE/TAN CHAU/CA MAU</td>
<td>Lt R. F. Elliott, USN</td>
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<td>SA SEAL AND UDT UNIT SAIGON</td>
<td>Lt C. W. Doran, USN</td>
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<td>SA SALVAGE UNIT CAT LAI</td>
<td>LCDR E. H. Shipp, USN (D)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>SA RID FOUR ZERO GO DAU HA</td>
<td>Lt R. J. Secord, USN (R)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA RID FOUR ONE CHAU DOC</td>
<td>Lt R. O. Milham, USN</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA RID FOUR TWO DONG TAM</td>
<td>Lt R. A. Dorsi, USN (D)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA RID FOUR THREE PHU CUONG</td>
<td>Lt M. Berman, USN (R)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA RID FOUR FOUR TRA CU</td>
<td>Lt C. Votava, USN</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA RID FOUR FIVE DONG TAM</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA RID FOUR SIX NAM CAN</td>
<td>Lt G. C. Cooley, USN</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA RID FOUR SEVEN NAM CAN</td>
<td>Lt C. F. TIBBETS, USN</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lt W. C. Smith, USN</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lt W. Taylor, USN</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SA RID FOUR EIGHT CHAU DOC/DONG TAM

LT W. R. RUSLING, USN

SA RAG TWO SEVEN NHA BE

LT W. GOTTSCALK, USN

FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (CTG 213.1)

SA FIRST CZ DANANG

CDR P. MCLAIRD, JR., USN (D)

CDR A. VIESSMAN, USN (R)

SA CG ONE ONE CUA VIET

LT R. DUMINITK, USNR (D)

LT R. ANDERSON, USN (R)

SA CG ONE TWO THUAN AN

LT R. N. MYERS, USN

SA CG ONE THREE CU TU HIEW

LT J. SCOTT, USN

SA CG ONE FOUR HOI AN

LTJG R. G. MCCAIN, USN

SA CG ONE FIVE CHU LAI

LT D. ROBINSON, USN (D)

LT J. TAYLOR, USN (R)

SA CG ONE SIX CUANG NGAI

LT W. R. OWENS, USNR

SA RAG THREE TWO HUE

LT G. L. MAGER, USN

SA HARDU DANANG

LT D. W. WIRICK, USNR

SA CSC DANANG

LTJG R. M. SCOTT, USN

SECOND COASTAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (CTG 213.2)

SA SECOND CZ NHA TRANG

CDR A. S. JEFFERIES, USN

SA CG TWO ONE DE GI

LT J. K. ENGELKEN, USN

SA CG TWO THREE SONG CAU

LT E. L. SIWINSKI, USNR (D)

LT F. J. BLAKE, USN (R)

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SA CG TWO FIVE
DONG HAI
LT D. G. THOMAS, USN

SA CG TWO SIX
PHU BA ISLAND
LT J. P. MCGRATH, USN

SA CG TWO SEVEN
NINH CHU
LTJG P. MILLER, USN

SA CG TWO EIGHT
PHAN THIET
LT G. NORDLAND, USN

SA HARDU NHA TRANG
LT J. E. BINGHAM, USN

SA HARDU QUI NHON
LT B. VALENTINE, USN

SA CSC QUI NHON
LCDR R. SAGEHORN, USN (D)
LCDR P. J. CISEK, USN (R)

SA CSC NHA TRANG
LT S. C. AREY, USN

THIRD COASTAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (CTG 213.3)

SA THIRD CZ
VUNG TAU
CDR J. G. SULLIVAN, USN

SA CG THREE THREE
RACH DUA
LT F. M. LEMON, USN (D)
LTJG C. JOHNSON, USN (R)

SA CG THREE FOUR
THANH PHO
LT E. J. GIBSON, USN

SA CG THREE FIVE
THU VINH
LTJG T. E. ARNOLD, USN

SA CG THREE SIX
LONG PHU
LTJG D. C. BOGER, USN

SA HARDU VUNG TAU
LT N. BARBOUR, USN

SA CIS VUNG TAU
LT D. R. ROGUS, USN

FOURTH COASTAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (CTG 213.4)

SA FOURTH CZ
AN THOI
CDR M. J. SHINE, USN
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
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<td>SA CG FOUR ONE POULO OBI</td>
<td>LT R. JOHNSTON, USNR</td>
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<td>LT O. R. COLE, III, USN</td>
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<td>SA CG FOUR THREE HON TRE ISLAND</td>
<td>LT M. A. SOBYNA, USN</td>
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<td>SA CG FOUR FOUR HA TIEN</td>
<td>LTJG D. C. SHYDER, USN</td>
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<td>SA CSC AN THOI</td>
<td>LT P. D. MCCURDY, USN</td>
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<td>THIRD RIVERINE ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 216)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA THIRD RIVERINE ZONE LONG BINH</td>
<td>CDR V. MCDONOUGH, USN</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SA RAG TWO TWO/TWO SEVEN NHA BE</td>
<td>LT J. CALABOUGH, USN</td>
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<tr>
<td>S' RAG TWO FOUR PHU CUONG</td>
<td>LT R. L. CANON, USN</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA RAG TWO EIGHT LONG BINH</td>
<td>LT R. M. ANDREWS, USN</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA RAG THREE ZERO PHU CUONG</td>
<td>LT R. M. ANDREWS, USN</td>
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<td>SA REG FOR RPG CUU LONG</td>
<td>LT C. E. ROBE, USN</td>
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<td>FOURTH RIVERINE ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 217)</td>
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<td>SA FOURTH RIVERINE ZONE CAN THO</td>
<td>CPN W. WARDELL, USN</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>LT K. J. PLIS, USN</td>
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<tr>
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<td>LTJG R. E. BROWN, USN</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA RAG TWO FIVE CA MAU</td>
<td>LT R. J. GILLESKIE, USN</td>
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<td>SA RAG TWO NINE</td>
<td>LT R. J. GILLESKIE, USN</td>
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SA RAG TWO SIX CA MAU

LTJG R. W. BASS, USNR

RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 228)

SA RSSZ NHA BE

CDR D. A. STEWART, USN

NAVAL TRAINING CENTER ADVISORY ORGANIZATION

SA NTC HNA TRANG

CDR P. R. FOURNIER, USN

SA NTC CAM RANH BAY

CDR R. R. WARD, USN

SA NTC SAIGON

CDR R. A. WILD, USN

LOGISTIC SUPPORT COMMAND ADVISORY ORGANIZATION

SA VNN LSC AND SA VNN DCOS LOG

RADM P. S. MCMANUS, USN

SA VNNSY

CAPT F. T. SHAVER, USN

SA VNNSC

CDR C. H. BARSTAD, USN

SA LSB AN THOI

LCDR R. W. HOTZ, USN

SA ISB RACH SOI

LT D. E. WARD, USN

SA ISB QUI NHON

LCDR T. A. HEAD, USN

SA ISB BEN LUC

LCDR C. W. ALBAUGH, USN

SA LSB DONG TAM

CDR W. M. COLE, USN

SA LSB CAT LO

LCDR S. UNGEMACH, USN

SA LSB CAM RANH BAY

CDR C. MCINTOSH, USN

SA LSB DA NANG

CAPT E. MOUNTFORD, USN

SA LSB NHA BE

CDR A. L. BADER, USN

SA ISB THUAN AN

LCDR J. STEVENS, USN

SA LSB BINH THUY

CDR R. J. COEN, USNR

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<table>
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<td>LT J. R. MURRAY, USN</td>
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<td>SA ISB VINH LONG</td>
<td>LCDR J. LASWELL, USN</td>
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<td>LT J. F. MAYER, USN</td>
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<td>LCDR R. BLEDSOE, USN</td>
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<td>SA ISB CHO MOI</td>
<td>LCDR B. BURGETT, USN</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA ISB CA MAU</td>
<td>LT D. CHALFANT, USN</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SA YRBM ALPHA UNIT</td>
<td>LCDR G. CRAWFORD, USN</td>
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</table>
## Glossary of Abbreviations

The following abbreviations and terms are commonly used in the combat zone by all agencies and are listed here in amplification of those used in the text.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABF</td>
<td>Attack by fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMMI PONTOON</td>
<td>A multi-purpose barge, standard size 28'x90'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>Army of the Republic of Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/S</td>
<td>Air Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASPB</td>
<td>Assault Support Patrol Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARTY</td>
<td>Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATC</td>
<td>Armored Troop Carrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATSB</td>
<td>Advance Tactical Support Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/W</td>
<td>Automatic Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDA</td>
<td>Battle Damage Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLACK PONY</td>
<td>OV-10 Aircraft, twin engine turboprop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>counterinsurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCB</td>
<td>Command and Communications Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Coastal Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHICOM</td>
<td>Chinese Communist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMD</td>
<td>Capital Military District</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORDS</td>
<td>Civic Operations for Rural Development Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSR</td>
<td>Camp Sentinel Radar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>Coastal Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIW</td>
<td>Dead in the water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUSTOFF</td>
<td>Medical evacuation by helo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENIFF</td>
<td>Enemy Initiated Firefight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOM</td>
<td>French Patrol Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRIFF</td>
<td>Friendly Initiated Fire Fight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSB</td>
<td>Fire Support Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FWMAF</td>
<td>Free World Military Assistance Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDA</td>
<td>Gun Damage Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVN</td>
<td>Government of Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H&amp;I</td>
<td>Harassment and Interdiction fire support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISB</td>
<td>Intermediate Support Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JGS</td>
<td>Joint General Staff (Vietnamese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>Killed In Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIT CARSON SCOUTS</td>
<td>Former Viet Cong who have come over to the side of the Saigon government and serve with allied military units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAW</td>
<td>Light Anti-tank Weapon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCPL</td>
<td>Landing Craft, Personnel, Large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDNN</td>
<td>Vietnamese equivalent of USN Underwater Demolition Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LF</td>
<td>Local Forces (VC terminology)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LHFT</td>
<td>Light Helo Fire Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOH</td>
<td>OH-6 Light Observation Helicopter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSSC</td>
<td>Light Seal Support Craft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACV</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDCAP</td>
<td>Medical Civic Action Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MID</td>
<td>Mining Interdiction Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONITOR</td>
<td>Heavily armored LCM-6 (40mm cannon or 105 Howitzer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR</td>
<td>Military Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSB</td>
<td>Minesweeper, boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSSC</td>
<td>Medium Seal Support Craft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGFS</td>
<td>Naval Gunfire Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NILO</td>
<td>Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIOTC</td>
<td>Naval Inshore Operations Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMCB</td>
<td>Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (Seabees)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOD</td>
<td>Night Observation Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>Naval Support Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSAD</td>
<td>Naval Support Activity Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA</td>
<td>North Vietnamese Army</td>
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</table>
OTC  Officer in Tactical Command
PBR  Patrol Boat, River
PCF  Patrol Craft, Fast
PF   Popular Forces
POL  Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
PRU  Provincial Reconnaissance Unit
PSA  Province Senior Advisor
PSDF Popular Self-Defense Forces
PSYOPS Psychological Operations
RAC  River Assault Craft
RAG  River Assault Group (VNN)
RAID River Assault and Interdiction Division (VNN)
REF  Reefer (ship)
RF/PF Regional Forces/Popular Forces
RMK/BRJ Civilian construction company in Vietnam
ROK  Republic of Korea
RPD  River Patrol Division
RPG  Rocket propelled grenade (or) River Patrol Group
RSSZ Rung Sat Special Zone
RVNAF Republic of Vietnam Air Force (or Armed Forces)
SA   Senior Advisor
<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>Search and Rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAL</td>
<td>Navy commandos (Sea, Air, Land)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEAWOLF</td>
<td>UH-1B Helo, heavily armored, USN operated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHADOW</td>
<td>C-119 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKIMMER</td>
<td>20-foot fiberglass motorboat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLICK</td>
<td>UH-1B, USA operated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSB</td>
<td>Swimmer Support Boat (Skimmer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAOR</td>
<td>Tactical Area of Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAW</td>
<td>Tactical Air Wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP/PT</td>
<td>Convoy designation for ships traveling up the Mekong River from Tan Chau to Phnom Penh and vice versa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USARV</td>
<td>United States Army, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAR</td>
<td>Visual Air Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNMC</td>
<td>Vietnamese Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNN</td>
<td>Vietnamese Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>VNNLSC</td>
<td>Vietnamese Navy Logistic Supply Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNNSC</td>
<td>Vietnamese Naval Supply Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNNNTC</td>
<td>Vietnamese Naval Training Center (Nha Trang)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>Wounded In Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIPPO</td>
<td>Flame thrower-equipped ATC or Monitor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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