U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam Monthly
Historical Summary, Nov. 1968
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COASTAL SURVEILLANCE FLICK DUG-DL
November 1968

Coastal activity continued to drop off due to sea and surf conditions along the South China Sea during the Northeast Monsoon. Total detections of junks and sampans fell to 32,655, over 12,000 less than in October. Nearly 75 percent of these detections were checked by 11,326 visual inspections and another 10,000 boardings. As a result of these boardings 391 persons were detained for improper identification, violation of restricted area, possession of contraband and other suspicious activity. A group of seven detainees picked up by PCF 53 on 19 October 30 miles southwest of Tung Tau were classified as prisoners of war during November as a result of interrogation. Also during November there were 1,123 detections of steel-hulled vessels in MATCH Taos areas. All were determined to be an innocent passage as a result of 773 inspections and 40 boardings.

Due to weather conditions the tempo of Task Force 115 naval gunfire activity was down for the first time in several months. The November record for naval gunfire support came to 634 missions including 46 hostile fire incidents, 8 evading craft taken under fire, and more than 40 raids and intelligence probes up rivers and canals. These river incursions in support of Operation SEA LORDS in the IV CTZ were carried out by from two to five "Swift" boats. The PCFs were supported by naval gunfire from off-shore...
patrol units and accounted for approximately two-thirds of the damage and destruction inflicted on the enemy by Task Force 115 during November. Again in connection with Operation Da Nang, "Swift" boats relieved Task Force 116 PT's of river patrol duties in the lower portions of the Han River and Hai River in the Mekong Delta. In addition, on 10 November PCF's began routine patrol operations on the Bach Giang Thanh up into the Vinh Te Canal to interdict enemy supply lines from Cambodia and disrupt enemy extortion of Vietnamese river craft.

On the morning of 3 November three PCF's along with VMF Coastal Group 41 units with a Regional Force company embarked carried out a raid up the Cong Doc River, 65 miles south of Bach Giang on the Gulf of Thailand. While PCF 36 remained a few miles from the river mouth to support a Regional Force sweep to the south, PCF 43 and PCF 50 proceeded to a point 10 miles up river to take suspected enemy positions under fire. Sniper fire was received killing the after mount operator of PCF 50. During the operation USS DuPont (DD 941) and USNCG IXHMA (USCG 35) provided 5-inch naval gunfire support.

During a naval gunfire mission 7 miles east of Quang Ngai on 7 November enemy recoilless-rifle and small-arms fire were encountered by PCF 70 and PCF 75. Two enemy recoilless-rifle rounds struck PCF 70 causing heavy damage, killing one crewman, wounding three others, and knocking a Marine rider overboard. Both craft also received several small arms hits. The Marine lost overboard was not found by the search carried out by PCF 75 and three other
"Swift" boats which promptly arrived at the scene to assist.

A very successful river incursion was made on the Cua Lon and Bo De rivers at the southern tip of the Ca Mau Peninsula on 11 November. Five PCF's transiting the waterway from east to west were supported by both fixed-wing and helicopter air strikes as well as by naval gunfire from USS "INCHON" COUNTY (LST 1165) at the mouth of the Bo De and USS "H. M. SHAMEY" (AMM 35) at the exit from the Cua Lon. Light hostile fire was encountered causing no damage or casualties during the six-hour transit. The air support accounted for 59 structures/bunkers/sampans destroyed or heavily damaged plus 7 secondary explosions. The "MARKET TIME" units destroyed or heavily damaged 248 structures/bunkers/sampans, set off 4 secondaries, and killed one Viet Cong.

These successes apparently prompted the enemy to stiffen his defenses of these areas as heavy hostile fire was encountered on two subsequent river probes. On the 13th while providing support for a VNQ Coastal Group 41 operation at the mouth of the Cua Lon PCF 6 and PCF 36 encountered automatic weapons and rocket fire. One 3-40 round hit PCF 36 causing moderate damage and wounding one crewman. The enemy lost 20 structures and 24 sampans destroyed. Late on the afternoon of the 24th five PCF's entered the Bo De River prior to the arrival of their air cover and ran into a well prepared enemy ambush from both banks of the river about two miles inland. The "Swift" boats were not able to suppress the heavy enemy fire and cleared the area after destroying two automatic weapons positions and killing an estimated five Viet Cong. Three "Swift" boats were damaged and three crewmen wounded.
one seriously. Late in November it was discovered that the enemy had
installed a series of log barriers or fences across the mouth of the Cua
Lon River. These barriers consist of tall poles vertically implanted in
the river bottom at short intervals and strengthened by cross pieces at
the top above waterline. It is presumed that these structures have been
erected to prevent OTP 115 PAVN units from gaining complete access from the Gulf
of Thailand to the South China Sea. Attempts to destroy these barriers have
not been successful to date.
GNC MARINES forces in addition to their normal mission were deeply involved in Operation Cal Lao3 with its related Can Tho crossing corridor blockade and sweeps of the Bassac islands and patrols on the Han River-Long Xuyen and Vien To canal. Activity this month was substantially higher than last month. P3s detected 212,937 watercraft during this reporting period and accounted for 43,713 inspections and 100,364 boardings. The enemy was showing an increased willingness to fight as was clearly evidenced by his attacks on P3s and his stepped up attacks on merchant ships.

On 3 November, two P3s on a routine patrol of the upper Bassac River about 20 miles northwest of Long Xuyen came under automatic weapons fire. They returned the fire and saw about 15 Viet Cong running. They pursued them and took them under fire, killing 9, wounding 2 and capturing 4. A half-hour later another section of P3s keeping the area under surveillance observed a sampan with two occupants set out from the east bank of the river. As the P3s approached, the sampan tried to evade and ignore fire warning shots. The P3s then took the sampan under fire and probably killed the two occupants. On 4 November, the Vietnamese Navy P3s relieved U.S. P3s of Dong Ha River patrol responsibilities.

On 7 November eight P3s, two "Seawolf" helicopters, one UH-1 with 150 PF troops from Phong Than 85 and the USS WINTHURST COUNTY attacked an area 12 miles southeast of CanTho in search of an arms cache. The PFs were directed by three informers. The cache when located contained 5000er
rifles, 48 hand grenades, 45 rifle grenades, 500 rounds of 7.62 ammunition, 15 miles of documents, 100 photographs, 3,500 rounds of 7.9 ammunition, one foot mine, 2 land mines, one claymore mine and 2 rounds of 81-mm mortar. No friendly casualties occurred. The next day, the PClas on blockade patrol with Vietnamese LSIL J5O oce under heavy automatic-weapons and rocket-lass-rile attacks from 13 positions in the same general area as the previous day's operation. After four firing runs by the PClas and two by the LSIL, "SeaWolf" helicopters took the entire target area under fire. The PClas advanced the seriously wounded from the LSIL to Can Tho. Two relief PClas then arrived to maintain the blocking forces. There were no U.S. casualties. This attack was determined to be a retaliation strike for the previous day's operation with the LSIL as the primary target.

On 8 November in the Bung Sat Special Zone 14 miles southeast of Saigon, two PClas came under RPG rocket and automatic weapons fire. The cover boat received two rocket hits on the starboard side wounding three of the personnel. The patrol officer shifted to the cover boat to aid the wounded and had the boats reverse course and make a firing run along the west bank of the small canal. The enemy attack became heavier and an Army LIFT diverted to the scene and a Navy LIFT was scrambled. While directing his patrol through the kill zone that was nearly a kilometer long, the patrol officer, Chief Quartermaster Theodore SMITH was hit by a rocket and died instantly. Chief SMITH has been recommended for the Silver Star Medal for his actions. Two subsequent fixed-wing air strikes were called in to

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complete the attack.

On 15 November SEALs set up an ambush 4 miles southwest of My Tho. Ten Viet Cong were seen in and about the area. The SEALs took them under fire in the ensuing firefight a Vietnamese civilian judge was killed. "Seawolves" were called in to cover the extraction and the mine boat used for the operation placed 31-mm mortar rounds in the area. Five Viet Cong were killed during this engagement.

On 21 November, two PBRs, components of Operation SEA LION, fell into an enemy ambush while transiting from Rạch Sol to Rạch Gia. One PBR was hit by 3 or 4 B-40 rounds along with automatic weapons fire directed from both banks. The stricken PBR beached and the other boat came alongside to render medical assistance. Both PBRs attempted to suppress the fire during the entire operation. Three additional PBRs, one monitor, three ATCs, and "Seawolves" converged on the area. When the enemy broke contact the damaged PBR was taken in tow and eventually proceeded under its own power to the JENNINGS COUNTY. Five USN casualties were suffered in this encounter.

On 21 November on the Vinh Te Canal, southwest of Chau Doc, two PBRs, participating in Operation SEA LION, came under RPG and automatic weapons attack. One PBR was hit by a RPG round starboard-broadside forward. The PBRs attempted to suppress the fire with no success. An ASPB that was patrolling with them and apparently not sighted by the Viet Cong opened up with 20-mm fire and the enemy broke contact. "Seawolves" were sent

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into the area but were unable to place strikes due to lack of identifying marks. Two nights later, the patrol officer who had been ambushed led another patrol through the same area. The enemy opened fire on the boats from both banks of the canal. "Seawolves" placed a strike on the ambush area and a ready reaction force was scrambled from the distant NLF special forces camp. The NLF and PAVN cleared the ambush area and reversed course to go back through the area with the "Seawolves" overhead again the enemy attacked. This time each of the surface craft were hit by 3-4 rockets. The patrol cleared the kill zone and evacuated the eight wounded to Vinh Cia. The patrol officer, Lieutenant Jack BIRKELD, USA, was killed during the encounter. He has been nominated for the Silver Star Medal for his actions.

In 21 November while on normal patrol on the upper Mekong River, about 4 miles east of Saigon, two PAVN came under moderate automatic weapons fire. They reversed course to engage the enemy. At this point the patrol came under intense rocket and automatic-weapons fire from at least 15 to 20 positions. Two 8-40 rounds hit the lead boat and both PAVN received numerous hits from automatic weapons. Several 3-40 rounds narrowly missed both boats. The lead boat was beached to prevent it from sinking and the cover boat went alongside to evacuate two seriously wounded crewmen. At the same time 13 PAVN and two "Seawolf" helicopters were scrambled to provide cover for the damaged boats and destroy the enemy. First reinforcements to arrive rescued the three remaining crewmen of the beached boat. The
helos placed several strikes on the area while attempts were made to refloat the beached boat. During the salvage operation, two mortar rounds impacted close by. The holo pilots spotted the enemy mortar position and destroyed it. All 11 crewmen of the original patrol were wounded. The beached boat was later brought to Vinh Long.

In 27 November, 1968, USN forces suffered their third and final fatality of the month. Two PBRs on patrol of the Rach Jina-Long Layan Canal, as part of Operation "La Lune," came under 3-40 rocket and heavy automatic-weapons fire about 3 miles northeast of Rach Gia. Both boats were hit by 3-40 rockets, one of the boats beached. Additional PBRs and an ASPB were dispatched to the scene and suppressed the fire. Six other USN personnel were wounded in the attack.

Attacks on merchant shipping in the channels to Saigon were up appreciably. Five attacks were made this month as opposed to the one made in October. On 1 November the ammunition ship SS 31422 FALLS VICTORY came under rocket and automatic-weapons fire 12 miles southwest of Saigon. The ship was not hit in the attack and suffered no casualties. PBRs in the area rushed to the scene and took the enemy firing positions under fire. Navy "SeaWolf" helos scrambled from Shea Be and joined the attack. After expending their ammunition they were relieved by an Army gunship. Damage to the enemy was unknown. On 5 November, the SS PRESIDENT JEFFERSON came under recoilless-rifle attack in the Vinh Sat Special Zone. The attack caused swift retaliation by U.S. ARMY forces and 1RN and AF
forces. On 13 November 2F-2 H-44 received a RPG round on the starboard side forward of Number One hatch, causing a fire. The ship cleared the channel and continued to Vung Tau. P2Rs and LIFT made repeated firing runs on the enemy position receiving no return fire. Regional Force quick-kill troops put in to make a sweep of the area made no contact. In 14 November, the merchant ship Maralak was hit by rocket attack 10 miles southeast of Saigon. The rocket, estimated to be 107-mm, fell short. P2Rs raked the area, Army LIFT placed striking followed a fixed-wing attack. Regional Force troops were inserted to conduct a sweep but made no contact. There were no friendly casualties. The last merchant ship attack took place on 16 November when the English tanker Halifax was attacked by B-40 rockets and automatic-weapons fire. The ship sustained a minor hole in the after deck house. Two P2Rs, 200 yards astern of the tanker, suppressed the enemy fire. A Navy LIFT airborne at the time joined the fight. Vietnamese quick-kill troops were inserted and made a sweep of the area. The troops found one B-40 round and blood trails but no enemy personnel were sighted.

Prevention of minings continued to be the order of the day. On 16 and 18 November, insulated conductor wire was discovered in retrieved sweep gear. On 18 November, a crewman of an ATC moored at Nha Be Naval Base heard a blowing noise in the water and sighted a man in the water with what appeared to be scuba equipment. The crew member threw two concussion grenades in the water immediately. A subsequent search by the harbor patrol and anti-mines patrol produced negative results.

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A routine search of a water taxi uncovered two women with an excessive amount of medicine in their possession. The women claimed they were taking the medicine to their homes. Included in the confiscated medicine was 30 bottles of streptomycin, 16 bottles of penicillin, 60 ampules of glucose and assorted other pills. The two women and medicine were turned over to the National Police at Vinh Long.
In the devastating attack on the USS WESTCHESTER COUNTY (LST-1167) at
0323 on 1 November, the U.S. Navy suffered the heaviest loss of life to
any action in a single incident of the Vietnam war. Eighteen U.S. Navy
men died in the attack. In addition five U.S. Army, one Vietnamese Navy
and one Vietnamese Army "river boat" were killed. Seven of the 24 Navy
personnel required medical evacuation. Three U.S. Army personnel were also
wounded.

After offloading all troops, River Assault Squadron personnel, and their
equipment, the WESTCHESTER COUNTY was beached in Haiphong harbor on 2
November in order to accomplish temporary repairs to make her seaworthy. Just ten
days later, on 14 November, the ship got underway - testimony to the profes-
sionalism and hard work of the Navy men from the several different units who
cooperated in getting the repairs completed expeditiously. WESTCHESTER COUNTY
arrived at Yokosuka, Japan, her home port, on 26 November.

The ISF continued the pattern of operations which began with the reorgan-
ization of the ISF on 15 October, with NSA ALFA operating in the western
Delta and NSA EASTO to the west. Of the five River Assault Divisions assigned
to NSA ALFA, NAD 51 supported the THIRD Battalion Vietnamese Marine Corps in
operations in Khanh Hoa Province; NAD 52 was assigned Base Defense duties;
NAD 111 supported the 3/34th Artillery Battalion of the Ninth Division; NAD 112
operated with the U.S. 3/60th Inf. Bn. in Khanh Hoa Province; and NAD 151 con-
tinued to work with the 3/39th Inf. Bn. in eastern Long An Province, operating
out of the Navy base at Me Khe. Of the three remaining divisions which were

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assigned to MACV-129. MACV-129 provided for land defense, MAC-129 supported 3144 MACD interdiction operations, and MAC-129 supported the NVA’s 1st Battalion, Vietnamese Marine Corps. The Division’s main effort also supported other troop units in particular operations during the month.

MACV’s Division 112 provided kind support to enemy’s intelligence dispersal teams and further dis-establish high security areas for enemy’s clandestine operations on the Cong (canal). Four mission barges had been partially blocking the canal. During the operation 1,300 pounds of explosives were used in twelve detonations. A survey following the successful operation indicated a minimum depth of six feet over the former obstructions.

Early on the morning of 3 November, operation NCAI AM-1 began when MAC-112 got underway with troops of the 1/60th Inf., 8, and MAC-112 landed elements of the 3rd MOTO for multiple riverine and air mobile insertions designed to locate and engage units of the Viet Cong 26th Main Force Battalion and several Viet Cong Local Force Companies which were operating in Ken Hoa province.

The operation lasted until 20 November, netting more than 100 Viet Cong killed. On the last day of the operation MAC-112 was embargoed twice while transferring Vietnamese Marines from the Ken Hoa River to assault landings on the Ken Hue Stream. In the first ambush two monitors were hit and about 30 rounds of recoilless-ridge fire, with small arms and automatic weapon fire, were directed at the craft. One Navy sailor was killed on MAC-112 and three were wounded.

MAC-112 took a rocket hit in the second ambush but there were no personnel casualties.
Every cadet/sapper again struck the M4 the night of 15 November. The Light Lift Craft FOUR (LLC-4), an LCU converted to salvage work by the addition of a large boom and miscellaneous salvage and diving equipment, was mined and sunk while at anchor on the Ton Lung River near the entrance to the Ton Tre River. The explosion within seconds of each other were observed and the craft sunk by the storm almost immediately. Two sailors were killed and 13 were wounded, including a crewman of L-52-2 which was moored alongside. Investigation by Task Force 117 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team personnel revealed one large hole along the port side about 10 feet long and extending around the stern of the craft. Corded detonating wire and other implements of mining were discovered on further searching. Almost immediately the LLC-2 was sailed to the scene and the craft was carefully surveyed to determine the feasibility and method of salvaging it. Because of the severe damage to LLC-4 and the hazardous location, Commander Service Group THREE recommended that the Medium Lift Craft (MLC) not be risked in an uneconomical salvage effort. CENTCOM directed the destruction of LLC-4 to eliminate it as a navigational hazard. Detonation of demolition explosives and the total destruction and clearance of LLC-4 took place on 26 November.

On the evening of 1 November Task Group 117-2 joined with units of Task Force 115 and 116 in the first combined operation in the Delta. Under the operational control of Commander Task Group 117-2 (CENTCOM L2D), the amphibious operation was launched into Khm Son Province to stop the flow of men and equipment across the Cambodian border southwestward into the Delta.
Task Group 117.2 provided troop lift and close support for the 5th Marine Battalion Vietnamese Marine Corps, while conducting riverine strike operations, and also conducted interdiction operations to prevent the flow of Viet Cong supplies through the area. Mobile Riverine Base 2207 relocated to the vicinity of Long Binh on 2 November to enhance support. The River Assault Craft Unit with several units from the 1st TIC - Long Binh Canal during the operation. The first phase of the operation, the assault phase, ended on 6 November, while the interdiction phase continued.

As part of the same general SIA/LOC operation, Task Group 117.2 supported reconnaissance-in-force operations in the See Son area of Dien Bien Province from 9 through 11 November, using the Ha Tien - Bach Gia and the Tri Ton Canals to transport the troops into the area of operations about 20 miles north northwest of Bach Gia. This was followed by operations from 12 to 14 November in the "Three Sisters" area about 10 miles northwest of Bach Gia. During the operation nine rounds of 105-mm were fired from a monitor indirect at a range of about 3/4 miles. The rounds were spotted by an Army artillery officer and achieved an accuracy of about 30-40 yards after the initial spotting round. The firing was done while the monitor was beached on the Tri Ton Canal. Lacking a fire-control computer three reference points were used: a stake on the craft's bow, an aiming stake about 60 feet from the shoreline, and an open sight positioned just forward of the command's position. With the bow as the pivot point, the crew maneuvered the monitor to keep the reference points in line with the sights. On the 14th the troops were backloaded and returned to Bach Gia.

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From 16 to 21 November River Assault Craft of Task Group 117.2 shifted their area of operations to an area about 25 miles south southeast of Ninh Gio. After landing the Fourth BN, VCM the craft set up interdiction patrols in the surrounding waterways. Later, on 20 November, Task 13 loaded ARVN troops at Cam The and then proceeded down thelasses River to conduct riverine assault operations on the Dung Island complex, while the troops searched for Viet Cong forces in the islands. On 22 November, the same day that River Assault Division 131 concluded its lengthy operations at the Ba and rejoined Task Unit.
On 4 November, the 728 River Patrol Group (RPG) 3A PUB's assumed total responsibility for patrolling the Dong Nai River. This relieved U. S. PUB's of TF 116 of waterway denial operations in the Capital Military District (CMD) and released them for redeployment to the 12C and the Delta. The 12 PUB's of TF 21 now provide two 24-hour-night patrols on this strategically located and important river east of Saigon. U. S. Navy enlisted advisors ride the 728 PUB's which this month conducted ambitious operations with SEAL, LWM, and ARVN troops embarked. Night raids and ambushes were conducted throughout the month as the PUB's supported the landed troops in gunfire support and river blocking operations. Psychological operations (tapes and leaflet drops) were conducted during the normal patrols in addition to routine search and inspection activities.

On 6 November, while conducting a probe of the Ca- Long River, 10 miles south of Rach Gia City during a SEAL LOHDS operation, three Coastal Group 11 junks were attacked by B-40, recoilless-rifle and small arms fire. Three 728 sailors were killed and seven others wounded, including the U. S. Navy enlisted advisor. This ambush took place in an area where a SEAL LOHDS PUB had just received and suppressed enemy fire.

On 8 November, SEAL 30 was ambushed by 3-11 and 75-mm recoilless-rifle fire from the south bank of the Bassac River near Cu Lao Hai Island. The ambush was immediately followed by automatic weapons fire from both banks.
of the river. The ship reversed course, returned to the area and layed down heavy reconnaissance fire. "Seawolves" were called in for follow-up strikes and medevac SH-60B's rushed in to on-load the seven USN sailors who were injured in the opening volley. This incident serves as a prologue to the Can Tho Crossing Corridor campaign which began on 11 November.

A river craft team of LCI 25/29 CF-Can detachment was毁于 on 10 November, resulting in one monitor, one LCM and one LCM damaged and seven USN sailors and one RF soldier wounded. These craft had been conducting salvage operations on the damaged boats from the previous mining incident in the same area on 20 October.

USN RAG units participated in the naval blockade of the Can Tho Crossing Corridor from 11 to 29 November. In concert with TF 116 FSB's, LCI/3 21/33, 23/31 and 25/29 conducted blocking and search operations around Cu Lao Xay, Cu Lao Hai and Tan Binh islands to deny the enemy a comms-liaison route from the lower Delta to upper IV CTZ and III Corps. Amphibious operations were pursued as ARVN 9th and 21st Infantry Division and ARVN Rangers were transported, landed and extracted by RAG craft during sweeps of the islands throughout the period of the campaign.

Until 12 November when LAC 26 relieved them, RAG 29 units were deployed out of Long Binh to the Soo Son area of Alien Giang Province. The 11th LDH operation was conducted in the Sa Tien-Dinh Gia canals area by TF 117 elements while the RAG craft lifted the VNAC 4th Infantry Battalion and artillery units.

Enclosure (4)
Formerly organized as a brigade, the FNC was redesignated a division on 1 October and was comprised of 2 Marine brigades. Brigade A operated in III CTZ under the operational control of the 10th U.S. Infantry Division until 2 November for Operation PASS THRU, on which day the operational control of the brigade went to the 25th U.S. Infantry Division. The brigade, which was comprised of the 1st and 2nd Infantry battalions from 1 to 5 November when the 4th Battalion joined it, performed local unit operations throughout the month and not with any significant enemy contact. Until 2 November, the 4th Infantry Battalion operated independently near the Sea under the operational control of the 10th U.S. Division with no major enemy contact. On 23 November, 25 Marines of the 6th Battalion were evacuated with the initial diagnosis of malaria.

Brigade 3 was comprised of the 4th Infantry Battalion and participated in Operation SEAL CORPS under the operational control of the 21st U.S. Division in coordination with the Mobile Riverine Force near Rach Gia, IV CTZ. The brigade was engaged primarily in reconnaissance-in-force operations with only minor enemy contact this month. Several caches of essential enemy supplies and equipment were uncovered during the operations.

The 3rd Infantry Battalion operated with the 1ST in the Ky Tho area under the operational control of the 7th U.S. Division. The Marines performed reconnaissance-in-force operations with no significant enemy engagement.

The 5th Infantry Battalion was engaged in operations in Tay Ninh Province under the operational control of the 25th U.S. Infantry Division in close coordination with the U.S. 1st Air Cavalry Division. Despite a significant
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number of enemy war arms and material captured and/or destroyed, the marines reported negligible enemy contact this month.
Psychological operations had new fields to exploit this month. Operational radio campaigns provided credibility to the people when the North Vietcong and North Vietnamese Air Force announced that they would only cease fire if the Viet Cong's politico-military forces in the south observed an armistice. The radio campaign was to assure the people that the leaders of the country realized that the aim of the U.S. policy was a conclusion of a just and reasonable development of the Vietnamese conflict by negotiation and that we were not forsaking our South Vietnamese allies. It was also necessary to have the people understand that the bombing halt was not unconditional. The North Vietnamese had stated that they would never negotiate while the bombing was going on and would never recognize the South Vietnamese government as a separate entity at the peace talks. However, after avoiding it would never do these things, the government agreed in reality to do both of these actions. The third important theme of the month was the new Paris peace talks with the government of Vietnam attending. This required that the people understand that Hanoi has been forced by SVN/Allied successes on the battlefield and overwhelming popular support of the Vietnamese people to agree to negotiate with the SVN at the conference table. The SVN enters the new talks with the goal of a just, secure and guaranteed peace in Vietnam, and that the SVN will not play only a leading role in the new meeting, but will take the lead and be the main spokesman on all matters which are

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of principal concern to South Vietnam. The treatment of the bombing halt
and Paris Peace Talks was in consonance with MACV/USMACV guidance. The
three foregoing themes easily dovetailed into the persistent theme that
now was the time for all those who had not done so rally to the government
of South Vietnam. Twenty-four Dai Chams rallied to novel forces during the
winter. There are also indications that the ethnic Dai vote in the area is
increasing since the start of Operation MEKAP. The MEKAP is also stimu-
lized in an accelerated pacification program in the delta area.

In the field of civic action 167 MEKAPs were held and 7,000 personnel
were treated. One MEKAP was held on 22 November in Binh Dai District to
mark the official opening of a new hamlet in an area that was considered
to be under Viet Cong control until 6 November. The MEKAP was highly suc-
cessful and the district chief requested that MEKAP teams return for the
scheduled opening of two more hamlets in the near future. In another area
U. S. Naval Support Activity Detachment, Qui Nhon, contributed the building
materials and tools necessary for the construction of an outdoor all-weather
TV theater at the hamlet of Dai Xuan. The Vietnamese Naval Repair Facility
build the theater and the Vietnamese information service provided the TV.
The first night's showing of Vietnamese programs on 20 November was witnessed
by a standing room only crowd.

Enclosure (5)
USN STATISTICAL SUMMARY
November 1968

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<th>MARKET TREN</th>
<th>GUN TREN</th>
<th>Mobile Riverine Force</th>
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<tr>
<td>Destructions</td>
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<td>Inspections</td>
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<td>79</td>
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<td>Total fire incidents</td>
<td>16</td>
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Energy casualties:
- Killed 51(26)+33(22) 47(16)+22(23)-3 | 224
- Wounded 14(50)+10(13) 8(20)+9(FW) | 6
- Captured | 20 | 17 |

USN casualties:
- Killed | 3 | 22 USN/11 USA/1 VNA/1 VNA/3 VSAO
- Wounded 11 | 42 | 63 USN/40 USA/1 VNA/60 VSAO
- Captured | 0 | 0 |
- Missing | 1 | 0 |

Energy material losses:
| Destroyed |
|---|---|---|
| a. | (1) Junks or sampans | 665 | 126 | 28 |
| b. | (2) Structures | 520 | 135 | 977 |
| Captured |
| a. | (1) Junks or sampans | 2 | 1
| b. | (2) Weapons | * | 1
| c. | (3) Ammunition (rounds) | * | 1
| d. | (4) Rice (tons) | * | 52

USN material losses:
| Destroyed |
|---|---|---|
| a. | (1) Surface craft | 0 | 0 | 1 (TLC-4) |
| b. | (2) Helicopters | 0 | 0 |
| Damaged |
| a. | (1) Surface craft | 6 | 10 | 7 |
| b. | (2) Helicopters | 0 | 2 |

SAR missions:

Remarks:
* Information not applicable or not available this date.
** Includes 7 October detainees classified as Viet Cong.
*** Includes 3 USN KIA and 1 USN KIA by ordnance accident during MRF.
**** Includes 1 USMC riding PFG lost when craft hit by rocket.
***** Includes 3 AK-47, 1 M-1 Car, misc. small arms arms, footsnares and grenades.
******* Includes 1,265 grenades and 93 mines.
******** Includes 620 rocket/mortar/rockless-rifle rounds.
### Vietnamese Navy

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<th>Unit</th>
<th>Daily Average</th>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Vietnam Marine Corps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Captured</th>
<th>Suspects Detained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NC/MA</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Provided 53 gunfire support missions.
- Includes 5, 27, 28, and 52.

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C417/4

DECLASSIFIED after 12 years

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Exclusion (7)


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitals/dispensaries</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orphanages</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Man Days</th>
<th>Expenditures (Ths)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>468,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>1,573,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Welfare</td>
<td>2,234</td>
<td>1,760,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>261,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>853,568</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

USH CIVIC ACTION STATISTICAL SUMMARY

November 1963

TOTAL NUMBER OF MAN DAYS PERSONNEL OF UNITS ENGAGED IN CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS:

3,931

CIVILIAN WORKERS CONTRIBUTED BY MILITARY RESOURCES FOR CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS:

790,497,512

ADJUSTMENT CONTRIBUTIONS:

382,659

A MENTION OF U.S. CIVILIAN CIVIC ACTION ACTIVITIES

Percent

Other USAF 3.3
Other MAVAF 6.7
U.S. civilian voluntary agencies 35.8
Average percent of self-help by USA civilians 36.2

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In mid-October of this year Operation SEA LION was conceived and initiated. This operation brought together for the first time in the Vietnamese conflict the three U. S. Naval Task Forces in country. The original objectives of the operation were:

a. The interdiction of Viet Cong infiltration routes from Cambodia along canals from the Bassac to the Gulf of Thailand.

b. Pacification of selected Trans-Delta waterways.

c. Pacification and clearance of the Bassac Islands, namely Tan Binh and Dung Islands.

d. Harassment of the enemy to keep him off balance.

A large portion of U. S. Naval assets have been continually engaged, frequently in areas that have been under Viet Cong control for years. Thus far the following has been accomplished toward the attainment of these original objectives:

(1) TG 117.2/VNQ Riverine Operations in the Rach Gia, Three Sisters area pacified the areas to the extent that 24-hour PBR/ASPB patrols were initiated on the Rach Gia to Long Xuyen and Cai San canals between the Gulf of Thailand and the Kien Giang/An Giang province boundary. This patrol is influencing SVN officials to continue development along the canals in terms of outpost development, hamlet resettlement, and intensified use of province and VNN boats. A renewed quality of aggressiveness appears to have been instilled in the local RP/PP troops as evidenced by their willingness to conduct ground sweeps rather than remaining close to their base camps.
(3) On 16 November the 7th NhU canal patrol by NVA was initiated and within five days of its commencement strong enemy reaction indicated that at least two platoon size elements had been thwarted in their attempted crossings. At the same time RH patrois were conducted in the Mekong Thanh River. Together these patrols are attempting to substantiate the information at the Cambodian border along the eastern banks, and sometimes have been conducted in combination with these patrols.

(3) Since the 'no canal was cleared of mined obstructions by 7th NhU and harbor clearance units, opening it to normal traffic.

(4) A PIR blockade has been thrown around the islands in the San River corridor and ground sweeps were conducted on San Dinh, Cu Lao Hay, and Cu Lao Hai Islands. This island complex is still under heavy surveillance while a tight blockade has been placed around the Song Island complex where ground sweeps have been completed.

(5) Since 10 October, 67P 115 has raidied Viet Cong areas to keep the enemy off balance. The effectiveness of these operations is evidenced by blockades of large constructed by Viet Cong in the rivers to stop these raids.

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