Naval Forces, Vietnam Monthly Historical Summary for March 1970
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LIST II (A&B)
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APPENDIX I Glossary of Abbreviations

APPENDIX II NAVFORV/NAVADVGRP MACV NOTE 05440
of 1 Apr 1970 (Subj: COMNAVFORV/CHNAVADVGRP
Task and Advisory Organization)
# List of Charts, Graphs, and Photographs

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Enemy activity during the month of March remained at the same low level that characterized the latter part of February. The enemy was again trying to make his presence felt without resorting to large offensive operations. His principal tactics were mining and sapper activities, especially in the I and II Corps, and abduction and assassination efforts used as part of his anti-pacification program to demoralize the populace.

In I Corps, Allied operations have pinpointed VC infiltration routes into populated areas and have thus hampered VC rice and medical collection activities. Toward the middle of the month, there was a movement into I Corps of one battalion of the 4th NVA Regiment from the northern DMZ. There was also another unidentified NVA battalion in the area. This activity may be the build up for a possible coordinated Spring-Summer offensive. This is in line with an increase in activity in the Sea Tiger AC in the enemy's attempt to maintain pressure. There was also a concentration of NVA units in the DMZ north of the Cua Viet River.

II Corps also saw the enemy avoiding large unit contacts and continued reliance on terrorist and harassment activities. During the second week of the month, however, the enemy changed his offensive position by staging three ABF's against the Cam Ranh Bay NAF/AB. Again, the nature of these attacks reflects his capability of harassment without committing his units.

Saigon and the III Corps area also saw gradually increasing terrorist activity. This activity reached a high point from 14-20 March when ten acts were recorded. Although the enemy seemed to be in a standoff
period, there was concentrated activity in the Rung Sat Special Zone, and recent events in Cambodia kept enemy forces along the border busy.

Enemy activity in the Delta and barrier areas of IV Corps was also light with no significant contacts reported although there were several attempts to infiltrate troops and supplies from Cambodia. The prime attempt was to move the 88th NVA Regiment across the border in the Barrier Reef AO, but there was no major movement of this unit reported during the month.
During the month of March, combined SEA LARDS forces operating in the Giant Slingshot, Border Interdiction, Search Turn, Breezy Cove, and Deadly Decks campaigns accounted for a total of 115 enemy killed (by body count) and 27 captured.

Friendly casualties for this period were six killed and 67 wounded. A breakdown of complete U.S. and Viet SEA LARDS statistics for March and statistical totals computed since the start of operations are located at the end of this section following the discussion of the various campaigns.
A Seawolf pilot watches as his rockets head for their target.
Giant Slingshot

During March, there was an average of 83 U. S. Navy and Vietnamese Navy boats available for daily operations in the Giant Slingshot Area of Operations (AO). The boats were used in performing escort duty, making troop lifts, setting waterborne guardposts (WBGP), operating as blocking forces in support of land based units, and in a variety of support missions on the Vam Co Tay and Vam Co Dong Rivers. During the month, an average of 34 WBGP's were set daily.

The level of general activity throughout the Giant Slingshot AO seemed to be lower for the month of March than the activity noted in January and February. The number of enemy killed in January was 187, while 55 of the enemy were killed during February. Friendly casualties for the month of March were four killed and 25 wounded.

In late February in an effort to make a larger interdiction force available for night operations in the Giant Slingshot AO, CNAVFORV proposed that USN/VNN liaison personnel accompany logistics craft which were transiting the Vam Co Dong and Vam Co Tay Rivers for the purpose of coordinating reaction forces in lieu of providing waterborne escorts during daylight hours. CTG 194.9 readily welcomed the proposal and indicated that river pilots could be made available in order to provide personnel riding on board the transiting crafts who were familiar with the AO and river navigation and who could also act as liaison personnel for requesting reaction force assets. It was also pointed out that in many cases
in the past the fire power of the units being escorted was superior to that of the escort units.

On 10 March 1970, COMNAVFORV granted permission for CTG 194.9 to discontinue providing escorts for daytime transits of logistics craft except for designated special interest cargoes, such as ammunition, and unarmed craft. The general concept of the logistic craft transit operation was to be the convoy method. Liaison personnel would be provided by the Navy on request. These liaison personnel would board the convoy in the vicinity of the repair ship located in the Vam Co River and would act as the communicator between the transiting craft and various patrolling units or with the Navy operations centers along the route. In the event of an attack, reaction forces of artillery, air, boats, and/or troops would be coordinated through the liaison personnel embarked for the transit.

On 11 March, CTG 194.9 provided additional guidance for the personnel assigned to act as pilots and established a check point system for hourly progress reporting of the convoy. CTG 194.9 also specified that the pilots would be assigned counterparts as soon as possible for training purposes in view of the early May schedule for turnover of Giant Slingshot operations to the Vietnamese Navy.

As of 28 March, CTG 194.9 reported that since the implementation of providing liaison personnel for convoys transiting the Vam Co Tay and Vam Co Dong Rivers that all convoy units had arrived at their
respective destinations without incident. The effort to increase the number of interdiction forces available for night operations has also been realized. The number of UBCP's established each night has shown an increase of at least five UBCP's per night and, depending, on the tactical situation, as many as ten UBCP's per night over the first half of the month when escort duties were performed for all craft transiting the rivers.

Another piece of hardware in our military inventory which the enemy is beginning to respect is the sensor device. A rallier recently revealed in a debrief with the NILO Tra Cu that the NVA consider that sensor devices are one of the most effective weapons being used in the Giant Slingshot AO. The rallier stated that he had been instructed that if a sensor was discovered during an infiltration attempt, the infiltrators were not to tamper with the sensor but were to clearly mark the area and quietly clear the area to a distance of at least 100 meters and move around the sensor always remaining at least 100 meters from the sensor. The rallier also stated that when artillery hits an area and no troops, boats, or aircraft are spotted nearby, the NVA always suspects sensors are located in the area.

Highlights of operational activity within the Giant Slingshot AO during the month of March are included in the following narrative descriptions.
On 9 March, PBR's 865 and 869 were transiting north on the Vam Co Dong River when they were hailed by two local youths and were shown the location of a VC weapons cache at XT 457 048, approximately seven kilometers north of Tra Cu. The cache contained 12 82mm mortar rounds, three 61mm mortars, and one claymore mine. There was no contact with enemy forces.

On 10 March, a helicopter carrying a SEAL team went down at XS 520 790, approximately ten kilometers from Ben Luc. Within five minutes, another helicopter, piloted by LCDR Cleveland, landed and picked up six passengers and crewmen of the downed helo. A second rescue helicopter followed on and picked up the remaining two crewmembers. All personnel were returned to Ben Luc without injury. A SEAL team was returned to the scene and inserted by helicopter to guard the downed aircraft. The downed helicopter was lifted out and returned to Ben Luc within three hours after losing power and going down.

Late in the evening of 9 March, PBR 708, under Boat Captain EN? Myers, and PBR 774, under Boat Captain EN2 Girouard, were in WBG at XS 335 040, approximately five kilometers from Tuyen NhOn. The units, under Patrol Officer BMC Smock, sighted seven VC crawling toward PBR 708. The VC were in the process of disconnecting a claymore mine which had been placed and was being controlled from the PBR. The boats took the VC under fire and received AK-47 return fire. Artillery and air assistance was requested, but, due to other units being in contact, no assistance was immediately available.
The PBR's then commenced to mortar the area and suppressed the enemy fire. Shortly after midnight, PBR's inserted troops from FSB Gettysburg. The troop sweep located multiple trails and a staging area of a large size enemy force.

On 17 March, a PBR of RIVDIV 511, while in WBGP at WS 015 98h, ten kilometers from Moc Hoa, received a grenade on the boat. The forward gunner threw the grenade overboard. The two PBR's in the WBGP then broke WBGP and received automatic weapons fire. Air assistance was requested, but on arrival, the Seawolves were unable to conduct an air strike due to low visibility and fog. The boats reset the WBGP in the same location with no further incident.

In the morning of 15 March, PBR 866 under Boat Captain EN1 Parker, PBR 868 under Boat Captain EN1 Girard, and 7-5 under Boat Captain GM1 Bishop were transmitting at XT 456 016 when they were hailed by children from Hiep Hoa. The children said that they knew the location of a cache and would point it out. The boats returned to Tra Cu to embark their Commanding Officer, LCDR Brennan, and to get U. S. Army ground support elements. The boats then proceeded to XS 472 996, approximately two kilometers from Tra Cu, utilizing a U. S. Army unit for protection and Seawolves for cover. The cache was found in a 55 gallon oil drum. In the oil drum were seven 105mm projectiles that were rigged with a booby trap device, 21 Chicom grenades in a wooden box. The cache was in poor, but usable condition.

This was the fourth cache turned in by these children. Since their lives may be in danger because they have cooperated with the U. S./VN Navy, they were brought to the District Chief so steps could be taken to protect them.
On 17 March, PBR’s 7H2 and 772 of RIVDIV 551, with Boat Captains TM1 Hinds and TM1 Fallon embarked, were in WBG at XS 337 8H3, approximately six kilometers northeast of Tuyen Nhơn on the Industrial Canal, sighted approximately 20 VC in single file approaching their position. When the VC were within about 100 meters, PBR 772 opened fire. Air and artillery assistance was immediately requested. The units began receiving AK-47 return fire. At 2205H, the units observed a large secondary explosion. Black Ponies arrived and placed strikes in the contact area from 2209H to 2218H. FSB Gettyburg fired artillery into the area from 2223H to 2315H. At 2325H, troops from FSB Gettyburg were inserted for a sweep, and another sweep was conducted by RIVDIV 551 personnel at first light. The sweeps produced the following items captured in action: one anti-tank grenade, 28 assorted hand grenades, eight B-40 rocket warheads with boosters, two boxes of fuses, seven packages of C-4 totaling 20 pounds, two rolls of time fuses, three AK-47 clips, 315 individual rounds of AK-47 ammunition, seven gas masks, assorted medicines, 52 battle dressings, three pounds of documents, 100 pounds of rice and other food stuffs, 15 pounds of clothing, 55 rounds of 9mm ammunition, 30 non-electrical blasting caps, 40 green plastic bags used for floating supplies across waterways, and two zero-time booby trap grenades.

TM1 Robert D. Hinds suffered a minor shrapnel wound to the right arm in this encounter. Seven VC were known to have been wounded.

On 18 March, Vietnamese units HQ 51H4 and HQ 51H7, with embarked advisors EN3 Prokup and BM1 Herrea, were in WBG at XT 247 353, approximately
17 kilometers from Go Dan Ha. At 2330H, the units had observed debris floating close by the boats. A concussion grenade was dropped with negative results. At 2350H, HQ 51HH was struck by a floating mine on the port side amidships. The explosion caused a temporary loss of communications and progressive flooding. HQ 51HH proceeded to assist in the evacuation of the stricken boat and provided fire support. HQ 51HH was flooded up to the main deck at the time of the evacuation.

EM3 Prokup suffered a laceration on the back of the head. Five Vietnamese sailors were also injured - none seriously.

Early in the morning of 20 March, one of the mortar pits of Advanced Tactical Support Base (ATSB) Ben Keo reported sighting swimmers in the water. The base went to General Quarters. All the boats available commenced a concussion grenade barrage around the area. The barrage apparently killed one swimmer. A second swimmer was seen under a hooch and was fired upon but escaped. Personnel of the base then conducted a thorough search of the area with grappling equipment. One mine attached to an inflated rubber life ring was retrieved.

Later in the day, a USN EOD Team destroyed the mine which was composed of approximately 50 pounds of Chicom C-4. During the process of destroying the mine, U. S. Arm. Tug Boat ST-1992 reported discovering a second mine down stream approximately 200 meters and across the river. The discovery was made when a crewman spotted a piece of nylon line floating on the surface. The crewman had
picked up the line and attempted to pull the line on board. The line parted while the crewman was trying to retrieve the line but not before the crewman saw that there was a mine attached to the line. Concussion grenades were dropped in an attempt to explode this second mine. The second mine did not detonate and is on the bottom of the river but is considered to be harmless after the concussion grenades failed to make the mine explode. At 210700H, the body of the second swimmer floated to the surface near the scene of the previous night's incident.

In the afternoon of 20 March, three boys from Hiép Hoa once again hailed FIB units and reported that they knew the location of a cache. The troops took the boys to the cache site, recovered the cache, and returned to Tra Cu. The cache consisted of six new baseball CS grenades, six booby trapped 105mm artillery rounds, and six electrical detonators. This was the sixth cache turned in by the same group of boys.

From 19 March through 22 March, SNI Bean, who bills himself as "Tenkokai," Master Hypnotist and Magician, conducted a four day tour of the Giant Slingshot bases. He entertained the personnel with magic and hypnotic shows. "Tenkokai's" performances were very well received and most appreciated.

On 23 March, the youths from Hiép Hoa once again hailed passing patrol units. The boys turned over two AK-47 magazines, three 60mm mortar rounds, two 82mm mortar rounds, and eight mackerel can booby
Traps. On the following day, the same boys hailed passing boats and
informed them that six VC had crossed the river and were proceeding
to the west.

On 31 March, PBUs were transmitting when hailed by the three
youths from Hieng Hon. The boys claimed that their lives had been
threatened by the VC. The boys had been told they would be killed
by the VC within three days. The youths were taken into protective
custody and then delivered to the protection of the District Chief.
The District Chief assured CTG 194.9 that sufficient Regional Forces
and Police were available to insure the protection of the youths.

The youths have thus far led friendly forces to seven caches
and have provided friendly forces with information on at least one
river crossing by VC forces.
Operation Ready Deck

Operation Tran Hung Dao V/Ready Deck, while strictly under VUN operational control has continued to carry the SEA LORDS designator TG 194.6. In order to clarify the situation, the present SEA LORDS link with CTG 194.6 was stated to be primarily administrative in nature. The chain of operational control is from CNO, VNN, to Commander III Riverine Area to Commander Tran Hung Dao V/Ready Deck.

At the end of the month, the departure of all of the RPG 51 assets from the area signalled the planned arrival and break in operations for all of RPG 52 and the departure of River Division 593 scheduled to be completed by the first part of April.

As of 31 March, the following units were committed to Operation Tran Hung Dao V/Ready Deck.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation</th>
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<td>TG 194.6 (Whaler)</td>
<td>Whaler</td>
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<tr>
<td>TU 194.6.1 (RIVDIV 593)</td>
<td>PBR</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG 52</td>
<td>PBR</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAG 24</td>
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Operating on the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers within an area approximately 43 miles in length that extends from four miles south of Phu Cuong (XT 810 780) upstream to Tri Tam (XT 480 460), the Tran Hung Dao V forces conducted WSOP's, river patrols, search and destroy operations, troop support, PSYOPS missions and ACTOV training in conjunction with the ground units, the 1st Infantry Division, USA, the 5th ARVN Division, and local RF/PP's, that have adjacent AO's.
The night WBG which has successfully interdicted numerous enemy movements across the rivers and streams in the past months detected almost a negligible number in March. The few incidents that did occur appeared to reflect the enemy's increased efforts to rid themselves of the tenacious allied river craft by employing ambush techniques on transiting units or by initiating a fire fight with the toss of a grenade at the boats positioned in a WBG.

The extremely low level of enemy activity that was experienced in the AO throughout the month was concomitant with intelligence reports that indicated that March was to be a period of reorganization and training as part of the enemy's forthcoming spring campaign which was considered to have begun on the evening of 31 March - 1 April when there was a marked increase in the number of enemy engagements throughout the 3rd CTZ. What action that did occur during the month was primarily concentrated in the frequently active area six miles northwest of Phu Cuong (vicinity XT 720 220).

The following narrative includes examples of the more significant incidents that occurred in the Tran Hung Dao V/Ready Deck AO.

While transiting south on the Saigon River 20 miles northwest of Phu Cuong (XT 526 362) on the afternoon of 12 March, RIVDIV 593 PBR's 761, 756, and 842, under the command of LTJG Hunter, were ambushed by four B-40 rockets and heavy automatic weapons fire from approximately 10 to 15 enemy soldiers positioned along the west bank of the river. The PBR's returned the fire, cleared the area, and
called for artillery and holo assistance from the 25th Infantry Division, U.S. The Army C and C helos arrived on the scene and evacuated the wounded, LTJG Hunter, BT3 Thompson, and BMC Rhea and the fatally wounded GMFSG Jacaruso to Cu Chi. Artillery was placed in the area, and an Army LHPT expended all its ordnance before departing the area. Following the air strikes and artillery firings, the PBR's began their long transit to Phu Cuong.

Later in the month, on 28 March, PBR's 842 and 756 of RIVDIV 593, with LT Mc Cumber in charge were guided by a Hoi Chanh on a search and destroy mission along a small stream six miles northwest of Phu Cuong (XT 722 222). Four large bunkers and one firing position were destroyed, and small amounts of food, personal clothing, and equipment were captured. Two of the bunkers displayed extremely fresh food that indicated they had been used within the previous hour.

That evening, LTJG Dougherty with PBR's 756 and 842 was positioned in a WBGP on the Saigon River in close proximity to the destroyed bunkers (XT 718 217). Remaining poised for action, the U.S. sailors took three VC under fire as they approached within five feet of the boats. As the units broke the WBGP, a grenade was thrown at one of the PBR's, but it failed to detonate. Two of the VC had been killed almost instantly at the point blank range, and the third was probably killed. The PBR's reconed the area by fire before a USA LHPT placed a strike with unknown results.
In another enemy grenade tossing incident, ENS Luong, VNN, the VNN advisor, Biil Noceri, and two VNN PBR's were silently watching the Saigon River and countryside from their WBGP 15 miles northwest of Phu Cuong (XT 610 33°). A lone hand grenade bounced off one of the VNN PBR's and detonated. The two boats broke their positions and took the suspected enemy locations under fire. Return enemy fire was received, and the area was completely saturated during four firing runs that effectively silenced the enemy. Final assessment of the enemy casualties was unknown.

During the early morning hours of 31 March, CPO Hoai, VNN, the USN advisor QMCS Land, and two VNN PBR's were enroute to Phu Cuong when they were ambushed by one B-40 and heavy automatic weapons fire only four miles from their destination (XT 717 185). The PBR's returned the fire and called in a USA LHF which expended all its ordnance with unknown results. The area was covered by USA Hand I artillery fire when the LHF departed the area. One VNN was seriously wounded in the brief confrontation.
Border Interdiction

For the past few months, the Border Interdiction Campaign has included the operational activity of both the Tran Hung Dao I AO and the Barrier Reef AO under the Operational Task Designator TG 19h.h.

On 15 March, Tran Hung Dao I became a combined operation with LCDR Giang, VNN, assuming the operational title Commander, Tran Hung Dao I and LCDR J. B. Bishop, USN, assuming the operational title Deputy Commander, Tran Hung Dao I. Commander, Tran Hung Dao I assumed the task designators CTG 212.h(VNN)/CTG 19h.8(USN), and the Deputy Commander, Tran Hung Dao I assumed the task designators CTU 212.h.0/CTU 19h.8.0. LCDR P. T. Souval, USN, assumed the duties as Senior Advisor to CTG 212.h along with his other duties as Commander, Border Interdiction Group with the task designator CTG 19h.h. Task Group 19h.h will continue operations in the Barrier Reef AO.

During the month, the combined forces continued to maintain the pressure on the enemy in his many attempts to infiltrate troops and supplies into the Republic of Vietnam by way of Cambodia. The water level of the Vinh Te Canal continued to drop and forced suspension of routine PBR operations to the west of N/S grid line VS 970 by 19 March.

During the month, the enemy suffered 33 confirmed killed in attempting to infiltrate the area. The U. S. Navy suffered only two wounded in action during the month in this area of operations.
During the month, CTG 19.4/19.8 had a daily average of 95 boats available and set an average of 43 LDGP's daily in the Tran Hung Dao I area of operations. In the Barrier Reef AO, CTG 19.4/19.8 had a daily average of 77 boats available for operations and set a daily average of 58 LDGP's.

On 3 March, PCF 37 of COSDIV 11, with LTJG Scattergood on board, suffered an underwater explosion under the stern of the boat near the canal locks located at VS 606 636 on the Vinh Te Canal. PCF 37 immediately commenced H and I fire on both banks. There was no return fire. PCF 37 then cleared the area to the west, and two more explosions were felt by the crew. PCF 37 suffered only slight damage to the starboard propeller and shaft. Apparently, the enemy had planted booby trapped grenades in the shallow water near the lock.

On 7 March, My Phouc Tay Special Forces Company requested PBR support for CIDG units in heavy contact 12 kilometers south of Ap Bac at XS 170 609. PBR's 773 and 778 of RIVDIV 551 under Patrol Officer Lt Smalley scrambled and provided a blocking force along the Tong Doc Loc Canal until 1715H when the boats were released and returned to My Phouc Tay. One hour later, a CIDG unit reported heavy contact, and the PBR's were again scrambled to provide support. On arrival on station, the boats came under B-40 rocket and heavy automatic weapons fire from both banks at XS 168 609. The PBR's immediately returned fire and placed 60mm mortar fire into the area. Black Ponies were requested but on arrival overhead were unable to conduct
... striker due to ground troops moving into the area. LT Smelley received a slight shrapnel wound during this encounter.

On 7 March, during a dufflebag implant mission, two VC from the 507th in were captured. They revealed that dufflebag directed artillery has been responsible for several kills in the Barrier Reef AO. They stated that the VC cannot understand how the artillery happens to be fired at them for no apparent reason in the middle of the night.

The use of dufflebag sensors and artillery is believed to be a very important contributing factor in the reported low morale of VC in this area.

Another report by Dufflebag operating personnel states that the combined use of sensors and the Army radar has proven again to be extremely effective. Almost every activation in the Vinh Gia AO has been confirmed by the radar at that location.

Enemy activity has definitely been on the upswing. In the Vinh Gia AO, the VC/NVA mission is to cross the canal while in the Ha Tien AO; more emphasis has been placed on attacking the boats, not only at night but in the late afternoon.

On 17 March, the stern sentry on USS IREDELL COUNTY (LST 839), anchored at 15 40 85 in Khanh Phong Province, sighted an object floating in the water near the ship. The sentry fired a short burst at the object. The object exploded with a bright flash. There was no damage to the ship nor injury to personnel.
In the early part of March, 20 Strike Assault Boats (STAB's) joined TG 194.4 as TG 194.4.7.2. The STAB's concept is a relatively new one and has evolved, in a ten month period, from the drawing board to production to in-country delivery. The STAB's unit had some minor growing pains getting organized and trained for operation on the Delta waterways. By 8 March, CTG 194.4 laconically reported that the "STAB's are out of gas." His comment was quite true but was primarily the result of intensive usage of the boats for training and secondarily that the support functions had not yet become totally operative and had not yet developed usage data in order to properly support the boats.

On 16 March, Stabron 20 units, STAB's 709 and 716, in coordination with T-27 and A-15, assisted MILO Cao Lanh in recovering an arms cache in reaction to an agent's report. The boats recovered the cache from underwater in the middle of Phuoc Xuyen village, Kien Phong Province at VS 660 777. The cache consisted of one B-40 rocket and launcher, one Chicom light machine gun, type 56, and one Chicom light machine gun, type 58. The agent reported that an unknown size NVA element had cached the weapons after crossing the canal at that location in the night of 10 March.

On 16 March, at the request of the Dong Tien District Chief, Seawolves 93 and 95 placed an airstrike at VS 481 870 approximately six kilometers northeast of An Long. The Seawolves had four secondary explosions and had one B-40 fired at them. CTE 194.4.5.1 coordinated with the Dong Tien District Chief and requested that a
Black Pony strike be made in the same area. Black Ponies 103 and 11th were diverted to the area. Following the Seawolf strike, Dong Tien District 99: RF Company moved from their night position to the area of the Seawolf contact. At 2030H, the troops observed 50 VC approximately 800 meters north of their position. At 20h01H, Black Ponies 103 and 11th were briefed on the contact area and informed that there were no U.S. forces on the ground to direct the airstrike. The Black Ponies, flown by LCDR Hardie and LTJD Baily, agreed to attempt to work with the RF Company through Aspirant Tin who spoke fair English.

At 2050H, communications were established between the Black Ponies and the ground troops. At 20h45H, Black Ponies rolled in on the strike zone. This may have been the first time that RF troops directed Black Ponies in a close fire support mission without any U.S. advisor assistance. The troops marked the target area with tracers as the Black Ponies put in the strike. At 2055H, the troops reported that the VC were shooting at the aircraft. At 2110H, the Black Ponies completed the strike.

The troops, who had been receiving light machine gun and automatic weapons fire throughout the engagement suppressed the enemy fire at 2111H. The troops then requested illumination for a sweep of the area. At 2115H, the Black Ponies departed for home base due to a low fuel state.
During the early morning hours of 29 March, VC/NVA units launched well coordinated simultaneous attacks against friendly positions at Chi Lang, Ba Xoai, Kien Luong cement plant, Tri Ton, and outposts within the Seven Mountains. CTG 194.8 immediately responded with Seawolves from HAL 3 Dets 3 and 5 and Black Ponies from VAL-4.

As night turned into day, U.S. Army helo assets were brought to the scene, and continuous strikes were placed throughout the day. All indications are that the enemy was well routed.

As a result of the effective initial enemy strikes, all the land based helo refueling and rearming facilities in the combat area were rendered useless. Both YRBM-20 and YRBM-16 quickly commenced to support the continuous airborne avalanche.

During the periods 290200 - 0430H and 290730-1700H, both YRBM's were called upon to conduct upwards of 150 individual rearming/refueling evolutions on aircraft ranging from armed UH-6 LOH through UH-1B Seawolves to heavily laden AH-1G Cobras.

Easter Sunday was a day of rest for some, but for the officers and men of the YRBM's, it was a tiring day of silent but critical support.
Search Turn

Raid 75, which was committed to Operation Search Turn on 23 February making it a combined USN/VNN operation named Operation Search Turn/Tran Hung Dao VI, conducted interdiction operations on the Rach Gia - Ha Tien Canal utilizing daylight patrols and night WBGP's. In view of the imminent movement of NVA units through the Search Turn AO, C'U 194.3 considered RAID 75 a particularly desirable asset. In addition to operations on the Rach Gia - Ha Tien Canal, RAID 75 also set patrols and WBGP's on the Kien Lyinh Quynh Canal. In addition to their primary mission of interdiction, the RAID assisted local Province Troops in coordinating and providing transportation for them across the Kien Lyinh Quynh in a sweep type operation.

Activity in the Search Turn AO rose during the month of March with 26 hostile fire incidents being recorded as compared to February's 17. Search Turn units accounted for enemy losses of 40 kills and 27 probable kills, a rise from the previous month's 16 and 13 respectively. Enemy craft loss totals were down, however, from February's seven destroyed and 12 damaged to one destroyed and one damaged in March. There were, however, four enemy craft captured this month, a rise of three over last month. While
enemy losses rose in March, friendly losses remained at February's level. There were two USN and one friendly killed in February; there were three friendlies killed in March's operations. February also saw three USN and two VNN wounded while March's total rose to six USN and 16 friendlies wounded.

At the end of the month, Search Turn assets included two UH-1B's and 64 water craft which included 37 PBR's, 14 ATC's, four ASPB's, three Boston Whalers, one Monitor, one Zippo, one LSSC, one BWH, and one MSSC.

Toward the end of March, the Gulf of Thailand weather and sea conditions deteriorated to the point where there was an average of less than three hours daily when LST support could be accomplished. Thus on 27 March, the USS HUNTERDON COUNTY (LST 8381) was given order to depart the vicinity of Rach Gia and proceed to the vicinity of Long Xuyen on the Bassac River where it arrived on 30 March ready to resume support for CTG 194.3.

The following incident narrative is typical of March's activity in the Search Turn AO.
During a day patrol (vic WS 005 345) on 6 March, PER's of RIVDIV 573, under Patrol Officer EMC Walker and Boat Captains RD1 Waters and RD1 Thompson, were checking water traffic when they were stopped by a sampan occupied by two men and one woman who said that VC tax collectors upstream had taken their money and raped their woman. Proceeding upstream, the unit encountered a group of 20 people dressed in a mixture of khaki, camouflaged, and black pajamas. The people were armed and indicated that they were RD cadre protecting the populace. The units checked with an outpost two kilometers downstream and determined that a bandit group had been robbing and raping local populace along the Tri Ton Canal on both sides of the Kien Giang Province boundary. The units returned and observed men escaping with M-16 rifles. The remainder were taken aboard. The apparent leader of the group was dressed in a very old, ragged RD uniform. He stated that the group's purpose was to protect fishermen and that their home was an undetermined outpost at the base of Seven Mountains. The people were taken to the Sector NILO for interrogation. In all, there were 25 people detained and seven rifles, two grenades, and six bandoliers of ammunition captured.

On the previous day, a patrol in the same area had captured a VC flag and banner which warned that black pajama clad local
forces were an enemy of the VC and would be killed. This banner might have been in reference to this group or could have been a rouse to discredit RD cadre or PSDF. Intelligence received on 6 March was that 200 VC had been in the same general area for the previous three nights.

At 0015H on 18 March, PBR's of RIVDIV 553 observed 11 VC/NVA approaching their position on the Tri Ton Canal 20 miles northwest of Rach Gia (WS 010 380) from the east. Both craft opened fire when the enemy was 250 meters out and caught them in a withering .50 caliber cross fire. They received A/W, R/F, and rifle grenades in return. Seawolves were requested on Scramble Two, and at 0019H Black Ponies were also requested. The Seawolves were on station and putting in a strike at 0035H, and the Black Ponies put in their strike at 0046H and left the area at 0110H. Two hours later, one VC/NVA was sighted in the contact area and taken under fire. At 0400H, two PBR's were dispatched to the contact area to assist in the sweep and to provide cover. At 0630, a sweep revealed three bodies and two distinct heavy blood trails. There were no friendly casualties while the enemy suffered three killed (BC) and two probably killed. The units were also responsible for capturing one AK-47, five AK-47 magazines, one kilo of documents, ten kilos of rice, and two Chicom grenades.
The next day, units of RIVDIV 553 were again engaged in action in approximately the same area while establishing a WEGP on the Tri Ton Canal 20 miles northwest of Rach Gia (WS 008 380) when PBR's 8131 and 8132 uncovered 21, 60 pound sacks of rice which were camouflaged and cached 20 feet from the Tri Ton Canal bank. The WBGP was set, but there was no action throughout the night. At 0700H on the 20th, SEAL elements were inserted in the cache area and cleared the PBR's about 3,000 meters to the south. At 0857H, the units observed 19 VC in a spread out line coming from the direction of Seven Mountains. They were observed to be in blue or black uniforms, and six of them were seen to be carrying or pushing a large object. At 0900H, a Shotgun aircraft was requested for visual reconnaissance. At 0909H, Sector clearance to fire was obtained. Sixteen minutes later, the enemy turned parallel to the canal and reached apparent CPA at about 2,500 meters. Fifteen minutes later, the VC were observed evading into cover upon hearing the aircraft. At 0946H, the PBR's opened fire, and at 1025H, Seawolves arrived on station and coordinated a strike with the Shotgun aircraft. One detainee was picked up north of the original contact area and delivered to Kien Son. The man was determined to be a PF from the Tri Ton District who had wandered one kilometer south of the Province border while fishing. At 1410H, a report was received from the 21st ARVN Division that one company of VC was
in the contact area. At approximately 1430H, the 21st ARVN inserted an Air Cavalry package to sweep the area. There were negative results. Enemy casualties in this action included five VC killed and 1,260 pounds of rice captured.

In the early evening of 19 March, CTU 194.3, 3 Seawolves 86 and 81, piloted by LCDR Thomas and LTJG McNaull respectively, were on a Scramble Three for 90 VC observed by Shotgun 38 in Kien Giang Province 12 miles northwest of Rach Gia (VS 970 200). With clearance from CTG 194.3 and the Kien Giang PSA, the aircraft placed rocket and machine gun fire into the area. The result of this action was six VC killed (BC) and nine VC wounded with no friendly casualties suffered.

In reaction to intelligence gained from MI 525 that a VC medical station was located along the Rach Thong Lua Canal, SEAL Team One, Det GOLF, DELTA Platoon, BRAVO Squad, under LT Hetzer, one LDNN, one KCS, and one interpreter were inserted by sampan on 21 March northeast of Rach Gia (WS 145 065). They proceeded approximately 75 meters up the canal when they observed four men carrying weapons 25 meters in front of their position on the north bank. The sampan was pulled into the tree line, and the LDNN jumped from the craft to the tree line. There was immediate movement from the target area which was taken under A/W fire. The
LDNN was wounded and was extracted by MSSC for return to Rach Gia airstrip for dustoff where he was pronounced dead on arrival by a naval doctor.
Riverine Strike Group

During March, all WAC formerly assigned to CTG 19.7 (Riverine Strike Group) remained out-chopped to other operational commanders with the exception of those craft undergoing overhaul or alteration.

During the month, USS SPINDL (ARL-21) completed installing two 3.5 inch bazookas on each of eight ASPB's. Current plans are to install bazookas on fourteen more boats.

The bazooka installation is expected to increase the effective firepower on each boat. As of this writing, no report has been received describing the effectiveness of the new 3.5 inch bazooka installation in a combat situation.
Breezy Cove

The level of enemy activity in the Breezy Cove AO decreased during the month of March. There is nothing concrete on which to base any reason for this reduction of activity. Events occurring in Cambodia may have been a contributing factor.

Enemy kills dropped to the lowest level in the past four months with only 14 kills being reported during the month of March. All the kills reported were attributed directly to U. S. Navy units. Eight U. S. Navy personnel were wounded during the month's action. The majority of those wounded were not serious in nature and were returned to duty without further complications.

The total number of boats assigned to the Breezy Cove operation during the month averaged 21 on a daily basis. However, there were several casualties to the boats with the total number of boats available for use dropping to a low of only ten boats on 17 March. The number of WBOP's set on a daily basis fluctuated widely due to the wide variety of casualties. On 19 March, only ten boats were available due to all FBR's assisting in Gulf of Thailand patrols, and no WBOP's were set. The daily average of WBOP's was, however, six per day.

Significant actions occurring during the month of March are described in the following paragraphs.
On 3 March, "B."s 49 and 138 of RIVDIV 572 under Patrol Officer CIC Moore were in WBG on the north bank of the Song Ong Doc at VQ 852 999. At 202h1, the boats detected movement near their position. A minute later, three VC jumped in front of PBR 138 and took the boat under fire with small arms. The forward gunner of PBR 138 immediately opened fire killing all three of the enemy. The boats broke WBGP and made a firing run and received moderate automatic weapons return fire. The boats broke WBGP and made a firing run and received moderate automatic weapons return fire. The boats made a second firing run and received no return fire. Friendly casualties totaled four USN wounded. All wounds were slight. Enemy casualties were three VC killed (BC).

On 21 March, Black Ponies, operating in the vicinity of the Breezy Cove AO, placed strikes in a wooded area at WR 179 389 to WR 188 384 where 150 VC had been reported along a canal bank. Enemy casualties reported from this strike were: 25 VC killed (BC), 30 VC wounded, two structures destroyed, one sampan destroyed, and six fires started. (Note: Kills from this operation are not included in the statistical summary).

On 23 March, Seawolf 66, piloted by LCDR Beck, was on routine patrol along the Song Ong Doc when at 173h1, an explosion was heard in the engine compartment. LCDR Beck experienced a power failure and immediately put the helicopter into auto rotation. The Seawolf landed at WR 080 105 without injury to the crew or further damage to the helicopter. The accompanying helicopter, Seawolf 63, piloted by LTJG Wolfe, remained overhead and requested Black Pony assistance.
for security. Two A-57's one ATC, and one Monitor were scrambled from
old Tour Long Doc to assist. An HSSC with SEAL's embarked departed the
ATSB at 1845H to provide additional ground security. Dustoff 66, on a
routine mission, diverted to the area and extracted the crew of Seawolf
66 at 1800H. All units were standing by providing security and support
when, at 1850H, a Chinook helicopter arrived and lifted the downed air-
craft out safely at 1900H. All units then resumed their normal patrols.
The entire operation, from the time of the accident to the successful
completion of the rescue mission, was only one hour and 24 minutes.

On 31 March, PBR's 145 and 136 of RIVDIV 577 were in night VBGP
at VQ 860 999. At 2040H, the boats sighted a man on the beach and
heard heavy movement in the area. The boats took the area under fire
and broke VBGP receiving small arms fire from an estimated five firing
positions. As the lead boat broke VBGP, a satchel charge exploded close
aboard the port bow of the boat knocking the bow gunner unconscious.
The patrol cleared the area to the west. Seawolves were requested
and placed a strike in the ambush area at 2015H. Friendly casualties
were evacuated by Dustoff helicopter. There were two USN wounded, both
with possible skull fractures. Enemy casualties were one VC killed.
MARKET TIME RAIDER CAMPAIGN

Market Time Raiders continued to conduct SEA LORDS missions along the rivers and canals of the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones during March. There were 69 missions conducted which resulted in 41 hostile fire incidents, 25 friendly initiated, seven enemy initiated, and nine unilateral. Enemy losses for the month were 25 craft and 72 structures destroyed, two craft and 62 structures heavily damaged. There were 21 enemy killed, one wounded, and nine captured during the SEA LORDS missions.

There were no U. S. personnel or material casualties during the month, although there were five friendly wounded and one killed during the operations.

The following craft and personnel participated in SEA LORDS missions during March: USN - PCF's, WPB's, River Assault Craft, SEAL Team Detachment Golf, CHARLIE Platoon, OV-10's; VN: PCF's, LSIL's, RF/PF's, LDNN's, Coastal Group 36 junks and personnel, and Kit Carson Scouts.

The PT CAUTION (USCG WPB), LTJG Andrews commanding, conducted a SEA LORDS mission on the morning of 4 March about 23 miles east of Ben Tre (XR 828 123). The targets were
VC supply routes and structures, with many well-used trails surrounding the area. The WPB destroyed six bunkers, two structures and one sampan, and damaged six bunkers and one structure. Enemy casualties were unknown.

On the afternoon of 8 March, the USCG WPB's PT MARONE and PT PARTRIDGE entered a canal off the Co Chien River about 20 miles southeast of Tra Vinh (XR 730 719) taking targets of opportunity under fire. During the transit of the canal both units played Psyops tapes to people along the canal banks. The WPB's destroyed four bunkers, two structures, and five sampans and damaged two structures, two sampans, and four bunkers. They also ignited two large fires. There was one VC wounded and no friendly casualties.

The PT CAUTION, PT PARTRIDGE, and PT WELCOME conducted a SEA LORDS mission on the afternoon of 10 March about 15 miles southeast of Tra Vinh (XR 733 874). The WPB's entered a canal and took targets along both banks under destructive fire. Several VC were sighted during the canal transit and taken under fire. There were several secondary fires and explosions which indicated enemy storage areas. An evaluation of the area indicated heavy enemy activity. Upon exiting the canal, bunker complexes were taken under M-79 fire and then OV-10's from VAL-4 placed
strikes in the area. There were no friendly casualties and four VC were killed and one VC wounded. The WPB’s destroyed 21 structures and one sampan and heavily damaged 30 structures and several bunkers.

On the night of 10 March, SEAL Team, Detachment GOLF, CHARLIE Platoon attempted to establish a waterborne guard post in the vicinity of a known VC crossing point about 14 miles east of Soc Trang (XR 340 545). The SEAL’s, while proceeding north up the Bassac River, encountered a sampan moving toward their skimmer. The sampan was illuminated and hailed; however, two male occupants attempted to swim ashore and were killed and their sampan destroyed. The mission was then aborted due to being compromised.

The USCG WPB’s PT PARTRIDGE and PT CAUTION and a Coastal Group 35 skimmer conducted a SEA LORDS mission on the afternoon of 17 March about 22 miles southeast of Tra Vinh (XR 698 640). As the units entered a canal, two VC were sighted and taken under fire. Proceeding on, 15 VC were sighted, who appeared to be setting up an ambush, and were taken under fire. Small arms fire was received and OV-10’s were called in, placed strikes in the area, and suppressed the fire. All units then exited the canal without further incident. Two sampans and one bunker
were destroyed, and three bunkers and one structure were damaged.

There were no friendly casualties, and enemy casualties were nine VC probably killed.

SEAL Team ONE, Detachments DELTA and GOLF, and LDNN's, operating on SEAL intelligence, were inserted at 2330H, 17 March, by LSSC about 20 miles southwest of Tra Vinh (XR 276 668) to conduct a night reconnaissance patrol. The SEAL's patrolled to the targeted hootch and established a perimeter. The structure was entered and small arms fire was received, wounding one LDNN who died en route to the Third Surgical Hospital, Binh Thuy. Small arms fire was received and suppressed from the south bank of the stream and light automatic weapon cross fire was received from three positions. The SEAL's withdrew by sampan southwest down the canal and were extracted by LSSC. There were seven VC killed and one VC detained. Three of the VC killed were identified as a deputy secretary at Long Phu, a security section chief at Tan Thanh village, and an area chief at Koko hamlet. One LDNN was slightly wounded and returned to duty.

In a SEA LORDS mission on the afternoon of 19 March, the PT CYPRESS and PCF 21 inserted 140 Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PF) troops at two locations about 30 miles southwest of Tra Vinh (XR 291 416). The troops then swept toward each
other while the naval units established a blocking force and stood by for support. The troops made contact with the enemy and called for 81mm support. Helicopter gunships were called in and placed strikes in the area. The area swept by the troops contained numerous bunkers, mines, and several rice caches. The troops were extracted at 1800 without further incident. There were two VC killed and two Popular Force men killed. There were four sampans, ten bunkers, and two mines destroyed and an undetermined number of bunkers damaged during the operation.

SEAL Team ONE, Detachment GOLF was inserted by LSSC about 20 miles southwest of Tra Vinh (XR 271 646) on the morning of 20 March. They commenced patrolling north toward their objective, a VC facility, when eight armed VC were sighted and were taken under fire. Immediately automatic weapons fire was received from four locations. VAL-4, OV-10's were called in and placed several strikes in the area. The SEAL's destroyed one bunker and one structure and killed four VC. There were probably more enemy killed by the air strikes. There were no friendly casualties.

In a SEA LORDS mission on 24 March, the PT WELCOME (USCG WPB), LTJG Wyche commanding, fired a gunfire support
mission on numerous new structures about seven miles northwest of Tra Vinh (XS 405 069). Seven VC were spotted attempting to evade into the treeline and were taken under fire. The WPB destroyed five structures and damaged two structures. There were no friendly casualties and four VC were probably killed.

PCF's 21 and 103 picked up 36 Kit Carson Scouts (KCS) at 1800H on 25 March and inserted them along a canal about 12 miles east of Tra Vinh (XR 770 890). The KCS proceeded to sweep the area where a VC company was suspected to be located. The Swift boats conducted H and I fire during the mission with unknown results. The KCS made contact with the enemy and OV-10's were called in and placed strikes in the area and drew light fire on three occasions. Extraction was made without further incident. There were no friendly casualties, and two VC were killed and three VC were captured. GDA by the Swift boats and OV-10's was unknown.

The PT BANKS (USCG WPB), LT Lashley commanding, and PCF 48 inserted 80 Regional Force troops about 20 kilometers east of Tra Vinh (XS 696 047) on 31 March, after prep fire of the beach. The area was the scene of recent enemy activity and contained many booby traps, bunkers, and VC sympathizers. The troops made contact with the enemy during their sweep. The
PT BANKS fired H and I throughout the day in support of the operation. There were four VC killed and no friendly casualties. One large structure and several booby traps were destroyed, and one sampan motor and numerous documents were captured. Further GDA was unknown.
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**Naval Statistical Summary (As of 1 April 70)**
### NAVAL STATISTICAL SUMMARY (AS OF 1 APRIL 70)

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( ) - Monthly totals
## NAVAL STATISTICAL SUMMARY (AS OF 1 APRIL 70)

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<td>73 (13)</td>
<td>70 (8)</td>
<td>175 (20)</td>
<td>51 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNIFF</td>
<td>198 (17)</td>
<td>716 (21)</td>
<td>56 (4)</td>
<td>52 (5)</td>
<td>90 (8)</td>
<td>62 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNILATERAL FIRINGS</td>
<td>126 (25)</td>
<td>1387 (40)</td>
<td>225 (27)</td>
<td>166 (33)</td>
<td>310 (30)</td>
<td>217 (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIVARIS</td>
<td>23 (1)</td>
<td>16 (2)</td>
<td>6 (0)</td>
<td>7 (0)</td>
<td>4 (0)</td>
<td>1 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-FUZZION CACHES &amp; CACHE WT. (TONS)</td>
<td>7 (0)</td>
<td>275 (6)</td>
<td>1 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>14 (0)</td>
<td>22 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER CACHES &amp; CACHE WT. (TONS)</td>
<td>11.5 (0)</td>
<td>142.9 (0)</td>
<td>4 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>12 (0)</td>
<td>4.3 (0.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPORTS OF PJEMY PLANS TO ATTACK PATROL CRAFT</td>
<td>145 (0)</td>
<td>198 (0)</td>
<td>27 (1)</td>
<td>8 (1)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAMOANS DESTROYED</td>
<td>252 (1)</td>
<td>327 (5)</td>
<td>160 (4)</td>
<td>266 (53)</td>
<td>309 (1)</td>
<td>1.44 (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

( ) - Monthly totals

* - Statistics not available.
Pages 45 and 46 not available and are not significant.
See the original.

28 Feb 85
COASTAL SURVEILLANCE FORCE SUMMARY

During March, Market Time and Stable Door forces continued routine operations with generally good weather prevailing throughout the Republic of Vietnam. There were 58,978 craft detected along the coasts and in the harbors during the month with 15,974 inspections and 12,231 boardings carried out resulting in the detention of 107 craft and 575 persons. There were 99 Viet Cong suspects detained during the month. The reasons for detainments were lack of or faulty identification, possession of contraband, incorrect or faulty manifests, violation of restricted zones, or other suspicious activity. In the Game Warden area of operations in the lower Bassac, Ham Luong, and Cua Tien Rivers, Market Time units detected 1,714 craft, inspected 1,653, and boarded another 1,820. There were two craft and seven persons detained.

Task Force 115 units continued to provide waterborne guardposts, troop lifts, blocking patrols, and naval gunfire in support of friendly ground operations along the coast and in the rivers and canals. There were no known large scale infiltration of men or supplies attempted during March. There were no U. S. casualties reported during the month although there were two friendlies killed and seven friendlies wounded. Enemy losses to the naval gunfire of Market Time units came to 108 confirmed killed, 109 probably killed, 24 wounded, and 23 captured.

Operation Market Time

The tempo of naval gunfire, SEALORDS, Sea Float, and Sea Tiger missions increased from the 499 conducted in February to 598 conducted
during March. Gun damage assessment (GDA) was the highest reported to date with 45 per cent of the missions reporting GDA. The number of confirmed enemy kills, 108, was also the highest killed in any one month by Market Time forces. The results of these missions were:

- 17 Viet Cong killed (108 body count, 109 probable), 24 Viet Cong wounded, 23 Viet Cong captured, 175 junks/sampans destroyed, 49 junks/sampans damaged, 626 structures/bunkers destroyed, and 287 structures/bunkers damaged.

There were 17 incidents of evading craft and personnel reported during the month. They were taken under fire in all cases with unknown results.

Surveillance operations resulted in the detection of 22,660 craft, and of these, 9,635 were inspected and 7,276 were boarded. There were 356 steel hulled vessels detected in Market Time areas during March, and 294 of these were inspected, and six were boarded. All were determined to be non-suspicious.

SEAL units attached to Task Force 115 conducted almost daily operations. The operations were conducted in the IV Corps Tactical Zone in support of the Market Time Raiders/SEA LORDS operations.

A Market Time aircraft located an SL-4 class trawler at 1223H, 11 March, at position 07° 15' N, 105° 25' E. The contact was designated 12F1. The USCGC HELLCOLN (WHEC 717) closed the contact and commenced overt surveillance. At 0705H on 13 March, the HELLCOLN was relieved by the SEVENTH Fleet ship USS BENNER (DD 807) with the
trawler at position 09°-105' N, 110°-76' E.

Commander Task Force 115 was advised at 1640H on 15 March that the SS COLUMBIA EAGLE was hijacked by two armed men and was proceeding to the central coast of Cambodia with an ETA of 1600H, 15 March. The USCGC MELON (WMEC 717) was dispatched, at best speed, to the scene to provide assistance as necessary. The USCGC MELON was the first U.S. unit on the scene outside of Cambodian territorial waters arriving at 1800H on 15 March. The COLUMBIA EAGLE was at that time anchored in the vicinity of 10°-22' N, 103°-15' E. Commander Task Force 115 chopped the USCGC MELON to Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Philippines at 2013H, 15 March.

The PT YOUNG (USCG WPB) and PT KENNEDY (USCG WPB) were decommissioned and transferred to the Vietnamese Navy on 16 March. Coast Guard Division TWELVE was decommissioned during the same ceremonies.

In a ceremony at Vung Tau on 27 March, the USCG WPB PT PARTHIDGE was decommissioned and transferred to the Vietnamese Navy.

First Coastal Zone

Weather conditions improved in the First Coastal Zone as the northeast monsoon season came to an end. The number of detections by U.S. forces decreased as the responsibility for patrol of areas 1 and 2 were turned over to the Vietnamese Navy on 28 February along with 11 PCF's and the Coastal Surveillance Center at Danang.
were 938 detections during the month, and of these, 317 were inspected, and 1\textsuperscript{1} were boarded.

There were approximately 40 naval gunfire support and Sea Tiger missions conducted, a decrease from the 59 reported in February. These were mostly Sea Tiger operations utilizing PBR's of Commander River Division 543.

On the afternoon of 3 March, the USCGC DALLAS (WHEC 716), in support of the U.S. 11th Light Infantry Brigade, received a call for a naval gunfire support mission. The three targets, consisting of bunkers and structures, were located about 10 miles southeast of Quang Ngai (BS 75 61). The five inch gun of the cutter destroyed eight bunkers, 12 structures, and two sampans and heavily damaged nine bunkers and 14 structures. There were three secondary explosions and two secondary fires.

Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) ELEVEN, Det HOTEL, with the Officer in Charge, LTJG S. McCrary, and one platoon of Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PF) troops conducted a 200 by 100 meters sweep of an area about four kilometers south of Hoi An (BT 146 530) on the morning of 7 March. Two PBR's inserted the troops and stood by for support. There was no contact made with the enemy during the sweep while ten bunkers and two wood structures were destroyed. The bunkers in this area were well built with cement bricks. There were no friendly casualties.
The USCG DALLAS inflicted heavy damage on enemy positions about eight miles southeast of Quang Ngai (BS 75 6th) on the afternoon of 10 March. The gunfire support mission was called for by the U.S. Army, 11th Light Infantry Brigade. The cutter destroyed five heavily fortified structures and damaged 15 others. There was one large secondary explosion and one secondary fire.

In a Sea Tiger mission on 14 March, PBR's of River Division 543 inserted UDT 11, Det H, and an eight man security force from the Second Combined Action Group about three kilometers south of Hoi An (BT 136 537). The Patrol Officer BMC Stokes, Boat Captains GMG401 Maxfield of PBR 47, and RD1 Krenk of PBR 114 then stood by for support. Following the bunker destruction mission, 30 - 40 VC were sighted as the troops were being extracted. Helicopter gunships were called in and took the area under fire with unknown results. The troops were then extracted without further incident. There were five bunkers destroyed and two booby trapped rounds recovered and turned over to the EOD team for disposition. There were no friendly casualties.

Patrol Officer BMC Turnbull with PBR's 47 and 67 conducted a WCP on the night of 15 - 16 March in the Sea Tiger AO about three kilometers south of Hoi An (BT 137 535). About 0600H, three VC were sighted walking toward the boats and were taken under fire at a distance of 25 feet. The PBR's then cleared the area. There were three VC killed and no friendly casualties.

PBR 67, under Boat Captain BM1 Mansfield, and PBR 114, under Boat Captain RD1 Krenk, with Patrol Officer BMC Stokes established
a WBGP about 14 kilometers west of Hoi An (BT 031 556) on the night of 16 March. Movement was heard in the elephant grass near the boats, and two fragmentation grenades were thrown on the bank as the boats withdrew. The PBR's established a second WBGP and after 30 minutes, three VC were sighted in the tall grass 20 feet from the boats and were taken under fire. The boats then cleared the area leaving three VC killed.

In a Sea Tiger mission on the night of 19 March, PBR's 47, 114, and 67 established a WBGP on the Vinh Dien River about six kilometers northwest of Hoi An (BT 054 636). Two VC were sighted on the west bank walking south, but the boats lost sight of them almost immediately. At 2030H, a sampan moved into the area with two persons on board and appeared to be looking for a signal as they moved north and south along the bank. One VC was then sighted on the west bank and a light sighted opposite the sampan on the east bank. Both banks were taken under fire, and as the PBR's approached the sampan to investigate, they received AK-47 fire which they suppressed. Nothing was found on the sampan, and it was destroyed. Two more VC were sighted on the west bank and taken under fire as the PBR's cleared the area and called in artillery fire. There were three VC probably killed and possibly several more killed in the mission.

On the night of 22 March, PBR's 67 and 95 were in a WBGP on the Ky Lam River about 10 kilometers west of Hoi An (BT 035 567) when two sampans with an unknown number of occupants were sighted crossing from north to south. The sampans were not taken under fire due to the
range; however, shortly afterwards, four VC were sighted on the bank and then taken under fire. Automatic weapons fire was received from three positions on the bank and suppressed as the boats cleared the area and called in artillery. There were four enemy probably killed in the Sea Tiger mission.

PBR 67, under Boat Captain BM1 Mansfield, and PBR 95, under Boat Captain BM1 Foster, and Patrol Officer RDC Armstrong established a TBO on the night of 24 March about three kilometers southwest of Hoi An (BT 031 558). A sampan with three VC was spotted crossing the river to the south and taken under fire. The PBR's got underway and spotted a second sampan with two VC and took it under fire with M-60 machine guns. Helo gunships were called in and took three additional sampans under fire. The PBR's and gunships received return enemy fire from the south bank during the entire action. A second flight of gunships arrived on the scene and placed strikes in the area but observed no further movement. At first light, the PBR's returned to the scene and destroyed the sampans hit by the gunships. There were no friendly casualties while the PBR's killed five VC, and the helo gunships killed three more VC. There were also five sampans destroyed.

On the afternoon of 30 March, UDT 11, Det H, and three companies of RF 2PF troops conducted a reconnaissance and bunker destruction mission in the Sea Tiger AO about seven miles south of Hoi An (BT 099 459). There was no enemy contact, and in the two hour operation, 22 bunkers were destroyed.
OPERATIONS IN THE FIRST COASTAL ZONE

- COASTAL ZONE
- COASTAL SURVEILLANCE CENTER
- HOSTILE FIRE/DESTRUCTION INCIDENT
- SAR/MEDEVAC INCIDENT

SCALE:

A. USCGC DALLAS - 3 MAR
B. Sea Tiger - 7 MAR
C. USCGC DALLAS - 10 MAR
D. Sea Tiger - 14 MAR
E. Sea Tiger - 15-16 MAR
F. Sea Tiger - 16 MAR
G. Sea Tiger - 19 MAR
H. Sea Tiger - 22 MAR
I. Sea Tiger - 24-25 MAR
J. Sea Tiger - 30 MAR
Second Coastal Zone

Weather conditions improved in the Second Coastal Zone as the number of detections of craft almost doubled from the February total of 5,782. There were 10,148 watercraft detected, and of these, 5,137 were inspected and another 2,682 were boarded resulting in the detention of nine craft and 62 persons for lack of or faulty identification, restricted zone violations, and suspected draft dodgers. In addition, one sampan attempted to evade and was destroyed.

The number of naval gunfire support missions decreased from the February total of 39 to 20 in March. There continued to be a minimum of gun damage assessment reported by Second Coastal Zone units.

On the evening of 5 March, on Hon Chua Island (CR 175 570), a Popular Forces man threw a grenade into a group of Vietnamese civilians, possibly as revenge for gambling losses. There were 11 persons hit by the grenade fragments; five died on the island; one died in transit in VNN PCF 3854; and the five wounded were taken to the Holy Family Hospital, Qui Nhon, for treatment.

Early on the morning of 11 March, PCF 61, while on normal Market Time patrol sighted a sampan without lights about 150 yards from the beach and about 14 miles northeast of Phan Rang (CN 03 93). The sampan then headed alongside a second sampan, and the "Swift" boat took them under fire killing two of the enemy and damaging two sampans. In addition, several secondary fires were ignited.
OPERATIONS IN THE
SECOND COASTAL ZONE

A. VNN PCF 385 - 5 MAR
B. PCF 61 - 11 MAR
C. PT CYPRESS - 12 MAR

Legend:
- Coastal Surveillance Center
\ - Hostile Fire/Evasion Incident
\ - SAR/MED/EVAC Incident

SCALE:
0 NAUTICAL MILES

CONFIDENTIAL
The PT CYPRESS (USCG WPB), while patrolling in area 5E, was called on for a gunfire support mission on the evening of 12 March about 19 miles northeast of Ohan Thiet (BN 128 199). The WPB closed the beach and fired .50 caliber machine guns at three VC attempting to evade over the sand ridge. Artillery fire was called in from Fire Support Base Sandy which saturated the area with 175mm rounds. The WPB then cleared the area with three VC probably killed.

Third Coastal Zone

Indigenous coastal traffic remained at about the same level as February with 6,021 detections of craft reported. Surveillance results improved as over 82 per cent of the craft were either inspected or boarded. There were 2,329 inspections and 2,659 boardings carried out during March and resulted in the detention of three sampans and 98 persons. The detentions were for lack of or faulty identification papers, incorrect or faulty manifests, possession of contraband, and curfew or restricted zone violations. The "Swift" boats continued their patrols in the Game Warden area of operations. During March, the lower Bassac River was patrolled continuously, and the Cua Tien River was patrolled from 1-25 March, and the Ham Luong River was patrolled from 26 - 31 March. There were 4,124 detection of craft during the month, 1,653 inspections, and 1,820 boardings carried out. There were only two craft and seven persons detained in the Game Warden AO and no reported incidents of evading craft.

Third Coastal Zone Market Time units conducted over 125 naval gunfire support missions during March in response to requests for
urgent gunfire support, H and I, targets of opportunity, or in pre-
planned river and canal incursions.

On the morning of 1 March, the PT WELCOME (USCG WPB), LTJG
Wyche commanding, while on normal Market Time Patrol in area 6H,
oberved a sampan with two Vietnamese females overturned about 15
miles southeast of Tra Vinh (XR 643 566). The sampan, which was
heavily loaded with rice, was reflotted and pumped out, and about
90 per cent of the cargo and the long shaft motor were recovered.
When the motor failed to start, the sampan was towed to the hamlet
where the Vietnamese lived. The rice cargo was properly manifested.

The PT PARTRIDGE (USCG WPB) fired a sector requested gunfire
support mission on the afternoon of 1 March in an area about ten miles
east of Soc Trang (XR 20 80). The WPB was on normal Market Time pa-
trol in area 7C at the time the request was received. The 81mm mortars
of the WPB destroyed three sampans and one structure and damaged one
sampan and burned two large piles of rice.

On the morning of 2 March, the PT PARTRIDGE detected two Chi-
nese Nationalist trawlers, YEONG SHYANG No. 3 and YEONG SHYANG No.
5 about 30 miles southeast of Phu Vinh (XR 76 55). The vessels were
wooden hulled, 80 tons, and 30 meters in length. The trawlers were
searched initially by the WPB; however, a thorough search was not
possible because of hard ice and fish in the holds. The VNN WPB 707
arrived and took custody of the trawlers at 13h5H and escorted them
to Cat Lo for a complete search and turnover of the trawlers and per-
sonnel to customs officials.
Kit Carson Scouts (KCS) in contact with the enemy about five miles east of Tra Vinh (XR 503 067) requested gunfire support from the PT CAUTION on the evening of 5 March. The KCS were receiving fire from an estimated 60 VC. After the KCS were extracted, the WPB directed .50 caliber fire into the area probably killing four VC and destroying one structure. The KCS killed two VC and captured two others. There were no friendly casualties.

The PT BANKS (USCG WPB) launched her skimmer on the afternoon of 29 March to conduct a daylight visual reconnaissance of an area about 12 miles north of Tra Vinh (XS 693 038). The skimmer entered a canal and received automatic weapons and small arms fire from four concealed ambush locations on both banks of the canal. The WPB suppressed the fire with .50 caliber, and then fired .81mm mortars on both banks. A helo gunship in the area was called in and placed a strike in the area. It was estimated that at least two of the enemy were wounded. The WPB destroyed three sampans and two structures and heavily damaged three structures. There were no friendly casualties.

PCF's 48 and 87 conducted a corral operation on 29 March about six miles west of Ben Tre (XS 500 250). The operation was designed to disrupt enemy infiltration and supplies that were reported in the area. There were approximately 100 junkes and sampans boarded during the operation; however, nothing suspicious was observed and no one was detained.
Fourth Coastal Zone

Market Time units returned to the Fourth Coastal Zone at 1200H on 10 March to man seven special patrol areas in Market Time area nine to counter reported Viet Cong infiltration by sea. The units, consisting of four PCF's and 18 PBR's, were assigned to Commander Task Group 115.4/213.4 for a ten day evaluation period. At the completion of eight days operations, 36 persons had been detained for fishing in restricted zones or lack of identification cards; however, none of the detainees were classified as Viet Cong or Viet Cong suspects. Although the results did not substantiate intelligence reports of large scale enemy infiltration in this area. Commander Task Force 115 recommended that these patrols be maintained at their present level and be extended for an additional 20 days and based his recommendation on the situation in Cambodia and the possibility of an increased exodus from Cambodian territory by enemy units.

On 20 March, COMNAVFORV directed that eight PBR's be chopped to Commander Task Group 194.0 for assignment to CTG 194.2. On 24 March, six PBR's were chopped to Commander Task Group 194.3 leaving four PCF's and four PBR's for the Special Gulf of Thailand patrol.

The Market Time surveillance units detected 5,465 craft in their special patrol areas. Surveillance results were high as over 80 per cent of the craft were either inspected or boarded. There were 2,014 inspections and 2,483 boardings resulting in the detention of 128 persons.
OPERATIONS IN THE FOURTH COASTAL ZONE

A. PBR's - 10 MAR
B. PBR's 55 & 145 - 12 MAR
C. PCF 75 - 16 MAR
D. PCF 36 - 20 MAR
E. PBR's 109 & 764 - 28 MAR
F. USCGC HAMILTON - 1 MAR
G. USCGC HAMILTON - 2 MAR
H. USCGC HAMILTON - 10 MAR
I. USCGC DALLAS - 23 MAR
J. USCGC CHASE - 26 MAR
K. USCGC CHASE - 26 MAR
L. USCGC DALLAS - 27 MAR
M. USS ORLECK - 30 MAR
N. USS ORLECK - 30 MAR
O. USS ORLECK - 31 MAR

SCALE: 0 - Nautical Miles 30

CA MAU POINT

CONFIDENTIAL

63
Special Gulf of Thailand Patrol

While on patrol on the night of 10 March in special Market Time area BRAVO Two, PBR's of RIVDIV 572 sighted an unlighted sampan about 20 miles north of Song Ong Doc (VR 813 340). The sampan with three occupants immediately evaded to the beach. The sampan was illuminated and taken under fire destroying the sampan. Enemy casualties were unknown.

On the morning of 12 March, PBR's 55 and 145, while on patrol, observed a sampan on the beach about 20 miles north of Song Ong Doc (VR 814 382). Upon closing the sampan, it was found to be abandoned with two other sampans about 200 meters to the south, one of which was camouflaged. Due to shallow water, the PBR's were unable to get closer than 200 meters to the sampans, and they were taken under fire damaging all three sampans.

At 2100H, on the night of 16 March, PCF 75 detected three unlighted sampans close to shore about 23 miles north of Song Ong Doc (VR 804 3). PBR 55 and PBR 145, in company with the "Swift" boat, searched the sampans and found various medical supplies and shovels made from ammo boxes and metal casings. One of the occupants stated that he lived in a village close by, and that there were several VC in the area. The three sampans, with nine Vietnamese, were detained and turned over to authorities in Song Ong Doc for further questioning.
On the afternoon of 20 March, PCT 36 was transitting from An Thoi to Ha Tien when BMISA Tran Van Duc fell overboard and drowned. The body was recovered and returned to An Thoi for further disposition.

PBR's 109 and 764 of RIVDIV 513 were on patrol at 1300 on 28 March in special Market Time area ULU about 14 kilometers northwest of Rach Gia (VS 988 160) and stopped and searched a sampan. The PBR's found three dead and two wounded Vietnamese. The occupants claimed to have been fired on by a helicopter at 1100H that morning. The occupants were taken to Rach Gia and turned over to the MILPHAP team for disposition.

Gulf of Thailand Offshore Patrol Unit Area 8/9 (WMEC Assigned) CG 115.6

On the afternoon of 1 March in a mission cleared by the Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer (NGLO), Ca Mau, the USCGC HAMILTON (WHEC 715) fired on a suspected Viet Cong base area about nine miles northeast of New Song Ong Doc (VR 855 145). The cutter destroyed one large structure and one bunker and heavily damaged five structures. In addition, there were three enemy probably killed.

The next afternoon, the HAMILTON was again called on to fire a destructive mission on a VC base area and ammo cache about seven miles north northeast of New Song Ong Doc (VR 850 117). In the mission, the five inch gun of the cutter destroyed one structure, damaged three structures and probably killed three VC.
On the afternoon of 10 March, the USCGC HAMILTON fired a mission on structures, bunkers, and approximately 20 VC in an area about 9 miles north northeast of New Song Ong Doc (VR 860 143). The mission was requested and cleared by the Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer (NILO), Ca Mau. In this mission, the cutter destroyed ten structures and one large sampan and damaged one sampan and 11 structures. There was one secondary explosion. Enemy casualties were unknown.

The USCGC DALLAS (WHEC 716) fired two missions on the afternoon of 23 March about five and eight miles northeast of Song Ong Doc (VR 862 059, VR 854 114). The missions were requested by CTG 194.2 and cleared by the NILO, Ca Mau. In the two missions, the cutter destroyed five structures, one bunker and damaged nine structures and two bunkers. Enemy casualties were unknown.

On the morning of 26 March, the USCGC CHASE (WHEC 718) received a call for fire in support of the 21st ARVN Division. The target was described as a VC position along a canal and located about 7 miles northeast of Song Ong Doc (VR 837 108). The cutter destroyed four structures and three sampans and damaged 11 structures, four bunkers, and two sampans. A late report credited the cutter with one VC killed.

In the afternoon, the CHASE was again called upon to provide support to 21st ARVN Division, about eight miles northwest of Song Ong Doc (VR 859 114). The targets were described as VC structures, sampans, and troop concentrations. The five inch gun of the cutter destroyed one structure and one sampan and damaged three structures and one sampan. There was one VC killed.
The USS CINCINNATI (MHEC716) fired on three enemy positions on the afternoon of 27 March about eight miles north of Song Ong Doc (VR 832 157). The mission was requested and cleared by CTG 194.2. The cutter destroyed seven structures and seven sampans and heavily damaged 14 structures, seven sampans and one bunker. There were three VC probably killed.

The USS CALEB (DD 886) conducted a call fire mission on the morning of 30 March about three miles north of Song Ong Doc (VR 810 504). The mission was requested by the NILO Ca Mau and consisted of VC structures. The five inch gun of the destroyer damaged 23 structures and ten sampans and destroyed 10 structures and four sampans. There were two VC killed.

In the afternoon, the ORLECK fired a mission about 25 miles north of Song Ong Doc (VR 839 512) on VC structures. This mission was requested by the 7th ARVN Division. There were three structures and one bridge destroyed and three structures damaged along with one secondary explosion. Enemy casualties were unknown.

The following morning, the destroyer was again requested to provide gunfire support to the 7th ARVN Division. The targets were located about 10 miles north of Song Ong Doc (VR 829 006) and consisted of structures and VC concentrations. There were three structures destroyed and eight structures damaged and one VC killed.
Stable Door

There were 30,318 craft detected by Stable Door forces in the harbors of the Second Coastal Zone during March, more than 10,000 more than the February total of 26,383. Of these, 6,309 were inspected and another 4,955 were boarded. As a result of these checks, 25 craft and 200 persons were detained for lack of or altered identification papers, possession of contraband, or restricted zone violations.

Unit One - Vung Tau

On 2 March, Picket 29 stopped a 90 foot junk for routine inspection and found a burlap bag containing ten pounds of marijuana. The Master, Vuong Asat, crew, and contraband were detained and turned over to the Coastal Group 33 advisor for disposition.

Picket 29 while on routine patrol was hailed by the fishing trawler YOUU SHINE 3 and requested to transport a crew member suffering from appendicitis to the pier. The crew member was taken to the pier where a 345th Medical Dispensary ambulance transported the patient to the dispensary for treatment.

On 16 March, the SS HOWELL LINES, anchored in Foxtrot Eight, notified the Harbor Entrance Control Post (HECP) that they had an injured man aboard and requested assistance. Picket 29 was dispatched to transport the man to the MSTS piers where an Alaska Barge and Transport ambulance transported him to the 345th Medical Dispensary for treatment.
The USS PAGE COUNTY (LST1076), anchored in Foxtrot Fourteen, requested assistance from the HECP in transporting three injured men to the hospital on 23 March. LCPL 33 picked the injured men up and took them to the MSTS piers where a hospital ambulance transported them to the 345th Medical Dispensary for treatment.

Unit Two - Cam Ranh Bay

Specialist 5 Thomas Turner, U. S. Army, a generator ship sentry, was embarked on LCPL 45 on a routine patrol on the evening of 6 March for indoctrination. During the patrol, Turner dropped a concussion grenade in the boat after pulling the pin. The boat captain, SM2 Tate, told everyone to jump over the side. Turner attempted to retrieve the grenade, and it exploded in his left hand. Turner was taken to the 12th Air Force Hospital were it was reported that he lost his left forearm and hand. There was only minor damage sustained by LCPL 45.

Early on the morning of 9 March, a swimmer at the north end of Cam Ranh Village was investigated by Skimmer 27. A Vietnamese beaching a flotation device, probably an air mattress about four feet by two feet, was observed. The swimmer successfully evaded, and Skimmer 27 resumed normal patrol.

LCPL 66 stopped a water taxi, on the morning of 15 March, for a routine inspection. A Vietnamese female was detained for having six one gallon cans of red lead primer in her possession with "U.S." marked on the cans. The paint was confiscated, and the detainee was turned over to the Military Police, Cam Ranh Bay, for disposition.
On the evening of 19 March, the AO MILICOM was preparing to get underway when she reported to the HECP that something was attached to her anchor chain. The BOD Team was notified and made an inspection; however, nothing was found.

Skimmer 26 reported a small junk in a restricted area near the Amo Pier was attempting to evade on the morning of 24 March. The Vietnamese aboard the junk grabbed something and started running up the sandbar. Warning shots were fired, but he continued running. As he passed the Skimmer, he threw something into the water, and SN Comandella shot him in the left arm. The boat crew then apprehended him and took him to Pier Three where an ambulance transported him to the 12th Air Force Hospital. Intelligence reports indicated that the Vietnamese, Nguyen Do, stated that he heard the warning shots but was afraid and he thought that he could escape completely if he was able to reach his hamlet. It further indicated that the detainee and family had lived in Su Chin village for six years. The BOD Team checked the area for the object which was thrown into the water with negative results.

On the evening of 27 March, Skimmer 27 reported two U. S. Army personnel departing Cam Ranh Village through the fence within five feet of the sentry and then proceeding north up the hill to the road. A short time later, two persons in civilian clothes using the same route to enter the village were hailed. One stopped and was turned over to the M.P.'s who identified him as a crewmember of the U. S. Steam Ship CANTON VICTORY. The M.P.'s also took the sentry into custody for dereliction of duty.
The Skimmer 30 stopped a water taxi on the evening of 29 March and detained two Merchant Marine Seamen who had boarded the taxi at Cam Ranh Village. The detainees, Gabriel Sellers and Thomas N. Eruska, were turned over to the Military Police for disposition.

**Unit Three - Qui Nhon**

The Harbor Entrance Control Post received reports on 5 March that a junk carrying VC and supplies had been sighted proceeding south. LCPL 69 was dispatched, and after firing, the junk came alongside. There were six persons aboard the junk but no weapons. Two more junks in the area were stopped and neither had any weapons on board. Fifteen persons were detained and turned over to the VNN S-2 for questioning.

On 10 March, the HECP was notified that a sweep was to be made by a combined police and Rural Force Troops and requested Unit Three to provide a blocking force. The troops picked up six U. S. personnel that were unauthorized absentees from their units and seven VC suspects.

At 0456H, on 12 March, an explosion occurred between the De- long Pier and the AMERCL OUD causing a hole eighteen feet by five feet, five feet below the waterline. The AMERCL OUD got underway and was pushed ashore by tugs to keep her from sinking. Two people were sighted in the area after the explosion and were taken under fire with negative results. The ship completed offloading and departed for Singapore for repairs on the afternoon of the 14th.
A 750 pound bomb was sighted by the 1st Platoon, 203rd Aero Reconnaissance Company on 10 March, and they requested the Stable Door EOD team to dispose of it. The team and three Sea Cobras were taken to the scene where a defensive perimeter was established, and the bomb detonated without incident.

On the night of 6-7 March in a preplanned operation, Sea Cobras were inserted by an Army skimmer near Vinh Quang Village. During the night, several persons were sighted attempting to determine the size of the force; however, no contact was made till daylight on the 7th when loud voices and two sampans were heard approaching their position. The team opened fire when they were within 30 feet killing one VC and wounding three more. The Sea Cobras also captured one VC.

On the morning of 23 March, a 14 month old girl was brought to the HECP with a deep three inch cut in her left leg suffered two days earlier. The assistant Officer-in-Charge cleaned the wound, and then Unit Three personnel took her to the Province Hospital for further treatment.

Unit Four - Nha Trang

A Vietnamese water taxi informed LCPL 43 on 2 March of a body floating in the harbor. LCPL 43 proceeded to the area and spotted the body of a Vietnamese boy. The body was taken to the Unit Four Pier and turned over to the Vietnamese National Police for further transfer to the Province Hospital.
Skimmers 28 and 74 provided transportation for 150 Montagnard troops and their U. S. advisors on the evening of 2 March.

On the night of 15 March, a U. S. Army Lark informed LCPL 44 that they had spotted a partly submerged object near the power ships. The Stable Door EOD Team proceeded to the area and found a 55 gallon drum partially filled with water but no explosives. The drum was towed to the beach for disposal.

Unit Four provided skimmer transportation throughout the month for small groups of ARVN and Montagnards. However, on 28 March, Skimmer 28 was tasked with providing transportation for Vice President Ky and his personal party from the VNN PGM 609 to his villa.

On 30 March, Skimmers 25 and 28, with Vietnamese National Police on board, conducted operations in the North River. The VNP boarded and searched approximately 35 craft and detained ten Vietnamese civilians and nine small arms of various types. All detainees and weapons were released after verification and identification.
Navy helicopter gunships assist in protecting a recently established village along the previously Viet Cong controlled Cua Lon River.
During March, there were over 265 gunfire support missions, including Sea Float and SEAL missions. The primary emphasis continued to be pacification of the Ca Mau peninsula, although the gunfire support missions were designed to maximize damage to known or suspected Viet Cong base areas, extortion stations, and secret zones. During the first two weeks of March, the enemy assumed a more aggressive posture as the number of enemy initiated firefights increased. Most of the activity was directed against the Mobile Strike Force troops, rather than the Naval units. However, pre-emptive sweeps by the MSF and SEAL's, and H and I fire by Naval units, have kept the enemy off balance. An example of this occurred on 6 March when nine rounds of H and I fire were placed on several VC reported about three kilometers north of Sea Float. A subsequent sweep of the area uncovered 32 75mm barrage rockets and 13 multiple tube rocket launchers in an L-shaped revetment. Part of the tubes were pointed at the Solid Anchor site and part were pointed at Sea Float. It was estimated that the enemy was about five hours away from launching his rocket attack when he was discovered.

To counter the enemy threat against friendly installations this month, U. S. and VN SEAL's, Kit Carson Scouts, and Mobile Strike Force troops continued the intensive use of randomized sweeps employed the latter part of February. This random area disruption continued to keep the enemy off balance by forcing him to move and denying him the long term use of previously secure base areas. Indications at
Month's end were that these operations had temporarily dispersed any general ground threat; although the enemy does have the capacity to rebuild and reposition.

The security of the Solid Anchor site was also enhanced by the operations in the area and permitted land fill and construction to progress. At month's end, approximately 35 per cent of the land fill was completed. The construction of the Advanced Tactical Support Base portion of Solid Anchor, or that portion which will house those facilities currently aboard Sea Float were 37 per cent completed and included ten large Southeast Asia Hut (SEAHUTS). Landfill was slower than originally anticipated because of rough weather, the dredge breakdown at Poulo Obi, and the strikes against NCK-BRIJ in Saigon.

The following U. S. and WIEI craft and units operated in the Sea Float AC during part or all of the month: PCF's 3, 9, 17, 22, 35, 36, 37, 38, 52, 56, 72, 73, 82, 89, 92, 94, 96, 691, 692, 693, 694, and 695; USS TERREL COUNTY (LST-1151), USS WASHOE COUNTY (LST-1165); USS ANTELOPE (PG 86), USS READY (PG 87), USS ASHEVILLE (PG 8h); LCPL; Sea Float River Assault Craft Detachment consisting of ATC's 4, 9, and 13, ASPB's 2 and 3, Zippo 2, and Utility Boat 2; SEAL Team Detachment GOLF; Underwater Demolition Team 12 Detachment GOLF, Duffle Bag Team CTE 194.1.5.2; Seawolves; Slicks; OV-10's; LSI's HQ L01, HQ L03, and HQ L01; LSSL HQ 228; LSSL HQ 331; VNN PCF's 01, 02, 02, 10, 12, and 13; Coastal Groups 33, 35, and 36 craft and personnel; VNN POLMAR Team; VE: Reaction Team; VNN Rangers; Mobile Strike Force troops; Mobile Strike Team TK; Detachments FOXTROT AND GOLF; Regional Force
troops; Kit Carson Scouts; and ELDI UPAC Team V.II 03. These forces continued to conduct psyops missions and escort services for logistics craft along the rivers and canals. Air assets provided psyops missions in those areas inaccessible to the craft. The afloat units and the Mobile Advanced Tactical Support Base conducted nightly H and I fire into known and suspected VC base camps and extortion areas.

CDR Patrick, Chief Staff Officer, CTF 115, and CDR Trang, Chief Staff Officer, CTF 213, attended ceremonies at the Trang Hung Dao I village on 7 March.

On 9 March, CAPT E. I. Finke, USN, Deputy Senior Naval Advisor, and CAPT K. T. Chan, VN Fleet Commander, were briefed on Sea Float and Solid Anchor and toured the Solid Anchor site, Tran Hung Dao villages, and the VNN ships.

RADM H. Suerstedt, USN, First SEA LORDS Commander, Commander Task Group 194.0, and MGEN Dolvin, USA, Prospective Chief of Staff, USMACV, visited Sea Float and were briefed on Sea Float operations and achievements on 10 March.

Commodore Tran Von Chon, VNN, Chief of Naval Operations and Captain Rauch, USN, Senior Naval Advisor, received a short operations briefing on 12 March. The party then visited the Biet Hai camp where Commodore Chon presented awards.

In an awards ceremony on 13 March, Brigadier General Nghi, ARVN, Commanding General, 21st ARVN Division, presented awards to two MSF
advisors, five U.S. sailors, and four VIJ sailors. Following the ceremony, the general toured the Tran Hung Dao villages.

On 13 March, Captain David F. Emerson, USN, relieved Commander T. R. M. Emory, USN, as Commander Task Group 115.7.

General Rosson, Deputy COMUSMACV, Vice Admiral E. R. Zumwalt Jr., USN, COMNAVFORV, BGEN Nghi, ARVN, CG, 21st ARVN Division, Rear Admiral Tridge, Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet Chaplains, Colonel Cuong, ARVN, Chief An Xuyen Province, and Captain Dise, USN, Commander Naval Support Activity, Saigon, visited Sea Float on 19 March and received briefing on current operations and construction progress of Solid Anchor.

On 22 March, Commander Paul E. Treagy Jr., USN, relieved Captain David F. Emerson, USN, as Commander Task Group 115.7.

Vice Admiral J. W. Smith, USN, COMPHIBPAC, and staff visited Sea Float on 28 March and was briefed on current operations and intelligence. The party then toured the Solid Anchor site and Kit Carson Scout Camp where the Admiral addressed the KCS.

From 28-30 March, two Field Historians, LCDR V. Isenburg Jr., USN, and LTJG S. Frantz, USNR, visited the Sea Float complex, receiving comprehensive briefings. Easter Sunday was spent on a PCF escorting the USS MARK (AKL-28) with the 14th amni for Sea Float from the mouth of the Bo De River to Sea Float and at the Tran Hung Dao villages with the Sea Float psyops personnel.
SEA Operations

A SEAL mission was conducted on the night of 3 March about five miles southwest of Sea Float (VQ 89A 513). The SEAL's were inserted by a Slick helicopter with Seawolves providing air support and set up an interdiction post targeted against VC sampans in the area. A sampan, when hailed, attempted to evade and was taken under fire killing the two occupants. Due to their position being compromised, the SEAL's were extracted by LCP's and returned to the Mobile Advanced Tactical Support Base (MATS). There were no friendly casualties.

On 9 March, SEAL Team ONE, Detachment GOLF, and a Kit Carson Scout platoon were inserted by Slick about 27 kilometers northeast of Sea Float VQ 263 893 to capture a medical supply station. The troops patrolled 300 meters west to the target and searched the surrounding area. During the search, sporadic small arms fire was received and suppressed without sustaining any friendly casualties while one VC was killed. After the landing zone was secured, the troops were extracted and returned to Sea Float. There were four structures and two tons of rice destroyed and four kilos of medical supplies captured.

Three structures and one ton of rice were destroyed by SEAL's and KCS on the morning of 13 March 18 kilometers northeast of Sea Float (VQ 161 845). The patrol was inserted by Slick, and sweeping south and east, it searched numerous bunkers, structures, and canals. An interdiction post was set as an elderly male approached followed
by one armed. The first male was detained and the second when hailed attempted to evade and was taken under fire. The troops were then extracted by Slick and returned to Sea Float. There were no friendly casualties and enemy casualties were unknown, and one male was detained.

SEAL's in the Sea Float AO, acting on KCS intelligence, were inserted by Slick about 32 kilometers northeast of Old Nam Can (WQ 169 885) on the afternoon of 14 March to capture village and Viet Cong infrastructures. After insertion, Seawolves and the Slick took a small group of VC under fire. The SEAL's made contact with the enemy a few minutes later and captured two VC who were extracted by Slick while the remainder of the unit established an interdiction site in the elephant grass along the canal. Immediately after extraction, personnel began to return to the area and were taken under fire. The SEAL's called for extraction and began receiving automatic weapons fire. Seawolves and the Slick placed strikes on the enemy positions and suppressed the fire. The extraction of the remainder of the units was accomplished without further incidents. There were nine VC captured and one VC wounded. There were no friendly casualties.

In a mission the following day, to search a hamlet where a VC squad was reported to be, SEAL's and three KCS were inserted by Slick about 12 miles northeast of Sea Float (WQ 135 823). They patrolled 500 meters east along the canal searching ten hootches with negative results. They then patrolled along the north bank and found one hootch with one ton of rice which was destroyed. The unit was extracted by Slick without any contact with the enemy.
Six SEAL's and two KCS were inserted by Slick about 11 miles northeast of Sea Float (WQ 12h 79h) on 25 March to destroy a VC exchange. They patrolled 100 meters to the south to a large hootch and found the PX inside. The patrol then continued to the north searching hootches. They found 50 kilos of rice and ten kilos of clothing hidden in the brush. Four detainees and the captured goods were extracted while the troops continued their patrol. Thirty minutes later, several armed males approached and were taken under fire. The area was then checked and all personnel extracted and returned to Sea Float without further incident. There were three VC killed, one VC probably killed, and four persons detained. In addition, four sampans, two structures, 200 kilos of rice, and miscellaneous supplies were destroyed, and three kilos of medical supplies and three kilos of documents were captured. There were no friendly casualties.

A SEAL mission to capture a District Security Chief was planned on KCS intelligence and was conducted on the afternoon of 27 March about 17 miles northeast of Sea Float (WQ 177 877). Ten SEAL's and one KCS were inserted by Slick and searched the targeted hootch with negative results. Seawolves, providing air support, pinned down two males in bunkers allowing the SEAL's to capture them. The patrol continued north and searched three hootches finding large quantities of rice and a large sampan mortar. Several armed males were sighted during the patrol and taken under fire. The SEAL's were extracted by Slick and returned to Sea Float without further incident. There were four VC killed and two VC captured. The SEAL's destroyed one ton of rice, four structures, and one large sampan mortar. There were no friendly casualties.
Sea Float Missions

At 1930H, 28 February, while inserting Mobile Strike Force (MSF) troops about six miles east of Sea Float (WQ 187 703), PCF's 17 and 94 tripped a claymore mine which impacted astern of the units. At this point, a large barrier was found across the canal with many punji pits along the banks. The MSF swept to the east discovering a small base camp of four hooches and four bunkers in which they set up for the night. As the "Swift" boats withdrew to the Song Cua Lon to set up a waterborne guardpost, they received B-40 fire from the south bank. The fire was immediately returned and suppressed. Two sampans were sighted as they exited the canal and when pursued turned and headed back into the canal. They were taken under fire hitting one VC who fell into the water and wounding the other. Upon investigating, six other sampans were spotted in the canal, but the occupants made good their escape. Four sampans were towed out to the Song Cua Lon, but due to approaching darkness, the other four sampans, which contained three B-40 rockets, rice, and various other assorted food and clothing, were sunk. PCF's 691 and 692 arrived on the scene, and then PCF's 17 and 691 towed the sampans to Sea Float while PCF's 94 and 692 set up a WBG. At first light on 1 March, the MSF destroyed the base camp and then swept the ambush area with negative results. There was one VC killed and one VC wounded while there were no friendly casualties. In addition, four sampans, two sampan motors, four bunkers, 5,000 pounds of rice, and three B-40 rockets were destroyed. Four sampans, two sampan motors, 1,100 pounds of rice and two kilos of documents were captured.
On the afternoon of 10 March, Jot Carson Scouts were inserted by "Seawolves providing air cover about 12 miles northeast of "Seafloat (10 137 876) to capture a VC supply station. After insertion, the JCC patrolled 500 meters to the supply station, while the Seawolves took four VC under fire killing two VC. The JCC captured seven VC and then destroyed the station. During the extraction, small arms and automatic weapons fire was received and suppressed by Seawolves. The extraction was then completed, and all units returned to Sea Float. The JCC captured 200 kilos of supplies, two kilos of medical supplies, and one kilo of documents. They destroyed two sampans, one sampan motor, one structure, and two tons of miscellaneous supplies.

On the afternoon of 20 March, PCF's 72 and 691 were escorting the tug, "Swift" boats inmediately countered with 81mm mortar and .50 caliber machine gun fire into the ambush site. Seawolves covering a SEAL mission to the north were diverted to the area, and en route, they took a sampan leaving the ambush site at high speed under fire. The Seawolves then placed strikes in the ambush area and returned to where the sampan had been sunk only to find three VC trying to salvage the sampan and supplies. A minigun strike was placed on the sampan probably killing the three VC. The tug transit then continued to the Solid Anchor site without further incident.

On the afternoon of 24 March, A-3, T-9, and 7-2 were on route to Square Bay when a male waving a flag was sighted in the water
about 10 miles west of Sea Float (VN 859 609). There were eight other men on the bank. The LAC thought the men were Hoi Chans, and T-9 took the one man aboard where he revealed that all nine were "D and personnel who had been held in a VC POW camp. That morning while on work detail south of the Song Cua Lon, they made good their escape to the north by overpowering three VC guards. Upon reaching the Song Cua Lon, they patched a sampan and crossed to the north bank and then hailed the LAC's as they headed west. The nine men were taken aboard the LAC and then transferred to PCF's 38 and 56. They were returned to Sea Float and turned over to the Naval Intelligence Officer, Nam Can, for interrogation.
SEVENTHFLT SHIPS

The following SEVENTHFLT ships operated in MARKET TIME during the month of March 1970.

USS EMBATTLE (MSO-434) 1-18
USS PRIME (MSO-466) 19-31
USCGC KLANATH (WHEC-66) 11-31
USS PEACOCK (MSC-198) 29-31
USS ANTELOPE (PG-86) 1-10 17-24
USS READY (PG-87) 7-13
USS ASHEVILLE (PG-84) 11-26
USS REAPER (MSO-467) 1-18
USS ACE (MSO-508) 19-31
USS WIDGEON (MSC-208) 1-4 23-28
USCGC DALLAS (WHEC-716) 1-10 22-31
USCGC MELLON (WHEC-717) 1-11 20-22
CF's Assigned to Coastal Divisions as of 3 April 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELEVEN</th>
<th>THIRTEEN</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A: HLT</td>
<td>SA DEC</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>53</td>
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<td>(27)</td>
<td>(24)</td>
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PCF's in Overhaul

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>PCF Location</th>
<th>Commenced</th>
<th>ETC</th>
<th>EST Length</th>
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<td>70 Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>03 APR 70</td>
<td>12 MAY 70</td>
<td>40 Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63 Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>16 MAR 70</td>
<td>25 APR 70</td>
<td>40 Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64 Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>04 MAR 70</td>
<td>13 APR 70</td>
<td>40 Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Cat Lo</td>
<td>20 FEB 70</td>
<td>04 APR 70</td>
<td>45 Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 Qui Nhon</td>
<td>19 MAR 70</td>
<td>03 MAY 70</td>
<td>45 Days</td>
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TOTAL NON-ASSIGNED PCF (05)
GRAND TOTAL (56)
1. Average No. U.S. ships/craft on patrol during month.

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<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>MSU</th>
<th>MSC</th>
<th>VPB</th>
<th>PCF</th>
<th>LST</th>
<th>PG</th>
<th>LHEC</th>
<th>PBR</th>
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<tr>
<td>Avg</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
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2. Average No. VNN ships/craft employed during month.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>SEA FORCE</th>
<th>RIVER FORCE</th>
<th>COASTAL FORCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Avg</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. U.S. Activity:

- **Total Detected**
  - **Wood**
    - Day: 16
    - Night: 5,862
  - **Steel**
    - Day: 172
    - Night: 184
    - Total: 22,660

- **Total Inspected**
  - **Wood**
    - Day: 6,342
    - Night: 2,999
  - **Steel**
    - Day: 138
    - Night: 156
    - Total: 9,635

- **Total Boarded**
  - **Wood**
    - Day: 6,293
    - Night: 977
  - **Steel**
    - Day: 3
    - Night: 3
    - Total: 7,276

4. VNN Activity:

- **Junks Searched**: 74,500
- **Persons Searched**: 306,642
- **Junks Detained**: 69
- **Persons Detained**: 306

5. U.S. Activity:

- **Junks Detained**: 107
- **Persons Detained**: 575

6. Stable Docor:

- **Junks Detained**: 30,318
- **Junks Inspected**: 6,309
- **Junks Boarded**: 4,955

7. Market Time Junks/Sea Lords:

- **KIA (BC)**: 108
- **KIA (EST)**: 109
- **WIA**: 24
- **CIA**: 23
- **Junks/Sampans Destroyed**: 175
- **Junks/Sampans Damaged**: 49
- **Structures/Bunkers Destroyed**: 628
- **Structures/Bunkers Damaged**: 287

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RIVER PATROL FORCE SUMMARY

Game Varden

The River Patrol Forces were further reduced during the month of March. River Squadron 53, including five river divisions, was disestablished on the 31st of the month. Operations continued smoothly as River Divisions 511, 512, 514, 515, and 592 turned over their areas of responsibility to their Vietnamese Navy counterparts.

Operational forces assigned to Game Varden during the month included SEAL Detachment ALFA and BJU Team 13 at Binh Thuy; MST Detachments ALFA and DELTA with the Fourth and Fifth SEAL Platoons at Nha Be; and MST Detachment BRAVC at Phu Cuong. Other assigned support included OV-10's on call from VAL-4 at Binh Thuy and Vung Tau. Two HAL-3 helicopters were assigned overhead support at Nha Be in the Rung Sat Special Zone. The remaining Game Varden assets were assigned directly to other operational commanders throughout the Delta.

Game Varden SEAL Operations

In the Rung Sat Special Zone, SEAL operations consisted of night insertions, setting canal and trail guardposts, support of Wolfpack operations, and search missions in reaction to intelligence.

Contact with the enemy remained at a low level throughout the month with casualties and damage inflicted during the brief contacts generally unknown.
At 0300H on the morning of 6 March, LT Jackoski and LTJG Noris departed Nha Be with a patrol of 11 SEAL's in an MSSC. ENS Scott took the SEAL's down the Long Tau shipping channel to the Dong Dinh River just north of the village of Can Gio in the RSSZ. The SEAL's inserted at YS 087 561 on the east bank of the Long Dong Dinh. This area was a suspected extortionist point for the Viet Cong. The SEAL's moved out to the east on patrol. As the patrol moved out, one of the SEAL's tripped a booby trapped concussion grenade compromising the patrol's position. At 0600, the patrol was extracted by MSSC about 2h kilometers southeast of Nha Be. On return to the base, the wounded SEAL was treated for a ruptured eardrum. No contact was made with the enemy.

At 1000H on the 25th, LT Jackoski with seven SEAL's were deposited by a U. S. Army Slick helicopter south of Nhon Trach at YS 083 785. Once inserted, the SEAL's patrolled to the southeast. After moving through the mud approximately 200 meters, four VC were sighted moving to the south on foot. The patrol took the VC under fire. Receiving light automatic weapons fire in return, the SEAL's requested an air strike. One VC was killed in the exchange of fire. LCDR Wolniewicz placed a strike by HIFT at the direction of the patrol. Moving west approximately 300 meters, the patrol was extracted by Slick and returned to Nha Be at 1115H. There were no friendly casualties.

A six man SEAL patrol, lead by LT Gardner, departed Nha Be by Slick at 2145H on the 25th to insert at YS 087 797 about four kilometers
northeast of Nha Be. CDR Price and LCDR Wolniewicz provided overhead cover with an LHPT. The SEAL’s patrolled about two kilometers with no contact just south of Nhon Trach. At 1705H, the patrol was extracted by Slick and reinserted at XS 978 818 at the upper end of the Moung Canal leading off the Nha Be River. As the LHPT provided overhead cover, the SEAL’s moved east away from the river. At about 1730H, two VC were sighted but evaded into the thick nipa palm growth before the SEAL Team could open fire. The SEAL’s patrolled back to the Moung Canal and were extracted by ENS Marsh in an LSSC, returning to Nha Be at 2115H.

Game Warden Operations in the Rung Sat Special Zone

Game Warden units in the Rung Sat Special Zone continued in their support of the VNN operations throughout the month of March. PBR’s from TU 116.9.1 provided blocking forces, patrolled the RSSZ, provided cover for SEAL and EOD operations, and gave fire support as required by the Senior Advisor RSSZ. Throughout the month, despite continued patrols, Wolfpack operations, and setting WBOP’s, contact with the enemy remained light.

On the 5th of March, five PBR’s provided a blocking force for the Vietnamese National Police at Nha Be. At 1515H, one platoon of National Police, embarked on the PBR’s, set a waterborne blocking cordon in the waterway of the Nha Be River adjacent to the town of Nha Be. Once the water route was blocked, the National Police began a search of the town. On completion of the search, 14 detainees were
taken. The action took place at the request of National Police of
the 'Nha Be District in Gia Dinh Province and DSA Nha Be. There was
no resistance and no friendly casualties.

One of the most extensive operations to take place in the RSSZ
began on the morning of the 10th of March. All units in the RSSZ
participated in a combined action throughout the day. Participating
U. S. Navy units included the RSSZ Senior Advisor, U. S. Navy and
Marine Corps Advisors, ASPB's from TO 116.9, PBR's from TU 116.9.1,
LHFT's from TU 116.9.8, and OV-10's on call from Vung Tau.

The operation commenced at 0500H as RF Companies 783 and 875,
with Marine Corps advisors WO1 Haferkamp and 1stLT James, departed
Nha Be in VNN LCM's to establish a base camp at YS 172 799, just
south of Song Thanh in Bien Hoa Province about 29 kilometers east
of Nha Be. BM1 Patterson with two ASPB's in company with VNN PBR's
embarked troops from RF Companies 999, 908, and 362, USMC advisors
CAPT Hickman, CAPT Cowan, and 1stLT Grosshams, at 0530H and departed
Nha Be to provide security for the base camp.

At 0645H, CDR Price and LTJO Wright in a USN LHFT conducted a
sniffer search along the Thi Vai River south of the base camp. Max-
imum sniffer contact was obtained one kilometer south of the Thi Vai
at 0800H. The USAF FAC directed an air strike on this area resulting
in four bunkers destroyed and one VC killed.

At 0850H, USA slicks inserted RF Company 875, USMC Advisor 1st
LT James, at YS 177 787, two kilometers south of the Thi Vai River.
The troops swept to the northeast through the area of the previous air strike. Remaining in the area until 1510H, no enemy contact resulted, and the Company returned to the base camps by Slick helicopter.

RF Company 367, USMC Advisor 1st LT Grosshans, inserted by Slick at 0913H in the vicinity of YS 151 813, where the Ben On Canal enters the Thi Vai River. The troops swept to the northwest and at 0925H, sighted an unknown number of Viet Cong. Taking the fleeing VC under fire, the RF Company captured one 155mm round, a small amount of flashlight batteries, and assorted clothing. Enemy casualties were unknown. Continuing the sweep, at 1415H, the troops found indications of fresh enemy activity. At the request for an air strike, CDR Price and LTJG Wright placed fire into YS 152 804 with two Seawolves. The RF Company now swept to the southwest and at 1510H received enemy automatic weapons fire. The Seawolves again hit the enemy position as the ground troops returned the fire. Sweeping through the enemy position at 1610H, the company found blood trails at YS 151 802. Following the trails, the enemy again engaged the troops in an automatic weapons fire exchange. There were no friendly casualties, and Slicks returned the petrol to base at 1610H.

CAPT Cowan, USMC, inserted with RF Company 908 at 1000H in the vicinity of YS 155 798, approximately two kilometers south of the other ongoing operations. On departure of the inserting Slick helicopters, the troops moved out to the northwest. One hour later, having covered three kilometers through muddy grass and short nippa
palm growth, the patrol came across fresh indications of enemy activity. At 1110H, the USN LHFT placed strikes in the area. Eleven minutes later, contact was made with the enemy. Two RF troopers were wounded in the ensuing fire fight. The LHFT provided overhead cover as the wounded were medevaced. As the ground troopers held their ground, an additional LHFT was scrambled to place air strikes on the enemy positions. One secondary explosion was observed during the air strike. Later, sweeping the area of the air strike at the head of the Ben Lon Canal, the troops found two VC killed and five bunkers destroyed. Clearing the area, the troops called for further air support, and the USAF FAC directed two Tactical Air Strikes on the position resulting in another secondary explosion and five more bunkers destroyed. At 1700H, the RF Company extracted by Slick helicopter to the base camp.

RF Company 999, CAPT Hickman, USMC, advisor, inserted at YS 151 801 as a blocking force. At 1330H, an LHFT providing overhead cover for the insertion sighted an unknown number of enemy near the company. The LHFT took the VC under fire killing four. Six minutes later, the RF troops killed another VC in the Landing Zone. The RF Company began a patrol of the immediate area and at 1435H captured one NVA with one K-50. At 1530H, enemy contact was again gained. In the ensuing fire fight, one RF trooper was wounded, one VC killed, and one AK-47 captured. From 1600H to 1810H, when the Company extracted by Slick, LHFT's placed air strikes in the area on call. The continuing intermittent contact resulted in six more
VC killed. As of 1900 extracted, five VC were sighted at Y5 157 613 crossing the Ben von Canal. Supporting LHMT's placed airstrikes on the position.

Intermittent contact with the enemy continued until termination of the operation (called Chuong Duong) at 2035H that night. Throughout the day, 1st LT Phipps, USMC, RSSZ MCIC, provided airborne coordination for the operation in an OV-10 provided from Vung Tau.

The result of the day's operation included one NVA captured, 53 VC killed, 16 bunkers destroyed, some secondary explosions, and two RF troopers wounded in action.

On the night of the 20th at 1915H, LTJG Curlop, LT McGinley, and CPO Merrill were proceeding to a night waterborne guardpost position approximately 20 kilometers south of Nha Be when the lead boat in a column of six PBR's heard a loud explosion. The cover boat PBR was blown apart by what was believed to be a command detonated mine at XS 985 625. Two USN sailors were wounded in action. The PBR's and LHMT's reconed the bank by fire and observed one secondary explosion. The PBR was a total loss.

Operation Chuong Duong continued throughout the month utilizing all forces available in the RSSZ. In conjunction with military operations, the RSSZ PSYOPS Team with CH2 Haferkamp, USMC, Dental Officer LT Ravencroft, Medical Officer LT Kays, HMC Crawford, and a VJ medical team conducted medcaps and PSYOPS missions in the villages near the operations areas.
CTF Clearwater

Reorganization for CTF Clearwater units commenced in February and continued into the month of March. Beginning 15 February, NSAD Cua Viet and the Dong Ha ramp were closed except for the off loading of rock barges by U. S. Army engineers and MOB personnel. Continuing that action, the water LOC was closed on 15 March. NSAD Cua Viet and ASTB Cua Viet were closed 15 March while ATSB Clearwater (opened 15 February) was commissioned as a command on 21 March. On 15 March, eight craft and crews were transferred from NSAD Tan My to CTF Clearwater in order to assume the increased responsibility for the Tan My harbor security and LOC. Clearwater minesweeping units based at ASTB Cua Viet were tasked to be able to open the Cua Viet/Dong Ha water LOC from a mine clearance standpoint on a 72 hour notice.

The Tan My and Hue River harbor security craft were assigned to CTF Clearwater on 15 March in order to provide security at Tan My and Col Lo Island, while the Commander Dong Ha River Security Group, located at the old NSAD Cua Viet site, was tasked for sweeping and interdiction operations on the LOC. This function is scheduled to be transferred to the VMN Minesweeping and Interdiction Division 92 on 1 July. Bank security was tasked to Commander XXIV Corps. On 15 March, the EODMUPAC Team was reassigned to Tan My. On the 22nd of March, COMNAVFORV assigned the Task Group designator 116.8 to CTF Clearwater effective 1 April.
Intelligence sources reported continued infiltration into the Hue and Perfum River areas. One report, on the 10th of March, indicated that three motorized sampans carrying one platoon of sappers and infantry with ammunition and different types of mines departed from YD 237 800. They crossed the Ben Hai and followed a small stream into the area of Trung Hai and Trung Giang to the vicinity of YD 271 777. They were reinforcements intended for two infantry/sapper companies. They dispersed and hid in the vicinity of YD 232 778 for further infiltration into the area of the Cua Viet River.

The Dong Ha River Security Group and the Hue River Security Group continued patrols, checking ID cards, minesweeping, Psyops missions, and conducted modcaps. Most of the Vietnamese detained were curfew violators.

Mining attempts by the enemy continued in all patrolled waterways throughout the month. Patrol Officer BMC Nelson and Boat Captain SN Howard were beached in LCM-28 on the north bank of the Cua Viet River extracting elements to the A/h/12 Cavalry Troop at 1753H on the 4th of March. The LCM-28 crew observed an object floating towards them, about 15 feet upriver and ten feet from the bank. The troopers threw concussion grenades at the floating object from the bank. A secondary explosion raised a 60 foot high water spout. There were no casualties.

There were no personnel casualties in the month of March from enemy mining efforts.
Enemy Mining/Harrassment/Attacks on Merchant Shipping

On the 4th of March, the Master of the Liberian Tanker SS ROYAL VENTURE reported on his arrival at the ESSCO Tank Farm that the ROYAL VENTURE had come under rocket attack in the Long Tau shipping channel at about 0957H that morning (vic YS 120 572) just as the ship was entering the Nha Be River from the Ganh Rai Bay. Three B-40 rockets were fired at the ship from the left bank. The first round passed over the ship, the second fell short, while the third B-40 hit the ship amidships on the portside at the boot topping causing superficial damage. There were no personnel casualties.

The ROYAL VENTURE did not report the attack until her arrival at the tank farm due to faulty radio equipment.

RF Company 875 was in the area at the time of the attack. On observing the rocket trails, the company swept the immediate firing with no contact with the enemy.
USN STATISTICAL SUMMARY

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<tr>
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<td>Detections</td>
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<tr>
<td>a. Killed</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>127</td>
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<tr>
<td>(108BC, 109 EST)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Wounded</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Captured</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

USN casualties:

| a. Killed                    | 0           | 0           |
| b. Wounded                   | 0           | 21          |
| c. Captured                  | 0           | 0           |
| d. Missing                   | 0           | 0           |

Enemy material losses:

| a. Destroyed:                |             |             |
| (1) Junks or sampans         | 175         | 6           |
| (2) Structures               | 628         | 26          |
| b. Captured:                 |             |             |
| (1) Junks or sampans         | *           | 0           |
| (2) Weapons                  | *           | 8           |
| (3) Ammunition (rounds)       | *           | 0           |
| (4) Rice (tons)              | *           | 0           |
| c. Damaged:                  |             |             |
| (1) Junks or sampans         | 49          | 0           |
| (2) Structures               | 287         | 11          |

USN material losses:

| a. Destroyed:                |             |             |
| (1) Surface craft             | 0           | 0           |
| (2) Helicopters              | 0           | 0           |
| b. Damaged:                  |             |             |
| (1) Surface craft             | 3           | 0           |
| (2) Helicopters              | 0           | 0           |
| SAR missions                 | 0           | 0           |

Remarks: * Information not available or not applicable.
NAVY ADVISORY GROUP SUMMARY

Vietnamese Navy

Fleet Command and Central Task Force

The VNN Fleet Command and Central Task Force continued their usual routine of KGFS, logistics support, and H and I missions on the rivers. LSM supply runs to Sea Float were on schedule, with three of four runs conducted at seven day intervals. On 4 March, the men of LSSL 228 commenced building an information service office in Hamlet 91 of Operation Sea Float. The purpose of the project was to reinforce harmonious relations between the hamlet and the VNN by providing a location where business and social functions could be held as well as providing a dispensing point for psyops material. The idea was conceived by the Commanding Officer, LSSL 228. On 22 March, the center was presented to the village chief in a ceremony attended by CTO 115.7. Sea Float held a medcap in conjunction with the ceremony.

Fleet Command units operated in conjunction with other commands periodically. On 3 March, for instance, ISIL 329 departed Saigon to participate in joint patrol with TG 115.3 in the Cua Dai and Ilo Ilo Island area. In all, Fleet Command ships provided 71 gunfire support missions in March. Her patrol ships, PCF's, and WPB's searched 9711 junks and 32,140 people, detaining two junks and 14 people.
First Coastal Zone

First Coastal Zone forces maintained their usual high level of activity in March as 32,794 junks and 141,121 people were searched with 16 junks and 179 people detained. Significant contacts were made both on the rivers and at base outposts with quite a few VC initiated attacks. The Hoi Chanh rate also remained high; on 3 March, six VC rallied in the area of CG 14; on 9 March, three rallied in the vicinity of CG 13; on 11 March, the fourteenth raller from Barrier Island (BT 330 650) since 21 February reported to PCF 3885; and on 14 March, one more rallied to CG 13. This high defection rate was attributed to the fast reaction time on the part of friendly psyops forces and to hunger, disillusionment, and need for medical attention on the part of the VC. The defectors claimed that tapes were more influential than leaflets.

A brief VC rocket attack on the CG 14 base and Doi village at 0300 on 3 March produced one VC killed, one VC wounded, and one Vietnamese civilian killed. On 9 March, the Cam Thanh outpost was hit by a VC platoon and resulted in the death of two RF and one RD cadre members. Two CG 14 units were called in. They strafed the area, captured a beached sampan, believed to belong to the platoon, and stood by for the remainder of the night with no contact made. The CG 14 sweep team accounted for three more VC/NVA killed on the night of 12 March when they took two sampans under fire near Cam Thanh Island.
Perhaps the most significant event for CG 11 during March was the mining of one of its junks. The boat exploded on 7 March in the Dong Ha River resulting in the deaths of three VNN and one wounded. Pieces of the plastic pressure type mine were later recovered by the Dong Ha River security group.

On 9 March, a unit of CG 13 picked up two VC female medics and one VC male from Loc Tu local guerilla unit operating in the Bu Lu locale.

Second Coastal Zone

The junks of the Second Coastal Zone detained 14 junks and 66 people during March with no major contacts with the enemy. On 11 March, a CG 28 junk carrying a working party of 25 on the river near Phan Thiet received a hand grenade thrown from another nearby fishing junk. The grenade bounced off the deck and detonated under water. The two VC suspects connected with the incident claimed they were trying to catch a big fish. The 15 year old suspect said he obtained the grenade from his brother in the Army. He was handed over to the National Police.

Third Coastal Zone

Most of the Third Coastal Zone groups' activity for the month involved guardposts rather than detection and search operations, no junks having been detained throughout March. The CG 35 ambush team along with a company of PF's set an overnight guardpost on 14

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March five miles east of Tra Vinh and killed one VC. Another VC was killed the next day during a group sweep involving PF's and two CG 35 units. By far, the most major encounters during the month occurred on 18 March when two CG 35 skimmers, the PT CAUTION, the PT CYPRESS, and two OV-1OA's combined to produce seven probable VC kills 22 miles south southeast of Tra Vinh.

On 21 March, CG 33 conducted a medcap at Ong Lu village, five miles east of Vung Tau, on Long Son Island. The corpsmen treated 150 people. Soap, soft drink mix, and psyops leaflets were distributed. The month's progress also included four Hoi Chanhs.

Fourth Coastal Zone

On 8 March, a special Gulf of Thailand patrol was initiated prompted by intelligence reports that enemy junks would try to bring supplies to the U-Minh Forest. Special emphasis was given to patrol area 9 with troop sweeps conducted on suspect islands, such as Hon Heo and Ile d'Quest, but the number of junks detained and enemy personnel encountered - essentially none - did not confirm expectations. The patrol was extended 20 days until April 9th but failed to produce significant results. The advisors' evaluations of VNN patrols, particularly PGM's 610 and 605, were very complimentary.
Third and Fourth Riverine Areas

The River Assault Groups continued their usual troop insertion and logistics efforts during March. RAG 21/33 spent most of its time conducting daily operations out of Dong Tan, inserting ARVN and IF units at various points along the Ky Tho and Ham Luong Rivers. A major sweep was made on 18 March when 12 units from RAG 21/33 (two monitors, six IC-6’s, two FCM’s, and two LCVP’s) inserted four companies of ARVN 7/10 Battalion at two points on the Co Chien River, about six nautical miles northwest of Tra Vinh. The troops were inserted at 2100. The RAG boats maintained position overnight on the river and conducted blocking force operations the next morning at 0800. At 1000, the troops were partially extracted and deposited at the Ham Luong Ferry Landing. The results of the operation as of 1700 on 19 March were 3 VC killed and 27 VC captured along with two Russian rifles, one AK-47, and 12 grenades.

RAG 22’s major activity for the month was the discovery of weapons caches. Acting on intelligence from a Hoi Chanh, two FCM’s of RAG 22 departed Ben Luc with 20 National Police at 1230 on 3 March and proceeded about three miles up the Rach Bao Tan. A cache was found under about eight feet of water in the canal (vic XS 597 717) and consisted of 1,000 AK-47 rounds, 12 EO rounds, and a sampan. The next day another expedition was initiated with 15 national police and three members of EOD Team 31, USN. The area immediately downstream from the previous day’s find was searched and produced 1,500 AK-47 rounds, nine EO rounds, seven 75mm R. rounds, a Chicom hand grenade, and a sampan.
VNV casualties for the RAG's were light. At 0530 on 6 March, four RAG 22 units were returning to Ben Luc after an overnight MOPP when the lead FCM, HQ 501st, received a near miss from an unidentified RPG. Shrapnel seriously wounded the VNN boat captain and gunner.

RAIDS

The River Assault and Interdiction Divisions continued their troop lifts, fire support, and river patrol missions throughout March experiencing two major encounters and the loss of a boat.

RAID's 72, 73, and 74 had been on a rotating schedule since February supporting VNNC operations at the southern tip of the U Minh Forest under the OPCON of the 7th ARVN Division. The beginning of March thus saw RAID 74 in the midst of a standdown at Long Xuyen. RAID 72 began her transit to Long Xuyen on the morning of 4 March, having been relieved of her support duties by RAID 73 on 3 March. It arrived at Long Xuyen at 061500H.

RAID 73 then commenced a continuous patrol of the Trem Trem River from WR 10 33 to WR 02 51 in support of 2nd Battalion VNNC units operating on the east bank, and it continued this type of operation in this general area for the duration of the month. On 9 March, the AO changed slightly as seven Tango boats and nine Alpha boats lifted 300 2nd Battalion troops to Rach Tieu Dua, a branch of the Trem Trem, and commenced blocking force operations from VR 99 38 to VR 92 44. On the morning of 10 March, RAID 73 units received small arms and B-40 rocket fire just south of their
operations area (from 3R 03 28) resulting in five VN wounded. Another VN was wounded the next day in a similar incident in the same area.

At 1800 on 15 March, RAID 73 shifted her support to the 4th Battalion, 32nd Regiment, 21st ARVN Division and lifted 340 troops from 3R 0250 to VR 95 61 using six Tango and nine Alpha boats. It then commenced a 21-hour patrol south of Dong Hung and sent four boats to Ca Mau for fuel. On 22 March, at 0045, RAID 73 units were beached, waiting for ARVN units at the 32nd Regiment command post near Dong Hung (VR 95 60) when VC initiated an attack on the command post. The enemy was driven back at the expense of nine VN wounded, two seriously. The battle lasted six hours and 20 VC were killed. Three boats received B-40 rocket hits above the water line (HQ 6530, 1226, and 1230) and proceeded to Dong Tam for repairs.

Five units of RAID 73 were again ambushed with B-40's on the morning of 28 March from both banks of the Trom Trom River; four VN were wounded, four VC killed, and four boats moderately damaged. The remainder of the month was relatively uneventful for RAID 73 as it conducted troop lifts and patrols in the same area.

RAID's 72 and 74 remained in a standoff status at Long Xuyen until 13 March when they were shifted to Dong Tam which was to be the new homeport of RAID 74 until Binh Thuy was completed. The two divisions, less three boats of 72 which had remained alongside the ASKARI, arrived in Dong Tam at 2100 on 14 March and prepared to support VNMC Brigade 3RAVC operations in Kien Hoa Province.
Departing Dong Tam at 0200 on 17 March, they picked up two companies of the 5th Battalion and inserted them at the confluence of the Ben Tre and Ham Luong Rivers (XS 55 19). The two RAID’s divided the remainder of the month between inserting and extracting VNAC units along the Ben Tre and Ham Luong Rivers and providing blocking patrols for operations in process.

A major encounter with the enemy occurred on 22 March at 0145 as RAID 71 units were patrolling the eastern stretch of the Ben Tre River (XS 62 2h5), an area never before encroached upon by RAC’s. Suddenly, the ATC HQ 1236 was being hit with recoilless rifle fire, then shuddered under a mine explosion, and soon sank. The only personnel casualties were a VNAC with minor wounds. The enemy was subdued but never apprehended. A visit to the ambush scene by CSO 211 on the morning of the 22nd revealed the ATC inverted in mid-channel in about 20 feet of water with two feet of the bow above water. Members of HCU-1 surveyed the wreckage the afternoon of 21 March, and salvage operations began on 30 March. Three boats and two companies of the 1st battalion remained in the area to provide security as the sunken craft was pulled to shore by wire. The salvage operations were still progressing by the end of the month.

RAID’s 70, 71, and 75 worked with SEA LORDS operations throughout the month. RAID 75 had been assigned to Operation Search Turn on 23 February for one month, and it proved so effective that a one month extension was requested and granted on 20 March. RAID’s 70 and 71 continued operations on Giant Slingshot with a minor shift
of units on 10 March: RAID 70, except for four Alpha boats, was sailed from Noc Hoa to Tan An; RAID 71 units were sailed from Tan An to Ben Luc, two of her Tango boats then leaving for Tra Cu on 11 March for a heavy troop lift.

Along with supervising their afloat units, members of ATF 211 headquarters in Dong Tam also managed to conduct two medcaps in March. On 9 March, the VNIN Policew Officer and doctor, accompanied by their advisor counterparts and three VNIN enlisted men, treated 70 people and distributed magazines, posters, candy, leaflets, and VNIN flags and plaques in Thoi Don Village. The next day, the same group returned to the village and treated 101 more people.
River Patrol Groups

The River Patrol Groups continued their routine WBG's and interdiction operations in March with relatively little contact with the enemy.

RPG 51 saw the most action for the month. At 2030 on 11 March, while in WBOP, one unit of 51 sighted six VC sampans moving south along the western bank of the river. The PBR opened fire and received return fire from the eastern bank of the river. Three sampans sank as two other units from RPO 51 arrived and assisted in repressing enemy fire. An LHFT arrived at 2042 and executed firing runs for approximately 20 minutes. The PBR's took the three remaining sampans in tow and returned to Cat Lai at 2055. There were no friendly casualties with 15 probable VC kills. Items captured included 60 B-40 rockets, one 60mm mortar, four AK-47's, 5,000 AK-47 rounds, 125 pounds of rice, medical supplies, and 100 documents.

Another unit from RPO 51 saw a different type of action at 1600 on 23 March. PBR 7506 was returning to Cat Lai from Eastern Repair, VNNSY, when she collided head on with a tug while rounding a bend in the Saigon River. The PBR sank, and two VNN's were seriously injured.

Three new RPG's were formed on 31 March. RPG 55 was given an additional 12 boats at the BINEWAH which would supplement the extant patrol of eight boats on the Cho Gia Canal. RPG 56 was activated at Moc Hoa, 57 at Nha Be. Each new RPG was composed of 20 boats and were formed from former USN River Divisions 511, 512, 514, 531, 592, and ten overhaul craft.
VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS

Brigade "A"

Under the OPCON of the 21st ARVN Division, Brigade "A", composed of the 2nd, 3rd, and 7th VNMC Infantry Battalions and the 1st VNMC Artillery Battalion minus, had just initiated reconnaissance in force operations in an area approximately 11 miles north northwest of Ca Mau in An Xuyen Province (vic WR 103 329) at the beginning of the month. Concentrating on Air Cavalry Eagle Flight tactics, Brigade and artillery command post security missions, infantry sweeps, and small unit guardpost operations, the Brigade established no major enemy contact through 26 March.

On 27 March, Brigade "A", including all the units that were previously assigned with the exception of the 2nd Battalion, which was relieved by the 6th Battalion on 23 March, shifted operations to the northwestern edge of the U-Minh Forest in Kien Giang Province (vic VR 556 677). No significant action was reported by the Brigade as it continued airmobile operations and RIF missions in the new area through the end of the month.

Brigade "B"

In March, Brigade "B," which included the 4th, 5th, and 6th Infantry Battalions and the 2nd VNMC Artillery Battalion, carried out RIF operations in Kien Hoa Province (XS 551 317) under the OPCON of the 7th ARVN Division. Primary missions assigned to the Brigade
were Eagle Flight operations, Brigade and artillery command post
security, small unit patrols, and guardpost missions. Enemy activity
was light as no major contact was reported during the month.

There was one Brigade task organization change on 10 March when
the 1st Battalion relieved the 6th Battalion. On 17 March, VNRAID's
76 and 78 joined the Brigade and began making insertions and extrac-
tions of the maneuvering elements.

1st Infantry Battalion

At the end of February, the 1st Infantry Battalion, under JOS
control, had been relieved of the CMD alert status and had returned
to their Thu Duc base camp. The Battalion remained in a stand down
status until 10 March when it replaced the 6th Battalion in Kien Hoa
Province (vic XS 551 317) and assumed the Brigade and artillery CP
security missions. On 25 March, Eagle Flight operations were initi-
at ed with the VNRAID elements. Operations were continued through
31 March with no significant encounters with the enemy reported.

2nd Infantry Battalion

Following an administrative lift with Brigade "B" into the new
area of operation in An Xuyen (vic VR 920 343) on 27 February, the
2nd Infantry Battalion commenced operations with an airmobile assault
followed by infantry sweeps in March. A brief contact on the evening
of 3 March 17 miles north northwest of Ca Mau (WR 082 499) netted one
VC killed and one AK-47 captured. Two days later and approximately
three miles to the east (vic 033 460), elements of the 2nd Battalion surprised a small VC units. Five VC were killed and 54 enemy weapons were uncovered. Evidence of the enemy activity continued to appear as reflected on 7 March when the 2nd Battalion discovered two VC company size base camps 16 miles north northwest of Ca Mau (vic VR 038 412) which yielded 94 VC grenades, six mines, 14 claymore mines, 2,500 rounds of small arms ammunition, four M-1 carbines, one CKC, one pistol, three Mausers, one M-79 grenade launcher, and ten 82mm mortar rounds. Two VC were also killed in the encounters.

On 13 March, two small contacts during company sized RIF operations (vic VR 890 328) concluded with a total of two VC killed and one VC and one CKC taken into custody. The next day, nine Marines were wounded by a mine incident, and two Marines were killed by a booby trap and gunfire. One small cache was also uncovered (vic VR 846 286). Enemy resistance was again met on 15 March when a VNMC company sized RIF operation on the western edge of the U-Minh Forest 19 miles northwest of Ca Mau (VR 848 292) engaged a small enemy force. Three VC were killed and two 1917 Springfield rifles, 85 claymore mines, and two 105mm rounds handmade into mines were confiscated. Another cache consisting of 1,200 sheets of tin, 26 rolls of steel wire, 80 hand grenades, 20 B-40 rockets, nine claymore mines, and nine 82mm rounds was uncovered on 16 March in the same general area (vic VR 843 288) of the contact on the previous day. Seven VNMC were wounded by two separate mine incidents on 17 March, and one VC Chieu Hoied to the Battalion on 19 March.
The 2nd Battalion was relieved on 23 March and returned to their Thu Duc base camp. While under JGS control, the Battalion was expected to stand down for approximately two weeks.

3rd Infantry Battalion

The 3rd Infantry Battalion remained with Brigade "A" during the relocation of the forces into the new operating area north of Ca Mau in An Xuyen Province at the end of February and was initially assigned the mission of providing security for the Brigade "A" forward CP (vic WR 090 459). While conducting an RIF infantry sweep 23 miles northwest of Ca Mau (VR 894 467) on 9 March, 3rd Battalion units encountered a VC minefield that took a heavy toll of the Marines. Before they had successfully negotiated the area, four VNMC had been killed by enemy mines and another 25 VNMC wounded. Later in the month on 19 March, the Marines established contact with a small VC force on the Western edge of the U-Minh Forest 18 miles northwest of Ca Mau (VR 907 363). The action was brief with the end results reported as two VC killed, one VC captured, and eight hand grenades confiscated. Security operations and infantry sweeps were continued through the end of the month with no significant results.

4th Infantry Battalion

At the beginning of March, the 4th Infantry Battalion was conducting company size patrols, airmobile assaults, and artillery security missions while supporting an RIF mission with Brigade "B" in Kien Hoa Province (vic XS 670 218). Towards the middle of the
month, activity began to increase for the 4th Battalion. On 13 March, a company size Marine element killed two VC and captured one AK-47 and four hand grenades 1/4 miles south southwest of My Tho (XS 580 203). The following morning, one VC was taken into custody (XS 701 250), and two cases of machine gun ammunition were found (XS 602 188). That afternoon, three separate mining incidents accounted for a total of two Marines killed and eight Marines wounded. During one of the mining incidents, the VNMC discovered a VC hospital that contained 25 beds. On 27 March, two separate actions involving the 4th Battalion ended with one VC killed and one VC and one VC suspect captured (XS 571 340). One AK-47 and one kilogram of documents were also recovered.

**5th Infantry Battalion**

Operating in Kien Hoa Province (vic XS 547 256), the 5th Battalion under the OPCON of Brigade "B" carried out CP security missions, Eagle Flight Operations, and company size infantry patrols. No significant contacts were reported in the first part of the month. However, enemy mines inflicted Marine casualties totaling three killed and 49 wounded in the first 20 days of March. From 20-31 March, the 5th Battalion had numerous small contacts in the area that ended with 25 VC killed and seven VC and nine personal weapons captured.

**6th Infantry Battalion**

Under the OPCON of Brigade "B", the 6th Infantry Battalion carried out small unit patrols, artillery security missions, and
Air-mobile operations while supporting RIF missions in Kien Hoa Province (vic XS 618 218). No significant contacts were reported through 10 March when the Battalion was relieved and returned to their Thu Duc Base Camp and placed under the OPCON of JGS. On 23 March, the 6th Battalion relieved the 2nd Battalion and began operations under the OPCON of Brigade "A" in An Xuyen Province (vic VR 90h 363). Air-mobile operations and infantry sweeps yielded negligible results for the remainder of March.

**7th Infantry Battalion**

The 7th Infantry Battalion under the OPCON of Brigade "A" conducted CP security missions, air-mobile assaults, Eagle Flight operations, and infantry sweeps in An Xuyen Province (vic VR 119 425). The Battalion established a platoon size contact on 12 March along the western edge of the U Minh Forest, 19 miles northwest of Ca Mau (VR 816 283), that resulted in seven VC killed and the discovery of a large enemy cache that contained the following items: one 75mm recoiless rifle, one 82mm mortar, four machine guns, four BAR's, one B-40 launcher, three sub-machine guns, five assorted rifles, one engineer repair shop, 63 75mm rounds, 150 82mm rounds, 95 57mm rounds, 200 B-40 rockets, 120 mines, 16,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, and 400 pieces of sheet metal. Two more enemy caches were found by the 7th Battalion on 13 and 14 March that contained 112 VC mines, 40,000 detonator devices, 200 sheets of tin, seven gas masks, one automatic rifle, one Mauser rifle, one box of machine gun ammunition and one kilogram
of documents (VR 833 283 and VR 83b 294). On the morning of 20 March, 7th Battalion units killed three VC and captured another six 25 miles northwest of Ca Mau in the western U-Minh Forest (VR 880 200). The results of this action were almost exactly duplicated on 23 March when the Marines killed two VC and captured six VC two miles to the east of the 20 March action (VR 837 505). Again on 26 March in the same general area, two contacts were established (VR 865 595). In these engagements, two VNMC and three VC were killed. One VNMC was wounded, and one VC was captured.

8th Infantry Battalion

The newly formed 8th Infantry Battalion displaced to the Van Kiep National Training Center on 21 March to commence seven weeks of initial unit training.

Division Artillery

. . . Employment of the artillery batteries is found in the operational control summary which follows.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DATES</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF</th>
<th>OPERATION NAME</th>
<th>MISSION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bde A</td>
<td>1-31</td>
<td>21st ARVN DIV</td>
<td>Song Than 748</td>
<td>RIF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bde B</td>
<td>1-31</td>
<td>7th ARVN DIV</td>
<td>Song Than 808</td>
<td>RIF</td>
</tr>
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<td>1stInf Bn</td>
<td>1-9</td>
<td>JGS</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Res</td>
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<td></td>
<td>10-31</td>
<td>Brigade B</td>
<td>Song Than 808</td>
<td>RIF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Res</td>
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<td>23-31</td>
<td>JGS</td>
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<td>Res</td>
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<td>3rdInf Bn</td>
<td>1-31</td>
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<td>RIF</td>
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<td>Song Than 808</td>
<td>RIF</td>
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<tr>
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<td>10-21</td>
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<td>Res</td>
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<td>22-31</td>
<td>Brigade A</td>
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<td>JGS</td>
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<td>Res</td>
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<td>JGS</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Res</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIT</td>
<td>DATES</td>
<td>OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF</td>
<td>OPERATION NAME</td>
<td>UTILITY</td>
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<td>------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Arty Bn</td>
<td>1-31</td>
<td>Brigade B</td>
<td>Song Than 808</td>
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<td>Btry D</td>
<td>21-31</td>
<td>JGS</td>
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<td>Res</td>
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<td>Btry I</td>
<td>1-20</td>
<td>JGS</td>
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<td>Btry J</td>
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### VIETNAMESE NAVY:

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<td>Empl</td>
<td>Junk</td>
<td>People</td>
<td>Junk</td>
<td>People</td>
<td>Junk</td>
<td>People</td>
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<td>COASTAL FORCE</td>
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<td>II</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>18,814</td>
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<td>III</td>
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<td>Sub-totals</td>
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<td>65,087</td>
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<td>60</td>
<td>215</td>
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*FLEET COMMAND

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<tr>
<th>PATROL SHIPS</th>
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<td>WPB's/PCF's</td>
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<td>23.2</td>
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<td>Sub-totals</td>
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<td>32,140</td>
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### RIVER AREA

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>RIVER ASSAULT GROUPS</th>
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<td>61.2</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>3,529</td>
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<td>TF 212</td>
<td>81.7</td>
<td>73.5</td>
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<td>Sub-totals</td>
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<td>76,016</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#CENTRAL TASK FORCE

|               | 53.0          | 67.2       | 1,895    | 3,406      | 0        | 0        |

**TOTALS:**

|               | 98,005        | 360,229    | 62       | 250        |

### VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS: 27 FEBRUARY - 2 APRIL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VC/NVA</th>
<th>KIA 93</th>
<th>Captured 39</th>
<th>Suspects detained 16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VNMC</td>
<td>KIA 1</td>
<td>WIA 2 4</td>
<td>MIA 0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Provided 71 gunfire support missions.

#Includes RAG 27 and RTEG
Throughout the month of March, physicians and corpsmen from the NSA hospital at Danang worked voluntarily administering approximately 1400 immunizations at the Stella Maris Dispensary, USOM Hospital and the CIDG Hospital. Approximately 500 Vietnamese patients were admitted at the NSAD Hospital in March.

Assistance was rendered at four schools, three dispensaries, and two separate institutions. As of the end of March, all Civic Action operations at Danang were terminated.

Seabee Teams of the Third Naval Construction Brigade conducted a total of 435 medical treatments in March. Donations of clothing, foodstuffs, soap, toys, lumber, cement, building supplies, medicine, and $74,630 VN were made through the 3NCB Civic Action program. There were 106 Vietnamese students who received English language instructions from the Seabees.

CTF Clearwater at Dong Ha RIVSECGRF conducted a Medcap at Vinh Giang (ZD 060 108). Vietnamese nurses assisted hospital corpsmen, PBR ACTOV personnel, and PBR crewmembers in treating 80 children and adults and in distributing 150 dental kits. The VN nurses did the majority of the diagnosis and treatment. Skin infections
were the major medical problem.

PCF and PBR forces in the Cu Dao Dung Island AO, general vicinity of XR 20 76 to 35 53, have noted a significant increase in the effectiveness of their Chieu Hoi rate and feel that it is due to aggressive waterborne loudspeaker missions. A total of 12 Hoi Chanh rallied to USN/VNN forces throughout the Republic of Vietnam in March.

A U. S. Navy Medcap team at Moc Hoa (XS 028 910), located five miles east of Saigon, transported the daughter of a recent Hoi Chanh to visit the Chieu Hoi Center at Moc Hoa. Leaflets were then printed showing the father-daughter reunion which emphasized the sincerity of the Chieu Hoi program’s promise to reunite ralliers with their families.

A request for Psyops material on 6 March by CTF 212 at Binh Thuy, located four miles northwest of Can Tho, is an example of the type and quantity of material which is distributed by a single unit for this purpose. The request included 2,000 Vietnamese government flags, 2,000 bars of soap, 1,000 tooth brushes and tubes of tooth paste, five bails of clothing, 1,000 plastic cups, and 1,000 bottles of baby vitamins.
On 1 March, a second brick making machine arrived at the Sea Float community on board the USS ANTELOPE and went into operation the following day. The new school at the Tran Hung Dao II settlement was nearing completion in early March. The location of the school site had been changed to better conform with the general building scheme in the area. Bricks have been hauled to THD-2 for the flooring of the school and for various other projects. The Tran Hung Dao II development now contains a laundry, two cafes and stores, a physician's office, and a pharmacy. Work at the THD-1 market was progressing slowly during March, but was expected to pick up as more laborers were being sent by the contractor.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>USN CIVIC ACTION STATISTICAL SUMMARY</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL NUMBER OF MAN-DAYS OF PERSONNEL OF UNITS ENGAGED IN CIVIC ACTIVITY ACTIVITIES:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COST OF SUPPLIES CONTRIBUTED BY MILITARY RESOURCES FOR CIVIC ACTIVITY ACTIVITIES:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNS $42,780,157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EXPENDITURES FROM THE US/FRMAF CIVIC ACTION PSYWAR FUND:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNS $450,759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNS $214,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PERCENTAGE OF U.S. MILITARY CIVIC ACTION ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED JOINTLY WITH:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other FRMAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RVNAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. civilian voluntary agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average percent of self-help by VN civilians:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor 29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material 27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PROGRAMS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expenditures (VNS)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Welfare</td>
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<td>Transportation</td>
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<td>Refugee</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>INSTITUTES ASSISTED</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orphanages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitals/Dispensaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*One Man-Day equals one ten hour working day*
Coast Guard Division 12 turned over the 82 foot patrol boats POINT KENNEDY and POINT YOUNG to the Vietnamese Navy on March 16 in a ceremony at Danang. Coast Guard Division 17 was decommissioned in the ceremony, leaving only one Coast Guard division in operation in the Republic of Vietnam.
ACCELERATED TAKEOVER PROGRAM AND TRANSITION SUMMARY

On 7 March at 0800, Tran Hung Dao I, one of the first SEA-CARDS operations, was transferred to VNN command. Operational command was assumed by LCDR Dinh Vinh Giang, CTG 212.4, located aboard YRBM 20. The operation would continue to patrol from Ha Tien to Chau Doc. By 14 March, the organizational structure of the new VNN command was finalized and the following units assigned:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Design</th>
<th>Operational</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CTG 212.4/CTG 194.8</td>
<td>CDR TRAN HUNG DAO I</td>
<td>YRBM-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Advisor CTG 212.4</td>
<td>LCDR P. T. SOUVAL, USN</td>
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<tr>
<td>TU 212.4.0/TU 194.8.0</td>
<td>TRAN HUNG DAO I</td>
<td>YRBM-20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>TU 212.4.1/TU 194.8.1</td>
<td>TRAN HUNG DAO I</td>
<td>Ha Tien</td>
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<tr>
<td>Western Sector Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>COSGRU 41/42/43/44</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ha Tien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIVDIV 515</td>
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<td>Ha Tien</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSSDIV 11</td>
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<td>Ha Tien</td>
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<td>MINEDIV 13</td>
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<td>Ha Tien</td>
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<td>RAD 151</td>
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<td>Ha Tien</td>
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<tr>
<td>TU 212.4.2/TU 194.8.2</td>
<td>TRAN HUNG DAO I</td>
<td>Vinh Gian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central Sector Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vacant</td>
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<tr>
<td>TU 212.4.3/TU 194.8.3</td>
<td>TRAN HUNG DAO I</td>
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<td>YRBM-16</td>
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<td>RPG-KSB</td>
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<tr>
<td>RIVDIV 532</td>
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<td>YRBM-20</td>
</tr>
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</table>

7 March marked the formation of RID 40 as 15 RAC's (one CCB, one Zippo, six ASPB's, and seven ATC's) were turned over by CCM-RIVSTRIKORU and accepted by CTF 214 at Ben Luc, the homeport of the new RID. RID 40 was the first group of craft to be turned over.
with secure voice equipment, KY-C units having been installed in six of the craft on 5 March. The new unit was then assigned to the operational control of CTU 194.9, and on 9 March, the Commanding Officer, LCDR. . nec, was ordered to assume CTU 194.9.2 and to deploy to the following Slingshot areas: 194.9.2 became the Go Dau Ha Interdiction Unit and was comprised of ten boats, six Alpha and four Tango; the remaining five craft chopped to 194.9.3 at Ben Hao commanded by LT . . Frenzinger, USN, with the senior RIO officer in charge of the five Vietnamese boats.

The U. S. Coast Guard also continued its turnover program in March as two more WPB's, the POINT YOUNG and the POINT KENNEDY, were transferred to Vietnam control on the 16th. Captain David E. Perkins, USCG, Commander of Coast Guard Activities, Vietnam, turned over the 8' cutters, and Captain Ho Van Ky Thoat, VNM, Commander First Coastal Zone, accepted on behalf of the Vietnamese government. The event increased to 15 the number of WPB's turned over, out of a total of 26, and brought to an end the Coast Guard's Patrol Division which had been operating since July 1965. And on 27 March, the POINT PARTRIDGE was transferred to the Vietnamese Navy at Cat Lo.

The ACTUVOPS Program continued in I Corps as the Sea Tiger operation changed to combined control on 3 March. The Commanding Officer of Coastal Group 14 assumed the position of Deputy Commander. It was projected that the current USN Commander of Sea Tiger would be relieved on 30 April by the Commanding Officer, CG 14, at which time, the Combined Command Operations Center would be relocated from
... to CG 14 headquarters on the Cua Dai River. At the time of the combined maneuvring, the following units were assigned to Sea Tiger:

**UNIT**
- RIVDIV 5/3 PBR's
- CTE 194.1.5.1 Duffle Bag Team Snipers
- UDT Team 11, Det HOTEL

**VNN**
- CG-14 Junks and Skimmers
- CTG 115.1 VNN/CTG 213.1 PCF's
- UDT and Assault Team

And on 20 March, LCU 1477 and YOG 71 were turned over to the Vietnamese Navy at Danang.

Training, the most crucial part of the ACTOV effort, proceeded in March with the usual gains made and losses incurred. The most important single event was the commencement of the first basic training class for the VNN UDT/SEAL Teams on 2 March at the Cam Ranh Bay Market Time Base; 59 trainees were enrolled. Numerous sailors, with varying degrees of "A" school and other preparatory training were assigned to OJT with different units throughout the country in everything from harbor defense to M-60 maintenance. As for the Marines, 152 recruits were graduated from the VNN CTC at Lamson, and on the same date, 50 VNNC officers graduated from the Reserve Officers Training School at Thu Duc.

On the negative side, unauthorized absences and discipline remained problems. Project START, for instance, was forced to drop 11 "A" school graduates, mainly for reasons of chronic UA and disciplinary action.

On the whole, however, the training effort was proceeding according to plan. The Naval Training Center at Nha Trang produced
the following outputs in March: 47 ET's, 32 ET's, 58 DC/SP's, 183
E's, and 137 graduates of BE/E training. The Naval Academy Class
70 commenced in March with 269 midshipmen. In addition, 62 mid-
shipmen were enrolled on 9 March at OCS, Newport, Rhode Island.

Craft and base maintenance training continued in March with
3,493 VIN personnel in various stages of training (47.5% of pro-
jected requirements based on the new VIN ceiling of 39,611). As
of 31 March, 237 craft maintenance personnel had been located at
USN bases. Base maintenance trainees as of 31 March numbered 739,
300 of which were enrolled in the Philco-Ford base maintenance pro-
gram at Danang. On 16 March, six VIN engineering designated officers
were ordered to the following NSA detachments to train as prospective
Repair Officers: Binh Thuy, Cat Lo, Nha Be, Dong Tam, and Cam Ranh
Bay.

In general, the ACTOVLOG Program could be said to be going well
although a shortage of technical manuals hampered the formal training
and C-JT programs alike, especially in the areas of boat propulsion
and auxiliary systems. By far the most major problems was insufficient
personnel in the craft maintenance program, a shortfall having de-
veloped in February and March. The Saigon Maintenance School had
not been filled during that time, and only 20% of the CCOS Craft
Maintenance Technical English Course had been subscribed. The pri-
mary cause of this problem had been the delay in recruiting in
January and February while awaiting approval of the new force level.
This was regarded as a short term problem, however, and the quotas
were expected to pick up by June.
At the beginning of March, work was progressing on dependent shelters at 13 sites with 463 units under construction and 645 units completed. The site fill project at Cua Long was complete, and the same project at An Khanh was 25% complete, making for an additional 222 family units in the Saigon area. By the end of March, construction was underway at 16 different sites with 653 units completed and 537 under construction. In October 1969, $900,000 had been appropriated from MILCON funds for the first 1,500 shelters. In March 1970, the program was expanded by the addition of 550 E-3, non-group VIII personnel.

Funding for the entire dependent shelter program had been predicated on the availability of no-cost, excess construction materials and troop labor. Accordingly, appeals were made in March to Naval Supply Systems Command and its subordinate branches for excess lumber, sheet metal, and nails. CINCPACFLT advised his component commands to expedite the shipment of all Project Handclasp materials destined for Vietnam. As for the labor problem, 550 E-3, non-group VIII personnel (NAVCATS) were assigned to shelter sites throughout the country. Even with this, the hire of local laborers at such sites as An Thoi was required.

As for the food supplement program, five additional bases, including An Thoi and Danang, were supplied with 200 broilers and feed for their initial programs in March. This addition brought the total
number of "pig and chicken" projects to 21 with 36 swine, 3,300
broilers, 50 ducks, and 54 rabbits, and animal husbandry advisory
team reports throughout the month indicated that the programs were
faring well. In marketing enough of the produce from their initial
poultry package, HR personnel at RAG 23/31, Vinh Long, purchased
50 more chicks and thus became the second self-sufficient project.
Minutes after March 27's turnover ceremony at the Naval Base, Cat Lo, the Coast Guard Cutter POINT PARTRIDGE is permanently erased from the rolls of Coast Guard Squadron ONE by a Vietnamese sailor quick on the draw with the paint roller.
The Naval Support Activity Detachment (NSAD) Detachment Dong Tam reported an explosion which was later determined to have been caused by a U. S. concussion grenade wired as a booby trap. Later the same night, a second similar device was discovered. The NSAD was unable to determine who was responsible for the placement of the grenade. There were no casualties or material damage. The Advanced Tactical Support Base (ATSB), Tra Cu had six instances of movement near the base detected by electronic devices during the month; however, there was negative contact. The ATSB, Ben Keo reported two incidents of electronic detection of movement also with negative contact. Two swimmers were killed, and two watermines were captured during one sapper attack at the ATSB Ben Keo. One possible swimmer was sighted on another occasion. There were no friendly casualties or material damage. There were three mortar attacks on the ATSB, Moc Hoa during the month, and none caused any damage or casualties. One U. S. sailor drowned at the ATSB, Moc Hoa. The sailor was sick and apparently fell over the side. The USS BENEWAH (APB-35) captured two VC suspects on the river bank in the vicinity of the ship. They were turned over to the ARVN for interrogation and disposition. The sentry on the USS IREDELL COUNTY (LST839) fired at an object in the water and triggered an explosion. The incident occurred near YRBH-21 in the Tien Giang River. There were no casualties or material damage.

The personnel status of the Naval Support Activity, Saigon at the end of March was as follows:
The USS KASK (AKL 17), YW-126, YFR-889, YFR-890, YFR-866, and the 100 foot utility boats, MONTERO AND MORCCCC, provided routine resupply services during the month. The USS BRULE (AKL 28) returned on 31 March after backloading cargo and PBR's from Subic Bay. She will return to Subic Bay to correct overhaul discrepancies. The USS ASKARI (ARL 38) was positioned at Dong Tam on 23 March and the USS HUNTERDON COUNTY (JST 638) was positioned at Long Xuyen due to adverse weather in the Gulf of Thailand. The USS SPHINX was on the Vam Co River providing services to Giant Slingshot forces while the USS BENEWAH, USS SATYR (ARL 23), YRBM-16, YRBM-20, and YRBM-21 were positioned on the upper Bassac River supporting Border Interdiction operations. YFU's 16 and 27 and YR 9 continued to provide additional berthing facilities for the ACTCVO Program. YFU's 1, 24, and 59 conducted routine resupply in the Gulf of Thailand while YFU's 55 and 57 conducted crew training at Nha Be.

At Cam Ranh Bay, an excess building was provided and placed in the VNN SEAL training area. The repair of the matting hardstand was completed at Cat Lo/Vung Tau. At Nha Be, the construction of wood frame heads, showers, and berthing spaces on YR 9 was completed, and she then moved to the VNN shipyard in Saigon. The preparation
for the Public Works maintenance training school was completed at Dong Tam. The upgrade of the air conditioning system for the COMNAVTEX VCC/CV Center was 90 per cent complete at month's end.

At Ben Luc, the construction on two berthing annexes was completed, and the construction of a mess hall and two berthing hootches was completed at Tra Cu. Construction of three berthing hootches was completed at Tuyen Nhơn, and the ACTOV construction continued at An Thoi, Cat Lo, Dong Tam, Ben Luc, Rach Gia, Ha Tien, and Binh Thuy.

**Maintenance and Repair Support**

**TF-115**

Six new PBR's were received in-country during the month and were placed in storage at Newport until required. The USS TUTUILA, USS KRISHNA, NAVSUPPAC, Cam Ranh Bay, NSAD's Qui Nhơn, Cat Lo, An Thoi, and Sa Dec provided routine support for Market Time units while the USS ASKARI was able to provide emergency repairs. The 35 secure voice kits plus two installation teams were sent to the USS TUTUILA and Sa Dec to install and train personnel for support of the PCF's.

**TF-116**

The NSAD, Ben Luc completed the teletype dubbing installation, and the Senior Naval Advisor/Rung Sat Special Zone secure voice installation was completed at Nha Be, Can Gio, and Quang Xuyen. The Communications Center update program was completed at Rach Gia.
The depot level maintenance of River Assault Craft assigned to the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones was accomplished at NSAD, Dong Tan. The intermediate level maintenance was conducted by USS ASKARI at Dong Tan, USS KRISHNA at Square Bay, USS SATYR at An Long, and the FS SPHILIX at the French Port. Operational maintenance was provided by YRM-16, YRM-20, and YRM-21 for river assault craft operating in their AUs. The development of the conversion package to convert LCI-6's to IPPC rechargers was in progress at month's end. The lack of support parts for the existing rechargers resulted in units becoming less reliable as operating hours increased.

The following personnel and craft were supported by the NSA Detachments during March:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BASE</th>
<th>OFFICER</th>
<th>ENLISTED</th>
<th>CRAFT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>1,774</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cat Lo</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>878</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nha Be</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>2,228</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Thoi</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sa Dec</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh Thuy</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>1,829</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dong Tam/YRM-17</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Luc</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M1 BASE II</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YRM-16</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YRM-20</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
The gross and net supply effectiveness for March was 73 per cent and 65 per cent respectively. Total issues for the month were 23,731, and total demands processed were 32,500. In addition, 1,118 back orders were released.

The Navy food management team made field assistance visits to ASTB Phu Cuong, YOBH's 16, 20, and 21, USS BENEWAH, NSAD's Nha Be and Dong Tam, and USS SANCTUARY. Initial outfitting material for the proposed ATSB at Phuoc Xuyen was commenced to be staged. A field assistance visit was made to NSAD Binh Thuy to coordinate STABS support. The STABS depot and MSSC Depot/Intermediate spare parts were received, segregated, and stored. NSA Saigon allocated Fourth Quarter '70 O&M funds to Detachments and advised that additional funds based on mid-year review had not been received and that funding conditions continued to be austere.

Captain Robert Diser, USN, relieved Captain William L. Siple, USN, as Commander, Naval Support Activity, Saigon on 3 March.
NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY, DANANG

Weather conditions were generally good during March in the I Corps Tactical Zone as high winds or sea conditions hampered coastal operations on only three days with small craft warnings in effect for three and one-half days.

The USS SAFEGUARD (ARS-25) and LCM-8-912 completed salvage of YOG-76 on 10 March. Between 10-12 March, the USS COHOES (ANL-78) and seven LCM-8's conducted a search for a missing HAO-16 helicopter. The USS COHOES completed salvage of Anmi Barge 117 on 12 March. On 15 March, the Naval Support Activity Detachment (NSAD), Tan My was closed as port operations were turned over to the U. S. Army 863rd Transportation Command. Also on 15 March, the rock shipment/offload at Dong Ha was completed. The Cua Viet and Dong Ha lines of communication were closed on 15 March. The USS CURRENT (ARS-31) completed salvage of the LUSTEVECO (NSTS Contract) Barge LO 702 on 20 March.

On 23 March, the YFU-61 reported heavy flooding while in transit from Danang to Tan My and beached in the vicinity of Mui Chan May Tay. The USS CURRENT completed salvage of YFU-61 on 29 March. During the month, 54 LCU/YFU lifts were required in loading Keystone Bluejay shipping at Danang. In addition to the above specific operations LCM 8/6's conducted 114 harbor shuttle runs carrying 469 short tons and 35 coastal shuttles with 19 amphibious beachings along the I CTZ coast carrying 100 short tons. The YR-41 returned to Danang on 26 March after undergoing overhaul at Sasebo, Japan.
Overall cargo operations for the month of March were satisfactory. Current export requirements and rates of cargo generation suggest a satisfactory situation during April. CONUS shipping projections indicated substantially the same level of import activity in April as was experienced in March. The U.S. Army assumed responsibility for cargo operations at Hue/Tan My ramp sites with the official disestablishment of the NSA Detachment on 15 March. The following is the port operations summary for March:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFFLOAD</th>
<th>BACKLOAD</th>
<th>THRUPUT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/T M/T</td>
<td>S/T M/T</td>
<td>S/T M/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DANANG</td>
<td>118,347 206,924</td>
<td>85,758 142,174</td>
<td>204,105 349,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHU LAI</td>
<td>33,952 47,430</td>
<td>6,190 22,918</td>
<td>40,142 70,348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUE/TAN MY</td>
<td>13,398 22,212</td>
<td>1,635 8,143</td>
<td>15,233 30,355</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is noteworthy that there were no hostile fire incidents reported during the month.

During the month, there were 35,271 S/T of rock shipped to the northern I CTZ. The depot operations at Danang and Chu Lai had a gross effectiveness rate of 95 per cent during the month. The overall Class I situation remained satisfactory. There were five days of supply of A-rations on hand at month's end and 7,002,460 C-ration meals on hand with 921,096 meals due in. The relocation work of the Camp Tien Sha provisions warehouse and the conversion of a portion of the Galley No. 2 to warehouse space was completed. The Philco-Ford camp one galley and mess hall opened on 23 March in support of the VNN base maintenance training program. Negotiations were
completed for transfer of the Camp Carter galley to the U. S. Army with the actual transfer to occur about 15 April.

Fuel issues in I Corps increased in March from the February rate of 1,165,000 gallons per day to 1,375,000 gallons per day. Weather did not cause any significant delays in the movement of fuel to I CTZ ports. The 12 inch JP line at Chu Lai was abandoned and will be replaced by an eight inch steel welded line. NGB-1 will commence putting this line in the first of April with an expected completion date of 30 April. The 12 inch multiproduct line at Red Beach, Danang was repaired early this month and remained operational the rest of the month. Repair ships made underwater surveys of the Sealoa line and mooring at Red Beach and China Beach, Danang to get a permanent record of the condition and locations of the line and mooring. On 26 March, common service support for bulk and packaged POL was assumed by the U. S. Army Support Command, Danang.

The following was the personnel status at month's end:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ALLOWANCE</th>
<th>OFFICER</th>
<th>ENLISTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>6,806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YR-71</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>6,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL ON BOARD</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>7,603</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During March, 107 personnel extended their tours in Vietnam. There were 751 persons performing base security and 131 persons performing afloat security duties. The following numbers of persons
were performing cargo handling duties:
- Hatch Teams: 242
- Ramp Teams: 112
- Checkers: 133
- Admin Support: 196
- Fleet Air Support: 37
 TOTAL: 720

Civilian Personnel Status:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. Civil Service</th>
<th>Ceiling</th>
<th>On Board</th>
<th>Net Gain/Loss This Month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NAVSUPPACT</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>minus 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVAAFORVRED</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>minus 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>minus 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local National</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NAVSUPPACT</td>
<td>6,707</td>
<td>6,211</td>
<td>minus 313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>7,972</td>
<td>6,892</td>
<td>minus 638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>14,679</td>
<td>13,103</td>
<td>minus 951</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was an average of 14,732 military personnel supported by the Naval Support Activity Danang in the I CTZ during March.

Project HOD was 85 per cent completed for Navy facilities and 75 per cent completed for all military facilities. All leasing will be assumed by the U.S. Army on 1 April, and their goal is to terminate 90 per cent of the leases by 30 June 1970. During the month, conversion was completed of the CCPO training facility to allow relocation of CCPO offices. The revetment for ammo storage
was completed at the Tien Sha camp and an armed storage area was con-
structed at Camp Tien Sha. The new MILCO three million gallons-
per-day water treatment plant located at the Danang Air Base was still
undergoing operational tests. There were a considerable number of
failures in the distribution system and several discrepancies in the
main plant that will be corrected by the contractor. The operation
and maintenance of the Danang East dial telephone exchange was turned
over to the U. S. First Signal Brigade on 15 March.

The following was the status of the Philco-Ford contract as
of 31 March:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>U. S.</th>
<th>L. H.</th>
<th>TGH</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On Board 28 FEB</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>1,332</td>
<td>2,069</td>
<td>3,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Board 31 MAR</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>1,237</td>
<td>1,786</td>
<td>3,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EST On Board 30 APR</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>1,225</td>
<td>1,614</td>
<td>2,839</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures include program management, personnel in training,
and personnel associated with public works, supply, SRI, and APP.

On board figures for 31 March include four U.S. employees directly
hired to replace TGH's.

The performance of the Korea Express - KEANGJAI LTD. (KEGI)
continued to be satisfactory during March, and the guaranteed mini-

mum contract requirements were met both seacido and pierside. The
following reflects the cargo handled by KEGI during the month:
There were 210 LCI and h3h TCI personnel employed during the month broken down as follows:

**ICCAI Country Nationals**

- Permanent hire in cargo operations: 53
- Permanent hire in support functions: 80
- Temporary hire in cargo operations: 77

**Third Country Nationals**

- Seaside Cargo Operations: 143
- Bridge Ramp Cargo Operations: 55
- Deep Water Piers Cargo Operations: 164
- Support Personnel (Admin, plumbers, electricians, etc): 72

The following facilities were turned over to the U. S. Army:

14 Mar - Cornfield Ramp, Hue - 21 structures - $156,000.
14 Mar - Tan Ky Causeway - 46 structures - $2,577,000.
14 Mar - Tan Ky PCL - 38 structures - $1,227,000.
26 Mar - N5 Tank Farm - 20 structures - $85,000.
26 Mar - N7 Tank Farm - 40 structures - $332,500.
26 Mar - Marble Mountain Tank Farm - 14 structures - $136,000.
26 Mar - Package PCL, Danang - 16 structures - $89,000.
On 28 March, 31 structures valued at $39,240 at NSAD, Sa Huynh were turned over to the ARVN. On 19 March, the U. S. Army 26th General Support Group assumed responsibility for SERVHART operations at NSAD, Phu Bai and took over the facility.

There were 827 patients admitted to the station hospital at Danang during March. Of these, 228 were battle casualties, 39 for minor surgery, 195 for major surgery, and nine malaria admissions. There were 11 single amputations, five double amputations, two triple amputations, and one quadruple amputation. The average daily patient census for March was 159 with 159 beds occupied at month's end. Throughout the month, physicians and corpsmen from the NSA hospital have voluntarily worked at the program of administering prophylaxis immunisation to school and orphanage children in the Danang area. Approximately 1,400 DT and DPT vaccines were given. Medications were held at Stella Maris Dispensary, USQN Hospital, and CIDG Hospital. Approximately 34 patients were cared for each week during the month. Weekly dermatology, orthopedic, medicine, surgical, and urology clinics plus ophthalmological care were held at the NSA hospital for those in need of these services. There were no in-patient Vietnamese at month's end. The average daily Vietnamese in-patient census was six with 16 admissions during the month.
THIRD NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BRIGADE

During March, all significant tactical incidents involving Seabees continued to occur in the southern portion of the I Corps Tactical Zone. Of major importance were the mining incidents on QL-1 south between Danang and Landing Zone Baldy. One Seabee, EO3 Leonard M. Ackerman, USN, was killed and two Seabees were wounded as a result of these incidents. In addition, 13 marines were wounded on a Seabee truck that detonated a mine in a bottom pit near Landing Zone Baldy.

During March, the major effort in the line of communication road upgrade program was again directed towards QL-1 south of Danang between the villages of Thanh Quit and Tu My. There was also a substantial amount of effort directed towards a 2½ inch asphaltic concrete overlay of the Hai Van Pass. Per cent complete as of 31 March for the above sections are shown below:

Thanh Quit - Cay Lay River

Fill - 100 pct.
Base - 98 pct.
1st lift - 45 pct.
2nd lift - 0 pct.

Ly Ly River - Tu My

Fill - 48 pct.
Base - 27 pct.
1st lift - 0 pct.
2nd lift - 0 pct.

Hai Van Pass - 30 per cent.
Maintenance also continued on route ML-13C, ML-12W, ML-1C and ML-1D. In the I CTZ, the shoulder upgrade on QL-1 continued between the Lang Co Bridge and the city limits of Hue.

Work on the aircraft shelter continued during the month with seven shelters under construction, five shelters complete except for concrete covers, and 102 shelters fully completed. There were eight shelters for the Fleet Air Support Unit, Danang Air Base under procurement and not yet scheduled for construction. There were 122 shelters in the total approved program. Forty-eight shelters that were not yet under construction were cancelled by III MAF.

Construction was commenced on the Quang Tri highway bridge on route QL-1. This 901 foot, two lane highway bridge consists of ten spans of pile and steel girder construction and is the last major highway bridge scheduled for completion by the Seabees. At Phu Bai Airfield the patching and overlay of taxiways continued with the runway overlay scheduled to begin on 1 April. The runway construction schedule provided for minimal runway downtime for both military and civilian aircraft. The construction of the third of four secondary bridges north of Hue was completed during March with construction of the fourth scheduled to begin in the near future. The site grading and compaction for the Hue detention facility was completed during the month. CORDS had approved the revised building layout plan, permitting vertical work to proceed. The overall project completion was scheduled for early May. Work on the ACTOV bases in the IV Corps Tactical Zone continued at Ha Tien, Long Phu, Kien An, Nam Can, and
Rach Soi. The facility at An Thoi was completed and work at Ha Tien was 97 per cent complete. The Rach Soi construction was 32 per cent complete, while extensive fill work continued at Nam Can. Sufficient fill has been obtained to permit construction of the ATSJ to commence, and the facilities are 38 per cent complete. Materials and equipment have arrived at Long Phu and Kein An and construction will commence in April.

Naval construction forces have a projected backlog amounting to 29 weeks of horizontal work and 16 weeks of vertical work. The programmed backlog amounts to an additional three weeks of horizontal and two weeks of vertical work.

The following was the logistics status during the month:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In-Country shipments:</th>
<th>Phu</th>
<th>Chu</th>
<th>Dong</th>
<th>Delta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bai</td>
<td>Lai</td>
<td>Ha</td>
<td>Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material (S/T)</td>
<td>1,907</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>1,301</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material (V/T)</td>
<td>2,037</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>1,203</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment (Pieces)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Material status:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Material ($000)</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Receipts</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,545</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>9,374</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tactical Support Functional Components (TSEC) ($000)</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Receipts</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,036</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>7,055</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Repair Parts:</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Receipts</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dollar Value ($000)</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line items</td>
<td>2,545</td>
<td>1,725</td>
<td>20,161</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment deadline:</th>
<th>Total Equipment</th>
<th>Number Deadline</th>
<th>Per. Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HMCB organic</td>
<td>1,482</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 NCR Augment</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Number of pieces shipped: 108
Number of pieces scheduled for shipment: 5

The following was the personnel status at month's end:

**Military:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ceiling</th>
<th>On Board</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFFICER</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENLISTED</td>
<td>3,707</td>
<td>3,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3,840</td>
<td>3,773</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Civilian:**

Regiment Headquarters - 153 (60TCN, 93 Vietnamese)

MCMC - 40

The following awards were presented to Third Naval Construction Brigade Personnel during March:

- Distinguished Service Medal - 1
- Legion of Merit - 1
- Bronze Star - 1
- Navy Commendation - 6
- Navy Achievement - 19
- Combat Action Ribbon - 36
- Purple Heart - 4
- Good Conduct - 1

On 4 March, RADM J. G. Dillon, CEC, USN, was relieved by RADM A. R. Marshall, CEC, USN, as Commander Third Naval Construction Brigade.
From 2-4 March, RADH S. R. Smith, CEC, USN, Commander Naval Construction Battalions, U. S. Pacific Fleet, visited the Third NCB and participated in the change of command briefings.

On 4 March, LOEN H. Nickerson, USMC, CO, III MAF, VADM E. R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN, COMNAVFORV, and LOEN H. X. Lam, I Corps Commander, participated in the Commander Third Naval Construction Brigade Change of Command.

On 9 March, the Commander Third Naval Construction Brigade flag was relocated from Danang to Saigon. The Deputy Commander and administration remained at Danang. Incident to the relocation, the Commander Third Naval Construction Brigade administration, construction, logistic, and equipment functions in the I CTZ were assumed by the Commander 32nd Naval Construction Regiment.

On 17 March, RADM J. Appleby, SC, USN, Commanding Officer, Naval Supply Center, Oakland, visited the 32nd Naval Construction Regiment and was briefed on the logistical aspects of the Naval Construction Force operations in Vietnam.

The Naval Mobile Construction Battalion FIVE deployed to the Republic of Vietnam on 20 March for the fifth time to relieve NMCB-1 at Camp Haskins in Danang and assume responsibility for the large construction program in support of ACTOV in the IV Corps Tactical Zone.
From 17 March, C.A.T. C. G. Miller, CEC, U.S., Chief of Staff, CECU, was briefed by the Commander 32nd Naval Construction Regiment and inspected construction sites throughout the I Corps.

# Glossary of Abbreviations

The following abbreviations and terms are commonly used in the combat zone by all agencies and are listed here in amplification of those used in the text:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABF</td>
<td>Attack by fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMMI PONTOON</td>
<td>A multi-purpose barge, standard size is twenty-eight feet by ninety feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>Army of the Republic of Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASPB</td>
<td>Assault Support Patrol Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATC</td>
<td>Armored Troop Carrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATSB</td>
<td>Advance Tactical Support Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/W</td>
<td>Automatic weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLACK PONY/BRONCO</td>
<td>OV-10 Twin Engine Turboprop Counterinsurgency Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCB</td>
<td>Command and Communications Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Coastal Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHICOM</td>
<td>Chinese Communist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDG</td>
<td>Civilian Irregular Defense Group—mercenaries of Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian descent who fight primarily around their own villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMD</td>
<td>Capital Military District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRIP</td>
<td>Civilian Reconnaissance Intelligence Platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Tear gas grenades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTZ</td>
<td>Corps Tactical Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>Coastal Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELTA HAWK</td>
<td>Mohawk OV-1C aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUSTOFF</td>
<td>Medical evacuation by helicopter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENIPF</td>
<td>Enemy initiated firefight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOB</td>
<td>Forward Observation Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSB</td>
<td>Fire Support Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FWMAF</td>
<td>Free World Military Assistance Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDA</td>
<td>Gun Damage Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVN</td>
<td>Government of Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAFT</td>
<td>Helicopter Attack Fire Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H&amp;I</td>
<td>Harassment and Interdiction Fire Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JGS</td>
<td>Joint General Staff (Vietnamese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIT CARSON SCOUTS</td>
<td>Former Viet Cong who have come over to the side of the Saigon government and serve with allied military units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAFT</td>
<td>Light Attack Fire Team (OV-10's)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAW</td>
<td>Light Anti-tank Weapon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCPL</td>
<td>Landing Craft, Personnel, Large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDNN</td>
<td>Vietnamese equivalent of USN Underwater Demolition Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LHFT</td>
<td>Light Helo Fire Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOH</td>
<td>OH-6 Light Observation Helicopter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRRP</td>
<td>Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACV</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATSB</td>
<td>Mobile Advance Tactical Support Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDCAP</td>
<td>Medical Civic Action Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONITOR</td>
<td>Heavily armored LCM-6 (105mm cannon or 105mm Howitzer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRB</td>
<td>Mobile Riverine Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRF</td>
<td>Mobile Riverine Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSB</td>
<td>Minesweeper, Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSD</td>
<td>Minesweeper, Drone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Mobile Strike Force - mercenaries who deploy and go anywhere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGFS</td>
<td>Naval Gunfire Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIMO</td>
<td>Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIOTC</td>
<td>Naval Inshore Operations Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOD</td>
<td>Night Observation Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA</td>
<td>North Vietnamese Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OINC</td>
<td>Officer in Charge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OJT</td>
<td>On the Job Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBR</td>
<td>Patrol Boat, River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCF</td>
<td>Patrol Craft, Fast (Swift Boat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>Prisoner of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRU</td>
<td>Provincial Reconnaissance unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSA</td>
<td>Province Sector Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psyops</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAD</td>
<td>River Assault Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAG</td>
<td>River Assault Group (VNN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAID</td>
<td>River Assault and Interdiction Division (VNN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAS</td>
<td>River Assault Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF/PF</td>
<td>Regional Forces/Popular Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPO</td>
<td>Rocket Propelled Grenade or River Patrol Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSSZ</td>
<td>Rung Sat Special Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RVNAF</td>
<td>Republic of Vietnam Air Force (or Armed Forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>Search and Rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAWOLF</td>
<td>UH-1B Helo, heavily armed, USN operated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHADOW</td>
<td>C-119 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKIMMER</td>
<td>20' fiberglass motor boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLICK</td>
<td>UH-1B Helo, USA operated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPOOKY</td>
<td>C-47 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSB</td>
<td>Swimmer Support Boat (skimmer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STAB</td>
<td>Strike Assault Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCATOR</td>
<td>Small Craft Asset, Training, and Turnover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOTGUN 49</td>
<td>Call sign for Army O1A aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Swift Training and Rapid Turnover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAOR</td>
<td>Tactical Area of Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USARV</td>
<td>United States Army, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNAV</td>
<td>Vietnamese Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNN</td>
<td>Vietnamese Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIPPO</td>
<td>Flame thrower equipped ATC or Monitor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>