Naval Forces, Vietnam Monthly Historical Summary for June 1970
MEMORANDUM

From: Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam
To: Distribution List


1. The subject publication was noted to contain several errors after distribution had been completed.

2. The publication has been corrected and reprinted. It is requested that previous issues be destroyed.

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W. O. McDANIEL
Chief of Staff

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FOREWORD

Enemy activity within the Republic of Vietnam was characterized during the month of June by being moderate to low level in all Military Regions.

Operations continued to be conducted within Cambodia during the month. By mid-month, U. S. Navy support of the operations in Cambodia was conducted from within the borders of the Republic of Vietnam with only relatively few advisory personnel physically located in Cambodia. All U. S. Navy personnel were withdrawn from Cambodia by the afternoon of 29 June.

The Honorable John H. Chafee, Secretary of the Navy, visited Vietnam from 21 - 25 June to personally review the progress of the war and the transfer of combat responsibility to the Vietnamese Navy. During the intensive four day schedule, the former Rhode Island governor toured American Naval installations at Nha Be, Dong Tam, Ben Luc, Sea Float, An Thoi, and Tay Ninh, in addition to Vietnamese operations at Ben Keo and Nha Trang. At several points, the Secretary took the podium at open meetings with naval personnel to respond to their questions, complaints, and comments. SECNAV was accompanied by Dr. Robert A. Frosch, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development, and Rear Admiral Ray Peet, Director, Office of Program Appraisal.
A highlight of Secretary Chafee's visit was his participation in the ceremony transferring 273 riverine combat craft to the Vietnamese Navy at the VNN Shipyard on 23 June (see pg. 85).

The Secretary commented that "the Vietnamese Navy takes over today the major combat role in its own waters. And, with the turnover next December of the final 123 combat boats, the U. S. Navy will relinquish all surface combatant responsibilities in the country." With the June transfer, Secretary Chafee added, the Navy's Vietnamization Program was "on or ahead of schedule."
CURRENT OPERATIONS
(As of 30 June 1970)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VNN Designation</th>
<th>USN Designation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trần Hưng Đảo I</td>
<td>(Did not have USN codeword designation) Originally part of Border Interdiction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trần Hưng Đảo II</td>
<td>Giant Slingshot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trần Hưng Đảo III</td>
<td>Sea Float</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trần Hưng Đảo IV</td>
<td>Solid Anchor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trần Hưng Đảo V</td>
<td>Ready Deck</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trần Hưng Đảo VI</td>
<td>Search Turn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trần Hưng Đảo VII</td>
<td>Sea Tiger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trần Hưng Đảo VIII</td>
<td>(No operations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trần Hưng Đảo IX</td>
<td>Barrier Reef</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trần Hưng Đảo X</td>
<td>Breezy Cove</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trần Hưng Đảo XI</td>
<td>(No USN codeword designation) Cambodian operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VNN REORGANIZATION
(The following information is excerpted).

From COMNAVFORV msg 301102Z JUN 70:

A major step in ACTOVOPS will occur on 1 July 1970 when RADM H. S. MATTHEWS, Jr., USN, DEPCOMNAVFORV, will report for additional duty as Deputy for SEA LORDS Operations to the Chief of Naval Operations, Vietnamese Navy. At this time he will become Operational Commander under CNO, VNN, of Task Fleet 21.

Task Fleet 21 will fulfill the operational mission of SEA LORDS, and COMTASKFLT 21 will be First SEA LORDS. To establish an effective organization for the fulfillment of the Naval Mission in RVN, certain basic changes in the existing organization have been deemed necessary by CNO, VNN, and concurred in by COMNAVFORV.

The following operational Task Organization will become effective on 1 July 1970:

A. Task Fleet Twenty-One (21) (First SEA LORDS)
   
   (1) Task Force Two One Zero (210) - Vacant, reserved for Special Operations.

   (2) Task Force Two One One (211) - Amphibious Operations at such times as the OPCON of the RAIDS is given to CNO, VNN, by JGS.

   (3) Task Force Two One Two (212) - Interdiction Operations to include Tran Hung Dao, and eventually Barrier Reef, Search Turn, and Breezy Cove.
(4) Task Force Two One Three (213) - Reserved for those Market Time Operations under SEA LORDS, such as Blue Shark.

(5) Task Force Two One Four (214) - Giant Slingshot and eventually Sea Float/Solid Anchor.

(6) Task Force Two One Five (215) - Reserved for Fleet Command operations that are under SEA LORDS.

(7) Task Force Two One Six (216) - Reserved for Third Riverine Zone operations that are under SEA LORDS, such as Ready Deck.

(8) Task Force Two One Seven (217) - Reserved for Fourth Riverine Zone operations that are under SEA LORDS.

(9) Task Force Two One Eight (218) and Two One Nine (219) Vacant

B. Task Fleet Twenty-Two (22)

(1) Task Force Two Two One (221) - First Coastal Zone Operations and Sea Tiger.

(2) Task Force Two Two Two (222) - Second Coastal Zone Operations.

(3) Task Force Two Two Three (223) - Third Coastal Zone Operations.

(4) Task Force Two Two Four (224) - Fourth Coastal Zone Operations.

(5) Task Force Two Two Five (225) - Fourth Riverine Zone Operations.

(6) Task Force Two Two Six (226) - Fourth Riverine Zone Operations.

(7) Task Force Two Two Seven (227) - Capital Military District Operations.

(8) Task Force Two Two Eight (228) - RSSZ Operations.

(9) Task Force Two Two Nine (229) - Vacant.
All operations with USN commanders will remain in the U. S. Chain of Command under COMNAVFORV, with USN Task Designators, until their operational turnover. As VNN officers take command of the various operations, the operations will be removed from the USN Task Force structure and assigned VNN Task Designators in accordance with the above. The following actions involving the USN Command structure will be accomplished on 1 July 1970:

A. Task Force 194 will be deactivated and placed in reserve for COMNAVFORV contingency use. Operational commanders under CTF 194 will CHOP to the commander specified in subpara delta, below.

B. CTF 115 will remain as presently constituted except that it is a combined command and CTG 115.7 will CHOP to CTF 116.

C. HAL-3 and VAL-4 will report to CTF 116 for Operational Control.

D. The current USN Commanded Operations will assume the following CTF 116 designators until turned over to VNN:

   (1) Sea Float (Tran Hung Dao III) and Solid Anchor (Tran Hung Dao IV): CTG 116.1

   (2) Breezy Cove (Tran Hung Dao X): CTG 116.2

   (3) Search Turn (Tran Hung Dao VI): CTG 116.3

   (4) Barrier Reef (Tran Hung Dao IX): CTG 116.4

   (5) Blue Shark: CTG 116.5

   (6) Duffel Bag: CTG 116.6

Other USN residual forces and assets will be organized as specified by CTF 116.
USN REORGANIZATION

On 1 July 1970, Task Force 116 will be reconstituted. The following information is provided as an alerting measure. (Reference COMNAVFORV 291356Z JUN 1970)

Reorganization will be as follows: (Based upon existing TG 194.0 units)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Designator</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Location</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CTF 116</td>
<td>COMRIVPATFOR/COMRIVPAT-FLOT Five</td>
<td>Binh Thuy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTG 116.1</td>
<td>Sea Float/Solid Anchor</td>
<td>Song Ong Doc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTG 116.2</td>
<td>Breezy Cove Group Cdr</td>
<td>Song Ong Doc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTG 116.2.1</td>
<td>CO RPG 60</td>
<td>Song Ong Doc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTG 116.2.2</td>
<td>CO USS HARNETT COUNTY</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTU 116.2.3</td>
<td>OIC SEAL Team Det ALPHA 6th Platoon</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTE 116.2.3.1</td>
<td>MST 2 Det FOXTROT</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTG 116.3</td>
<td>Search Turn Group Cdr</td>
<td>Rach Gia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTU 116.3.1</td>
<td>CO RPG 58</td>
<td>Rach Gia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTU 116.3.2</td>
<td>OIC SEAL Team One, Det GOLF D Platoon</td>
<td>Rach Gia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTE 116.3.2.1</td>
<td>OIC SEAL Team One, Det GOLF DELTA Platoon, ALPHA Squad</td>
<td>Rach Gia</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTE 116.3.2.2</td>
<td>OIC SEAL Team One, Det GOLF DELTA Platoon, BRAVO Squad</td>
<td>Rach Gia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>Barrier Interdiction Group Cdr</td>
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<td>Barrier Reef West Cdr</td>
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<td>CTE 116.4.1.1</td>
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<td>YRBM-21</td>
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<td>COMRIVDIV 532</td>
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<td>Barrier Reef East Cdr</td>
<td>Tuyen Nhon</td>
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<td>CTE 116.4.3.1</td>
<td>CO RPG 59</td>
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<td>CTU 116.4.4</td>
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<td>CTU 116.5</td>
<td>Delta Major River Incursion Group Cdr (Blue Shark)</td>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
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<td>Delta Major River Incursion Unit / Vung Tau Cdr (COMCOSRON One)</td>
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<td>Upper Bassac-Mekong River Cambodian Border Patrol Unit Cdr</td>
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<td>Football Island Incursion and Sa Dec Maritime Surveillance Unit (COMCOSDIV 13) Cdr</td>
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<td>PCF Raider Element Cdr</td>
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<td>CTE 116.5.2.3</td>
<td>OIC SEAL Team One, Det GOLF HOTEL Platoon</td>
<td>Sa Dec</td>
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<td>Crusades Cdr</td>
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<td>Deputy Crusades Cdr</td>
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<td>Breezy Cove Crusades Cdr</td>
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<td>Barrier Reef Central Crusades Cdr / Kinh Quan Hai</td>
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<td>CTU 116.6.9</td>
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<td>CTG 116.7</td>
<td>CO HAL-3</td>
<td>Binh Thuy</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Cdr Helo Support Unit</td>
<td>Binh Thuy</td>
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<td>USS TERRELL CTY</td>
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<td>Nha Be</td>
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<td>OIC HAL-3 Det 3</td>
<td>USS GARRETT CTY</td>
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<td>Ben Luc</td>
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<td>CTU 116.8.1</td>
<td>OIC VAL-4 Det B</td>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(NOTE: CTG 116.9 organization remains unchanged).
OPERATION TRAN HUNG DAO XI

United States Navy assets and advisors continued to take part in Operation Tran Hung Dao XI during the month of June. A heavy portion of the burden of the operation was borne by the Vietnamese Navy and at the end of the month, with the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Cambodia, the operation became entirely Vietnamese.

At the beginning of the month the task organization of the operation was as follows:

- **TG 194.0** Tran Hung Dao XI
  - Amphibious Assault Unit: RAIDs 71-75, LSIL 329, 5 VNN PCFs, 10 USN ATCs of RAS 13/15.
- **TU 194.0.1**
  - Air Support Unit One: HAL-3
- **TU 194.0.2**
  - Air Support Unit Two: VAL-4
- **TU 194.0.3**
  - River Security Unit: 11 PBRs of RIVDIV 593, 5 PCFs of TU 194.5.1, 3 STABs of STABRON 20.
- **TU 194.0.4**
  - Flag Support Unit: USS BENEWAH, AS KARI SATYR, USS HUNTERDON COUNTY, YRBM-16, YRBM-21.
- **TU 194.0.5**
  - LSM(H) 400, LSSLs 225 and 226, 10 VNN PCFs, 9 VNN PBRs.

At 0200H on 1 June, US ATC 50, while on routine night patrol about nine kilometers south of the Neak Luong Ferry (coordinates WT 265 335), was taken under fire by small arms and B-40 rockets. ATC 50 and ATC 47 returned the fire and cleared the area. One USN was wounded as a result of the action.
On 4 June ASKARI departed the area of operations, towing the ferries which had been salvaged in May to Dong Tam. She chopped to NSA Saigon upon her arrival at Dong Tam.

At 0700H on 6 June, Seawolves of HAL-3 Det 9 on patrol received heavy automatic weapons fire from a point about 15 kilometers north of the border (coordinates WT 270 250). They returned the fire and called in Black Ponies for assistance. They made two hot turn arounds off the USS HUNTERDON COUNTY (LST 838) and continued to place strikes until the Black Ponies arrived. The Seawolves made one last strike after the Black Ponies had finished making their air strikes. Initial results were reported as three structures destroyed and two damaged. At 1830H on the same day Seawolves again took fire from the same area. Black Ponies were again called in, but they were unable to suppress the fire. The next day, June 7, the 520th Tactical Air Squadron placed heavy air strikes in the area.

At 1000H on 8 June, the HUNTERDON COUNTY moved from its position in Cambodia to a point just south of the border. One US ATC was left in Cambodia for communication purposes.

On 14 June a major reorganization took place due to the dwindling U.S. role in the operation. River Division 593 was chopped to CTG 194.8 (THD I) and the STABs were chopped to CTG 194.4 (Barrier
Reef). The USN PCFs returned to the operational control of CTF 115 but CTG 194.5 was tasked to provide five PCFs as a contingency for Cambodian operations until 25 June.

About 1200H on 16 June, four VNN sailors from the monitor HQ 6518 of RAG 26 went ashore against orders about ten kilometers south of Neak Luong (WT 268 308) to visit a coffee house. While drinking coffee, one of the other customers, apparently a VC, started a brawl. Two of the sailors managed to escape, one wounded in the head, but the other two were captured and presumed dead. There were no U. S. advisors present during this incident.

SEALs carried out operations during the month in the Tran Hung Dao XI area of operations. On the night of 16 June LDNN Group A, consisting of nine VNN SEALs and two U. S. advisors, acting on NILO intelligence, was inserted by STABs at a point about 10 kilometers north of the border. They set up an ambush at a small road (WT 243 251). At 2320H two men on bicycles sped past the alert and watchful SEALs too quickly to be taken under fire. The SEALs then extracted. The next night, 17 June, the SEALs returned with a ploy to outdo the wily bicycle riders. A wire was rigged across the road. At 2110H a man came along the road on a bicycle and ran into the wire. He was captured but released when it was found that he had no documents or weapons. The SEALs, their ambush site compromised, then extracted.
At 1330H on 20 June a VNN sailor against orders took a sampan into the beach about 20 kilometers north of the border (WT 298380). He was taken under fire which he returned until he was subdued by an unknown number of VC. Three other VNN sailors heard the fire and went to his assistance. They were taken under fire by about 30 VC and two were wounded, losing an M-16 rifle and an M-79 grenade launcher. The sailors returned to HQ 1201 of RAID 70. The RAID commander led a 16-man landing party which searched up to 800 meters inland. They came under B-40 and small arms fire before withdrawing. Then the RAID units launched a two hour assault, destroying a village and numerous bunkers.

At 1325H on 21 June, VNN ATC HQ 1233 received a sniper round which killed one VNN sailor. At 1529H units of RAIDs 74 and 75 and RAGs 23/31 proceeded to the area and took 20 VC in houses and bunkers under fire. Seawolves scrambled and placed multiple rocket and machine gun strikes at the direction of USN advisors aboard RAID 74/75 boats. Nine houses and one sampan were destroyed and one VC was killed by air.

At the end of the month the withdrawal of all U. S. personnel and assets from Cambodian territory was carried out. At 1055H on 29 June, USN PCF 74, while on its way out of Cambodia, received B-40 rocket and sniper fire about 12 kilometers south of Neak Luong.
The PCF did not return the fire but cleared the area.

One USN sailor was slightly wounded. All USN/USMC personnel had withdrawn from Cambodia by 291427H June.

The evacuation of refugees from Phnom Penh by ships of the Vietnamese Fleet Command, which had been interrupted briefly around the beginning of the month, continued during the month. By 30 June the total number of refugees brought out of Cambodia was 37,720.
OPERATION SEA LORDS SUMMARY

During June Rear Admiral H. S. Matthews, Deputy COMNAVFORV and First SEA LORDS (CTG 194.0) continued to concern himself primarily with the Cambodian operation as naval action in Vietnam itself continued along the same sporadic course of the past several months. The only organizational change of note in TU 194.0 was the disestablishment of River Assault Squadron 13 and River Assault Divisions 131 and 132 on 19 June. The remaining assets and personnel from these units were assigned to River Assault Squadron 15.

First SEA LORDS expressed concern for the growing number of sniper attacks in June. In addition, he pointed to evidence that the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese were reorganizing and infiltrating with the civilians into villages along the Mekong and her tributaries in an effort to regain dominance in that area. RADM Matthews warned against a tendency for U. S. boat crews, relaxed after the initial lull in Cambodian operations, to anchor too close to shore without proper lookouts, to wander ashore in unauthorized groups, and to swim within sniper range. The battle against boredom is one of the greatest struggles in which a river sailor must engage. The long hours, emotional strain, and oppressive heat normally work with the communists in weakening the Americans' guard.
With the withdrawal of all U. S. forces from Cambodia on 30 June, COMNAVFORV reiterated the necessity of practicing navigational exactitude to prevent the diplomatic embarrassment of a patrol boat inadvertently straying across the border. He pointed out that in the past boredom and routine have contributed to carelessness and inefficiency of patrols along the border regions.
Throughout June Operation Breezy Cove continued to be the most active operation in the entire SEA LORDS area. There were 15 friendly-initiated firefights, 11 enemy-initiated actions, and 30 unilateral firings by allied forces. USN/VNN forces killed 63 of the enemy and captured eight, while suffering only six wounded themselves.

Seawolves accounted for the largest number of enemy killed in a single June action in the Breezy Cove AO. Before dawn on 11 June, Seawolves 62 and 63 scrambled to assist ARVN and U.S. troops in contact with a battalion-size enemy element 12 kilometers north of Thoi Binh (WR 09 44). They placed two air strikes in the area during a 90-minute period and received sporadic AK-47 fire. The allied ground elements counted the bodies of 15 dead Viet Cong.

Unit commanders in Vietnam's two southernmost AOs, Breezy Cove and Sea Float, experienced difficulty in making necessary repairs on their heavily committed river craft. The services provided by the USS KRISHNA (ARL-38), although of excellent quality, have been only barely adequate because of the large number of boats needing repair. It often took a week or more before the ARL could accept a boat for repair, and repair time averaged one to ten days. The small craft in these AOs are expected to receive even less maintenance as the number of River Assault Craft (RAC, will be increased from 21 to 45 in the coming weeks.

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Breezy Cove units experienced the first sapper swimmer attack on USN river assets since the operation began in September 1969. Early on the morning of 11 June, boats of RIVDIV 554 had just shifted their WBGP toward the mouth of a canal six miles east of Song Ong Doc (VQ 890 975) when a crew member spotted a man swimming south along the canal, approximately 10 meters from one of the PBRs. The swimmer was going against the current and carrying a rectangular object. The swimmer dove under the water and reappeared 10 feet from the boat. The units attacked the man with concussion grenades, apparently killing him. They sank the small rectangular floating object rather than risk bringing it aboard. Intelligence analysts believed this assailant to be a member of the sapper element of the 95th North Vietnamese Regiment known to be operating in the area. Day rocket attacks on the PBRs had generally been ineffective, and an increase in night sapper activity against the vulnerable WBGP was expected.

The United States' most effective counter-guerrilla forces, the Navy SEALs, were quite successful during June operations at Breezy Cove.

At 1445H on the afternoon of 9 June, a nine member SEAL platoon of Detachment ALPHA inserted by air at VQ 902 928 along the Song Dong Dung with a Viet Cong Hoi Chanh as guide. They fired at
two males running into a treeline and then discovered a VC rice

Two males running into a treeline and then discovered a VC rice
cache pointed out by the Hoi Chanh. The 3600 kilos of rice were in
huge bins and could not be salvaged, so the SEALs destroyed them.
The SEALs entered the hootch of the VC village chief 50 meters away,
captured a one kilo pile of documents, and then retreated to the

proposed pickup area. While waiting for the helicopter, the SEALs
saw a woman pointing them out to a man with a K-54 pistol. The man
spotted the Vietnamese guide and fired at him, wounding him in the
forearm. The patrol took the area under fire and called in air
strikes. Another Vietnamese was wounded by VC automatic weapons
fire when he ran into the open to recover the K-54 pistol. When
enemy fire was suppressed, the SEALs and the two wounded Viet-
namese were extracted by an Army Slick.

On 17 June, LT Boink led a squad of SEALs from Detachment
ALPHA to VQ 902 900. They were operating along with Vietnamese
counterparts and inserted in sampans. The SEALs established a
guardpost along a trail and at 1020H encountered two men. The men
began to run, and the SEALs killed one and captured the other. These
men were later identified as the VC province chairman of finance
and economy and his assistant. An estimated eight Viet Cong then
attacked the SEALs who called in Seawolves to cover their escape.
One Vietnamese agent was wounded as they boarded the sampan and
a Seawolf hovered to evacuate him in the midst of the firefight. The Seawolves continued air strikes until the SEALs successfully extracted.

LT Boink's platoon successfully captured three other members of the Ca Mau Viet Cong infra-structure on the morning of 22 June. Acting on Hoi Chanh intelligence, the SEALs departed Ca Mau by MSSC and landed 13 kilometers NE of Ca Mau (WR 289 223) on the Quan Lo River 0245H. Two men crawled into a nearby hootch pointed out by the Hoi Chanh and encountered two male and one female VC. The female struggled briefly with one SEAL, and one of the men tried to stab LT Boink with a bayonet. The SEALs quickly withdrew with their prisoners and returned to Ca Mau. The captives were identified as the village propaganda chairman, a bodyguard of the Ca Mau City committee chairman, and a member of the VC female proselytizing cadre.
Search Turn

Enemy activity in the Operation Search Turn AO (CTG 194.3) during June declined rapidly from the previous month's level. During May, the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese had aggressively operated from their sanctuaries in the U Minh Forest, but during June, initiated only two firefights, and did not kill or wound any USN/VNN sailors. The enemy lost ten KIA.

On 17 June Commander M. A. Brisbois relieved LCDR S. T. Hock as CTG 194.3 in Rach Gia City. The following day Lieutenant Le Hue Nhi, VNN, the commanding officer of RPG 58, was appointed Deputy Commander of Operation Search Turn.

The Navy's ubiquitous SEALs accounted for the only significant action in the Search Turn AO during June. SEALs from Detachment GOLF, DELTA Platoon destroyed a small Viet Cong ammo cache three kilometers north of Soc Son on 18 June. Acting on intelligence received from a U. S. Army informant at Rach Gia, they departed Rach Soi along the Rach Gia - Ha Tien Canal. The SEALs inserted at VS 993 162 and quickly discovered the cache which was not booby trapped. The stockpile included a handful of AK-47s and B-40 rocket launchers, 60 grenades, 21 pounds of powder, 85 pounds of C-4 explosives, and several hundred pounds of sugar, salt, and rice,
all of which were destroyed with demolitions. The SEALs, covered by Seawolves, withdrew to Rach Soi.

Another SEAL effort to locate a Viet Cong supply station on 23 June was not as successful. LT Short led a six man platoon two kilometers north from Rach Soi to an area at WS 121 082, pointed out by a Vietnamese informer. The unit patrolled 150 meters crossing the Rach Vay Canal, and entered a suspected hootch. The SEALs detained the five occupants and fired at one man who escaped from an adjacent hootch. The Americans' security guard reported suspected enemy activity and signaling in the jungle surrounding the hooches, and the SEALs quickly retreated to the extraction point. They held one man who admitted to frequently supplying the local Viet Cong with rice and food. He was turned over to the Rach Gia Naval Liaison Intelligence Officer.
Barrier Reef

The Area of Operations of Barrier Reef was one of the most active for the Brown Water Navy during June. In eight firefights, allied forces accounted for 27 enemy KIA and one captured. No Americans or Vietnamese were killed in the month's operations, but 11 allies (8 USN, 3 VNN) were wounded.

The only major personnel change in CTG 194.4 came on 15 June when Lieutenant Commander Richard F. Barbour relieved LCDR Paul T. Souval as COMRIVRON 55.

The Vietnamese peasant who occasionally cooperates with allied forces is by far the best source of information on Viet Cong activities. Guerrillas who travel by night in small groups are often visible only to the indigenous population and must depend on them for supplies and geographical information. On 31 May a local farmer at Thanh Loi (WS 7977785) informed ARVN forces that five Viet Cong planned to cross the canal adjoining his land within two days. Units of STABRON 20 and an Army Hunter Killer Team set a WBGP at the designated point on the evening of 1 June. At 2200H STAB 7015 and 708 sighted two persons fording the canal and opened fire with M-60 machine guns and M-79 grenade launchers. After the assailants lost sight of their prey, four persons (3 USN, 1 VNN) from STAB 7015
landed to investigate while STAB 708 provided illumination. The landing party discovered two men hiding in a ditch, one of whom tossed a grenade at the group, wounding the Vietnamese. The landing party and STAB 708 saturated the area with bullets while STAB 7015 evacuated the wounded man to ATSB Phuoc Xuyen. Seawolves from Detachment SEVEN, aided by an Army Cobra Team, placed air strikes along the bank of the canal. The allies reported that two VC were killed in the action.

A USN investigation of the area the following morning resulted in the capture of one of these "dead" Viet Cong. During interrogation by the national police at Phuoc Xuyen, the 31-year-old suspect admitted to being a communist from Hanoi who had lived in the village for six years. He had two other VC working for him and reported to a Viet Cong captain on the hull numbers and types of boats on the canal each night. The VC captain had been the other man who was wounded in the previous night's conflict. The Phuoc Xuyen police reported the rather incredible fact that the man's wife and child were unaware that he was a VC.

The Viet Cong apparently carefully monitor all U. S. traffic along the canals - at least in the Barrier Reef AO. The national police from Hoa discovered two VC located in hootches on the south bank of the Grand Canal near WS 801 785 whose job was to relay
information by radio to their cohorts waiting for a safe moment to cross the canal. The Barrier Reef commander instituted a twofold scheme to thwart VC canal crossings. Strike assault boats began random day patrols, and troops covered by assault boats were occasionally inserted in between areas covered by nightly WBGPs.

Viet Cong intimidation continued at a high pace along the border areas despite these efforts. A mid-June intelligence report indicated that the guerrillas had ordered inhabitants in the Phuoc Xuyen vicinity to do away with their dogs as they often barked and compromised Viet Cong positions. An old man living at VS 903 771 on the Grand Canal reported that VC had ordered him not to stray more than 50 meters from his hootch as the entire area was booby trapped. The national police also reported that the VC has forced the local population to inform on the location of U. S. craft and in one case had murdered a VN male for giving GVN officers information about communist troop movements. In times of war, the civilian population has always suffered from the destruction surrounding them. In Vietnam this suffering often results from methodical terrorism against a people caught in the middle.

The treacherous currents of South Vietnam's small rivers and streams claimed the lives of several U. S. Naval personnel in June, one of whom was EN3 Warnick, an advisor with RPG 59 under
CTG 194.4. PBR 708 was at a WBGP 16 kilometers SE of Moc Hoa (XS 119 791) on 7 June when it sighted two Viet Cong on the east bank of the Kin Moi Hai. It broke its guardpost to make a firing run on the area. Petty Officer Warnick, who had been lying on the canopy of the PBR, fell into the canal and was never seen again. PBRs 742, 77, and 774 joined in the search, and Black Pony/helicopters provided illumination. The PBRs dragged the canal bottom without success and Regional Force personnel conducted an abortive search of the surrounding area.

Seven U. S. Navy personnel were wounded on the evening of 20 June when a satchel charge was tossed into ATC 50 while it was in a WBGP near WS 935 766. Air support was not immediately available so a nearby STAB made a firing run along the canal bank. All the wounds were fortunately of a slight nature and were quickly cared for by an embarked Navy corpsman.

PBR 145 of RIVDIV 532 in a WBGP 16 kilometers south of Moc Hoa on 25 June sighted a moving light on the north bank at WS 995 755. The PBR fired a short burst at the light and moved to a new guardpost. Thirty minutes later, the boat stopped a lighted sampan moving west along the canal with a young girl aboard who was in serious condition from a bullet wound in the hip, probably as a result of fire from the PBR. The boat crew took the girl to
Military Advisory Team 61 for treatment, from where she was medevaced to Tan An. The girl was subsequently identified as a Viet Cong whose job was to signal the position of U. S. river boats to VC units in the area.
Riverine Strike Group

Midway through June, the commander of Riverine Strike Group (CTG 194.7) sent the following message to COMNAVFORV:

"Riverine Strike Group will disestablish without ceremony 30 June 1970."

All remaining river assault craft were reassigned on that date to COMRIVRON 15 under the administrative and operational control of COMRIVPATFLOT Five.

For the past seven months CTG 194.7 had been a skeleton force. During November 1969, as U. S. Naval forces began a buildup of interdiction forces along the Cambodian border, most Riverine Strike Group units were out-chopped to other SEA LORDS components. Since that time CTG 194.7 had controlled only those boats which were returned for alterations and repairs.
Market Time Raider Campaign / Operation Blue Shark

During the month of June units of TG 194.5 conducted numerous incursions and sweep operations and encountered a generally moderate level of enemy activity. In Blue Shark operations during the month there were 13 friendly- and nine enemy-initiated firefights. The enemy suffered 24 killed (12 body count and 12 probable), 6 wounded, 27 captured, and one detained as a result of June Blue Shark operations. Two USN personnel were wounded during the same period.

WPBs, PCFs, Regional Forces, Kit Carson Scouts, CG 36, and SEALs of SEAL Team One, Detachment GOLF participated in Blue Shark operations during the month.

A typical operation was carried out on the evening of 19 June about seven kilometers northeast of Sa Dec. Twelve SEALs and one scout were inserted by Medium SEAL Support Craft to conduct a target operation on a VC firing position discovered on an earlier SEAL patrol. While approaching the firing positions two VC warning signs were seen and then three males were sighted fleeing into the treeline. A few minutes later the point element spotted two males walking along a dike line carrying AK-47s, a B-40 rocket and a launcher. They took the men under fire and the men dropped the rocket and launcher and ran. The rocket and launcher were captured.
As the team approached the firing position which had been the mission's objective, a SEAL stepped on a booby trap and suffered multiple fragment wounds in his legs and feet. The MSSC was called in for extraction as members of the team placed charges in and blew up the bunker in which the VC firing position had been. When the bunker had been destroyed the team extracted and returned to Sa Dec.
COASTAL SURVEILLANCE FORCE SUMMARY

Operation Market Time

Market Time and Stable Door forces continued their normal operations during the month of June. U.S. Navy Market Time units detected 8,435 watercraft, inspected 5,618 and boarded 1,128 during the month of operations. Ninety-three junks and 537 persons were detained for further interrogation as a result of the inspections conducted.

Stable Door units detected an additional 12,027 watercraft and boarded 1,118 of these. As a result, 61 junks were detained along with 61 persons.

The Vietnamese Navy units assigned to Market Time Operations accounted for an additional 87,344 watercraft being searched. The VNN units searched 268,174 persons and detained 346 persons for further interrogation. Forty-nine junks were detained by the VNN units.

Market Time and Blue Shark forces accounted for 47 enemy killed, 58 captured, and nine enemy wounded. These operations also accounted for 73 junks/sampans destroyed, four junks/sampans damaged, 298 structures/bunkers destroyed, and 96 structures/bunkers damaged.
On 10 June, the USCGC SHERMAN (WHEC-20) detected an SL-4 type infiltration trawler at position 08-15N 105-40E. The contact, when detected, was deaf in the water, but then got underway and proceeded away from the Vietnamese coastline. The SHERMAN continued to follow the trawler until such time that the trawler entered CHICOM waters at position 18-56N 110-49E at 140002H June 1970.
Stable Door

Unit One - Vung Tau

The June activities of Unit One at Vung Tau were highlighted by two incidents involving Seventh Fleet LSTs. The attempted mining of the USS MEEKER COUNTY (LST 980) on 28 June is discussed in the Naval Support Activity Saigon section of the summary.

At 1650H on 19 June, USS HAMPSHIRE COUNTY (LST 819) collided with and sank a Vietnamese fishing craft in the vicinity of channel buoy two in Vung Tau Harbor. There were no casualties. Two people were picked up by another Vietnamese fishing boat and one man was rescued by the ship's boat.

Unit Two - Cam Ranh Bay

June was quite an active month for Unit Two at Cam Ranh Bay. In the early morning hours of 12 June, VC sappers carried out an attack on the base at Cam Ranh. Skimmers 10 and 30 were dispatched to vicinity of CP 050 280, about 13 kilometers north of the air field at Cam Ranh. When they arrived on station at 0200H they observed a swimmer in the water. They captured the swimmer by wrestling him aboard the boat. During the struggle he attempted to foil the attempt to capture him by knocking the throttle of the skimmer.
open all the way. The swimmer had been towing behind him an AK-47 and two satchel charges. He was turned over to the police for interrogation by the NILO and was subsequently found to be a member of the K-92 NVA Sapper Company.

On the evening of 14 June, skimmers 26 and 10 foiled an apparent attempted sapper attack near the 22nd Replacement Battalion (CP 030 320). Arriving at the scene at 1825H several Vietnamese were sighted on the beach and taken under fire. One of the men was seen to fall and was presumed dead. Later in the evening a sweep of the area was conducted and an abandoned sampan was sighted. It was wisely assumed to be booby-trapped. When one of the IUWG personnel tossed a grenade near it, a large secondary explosion completely destroyed the sampan. A short time later the skimmers began receiving fire and they immediately returned it. Then the Harbor Entry Clearance Point ordered them to clear the area. As Skimmer 26 turned to leave the area a mine was detonated near her stern.

She received some shrapnel damage to her engine but was still able to clear the area. Two sampans were seen leaving the area of the mining but escaped.

On 18 June Skimmers 26 and 27 foiled another attempt to infiltrate the Cam Ranh Peninsula while patrolling about 2000 yards north of Dong Da Tin (CP 018 327). Three unidentified junks attempted
to evade when approached and beached on the mainland side. The
occupants disembarked and fled north on foot. Despite warning shots
the men continued to flee. Then the skimmers opened fire on the men,
one of whom appeared to dive into the water. Skimmer personnel
got out of their boat and waded over to the man who was found to be
dead. The other man got away.

Unit Three - Qui Nhon

Two men were injured on the afternoon of 11 June at the Qui
Nhon base while conducting a training mission. Explosives Ordnance
Disposal personnel were explaining the construction of an M-60
rocket fuze when the device exploded, hurling fragments into the
group. CWO2 H. W. Russeno and Phu A Cam received surface lacer-
ations on various parts of the body and were taken to the 67th Evacua-
tion Hospital.

The Qui Nhon Stable Door Unit was turned over to Vietnamese

Unit Four - Nha Trang

LCPL 43 and Skimmers 28 and 74, under the control of CTU
213.2, conducted a large operation on the night of 31 May/1 June in the
Nha Trang Harbor and around outlying islands. In addition to boarding
and searching all craft in the area, the Vietnamese crews, accompanied by Vietnamese National Police and Military Police, handed out psyops literature to all civilians they encountered. The operation netted 26 detainees who were turned over to the National Police.

While on routine patrol early on the morning of 12 July, Skimmer 28's crew captured a swimmer 200 meters east of the merchant ship SS HOOSIER STATE. All available Unit Four patrol craft made a surface search and dropped concussion grenades around the ship. The Stable Door EOD team made hull checks on all harbor shipping with negative results. The 40-year-old suspect carried neither explosives nor identification. After interrogation, the Second Coastal Zone Intelligence Officer reported that the detainee was a smuggler and not a swimmer sapper.

A Navy EOD swimmer made a dramatic attempt to capture a communist swimmer sapper in the Nha Trang Harbor on the night of 25 June. EOD team members making a hull check of the TRUONG-SON, a Vietnamese coastal freighter, discovered a swimmer floating near the ship's starboard anchor chain. EOD personnel signaled to Skimmer 28 to provide illumination. When the man realized that he was detected, he swam underwater to the port side of the ship, but was spotted with a search light as soon as he surfaced. He quickly resubmerged and swam back to the other side of the ship.
An EOD swimmer swam to within 12 feet of the suspect and called, "Lai day" (come here). The man did not respond and the Navy swimmer closed to four feet in an attempt to capture him. The sapper then pulled a grenade from his belt and tried unsuccessfully to pull the pin. The EOD swimmer logically abandoned his intention to capture the sapper, and a crew member of Skimmer 28 shot the man with an M-16. The water filled with blood, and the body sank before it could be recovered. Navy personnel dropped concussion grenades into the water to insure a kill and possibly detonate any explosives the sapper had carried. The swimmer searched the area for additional swimmers, and the EOD team members checked the hull of the TRUONG-SON and all the other ships in the harbor, all with negative results. The alertness of the Stable Door EOD team was solely responsible for averting a possible disaster as the TRUONG-SON had poor waterline lighting and no sentries on deck.

The next day the Vietnamese National Police found the sapper's body washed up on the beach near Chut Village (CP 062 504). The corpse was still clutching a U. S. handgrenade spoon in his right hand.
During the month of June, Sea Float celebrated its first anniversary. When the big day arrived on 27 June, it appeared, however, that the personnel of Sea Float had other things to do rather than celebrating the anniversary as the Sea Float Daily Operations Summary makes no mention of any change of routine.

It is understandable that a birthday celebration during the month might have been overlooked, or at least celebrated quietly, as the enemy was still very much in evidence in the Sea Float Area of Operations. On the day before the day recognized as Sea Float's first anniversary, the enemy had ambushed two formidable Sea Float assets, an LSSL and a PG, and carried out a total of five ambushes on that single day. Besides the presence of the enemy, the personnel of Sea Float had another cause for not being in a celebrating mood for seven Sea Float personnel had perished in a logistic helicopter crash on 24 June.

In making his presence felt in the Sea Float AO during June, the enemy carried out ten ambush operations against the Sea Float forces. On two occasions, sharp-eyed pilots detected the enemy making preparations for an ambush and the Sea Float forces foiled the attempted ambush.
SEAL operations in the Sea Float AO accounted for the majority of casualties inflicted on the enemy during the month. Four platoons of SEALs conducted 60 distinct operations to search out the enemy forces. Biet Hai troops (VNN Rangers) conducted another 26 operations of their own.

The enemy lost 25 killed and 24 captured. Friendly casualties were seven Sea Float personnel killed in the helicopter crash and seven USN, two US civilians, and 12 VNN wounded.

During the month, the names of the two hamlets in the Sea Float area were changed in accordance with the desires of the inhabitants. The people living in the hamlets desired to maintain the traditional name of Ham Rong. The hamlets are now called Ham Rong One and Ham Rong Two. The village made up of the two hamlets will now be known as Tran Hung Dao Village.

On 17 June, 15 units of RID 45 arrived at Sea Float. The increase in forces for Sea Float was appreciated, however, these new forces further added to logistics problems at Sea Float.

The 86 Seabees at Sea Float have worked continuously throughout the month of June to complete the facilities ashore (Solid Anchor). Since the facilities ashore are not yet completed, the arrival of RID 45 units, although appreciated, compounded the personnel berthing and
messing problem, the overall logistics and repair problem, and the dispersal of craft for the best defense posture.

On 18 June, units of the Sea Float Junk Force were involved in a melee which did not involve any enemy activity. The initial cause was attributed to mechanical difficulty. The end result, from junks attempting to assist and being involved in collisions, was two junks damaged and a third junk sunk.

On 23 June, Secretary of the Navy, John Chafee, accompanied by COMNAVFORV, VADM King, and CNO, VNN, Commodore Chon, arrived on board Sea Float at 1300H. The distinguished guests lunched with the crew, were briefed on current operations, inspected various floating units, and toured Solid Anchor before departing at 1458H.

At 2412 25H June, Commander Thomas A. Kelleher, Jr., USN, relieved Commander Robert W. Curran, USN, as Commander Task Group 115.7.

On 25 June, Major General McCown, CG DMAC, visited Sea Float to discuss future operations and plans for the Sea Float Area of Operations.
By far, the most significant enemy activity during the month concerned ambushes directed at friendly forces.

On 9 June, PCF's 93 and 96 departed Sea Float to transit to an ARL for accomplishment of required repairs. At 091004H, the PCFs came under fire from five B-40 rockets and automatic weapons fire from the south bank in the vicinity of VQ 955 624. PCF 93 was hit by one rocket amidships on the port side which entered the main cabin with fragments penetrating through the starboard side and wounding two USN personnel. PCF 95 was simultaneously hit by one rocket on the port side at the waterline below the pilot house door which wounded the officer-in-charge. The PCFs returned fire, beached, and commenced mortar fire into the ambush position. Seawolves 10 and 15, PCFs 692 and 695, and PG 84 were scrambled to the ambush site. While Seawolves placed strikes, PG 84 took possible enemy retreat areas under fire. PCFs 9 and 694 arrived at 1140H with CIDG troops which were inserted for a sweep of the area. They located two firing positions and captured six firing tubes and a B-40 rocket.

At 1357H that same afternoon, PCFs 3, 40, and 63 came under B-40 rocket fire at WQ 175 702. One rocket passed astern of PCF 3 and one rocket passed astern of PCF 63. The PCFs returned fire and cleared the area. There was no damage.
At 131822H June, PCFs 3 and 9 were transiting the Bo De River inbound when they came under B-40 rocket and automatic weapons fire from the west bank in the vicinity of WQ 210 694. Three rockets fell short of the boats and the automatic weapons fire did no damage. The PCFs, with the assistance of Seawolves, suppressed the enemy fire.

On the night of 13 June, PCFs 694 and 695 assisted an MSSC in the capture of four heavily-loaded sampans. The PCFs towed the sampans to Sea Float for examination. Inspection of the sampans revealed over eight tons of foodstuffs, rice, gasoline, beverages, sampan motor parts, medical supplies, tobacco, and miscellaneous supply items. The entire shipment was valued at 200,000 piasters.

On 15 June, the USS ASHEVILLE (PG 84) departed Sea Float at 1330H enroute to rendezvous with the USS ANTELOPE (PG 86) at the mouth of the Bo De River for relief. At 1430H, PG 84 came under B-40 rocket and automatic weapons fire from both the north and south banks in the vicinity of WQ 175 701. Three rockets detonated on the starboard side. Two rockets struck the ship forward and disabled the ship's main battery. The rocket striking aft ruptured a reduction gear lube oil line in the engine room and wounded one sailor.
An Army helicopter in the vicinity, conducting visual reconnaissancce, observed four additional rockets detonate in the water near the PG.

The PG reversed course and proceeded back through the ambush area receiving automatic weapons fire for approximately 1000 meters. The Army helicopter acted as a communication relay and directed Seawolves 13 and 18 into the area, where the Seawolves placed rocket and mini gun fire on the ambush positions.

Biet Hai troops were inserted a short time later on the north bank where they discovered eleven 125 mm launch bombs, five B-40 and two B-50 launch tubes in a bunker. After the troops were extracted, Black Ponies destroyed the bunker.

After accomplishing emergency repairs, PG 84 rendezvoused with PG 86 for relief, and then proceeded to Cam Ranh Bay for further repairs.

On 18 June, PCFs 3811 and 3817 departed Sea Float at 0715H to escort the Tug MICHAEL on its outbound journey. At 1000H, the PCFs and the Tug came under rocket and small arms fire from the west bank of the Bo De River in the vicinity of WQ 250 667. PCF 3817 was hit in the starboard side above the waterline. Damage to the PCF was a four inch by six inch hole. The Tug MICHAEL was hit by
two rockets which exploded inside the engineroom and the galley
wounding two civilian crewmembers. Three additional rockets
hit the tug topside but failed to detonate. Enemy fire was suppressed
by the assistance of additional PCFs and Seawolves. Later, Sea Float
EOD personnel were transported to the tug by Seawolf to disarm the
three undetonated rockets.

On 26 June, the USS ANTELOPE (PG 86) was supporting a
CIDG operation and was anchored at the intersection of the Cua Lon,
Dam Doi, and Bo De Rivers. At 0554H, PG 86 came under B-40 rocket
attack from the north bank from the vicinity of WQ 205 720. Six
rockets detonated on all sides of the PG, but caused no damage.
The ANTELOPE returned heavy counter battery fire. Seawolves
placed rocket and mini gun strikes in the ambush area followed by
a troop sweep, but no enemy casualties were found.

Later in the morning of 26 June, LSSL 229 was proceeding
east on the Cua Lon River for a rendezvous at the mouth of the Bo De
River with the USS WASHOE COUNTY (LST 1165) for refueling.
At 0924H, LSSL 229 came under intense B-40/41 rocket attack at
WQ 213 704. It was struck by five rockets which wounded seven
VNN personnel, one seriously. Rockets struck the ship on the port
te side at a 40 mm tub and a 20 mm gun tub, causing the majority of
the casualties. One rocket struck the after deck house above a
watertight door. This rocket appeared to be a blank loaded rocket since quite a bit of sawdust was spread around the impact area and no damage was inflicted. One rocket hit the ship's nameplate port side of the transom. This rocket may have been a dud as there was no explosion and no damage. Another rocket struck the ship approximately two feet above the waterline with no penetration or damage.

PG 86 departed station to render assistance. LSSL 229 and PG 86 suppressed fire from the ambush area. VNN PCFs 3815 and 3816, returning from Market Time patrol, medevaced the wounded to the USS WASHOE COUNTY. Upon completion of suppression fire, PG 86 returned to station in support of the CIDG troop operation and LSSL 229 proceeded to rendezvous for refueling.

At the same time that LSSL 229 came under fire, PCFs 3817 and 3820, in transit outbound to assume Market Time patrol stations, came under B-40 rocket and small arms fire from both banks in the vicinity of WQ 100 698. The PCFs returned fire and cleared the area with no casualties or damage. Seawolves 15 and 16 scrambled and placed strikes in the ambush area. The PCFs then cleared the area and continued to Market Time patrol stations.

In the afternoon of 26 June, ATC 5162 and ATC 5167, units of RID 45, were proceeding south on the Rach Cai Nhap Canal when they came under small arms fire from the vicinity of WQ 070 780 at 1313H.
The RID craft returned suppression fire. Black Ponies 10 and 13, in the air on a routine mission over the Sea Float AO, placed strikes on the ambush site. The RID 45 units sustained no casualties and continued on their assigned mission.

That same evening, PCFs 3 and 9 were transiting east on the Cua Lon River enroute from An Thoi to Cat Lo. At 1655H they ran into a B-40 ambush in the vicinity of WQ 845 601. Three rockets were fired at the boats but all fell short. The PCFs returned fire. PCF 3 beached opposite the ambush area and blanketed the area with 81 mm mortar fire. PCF 9 made one firing run through the area, then beached, and added to the 81 mm mortar barrage. The PCFs retracted and continued on their assigned mission. Upon inspection, the total damage incurred from this encounter was found to be one bullet hole in the main cabin of PCF 9 caused by an AK-47 round.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND INCIDENTS

CTF Clearwater

Enemy activity in the CTF Clearwater Area of Operations (AO) was very light throughout the month of June. The personnel assigned to CTF Clearwater, however, were kept busy making final preparations for the scheduled turnover of operations to the Vietnamese Navy and the disestablishment of CTF Clearwater as an operating force of the U. S. Navy.

On 1 June, all of the PBRs of River Division 521 were turned over to the VNN River Patrol Group (RPG) 60. At this time, the security of the inshore waterways of Thua Thien Province, other than the harbor defense of Tan My Harbor, was assumed by VNN units under the operational control of the Commander, First Coastal Zone.

At 1000H, 1 July, in ceremonies held at Coastal Group II Base, CTF Clearwater turned over all remaining security functions to the Vietnamese Navy and terminated the mission of Task Force Clearwater.
SEAL Operations in the Rung Sat Special Zone

SEAL Detachment ALPHA, 5th Platoon, Squads ALPHA and BRAVO, composing TU 116.9.5, continued operations in the RSSZ during part of June. Operations were very much reduced from preceding months, and late in June, the 5th Platoon moved its base of operations to Dong Tam.

SEAL Detachment ALPHA, 7th Platoon, conducted operations out of Nha Be after 27 June and assumed the designator TU 116.9.5.
Rung Sat Special Zone Shipping Incidents

Six enemy attacks on shipping transiting the Long Tau Shipping Channel occurred during the month of June.

At 150815H, the merchant ship FINNAMORE VALLEY was hit by three B-41 rockets while transiting north (YS 104 634) on the Long Tau Shipping Channel. Minesweepers from RAG 91 immediately returned the fire. A USN Light Helicopter Fire Team (LHFT) was called in for a strike. Within 15 minutes after the attack, two RF companies were inserted into the ambush area and conducted a sweep. The results of the sweeps were negative.

The FINNAMORE VALLEY received three hits. Two rockets penetrated on the port side into the engine room and one rocket exploded on deck injuring one crewmember slightly.

Slightly over an hour later, at 150925H, the merchant ship RAPHAEL SEMMES also transiting north (YS 012 698) came under a B-41 rocket attack. This attack occurred approximately seven kilometers distant from the position where the FINNAMORE VALLEY was attacked. Three rockets were fired but none struck the ship and there were no casualties. PBRs on patrol sighted the firing position and reconed the bank by fire receiving sporadic return fire. Two RF companies conducting day sweeps on opposite banks
swept toward the firing area. One company detained one suspect while the other company located and detained four suspects.

Approximately four hours later, at 151300H, the French merchant ship GODAVERY, while transiting south (YS 100 645) came under attack by one B-40 rocket but was not hit. PBRs and RF troops were unable to confirm this incident of shipping harassment. This attack occurred at a position approximately two kilometers distant from the attack on the FINNAMORE VALLEY earlier in the day.

On 20 June, the merchant ship ALBANY became the object of two rocket attacks during a single transit of the Long Tau Shipping Channel. At 1015H, when the ALBANY was 30 kilometers SE of Nha Be (YS 125 580), five B-40 rockets were fired at the ship. None of the rockets hit and no casualties were sustained. A PF company on a security sweep saw the rockets fired and marked the enemy position at YS 122 570. At 1018H, an ARVN artillery battery commenced firing into the area. PRUs were inserted by Slicks into the area but found only launching stakes which they destroyed.

Meanwhile, the ALBANY proceeding toward Saigon, received a second barrage of B-40 rockets. Her position now was only nine kilometers SE of Nha Be (YS 015 750). Two rockets were fired, but once again, the ALBANY suffered no hits and no casualties. Personnel on board ASPBs, which had gotten underway to provide additional
security, saw the rockets fired and marked the position. Black Ponies were called in and placed a strike on the suspected position. The ASPBs embarked troops from an RF company and inserted the troops into the area. During a sweep of the area, the troops located and destroyed the rocket firing stakes.

Later the same day, the British merchant tanker SS HEMIS- INUS reported coming under attack from three rockets fired from the east bank of the Long Tau Shipping Channel in the vicinity of XS 980 782, approximately six kilometers SE of Nha Be. The ship reported that no hits were scored and that the nearest round had landed about 100 yards astern. USN LHFT and LAFT were vectored to the scene but were unable to place strikes due to operations of the 18th ARVN Division in the general area. The ARVN troops were alerted to the harassment area and patrolled the area.

Due to the unusual number of harassments on this day, extra security precautions were taken prior to the transit south through the shipping channel of special interest ships USNS BLAND and SS ROBIN HOOD.
Groundings

It is not uncommon for ships and boats operating in the waters of Vietnam to inadvertently ground. Common causes of such situations are rapidly changing bottom conditions compounded by lack of navigational aids, or in some cases, operating in areas which have never been adequately surveyed.

It is uncommon, however, that several ships should experience groundings during a short time frame of little over one week. On 5 June, an ammunition ship, the SS AMERICAN HAWK, went aground in Danang Harbor 500 yards from the Harbor Entrance Control Post (HECP). By unloading cargo to lighten the ship, the ship was successfully refloated at 061036H without damage.

Also on 5 June, the USS JENNINGS COUNTY (LST 846) reported a temporary grounding at position 10-12.8N 106-52.1E. The JENNINGS COUNTY was transiting the Banc Soirap enroute from Vung Tau to the My Tho River. It was first thought that the ship had grounded on an uncharted sand bar. Hull damage was reported.

A later report indicated that a sunken wreck had possibly been struck. An underwater hull inspection after the ship entered drydock in Saigon on 9 June revealed that nine of the ship's bottom tanks had been ruptured as a result of the incident.
On 13 June, the USS HUNTERDON COUNTY (LST 838) grounded near the mouth of the Bassac River at position 09-27.8N 106-27E. That night, on the rising tide, the HUNTERDON COUNTY was able to get underway on her own power. After careful sounding of the ship's tanks throughout the night, the ship was able to report that no apparent damage had been sustained.
NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP SUMMARY

**Fleet Command**

The assets of the Fleet Command are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flotilla I: Combatant Ships</th>
<th>Flotilla II: Service and Support Ships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PC 06</td>
<td>YOG 470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCE 07 09 10 11 12 13 (in U.S.) 14 (in U.S.)</td>
<td>472 473 LSM (H) 400 LSM 402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSC 114 115 116</td>
<td>601 602 603 604 605 606 607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSSL 225 226 228 229 230 231</td>
<td>611 612 613 614 615 617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSIL 327 328 329 330 331</td>
<td>618 619 614 613 612</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Accounts of significant actions involving units of the Fleet Command may be found in the sections of the summary which cover specific operations.
### River Patrol Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th># of PBRs</th>
<th>Homeport</th>
<th>Operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RPG 51</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cat Lai</td>
<td>RSSZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Phu Cuong</td>
<td>Ready Deck/THD V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53A</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ben Kec</td>
<td>Giant Slingshot/THD II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53B</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ben Luc</td>
<td>Giant Slingshot/THD II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54A</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>My Tho</td>
<td>THD VIII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54B</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Tan An</td>
<td>Giant Slingshot/THD II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Chau Doc</td>
<td>THD I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>An Long</td>
<td>Barrier Reef/THD IX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Nha Be</td>
<td>RSSZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Rach Soi</td>
<td>Search Turn/THD VI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Tuyen Nhon</td>
<td>Barrier Reef/THD IX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>10/20</td>
<td>Tan My/Hoi An</td>
<td>Sea Tiger/THD VII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Ha Tien</td>
<td>THD I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Song Ong Doc</td>
<td>Breezy Cove/THD X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Accounts of actions involving assets of individual River Patrol Groups may be found in those sections of the summary which discuss specific operations.
River Assault Groups

The River Assault Groups of the Vietnamese Navy carried out normal river interdiction and amphibious operations during June. Elements of RAG 26 and RAGs 23/31 took part in operations in Cambodia, as described in the section of the summary which discusses Operation Tran Hung Dao XI.

RAG 91 continued minesweeping patrols on the navigable rivers east and southeast of Saigon. At 0825H on 15 June, HQ 157, while on a routine minesweep patrol about 35 kilometers SE of Saigon was taken under fire by small arms. HQ 158 was sweeping the opposite side of the river when the ambush occurred and immediately came to the assistance of HQ 157. They returned the enemy fire for approximately five minutes. Then a LCVP carrying ARVN troops came up the river. The troops were landed to fight the enemy and the minesweepers continued on their patrol.

At 1115H on 25 June, HQ 154 received small arms fire while on patrol on the Dong Nai about 16 kilometers east of Saigon. The fire was not returned and the minesweeper cleared the area.

The base of RAG 21/33 at Dong Tam suffered a misfortune on 10 June. The base came under a mortar attack and approximately 10 rounds of 120 mm mortar fire impacted in the area. Nine USN
sailors and one VNN sailor were wounded by shrapnel from the mortars. The RAG 21/33 ammo dump took a direct hit and was destroyed by fire with most of the ordnance therein being destroyed by cooking off. As the month ended plans were underway to build a new ammo dump for the base.
River Assault Groups

The River Assault Groups of the Vietnamese Navy are deployed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Homeport</th>
<th>Area of Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RAG 21/33</td>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
<td>Dinh Tuong Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Ben Luc</td>
<td>Long An Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/31</td>
<td>Vinh Long</td>
<td>THD XI (Cambodia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Phu Cuong</td>
<td>Upper Saigon River/Binh Duong Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/29</td>
<td>Can Tho</td>
<td>An Xuyen Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Long Xuyen</td>
<td>Song Cai Lon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Cat Lai</td>
<td>RSSZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Nha Be</td>
<td>Southwest of Saigon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td>Saigon River between Saigon and Phu Cuong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Hue</td>
<td>Perfume River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81 (escort)</td>
<td>Cat Lai</td>
<td>Delta-wide</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Coastal Surveillance Forces and Coastal Groups

First Coastal Zone

The level of Vietnamese involvement in and responsibility for operations in the First Coastal Zone rose sharply with two significant events around the beginning of June. On 31 May the command and control of Operation Sea Tiger was turned over to the Vietnamese Navy First Coastal Zone Commander who was designated CTF 217.

On 1 June, in ceremonies at the Small Craft Repair Facility in Danang, 20 PBRs of River Divisions 521 and 543 were turned over to the Vietnamese Navy to form RPG 60.

Task Force 217 was set up as follows:

CTF 217 First Coastal Zone Commander
CTG'217.1 Commander Sea Tiger/Tran Hung Dao VII; HQ Hoi An, Secondary HQ CG 14,
TU 217.1.1 8 Junks of CG 14
TU 217.1.2 2 PCFs of COSFLOT One
TU 217.1.3 10 PBRs of RPG 60
TU 217.1.4 USN UDT, Duffle Bag, and sniper assets
CTG 217.2 Commander Vietnamese Naval Operations in the Hue area; HQ RAG 32 base, Hue
TU 217.2.1 11 River Assault Craft of RAG 32
TU 217.2.2 10 PBRs of RPG 60
TU 217.2.3 8 Junks of CG 12
TU 217.2.4 3 Junks of CG 13

Units of Task Group 217.1 conducted almost daily sweeps of the Sea Tiger/THD VII area of operations. There was frequent contact with the enemy. Several unusually large enemy units were encountered.
At 2015H on 9 June, one unit of CG 14, two VNN PCFs of COS-FLOT One, four PBRs of RPG 60, and a CG 14 sweep team were proceeding to the CG 14 base when they spotted approximately 25 VC/NVA crossing a small river about 4.5 kilometers southeast of Hoi An. The enemy was taken under fire by all units at once. The CG 14 sweep team was inserted and came under small arms fire. A sweep was conducted but there was no further contact with the enemy.

On 16 June a large sweep operation was conducted along the east bank of the Truon Giang River by Task Group 217.1 along with an Air Force and a Marine Corps fixed wing aircraft. During the course of the operation contact was made with the enemy six times. A CG 14 sweep team landed and was fired upon three times while blowing bunkers and huts in a large complex. A reaction force which had been posted took two VC under fire and killed one and wounded one. PBRs and a CG 14 KSB extracted the sweep team and the naval force proceeded south. The KSB was taken under fire by the enemy. While the other units remained on station in the area a UDT sweep team was inserted to suppress the enemy fire. They received small arms fire which they returned with unknown results. The Marine aircraft spotted 40 VC with packs and weapons proceeding south. At this point the operation terminated and all units returned to base. 105 suspects were detained as a result of the operation. There were no friendly casualties.
On 22 June, CG 14 received a report that VC were fishing and collecting taxes 11 kilometers SE of Hoi An. Units were sent to the area and arriving there they spotted three VC in basket boats. One attempted to evade, was taken under fire and was killed. The other two VC were captured.

The tempo of enemy activity was also fairly high in the portions of the First Coastal Zone outside of the Sea Tiger area of operations. On the night of 2 June, two units of CG 15 were patrolling along the Song Tra Bong (BT 617 015) when Hai Ninh Village came under attack from the southeast. A PF unit with support from the CG 15 units returned fire and turned back the attacking force which consisted of a VC/NVA platoon. There were no friendly casualties. Three VC were killed and one AK-47 was captured.

On the night of 3 June, units of CG 16 spotted a large group of the enemy about seven kilometers east of Quang Ngai City. Artillery and NGFS were called in. At this point the VC came up on the net and said that they were going to attack the CG 16 base. After this there was no further contact with the enemy although a local fisherman located north of the Song Tra Khuc reported sighting a large group of the enemy moving south.
Second Coastal Zone

Activity in the Second Coastal Zone was at a fairly low level during the month of June with a few exceptions. As usual the hot spot was the area of operations of CG 23.

Early in the morning of 4 June, a coordinated attack was made upon Song Cau, Phuoc Ly, and Long Phuoc. Contact was broken off at 040155H. In the meantime, at 040135H, Song Cau and the CG 23 base received about six rounds of 82 mm mortar fire. Counter-mortar fire was returned by the CG 23 mortar. While all this was going on, a VC platoon overran Phuoc Ly with no opposition from fleeing PF and RD units. RF Company 709 was sent to retake the village, but when they arrived the VC had departed. As a result of this action, two PFs, three RDs, and two PSDFs were KIA and one PF was WIA. One VC was KIA. There were no casualties at CG 23 but the base's 60 KW generator received minor damage from the mortar attack.

On the night of 12 June, a PF position near the CG 23 base was attacked by 60 mm mortar and machine gun fire. Fire support for the PF position was provided by a CG 23 junk, PCF 78 and the Song Cau subsector artillery. There were no friendly casualties and enemy casualties were unknown.
A number of searches and sweeps were carried out by the personnel of CG 23 during the month. On 31 May and 1 June, a large scale blockade and sweep of Nha Trang Harbor and the surrounding area and islands was made by units of CGs 25 and 26. CTF 115 commended the operation as a fine example of USN/VNN coordination.

**Third Coastal Zone**

The month of June was highlighted by the turnover of the Third Coastal Zone to VNN control. On 19 June CDR Bui Cuu Vien assumed duties as CTG 115.3 VNN/213.3. This action completed the turnover of the coastal zones to the Vietnamese.

Numerous sweep operations were conducted by the coastal groups of the Third Coastal Zone during June. One such operation was conducted on June 20th by four CG 35 units, one RF company, the POINT CYPRESS, and the POINT MARONE on the Rach Giang about 19 miles SE of Tra Vinh. Several large groups of VC were sighted and engaged during the course of the operation. Four VC were killed (body count) and five others were counted as probable kills. Also, three VC were captured.
Fourth Coastal Zone and Extended Market Time Operations

Activity in the Fourth Coastal Zone was at a fairly high level during the month of June, especially in the area of Sea Float. That activity is discussed in the section of the summary which concerns Sea Float. Normal patrols were conducted in other coastal and river areas of the Fourth Coastal Zone and in these areas a moderate level of enemy activity was encountered.

Extended Market Time activities were continued along the Cambodian coast. Under an agreement reached with the Cambodian authorities, VNN vessels patrolled in Cambodian waters as far as Phu Du Island. Former patrol areas 9N and 90, off Kompong Som and Ream, were vacated but patrols were continued in international waters off that portion of the Cambodian coast with Cambodian agreement. Coastal traffic in this area was very light. At the end of the month all U. S. advisors were removed from VNN vessels patrolling in Cambodian waters.
Tran Hung Dao I

Elements of Operation Tran Hung Dao I operated inside Cambodia and along the border throughout June, but met very little resistance. They were involved in nine firefights (five friendly- and four enemy-initiated) and reported killing six of the enemy. There were no friendly KIAs in June, but six of the allies were wounded.

On the afternoon of 13 June four PBRs of River Patrol Group 55 received heavy automatic weapons fire, a B-40 rocket, and mortar fire from a village three miles into Cambodia on the Upper Bassac River (WT 068 130). Seawolves were scrambled and observed numerous personnel fleeing from hooches but could not fire because of the density of the civilian population. The Navy helicopters did receive permission to fire into the structures from which enemy fire had emanated. The Seawolves medevaced the two wounded men (1 VNN and 1 USN) to Binh Thuy. One Vietnamese sailor was killed in the action.

At 2235H on the evening of 10 June, PBR 764 in a WBGP at VS 507 548 received a grenade from a nippa palm grove and small arms fire from adjoining positions. For some unknown reason, the enemy then fired a red flare which provided sufficient light for the
boat officer, GMGC Portor, to find the grenade and throw it overboard before it exploded. PBRs 764 and 109 made firing runs on the area, but they received no return fire and found no indication of an enemy crossing. One USN sailor was slightly wounded.

Four PBRs of RPG 55 under Vietnamese command were attacked on 15 June while on patrol on the upper Bassac River three miles into Cambodia. The units returned fire, and Seawolves scrambled to assist and accounted for two secondary explosions. After enemy fire was supressed, the PBR crews made a sweep and found three large blood trails and seven destroyed bunkers. They captured 13 suspected Viet Cong and delivered them to VN authorities in Chau Doc.

Carelessness accounted for the death of one Vietnamese sailor and the wounding of six others in the Border Interdiction AO. On the afternoon of 26 June, a crew member of RID 42 was handling a fragmentation grenade, and according to reports, inadvertently pulled the pin. He tried to toss the grenade into the water, but it exploded while still within lethal range. Seawolves 56 and 99 effected the medevac of the six wounded men.

Seaman Leroy B. Mudd was a victim of one of South Vietnam's deceptively swift rivers during June. Mudd dove into the Bassac River near Chau Doc City on 29 June to recover an errant football.
he had thrown, and was immediately swept away. A thorough
search for his body by all small boats in the area and Seawolves
was futile.
The participants in Tran Hung Dao II continued their activity at a moderate tempo in June, producing six enemy definitely killed, 24 probable enemy KIA, and only two of their number decimated in a total of 19 enemy- and 25 friendly-initiated firefights.

On 2 June at 0345H, PBRs 61 and 14 with LTJG Pickett in charge used drifting tactics and surprised two enemy in the water and one on the bank, taking them under fire with M-60 and .50 caliber, and using concussion grenades. A HUK team from the 162 Aviation Company was in the area and placed a strike. The boats recovered three packs and one body, and a sweep at first light confirmed two KIA. A 61 mm mortar was also captured, and documents identified the unit as a mortar team from the 95th Regiment, 325th Division NVA.

Two of the relatively "major" incidents occurred 8-9 June. At 2026H, 8 June, at WS 91 98, 15 miles NW of Moc Hoa, PBRs 87 and 148, with QMC Buffington and TMI Burtes in charge, opened fire on "two to four" VC on the north bank, approaching the boats at a distance of 20 meters. The boats then broke WBGP and made three firing runs, receiving no return volleys. Air cover and illumination assistance
from Brinh Thanh artillery were requested. The first round fell at 2045H. Then the Seawolves placed a strike at 2055H. At 2116H the Black Ponies made a pass, and at 2130H an intelligence report was received of a possible battalion-sized crossing in the contact area. A ground sweep the next morning revealed freshly-used trails and, of course, the usual definitive body count. Two VC KIA, probable.

A more substantial confrontation took place the same night at 2118H, 16 kilometers from Ben Luc at XS 722 652, when PBRs 7552 and 7550, with Ensign Ty and his advisor EMI Herera in charge, sighted a sampan emerging from a canal on the east bank with three occupants. The boats took the sampan under fire, killing one man and inducing the other two to surrender. Two AK-47s were seized. A subsequent search of the area revealed no personnel.

Vietnamese ASPBs conducting a bunker-blowing patrol the morning of 10 June 15 kilometers from Tra Cu (XT 417 104) received small arms fire from the east bank and immediately commenced firing runs on the area. The crew conducted sweeps at 1300H, discovering one VC KIA, capturing one NVA, and AK-47, 20 B-40 rockets, and many launchers.

On 16 June at 2210H, RID 43 units with PO3 Thanh in charge at XS 712 570 sighted a sampan crossing from east to west and TUF. All four passengers were thrown into the water, followed by concussion
grenades from the RID units. Two AK-47 rifles were recovered from the sampan, and the four previous occupants were considered probably KIA.

The "peaceful" war also progressed in June as the 214.1 POLWAR Officer planned a new type of Chieu Hoi technique in Long An Province, eight kilometers south of Ben Luc. It was announced by aerial broadcast about midnight, 19 June, that there would be a large operation in the area at first light, and that during the night this area would be a no-fire zone. Viet Cong were encouraged to proceed towards the Vam Co Dong River and to arrive at first light, at which time they would be allowed to safely defect. Two ATCs and an ASPB with PF troops arrived at the announced positions the next morning and commenced psyops broadcasts. Unfortunately no VC appeared, and a groundsweep produced only one draft-dodger. Available intelligence indicated that many VC were in the area, however, and further such ops are planned.

A new and different sort of "combat" activity also arose for 214.1 units during June as two unexplained explosions resounded at NSAD, Ben Luc, at 2353H, 11 June. A search of the base and the perimeter produced negative results, and it was surmised that the explosions were grenades detonated by someone inside the base. One USN, DC1 Haislip, was wounded and dusted off to Tan An.
At 2112 H 15 June, a similar explosion occurred, this time wounding five USN, and one VNN: YNI Felkins, RMI Reynolds, AN Higgins, ENI Sexton, SKI Windale, and CPO Ghenh (VNN). The explosion was a fragmentation grenade. Investigation by ONI on 16 June revealed no racial or USN/VNN conflicts, so it was concluded that a VC had infiltrated disguised as a VNN sailor, with three suspects detained for further questioning. Base security was strengthened accordingly and an earlier curfew established.

In summary, if any safe generalization can be culled from the many messages that emanated from the THD II AO for the month of June, it is that major enemy offenses were rare. Only one minor ambush occurred, and a brief mortar attack was staged on Moc Hoa the night of 7 June, to no consequence. It would also seem that interdiction operations handled by the VNN are improving.
As the U. S. Navy's involvement in Cambodia continued through June, Operation Tran Hung Dao V/Ready Deck experienced the same low level of activity as in the past few months. In the upper Saigon River AO there were only three firefights (one friendly- and two enemy-initiated) during the month. USN personnel, by the end of June serving only in an advisory capacity, accounted for the ten enemy killed. There were no friendly casualties during the month.

Assault craft of the Brown Water Navy are often in greatest danger when positioned along canal banks in nocturnal waterborne guardposts. PBRs 36 and 38 were 40 kilometers NW of Phu Cuong on the evening of 8 June when a crew member sighted two personnel approaching. Boat 38 was on the east bank. One of the men hurled a grenade at the boat, but it failed to detonate. The boats fired .50 calibres at these men and two others they sighted and killed all four. No U. S. or VNN personnel were injured.

Two days later two other Ready Deck PBRs on the upper Saigon River scored a larger kill. From a WBGP 37 kilometers NW of Phu Cuong (XT 516 385) they observed approximately 12 men on the east bank and in the water, attempting to cross the canal. They were using inflated plastic bags and rubber rafts to float boxes
and equipment. The PBRs attacked the group and killed 12 (10 body count, 2 probable). They salvaged several documents which indicated the men were members of the 101st North Vietnamese Army.

On that same evening, PBR 30 was sunk when it struck an underwater piling 42 kilometers NW of Phu Cuong (XT 518 385) while proceeding to a WBGP. The accompanying PBR quickly picked up the crew, all of whom were unharmed, and set a security watch in the area. Salvage operations were begun the following morning by two LCMs and two LCVPs of RAG 24.
Rung Sat Special Zone

Combined operations were continued in the Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ) during the month of June. Four such combined operations were conducted and were named Chuong Duong 23-70, Chuong Duong 24-70, Chuong Duong 25-70, and Chuong Duong 26-70.

Chuong Duong 23-70

The first combined operation of the month commenced at 060530H June in the Quang Xuyen District of Gia Dinh Province in the vicinity of XS 934 588, approximately 22 kilometers south of Nha Be. No contact with the enemy was made and the operation secured at 1600H on 6 June. One RF was injured during an insertion and one Vietnamese civilian was wounded by a ricochet. Sixteen bunkers were destroyed as well as 45 Chicom grenades, assorted cooking utensils, assorted clothing, and four 2.75 rocket launchers. Three 12-ounce bottles of mercury were captured and retained. Twenty-four booby traps were located during the operation and were targeted for future destruction.

Chuong Duong 24-70

During two days of operations in the RSSZ, in the general area 14.5 miles southeast of the Nha Be Navy Base, combined forces assigned to Chuong Duong 24-70 sustained no casualties. The opera-
tion commenced at 100500H and secured at 121600H June. During the course of the operation, troops made contact with only four VC and the enemy was able to evade. Results of the operation were rather meager as only three sampans, eight bunkers, an assortment of clothing, 100 pounds of rice, and two sleeping platforms were destroyed.

**Chuong Duong 25-70**

Chuong Duong 25-70 was conducted in the vicinity of YS 008 703, ten kilometers southeast of the Nha Be Navy Base from 180800H to 191630H June. Once again, the enemy was able to avoid area troop sweeps. A total of only ten VC were sighted, six of whom were killed by air units supporting the operation. There were no friendly casualties.

**Chuong Duong 26-70**

Chuong Duong 26-70 differed only slightly from the other combined operations conducted during the month. Operation Chuong Duong 26-70 commenced at 270600H in Nhon Trach District of Bien Hoa Province in an area nine kilometers east-southeast of Nha Be. Later in the day, activity was shifted to an area 14 kilometers due east of Nha Be in the same district. Further operations were then shifted to the Quang Xuyen District of Gia Dinh Province in an area
from 22 to 25 kilometers south of Nha Be. Results were meager for
the operation which ended at 291600H June. There were no friendly
casualties while friendly air and ground units accounted for 11 enemy
killed. Four of the enemy were killed while transiting in a sampan
at night. The sampan was searched prior to being destroyed.
A document captured in this action indicated that one of those killed
was a squad leader with many decorations for firing at merchant
ships on the Long Tau River.

Casualties for the month in the RSSZ AO were three killed
and three wounded. Two of the wounded were U.S. Navy personnel.
Enemy casualties were 31 killed, three captured, and one Hoi Chanh.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIC ACTION SUMMARY

During June CTF Clearwater personnel continued to conduct MEDCAPs using small units to visit the small villages located near the Clearwater Advance Tactical Support Base (ATSB). In keeping with the ACTOV Program, the MEDCAPs conducted during the month were conducted by Vietnamese Navy personnel with U. S. Navy personnel accompanying as advisors. Six villages were visited during the month and 415 patients were treated. Other units of CTF Clearwater, in conjunction with their normal patrol duties, distributed Chieu Hoi and hygiene leaflets on a daily basis. Operations of CTF Clearwater terminated on 1 July 1970.

In the Rung Sat Special Zone, seven MEDCAP/DEPTCAPs were conducted during the month. Vietnamese medical teams conducted the MEDCAPs accompanied by advisors. The medical teams treated 962 villagers and distributed 353 Health Kits.

Air and waterborne psyops broadcasts were continued during the month of June in the RSSZ. Over 1,700,000 leaflets were dropped over the RSSZ in conjunction with psyops broadcasts and operations conducted within the area. The leaflet drops were composed of Safe Conduct passes, Chieu Hoi and Special Chieu Hoi passes.
NSA Saigon Detachment Medical Teams from detachments located within the Giant Slingshot Area of Operations (AO) conducted seven MEDCAPs during the month. Besides treating villagers for medical and dental problems, they distributed Health Kits, bars of soap, Chieu Hoi leaflets, water purification leaflets, first aid leaflets, health and diet leaflets, and Vietnamese newspapers.

In the Sea Float AO, a decision was reached this month as to the naming of the hamlets. The residents of the hamlets had not been happy to call the hamlets Tran Hung Dao I and II and desired to rename them. The hamlets were renamed Ham Rong I and Ham Rong II and now make up Tran Hung Dao Village."

On 1 June, the POLWAR/Psycopgs teams cleared the south bank of the Cua Lon River of all civilians for security reasons. The people living south of the river had been informed on 20 May that they were going to have to move to more secure areas. The people were reluctant to move as more money can be made cutting wood on the south side of the river. Since the majority of the stable population are woodcutters, it is possible that many will leave the area because of their loss of the choice wooded area to the south of the river.

During the first week of June, the number of children attending the Ham Rong II school (previously called the Tran Hung Dao II school) rose from 125 to 196. By the end of the month, the school
consisted of two classrooms and a central room used for a recreation room during inclement weather. Since the school has a nipa palm roof, the school is still classified as a temporary structure. Plans call for the installation of a tin roof which would change the classification to that of a permanent structure. The change of classification would make the school eligible for assignment of a province-paid teacher.

On 16 June, two civilian teachers were employed to teach in the Ham Rong II school. They will conduct classes four hours daily, six days a week.

The school in Ham Rong I closed at the end of May and remained closed for most of the month of June.

After the middle of the month, the U. S. Psyops Team and civilian volunteers began work on a small dispensary/hospital. When completed, the structure will be capable of housing 25 bed patients, and should be able to provide medical facilities for the inhabitants of both Ham Rong I and II.

By 15 June, woodcutters were allowed to cut wood on the south bank of the Cua I on River between the hours of 0800H and 1600H daily. The wood cutting area contains the choicest wood in the Nam Cam Forest, and extends three kilometers south from the river bank.
This area was conceded to the woodcutters on the promise of the district chief to provide security in the form of RF troop sweeps.

The troop sweeps were not altogether effective and on 15 June, six woodcutters were kidnapped and nine sampans were stolen from within the specified area.

The RF troops also provide night security in the hamlets. Information received by the U. S. Psyops Team through various sources indicates that the population of Ham Rong II believes that there is no night-time security for their hamlet. The enemy has been reported to roam at will during the night in Ham Rong II. Without some form of night security, pacification of the area will be an agonizingly slow process.

New projects for the village presently in the planning stages are the construction of a refugee house and an agricultural project.
ACCELERATED TURNOVER PROGRAM AND TRAINING SUMMARY

June was a most important month for the ACTOV Program, for it marked the largest single turnover of assets to date, and established the Vietnamese Navy as the fourteenth largest in the world. It brought to 568 the number of craft turned over since June, 1968, giving the VNN control of about 80% of all American-built brown water Navy combat boats presently operating in RVN.

There were 273 boats turned over in the ceremony on June 23; they included 162 PBRs, 75 RACs, and 36 PCFs. Many of the boats were actually being turned over for the second time, as the June 23 ceremony was planned as a massive formal event which would include many craft previously turned over informally. Among the assets being turned over for the first time in June were 50 PBRs which will comprise RPGs 61 and 62; the extra ten PBRs will be attrition/escort/PBR School boats based in Binh Thuy under the OPCON of CTF 212. These ten boats will come from the turnover of RIVDIV 553. Another new unit to emerge from the June ceremony was RID 45, which was actually turned over on 19 June. Other turnovers in June:

1. PCEs AMHERST (853) and PROWESS (305) were transferred June 3 in Brooklyn, N. Y. Accepted by Mr. Nguyen Huu Chi, the Vietnamese Ambassador to the U. N., the two ships have been renamed VNS HA HOI (HQ 13) and VAN KIEP (HQ 14) respectively.
2. Two WPBs were turned over in Cat Lo on 16 June. This brings the number of WPBs to 22. The boats were the POINT GRACE (WPB 82323) and POINT MAST (WPB 82316).

3. CSB-4 (Combat Salvage Boat) was turned over to CTF 214 on 30 June at Cat Lo. It is the first such boat to be delivered; three more are planned.

Two PCFs (56 and 6) transferred 18 June at Cat Lo marked the end of Project Start. There are 38 remaining PCFs to be turned over prior to December, 1970. The PBR ACTOV Program continued as 30 graduates of PBR Boat School, Binh Thuy, Class Five, were assigned to RIVDIVs 532, 571, and 594; these three divisions, along with 535, will be disbanded in October. RIVDIVs disbanded to form these RPGs were: 553, 554, 593, and 513.

Four ATSBs in the THD II AO were commissioned on 13 June with VNN Commanders. A 25-man detachment of VNN Base Support personnel will replace the present NSA detachments at each ATSB; nine of each 25 reported on 13 June. Communications equipment, with the exception of secure TTY gear, was included in the turnover. Personnel loading for Ben Keo and Go Dau Ha is projected at 148; for Tuyen Nhon and Tra Cu, 168, with a 20-man Duffle Bag Team at each. Twenty-four Vipers will operate from each ATSB by FY 72. Change of command was also effected with a VNN Commander and USN Deputy at Ben Luc and Ha Tien on 13 and 17 June respectively. Ben Luc was the first major base to change command under the co-manning concept.
Other extraneous turnovers in June were the Second Coastal Zone Coastal Surveillance Center (19 June) and the Qui Nhon Harbor Defense Unit (15 June). The latter transfer included three picket boats, five LCPLs and four Boston Whalers.

The recruiting ceiling of 39,611 was reached in June as planned, making VNN the first RVNAF service to attain its ultimate Phase III ceiling. Measured in terms of personnel, VNN is now the ninth largest navy in the world. The training of naval personnel also continued satisfactorily in June: 240 petty officers of various rates were graduated on 10 June at NTC Saigon; 34 LDNNs (VNN SEALs) graduated 22 June at Cam Ranh Bay.

The Dependent Shelter Program employed NAVCAT at 20 sites, with 1038 units under construction throughout the country and 1158 additional shelters under construction. Present funding will permit shelter construction at 34 bases.
During the month of June ships and craft of Naval Support Activity, Saigon (NSAS) continued their support of Operation Tran Hung Dao XI, the operation on the Mekong River in Cambodia.

USS BENEWAH (APB-35), ASKARI (ARL-38), SATYR (ARL-23), and YRBM 16 were at anchor in the Mekong just south of the border during most of the month. These units were involved in no direct contact with the enemy. At the end of the month BENEWAH outchopped from NSAS to served as flagship for Deputy COMNAVFORV.

NSAS detachments throughout the southern three corps of South Vietnam were harassed by the enemy by varying tactics and in varying degrees of severity.

NSAS detachment Dong Tam continued to earn its nickname "Mortar City" by being mortared on 4, 6, 10, 12, 13, and 29 June with a rocket attack on 26 June. Over 50 pounds of mixed 82 and 120 mm mortar fire were received by the base on 4 June. On 10 June a round hit and blew up the River Assault Group 21/33 ammo dump, just adjacent to the detachment's base. Nine USN personnel were wounded as a result of this attack. Around the middle of the month COMNAVFORV instituted a crash program to find some way to deal with the serious problem of mortar attacks on Dong Tam. At the end of the month, the solution to this problem was still pending.
In II Corps, NSAS Detachment Qui Nhon experienced a small arms probe of the base perimeter on 6 June.

On 14 June three intruders were captured inside the ammunition supply point at Vung Tau with a small quantity of stolen ammunition and C-rations. On 28 June at Vung Tau an attempt to mine USS MEEKER COUNTY (LST-980) was foiled. The security watch observed a line securing something to the pier and spotted a swimmer shortly thereafter. The swimmer was taken under fire with unknown results. The EOD team was called and a diver discovered and removed a mine containing a 20 pound charge attached to the line.

On 11 June the 100-foot utility boat MOROCCO came under recoiless rifle fire while transiting west about five kilometers west of Dong Taf on the My Tho River. About eight or ten rounds were received and the fire was returned. One round impacted on the port side aft causing a hole below the waterline about one foot in diameter. The MOROCCO returned to Dong Tam where the damage was repaired.

Again, on 15 June, at approximately the same location on the My Tho River, the MOROCCO came under enemy attack. She first came under AK-47 fire and then five or six rounds of recoiless rifle fire. The fire was returned with no apparent effect. The VNN LSIL 330 was in the process of overtaking the MOROCCO when the
attack occurred and she returned the enemy's fire while continuing down river. ASKARI, which was in company, obtained clearance and walked 40 mm rounds back and forth across the area in order to suppress the enemy fire. The MOROCCO sustained no substantial material damage as a result of the attack but two USN personnel were wounded.

Vietnamization of Naval Support Activity Saigon continued very rapidly. During the month Binh Thuy became a co-manned base and the OIC of Ben Luc was relieved by a Vietnamese officer. At the end of the month only Dong Tam and Sa Dec did not yet have combined manning and Ben Luc, Cat Lo, and An Thoi had Vietnamese commanding officers.

At the end of the month a total of 175 officers, 3,658 men, and 967 civilians were attached to Naval Support Activity, Saigon. They were supporting a total of 9,646 personnel and 639 craft.
NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY, DANANG

Throughout June naval personnel at Danang continued the transition from a Naval Support Activity to a Naval Support Facility which was not to be finalized until the last day of the month. On the next day (1 July) the Army assumed all common service support responsibilities in I Corps.

The bridge ramp cargo facility and Tien Sha Ramp transferred to components of the Army's Fifth Transportation Command on 15 June. Responsibility for all Army air freight shifted to the Army Support Command on 30 June. So as to insure a smooth and efficient transition from Navy to Army management, five U. S. Navy harbor pilots will remain at Danang until September 1970 so that Army or VN pilots may be trained. Before it was turned over to the Army on 1 July, the Port of Danang was the last port in RVN under U. S. Navy control. The following is a summary of June operations:

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<tr>
<th>Offload</th>
<th>Backload</th>
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<tr>
<td>S/T</td>
<td>M/T</td>
<td>S/T</td>
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<tr>
<td>122,557</td>
<td>178,740</td>
<td>69,756</td>
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On 1 June the Chu Lai Detachment of NSAD turned over all its logistics functions, except for public works, to the Army's support command. The turnover of the supply warehouses, 160 acres of land,
and boat ramps marked the end of four years of operations as
NSAD's largest and oldest logistics support detachment. The Navy
maintained a small repair base there to train VNN personnel in
boat maintenance. The Chu Lai installation was the fourth NSAD
component to be transferred to the Army, following detachments
at Hue/Tan My, Phu Bai, and Chu’Viet/Dong Ha.

A harbor skimmer patrol craft reported killing a suspected
Viet Cong swimmer sapper in the Song Han River on the evening of
29 June. While on routine patrol Skimmers 7 and 8 sighted a sampan
crossing the river at BT 039 792 after curfew. As Skimmer 7 approached
the sampan, a crew member saw a man swim away from the sampan
towards the bank. Skimmer 8 approached the swimmer and
dropped concussion grenades when he dove underwater despite
warnings to stop. The crews of the two patrol boats later sighted
a floating body, but it sank before it could be recovered.

Three Vietnamese died from accidents at NSAD in June.

A female Vietnamese worker, Nguyen Thi Ty, was crushed by a
five-ton truck outside Camp Tien Sha when she accidently stepped
in from of the vehicle during a rainstorm (23 June). A VN cargo
checker, Phan Phung, died at the Deep Water Piers when two pallets
of canned ham fell from a fork lift and landed on him (26 June).

Hoang Thiet suffered a similar fate the following day when two pallets
of black powder were thrown from a turning truck.
THIRD NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BRIGADE

The Seventh Naval Mobile Construction Battalion completed its deployment on 20 June and departed Camp Shields, Chu Lai, for its homebase in Davisville, Rhode Island. Among its accomplishments were:

--- completion of USMC living facilities at LZ Baldy and FSB Ross, including 330 seahuts, 20 showers, six mess halls, and various helopads and gunpads;

--- Concrete Sky, the completion of 33 of the originally planned 61 steel and concrete aircraft shelters to protect aircraft at Chu Lai from rocket and mortar attacks;

--- the upgrading of 11 1/2 miles of QL-1 from Son Cau Lau to Tu My, including the reopening of 4 1/2 miles which had been completely closed by monsoon rains, converting a mud path into a 50 mph paved highway;

--- the construction of numerous operational support facilities such as landing craft ramps, runway and taxiway lighting, runway and taxiway shoulder repairs, and various aircraft maintenance facilities.

During its October, 1969, to June, 1970, deployment, the battalion suffered numerous road minings and mortar attacks. Three men were KIA and 11 WIA during the 8-month tour. The tentative plan is to turn over Camp Shields with its 760-man capacity to the 26th Engineering Battalion of the Americal Division.
NMCB Five continued its work throughout the Delta, concerning itself mainly with ACTOV bases. Detail Delta with 40 men reported the base at Ha Tien 99% complete at the end of the month. Detail Kilo (65 men) had finished 88% of the Rach Soi base as of 25 June. Other projects are as follows:

--Nam Can, Detail Golf (59 men), 26% vertical work finished;
--Kien An, Detail Foxtrot (48 men), 17% complete;
--Long Phu, Detail Hotel (42 men), 15.5% complete;
--Vinh Gia, Detail Juliet (11 men), 71% complete;
--Phuoc Xuyen, Detail X-ray (14 men), 40% complete;
--Binh Thuy, NMCB 62, Detail Albany (13 men), 97% complete (NSAS) and 80% complete (OV-10);
--Chau Doc, NMCB 62, Detail Albany (91 men) 5% complete;
--Tan Chau, NMCB 62, Detail Hollywood (56 men), not started; Seabees and first shipments of equipment arrived on site 26 June;
--The ATSB at Song Ong Doc was completed 25 June. Other projects throughout the country include 54 men of NMCB Five, Detail Zulu, working in Saigon.

In I Corps Naval Construction Regiment 32 continued, with the Phu Bai Airfield 79% complete as of 20 June. By the end of the month, they had completed the four secondary bridges north of Hue.
Another ongoing project, road upkeep, was again directed towards QL-1 south of Danang between the villages of Thanh Quit and Tu My. The first six miles from Thanh Quit to the Cau Lau River is essentially complete; the second .1 mile leg from the Cau Lau to the Ly Ly River is about 50% surfaced, and the last 6.75 mile stretch is 100% filled with 75% of the base installed.

Two Seabees lost their lives in June. SWCN Gary L. Mercer was found dead at 0700H, 8 June, at the CBMU 301 worksite in Chu Lai; the cause of death appeared to be a self-inflicted bullet wound. EOCN John A. Gioia was killed in the line of duty at 1625H, 9 June, at Hai Van Pass near Danang when his pneumatic-tired roller rolled off a cliff. A third man, CE3 Terry L. Kennedy, received serious frag wounds to the chest during a mortar attack on Dong Tam, where he was TAD to CBMU 302 as part of NAVCAT Seven. Three mining incidents took place on 14, 23, and 26 June. The first two took place about 20 kilometers south of Danang (AT 967 600 and BT 005 566) and resulted in the loss of a truck tractor and a dozer respectively with one man medevaced on each occasion. The third incident occurred in Gio Linh on QL-1 (YD 215 730) when an NMCB-10 dozer detonated a land mine on the shoulder of the road. The machine was badly damaged and the driver WIA minor.
APPENDIX I

Glossary of Abbreviations

The following abbreviations and terms are commonly used in the combat zone by all agencies and are listed here in amplification of those used in the text:

ABF
Attack by fire

AMMI PONTOON
A multi-purpose barge, standard size 28'X90'

AO
Area of operations

ARVN
Army of the Republic of Vietnam

ASPB
Assault Support Patrol Boat

ATC
Armored Troop Carrier

ATSB
Advance Tactical Support Base

A/W
Automatic weapons

BLACK PONY/BRONCO
OV-10 Twin Engine Turboprop Counterinsurgency Aircraft

BRONCO

CCB
Command and Communications Boat

CG
Coastal Group

CHICOM
Chinese communist

CIDG
Civilian Irregular Defense Group - mercenaries of Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian descent who fight primarily around their own villages

CMD
Capital Military District

CONUS
Continental United States

CONFIDENTIAL
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>CRIP</td>
<td>Civilian Reconnaissance Intelligence Platoon</td>
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<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>Coastal Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>DUSTOFF</td>
<td>Medical evacuation by helicopter</td>
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<td>ENIFF</td>
<td>Enemy-initiated firefight</td>
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<td>FSB</td>
<td>Fire Support Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>FWMAF</td>
<td>Free World Military Assistance Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDA</td>
<td>Gun Damage Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>GVN</td>
<td>Government of Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>HAFT</td>
<td>Helicopter Attack Fire Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H&amp;I</td>
<td>Harassment and Interdiction Fire Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JGS</td>
<td>Joint General Staff (Vietnamese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIT CARSON SCOUTS</td>
<td>Former Viet Cong who have come over to the side of the Saigon government and serve with allied military units</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAFT</td>
<td>Light Attack Fire Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAW</td>
<td>Light Anti-tank Weapon</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCPL</td>
<td>Landing Craft, Personnel, Large</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDNN</td>
<td>Vietnamese equivalent of USN Underwater Demolition Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LHFT</td>
<td>Light Helo Fire Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOH</td>
<td>OH-6 Light Observation Helicopter</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRRP</td>
<td>Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol</td>
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<tr>
<td>MACV</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>MATSB</td>
<td>Mobile Advance Tactical Support Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEDCAP</td>
<td>Medical Civic Action Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONITOR</td>
<td>Heavily armored LCM-6 (40 mm cannon or 105 mm Howitzer)</td>
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<td>MR</td>
<td>Military Region</td>
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<td>MRF</td>
<td>Mobile Riverine Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSB</td>
<td>Minesweeper, Boat</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSD</td>
<td>Minesweeper, Drone</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Mobile Strike Force - mercenaries who deploy and go anywhere</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGFS</td>
<td>Naval Gunfire Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>NILO</td>
<td>Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIOTC</td>
<td>Naval Inshore Operations Training Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOD</td>
<td>Night Observation Device</td>
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<tr>
<td>NVA</td>
<td>North Vietnamese Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>OJT</td>
<td>On-the-job training</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBR</td>
<td>Patrol Boat, River</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCF</td>
<td>Patrol Craft, Fast (Swift Boat)</td>
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<td>PRU</td>
<td>Provincial Reconnaissance Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSA</td>
<td>Province Sector Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSYOPS</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAD</td>
<td>River Assault Division</td>
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<td>RAG</td>
<td>River Assault Group (VNN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAID</td>
<td>River Assault and Interdiction Division (VNN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAS</td>
<td>River Assault Squadron</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>RF/PF</td>
<td>Regional Forces/Popular Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG</td>
<td>Rocket Propelled Grenade or River Patrol Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSSZ</td>
<td>Rung Sat Special Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RVNAF</td>
<td>Republic of Vietnam Air Force (or Armed Forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>Search and Rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAWOLF</td>
<td>UH-1B Helo, heavily armed, USN operated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHADOW</td>
<td>C-119 aircraft</td>
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<tr>
<td>SKIMMER</td>
<td>20-foot fiberglass motorboat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLICK</td>
<td>UH-1B Helo, USA operated</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPOOKY</td>
<td>C-47 aircraft</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSB</td>
<td>Swimmer Support Boat (Skimmer)</td>
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<tr>
<td>STAB</td>
<td>Strike Assault Boat</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAOR</td>
<td>Tactical Area of Responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>USARV</td>
<td>United States Army, Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>VNMC</td>
<td>Vietnamese Marine Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>VNN</td>
<td>Vietnamese Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZIPPO</td>
<td>Flame thrower equipped ATC or Monitor</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAP</td>
<td>Rocket Assisted Projectile</td>
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