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Monthly Historical Summary

SEPTEMBER 1970

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FOREWORD

Enemy activity within the Republic of Vietnam remained low to light in all Military Regions during most of the month of September.

Of particular interest was the increase in mining incidents which affected all Military Regions. Mining on the Cua Viet River reached an all time high when on 27 September, seven mines were discovered within a 15 hour period.
# CURRENT OPERATIONS
(As of 30 September 1970)

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* TRAN HUNG DAO VI will operate as TG 212.5 when activated.

** TRAN HUNG DAO X will operate as TG 212.6 when activated.
SEALS - A SEAL team just returned from a mission pauses for a 
smoke break prior to debriefing. The Vietnamese lighting his cigarette. 
In a Viet Cong Scout serving with the Navy, like these Scouts are 
former Viet Cong who have returned to the Government of Vietnam.
Operation SOLID ANCHOR (THD IV)

Operation SEA FLOAT passed into the annals of Naval history on 1 September when CTG 116.1 moved ashore to the SOLID ANCHOR site. All remaining personnel were transferred ashore by 3 September. Unfortunately, this move ashore did not solve the many problems which plague the CTG 116.1 forces. Instead, it brought about another serious problem, that of base defense.

This problem of base defense was the subject of a great deal of study by the U.S. Navy command throughout the month. Aside from a shortage of both USN and VNN personnel to man the base, and the shortage of defensive material and weaponry (A number of U.S. and VN sailors were sent to SOLID ANCHOR without weapons - a situation which was later corrected), the disadvantages of the SOLID ANCHOR site itself were brought to light. In a message sent to COMNAVFORV on 20 September CTG 116.1 stated that:

"The physical SOLID ANCHOR site is considered unsatisfactory from a defensive point of view. The frontage is long and the depth is narrow. The appendage of a helo pad and airstrip, the lack of adequate ammo and POL storage and the neat symmetry of the quarters and warehouses all provide advantages to the attacker."

1. CTG 116.1 msg DTG 200940Z SEP 70.
This shaky defense posture was not enhanced by the disestablishment of the Kit Carson Scouts which also occurred during the month. The loss of the KCS and their camp on SOLID ANCHOR's eastern flank "creates an exposed relatively open flank to the enemy, which SOLID ANCHOR is incapable of filling at this time."\(^2\)

The assets of SOLID ANCHOR did, however, receive a most welcome addition when the 6th Vietnamese Marine Battalion, along with an artillery battery were ordered into the SOLID ANCHOR area of operations on 2 September. The last of these troops arrived on 5 September. Their presence provides the SOLID ANCHOR command with the large strike force which it had been sadly lacking since the departure of the Mobile Strike Force troops in May of this year.

Another continuing concern of CTG 116.1 has been the deplorable material condition of the RID 45 craft assigned to SOLID ANCHOR. This condition reached its nadir on 25 September when of the 11 RID 45 craft assigned, nine were non-operational due to material deficiencies and the other two were sunk (The sinking of these two craft will be discussed later). In an attempt to bolster the River Assault Craft forces, RID 41 was ordered to replace RID 45 at SOLID ANCHOR. This shift had not yet occurred at month's end.

2. CTG 116.1 msg DTG 181610Z SEP 70.
A group of dignitaries visited Seabee (Third Naval Construction Battalion) construction sites during September.

Colonel S. F. Lapping, Deputy Chief of Psyops Division, COMUSMACV, gained some first hand knowledge of U. S. Navy psyops efforts during his visit on 30 September.

Commander M. B. Brisbois relieved Commander T. A. Kellerher as CTG 116.1 on 1 October.

Operational activity in the SOLID ANCHOR area of operations remained at a high level throughout the month. There were a total of 13 ambushes of SOLID ANCHOR units by the enemy in September. These attacks resulted in damage to three PCFs, two ATCs, an LSM, and a civilian tug. and the wounding of three USN and nine VNN personnel. The enemy also successfully attacked two RID 45 units nested off the SOLID ANCHOR site on 25 September with water mines. ASPB 5167 and ATC 1269 were sunk while ASPBs 5165 and 5166, and ATC 1267 were damaged. Six VNN personnel were wounded while another eight were missing and presumed drowned. One U.S. Navyman was injured during rescue attempts.

In a tragic incident on 27 September, two U.S. Navy Seawolves sighted smoke from campfires and requested firing clearance from the SOLID ANCHOR NOC. The NOC granted clearance and the
Seawolves commenced their strike. They immediately ceased fire when they observed a yellow smoke grenade, indicating a friendly unit. Unfortunately, seven Vietnamese Marines, part of a company sized unit making a sweep, were wounded before the cease fire. Only the quick reaction of the Seawolves in halting the strike when they observed the yellow smoke averted what might have been a more serious incident.

SEALs from Zulu Platoon of SEAL Team ONE, Det GOLF hit the jackpot on a mission conducted 13 kilometers east of SOLID ANCHOR (vicinity WQ 128 720) on 23 September. The SEALs found a bunker and hootch complex containing a VC or NVA rocket and rocket launcher factory and weapons repair facility. The SEALs, along with a UDT demolition element destroyed hundreds of rockets, numerous rocket launchers and mines, approximately 350 disassembled SK3 rifles, plus a wide range of weapons manufacturing machinery and other assorted weapons. They also captured 45 pounds of documents. In all the SEALs and UDT personnel destroyed 80-90 percent of the munitions and severely damaged the machinery before extracting. A follow up patrol the next day destroyed more of the munitions and machinery. The SEALs on this patrol noted that the bodies of three VC killed the previous day had been removed from the area, indicating that the VC had returned after the SEAL attack.
SEALs from GOLF Platoon under LT Dyer, along with Kit Carson Scouts, did not meet with the same success as their comrades when they attempted to raid a VC training camp 22 kilometers northeast of SOLID ANCHOR (vicinity WQ 208 740) on 26 September. Instead of the eight armed VC their intelligence source had indicated would be present, they ran into a heavily armed force of approximately 20 men. This force hit the SEALs with M-79 grenades and heavy automatic weapons fire which wounded three SEALs and three KCS before the SEALs were able to call in Seawolves which provided cover for a medevac and a successful extraction by MSSC and LSSC. Ten of the enemy were killed during the encounter (5 BC, 5 probable).
Operation BREEZY COVE

While Operation BREEZY COVE SEALs and river assets experienced a moderate measure of hostile action in September, an encounter between Navy Seawolves and a massive enemy ground force was the most significant action reported by CTG 116.2. There were a total of 12 firefights during the month, and the allies reported finding the bodies of 12 enemy troops.

Navy SEALs of Detachment GOLF made several contacts with the Viet Cong after inserting in the area south of the Bay Hap River on the morning of 13 September. The SEALs first battled a five man enemy unit armed with automatic weapons at VQ 953 743, and shortly thereafter encountered 40 communist troops at VQ 964 736, seven of whom were wearing light blue uniforms. The SEALs reported killing six of the enemy (body count) and six (probable). They recovered assorted weapons and communist documents.

Seawolves from Song Ong Doc were involved in one of the Navy's greatest operational losses in September. On 15 September three American helicopters (two USN, one USA) were shot down in the vicinity of "VC Lake" (VQ 94 95) The incident began in mid-afternoon when Seawolves inserted elements of a Regional Forces company six kilometers south of the city of Song Ong Doc (VQ 93 97). Shortly
thereafter, the ground troops made contact with a large enemy force and urgently requested medical evacuation for six seriously wounded troops. Dustoff 86 attempted extraction, but heavy ground fire drove it away, and it was forced to wait for helicopter gunship support. While waiting, it withdrew southward to Solid Anchor, approximately 30 kilometers away to medevac two life or death cases. Seawolves 12 and 32 of Detachment Three were scrambled from Ca Mau, and Seawolves 62 and 65 left Solid Anchor to provide cover for the second extraction attempt. As they overflew the contact area at 1700H, all four aircraft were hit almost immediately. Seawolf 62 was saturated with large calibre machine gun fire and crashed into a rice paddy dike at VQ 930 960 with two of its crew killed and two wounded. Moments later Seawolf 12 was hit, and the pilot radioed that the ship was going down. To avoid a ground assault by the enemy, the pilot elected to guide the disabled aircraft into the shallow "VC Lake." Seawolf 65 sustained hits in the pilot's pedal linkage and was forced to withdraw and limp toward Ca Mau. Seawolf 32, flown by LT.'G Xucuhko, was simultaneously hit in the fuel cell and though losing fuel at a critical rate, hovered over her Detachment Six sister ship to provide cover for Dustoff 86 which sought to extract the crew of Seawolf 12. In the process, Seawolf 32 sustained at least eight additional hits but was able to remain airborne. This task completed, the rescue helicopter braved withering fire to save the two wounded survivors of Seawolf 62.
Seawolf 32 then escorted Dustoff 86 out of the fire zone and headed toward Song Ong Doc, requesting that boats be sent up the Song Ong Doc in case the crippled helicopters could not make it to the ATSB. CTG 116.2 responded immediately, sending boats eastward from Song Ong Doc and calling additional boats from their assigned patrols in case assistance was needed. Meanwhile, Dustoff 86 flew to the 3rd Surgical Hospital in Binh Thuy with the two wounded men. Throughout the episode Army Cobra helicopters in the area were unable to provide assistance as they were involved in other actions.

At 1732H three Navy Slicks arrived at the crash site to recover the bodies of the two Seawolf 62 crewmen but could not land because they had no gunship cover. They were able to land an hour and a half later when an Army Cobra arrived to provide fire protection. The enemy's obdurate anti-aircraft gunners had apparently stayed in place for they then shot down the Cobra whose crew was quickly extracted by a Dustoff helicopter. One of the SEA LORDS Slicks then landed to extract one of the bodies from Seawolf 62. Navy OV-10 aircraft waiting overhead were denied firing clearance because of the presence of friendly troops in the area.

By 2255H it was reported that Seawolf 62 was engulfed in flames, and it appeared that the enemy forces had moved on the helicopter after dark. removed the remaining body, stripped away the guns,
and set the aircraft on fire. The following morning, the body was found a short distance from the helicopter. OV-10s then destroyed the downed Seawolf 12 in VC Lake and an ARVN demolition team blew up Seawolf 62. An Army Chinook helicopter lifted out the Cobra.

The total friendly casualties for this engagement were two USN killed and two USN wounded. LTJG William A. Pedersen and ADJ3 Jose Pablo Ramos were killed when Seawolf 62 crashed. The other two crewmen of that aircraft, LTJG William L. Ford and AMS3 James P. Plona, were both wounded.

The helicopter crewmen involved in this massive battle agreed that the incident showed signs of a skillfully planned ambush rather than of spontaneous anti-aircraft fire. Several men, probably guerrillas acting as decoy, were spotted in close proximity to Seawolf 12 after it crashed and seemed to be attempting to draw the other aircraft in for a landing by waving white and red flags or handkerchiefs. The NILO at Ca Mau indicated that there were no friendly units within two kilometers from the crash site. Whenever the Seawolves would make a pass, the hidden enemy gunner units would not disclose their positions by firing until the helicopters' ordnance would no longer bear on them. According to the pilots involved, the enemy force numbered approximately 500 to 1000 men who, because of their deadly accuracy with large calibre automatic weapons, appeared to be extremely well trained.
This battle was the first significant contact to be reported in the "VC Lake" vicinity in some time. According to ARVN intelligence sources, the headquarters of the 95th North Vietnamese Army Regiment has been located in this area, but the unit was beginning to move into the U Minh Forest as the local Viet Cong were unable to support them. This attack, according to intelligence analysis, might indicate a reverse of that trend.

The only major administrative change for the month occurred when CDR C. R. Christensen, USN, relieved LCDR K. J. Rhea, USN, as CTG 116.2 and SOPA ATSB Song Ong Doc on 22 September. CDR Christensen was formerly Assistant Senior Advisor to CTF 212.
Operation SEARCH TURN

COMNAVFORV ordered an increase in the number of daytime patrols and inspections of river traffic in the SEARCH TURN (TG 116, 3) Operation area during September. Intelligence reports had indicated possible enemy movement of war materials from the U Minh Forest to Cambodia. Possibilities for communist mobility was great as the heavy monsoon flooding in the area allowed the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese to travel in sampans over normally dry land. Allied river craft, engaging in a total of nine firefights, battled several large enemy units in the last week of September and reported killing eight (body count) by the end of the month.

PBRs of River Patrol Group 58 battled with an estimated company size communist force on the night of 23 September. The crews of PBRs 51, 54, and 55 observed heavy movement 100 meters inland from their WBGP position on the Kinh Tu Canal, eight kilometers northeast of Rach Gia (WS 141 119). At 2009H the allies began firing into the area with all weapons and finally received automatic weapons fire in return. Navy Seawolves expended all their ordnance on the target site, and soldiers from a nearby ARVN outpost at WS 136 112 began firing at the enemy but could still not suppress the return fire. Two SEARCH TURN OV-10s patrolling nearby arrived to place their entire load on the estimated 50-100 man guerrilla force which then temporarily
ceased firing. At 2110H the ARVN outpost itself was attacked as the
defenders observed numerous lights moving toward them. The PBRs
and Detachment Eight Seawolves rushed to the area to assist, and
after a brief exchange of fire, the lights were extinguished, and
firing on the outpost ceased. As the river craft returned to the
original contact area, crew members observed troop movement along
the bank and interpreted it as enemy forces sweeping for battle
casualties. The PBRs and Seawolves again fired into the area, and
this time received no return fire. As the ground movement ceased,
the sailors heard sampans moving west along Ta Keo Creek and
adjoining canals, but the proximity of their allied boats precluded
the use of artillery. OV-10s placed air strikes, and Seawolves illuminated
the area with flares, but no enemy were sighted. There were no more
incidents during the night.

The following day several local inhabitants told an allied
interpreter that the Viet Cong had suffered six killed and ten seriously
wounded in these engagements. The communists had aroused animosity
among the indigenous population by forcing them to treat the wounded and
bury the dead. The Viet Cong apparently extorted a considerable
amount of money to conduct the burial ceremony.

SEALs of Detachment GOLF, KILO Platoon captured a
Viet Cong tax collector on 25 September in a village 21 kilometers
south of Rach Gia (VR 966 880). Reacting on intelligence provided by
a Kit Carson Scout, the SEALs inserted in the small village at 1515H, and were searching hootches when they heard movement and voices in the adjacent woods. One man, armed with a rifle, escaped as the allies approached, but another Viet Cong, identified as a tax collector, was captured. The allies began to receive small arms fire from a position 50 meters away, but a Seawolf was called in to suppress fire. The ground troops extracted without casualties and returned to Rach Soi.

A column of eight boats of RPD 58 was ambushed six kilometers southeast of Rach Cia (WS 130 025) on the evening of 26 September while enroute to a WBGP. PBR 7649, the third boat in the column, received two B-40 rockets on the starboard side and was forced to break away from the column with five wounded VNN sailors. The remaining boats, assisted by Seawolves and additional RPD 58 PBRs, took the contact area under fire, and crew members claimed killing five of the enemy. They also reported seeing over 30 NVA fleeing the area. PBR 7649 attempted to return to the Rach Soi base at top speed, but was forced to beach after covering only about three kilometers. The river craft sank to the extent that only one inch of freeboard existed, but within 30 minutes the boat had been pumped out enough to allow towing back to Rach Soi.
Intelligence investigation revealed that the ambush team,
probably the same group which had attacked PBRs 51, 54, and 55
three days earlier, had forced the civilian population to move out of
the area earlier in the day. The nearby Regional Force personnel
were aware of these developments but made no effort to warn the
PBRs, according to VNN officers and USN advisors.
Operation BLUE SHARK

Activity in the BLUE SHARK area of operations maintained its moderate level of the past few months in September. The majority of U.S. Navy missions were conducted by the three SEAL teams operating in the AO. Enemy losses during the month were placed at 17 killed (13 BC, 4 probable) and eight captured. Nineteen U.S. sailors were wounded in BLUE SHARK action.

On the morning of 16 September, eight SEALs of SEAL Team One, Det GOLF, HOTEL Platoon under the command of LT Todd were inserted by two U.S. Army Slick helicopters into an area five kilometers north of Thoi Thuan (vicinity XS 905 185). The target was a VC base camp. The SEALs entered the undefended camp and found it to consist of three hooches and six heavily fortified log and earth bunkers, all of which were well constructed. One of the bunkers gave signs of being used as a VC medical aid station.

Documents captured in one of the hooches stated that the area was used as a combination base camp, medical aid station, and rear services area manned by 20 to 25 men. The documents also indicated that the area was used as a VC R&R center with the necessary facilities for "sexual tension release." After the bunkers and hooches were destroyed by the SEALs and helo air strikes, the SEALs...
cleared the area, probably killing one VC who attempted to flee when
the SEALs neared their extraction site.

Mines and booby traps have played an increasing role in VC
and NVA operations in the Republic of Vietnam in recent months and
the BLUE SHARK area of operations was no exception as the following
incidents illustrate:

On the morning of 27 September, seven SEALs from the 8th
Platoon of SEAL Team TWO Det A inserted into an area nine kilometers
west of Dong Tam (vicinity XS 322 422) in search of a suspected VC
unit. The SEALs were supported by Black Ponies, Seawolves, and
four STABs. The squad found a large VC base camp, observed
movement and heard voices throughout the area. The SEALs resumed
their patrol and took two VC under fire. Suddenly, they tripped
a VC claymore which wounded every member of the SEAL squad
(one seriously). Only the rapid response by Seawolves, Black Ponies,
Dustoff helicopters, and another SEAL squad saved the wounded
and the pinned-down SEALs from further casualties as they were
receiving fire from VC on both sides of their position. Under the
protective cover of supporting fire the wounded SEALs were
lifted out.
In a similar incident on 30 September, ten SEALs from JULIETT Platoon of SEAL Team ONE, Det GOLF along with their guide, one KCS, and an interpreter were wounded by two command detonated mines while they were inspecting a VC munitions plant in Bac Lieu Province 15 miles southeast of CG 36 (vicinity XR 301 384). The SEALs still managed to kill seven VC (5 BC, 2 probable) and, with Black Pony support, to destroy most of the VC munitions (approximately 30 mines and 200 grenades) before being extracted by Dustoff helicopters.
As in previous months, hostile activity was extensive in the southern SEA LORDS campaign area, particularly around Operations SOLID ANCHOR and BREEZY COVE, and quite limited to the north. September action thus followed the recent pattern of communist buildup in the Ca Mau Peninsula and weakening of pressure in Military Region III.

Deputy COMNAVFORV issued new directives to all allied riverine forces during September instructing them to ameliorate their search procedures. Recognizing that "currently the Viet Cong move with impunity on the waterways confident that they will not be searched, or if searched, the examination will be casual and incomplete," Rear Admiral Matthews called for a transfer of emphasis from quantity to quality of the inspections. Daily situation summaries from individual operations traditionally report high numbers of crafts inspected and boarded, but it was believed that sophisticated concealment techniques used by the communists have rendered most cursory examinations completely ineffectual. False bottoms, concealed hatches, underwater towing systems, and other hidden devices may be discovered only after careful perusal. Deputy COMNAVFORV emphasized that even though it will become necessary to search fewer boats, a thorough scrutiny resulting in discovery of enemy materials will slow down
Viet Cong movement and limit their confidence to move freely.

Consequently, RADM Matthews ordered random daytime search and inspection operations on major Delta rivers and in barrier operations in Chau Doc, An Giang, and Kien Phong Provinces. Boat crews were to be specifically instructed in communist evasion and concealment techniques. The following characteristics were found to be fairly common among enemy craft:

Speed: Enemy craft frequently have two motors or fittings for two motors.

Construction: Enemy craft are not worn or broken, but of solid and generally sound construction.

Appearance: Enemy boats are usually either heavy sampans with rounded hatch covers or light, open sampans.

Actions: The Viet Cong may blatantly ignore hailing, but once alongside, they are often extremely accommodating.

In keeping with recent concern expressed by COMUSMACV, Deputy COMNAVFORV also reissued directives delineating the rules of engagement for tactical operations. Recent operations in the Fourth Military Region had apparently resulted "in the death and injury to a considerable number of civilians." Many of the casualties, RADM Matthews felt, were caused by a misunderstanding on the part of helicopter pilots as to their obligation to fully identify friendly and
civilian positions before firing. A pilot who receives permission
to fire from the designated control agency does not have free rein to
fire until he has positively identified these allied and civilian positions.
Additionally, Deputy COMNAVFORV indicated that in the Mekong Delta,
there is no such thing as a "free fire zone," a term which implies
indiscriminate, uncontrolled and uncoordinated firing within an area.
Specified strike zones are established by Commanding General
IV Corps for a specific period of time, but pilots must still obtain
appropriate clearance before attacking the area. All commanders and
senior advisors were instructed to adhere strictly to these regulations.

NAVFORV intelligence analysts provided important insights
into Viet Cong anti-boat tactics by translating a VC document captured
in the TRAN HUNG DAO I Operation area. The document outlined
the following experiences and tactics:

a) Tactical boat formations are crowded and become disordered
when attacked.

b) Small arms can be used effectively against boats on small
rivers and canals.

c) When attacked unexpectedly the return fire from boats is
ineffective and disordered, and when ambushes are pre-planned,
air strikes and artillery have difficulty locating the site.

d) Fire on the banks becomes weak when troops are landed.
The Viet Cong document established six guidelines for ambushing USN and VNN river craft:

a) Plan carefully, and when under fire, reinforce each other.
b) When taking boats under fire, aim for the hull at the waterline.
c) Deploy fire power into teams 300 and 400 meters apart.
d) Each team should have infantry fire support.
e) Select positions which will avoid flame throwers.
f) Opening fire must be accurate and fast, not giving the boats time to react. Then withdraw to another position for fire support.

These enemy tactics are by no means innovative which is in itself significant as the VC are known for sticking to well established routines.

In September, the 12 River Patrol Divisions (formerly River Patrol Groups) of Task Fleet 21 were assigned as follows:

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<th>RPD 51</th>
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<td>RPD 62</td>
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The boats of TRAN HUNG DAO I (TG 212.4) experienced very light action during September. They were involved in only six firefights, all of them minor, and the allies suffered no casualties.

River craft of TG 212.4 took time off from the war to perform several humanitarian missions during the month. LCMs assisted in the evacuation of 100 Vietnamese nationals when floods from the monsoon swollen Mekong River drove them from their homes at Thuong Thoi (WS 285 947) on 15 September. The following day, crewmen of River Patrol Division 61 rescued four Vietnamese women whose sampan had sunk on the Upper Bassac River (WS 246 714). While on routine patrol, the allies heard cries for help emanating from midstream. When they illuminated the area, they discovered the four women clinging to a construction barge and took them aboard.

A case of mistaken identity resulted in two Civilian Irregular Defense Group personnel wounded on the evening of 20 September. At 1940H, PBR 7591 of RPD 55 took a friendly CIDG ambush position located at VS 820 612 under fire. The boat made two firing runs on the position, wounding two men who were subsequently evacuated to YRBM 20. One hour later the PBR struck a fishing stake at VS 866 615 and was forced to beach with a large hole in the hull bottom. The boat was salvaged and towed to Binh Thuy for repairs.
TRAN HUNG DAO II

Although September brought a marked decrease in activity in the
TRAN HUNG DAO II AO as measured by the number of firefights (nine
enemy-initiated and five friendly-initiated), the month proved more
expensive than usual as one VNN refueler was sunk and a USN Black
Pony downed. Only one of the enemy was killed, and there were no
friendly fatalities due to hostile action.

At 0025H on 1 October, units of RİD 43 on patrol near the Ben Soi
Bridge (XT 096 478), came under heavy mortar, rocket, and small arms
fire. In the course of the melee, an LCM-6 with refueling capability
(HQ 9170) was sunk by what was first thought to be a mortar round.
From the nature of the damage it was concluded that a large floating
watermine had caused the boat to sink. A salvage crew on CSB-2
surveyed the wreckage the morning of 8 October and reported that the
boat had been hit in the starboard engine area. Only one VNN was
injured in the incident, with enemy casualties unknown. Salvage efforts
were begun the morning of 13 September by YLLC-1; the work was
completed the afternoon of 16 September, and HQ 9170 was beached on
the south bank of the Vàm Co Dong opposite the Ben Keo base. After
assessment by the NAVSUPPACT Repair Office, it was decided to tow
the boat to the Saigon Shipyard for repairs, and YLLC-1 was dispatched
for that purpose on 28 September.
On 29 September at 1700H, a Boston Whaler carrying the Senior Advisor for RPD 59, LT Smelly, was en route from Ben Luc to Tuyen Nhon when she began receiving automatic weapons fire from XS 346 790. A PBR patrol was scrambled and Black Ponies called in. The Black Ponies commenced their strike at 1716H, and during the engagement one of the planes was hit by a rocket and caught fire. The pilots bailed out, were soon recovered by Army Slicks, and taken to Dong Tam. The plane crashed at XS 319 863. A group of Tuyen Nhon District RF troops were inserted by PBR and swept the area with negative results.

There were no other engagements of consequence for the month. On September 23 at 0153H the Moc Hoa ATSB and village came under mortar and rocket attack. Four B-40 rounds were fired at the ATSB, two of which hit the ammis, injuring two USN and two VNN personnel. Injured personnel were: BMC Joseph Zagar, USN, SN Wayne H. Brant, USN, and VNNs Ly Kim Quoi and Le Van Van. All the injured were attached to RIVDIV 535, and none received major wounds.

Two USN sailors were also the victims of a tragic non-combative accident. On the morning of 3 September, FN Cary L. Ruff and SN Paul J. Backus were burning 81 mm mortar increment bags at the Tra Cu ATSB. Vietnamese children in the adjacent CIDG camp who witnessed the incident claimed that the men packed the bags into a 105 mm cannister and placed one concussion grenade each into the
cannister. They were running clear of the area when the cannister exploded. Ruff was killed and Backus seriously wounded by the resulting shrapnel.

TRAN HUNG DAO II assets at the end of September were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>214.1.1</th>
<th>RPD 53; RID 40; RID 44</th>
<th>Ben Luc</th>
<th>3 ATC, 1 ASPB, 10 PBR</th>
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<tr>
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<td>RID 44</td>
<td>Tra Cu</td>
<td>1 ATC, 7 AFSB, 1 MON, 1 CCB</td>
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<td>Go Dau Ha</td>
<td>4 ATC, 4 AFSB, 1 ZIP, 1 REF, 1 USN REF</td>
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<td>RPG 53; RID 43</td>
<td>Ben Keo</td>
<td>3 ATC, 5 AFSB, 1 CCB, 1 MON, 1 ZIP, 1 REF, 10 PBR</td>
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<tr>
<td>214.1.5</td>
<td>RPG 54; RID 44</td>
<td>Tan An</td>
<td>1 ATC, 10 PBR</td>
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<tr>
<td>214.1.6</td>
<td>RIVDIV 594</td>
<td>Tuyen Nhon</td>
<td>10 PBR</td>
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<tr>
<td>214.1.7</td>
<td>RIVDIV 535</td>
<td>Moc Hoa</td>
<td>10 PBR</td>
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The TRAN HUNG DAO V (READY DECK) AO continued to be one of the most inactive of the Vietnamese War during September as allied units participated in only two brief firefights.

A Vietnamese PBR of River Patrol Division 52 was struck with one B-40 rocket and automatic weapons fire while in a waterborne guardpost seven kilometers southwest of Phu Cuong (XT 976 068) on the evening of 2 September. Three crewmen were wounded, two seriously, while the American advisor, EN3 Thomas A. Hughes, sustained minor fragmentation wounds.

Initial plans to move all USN personnel to the new VNN base at Phu Cuong and to dismantle the ATSB were abandoned by mid-September. CTG 216.1, including all USN advisors, continued to maintain the original base, presumably until a RVNAF or ARVN unit can be found to replace them.
TRAN HUNG DAO VIII

TRAN HUNG DAO VIII units continued to assert their presence in Dinh Tuong Province. Activity for all units continued at a light level.

On 4 September all units were scrambled to provide support for CTG 217.2 (TRAN HUNG DAO XIV units) during the salvage operation of ASPB 5125 and ATC 1240. Seawolves scrambled to provide fire support for SEAL Team Det A, 8th Platoon in Dinh Tuong Province 16 kilometers from Dong Tam, on a treeline just south of the SEAL position where small arms and automatic fire was received. After suppressing the fire, the Seawolves turned to provide assistance to an RF/PF outpost in Kien Hoa Province, 20 kilometers southeast of Dong Tam (XS 572 323) which was under attack. Small arms and automatic weapons fire were encountered and a secondary explosion was noticed upon completion of the strike.

On 28 September, two River Patrol Boats, 7563 and 7569 of RPD 54, operating in Dinh Tuong Province, Ca Lay District, 19 kilometers from Dong Tam, received fire from the south bank of the Tong Doc Lo Canal. PBR 7563 was sunk by enemy fire in the area of XS 280 58. The remaining PBR was under attack until
Seswolves and Black Ponies provided suppressing fire in the area. STABs of STABRON 201 scrambled to tow PBR 7569 to My Tho. Sporadic small arms fire continued while Seawolf 76 evacuated one U.S. and one VNN wounded personnel. One company of RF/PF personnel was inserted into the area by Army Apache aircraft to conduct a sweep from the south. Also 22 Kit Carson Scouts were inserted on the north and south banks of the Tong Doc Loc Canal. At the conclusion of the sweep, two VC had been captured.
River assets of Operation TRAN HUNG DAO IX (BARRIER REEF) enjoyed their lowest level of activity in many months as they engaged in only three firefights in September. There were only two allied casualties resulting from direct enemy fire.

Combined PBR and air strikes accounted for an estimated four Viet Cong dead and another ten wounded on the night of 11 September. The crew of PBR 7669 in a WBGP 18 kilometers southeast of Moc Hoa (XS 100 734) sighted two VC or NVA and took them under fire with unknown results. Ten minutes later at 2308H, 30 more enemy troops were seen attempting to cross the Grand Canal at XS 085 740. PBRs 7669 and 7662 attacked them as OV-10 aircraft placed air strikes, and PBRs 7672 and 7673 formed a blocking force to the east. All firing ceased within 45 minutes and Popular Force troops conducted a ground sweep, finding one enemy dead, numerous blood trails and drag trails, and assorted weapons. An Army light fire team placed a final strike on the suspected trail of the fleeing enemy.

River boats are perhaps the most vulnerable when moored on a canal bank during a nocturnal WBGP. Two American advisors aboard ATC 51 of River Assault Squadron 15 were wounded on the night of 15 September 18 kilometers southwest of Moc Hoa (WS 928 767) when
an unknown assailant hurled a hand grenade into their boat. The unit immediately saturated the south bank with fire and called in Seawolves to illuminate the area. As no enemy could be located, the craft returned to the Advanced Tactical Support Base at Phuoc Xuyen to treat the minor shrapnel wounds of SN James C. McMinn and RMSN William L. Diggins.

Four U.S. Navymen were injured as a result of faulty ordnance handling at the Phuoc Xuyen Advanced Tactical Support Base on the evening of 23 September. As the crew of PBR 6123 (RIVDIV 532) was offloading ammunition from their boat to the utility ammi, the boat captain inadvertently activated a trip flare. It began to burn in his hand and fell into a nearby 426 round .50 calibre ammunition can which was being used to transport small items of ordnance to the storage bunker. The can contained 16 offensive hand grenades, four pop flares, three trip flares, and nine smoke grenades. The boat captain ordered the area cleared, and the ordnance in the box detonated in about 30 seconds. Four U.S. personnel received only minor fragmentation wounds and were soon returned to duty, while a more seriously wounded Vietnamese Regional Force soldier was medevaced to Binh Thuy. Holes were blown in the ammi, the PBR received extensive damage to the hull, radar, and after guns, and the Vietnamese casualty's sampan was sunk.
Another U.S. Navy sailor was lost by drowning during September. A PBR advisor, EN3 Johnny C. Jones, slipped on the bow of his boat and fell into the canal alongside the ammi at the Phuoc Xuyon ATSB. He surfaced once but his head struck the keel of his PBR and he again went under. Several USN and VNN personnel immediately dove into the canal, but could not locate Jones. All the boats in the area were moved away from the ammi and EOD divers conducted a search for the body, recovering it the following day.
Salvage operations on the sunken ASPB 5125 and ATC 1240 commenced at 0700H on 2 September by members of HCU-1 and attached EOD Team 12 units. HQ 5125 was raised by 1530H, 2 September, and transited to Dong Tam that evening. The other boat was raised at 1645H on 4 September and towed to Dong Tam at 2000H. The salvage operations were conducted smoothly and without major incidents, although at 0710H on 4 September, enroute to the salvage site, HCU-1 units and accompanying RAID 75 boats underwent a recoiless rifle and automatic weapons attack on the Mo Cay Canal (from XS 474 236 to 479 238). The enemy fire was suppressed with the help of Seawolves. Only minor damage was done to the boats. Three VNN sailors received minor wounds, and BM1 Donald Groce, received rather serious wounds in the legs and head and was medevaced to Third Field Hospital, Saigon, and then to Japan.

A third sinking took place in the early morning of 5 September when HQ 6532 sank mysteriously while tied up alongside the south quay wall at Logistics Support Base, Dong Tam. An investigation revealed that the boat crew had been dropping concussion grenades, causing a DC plug inserted in the bottom of the boat in lieu of salt water valves to loosen. The boat was easily salvaged, having sunk in fairly shallow water with about three feet of the bow protruding above the surface.
One VCI was captured six kilometers south of Ben Tre City (XS 500 240) at 1300H, 9 September, by RAG 23 units with a Hoi Chanh embarked. The VC, a 19-year-old girl, stated she was involved in collecting intelligence on VNN operations in Dien Phong Province. She was later turned over to the Kien Hoa Sector.

At 1045H, 12 September, RAID 75 picked up another man 11 kilometers south of Ben Tre (XS 540 183). The man said he wanted to Chieu Hoi and presented two Safe Conduct passes. He claimed he had been working for the VC for six years in an engine mechanic section responsible for repairing engines for sampans used to move troops and weapons and commo-liaison material across the Ham Luong River. Still a third VC was picked up by RAID 73 units at 1130H, 17 September, 12 kilometers south of Ben Tre (XS 545 175). This one had been working as a local guerrilla for the past seven years; he was turned over to Kien Hoa Sector.

The only major firefight for the month occurred at 1355H, 20 September, five kilometers south of Ben Tre (XS 490 242) when RAID 75 and RAG 23 units received automatic weapons fire from the south bank of the Mo Cay Canal. The enemy fire was suppressed by the boats at 1405H, and at 1420H, 20 Kit Carson Scouts were inserted at XS 493 246, with RAG 23 units used for support. At 1430H these
boats received automatic weapons fire from XS 494 240. Black Ponies were scrambled, and at 1440H the RAG boats received more shots and M-79 grenades from the north bank of the Mo Cay. The KC Scouts were extracted, then inserted again at 1600H at XS 492 250; 40 minutes later they contacted a 10-man VC force, one of whom they captured with no casualties to themselves. At 1700H all ground forces were extracted, and the engagement came to an end. The outcome of the afternoon's activities was three VNN wounded, one of them seriously, and no boat damage. An on-scene interrogation of the captured VC revealed that 17 VC were killed or wounded by the boats' return fire and Black Pony strikes, but subsequent sweeps were unable to confirm this number.
CAMBODIAN OPERATIONS

Operation TRAN HUNG DAO XI, which began on 9 May, was disestablished on 27 August. Eighty-two VNN personnel were killed, 271 were wounded, and one was listed as missing during the course of the operation. Enemy casualties during the three and a half months were 681 VC killed and 79 VC captured. In a total of 40 lifts, 82,070 refugees were transported from Cambodia to Vietnam. River assault craft of Task Force 211 continued to operate on the Mekong River in Cambodia, however, without USN advisors.

At 1200H on 10 September, an ATC of RAID 71 was conducting a sampan search in an area 30 miles northeast of Chau Doc (WT 273 332) when the crew detected a buoyant mine attached to the side of their boat. The crew pulled up the light nylon line which was attached to an inflated rubber inner tube and an explosive charge estimated to weigh about 30 pounds. The device was cast adrift and exploded several minutes later. The last sampan searched prior to the discovery of the mine was intercepted by another boat in the area and the four occupants were detained. Search procedures were modified to prevent further incidents of this kind.

At 1220H on 16 September a Monitor and an ATC of RAID 73 were escorting some LCM-8s from Neak Luong to Phnom Penh when they were ambushed with B-40 rockets and automatic weapons fire six
miles southeast of Phnom Penh (WT 050 751). The boats immediately
returned and suppressed the enemy fire. The ATC took two B-40
rocket hits which caused minor damage and wounded two Vietnamese
sailors. Enemy casualties were unknown.

At 1000H on 20 September, Operation Tran Hung Dao XVI was
initiated with the insertion of the Ninth Battalion of the VNMC on the
Bassac 21 miles north of Chau Doc (WT 075 160) and the 41st ARVN
Ranger Battalion on the Mekong five miles north of the border. The
insertion was made by river assault craft of Task Force 210. USS
BENEWAH, anchored in the Mekong just south of the Cambodian border,
served as an afloat command post for the operation with CTF 210,
CAPT Thong, embarked.

The operation was organized as follows:

Task Group 210.1 Bassac Assault Group - RAIDs 72 and 73
   RID 41
   RAG 21/33

Task Group 210.2 Mekong Assault Group - RAID 70
   Det RAIDs 71, 72, and 73
   Det RID 41
   Det RPD 55

Task Group 210.3 Neak Luong Operational HQ - RAID 71

Ground Forces - 7th Battalion, 369th Brigade VNMC
   9th Battalion, 369th Brigade VNMC
   105th Howitzer Battery, 369th Brigade VNMC
   41st Ranger Battalion
The operation continued until 1200H on 27 September with numerous landings and ground sweeps. Five ASPBs and three ATCs were damaged by enemy fire, and seven VNMC, one VNN, and four RF personnel were killed, 35 VNMC, seven VNN, five RF, and one ARVN were wounded. There were 132 of the enemy killed by ground forces, 19 killed by air, and 12 captured. There were 275 detainees.
Combined operations were continued in the Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ) during the month of September. Six such operations were conducted and were named Chuong Duong 38-70 through Chuong Duong 43-70. The Chuong Duong operations were all very similar in concept, with the usual insertions by Slick helicopter, cover by USN and USA LHFTs, sweeps by RF companies and PRUs, and extractions by ASPBs or Slicks.

The most significant Chuong Duong operation was 38-70. At 030628H two ASPBs at XS 969 581 were fired upon with two B-41 rockets and other small arms fire from the west bank near Quang Xuyen, 12 kilometers south of the Nha Be Navy Base. One ASPB received one B-41 rocket on the port side resulting in four USN personnel wounded. The ASPB although damaged continued in company and commenced a firing run to the north where additional fire support was requested from USN LHFT on an enemy position located at XS 968 580. Results of Chuong Duong 38-70 were six U.S. wounded, nine VN wounded, and two VN killed. Four bunkers were destroyed and assorted turtle mines, M-79 duds and booby trap grenades were captured.
In a special operation (110600H - 151800H) near Long An and Can Giuoc (XS 807 745), 15 kilometers southwest of the Nha Be Navy Base, two PF platoons supported by a Zippo boat and a Douche boat (water Monitor) and Seawolves conducting a sweep northward through the area came into contact with enemy forces. At 151000H, the Zippo boat and Douche boat came under B-40 rocket and heavy automatic weapons fire at XS 807 745. Three B-40 hits were received by the Zippo, wounding two USN personnel and two PF personnel plus moderate damage to the boat. One B-40 round glanced off the Douche boat bow causing light damage. USN helicopters and fire teams were scrambled to the area and placed suppressing fire on the enemy position.

Various other insertions, sweeps, and extractions were made during this period. In addition, the Zippo boat made burn runs for a total of 20 minutes of flame time. Douche boats destroyed two bunkers and accumulated 30 minutes of water time. Results of the Long An (PF waterborne) operation were two PFs missing, three PFs wounded, two USN wounded, four enemy killed and three captured. Materials captured were: two B-40 rocket launchers, two B-40 rocket rounds, three AK-47 rifles with magazines, 40 rounds of 7.62 ammunition, and a small quantity of food.
PRU and Chuong Duong operations during the month accounted for 14 enemy killed and 10 probably killed. Three enemy and 15 individual weapons were captured. Friendly casualties during the month were six killed and 22 wounded, of which eight were USN.
RSSZ Shipping Incidents

Harassment on the Long Tau Shipping Channel continued when at 011330H, the U.S. civilian tug SANTIAM, with a barge in tow transiting north, came under fire from three B-40 rockets shot from the south bank at YS 066 623. There was no damage or casualty to the SANTIAM.

A USN Light Helicopter Fire Team (LHFT), a USAF Forward Air Controller, and RF Company 908 responded to the incident. The RF company swept the area with negative results.
September was an important month for Operation MARKET TIME for at 0001H on 1 September, CAPT Nguyen Huu Chi, VNN, CTF 213 assumed command of the MARKET TIME Inner Barrier from CDR Thomas F. Mullane, USN, CTF 115. This ended the operational control of Inner Barrier forces by USN commanders which began when Operation MARKET TIME was formally established on 24 March 1965 and was a significant indicator of the progress of the ACTOV Program. CDR Mullane reported as Deputy Commander and Senior Advisor to CTF 213 and was relieved by CAPT Carl R. Quanstrom USN, on 2 September. The MARKET TIME Outer Barrier remained under the control of CTF 115 with the task group designator 115. The name MARKET TIME in reference to the Inner Barrier was dropped, and the surveillance operations there were redesignated TRAN HUNG DAO XV.

Shortly after the turnover, a new concept in surveillance operations was put into effect in which all units operating in a patrol area where the threat of enemy infiltration was particularly acute would be put under the command of a senior officer afloat rather than allowed to operate independently. The senior officer, embarked in a large unit having better communications than the majority of the patrol units, would, on receipt of reliable intelligence, assume direction.
of all patrol units and direct their movements to the area where a threat of enemy infiltration existed. By coordinating the movements of all units, the junks and sampans near the threat area would be corralled; then the patrol units acting together, could board and inspect in force rather than in piecemeal fashion. It was hoped that the new technique would result in better coordinated searches of the suspicious craft, faster and more effective exploitation of intelligence, reduction of stereotyped patrol procedures, and, generally, increased flexibility overall. In early September, CTF 213 directed the formation of three task element commanders who would be in command of TRAN HUNG DAO XV craft in areas 4, 5, and 8 and who would attempt to implement the foregoing tactics.

**Trawlers**

Shortly after noon on 4 September, a VP aircraft flying a MARKET TIME patrol sighted a possible SL-6 infiltration trawler at 08-25N, 109-20E, 265 nautical miles east of the tip of the Ca Mau Peninsula. Air surveillance was undertaken on this trawler, designated 04S-01. The following day the USCG Cutter YAKUTAT (WHEC 380) was directed to proceed to the scene and take the SL-6 under overt surveillance. YAKUTAT arrived at the trawler's position on 7 September and maintained surveillance until the SL-6 entered CHICOM waters off Hainan Island on 9 September.
In another reported trawler incident, a Hoi Chanh being interrogated in Bac Lieu stated that a North Vietnamese infiltration trawler had come ashore near the mouth of the Ganh Hao River (vicinity WQ 462 960) on 27 or 28 August. He described the vessel as being approximately 35 meters long with a beam of approximately 10 meters. According to the report, the crew members of the vessel told villagers in the area that they had been able to outrun U.S. and South Vietnamese Naval units because their vessel was nuclear powered. The Hoi Chanh's report was being closely examined by Intelligence personnel at month's end. COMNAVFORV ordered five PCFs chopped from CTG 116.5 to CTG 115.6 and assigned to patrol Inner Barrier areas 7E and 8C, near the Ganh Hao River entrance to augment the regular TG 213.3 and TG 213.4 units.

First Coastal Zone

September in the First Coastal Zone was characterized by an upswing in activity, especially in the area around Cua Viet as the enemy mining campaign there reached a level unknown in more than two years.

At 1110H on 7 September, an underwater explosion occurred in the vicinity of a passing sampan on the Cua Viet River three kilometers east of the Coastal Group II base (YD 358 307). The detonation
produced a 70-foot waterspout from what was believed to be an NVA pressure influence bottom mine. There were no casualties or damage as a result of the explosion and the five civilians aboard the sampan were released following questioning. It was thought that the explosion might have been triggered by variations in tides and currents near the river mouth.

At 1410H on 13 September, a mine detonated without causing damage to friendly watercraft at the mouth of the Cua Viet River (YD 345 702), not far from the location of the mine which exploded on 7 September. The explosion produced a 150-200 foot waterspout, and the mine was believed to be a large pressure influence bottom mine which was probably detonated by surging currents.

Great concern had been caused by the discovery in August of the presence of enemy mines to seaward of the mouth of the Cua Viet River. Although it seemed likely that the mines had broken loose from moorings in the river and drifted out to sea, there was nevertheless some fear that the enemy was making an attempt to mine naval gunfire support and MARKET TIME ships in the open sea. Thus there was an immediate response when at 1840H on 18 September, the USS BUCHANAN (DDG 14), while lying to 5,500 yards east of the Cua Viet River mouth (YD 390 700), picked up a small contact
with a strong metallic echo quality on its AN/SQS-23D sonar.

USS DYNAMIC (MSO 432), at the time patrolling MARKET TIME Outer Barrier Station 1B, was immediately ordered to the contact area to investigate. The First Coastal Zone Advisor sent an EOD team to assist in the search. DYNAMIC reported her sonar inoperable and she was ordered to exchange stations with USS IMPLICIT (MSO 455) which was patrolling area 7B. IMPLICIT arrived in the Cua Viet area on 22 September and commenced mine-hunting operations. The EOD team was picked up at first light on 23 September, and they commenced diving, using non-magnetic equipment. They had no success in locating mines but they did find a case of pineapple juice, a bundle of angle iron, a metal locker, and other debris.

At 0800H on 23 September a craft of MID 92 discovered an enemy watermine on the Cua Viet River 3.5 kilometers northeast of Dong Ha (YD 270 640). EOD personnel recovered the pressure influence detonating device and attached charge.

Mine hunting operations conducted by the MSOs were terminated on 26 September in order that the MSOs could be on their Outer Barrier stations during the period of highest infiltration threat, the dark of the moon, which was anticipated about 30 September. CTF 115 assigned the MSOs to areas 1B and 2B, where maximum use could be made of
their capability for detecting infiltration trawlers and where they would be close to the Cua Viet River and could return rapidly to resume their mine hunting once the trawler threat period was over.

An 18 man group from the 126th NVA Naval Sapper Regiment was reported to have infiltrated across the DMZ on 19 September with the intention of mining the Cua Viet. On 27 September an incredible series of seven mining incidents occurred, a possible indication of their presence.

At 0300H on 27 September, a large explosion resulted in the destruction of two sampans located approximately 20 meters from the north bank of the Cua Viet River near the mouth (YD 335 699). At 0830H a similar explosion destroyed another sampan at the same location. Although no personnel were aboard either civilian craft, the owners were taken into custody for interrogation when an investigation revealed that the watermines involved appeared to have been attached to two of the sampans by a nylon line.

At 1005H a mine sweep craft of MID 92 discovered an NVA pressure influence watermine partially exposed in two feet of water about four miles southwest of CG 11 (YD 305 675). At 1020H a second watermine of the same type was recovered in a fisherman's net near the first major bend in the Cua Viet River from the mouth (YD 297 688).
Both mines were in excellent condition and appeared to have been in the water no more than six hours. Each mine had two chemical-delay arming pencils and of the four, three had not been activated. The two mines including pressure influence detonator and attached charge were identical except that the first mine had four, 20 pound blocks of plastic explosive hanging from the detonator and the second mine had five blocks.

At 1500 another mine was discovered but exploded as it was being dragged along in a fishnet about 2 1/2 miles northeast of Dong Ha (YD 270 638). The owner of the sampan who discovered the mine was questioned and released.

At 1605H a craft of MID 92 detonated a watermine during a routine scare charge run about two miles northeast of Dong Ha (YD 268 632). A 100-foot waterspout was observed but there were no casualties. At 1612H a mine was detonated in the sweep gear astern of a MID 92 craft not far from the scene of the explosion which had occurred seven minutes earlier (YD 267 636). Another 100-foot waterspout was observed and again there were no casualties.

At 1300H on 29 September an NVA pressure influence mine was recovered in a fishnet and turned over intact to personnel of CG II. At 1330H a basket of explosives similar to the type encountered with pressure influence mines was turned over to EOD personnel of MID 92 following a sweep of the river.
As the month ended preparations were underway for a renewal of mine counter-measure operations at the mouth of the Cua Viet River to counter the enemy mining threat.

Although activity in the Chi Lang I and SEA TIGER area of operations was at a fairly low level there were a number of sharp encounters.

Duffle Bag personnel began experimenting with a new technique using sensors and associated claymore mines detonated by remote firing devices and achieved some measure of success on enemy-infested Cam Thanh Island. On 31 August the Duffle Bag team set up an ambush three kilometers east of Hoi An (BT 177 578). At 1450H on 1 September, movement was noted near the sensor string, and the claymores were detonated. At 1800H Duffle Bag personnel and the CG 14 sweep team entered the area by PBR. They found three VC killed and captured one M-79, one AK-47, and six M-26 grenades.

On 4 September a similar remote ambush was conducted 3.2 kilometers east-northeast of Hoi An (BT 179 581). Again Duffle Bag personnel and the CG 14 sweep team were inserted by PBRs of RPG 60. Two VC were discovered who had been killed by the mines and an additional arm and leg were also discovered, indicating the demise of other enemy personnel. One AK-47, one AK-47 magazine, one M-26 grenade, and one hand flare were captured.
Allied commanders were delighted with the success of this new tactic. The Duffle Bag commander announced his intention to continue using this demoralizing technique in the hopes of depriving the enemy of his feeling of security in his Cam Thanh Island sanctuary.

At approximately 2100H on 7 September, USMC CAP Team 2-4 made contact with the enemy about 2.5 kilometers east of Hoi An (BT 178 579). One PBR of RPG 60 broke WBGP nearby (BT 181 583) in order to go to the CAP Team’s assistance. As it broke WBGP, other units of RPG 60 in the area began receiving heavy small arms fire. All RPG units went to the original WBGP position to take the enemy under fire. They came under heavy small arms fire and were narrowly missed by two B-40 rocket rounds. Finally all units cleared the area and artillery strikes were called in. There were no friendly casualties and enemy casualties were unknown.

Tragedy struck on 18 September. At 1030H personnel of UDT 13 Det HOTEL and an RF company were inserted for a bunker destruction mission about four kilometers east of Hoi An (BT 181 584). At 1135H a member of the UDT team detonated a booby trap believed to have been made of an 81 or 82 mm mortar shell. SN L. W. Palma and HM3 L. C. Williams were killed and LTJG E. L. Jahncke, SM3 T. A. Nichols, and MR3 R. C. Banfield were wounded and medevaced. Three bunkers were destroyed as a result of the mission.
Second Coastal Zone

Activity in the Second Coastal Zone was at a low level during September but the enemy scored a signal success by mining and sinking PCF 3863 on 7 September near Qui Nhon.

Around 2400H on 6 September, the swift boat anchored, contrary to patrol instructions, about 600 yards off the beach from Hung Luong Village (CR 150 374) 12 miles northeast of Qui Nhon. It was later revealed that this was a popular spot for anchoring by boats supposedly on patrol, a phenomenon which the enemy had evidently observed. Around 0230H on 7 September, while the crew members and the American advisor slept, there was a large explosion. The advisor, who had been asleep on the 81 mm mortar ammunition box aft, awoke and ran forward to the pilot house where he encountered the boat's officer in charge. They attempted to use the radios but were forced to abandon ship. The swift boat sank in about two minutes. The advisor and four VNN personnel were wounded. A VNN ACTOV trainee who had been asleep in the cabin was killed.

Salvage units immediately went into action. EOD and HCU-1 divers recovered weapons, cryptographic material, and the body of the Vietnamese who had been killed on 8 September. They also found a parachute shroud attached to the anchor line and fairlead aft and
tied off on the port outboard exhaust flapper, confirmation that the
explosion had been caused by a sapper-placed negative buoyancy mine.

A 60-ton crane was brought to the scene and with the help of Army and Navy EOD divers, the craft was salvaged by 12 September.

At 2000H on 5 September, CG 23 at Phu My received three rounds of 82 mm mortar fire. One round landed in the CG 23 compound, one round hit the district compound and one round landed outside the compound. The enemy fire was returned with unknown results. Two VNN sailors, two ARVN personnel, and two Philippino civilians were wounded as a result of the attack.

At 2225H on 25 September, the Qui Nhon Support Command came under a mortar attack consisting of 22 rounds of mixed 60 mm and 82 mm mortar fire. Eleven U.S. Army personnel were wounded and six buildings were damaged.

Third Coastal Zone

Activity in the Third Coastal Zone was light and scattered during September and there were no significant actions reported. However there was some concern caused by the report from a Hoi Chanh that a North Vietnamese trawler had entered the Ganh Hao River (WQ 462 960) and offloaded a large quantity of arms. Although
the report was unconfirmed, COMNAVFORV ordered five USN PCFs chopped from CTG 116.5 to CTG 115.6 and assigned to assist regular 213.3 and 213.4 units in patrolling Inner Barrier areas 7E and 8C which are adjacent to the mouth of the Ganh Hao River.

Fourth Coastal Zone

At 1655H on 31 August, approximately 40 VC and NVA prisoners escaped while being transported by truck from the Phu Quoc Naval Base, where they had been on a working party, to the Phu Quoc POW Camp. During the escape two VNN guards were wounded and subsequently died.

At 1710H the sector advisor provided USA gunships which placed a strike in the area between the base and the POW camp. At 1815H two RF platoons swept the area and flushed several escapees and recovered a missing M-16. At day's end, 11 POWs had been killed, three had been recaptured, and 26 were still missing. On 6 September one POW was killed and another was recaptured by an RF patrol. It was assumed that the remaining 24 escapees had succeeded in joining local VC units, thus increasing enemy strength on Phu Quoc Island by seven percent. Authorities concluded that the escape had been spontaneous rather than preplanned and was carried out without the help of outside assistance.
Units of the Fourth Coastal Zone continued to carry out normal surveillance patrols in Vietnamese and adjacent Cambodian coastal waters during the month without any major incidents.
Operation STABLE DOOR

Unit TWO - Cam Ranh Bay

Due to operational commitments it was decided to retain the original turnover date of 1 December 1970 for the STABLE DOOR unit at Cam Ranh Bay vice 1 November as had been proposed.

Unit TWO personnel had their hands full at Cam Ranh Bay on 22-23 September. At approximately 2144H on 22 September, LCPL 66 reported small arms fire in the vicinity of Pier Five (Ammo Pier) and investigated. The pier sentry had fired upon a swimmer alongside the pier. EOD divers were called to the scene and discovered a charge consisting of 120 pounds of C-4 explosive, blasting caps, detonating cord, and a pull friction release type detonator attached to the hull of the OVERSEAS ROSE at Pier Five. The charge was towed out of the area and disarmed by the cool EOD team members. All other ships in the area were checked for charges with negative results.

The following morning at 1036H the SS AMERIGO, also moored at Pier Five suffered a detonation which was located on the starboard side, aft of the starboard boiler in the engine room. The ship lost all power and began flooding in the engine room. She was towed
to the opposite side of the turning basin and allowed to settle in
18 feet of water on the sandy bottom. The ship was later dewatered,
temporarily patched, and returned to Pier Five where more permanent
repairs were effected.

In a footnote to this action, the body of a swimmer was found
in the harbor on 24 September. The body had a bullet hole through
the right wrist and damaged facial bones thought to be caused by
close proximity to an underwater concussion grenade. It was believed
that this was the swimmer sighted by the sentry two nights before.
Evidently, two or more swimmers were involved in the attack
which damaged the AMERIGO and unsuccessfully attempted to
mine the OVERSEAS ROSE.
RAIDS

RAIDs 70-73 operated in Cambodia under the opcon of CTF 210 for the month, RAID 75 continued operations in the Third Riverine Area under the opcon of CTF 217, and RAID 74 performed troop lifts and patrols out of Ca Mau for most of September. From 3-5 September RAID 74 units were enroute from Can Tho to Thoi Binh, having received orders to support the 21st ARVN Division, 4th Battalion, 31st Regiment, and they established a patrol along the Song Trem Trem from WR 065 406 to WR 043 470, about 10-15 kilometers north of Thoi Binh. In the early morning hours of 6 September while on a routine sampan check, RAID boats encountered many women and children evacuating the area because of B-52 strikes the day before.

Patrolling the same general area, RAID 74 came under attack at 0010H, 11 September, when a B-41 round demolished a sampan next to HQ 1233 seven kilometers north of Thoi Binh. There had been a report from NILO, Ca Mau, that local VC in the area 10 kilometers north of Thoi Binh were planning to destroy RAID 74 craft.

The action became more intense at 1845H, 11 September, when RAID sailors received eight rocket rounds and automatic weapons fire 11 kilometers north of Thoi Binh (WR 180 404). Five of the enemy
rockets found their marks: both engines of HQ 5119 were rendered inoperable, and two USN advisors, BMi Pat Stauber and EN3 Alan Yozura, received minor shrapnel wounds. The boats returned to an RF outpost at WR 167 390 with HQ 5119 in tow after the ambush to rearm; at 1130H, 13 September, that outpost received 10 mortar rounds, causing no friendly casualties.

RAID 74 stayed on the Song Trem Trem and adjacent canals until at 1800H, 17 September, they received orders from the 21st ARVN Division to sail all boats to Ca Mau, and upon arriving there received an assignment to establish a patrol from VQ 960 765 to WQ 110 870 on the Song Bay Hap in support of the 32nd Regiment. The commanding officer of RAID 74, LCDR Khan, objected to these orders, knowing that the water level in that particular area was too shallow for his craft. Nevertheless, his units commenced patrol in the new AO on 18 September, and LCDR Khan's predictions came true. HQ 5119 reported a steering casualty at 1930H but was able to be towed to an outpost by two other units; all three of the boats were aground at 2130H at the outpost (WQ 105 856). The next morning at high tide HQ 5119 was towed to Ca Mau for repairs. RAID 74 boats continued patrolling the Song Bay Hap for the remainder of the month by remaining in the vicinity of the outpost for support during low tide periods.
On 24 September, Senior Advisor, RAID 74, flew to Ca Mau to discuss the shallow water problem with Senior Advisor, 21st ARVN Division. The results of that discussion were unknown at the end of the month.
USN Psyops teams in the Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ) and the SEA FLOAT AO conducted MEDCAP/DENTCAPs, taped broadcasts from boats and helicopters and leaflet drops throughout September.

In the RSSZ, the Vietnamese medical team with USN medical and dental advisors conducted nine MEDCAP/DENTCAPs in Quang Xuyen and Can Gio Districts south and east of the Nha Be Navy Base. A total of 811 people were treated for various medical and dental ailments and two taken to the Nha Be Navy Base Dispensary for further treatment. The MEDCAP/Psyops teams visited five villages and four Regional Forces company compounds by helicopter (USA Slicks). Sixty-three Health Kits were distributed. On September 2, the MEDCAP/DENTCAP was held aboard Vietnamese LCVP and RF company boats while BJU-1 (Beach Jumper Unit ONE) personnel played tapes urging support of the GVN.

The RSSZ PsychoPS teams conducted airborne broadcasts in Slicks seven times during the month, playing tapes of 30 to 45 minutes length urging people to "Chieu Hoi." There were also three leaflet drops conducted in the two districts Can Gio and Quang Xuyen; areas covered were saturated with a total of 151,000 Chieu Hoi leaflets, 37,500 Weapons Reward leaflets, and 30,000 Safe Conduct passes.
In the SEA FLOAT area of operations, the Psyops/Civic Action team reported seven Hoi Chanhs, 125 people who were medically treated, 281 detainees, and 17 hours of air and surface Psyops broadcasts during September. On 8 September at 1520H, 10 refugees, two men, two women, and six children, rallied to VNN Alfa boats at VQ 905 603. The ralliers reported they had heard Psyops broadcasts but that they were weak and incomprehensible; they rallied due to fear of air strikes. On 15 September at 1315H, 58 refugees rallied to VN junks in Vien An Village (VQ 93 61) in response to the Psyops broadcasts and due to fear of air strikes. Cumulatively, since 10 July 1970, there have been seven Hoi Chanhs and 624 refugees who have rallied to the allied forces at SEA FLOAT.

Civic Action projects, the building of a 25-bed hospital at Ham Rong II Hamlet and the civilian agricultural project, were reported as making slow progress due to the move to SOLID ANCHOR, and a lack of lumber. CTF 116.1 reported receiving axes, saws, and other materials which were needed for Civic Action work.

It was also reported that in the refugee hamlets Ham Rong I and II, "Terrorism has reached the point where woodcutters are leaving the rich authorized cutting zones and are cutting in free fire zones within the SOLID ANCHOR 5,000 meter defensive perimeter."
The tragic possibility, particularly at night, of mistaking woodcutters for VC is becoming greater daily. VNN PolWar and Psyops/Civic Action teams (five men each), with the assistance of the Yabuta junk forces, are engaged in daily Civic Action operations in Ham Rong I and II. Six Vietnamese educational films have been shown there since the inception of the plan last month. A census taken of Ham Rong I and II on 26 September showed a total stable population of 5,852 (4,058 children) and a transient population of 2,270. There are in the two hamlets: 836 homes, 396 sampans, 20 charcoal kilns, and 35 fish processing shops.
The MARKET TIME Inner Barrier was turned over to the Vietnamese Navy on 1 September at Cam Ranh Bay. The Inner Barrier force was designated Task Force 213 under the command of Captain Nguyen Huu Chi, VNN, with former CTF 115, CDR Thomas F. Mullane acting as his deputy for one day, until he was relieved by CAPT Carl R. Quanstrom on 2 September. In addition to the Inner Barrier, the VNN also has control of Coastal Surveillance Centers at An Thoi, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Vung Tau, and Danang, with a Combined Operations Center (COC) at Cam Ranh Bay. CTF 115 continues to control the Outer Barrier of Operation MARKET TIME, under the Task Designator of 115.6. The Inner Barrier turnover marked the second transfer of a major USN operation in Vietnam (the first one being SEA LORDS in July, 1970), and the assumption of responsibility for Inshore MARKET TIME by the VNN also resulted in the implementation of some new patrol procedures which are explained in the "Coastal Surveillance Force" section of this summary. The task organization and key personnel for the operation are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Title &amp; Location</th>
<th>CDR &amp; Deputy CDR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CTG 213.1</td>
<td>Northern Surveillance</td>
<td>CAPT Ho Van Dy Theoai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDR, Danang</td>
<td>LCDR Ton That Ky</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTG 213.2</td>
<td>Central Surveillance</td>
<td>CDR Pham Manh Khue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDR, Nha Trang</td>
<td>CDR Nguyen Nhoc Rac</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The new task group commanders will also act as Coastal Zone commanders, while their deputies assume the role of COSFLOT commanders.

So far as craft turnovers for the month were concerned, eight ACTOV-X PCFs were turned over at Cat Lo on 1 September, the first of a group of 38 PCFs to be turned over by December. Four of the
eight PCFs turned over on 1 September were sailed to COSFLOT 4 at An Thoi; the other four chopped to 116.1 on 4 September for duty at SOLID ANCHOR.

A total of 13 support craft were transferred by NSF Danang during September. On 10 September, three LCM-8s (812, 873, and 678) were presented to the VNN, represented by LCDR Le Ba Thong, VNN, a First Coastal Zone Logistics Officer, by LCDR G. C. Moore, ACTOVLOG Officer, NSF Danang. On 15 September two LCPLs, two 45-foot picket boats, PBs 39 and 41 to be used for harbor defense, and two Boston Whalers were accepted by LCDR Pham Pho, First Coastal Zone Logistics Officer, from LCDR K. W. McCarter.

Finally, on 30 September, LCU 1485 (for Fleet Command), LCM-8 798, LCM-6 628, and PB 44 were signed over to CAPT Ho Van Ky Thoai, First Coastal Zone Commander, by CAPT Maurice A. Horn, Commanding Officer, NSF Danang. September's turnovers brought to 49 the number of boats turned over by NSF Danang in the last 10 months.

As part of the salvage ACTOV program, CSB-2 was transferred to CTF 214 on 17 September at Cat Lo. Thus, by the end of September 49 logistics craft and 575 operational craft had been turned over, with 102 logistics and 225 operational craft remaining to be transferred.
Training proceeded as usual for the month. September outputs were:

138 graduated from basic E/E School at NTC, Nha Trang, 5 September;
24 graduated from EM "A" School, Nha Trang, 5 September;
109 graduated from EN "A" School, Nha Trang, 26 September;
134 graduated from Saigon Maintenance School, 19 September;
59 VNN Officer Candidates graduated from OCS, Newport, R. I.,
23 September.

The Food Supplement Program continued its normal cycle of procreation and consumption for the month, with 101 projects operated by 74 VNN units at 42 bases; 44 of these 101 are in the expansion stage. There is a total livestock population of 42,000 chickens, 240 swine, 500 ducks, 149 rabbits, and 3 goats.

As of 14 September 1800 dependent shelters had been completed, and an additional 1100 were under construction. Work was proceeding at a rate of 140 shelters per week, which would come close to the goal of 2500 complete by 30 September 1970. It is anticipated that the great cutback in USN construction personnel over the next few months will have a severe effect on the shelter program; There are 22,000 dependent shelters programmed for the VNN and VNMC, and it is estimated that USN funds and personnel strength are sufficient
to construct only about 5,000 of these. Thus, VNN participation in the building will be the single most important determinant of its ultimate success, and it remains to be seen just how extensive this participation will be.
NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY, SAIGON

Action involving Naval Support Activity, Saigon, units and detachments was very light in September. The Logistics Support Base at Dong Tam received two 120 mm mortar rounds in the early morning hours of 28 September and one more round that same night. There were no personnel or material casualties. The Advance Tactical Support Base at Moc Hoa was not as fortunate. At almost the same time that the LSB at Dong Tam was going to Red Alert because of the two mortar rounds, the ATSB at Moc Hoa was hit by a B-40 rocket. The rocket detonated in the berthing quarters of the ATSB ammi, wounding SN Wayne Brant and BMC Joseph Zagar. SN Brant was treated and released while BMC Zagar was transferred to the 94th Evacuation Hospital for further treatment.

On 2 September, the Naval Support Activity, Saigon received the Navy Unit Commendation in ceremonies at the Logistics Support Base at Nha Be. Vice Admiral Jerome H. King, Jr., COMNAVFORV, presented the award to RADM Robert E. Adamson, Jr., COMNAV-SUPPACT, Saigon, and to ENCS Paul B. Bostic, the senior enlisted man at LSB, Nha Be.
On 26 September, USS SATYR (ARL 23), a venerable veteran of both Vietnam and Cambodian naval action, departed Vietnamese waters for a well earned restricted availability period in Japan. This unit had served as a major asset in various TRÁN HÙNG DẢO campaigns.
PAVING THE WAY - Equipment Operator Third Class Phillip C. Bebber (right) of Healdsburg, Calif., clears land for Vietnamese Navy dependent shelters at Nha Trang. He is assisted by Engineering Aid Third Class Thomas W. Olson of Minneapolis, Minn. Both men are assigned to Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit 302 which is building the homes throughout the Republic of Vietnam as part of Operation Helping Hand.
THIRD NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BATTALION

As in previous months, the most significant tactical incidents involving Seabees took place on Routes LTL-4 and QL-1D in the southern portion of the First Military Region. The Seabees in this area continued to be hindered in their construction efforts by a series of minings which injured six U.S. Navymen during the month.

One major construction highlight of the month was the completion of the Quang Tri highway bridge on Route QL-1. This 901-foot two lane bridge was dedicated, turned over, and opened to traffic on 4 September. Also completed during the month were the upgrade of the Tra Bong airfield, the paving of Route QL-1 South, and the ACTOV base at Thuan An. Nearing completion are the ATSBs at Phuoc Trach and Nam Can, the ACTOV bases at Ha Tien, Chau Doc, and Kien An, and the dependent housing project at Ha Tien.

The usual contingent of visiting dignitaries paid calls on the men of SOLID ANCHOR in late August and September. On 31 August, a star-studded party including LT General Weyand, prospective DEPCOMUSMACV, Maj. General McCown, CG DMAC, Rear Admiral Matthews, DEPCOMNAVFORV, and Maj. General Truong, CG Main Reg. IV Corps visited SOLID ANCHOR. On 7 September, Vice Admiral King, COMNAVFORV, Rear Admiral Chon, VNN CNO, and Rear Admiral Marshall, CEC, COMTHIRDNCB visited.
Seabee units NMCB TEN and CBMU 301 completed their deployments in Vietnam during the month of September and were redeployed to CONUS.

The remaining Naval Construction forces have a total projected backlog in the First Military Region amounting to seven weeks of horizontal and 18 weeks of vertical work. In the Third and Fourth Military Regions the projected backlog for present Seabee asset is 26 weeks of horizontal and 51 weeks of vertical work.

There were a total of 1,733 Seabees (62 officers, 1,671 enlisted) in the Republic of Vietnam at month's end. Seabees received six purple Heart Awards during the month.
APPENDIX I

Glossary of Abbreviations

The following abbreviations and terms are commonly used in the combat zone by all agencies and are listed here in amplification of those used in the text:

**ABF** Attack by fire

**AMMI PONTOON** A multi-purpose barge, standard size is 28' X 90'

**AO** Area of operations

**ARVN** Army of the Republic of Vietnam

**ASPB** Assault Support Patrol Boat

**ATC** Armored Troop Carrier

**ATSB** Advance Tactical Support Base

**A/W** Automatic weapons

**BLACK PONY/BRONCO** OV-10 Twin Engine Turboprop Counterinsurgency Aircraft

**CCB** Command and Communications Boat

**CG** Coastal Group

**CHICOM** Chinese Communist

**CIDG** Civilian Irregular Defense Group - mercenaries of Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian descent who fight primarily around their own villages

**CMD** Capital Military District

**CONUS** Continental United States
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CRIP</td>
<td>Civilian Reconnaissance Intelligence Platoon</td>
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<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>Coastal Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>DUSTOFF</td>
<td>Medical evacuation by helo</td>
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<td>ENIFF</td>
<td>Enemy-initiated firefight</td>
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<td>FSB</td>
<td>Fire Support Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>FWMAF</td>
<td>Free World Military Assistance Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDA</td>
<td>Gun Damage Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>GVN</td>
<td>Government of Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>HAFT</td>
<td>Helicopter Attack Fire Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H&amp;I</td>
<td>Harassment and Interdiction Fire Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JGS</td>
<td>Joint General Staff (Vietnamese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIT CARSON SCOUTS</td>
<td>Former Viet Cong who have come over to the side of the Saigon government and serve with allied military units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAFT</td>
<td>Light Attack Fire Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAW</td>
<td>Light Anti-tank Weapon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCPL</td>
<td>Landing Craft, Personnel, Large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDNN</td>
<td>Vietnamese equivalent of USN Underwater Demolition Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LHFT</td>
<td>Light Helo Fire Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOH</td>
<td>OH-6 Light Observation Helicopter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRRP</td>
<td>Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol</td>
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<tr>
<td>MACV</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>MATSB</td>
<td>Mobile Advance Tactical Support Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEDCAP</td>
<td>Medical Civic Action Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONITOR</td>
<td>Heavily armored LCM-6 (40 mm cannon or 105 mm Howitzer)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MR</td>
<td>Military Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRF</td>
<td>Mobile Riverine Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSB</td>
<td>Minesweeper, Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSD</td>
<td>Minesweeper, Drone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Mobile Strike Force - mercenaries who deploy and go anywhere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGFS</td>
<td>Naval Gunfire Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NILO</td>
<td>Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIOTC</td>
<td>Naval Inshore Operations Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOD</td>
<td>Night Observation Device</td>
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<tr>
<td>NVA</td>
<td>North Vietnamese Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>OJT</td>
<td>On-the-job Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBR</td>
<td>Patrol Boat, River</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCF</td>
<td>Patrol Craft, Fast (Swift Boat)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRU</td>
<td>Provincial Reconnaissance Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSA</td>
<td>Province Sector Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSYOPS</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAD</td>
<td>River Assault Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAG</td>
<td>River Assault Group (VNN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAID</td>
<td>River Assault and Interdiction Division (VNN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAS</td>
<td>River Assault Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>RF/PF</td>
<td>Regional Forces/Popular Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPD</td>
<td>River Patrol Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPG</td>
<td>Rocket Propelled Grenade or River Patrol Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSSZ</td>
<td>Rung Sat Special Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RVNAF</td>
<td>Republic of Vietnam Air Force (or Armed Forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>Search and Rescue</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEAWOLF</td>
<td>UH-1B Helo, heavily armed, USN operated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHADOW</td>
<td>C-119 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKIMMER</td>
<td>20-foot fiberglass motorboat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLICK</td>
<td>UH-1B Helo, USA operated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPOOKY</td>
<td>C-47 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSB</td>
<td>Swimmer Support Boat (Skimmer)</td>
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<tr>
<td>STAB</td>
<td>Strike Assault Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAOR</td>
<td>Tactical Area of Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USARV</td>
<td>United States Army, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNMC</td>
<td>Vietnamese Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNN</td>
<td>Vietnamese Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIPPO</td>
<td>Flame thrower equipped ATC or Monitor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAP</td>
<td>Rocket Assisted Projectile</td>
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