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Monthly Historical Summary

NOVEMBER 1970

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COMMANDER
U.S. NAVAL FORCES
VIETNAM

MONTHLY HISTORICAL SUMMARY

November 1970

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FOREWARD

The level of enemy-initiated activity remained low throughout the country during the month. In the First Military Region friendly and enemy forces alike were still recovering from October's inclement weather.

November will nevertheless remain an important month in the annals of the Navy's Vietnamese effort. For the first time since the 1968 Tet Offensive, a North Vietnamese trawler was challenged and sunk. After an extended period of covert tracking, U. S. Naval and Coast Guard ships finally sank the trawler after she had entered the 12-mile limit on 22 November at 0006H.

Another significant coup occurred on 22 November when a group of SEALs accompanied by PF troops, assaulted an enemy POW camp near Nam Can in the Cau Mau Peninsula and freed 19 South Vietnamese prisoners.

U. S. Navy and Coast Guard in-country strength continued to decline in November. As of 26 November, there were 17,389 Naval and Coast Guard personnel in South Vietnam, a reduction of about 500 men over the course of the month.
### CURRENT OPERATIONS
(As of 31 November 1970)

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*Not Yet Turned Over*
OPERATION SOLID ANCHOR

Solid Anchor units scored a smashing victory against the enemy on 22 November. While newspapers around the world were telling of the unsuccessful attempt to liberate U.S. POWs in the Sơn Tây prison camp in North Vietnam, 10 SEALs of WHISKEY Platoon of SEAL Team One, Detachment GOLF led by LT Couch, along with 19 PF troops, were doing some liberating of their own. In an area 15 kilometers east-southeast of New Nam Can (VQ 880632), the SEALs and PFs freed 19 South Vietnamese POWs after carrying on a running fire fight with 18 VC guards. The aggressiveness of the SEALs and PFs was clearly exhibited in this team operation. Two VC were also captured along with numerous documents in the raid. Worthy of note is the fact that this was the first in-country operation for WHISKEY Platoon and its supporting unit, MST Det Charlie.

Rocket ambushes and mining attempts continued to plague the waterborne units assigned to Solid Anchor, but the frequency of the attacks dropped off sharply in November. There were three rocket ambushes which resulted in minor damage to LSSL-230 and PCF 3919 and two mining incidents which caused moderate damage to A-5164 and minor damage to A-5165 and T-1272. Nine VNN personnel and one U.S. Navy advisor were wounded in these attacks, but fortunately their wounds were minor.
Heavy weather in the South China Sea accounted for the only major losses to Solid Anchor Units during the month. Six VNN PCFs transiting from Solid Anchor to Cat Lo on 2 November were buffeted by extremely high seas caused by a tropical storm Nora. PCF 3907 swamped and sank (XR 645160) and ten hours later PCF 3904 met the same fate. Both crews were rescued without loss of life and the remaining swifts arrived at a safe haven off Coastal Group 36 at Long Phu.

A search and rescue mission for these PCFs, and also for a VNN PGM, a VNN WPB, and three USN PCFs, was coordinated by CTF 115. With the exception of two Solid Anchor PCFs, all units reached safety.

In a command shift on 1 November, CAPT E. I. Finke, USN, formerly the Senior Naval Advisor to the Vietnamese Navy, assumed the position of CTG 116. CAPT Vuong Huu Thieu, VNN, became his Deputy Task Group Commander and Chief Staff Officer.

The 6th VNMC Battalion departed the Solid Anchor area of operations on 4 November. This battalion was responsible for 61 enemy KIA and 10 captured as well as the capture of a large number of weapons and supplies in the two months it spent at Solid Anchor AO. The 6th VNMC Battalion was relieved by the 7th VNMC Battalion which acquitted itself well in November. The Marines killed 13 of the enemy and captured three more. They also took part in a two day operation

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in conjunction with VNN river craft, a first in the Solid Anchor VNMC operations.

The nomenclature of the two hamlets adjoining the Solid Anchor complex underwent another change in November. Although the hamlets have been referred to as Ham Rong I and II by Navy sources in the past, their names within the GVN structure are listed as Ham Rong (Ham Rong I) and Thi Tran (Ham Rong III). The GVN nomenclature will henceforth be used.

Although their nomenclature was changed, the problems of the hamlets remained basically the same in November—adequate defense against the enemy. The PF outpost under construction at Thi Tran was hit by two B-40 rockets on 4 November (no damage) and an RF outpost on the Kinh Ngang Canal eight kilometers from Solid Anchor (WQ 019743) received 20 rounds of 81mm mortar fire on 30 November, killing one RF and wounding ten others.

The distribution of the 59 M-1 carbines received by CTG 116.1 in October to PSDF personnel in Ham Rong and Thi Tran was delayed until a PSDF recruiting drive in these hamlets is completed. CTG 116.1 is retaining the carbines until the Nam Can District senior advisor requires them for the new PSDF troops.

VADM J. H. King, Jr., COMNAVFORV, RADM Tran Van Chon, CNO, VNN, and BGEN Nguyen Huu Hanh, Dep CG IV Corps were
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on hand for the dedication ceremonies of the Solid Anchor air strip
on 26 November.
At the beginning of November, CTG 116.2 was faced with reconstructing his totally destroyed Advanced Tactical Support Base at the mouth of the Song Ong Doc River. A large scale enemy attack on 22 October had driven away the allies and razed the floating base, but within a week, COMNAVFORV issued orders to rebuild it at its original location. During the reconstruction period, the Breezy Cove Naval Operations Center was located on the USS GARRETT COUNTY (AGP786), anchored off-shore. The PBRs and River Assault Craft returned to the ATSB for staging.

During the first week of November, these initial plans were modified by COMNAVFORV. The new projected plan provided for relocation of the main Breezy Cove base to Ca Mau with an advanced staging base situated at Song Ong Doc, 15 kilometers from the river's mouth. Deputy COMNAVFORV delineated the following advantages of this relocation.

(a) The capability to cover Song Ong Doc from Ca Mau to the Gulf of Thailand. Advanced staging from Old Song Ong Doc would provide continued allied presence in the western portion of the AO and hence preclude adverse psychological effects on the civilian inhabitants of the Song Ong Doc District.
(b) The tactical versatility of concentrating forces in either the eastern or western portion of the AO., depending on the threat.

(c) Enhanced base defense posture at both bases.

(d) Improved communication capability from the Gulf of Thailand through Old Song Ong Doc to the new base at Ca Mau.

(e) Closer and improved liaison with the district chief of Old Song Ong Doc and the Ca Mau Province chief for combined operations.

(f) Improved overland logistics capability from LSB Binh Thuy to Ca Mau.

The advanced base at Old Song Ong Doc was to be a simple, floating complex, similar to the original one at the river's mouth. Two ammis were towed under escort from Solid Anchor as were the undamaged ammis from the original ATSB.

The entire relocation was completed by 25 November and the Breezy Cove logistics and gunfire support ships were released from duty. The construction of the new operations center at Ca Mau involved a much longer process, not scheduled for completion until March, 1971. In the meantime, the province chief offered the Navy
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temporary use of the PRU camp located three kilometers northwest of Ca Mau on the Song Tac Thu. Because of this shift, the turnover of Operation Breezy Cove to the Vietnamese Navy, originally scheduled for 1 December, was postponed. While there were a few scattered incidents, the enemy did not attack in force during this period of instability. The new NILO at Song Ong Doc reported that Communist concentration in the area remained high and seemed to be increasing. Navy OV-10 aircraft and Seawolves operating in the area reported extensive troop movement, and bunker construction near the old ATSB. At mid-month a reliable local Vietnamese informer stated that the Viet Cong planned to attack the Song Ong Doc base on 25 November with an even larger force than before. The man claimed that one group of the enemy was going to attack from fishing junks returning from sea while a second element would move through the village to prevent the shore based allies from reaching their boats. This assault never materialized. The only direct enemy activity involving the defenders of the ATSB was sniper fire on 19 November which wounded BM3 Eugene J. Jones, who was standing a perimeter watch.

Because of the heavy enemy threat in the Song Ong Doc District, the CNO of the Vietnamese Navy ordered River Interdiction Division 43,
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heretofore attached to Tran Hung Dao II to the mouth of the Song Ong Doc River to protect base reconstruction efforts. It was estimated that these boats would reinforce TG 116.2 for a period of six weeks. On 20 November, RID 43 relieved River Assault Squadron 15, which proceeded to Dong Tam for standdown and eventual turnover to the VNN.

Base security around the destroyed ATSB remained a problem pending relocation because of the paucity of ground troops. CTG 116.2 depending almost entirely on Dufflebag sensors, requested that a company of Vietnamese Marines be sent to Song Ong Doc, but was denied. On 17 November, however, a battalion of the 32nd ARVN Regiment arrived to protect the area. The unit's four 105 mm howitzers supplied vital striking power for the immediate vicinity.

The only major action involving Breezy Cove river boats in November occurred on the 20th of the month when two PBRs received B-40 rockets, five kilometers east of the Song Ong Doc ATSB (VR 846 002). The lead boat escaped without mishap, but the cover boat caught fire and exploded before sinking. The crew, including two wounded VNN sailors and a slightly injured USN advisor, ADR1 C. R. Benson, were quickly rescued by Zippo-3. Two days later Explosive Ordnance Disposal divers recovered all serviceable weapons and blew up the sunken PBR.

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While the riverine units of Operation Breezy Cove enjoyed a rather peaceful month, U. S. Navy SEALs were highly active in their efforts to neutralize members of the Viet Cong infrastructure in the Song Ong Doc area. On the evening of 5 November, seven SEALs of Detachment ALFA, 9th Platoon, led by a Kit Carson Scout and a local informer, captured two VC four kilometers south of Ca Mau (WR 182108). Upon returning to their base camp, the SEALs persuaded their captives to divulge the whereabouts of their village cadre leader. Within three hours, the commando squad had captured him as well.

LT Moran's 9th Platoon captured three more VC just two days later. A pair of Hoi Chanhs led the SEALs to a small village 15 kilometers southeast of Ca Mau (WR 238040) on the night of 7 November. They immediately entered the suspects' hootch and captured three men, two of which were hamlet level guerrillas and the other a village level VC. When the SEALs began to withdraw, they received continuous sniper fire and as they were scrambling into the extraction helicopter, EMI John S. Fallow was wounded slightly in the leg.

Another USN sailor became the victim of the swift currents of the Delta waterways in November. EN3 Bruce C. Hunt, a crewmember of ATC-2 of RIVDIV 152 drowned near the ATSB.
Song Ong Doc on the third day of the month. It was believed that he fell from the nest of RACs while carrying a seabag and was swept under one of the ATCs. Hunt had been proceeding to the helicopter pad for a flight to Binh Thuy, and his disappearance was not suspected until his body was discovered the following day.

Evidence of skillful joining of allied communications in the Ca Mau Peninsula presented itself again during November. On the afternoon of 6 November, the USS HUNTERDON COUNTY (LST-823) launched an LCVP to investigate two contacts six kilometers off shore from the north of the Song Ong Doc River (VQ 743974). Both craft were sampans, one occupied by two men with fishing gear and the other by six men, resting at anchor. When the LCVP boat captain tried to contact the HUNTERDON COUNTY for instructions, his broadcast was blocked by loud Vietnamese music. The jammed frequency was the standard one used by the USS GARETT COUNTY, the USCGC YAKUTAT, and the USS HUNTERDON COUNTY for communication with their LCVP craft. According to the Song Ong Doc NILO, the timing of the jamming indicated that the jamming station was either aboard one of these two sampans or in contact with their crews. Neither of the sampans was boarded or inspected, according to the Commanding Officer of the HUNTERDON COUNTY, because
they did not appear to be a threat and because of lack of boarding
and search experience on the part of the crew.

A SEA LORDS helicopter was ditched in the Gulf of Thailand on
26 November when it ran out of gas attempting to reach the USS
GARRETT COUNTY (AG-786) off the coast near Song Ong Doc.
The crew was rescued and for the next three days, high winds and
seas prevented salvage divers from reaching the sunken helo, and
when they were able to dive, they could not find it.

On the day after the helicopter loss, LCM-6, after battering
against a YFU alongside the GARRETT COUNTY, in heavy seas,
sank in 24 feet of water. On 28 November, a PBR broke loose
from its moorings at the GARRETT COUNTY and sank in heavy
seas before it could be recovered. In both cases, the suddenness
of high winds was cited as the reason for failure to take sufficient
preventative action. COMNAVFORV, however, concerned with
this triple loss in three days, ordered an investigation of the
GARRETT COUNTY's boat and helicopter control procedures and
adequacy and timeliness of weather forecasts.
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Operation BLUE SHARK

The highly successful Operation BLUE SHARK closed out its assignment on 15 November. BLUE SHARK, which was mounted following the disestablishment of the MARKET TIME Raider Program in May of this year, went out as it had come in - in style. The success of the operation is attested to by a message from COMNAVFORV to CTG 116.5 (Commander, BLUE SHARK) which stated that:

"Along the coastline from the southern border of the Rung Sat Special Zone to Vinh Chau District, and up the Bassac and Hau Giang Rivers you kept the enemy off balance and on the defensive with your board and search operations, inshore surveillance, river patrols, SEAL insertions and attacks on enemy base camps and supply points. Yours was a difficult operating area, with heavy foliage, shallow and often uncharted waterways and shifting sand bars, but you covered it well. "

In one of the last BLUE SHARK missions, PCFs 45, 87, 93 and 692 lifted a KCS/SEAL team to the Thanh Phu Secret Zone (vicinity XR 802952) on 12 November. As the Swifts entered the northern mouth of the Eo Lon Canal 26 miles south-southeast of Ben Tre, they received two B-40 rockets and small arms fire. The enemy fire was suppressed, and the SEALs and KCS inserted to conduct a pincer sweep. Black Ponies provided covering strikes during the sweep. Two VC were killed and an enemy arms cache consisting of over two tons of arms and equipment was discovered during the 1. COMNAVFORV MSG of 151556Z Nov '70

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sweep. The cache, containing 15,000 AK-47 rounds, nine turtle
shell land mines, 30 60 mm mortar rounds, ten 100 mm rockets,
10 claymore mines, 100 40 mm grenades, 200 cluster bombs,
4,000 rounds of Russian carbine ammo, and other assorted ordnance,
was destroyed by the SEALs.

After extraction, PCF 87 was ambushed while proceeding out of
the Eo Lon Canal. One B-40 hit the after conning station, killing two
KCS and wounding two U.S. sailors (EN2 Richard Paul Shade and
GMGSA John William Oberster), another KCS, and one VNN crew-
member.
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TASK FLEET 21

November was an extremely hectic month for the Task Fleet 21 operation in the Mekong Delta. There was evidence of further enemy infiltration into the Fourth Military Region, culminating in several attacks on the recently established Kien An base in the Tran Hung Dao VI operating area. During the month, the headquarters of Operations Breezy Cove and Tran Hung Dao I were relocated, and preparations were made for the massive combined sweep through the U Minh Forest, a long time Communist stronghold.

An agreement between the CNO, VNN and COMNAVFORV delayed a major step in the Navy's ACTOV program. Early in 1970, these two leaders had projected that the VNN Vice Chief of Naval Operations would relieve the First SEA LORDS (Deputy COMNAVFORV) in his role as Deputy Commander, Tran Hung Dao Operations in December 1970. In November, Vice Admiral King and Rear Admiral Chon agreed to defer this change until at least March of 1971.

Deputy COMNAVFORV reiterated his earlier statements on the necessity of gaining proper clearance before placing air strikes on a target. Stating that the two most difficult problems faced by the Seawolves were target identification and validation and obtaining of proper clearance to fire, he called for emphasis on accurate
communication from pilots to NOCs to eliminate ambiguity. The efforts to closely control air strikes and to eliminate indiscriminate firing resulted from unfortunate attacks on civilian homes and personnel in previous months.

COMNAVFOR's "Quality Search" program was further developed in November. Henceforth a casual perusal of cargo and identification papers was to be referred to as a "visual inspection". An actual "search" was to conform with the following detailed procedures:

(1) Structural

(a) Inspect gunwales for documents jammed between boards.

(b) Look for double transverse members and double bottoms.

(c) Check underside of all horizontal surfaces for documents and packages.

(d) Inspect mud in boat bottom and mud caulking for imbedded documents.

(e) Check underside of rubber fenders on bow and stern for documents.

(f) Check thatched roofs for new weaving which could possibly conceal documents.
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(g) Drag a line under the boat, keekhaul fashion, to check for underwater appendages.

(2) Cargo

(a) Probe fish, sand, and rice for weapons, etc.
(b) Check all paper for invisible ink.
(c) Check newspapers and magazines for implanted documents.
(d) Use magnetic probe, if possible, for concealed metallic objects.

(3) Passengers

(a) Hold conical hats to sunlight to detect woven-in-messages.
(b) Inspect personal belongings and clothing.
(c) Check ID cards and manifest.
(d) Conduct personnel search if other discrepancies warrant it.

In addition, Deputy COMNAVFORV warned commanders that enemy efforts would probably be aimed at disrupting vital lines of communications and transportation to discredit government pacification efforts in the Fourth Military Region. It was recommended that maximum security be maintained against sappers on all key bridges, ferry sites, roads, and waterways.
Naval units received a newly perfected weapon, the remote firing device (RFD) during November. The RFD consists of a firing device (receiver) and a firing device control (transmitter) and is used to initiate demolition charges from a distant position by a secure radio link. The device can be used for base defense and as a quick reaction to sensor activations.
Despite reports of continued communist infiltration across the Vinh Te Canal, Vietnamese naval assets and their American advisors made only sporadic contact with the enemy during the month of November. Because of limited ground activity, CTG 212.4 reported no allied casualties for the month. Navy Seawolf pilots of HAL-3, Detachment 5, (Chau Doc) and Detachment ? (YRBM 21) were most active as their quick reaction provided the best deterrent against covert nocturnal movement by the enemy.

The completion of the Chau Doc Operating Base was the major non-combatant accomplishment of CTG 212.4 during November. By the end of the month, River Patrol Division 55, River Interdiction Division 41, and CTG 212.4 were relocated at the new base which is scheduled to be formally commissioned in December.

Carelessness by a Vietnamese sailor resulted in the death of a young girl in Ap Con Ca village (VS 655632) near Vinh Gia on 24 November. CTG 212.4 reported that a crewmember of PBR 5159 accidently fired an M-79 round or rounds into a hootch, killing one girl and wounding two others. An American advisor, Signalman Chief Young, entered the hootch, found the girls in a bed, and took them, along with their mother to Vinh Gia. The two injured girls were medevaced to Binh Thuy.
A subdued atmosphere prevailed in the Tran Hung Dao II AO, throughout November, though in spite of this, two PBRs were sunk and sporadic shellings kept the Moc Hoa Base on the alert. There were one friendly and ten enemy-initiated firefights during the month, resulting in five enemy killed and 12 of the friendly forces wounded (three USN, nine VNN), none seriously.

On 5 November at 0035H about six B-40 rounds impacted 100-300 meters east of the Moc Hoa ATSB. Soon thereafter the local RF Company reported contact at XS 033915, and Black Ponies were sent to the scene. Contact ceased at 0105H with unknown enemy casualties and one RF wounded.

The enemy assailants were more effective on 17 November when at 2309H three more rockets streaked into the base, one of which passed through the hull of PBR 6863 about four feet aft of the bow; the boat sank alongside the ammi. VNN sailors riddled the opposite bank for ten minutes in response, and once again silence prevailed by 0015H. One USN and three VNN were slightly wounded in the engagement. Local attempts to salvage the PBR, the bow section of which was severed, failed, and a Harbor Clearance Unit representative was dispatched to the scene by COMNAVFORV on
22 November to assess the damage. Salvage had not been effected by the end of the month.

A third barrage occurred on 21 November at 0130 H, this time consisting of 20-25 rounds, which landed inside the town rather than at the base. There were no naval casualties.

A second PBR was rendered inoperative when during the late night hours of the 18th, it sank to the gunwales while tied up alongside the ammi at Moc Hoa. The boat had taken on water the night of 17 November, and a watch was set the next night to ensure that the boat was properly pumped out. The VNN sentry was apparently negligent. The boat was refloated at 0247H and taken under tow to Ben Luc the next morning at 0800H.

The friendly forces did not maintain an entirely defensive posture throughout the month, however. At 2036H on 1 November, PBRs 7556 and 7559 observed one sampan while in WBGP eight kilometers from Ben Luc (XS 555810). The units opened fire and sank the sampan, then called in a Black Pony strike. One of the sampan's occupants was confirmed dead, the other two assumed dead.

Four more of the enemy were killed on 12 November at 2330 by Seawolves 40 and 46 six kilometers from Bao Trai (XT 553101).

The presence of a sapper company in the Tra Cu area was indicated when on 24 November 4 RID 44 unit discovered a large
mine constructed from a 500 pound bomb on the bank of the Vam Co Dong at \( \text{L.T} 415125 \). The NILO at Tra Cu surmised that the responsible group might be the 50-man 12th VC MF Sapper Battalion. A second instance of sapper activity occurred at 0430H on 30 November when a large floating charge was detonated by an RF sentry only four meters from the Go Dau Ha Bridge pilings.

Although overt harassment by the enemy has lessened considerably during the last few months, possibly due to supply and logistics problems, his presence continues to be felt throughout the area. On the morning of 21 November, units of RPD 53 found a string of five VC paper flags on floats made of nip palm stalks at about XS 8956 on the Vam Co Dong. The RPD crewmembers picked up the flags, but later in the morning other friendly units discovered similar creations in about the same area, leading them to suspect that the woodcutters in the area, all of whose identification papers were in order, were launching the provocative pennants as soon as GVN forces were out of sight. The NILO at Tra Cu suggested that such acts "stressed the enemy belief that clandestine tactics (in order to secure a better posture on the political front) are the most effective means of continuing the struggle against the GVN until more outright military actions become feasible." ¹ Whether the enemy is voluntarily

1. NILO Tra Cu MSG 261950 November '70.
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decreasing his outright assaults or whether he has been pressed into such a posture by a dearth of supplies and manpower can perhaps only be judged in the months ahead.
Enemy aggressiveness in the Tran Hung Dao V AO during November seemed heavy only in comparison to Communist inactivity of the previous few months. CTG 216.1 reported only five firefights for the month, but three resulted in friendly personnel and material casualties. The Vietnamese commander claimed ten enemy casualties from these encounters.

The first significant action involved two PBRs, ambushed on the upper Saigon River, 37 kilometers northwest of Phu Cuong (XT 543349) on 9 November. The lead boat sustained minor damage when it received two B-40 rocket hits. Two additional PBRs scrambled to the area and immediately received intense machine gun fire. One Vietnamese sailor was slightly wounded by shrapnel when a B-40 rocket detonated in the water five feet from his boat. The allies returned fire, but never even caught a glimpse of the enemy.

Four more PBRs were ambushed with recoilless rifle, B-40 rocket, and automatic weapons fire in this same area (XT 537367) three days later. Two VNN sailors and a U. S. advisor sustained
Minor wounds in the brief skirmish on 12 November. One boat had four engines destroyed and had to be towed from the contact area.

A skillfully aimed E-40 rocket caused the grounding of a PBR on 24 November on the upper Saigon River (XT 544350). As four boats were proceeding south to extract an ARVN ambush team at Fire Support Base Tennessee, a B-40 rocket struck the second one. The explosion knocked the coxswain off his feet but he was not injured. Running uncontrolled, the PBR grounded at full speed on a rock and mud bank, cracking the hull. After the fire was suppressed, the damaged boat was towed to Phu Cuong.

Communications security remained a vital objective of all combined Naval forces and for good reason. The senior advisor for River Patrol Division 52 of operation Tran Hung Dao V reported extensive enemy jamming and intrusion during November. This ranged from moderate jamming in which a buzzing or keying noise was broadcast over the net to actual voice deception. This interference appeared on both VNN and USN nets of boats in waterborne guardposts along the upper Saigon River. Voice intrusions in Vietnamese have included obscenities directed at the boats' crews, anti-government propaganda and threats of immediate attack.
When Lieutenant Commander Brown, USN, relinquished the command of Operation of Tran Hung Dao VI to Lieutenant Commander Gluu, VNN, on 6 November, the AO of CTG 212.5 was continuously threatened. Intelligence sources had been indicating an enemy buildup for the past several months, and the Viet Cong had made known their intention to overrun and destroy the newly established Advanced Tactical Support Base at Kien An. During the month there were 16 firefights, and the allies sustained 44 casualties, two of these resulting in death. CTG 212.5 claimed nine enemy kills.

The guerrillas made good their threat to attack the Kien An's operating base by lobbing 20 rounds of 81mm mortar fire in the small perimeter, on the night of 12 November. Four rounds landed directly on two Vietnamese BEQs, housing the crews of RAID 70 and 71, wounding 16 sailors. One Regional Force soldier was wounded by a round impacting outside of the base. A tower guard saw mortar flashes at an estimated 800 meters west of the base, and Seawolves from Rach Soi and Black Ponies from Bin Thuy placed air strikes on the suspected enemy position. Two PBRs of River Patrol Division 58 broke from their nearby waterborne guardposts to make firing runs on the east bank. No return fire was received and it
was not known whether the enemy sustained any casualties in the attack. Two days later, the allies received an unconfirmed report attributed to a VNN officer of RAID 70, that the Viet Cong had entered the village of Kien An and told the local population that they intended to wipe out the Navy base within the next few days. The anticipated attack did not occur until over two weeks later. In the early morning hours of 29 November, the Viet Cong fired 20 rounds from 82 and 120 mm mortars and inflicted moderate to heavy casualties. Seawolves and OV-10 aircraft struck at suspected mortar sites and reported three secondary explosions. Nine Americans were medavaced with serious wounds while eight were slightly wounded. One American, EN2 Robert E. Young, later died of wounds received from a direct 120 mm mortar hit. Of the ten injured Vietnamese, only four were evacuated for treatment. A Vietnamese barracks took another direct hit, as did a large outer building and a section of the pontoon pier. The base personnel, who had been sleeping in bunkers for most of the month, once again retreated underground.
Operation TRAN HUNG DAO VIII

TRAN HUNG DAO VIII units kept up their relentless pursuit of the enemy even though most operations produced minor results. However, enemy units, not to be intimidated, continued to display their cunning tactics, ending the month by shelling the My Tho Navy Base. Activity during the second half of the month more than compensated for the lag during the first two weeks.

The My Tho Province Sapper Company was reported on 9 November to have the mission of destroying all GVN boats on the Kinh Xang Canal from Long Dinh Bridge (XS 380 495) to Ca Giam (XS 353 495). The sapper unit was reported to be armed with three U/I water mines and assorted individual weapons. This was the first report concerning an area north of the Long Dinh Bridge. Numerous enemy bunkers had been sighted along both canal banks from XS 370 520 to XS 353 553, and the area mentioned had also been the sight of three boat ambushes in the past.

On 16 November, a Seawolf of Hal-3, Det 7, in Dinh Tuong Province, Sam Giang District (XS 368 448), six kilometers west of Dong Tam crashed on takeoff while on scramble for ARVN units. AN T. L. Mize suffered bruises on his left thorax and pelvis. The aircraft was lifted out of the rice paddy by Chinook to Vinh Long on 17 November at 1430H.
On 21 November at 0520H, RPD 54 units on routine patrol received small arms fire from the west bank of the Kinh Xang Canal, (XS 399 455), three kilometers northwest of Dong Tam. PBR 7565 was sunk after receiving one B-40 rocket round. After suppressing the enemy fire, PBR 7565 was floated and towed to My Tho.

At 2050H on 26 November, two 82 mm mortar rounds were fired at the Vietnamese Navy Base at My Tho (XS 498 445). The rounds were apparently launched from the south side of the My Tho River. One round impacted on the base, inflicting minor wounds to four VNN sailors. The second round fell into the My Tho River. This is the first attack on the base in over a year, although previous to this, the provincial capital of My Tho was struck twice in November alone. Or. 9 November, My Tho received three rounds of 82 mm mortar fire at XS 450 which resulted in five civilians wounded, and again on 14 November, three rounds of 82 mm were received at XS 494 450 wounding three civilians.

An evaluation of the shelling of the My Tho Naval Base indicated a change in tactics used by the enemy. This could have been a rehearsal for future attacks as indicated by the small number of rounds received. Intelligence sources have indicated that the enemy forces must launch an offensive phase of some kind in order to put sector forces back on the defensive and get them out of the field.
where they have been most effective in producing a high rate of enemy casualties. Future enemy tactics are likely to consist of indirect fire attacks against district towns, acts of terrorism, harassment, and attempts to interdict major lines of communication.
Throughout November, naval units of Tran Hung Dao IX experienced the same low level of hostile activity which had characterized the preceding several months. As the flood levels dropped in the area of operation, waterborne infiltration became increasingly difficult for the guerrillas. While roads around Tuyen Nhon and Moc Hoa were open for the first time in several months, the slackening of the water deprived the Viet Cong of several routes to carry large numbers of men and supplies by sampan from Cambodia. Timely air and artillery response to Dufflebag sensor and anti-personnel radar activation frequently thwarted the guerrillas' travel plans. The allies reported only one riverine firefight for the entire month.

The last American units in this operation were turned over to the Vietnamese Navy on 15 November, when PBRs of River Division 535 became River Patrol Division 64. The first U. S. Navy craft had begun patrolling the rivers and canals of Operation Barrier Reef/Tran Hung Dao IX in January of 1969. These 20 PBRs were the last active assets of RIVPATFLOT FIVE.

Navy Seabees worked throughout the month to complete the shore based headquarters for CTG 212.3 at Tan Chau. During that
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period, Tran Hung Dao river boats continued to stage from YRBMs 16 and 21. The completion of the Tan Chau base gave the commander of this interdiction operation his first permanent home.

The Tan Chau NILO reported the discovery of an enemy frogman unit operating on the Mekong River along the Cambodian border. This 26 man platoon, equipped with air tanks and masks, was tasked with the mining of VNN patrol boats. A reliable informant stated that the team had been living on islands across the border since October and was probably responsible for the recent sinking of three Tango boats and one Monitor.
Operation TRAN HUNG DAO XIV

TRAN HUNG DAO XIV units continued to settle the indirect fire attacks against the district towns, acts of terrorism, swimmer-sapper attacks, and attempts to interdict major lines of communication which plagued Kien Hoa Province throughout the month.

There were numerous incidents in November: the possible attempt to strike the USS ASKARI (AKA 30) with 60 mm mortor one mile southwest of Dong Tam (X5 328 413) while she was on anchor; the mining of the Hoa Loc Bridge (X5 452 238), approximately three miles north of Mo Cay District Town on 1 November; and the shelling of the base at Dong Tam with 81 mm mortor and possible small arms fire from the northwest perimeter of the base which resulted in three U.S. Army wounded on 3 November.

Fortunately, the USS ASKARI was not struck and naval exchange which afforded more protection. But the Hoa Loc Bridge was 50 percent destroyed by what was thought to be a large charge rigged in a s qu and then floated beneath the bridge and detonated. This was the second bridge destroyed within Kien Hoa Province in one week. As a result, Ben Tre City was isolated from her supply sources along with Mo Cay District which could only be reached by air. The destruction of both of these spans seriously endangered
the GVN pacification effort and limited its ability to counter the guerrilla activity in this area. Intelligence sources have indicated that the F105X Boat Sapper Team or the 560th Battalion Sapper Team was responsible.

On 4 November, eight VNN boats of RAID 74, while exiting the Mo Cay River four miles south of Ben Tre (XS 491 244), came under fire from the south bank of the river. The ATC which was last in line observed three rounds which were identified as possible M-79. None of the boats were hit, and heavy fire from the VNN boats suppressed the enemy.

On 7 November, another bridge was mined at Huong My (XS 538 074) in Kien Hoa Province. It was suspected that enemy sappers had placed a mine on a sampan and floated it in with the tide, then command detonated it. Destruction of the bridge was estimated to be 25% with damage extending to 60%. This was the third bridge to be destroyed this month and the second to be mined. The Ba Lai Bridge has been repaired and is again in full operation while the Hoa Loc Landing to Mo Cay District Town is estimated to require at least 10-20 days more. The mining of the Huong My Bridge was an example of the enemy's effort to cut off road transportation between Huong My and Mo Cay.
On 10 November, seven SEALs, one KCS, one guide and one interpreter were transported by MSSC into an area three miles southeast of Ben Tre (XS 562 272). The SEALs proceeded down the Rach Tai Phu, turned around after several miles and came back up the canal. While proceeding back, a grenade was thrown from the east bank, struck the MSSC canopy, rolled off aft and exploded in the water. In addition, small arms fire was received from the same position and was quickly returned without attempting to establish the results.

On 12 November, two SEALs with KCSs were inserted into an area 24 miles southeast of Ben Tre (XR 796 949) to destroy an ammunition cache which had been discovered by KCS the preceding day. Items destroyed were 12 57 mm recoilless rifle rounds, two cases of cluster bombs, five 155 mm rounds, ten 105 mm rounds, 30 60 mm rounds, four cases of 30 calibre small arms ammunition, 100 50 calibre rounds, 100 20 mm rounds, five 5-kilo land mines, two 10-kilo land mines, two claymore mines, and approximately 300 pounds of unidentifiable ordnance.

On 19 November, eight SEALs and one KCS were inserted into an area five miles southeast of Long Phu (XR 316 598) by MSSC. Three VC were encountered and were taken under fire as they
attempted to escape. The SEALs received heavy automatic
weapons fire from bunkers sighted in the area by an unknown number
of VC. On extraction from the area, the SEALs requested Black
Pony support and air strikes were delivered into the area. Six huts,
seven bunkers, and one sampan were destroyed by the air strikes.
Fifteen VC were killed with four probables; there were no friendly
casualties.

In summary, intelligence agencies indicate that enemy political
indoctrination sessions have been taking place throughout the
province emphasizing military recruiting and stressing the upcoming
political struggle.
VNN Cambodian Operations

VNN craft continued to patrol the Mekong and Bassac Rivers during November between Phnom Penh and the Cambodian-Vietnamese border. There were persistent reports of enemy intentions to conduct anti-boat operations along this stretch of the Mekong which was becoming increasingly important as the enemy succeeded in cutting more and more of the land routes out of the Cambodian capital. At 2030H on 4 November, two AT4s of RAID 71 were patrolling the Mekong six miles south of Neak Luong (WT 278 353) when a floating mine detonated, sinking one of the boats and heavily damaging the other. One VNN sailor was missing, four were seriously injured, and five received minor wounds.
Rung Sat Special Zone

For the forces of the RSSZ, it was again a month of furious activity that required an enormous amount of patience and diligence. On 1 November at 0120H, personnel on a Boston Whaler assigned to pier security for the logistical base at Nha Be spotted floating vegetation and debris approximately 100 meters east of the deep water piers. The crew made a routine inspection of the debris and decided to disperse it with a concussion grenade. The result was a minor secondary explosion. No damage occurred and the incident was regarded as a possible enemy mining attempt.

On 3 November at 1920H, a reconnaissance squad from RF Company 999 was inserted by Slick 15 miles east of Nha Be (YS 191 760) and patrolled an assigned perimeter. One sampan with three persons aboard was sighted and taken under fire, probably killing three VC. The sampan was destroyed and 20 kilos of food captured. Seawolves were called and placed air strikes in the vicinity with unknown results.

Between 0900H and 1800H on 5 November, RSSZ PRUs conducted a special operation supported by Slicks, Seawolves, and Black Ponies. The PRUs were inserted by Slick aircraft into an area 11 miles northeast of Nha Be and began a sweep of the area. Two contacts were made with an unknown size VC force during the operation.
Results of the operation were no friendly casualties, eleven VC killed, and two captured. Items captured included five B-40 rocket rounds, 1000 AK-47 rounds, four claymore mines, and a large number of documents. Three hundred kilos of rice, two sampans, two anti-vehicle mines, ten kilos of TNT and five fortifications were destroyed.

From 1330H to 1815H on 6 November, RSSZ PRUs conducted a special operation in an area 11 miles northeast of Nha Be (YS 070 950). The operation was supported by Slicks and Seawolves. Immediately after insertion, the PRUs engaged a large enemy force and with effective air strikes and overhead cover suppressed the enemy fire. Seven VC were killed, and two VC were captured. Four small arms weapons, five anti-vehicle mines, and many documents were captured while three bunkers were destroyed. There were no friendly casualties.

Operation Chuong Duong 50-70 commenced at 0800H on 7 November approximately 27 kilometers northeast of the Nha Be Navy Base in the vicinity of YS 158 198. Two VNN PBRs received fire from the west bank in the vicinity of YS 182 800, but could not return the fire due to the close proximity of friendly troops. RF Company 121 made contact with an unknown number of VC which lasted intermittently.
until 1300H. RSSZ Psyops Team and BJU-1 Team 13 conducted 20
minutes of taped loudspeaker broadcast with the Chieu Hoi theme.
The results of Chuong Duong 50-70 were one friendly casualty,
nine VC killed, and one VC captured. A large amount of documents,
medical supplies, one AK-47, two wrist watches, two transistor
radios, and three kilos of fish were captured.

Based upon intelligence in Nhon Trach (YS 15 75), 22 kilometers
east of the Nha Be Navy Base, PF Platoon 018 and the Quang Xuyen
Intelligence Squad were inserted by Slicks on 10 November to
search for a possible weapons cache. At 1120H, the contingent
discovered the enemy cache in the vicinity of YS 153 756 which
included 14 CKC rifles, five-nine mm grease guns, one light machine
gun DPM Chicom type 53, and one Mauser rifle. In addition, they
destroyed 1,200 K-54 rounds, 750 AK-47 rounds, and 20 60 mm
mortar rounds.

Chuong Duong 51-70 commenced on 13 November at 0855H in the
vicinity of YS 075 535, 36 kilometers southeast of the Nha Be Navy
Base. The district operation was secured due to no contact with the
enemy. The result of the operation was six bunkers destroyed.

Chuong Duong 52-70 District Operation commenced on 17
November at 0730H in the vicinity of XS 95 68 - XS 99 68, 14 kilometers
south of the Nha Be Navy Base. On 18 November at 1530H, the operation
was secured due to no contact with the enemy.
Chuong Duong 53-70 Headquarters operation commenced on 19 November at 1600H in the vicinity of YS 14 80 - YS 21 77, 23 kilometers east of the Nha Be Navy Base. The results of the operation were one RF wounded, two bunkers and one sampan destroyed.

In one of the more tragic operations that started on 20 November at 0930H in the vicinity of YS 075 922, 16 kilometers northeast of the Nha Be Navy Base, a PRU tripped a booby trap, wounding seven personnel, four seriously, who were immediately medevaced by Slick to the 24th Evacuation Hospital in Long Binh. A sweep of the area brought them in contact with an unknown size VC force. USN LHFT placed air strikes on the enemy which resulted in 4 VC killed and one captured. Items captured were five individual weapons, four B-41 rockets, two claymore mines, two grenades, and four kilos of documents. Three base camps and four camouflaged hideouts were destroyed.

Chuong Duong 54-70 Headquarters Operation commenced on 25 November at 0800H in the vicinity of YS 175 801, 21 kilometers east of the Nha Be Navy Base. In one of the most relentless pursuits of the enemy by RSSZ units, results were finally established which reflected the tenacious struggle. On 28 November at 1400H, Chuong Duong 54-70 was concluded with one RF wounded, 50 VC killed,
one VC wounded, and two captured. Five individual weapons, three watches, two radios, three batteries, assorted electronics equipment and codes and five kilos of documents were captured. Ninety kilos of food and clothing, 30 kilos of rice, eight base camps, eleven bunkers, three sampans, 14 sleeping platforms, and 15 kilos of eating utensils were destroyed.

For the month of November, RSSZ units accounted for 87 VC killed, four probably killed, nine VC and 31 weapons captured, while suffering only one friendly killed and 13 wounded.

River Assault Division 153 departed Nha Be on 9 November and marked the end of the U.S. patrol and assault boat operations in the RSSZ. CTG 116.9 stated:

"In the 17 months that your unit was employed in the Rung Sat as part of TG 116.9, your performance served as an outstanding example of exemplary courage in combat for others to follow. During this period, your units participated in more than 75 major combined air mobile - water mobile operations in addition to the multitude of other tactical assignments to which you were tasked. The alpha boats commonly known as the dreadnoughts of the Rung Sat were vital to the success of the elimination of over 500 Viet Cong."

1. CTG 116.9 MSG DTG 090750Z Nov '70
Long Tau Shipping Channel

With the abatement of hostile activity on the Long Tau Shipping Channel, COMNAVFORV saw fit to recognize this accomplishment with the following statement to the Senior Advisor, Rung Sat Special Zone:

"I note with pleasure that the passing of September and October completed two consecutive months during which there were no attacks on shipping transiting the Long Tau Channel. An accomplishment of this nature is tangible evidence of the continuous pressure you have maintained on the enemy through extensive offensive operations, increased security, your overall professionalism and the outstanding spirit of teamwork which exists in the RSSZ. Every effort should be taken to exploit this success by maintaining continuous pressure and relentless pursuit against the enemy."  

But the lull that persisted in the past two months was suddenly broken when on 1 November at 1415H, the SS PRESIDENT COolidge, transiting north on the Long Tau Channel, came under fire from the east bank, three miles southeast of the Nha Be Navy Base. An estimated three B-41 rockets were fired at the ship, but there were no hits. Seawolves were denied clearance to place strikes on the suspected enemy positions because of close proximity of an RF outpost. An aftermath investigation revealed that some debris from the air burst settled on the fantail of the vessel.

1. COMNAVFORV MSG OF 081058 Nov '70 CONFIDENTIAL
On 28 November at 0135H, a VNN MSML, moving south on the Long Tau River, two miles north of the Nha Be Navy Base, reported an explosion 50 yards from the boat. The explosion was initially thought to be caused by a rocket, but subsequent investigation proved the explosion to have been a mine of unknown type. The merchant ship THELMA TAYLOR was at anchor off the Nha Be tank farm approximately 50 meters from the explosion but received no damage. A VNN EOD team inspected the hull of the merchant ship and found 200 meters of nylon line attached to the anchor chain and hull. The USS TUITILLA was inspected for possible mining since she was also in the immediate area.

Toward the end of the month MINEDIV 112 bid farewell to the Brown Water Navy. COMNAVFORV recognizing this effort stated:

"Your disestablishment marks another milestone of Vietnˌmization in the Brown Water Navy. I wish to express my appreciation for the fine work you have done here on the Long Tau Shipping Channel as well as on the rivers and harbors in the vicinities of Danang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, and Cam Ranh Bay. The fact that not one of the thousands of ships which streamed the Long Tau were sunk by mines during your stay significantly demonstrates the diligence and professionalism with which you plied your trade. It is always sad to see such a fine unit as yours broken up but at the same time it is reassuring evidence that the U.S. Navy's mission in Vietnam is being accomplished. I am sure that the countless merchant seamen who depended on you to clear the way join me in thanking you for an outstanding job."

2. COMNAVFORV MSG OF 270130Z Nov. '70
And this...
The six VNN RAIDs spent the entire month either under the 
OPCON of other task groups or in the process of being reassigned. 
At the beginning of the month, RAIDs 70 and 73 were operating 
with the 44th Special Tactical Zone in Cambodia. Twelve of the RAID 
74 units were being repaired at Dong Tam and RAID 75 was 
operating with Tran Hung Dao XIV (217.2) units. RAID 74 relieved 
75 about the middle of the month, the latter group rotating to Dong Tam for repair. This overhaul being accomplished by the third 
week in November, both RAIDs 74 and 75 deployed to the Tran Hung Dao VII (217.1) AO, then RAID 74 shifted back to THD XIV by the end 
of the month. RAIDs 72 and 73 continued to operate in Cambodia 
throughout the month, although RAIDs 70 and 71 were sent to the 
USS SPHINX (ARL-24) in mid-November for much needed repair 
and were then dispatched to the Tran Hung Dao XVII AO in the U. Minh Forest.

A more non-combative accomplishment took place during the 
month as UDT Team 13, Detachment Delta, continued to prove the 
effectiveness of demolitions in creating a new channel two kilometers 
northwest of Dong Tam in Dinh Tuong Province (XS 400463). The 
team conducted a demonstration of a new "explosive dredge": two 
4500 pound explosive shots were used to create a crater 50 x 20 x 3 
feet. Unfortunately, during the demonstration, two booby traps
With this...
CONFIDENTIAL

constructed from hand grenades were tripped, seriously wounding LTJG J. Hoover, USN, and ENFN F.H. Kelly, USN. Two more detonations were staged, one on 26 November and one on 27 November, creating a new channel of 200 meters with an average depth of four feet.
River Assault Groups

The River Assault Groups of the VNN continued to carry out normal river patrol, troop lift, and psychological operations during the month of November. They were involved in a number of serious incidents throughout the Third and Fourth Riverine Areas.

At 1130H on 4 November, an RPC of RAG 25/29 became entangled in a fishnet and sank in 15 feet of water about 18 miles southeast of Ca Mau City (VR 445 080). Two members of Harbor Clearance Team FIVE and two VNN divers made a salvage survey on 11 November, concluded that salvage operations were feasible, and plans were being made to retrieve the craft at month’s end.

At 0330H on 18 November, a Commandement of RAG 26, moored to the bank of the Can Gao Canal about 20 miles south southwest of Rach Gia, was sunk by the explosion of what seemed to be a floating mine. Three VNN sailors were killed, and four were seriously wounded. GMGC Harvey L. Roland was seriously injured with shrapnel wounds to the scalp and right knee.

RAG 30 was involved in some heavy action during the month. At 1630H on 25 November, a Monitor and two LCMs of RAG 30 drew automatic weapons fire from the north bank of the Dong Nai River seven kilometers northwest of Cat Lai (YS 034 915). The units
immediately returned the fire and beached the boats at the point of the fire's origin. The enemy immediately broke contact, and eight sailors were inserted to make a sweep of the area. Numerous blood trails were found, and upon returning to the boats, the sailors found one AK-47 and four Thompson sub-machine guns. There were no friendly casualties or damage, and enemy losses were estimated on the basis of the blood trails to be five wounded.

While transiting west on the Song Dong Tranh about 11 kilometers southwest of Nha Be (YS 041 768), six boats of RAG 30 came under automatic weapons fire from the north bank of the river at 1300H on 28 November. All units immediately returned the fire, and the enemy broke contact. There were no damage or casualties incurred by friendly forces.

At 1305H on 29 November, units of RAG 30 came under heavy automatic weapons fire while providing a blocking force for elements of the 34th Ranger Battalion about 11 kilometers southwest of Nha Be (YS 045 765). The boats returned the fire. At 1315H friendly troops were withdrawn by three boats which proceeded south on the Rach Ong Keo. While in transit one of the boats drew light AK-47 fire from the west bank of the canal. At 1330H Seawolves arrived on the scene and began placing strikes in the area and taking ground fire
(YS 043 767). At 1545H tactical aircraft arrived and dropped four 500 pound bombs and four napalm cannisters on the east bank of the canal, the area from which the Seawolves had taken the heaviest ground fire. At 1645H troops were inserted by helicopter for a sweep of the contact area but nothing was found. LT Stoppa, the senior advisor to RAG 30, felt that the area was being used as a base camp because of the enemy's tenacity. He also felt that the enemy unit had recently arrived in the area because no heavy weapons such as B-40s were used against the boats. In this action there were no friendly casualties, and the boats suffered only minor damage. Enemy casualties were unknown.
TRAILER INFILTRATION INCIDENT, NOVEMBER 21-22, 1970

SCALE:

0 30
Nautical Miles

X SI-3 Tralier Sunk at 0006 on 22 November 1970
The highlight of activities conducted by coastal surveillance force units during the month was the destruction of a North Vietnamese arms trawler on the night of 21 November. The trawler had been detected by MARKET TIME VP aircraft on 17 November and had been designated 175-01. The trawler was south of Con Son Island when first detected. While the VP aircraft maintained surveillance of the SL-3 trawler, two American surface units, USCGC RUSH (WHEC 723) and USS TACOMA (PG 92), were rushed to the scene and Vietnamese Navy PBs alerted.

The TACOMA arrived on the scene first, assumed surveillance responsibility for the enemy trawler from the MARKET TIME aircraft, and maintained radar contact at 7-8 miles throughout the night. The RUSH took over the covert shadowing the following day and the TACOMA cleared the area.

The trawler steamed on various courses in the South China Sea for the next three days with the RUSH doggedly holding radar contact and remaining out of visual range. For a time it appeared that the trawler was going to abort its mission and take the usual homeward route toward Hainan Island, but on 21 November the SL-3 intruder began a northwesterly run toward South Vietnamese
coastal waters off either the Long Toan or Thanh Phu Secret Zones in the Third Coastal Zone. The trawler entered the 12 miles territorial water limit, and at 2200H on 21 November in the vicinity of XR 93 69, the RUSH, accompanied by USS ENDURANCE (MSO 435) and USCGC SHERMAN (WHEC 720) challenged it by flashing light. The trawler turned on her navigation lights and attempted to evade. The ENDURANCE fired warning shots across the intruder's bow, and, when that vessel refused to stop, took her under direct fire.

The trawler attempted to ram the MSO and opened fire on ENDURANCE with 75 mm recoilless rifle and small arms fire. One 75 mm round landed on the MSO's fantail causing minor damage. Missing the ENDURANCE, the bold SL-3 broke for the beach north of the Cua Cung Hau River. RUSH, SHERMAN, and TACOMA (which had just arrived on the scene) opened fire on the trawler and, along with ENDURANCE, scored several hits with 3", 5", 20 mm, and .50 calibre projectiles. At 0016H on 22 November, the thwarted trawler blew up and sank, probably due to a self-destruct mechanism, at XR 86 80 (09-46.4N, 106-41.6E). A careful search of the area revealed no survivors although two crewmembers were later captured in Kien Hoa Province.
Salvage operations commenced almost immediately on the sunken trawler, and some ammunition and weapons were recovered before severe weather halted diving operations. Salvage operations were resumed after the weather abated and continued into December.
In ceremonies conducted on 25 November, the last remaining U. S. operated unit of Operation Stable Door, unit TWO at Cam Ranh Bay, was turned over to the Vietnamese Navy. Thus, the last of the Inshore Undersea Warfare Group ONE, Western Pacific Detachments was dissolved. This ended a saga which began on 15 November 1966, when Operation Stable Door was established as part of Operation Market Time.

Inshore Undersea Warfare Group-1 units protected approximately 17,000 ships per year of which over 10,000 were checked by Stable Door EOD Teams. Harbor Defense Units inspected an average of 1,400 junks per month and confiscated tons of contraband. This action directly contributed to the role of keeping the Republic of Vietnam resource control in operation and in hindering blackmarket activities.

The U. S. Navy personnel assigned to Stable Door operated in a combat environment under field conditions and maintained steady patrols, often in adverse weather. During the four years of harbor defense operations, 13 U. S. sailors were killed and another 14 wounded in action.
First Coastal Zone

Activity in the First Coastal Zone was at a low level during October as both friendly and enemy forces attempted to recover from the effects of heavy rains and severe flooding of the coastal lowlands.

At 1300H on 3 November, U.S. Army Support Command YFU-63 was found aground and overturned about two and a half miles southeast of the CG 12 base (YD 875 300). There was no sign of any survivors, and it was concluded that the eleven crew members had been lost at sea. Efforts to salvage the craft, coordinated by COMNAVSUPFAC, continued without success until 21 November when it was decided that any further attempts would be fruitless. The poor weather made the operation extremely difficult throughout and at 1900H on 19 November, the ARVN security group stationed on the beach at the site took some small arms fire from an unknown number of VC. On 25 November VADM King expressed his appreciation to COMNAVSUPFAC Danang for all the efforts to salvage the vessel.

Salvage units were also busy elsewhere. On 15 November USS PERSISTENT (MSO 491) was successful in locating PB 43, which sank off China Beach in October. At 2100H on 23 November, VNN Harbor Security patrol boat (Vedette) 3008 sank in the Danang River.
about two miles south of Danang (BT 036 772). The casualty was not due to enemy action but it was unknown what brought it about.

The craft was located in the main ship channel at 1100H on 24 November and was raised by 1900H. In a message to COMNAVFORV, COMNAVSUPFAC Danang stated:

Successful and expeditious salvage operations were only made possible by close coordination of U.S. and Vietnamese members of NSF/LSB Danang, U.S. Army Fifth Transportation Corps, and First Coastal Zone.

The calm and competent performance of the Vietnamese Naval officers and men coupled with the cool professional skill of the NSF diving crew and the expeditious support provided by the 5th Transportation Corps were not only commendatory, but the entire operation was a splendid example of three separate services working in harmony toward expeditious achievement of a common goal. 1

Although there were repeated reports of the 126th NVA Naval Sapper Regiment's intention to mine the Cua Viet River, there were no mining incidents until 26 November, an indication that the enemy was hindered by SEAL operations, or, more probably, the inclement weather. At 1130H on 26 November, an NVA pressure mine was turned over to a unit of MID 92 by a fisherman about 3.5 kilometers southwest of Cua Viet (YD 297 666), the first such incident since 29 September. The mine contained about 80 lb. of Chicom plastic explosive and had a chemical delay arming device. The firing device was set for a large craft (LCM-6 or bigger).

1. NAVSUPPAC DANANG MSG OF 14133Z Nov 70
At 1115H on 27 November, a unit of MID 92 detonated a mine about 3.5 kilometers northeast of Dong Ha during a routine sweep operation. There were no damage or casualties.

These incidents pointed up the enemy's determination to continue to interdict the Cua Viet with mines. Naval commanders in the First Military Region were once again presented with the necessity for effective countermeasures. SEAL Det ALPHA Seventh Platoon, which had been sent to Cua Viet in October specifically to target the 126th NVA Naval Sapper Regiment, continued to operate during the month, but their operations were for the most part ineffective. Although there was no tangible evidence of resentment against the SEALs, there was no similar evidence that they were well received or fully supported by the Sector or U.S. Army and ARVN forces in the area. The SEALs felt that their lack of results was due to a paucity of hard intelligence which the intelligence community in Quang Tri Province seemed unable or unwilling to provide. Some Naval sources felt that this apparent reluctance might be due in part to the fact that successful SEAL operations would indicate the province was not as fully pacified as senior province and district officials said it was.

There were repeated difficulties with area clearance. It was not unusual for the SEALs to enter an area which supposedly had been cleared and encounter two to four RF/PF ambushes. The SEALs
also felt that local intelligence agencies were noticeably slow in providing and reacting to information and that when they did react it was often in an incomplete fashion.

Commanding General XXIV Corps instituted a study to find the best way to counter the sapper threat in the Cua Viet area. The study concluded that the inadequate coordination encountered was a result of a weak sector and strong subsector power situation in Quang Tri Province. The situation was further complicated in Gio Linh District, in which Cua Viet is located, by the division of the area of operations between the 1st ARVN Division, the 1st Brigade of the 5th Mechanized Infantry Division, and RF and PF forces, all of whom apparently felt that the mining of the Cua Viet was strictly a Naval problem. The study also concluded that these forces had the potential to counter the sapper threat. In light of its findings the following recommendation, which were being considered at month's end, were made:

1. That regular Navy SEAL assets presently assigned in support to First Coastal Zone operations be retasked and transferred, and that Vietnamese LDNN and CSS be used in future special operations in I Corps.

2. That strong top level ARVN attention should be solicited to emphasize the need for full cooperation in order to stop the mining threat.
(3) That priority be given to an updated multi-sensor warning system in the AO.

(4) That specific agencies be tasked to recruit new agents or to re-direct current agents for harder targets.

In the Chi Lang I and SEA TIGER area of operations during November, activity was light and there were no major actions reported, possibly because the enemy was attempting to recoup his forces after the floods at the first of the month.

At 2215H on 23 November an advanced guardpost of CG 16 came under attack by an enemy force estimated to be of platoon size, approximately eight kilometers east of Quang Ngai City (BS 730740). The post took three M-79 rounds and a moderate amount of AK-47 fire. One VNN sailor was killed, three were wounded, and five of the enemy were killed.

1. First Coastal Zone Advisor/First Coastal Zone Intelligence Officer
Msg of 250150Z Nov '70
Second Coastal Zone

Activity in the Second Coastal Zone during November was at a very low level as both friendly and enemy forces recovered from the effects of the bad weather at the beginning of the month. There was extensive flooding in the coastal lowlands of Binh Dinh and Phu Yen Provinces as CG 21 at Degi was made inaccessible by land and 500 people were made homeless at Song Cau, the location of CG 23.

At 1715H on 3 November, 10 rounds of 82 mm mortar fire impacted in Song Cau Hamlet. Two Vietnamese civilians were killed and 15 were wounded as a result of the attack. The Second Coastal Zone Intelligence Officer concluded that the attack had probably been directed against the hamlet rather than the Naval compound, for the enemy had displayed his ability to hit the base in the past.

At 0205H on 26 November, an estimated 200 pounds of high explosives detonated alongside the Philippine coastal tanker ISLANDER which was moored to the Cau Da Pier in Nha Trang Harbor (CP 080 505). The ship sustained a hole 15 feet long and 12 feet wide in her port side just forward of the superstructure at the waterline. Two cargo tanks and a pump room were flooded and two crewmembers working on the main deck were slightly injured. The concrete pier was buckled by the force of the explosion. A daylight check of the
ship and the pier indicated that the charge had been suspended from the pier and not from the ship. The pier at the time had been under modification and had had insufficient lighting and sentries. Intelligence analysts concluded that the charge had been placed by a swimmer (the tide was ebbing with negligible current in the vicinity of the pier at the time of the explosion), and that the unit responsible for the attack might have been either the K-92 Swimmer-Sapper Company or the 407th Sapper Battalion. The last successful mining attack in Nha Trang Harbor had occurred on 15 October, 1969, when the Nationalist Chinese Cargo Ship KIN WAH was sunk.
Third and Fourth Coastal Zones

Activity in the Third and Fourth Coastal Zones during November was highlighted by the loss of two PCFs in a storm on 2 November, discussed in the SOLID ANCHOR section of this summary, and the destruction of a North Vietnamese trawler on 22 November, discussed in the introduction to the Coastal Surveillance section of the summary. The USS ENDURANCE (MSO 435) was tasked with finding the sunken swift boats so that they could be salvaged, but the craft had not been found at month's end.

At 1050H on 3 November, a Vietnamese stevedore discovered a floating object alongside the Delong Pier at Vung Tau. The man had been fishing, snagged the line attached to the device, and pulled it from the water. VNN EOD personnel were called and recovered the mine which consisted of 80 pounds of TNT with three time delay chemical pencil fuzes. The components of the mine were of U.S. manufacture. This was the fourth mine found in Vung Tau Harbor since the early part of 1970.

At 0700H on 24 November, two rockets hit Vung Tau. One landed on the grounds of the National Police Advanced Training Center (YS 301 481), and the other impacted on the northern perimeter of the Vung Tau Airfield, (YS 298 486). There were no casualties or damage as a result of the attack.
SEAL Team ONE Det GOLF operated out of the CG 36 base in Ba Xuyen Province during the month. Acting upon intelligence supplied by NILO, Soc Trang, they conducted an operation on 19 November in an area eight kilometers east southeast of the CG 36 base in an effort to capture enemy guerrillas. Leaving the CG 36 base at 0300H, the SEALs were inserted by MSSC at a point on the Dung Island complex (XR 318 601). They patrolled south and set up security on a four hut complex (XR 316 586). As the search element moved in, three VC attempted to escape and were taken under fire. A Kit Carson Scout with the SEALs identified one of those killed as a former KCS recruit. Then some people were seen evading from a hut on the eastern side of the complex and taken under fire. At the same time, the SEALs began taking heavy automatic weapons fire from bunkers south of the complex. They moved out of the area and called in Black Ponies. When the aircraft arrived at 0700H, the SEALs directed the strike from a point on the river (XR 318 600) and returned enemy fire which was coming from the complex. While waiting on the river during the SEAL operation in the hut complex, MSSC personnel set a WBGP at 0450H. They sighted three persons that they took to be VC and took them under fire. The SEALs returned to the CG 36 base at 08:00H on 19 November. There were no friendly casualties during the operation, but enemy casualties
were heavy. Seven VC were killed, verified by body count, four probably killed, and eight VC were killed by the air strikes, which also destroyed seven bunkers and six huts.

Information gained in the interrogation of Hoi Chanhs indicated that the VC in the Dung Island complex were being badly hurt by operations such as this one. A Hoi Chanh interrogated on 18 November reported that the VC cadre in Dai An Village were having to assume several positions due to a shortage of personnel and that the positions were often symbolic rather than active. To prevent civilians from moving out of the area to resettle, the Hoi Chanh said, the VC had begun to confiscate ID cards and other GVN papers. There were 13 Hoi Chanhs from Dai An Village during September and October, compared with only four during the first eight months of 1970. Interrogation of two other Hoi Chanhs from Dai An Village revealed that key cadre from Dai An, An Thanh Nhut and An Thanh Nhi of the Dung Island complex had had to contribute their next three months pay to Long Phu District. This was done in order to fulfill financial commitments to Central Vietnam and Cambodia which had not been met by VC tax collection, limited by the expansion of GVN control.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIC ACTION

Although the rainy weather hampered civic action and psyops operations, particularly the loudspeaker broadcast programs, during November, more leaflet drops, Medcaps, and Hoi Chanhs were reported throughout the Republic than in previous months.

BJU-1 (Beach Jumper Unit ONE) reported the following statistical survey of psyops for the period of 3 - 30 November 1970:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>location</th>
<th>loudspeaker broadcasts</th>
<th>leaflets</th>
<th>Hoi Chanhs</th>
<th>Med/Dentcaps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Boat</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSSZ</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td>153,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOLID ANCHOR</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>411,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moc Hoa</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2,695,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chau Doc</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>209,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rach Gia</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>605,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Luc</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Tre</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Thoi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the SOLID ANCHOR AO in November, psyops activity for the refugee village, although mostly in the planning stages, was at a high level. While the VNN Polwar team continued to conduct "face to face" psyops in Ham Rong II (which, according to DEPCORDS, 4th MR, is...
to be called henceforth by its historical name, Thi Tran Hamlet of Nam Can Village), USN MAT (Military Assistance Team) 67 helped the PFS set up in Thi Tran, instructing them in the operation of Browning rifles and M-1 and M-2 carbines. In addition, a PSDF (Popular Self-defense Force) consisting of 105 men and 132 supporting troops (women and children), has been established in the hamlet, which is in great need of security against terrorism.

As the 25-bed hospital nears completion - now in the painting stage, proposed civic action projects for SOLID ANCHOR included elevated walkways, movie shelter, cane planting, and the building of minor bridges and dykes. CTG 116.1 reported 170 civilians receiving medical treatment from 31 October to 26 November. On 28 November, a census of Thi Tran Hamlet was scheduled to begin.

At 1500H on 18 November, elements of the 32nd Regiment (21st ARVN Division) and the 974th RF Company concluded a two day operation in the southern part of the SOLID ANCHOR AO (vicinity WQ 040 571) with the discovery of a 20-hootch hamlet occupied by about 40 women and children. The ARVN company commander told the people to leave the area and resettle in Thi Tran. They indicated they would do so and were last seen in their sampans moving out; aerial reconnaissance of the area later failed to detect the departed personnel.
Psyops was also a part of another operation, the liberation of the POW camp at VQ 878 640 (See the SOLID ANCHOR section of the summary) as a prerecorded broadcast was played while the camp was taken and the prisoners released.

At Coastal Group 35 a Dentcap was held on 9 November and 59 Vietnamese (base personnel and villagers from the adjoining hamlet) were treated.

In the Rung Sat Special Zone, the RSSZ psyops team and BJU-1 Team 13 conducted loudspeaker broadcasts urging VC to "Chieu Hoi" in the area 10 to 35 kilometers southeast of the Nha Be Navy Base (Can Gio and Quang Xuyen Districts) on 3, 4, 11, and 21 November. A Med/Dentcap at Tan Thah Village (XS 115 586) on 18 November treated 80 people and distributed 18 dental kits and 64 dental hygiene pamphlets.
ACCELERATED TURNOVER PROGRAM AND TRAINING SUMMARY

The Vietnamese Navy assumed responsibility for another major USN operation on 6 November as Operation Search Turn became Tran hung Dao VI, and LCDR W. S. Brown, USN, CTG 116.3, was relieved as CO of the operation by LCDR Vo Tron Guu, VNN, CTG 212.5. The operation is based in Rach Soi, and its patrol area extends along the Kinh Rach Soi and Kinh Rach Gia, the two long canals that stretch from the Gulf of Thailand to the Bassac River. RPD 58 was the sole unit of the operation, whose task group designator is 212.5, but ten boats from RPD 61 formerly with Tran Hung Dao I on the Vinh Te Canal, were sent to augment RPD 58 in October. Search Turn was started 1 November 1968 as part of the SEA LORDS Campaign in the Delta.

River Patrol Division 64 came into being on 15 November as RIVDIVS 535 and 594 were transferred to the VNN at Moc Hoa. The RIVDIVS were the last of the USN PBR assets operating in South Vietnam, although COMRIVPATFLOT FIVF, who still oversees some river assault craft and attrition PBRs, will not be dissolved until 31 December. An additional PBR was also turned over at Binh Thuy on 15 November to the reserve team of the Recon and Patrol Force (CTF 212).
Another key VNN unit was formed on 3 November when RID 47, composed of 13 river assault craft, was created at Dong Tam. The new RID was assigned to Tran Hung Dao II and will operate out of Moc Hoa.

The Harbor Defense Unit at Cam Ranh Bay disestablished on 25 November and with it, CTG 115.9, relieving the USN of all Harbor Defense responsibilities throughout the country. Along with this assumption of command, the VNN received two picket boats, six LCPLs, and six skimmers.

Other turnovers for the month were two LCM-6s and an LCM-3 on 30 November at Nha Be; the boats were added to Minesweeping and Interdiction Division 92. The VNN salvage contingent was augmented on 30 November at Cat Lo with the turnover of CSB-3. Finally, Naval Support Facility, Danang, turned over five craft during the month: three skimmers and one 45' picket boat on 9 November and another picket boat on 19 November; the boats will all be employed by the Harbor Defense Unit, Danang.

On 10 November, NAVSUPPAC, Danang, was commissioned as a VNN Logistic Support Base with a USN Commanding Officer and a VNN Deputy. Danang is one of seven major support bases in the VNN Logistics Support Command and will fulfill major maintenance and supply needs for all VNN forces connected with
the First Coastal Zone. Under the cluster concept, Logistic Support Base, Danang, will service two intermediate Support Bases, Chu Lai and Thuan An; the latter of which was also commissioned this month.

Of the 43 total bases programmed for the VNN, 20 bases and two ATSBs were completely constructed by the end of November. There were 11 bases in the process of construction, and three bases and seven ATSBs required no new construction at all.

The VNN training program in November continued to aim at filling the crucial dearth at the officer and NCO levels and in logistics personnel. There were 52 officers received by the VNN from various officer candidate schools, increasing the officers on board to 3583, or 60% of the allowance; 30 enlisted men were promoted to NCO grade, bringing the total to 5321, or 38% of the allowance. In Danang, the Philco-Ford Corporation graduated its last class of base maintenance trainees and released 200 newly-trained Vietnamese constructionmen to support the ACTOVLLOG Program. Philco-Ford has trained a total of 570 public works people since it contracted to the USN on April, 1970; the target figure for VNN base maintenance personnel is currently set at 883.

Dependent Shelters also continued to go up in November. Eight sites were complete by the 30th, Ha Tien being the latest project.
As more and more USN Seabees are withdrawn from country, however, it has become clear that the "self-help" aspects of the program must be given greater emphasis if the program is to proceed on schedule. COMNAVFORV issued this warning in the middle of the month:

"During the last two months, the number of USN personnel working on dependent shelters has dropped almost 50% due to the U.S. drawdown. VNN participation has also dropped 50%. In view of pending additional personnel decreases the dependent shelter construction situation is becoming serious. Unless addees renew their efforts to ensure a marked increase in VNN participation, the units funded for construction in FY 71 will not be completed until 1973."

1. COMNAVFORV MSG 152002Z Nov '70.
Naval Support Activity, Saigon detachments and units were busy throughout the month of November. The OP Base at Kien An was attacked by mortars on 12 and 28 November, (these attacks are discussed in the Search Turn section of this summary). Dong Tam was hit by mortar fire on 3 and 8 November. No U. S. Navy personnel were wounded in the Dong Tam and ASKARI attacks.

Alert sentries on board USS SPHINX (ARL-24) exploded a suspected mine on 21 November.

In one tragic incident during the month, SN John Edward Hollis of the USS BENEWAH (APB-35) was killed after dropping a concussion grenade on the deck of that vessel on 11 November. SN Hollis was blown over the side by the explosion. His remains were recovered a few days later.

A chapter in the history of the Brown Water Navy was closed on 25 November as the USS BENEWAH (APB-35) departed Vietnamese waters enroute to retirement. This venerable veteran spent three and one half years giving superb support services throughout the Mekong Delta and into Cambodia.

Change of Command ceremonies took place on three NSA, Saigon Units during the month. LCDR Lauren Seeber, USN, relieved LCDR Rudolf Garcia, USN, as CO, USS SPHINX (ARL-24) on 9 November.
On 10 November, CDR Walter Frick, USN, relieved CAPT Frederick Feagin, USN, as CO, USS TUTUILA (ARG-4). Finally, on 15 November LCDR Wells, USN, relieved LCDR Fischer, USN, as CO, USS HUNTERDON COUNTY (AGP-838).

Rear Admiral D. D. Chapman, JAGC, USN, Deputy Judge Advocate of the Navy visited the LSE at Nha Be, on 13 November. He presided over ceremonies which opened a Navy Law Center on that base.

Rear Admiral Robert Adamson, Jr., USN, COMNAVSUPPACT, Saigon, was at the Naval Support Facility, Danang on 10 November for a U. S. Navy-Vietnamese Navy co-manning ceremony during which the co-manned Logistics Support Base, Danang was established. The following day he attended the commissioning of the Intermediate Support Base at Thuan An.

On 3 November, NSF Danang Navymen flying from Cua Viet, spotted an upturned hull wallowing in the surf off Tan My. Upon calling the U. S. Army Support Command in Danang, it was discerned that the craft was YFU-63 which was transporting ammunition to Tan My when it was apparently caught in heavy weather, overturned and sank. Thirteen men were aboard and all
hands were lost. One body washed ashore at Chu Lai, 125 miles to the south, several days later. NSF Danang was asked to assist in the salvage of the craft and recover the bodies of the men aboard.

USS COHOES (ANL-78) sent a team of divers and salvage personnel with equipment by helicopter to the scene on 5 November. Salvage operations continued until 21 November with USS GRAPPLE (ARS-7) participating. Difficulties were experienced throughout the salvage attempt including heavy weather, sand in the compartments and lines and chains parting during attempts to pull the craft from the sand. These problems were compounded by the approach and passing of Typhoon Patsy. After many futile attempts by divers and salvage crews to recover the bodies of the crew (including cutting open the hull and inspecting as many sand filled compartments as accessible) and trying to free and right the overturned craft, it was determined that the craft was unsalvageable, the bodies were unrecoverable and the salvage operations were terminated on 21 November.

On 24 November, a Vietnamese Navy Harbor Patrol craft floundered and sank in the Danang River after an engineering failure to its drain system. The combined efforts of U. S. and Vietnamese Navy and U. S. Army personnel resulted in salvage of the craft. Four crewmen escaped injury, while one died.
THIRD NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BATTALION

Enemy mining activity against Seabee construction efforts in the First Military Region dropped to its lowest level in several months during November. Only one mining incident was reported, which resulted in minor injuries to one Seabee.

Floods proved more detrimental than the VC to Seabee efforts to upgrade Route QL-1. Three to six feet of water covered parts of QL-1 in the First Military Region, causing serious erosion and damage to paved surfaces and bridges.

ACTOV base and Dependent Shelter construction programs continued satisfactorily during November, with the completion of ACTOV bases at Chau Doc and Tan Chau and the Dependent Shelter program at Tan Chau.

From 9 to 14 November, NMCB 62 redeployed to CONUS. This outstanding unit worked on such varied projects as the Go Noi Island Bridge, the ACTOV bases at Chau Doc and Tan Chau, and numerous road and airfield upgrading programs during its Vietnam tour. NMCB 62 was relieved by NMCB 3.

CONFIDENTIAL
The remaining naval construction forces have a projected backlog in the 1st MR amounting to 18 weeks of horizontal and 20 weeks of vertical work. In the Second, 3rd, and 4th MRs the projected backlog is 31 weeks of horizontal and 54 weeks of vertical work. There were a total of 1605 Seabees (59 officers, 1546 enlisted) in the Republic of Vietnam as of 30 November.
The following abbreviations and terms are commonly used in the combat zone by all agencies and are listed here in amplification of those used in the text:

ABF
ATTACK BY FIRE

AMMI
PONTOON
A MULTI-PURPOSE BARGE, STANDARD SIZE IS 28'X90'

AO
AREA OF OPERATIONS

ARVN
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

ASPB
ASSAULT SUPPORT PATROL BOAT

ATC
ARMORED TROOP CARRIER

ATSB
ADVANCE TACTICAL SUPPORT BASE

A/W
AUTOMATIC WEAPONS

BLACK PONY/
BRONCO
OV-10 TWIN ENGINE TURBOPROP COUNTERINSURGENCY AIRCRAFT

CCB
COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS BOAT

CG
COASTAL GROUP

CHICOM
CHINESE COMMUNIST

CIDG
CIVILIAN IRREGULAR DEFENSE GROUP - MERCENARIES OF VIETNAMESE, LAOTIAN, CAMBODIAN DESCENT WHO FIGHT PRIMARILY AROUND THEIR OWN VILLAGES

CMD
CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT

CONUS
CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CRIP</td>
<td>Civilian Reconnaissance Intelligence Platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>Coastal Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUSTOFF</td>
<td>Medical evacuation by helo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENIFF</td>
<td>Enemy-initiated firefight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSB</td>
<td>Fire Support Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FWMAF</td>
<td>Free World Military Assistance Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDA</td>
<td>Gun Damage Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVN</td>
<td>Government of Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAFT</td>
<td>Helicopter Attack Fire Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H&amp;I</td>
<td>Harassment and Interdiction Fire Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JGS</td>
<td>Joint General Staff (Vietnamese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIT CARSON SCOUTS</td>
<td>Former Viet Cong who have come over to the side of the Saigon government and serve with allied military units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAFT</td>
<td>Light Attack Fire Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAW</td>
<td>Light Anti-tank Weapon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCPL</td>
<td>Landing Craft, Personnel, Large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDNN</td>
<td>Vietnamese equivalent of USN Underwater Demolition Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LHFT</td>
<td>Light Helo Fire Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOH</td>
<td>OH-6 Light Observation Helo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRRP</td>
<td>Long Range Reconnaissance patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACV</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATSB</td>
<td>Mobile Advance Tactical Support Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Acronym</strong></td>
<td><strong>Description</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDCAP</td>
<td>Medical Civic Action Program - sick call</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONITOR</td>
<td>Heavily armored LCM-6 (40 mm cannon or 105 mm Howitzer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR</td>
<td>Military Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRF</td>
<td>Mobile Riverine Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSB</td>
<td>Minesweeper, Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSD</td>
<td>Minesweeper, Drone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Mobile Strike Force - mercenaries who deploy and go anywhere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGFS</td>
<td>Naval Gunfire Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NILO</td>
<td>Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIOTC</td>
<td>Naval Inshore Operations Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOD</td>
<td>Night Observation Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA</td>
<td>North Vietnamese Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OJT</td>
<td>On-the-job training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBR</td>
<td>Patrol Boat, River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCF</td>
<td>Patrol Craft, Fast (Swift Boat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRU</td>
<td>Provincial Reconnaissance Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSA</td>
<td>Province Sector Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOPS</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAD</td>
<td>River Assault Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAG</td>
<td>River Assault Group (VNN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAID</td>
<td>River Assault and Interdiction Division (VNN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAS</td>
<td>River Assault Squadron</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RF/PF  Regional Forces/Popular Forces
RPD   River Patrol Division
RPG   River Patrol Group (or) Rocket propelled grenade
RSSZ  Rung Sat Special Zone
RVNAF Republic of Vietnam Air Force (or) Armed Forces
SAR   Search and rescue
SEAWOLF UH-1B Helo, heavily armed, USN operated
SHADOW C-119 Aircraft
SKIMMER 20-foot fiberglass motorboat
SLICK UH-1B Helo, USA operated
SPOOKY  C-47 aircraft
SSB   Swimmer Support Boat (Skimmer)
STAB  Strike Assault Boat
TAOR  Tactical Area of Responsibility
USARV United States Army, Vietnam
VNMC  Vietnamese Marine Corps
VNN   Vietnamese Navy
ZIPPO Flame thrower equipped ATC or Monitor
RAP   Rocket Assisted Projectile