

*Exercise*


# FINAL REPORT

# EXERCISE BANYAN TREE II

8-16 MARCH 1960

AD A9 50095

U.S. ARMY INFANTRY  
HUMAN RES. ARCH UNIT  
JUL 25 1960  
Box 2086,  
Ft. Benning, Ga.



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UNITED STATES ARMY CARIBBEAN

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY CARIBBEAN  
Office of the Commanding General  
Fort Amador, Canal Zone

CARGO

23 April 1960

SUBJECT: Final Report, Exercise BANYAN TREE II, 2-26 April 1960.

TO: Commander in Chief  
Caribbean Command  
Quarry Heights, Canal Zone

1. References:

a. Letter, AGAM-P 354.2 (9 Nov 59) DCSOPS, Department of the Army, 7 December 1959, subject: "Directive, Exercise BANYAN TREE II."

b. Exercise Directive, Headquarters Caribbean Command, 15 December 1959.

c. Exercise Directive Nr. 1, Headquarters United States Army Caribbean, 11 January 1960.

2. Attached hereto is a final report on the ground maneuver phase of Exercise BANYAN TREE II.

3. Points worthy of particular mention are:

a. This exercise tested the capability of the United States Army to send assault forces from CONUS by an air movement of many hours and great distance to conduct combat operations in combination with assault forces sent from the Latin American Republics of Brazil, Colombia, and Panama. This exercise demonstrated that the member nations of the Organization of American States are capable of planning and conducting effective combined combat operations against a well-armed and well-trained Aggressor. Considering this is the first time there has been a true Organization of American States maneuver, the action was exceptionally well-coordinated. It demonstrated a capability and a need not only for further exercises of this scope but also for division level command post exercises as well. The entire ground operation emphasized the need for an integrated Organization of American States operational capability in the Western Hemisphere.

b. Over-all air support, both troop carrier and close air support, rendered to the ground elements by the Air Forces of Chile, Peru and the United States and the close teamwork between Army and Air Force elements, were outstanding features of the entire maneuver.


c. US Naval support for the amphibious landing of Panamanian troops, and subsequent search and rescue operations was exceptionally well-planned and executed.

d. An Army Operations Center was established at Fort Amador, Canal Zone in conjunction with the Air Operations Center, Air Support Operations Center and the Troop Carrier Command Post. This Operations Center coordinated all requirements for close tactical air support as well as air movements of personnel and cargo. In addition to the Operations Center in the Canal Zone, an advance Command Post with an adequate staff was established in the Rio Hato training area. These arrangements insured close support for the participating troops and effective liaison between United States and other Organization of American States units.

e. Aggressor activities were designed to achieve maximum realism and were responsible for maintaining a high degree of interest among all participating troops. Aggressor units in contact were full strength and completely equipped. Patrols were active throughout the maneuver, and frequently operated deep in friendly territory. One surprise rear area attack was successfully executed by Aggressor forces. Aggressor was allowed approximately three (3) days to prepare his positions and this helped maintain realism by keeping the barrier plan within bounds of what could be expected to be done in a rapidly moving situation.

4. Exercise BANYAN TREE II proved to be a valuable training vehicle. The foregoing points as well as those contained in the final report comprise the lessons learned during the course of the exercise. All concerned should profit from their participation in this exercise.

1 Incl  
Final Rpt for Exercise  
BANYAN TREE II  
8-16 March 1960

  
CHARLES L. DASHER  
Major General, USA  
Commanding

Accession No. *1*

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY CARIBBEAN  
Office of the Commanding General  
Fort Amador, Canal Zone

CARGC

23 April 1960

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TO: Commander in Chief  
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Quarry Heights, Canal Zone

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
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8-16 March 1960

  
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Major General, USA  
Commanding

## FINAL REPORT - EXERCISE BANYAN TREE II

### 1. Background and Organization for the Maneuver

a. When Exercise Banyan Tree II was first conceived, the CINCARIB expressed a desire that selected Latin American countries be invited to send troops to participate. This would broaden the purpose of the exercise to include a practice exercise under the provisions outlined in the Rio Pact, which provide for mutual defense in the event of attack against a member country.

b. A preliminary planning conference was conducted at Headquarters Caribbean Command during period 22-24 September 1959 with representatives from Headquarters CARIBCOM, USARCARIB, 15th ND, CAIRC, and CONUS attending. During conference, it was confirmed that sufficient aircraft would be available (25-C130's and 50-C123's) to provide airlift for one (1) CONUS based airborne battle group on a direct flight from Fort Bragg, N.C. to Panama. Airlift would terminate in an airborne assault on the Rio Hato objective area on 8 March 1960, (D-Day). It was further confirmed that a composite air strike force was available for deployment to this command.

c. At this time, participation in Banyan Tree II by Latin American countries was not fully resolved and it was recognized that detailed planning could not be accomplished until the extent of Latin American participation was determined.

d. During the period 1-10 December 1959, a liaison group consisting of representatives from Headquarters CARIBCOM, USARCARIB and CONUS visited Colombia, Peru and Brazil for discussions with MAAG personnel regarding proposed participation by those countries in the exercise. Since no commitments had been received from any Latin American countries, it was not possible to develop any detailed plans, or discuss the exercise with the local military authorities. The visits were well worthwhile because they provided an opportunity to present tentative plans to MAAG personnel who in turn carried on the liaison functions as the planning progressed. Because of the time element, no further liaison visits to Latin American countries were made by Canal Zone representatives.

e. Exercise Directive Number 1, Headquarters CARIBCOM, dated 15 December 1959, announced the conduct of Exercise Banyan Tree II in the Rio Hato Training Area, Republic of Panama, during March 1960 and listed the following purposes to be accomplished:

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(1) Conduct a practice exercise under the provisions outlined in the Rio Pact, which provide for mutual defense in the event of attack against a member country.

(2) Exercise STRAC and TAC mobility plans.

(3) Provide troop training for STRAC, TAC, local forces, MAP-supported elements from selected Latin American countries and the Panamanian Nacional Guard forces.

(4) Provide training in joint and combined operations for headquarters personnel.

f. CARIBCOM's Exercise Directive Nr 1 assigned USARCARIB responsibility for the conduct of ground operations to destroy Aggressor forces in the Rio Hato area, utilizing ground forces available for that mission. In addition, USARCARIB was directed:

(1) To provide Aggressor ground forces of at least two (2) Reinforced Infantry Rifle Companies and conduct Aggressor operations in conjunction with CAIRC Aggressor air units in Rio Hato area.

(2) To prepare drop and landing zone at Rio Hato by D-10 days for use by Airborne and Airlanded troops.

(3) To translate necessary documents for distribution to Latin American forces, in coordination with CAIRC.

(4) To support local Search and Rescue plan for this exercise as developed by COMCAIRC.

(5) To continue normal missions.

g. Department of the Army letter AGAM-P 354.2 (9 Nov 59) DCSOPS, subject: "Directive, Exercise Banyan Tree II," dated 7 December 1959, as amended, announced the conduct of Exercise Banyan Tree II in the Panama area during the period 8-21 March 1960 and designated the Commanding General, USARCARIB, as the Maneuver Controller.

h. Troops to be utilized in the destruction of Aggressor Forces in the Rio Hato area were:

(1) One (1) airborne battle group (reinforced). The unit selected was the 1st Airborne Battle Group, 325th Infantry, 82nd Airborne Division. The Battle Group was directed to make an

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airborne assault of the objective area at H-Hour  $\frac{1}{5}$  Minutes (0735R) on D-Day (8 March 1960) on a direct flight from Pope AFB, N.C.

(2) One (1) MAP-supported Airborne Infantry Company provided by Brazil. The unit selected was the 3rd Airborne Infantry Company of the Santos Dumont Battalion. Company to initiate an airborne assault of the objective area at H-Hour (0730R) on D-Day (8 March 1960) on a direct flight from a staging area in Colombia, South America.

(3) One (1) MAP-supported Advance Planning Detachment provided by Colombia. Detachment to be air landed on a direct flight from staging area in Colombia, South America, to objective area.

(4) One (1) Company of National Guard provided by Republic of Panama to make an assault beach landing in objective area at H- $\frac{1}{2}$  hours D-Day (8 March 1960).

(5) Operational control of troops to pass to Commanding General, USARCARIB, on order Commander in Chief, CARIBCOM.

i. An analysis of the missions assigned to Commanding General, USARCARIB, resulted in the publication of USARCARIB's Exercise Directive Nr 1, Banyan Tree II, dated 11 January 1960, as changed. As plans were developed by various general staff sections, appropriate Annexes were published as additions to the basic exercise directive. The complete directive contained Annex A (Scenario), Annex B (Intelligence Plan), Annex C (Administration and Logistics), Annex D (Umpire Control).

j. In the planning stages for the exercise, it was decided to avoid the establishment of a separate planning and operational staff for the Maneuver Controller due to limited personnel resources. Regularly assigned Officers and EM of the various staff sections developed plans for the exercise concurrent with normal day-to-day operations. Annex A to Annex H, inclusive, final reports of staff sections concerned.

k. A final coordinating conference of CARIBCOM, USARCARIB, CAIRC, 15th ND, TAC, CONARC and Latin American Mission personnel was conducted by CARIBCOM in Panama during February 1960.

l. A Chief Umpire was designated by Commanding General, USARCARIB, in February 1960, and utilizing a small initial staff, umpire headquarters was activated on 8 February 1960. Annex K, Chief Umpires' final report.

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m. Tactical Situation, D-Day (8 March 1960). Aggressor forces crossed the Panamanian border from Costa Rica on 1 March 1960. By a combination of beach landings, Partisan forces and Aggressor troops supported by air, captured the Rio Hato airstrip, and seized the road net at Churuquita and Penonome. By 8 March 1960, Aggressor had taken defensive position in anticipation of receiving reinforcements that would enable him to launch a full scale attack against the Panama Canal. In response to Panama's request for OAS assistance in driving the invading force out of Panama, an expeditionary force was marshaled for a combined amphibious-airborne assault in the vicinity of Rio Hato to destroy the Aggressor forces. The Commander in Chief, Caribbean Command, was designated as the Commander of all OAS forces and the Commanding General, U. S. Army Caribbean, was appointed Commander of OAS ground forces. The Commander in Chief, Caribbean Command, directed that the combined amphibious assault commence at first light, D-Day, 8 March 1960, to be followed by the airborne assault at 0730R the same day.

n. Troop lists and personnel strengths, Annex L.

### 2. Summary of Operations

a. 8 March 1960 (D-Day). (Reference: Sketch of maneuver area.)

(1) At 0440R, 8 March 1960, the Panama Guardia Nacional Company executed an amphibious landing on the Rio Hato beach and moved inland to seize, clear and defend Objective 1. An air bombardment by F 80 and F 100 aircraft from 0700R to 0720R, using conventional armament was followed by the Airborne Assault of the 3d Airborne Infantry Company of Brazil and the 1st Airborne Battle Group, 325th Infantry at 0730R. The Brazilian Company was assigned the mission of seizing, clearing and defending Objective 2. The 1st Airborne Battle Group, 325th Infantry was assigned the mission to seize Objective 3 and to clear and defend the airhead. Heavy equipment was dropped on schedule and this was followed by the airlanded elements, which included the Colombian Advance Planning Detachment. By 0932R, 75% of the troops were assembled.

(2) The Commanding General, USARCARIB, assumed operational control of the land forces upon their arrival in the maneuver area, and at 0955R, 8 March, directed the CO, 1st Airborne Battle Group, 325th Infantry, to assume operational control of all Latin American forces and to form the Combined Expeditionary Force.

(3) Objectives 1 and 2 were taken by 1018R with little resistance. Stubborn aggressor resistance slowed the assault on Objective 3 and after it was seized, an aggressor counterattack penetrated the position. Company C supported by Company B and fighter

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bomber aircraft regained control of the objective at 1610R. Action continued to clear the aggressor out of the airhead. Seven pre-planned air strikes were flown between 0700R and 1420R by the combined Air Support Force with GP bombs and rockets. Friendly forces were not permitted to advance beyond Phase Line A, except for patrols prior to daylight D/1.

(4) USARCARIB Operation Order T-2-60 was issued at 0800R, 8 March, directing the CO, Combined Expeditionary Force, to attack to the north at 0630R, 9 March, seize Objective 4 and be prepared to continue the attack on order. It also directed that plans be prepared to employ a Colombian Infantry Battalion (simulated) to seize Penonome.

b. 9 March 1960 (D/1)

(1) Reference: Sketch of maneuver area.

(2) At 0630R Companies B, E, D and A of 1st Battle Group, 325th Infantry (L to R) crossed the LD (PL "A") in the attack to seize and secure Objective 4 and prepare to continue attack to seize and secure Objective 5, on order. Concurrently, with start of attack, forces from the Aggressor State infiltrated CEF rear areas from the West (0635R). Elements in the rear successfully repulsed aggressor efforts and aggressor withdrew to the West. Objective 4 was taken with light to moderate resistance. Throughout the late stages of attack on Objective 5, resistance by aggressor stiffened. Objective 5 was secured at 1253R.

(3) After seizure of Objective 5, units reorganized and consolidated their positions. At 1500R, aggressor launched a counterattack on Objective 5 which was repulsed at 1610R and aggressor withdrew to the North. Action was limited thereafter to patrolling beyond Phase Line C.

(4) Air support for D/1 continued using conventional armament.

(5) CEF was ordered to:

(a) Withdraw two rifle companies to the Rio Hato Airstrip during the night of 9-10 March for redeployment by air to other threatened areas on 10 March.

(b) To continue the attack at 0630R, 10 March, to seize Objectives 6 and 7.

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c. 10 March 1960 (D/2)

(1) Reference: Sketch of maneuver area.

(2) Units of CEF crossed the LD on schedule (0630R) and advanced slowly against heavy resistance. Objective 6 was secured by 3d Airborne Infantry Company, Brazil, at 1105R. CEF Objective X was secured by Panama Guardia Nacional Company at 1305R. Company A, 1st Airborne Battle Group, 325th Infantry, was assigned Objective 7 with Company D supporting the attack by fire. The stubborn resistance of aggressor forces necessitated commitment of Company E (CEF Reserve) to assist Company A in securing the objective. Objective 7 was secured at 1347R.

(3) CEF units were reorganized and positions were consolidated and strengthened in anticipation of an aggressor counterattack which did not materialize.

(4) Throughout the day, a number of fighter-bomber sorties were flown in close support of CEF forces inflicting heavy losses on the aggressor forces.

(5) Orders were issued to resume the attack at 0630R, 11 March, to seize Objective 8. Using plans prepared by the Colombian Advance Planning Detachment, elements of a Colombian Battalion (simulated) which arrived in the maneuver area 10 March, relieved the Panama Guardia Nacional Company and the Brazilian Airborne Company on battle positions and these two companies were moved to reserve assembly areas, vicinity of the Rio Hato Airstrip. The entire Brazilian Company was airlifted to the rear by HUIA helicopters while the Guardia Nacional Company was moved by truck. During the night, action beyond phase line D was limited to patrolling.


d. 11 March 1960 (D/3)

(1) Reference: Sketch of maneuver area.

(2) Company A, 1st Airborne Battle Group, 325th Infantry crossed the LD on schedule (0630R) to be followed by Company E in a helicopter assault. At 0630R, Exercise Banyan Tree was terminated by the Chief Umpire.

3. Lessons Learned

a. This exercise demonstrated that member nations of the Organization of American States are capable of planning and conducting effective combined combat operations against a well-armed and well-trained aggressor.



b. Diplomatic negotiations necessary in extending U.S. invitations and obtaining acceptances for participation by Latin American countries emphasized a need for a long lead time for planning such joint exercises.

c. The limited size and configuration of the Rio Hato training area restricts the maneuverability of a reinforced battle group and does not permit a true test of the capabilities of an air-borne battle group.

d. The capabilities of this command were taxed to the maximum to provide personnel, facilities and equipment to adequately support the exercise and accommodate the large number of observers and press representatives.

#### 4. Conclusions

a. Valuable training benefits were received by all participants and the purpose of Exercise Banyan Tree II was fulfilled with the exception of a complete and realistic testing of STRAC and TAC mobility plans. The requirement for prepositioning of supplies and equipment, and for administrative and safety restrictions in an exercise of this nature, did not permit a true test of CARIBCOM Operational plans.

b. This exercise should be considered the first of a series of combined training exercises to be conducted in Latin America in which U.S. forces and those of selected Latin American countries could further develop a tactical military operational capability and concurrently demonstrate Western Hemispheric solidarity.

#### 5. Recommendations

a. That Latin American forces be invited to participate in future exercises conducted in this area.

b. That desired composition of forces for future exercises be determined sufficiently early to insure acceptance of invitations by Latin American participants not later than D-180 days.

c. That the number and identity of official observers be determined as early as possible so adequate arrangements can be made to provide administrative and logistical support.

d. That aircraft crews be kept to a minimum and only those personnel required to support the exercise accompany each aircraft in order to reduce the overload on the limited messing and billeting facilities at Fort Kobbe.

Final Report - Exercise Banyan Tree II

c. That the Army Operations Center be established in the Rio Hato area for future maneuvers instead of in the Canal Zone.

f. That VHF radio equipment, pack type, transportable and capable of dropping by parachute, be assigned to the TO&E of the Airborne Battle Group to provide for early control of close air support in the airhead area.

13 Incl

1. ANNEX A - Personnel
2. ANNEX B - Intelligence
3. ANNEX C - Operations
4. ANNEX D - Logistics
5. ANNEX E - Adjutant General
6. ANNEX F - Information
7. ANNEX G - Visitors Bureau
8. ANNEX H - Signal
9. ANNEX I - 1st Battle Group, 20th Inf
10. ANNEX J - 1st Airborne Battle Group, 325th Inf
11. ANNEX K - Umpire
12. ANNEX L - Troop List
13. ANNEX M - Distribution

ANNEX A

PERSONNEL

FINAL REPORT - EXERCISE BANYAN TREE II

1. Resume of Organization and Operations.

a. Organization: A project officer was designated early in the planning phase. He attended all briefings and conferences at Quarry Heights and Fort Amador, and coordinated the planning activities of Special Staff Sections (AG, Provost Marshal and Special Services). During the maneuver phase, a total of five (5) officers and two (2) enlisted men participated to provide the necessary personnel and administrative services in the Canal Zone and to staff the G1 Section of the command group at the Rio Hato maneuver area.

b. Summary of Operations. Operations prior to the exercise were characterized by developing the administrative requirements incident to the support of Exercise Banyan Tree II. In view of the mutual interest shared in preparing for and conduct of the exercise, G-1 collaborated and worked with appropriate agencies as follows:

- (1) Personnel requirements to support the exercise - G-1, AG, G-4 and Headquarters Commandant.
- (2) Umpire requirements - G-1, G-3, AG and Commanding Officer, 20th Infantry.
- (3) Special service program - G-1, Special Services, Commanding Officer, Forts Clayton and Kobbe.
- (4) Post Exchange Facilities - G-1, CEO and Commanding Officer, Forts Clayton and Kobbe.
- (5) Finance and pre-exercise money exchange - G-1, Finance Office and Mission Chiefs.
- (6) Preparation and execution of G-1 portion of the Banyan Tree II Administrative Order. - G-1, G-4, AG, Finance, Provost Marshal, Information Office, Central Exchange, Chaplain and Special Services Officer.

ANNEX A

Final Report - Exercise Banyan Tree II

- (7) On the spot and periodic casualty reports - G-1, CG, CofS, G-3, G-4, JOC CINCARIB and DA War Room.
- (8) Personnel Daily Summary - Reported daily during exercise to Office Chief of Staff, CINCARIB.
- (9) Prisoner of War Exchange, duty return of minor casualties and introduction of exercise replacements. G-1, AG, Chief Umpire Aggressor and OAS Unit Staffs.
- (10) Personnel and Administrative Briefings prior to and during the exercise for visiting General Officers, dignitaries, Latin American visitors and Chiefs of General and Special Staff Sections this headquarters.

2. Summary of Major Planning and Operational Problems.

a. Restrictions curtailing operations prior to and during the exercise.

(1) Shortage of available personnel to support the exercise. This could be alleviated in part if a peak load of students is not scheduled during Banyan Tree thereby providing an additional source of bilingual umpires.

(2) Austere staffing levels in all agencies of USARCARIB. An exercise of the magnitude of Exercise Banyan Tree II imposes a severe manpower shortage on agencies in the conduct of routine workloads. Any contemplated expansion of Banyan Tree type exercises must provide for an increase in staffing levels throughout USARCARIB.

b. Procedural problems

(1) No major procedural problems were encountered. The lack of an internal staff message center system and shortage of tactical vehicles hindered but did not seriously impede G-1 operations.

c. Adequacy of personnel, facilities and logistical support and organization thereof for the accomplishment of tasks assigned.

ANNEX A

Final Report - Exercise Banyan Tree II

(1) Insufficient personnel (one enlisted man) was taken to the field. This will be corrected next year in the light of experience gained.

(2) Logistical support was excellent, however the shortage of tactical vehicles was apparent. The military police had a marginal vehicle capability and performed well despite this handicap.

(3) The Information Office was provided the additional translator requested by I.O. It is now apparent that greater augmentation is needed. Experience shows that two officer spaces are needed as early as November if maximum benefits from publicity are desired.

3. Summary of Lessons Learned

a. Planning Phase. Planning for Banyan Tree III should begin at an earlier date than for Banyan Tree II. If next year's exercise is to place greater emphasis on Central and Latin American participation, action must be taken in the first quarter FY 1961 to earmark a Banyan Tree III planning group.

b. PIO should receive early augmentation.

c. Staffing levels of general staff sections should be reviewed and recall of reservists to two weeks active duty should be maximized during Banyan Tree III.

4. Conclusions and Recommendations

a. Attempt to obtain guidelines from CINCARIB at the earliest practicable date and consider early development of a Banyan Tree III Planning Staff.

b. Augment PIO and general staff sections to the maximum degree possible and maximize the recall to active duty for two weeks reservists in the Panama area.

c. Retain these comments and the Banyan Tree II Administrative Order as the basis for planning G-1 participation in Banyan Tree III.

ANNEX B

INTELLIGENCE

FINAL REPORT - EXERCISE BANYAN TREE II

1. Resume of Organization and Operations.

a. Organization & Tasks.

(1) The G-2 planning group consisted initially of one field grade officer and, during the three weeks immediately prior to D-Day, of one additional officer and one senior NCO. G-2 also obtained assistance for four days from one officer and four enlisted members of the 470th CIC Detachment.

(2) Planning tasks assigned to the above group included responsibility for the preparation of intelligence annexes to Exercise Directive #1 and to Op Order T-1-60. These included the Aggressor Scenario, Information Distribution Plan, prepared messages, terrain analysis, weather summary, air recon plans and communications intelligence and field operations intelligence plans. These documents governed the employment during the exercise of the following units:

1st Battle Group, 20th Infantry  
470th CIC Detachment  
45th MI Company  
ASA Support Team  
F-101 Photo Reconnaissance Unit (USAF)

b. Pre-D-Day activities aside from the planning tasks described above, included preparation of exercise build-up messages starting 24 February which included background information regarding the simulated enemy and daily weather and terrain information needed by the CONUS forces. Over-all supervision of training and preparatory activities of the 45th MI Company as well as the coordination of plans for the participation of ASA and CIC units imposed special requirements due to the existing Republic of Panama political situation at that time.

2. Summary of Major Planning and Operational Problems.

a. Planning Phase.

(1) Lack of time following receipt of the CINCARIB directive precluded a thoroughly coordinated planning effort.

ANNEX B

Final Report - Exercise Banyan Tree II

(2) The commitment, for planning purposes, of definite aggressor and CIC elements for the exercise was hampered by other operational commitments.

b. Operational Phase.

(1) The major problem was the near-absence of intelligence information from the tactical forces. Communications problems, confusion over command relationships and inadequate S2 activity were the primary causes of this situation.

(2) The requirement to function as the G-2 Section of both maneuver and player headquarters at Rio Hato placed a severe strain on limited G-2 personnel resources during the exercise. Intelligence play for both the aggressor and friendly sides resulted in around-the-clock functioning by members of the G-2 Command Group during the first two days and ultimately brought about certain deficiencies in the situations developed. These resulted both from fatigue and from a "schizophrenia" natural to the combined enemy-friendly role G-2 was required to play.

(3) Additional manpower restrictions resulted from the need for G-2 Air functions at both Rio Hato and Fort Amador.

(4) Although communications were installed according to plan and provided excellent service, they eventually proved inadequate. The G-2 vehicle-mounted radio net could not compete with the ground antenna and thus was useless most of the time. The absence of a direct G-2 - S-2 "hot line" precluded a realistic evaluation of S-2 reporting procedures or effectiveness.

(5) No training problems were encountered in connection with the Aggressor Force, and only minor ones attended the use of bilingual personnel of Company C, 1st BG, 20th Inf, by the 45MI Company. The need for training "friendly" units in aggressor concepts, code of conduct, Geneva Convention, etc., however, was evident.

(6) Difficulty in obtaining delivery of aerial photographs to using units was encountered throughout the exercise.

(7) Little effort was made by friendly units to interrogate or search POW's. Thus, approximately 50% of "planted" aggressor intelligence information was missed.

ANNEX B

Final Report - Exercise Banyan Tree II

3. Summary of Lessons Learned.

a. Planning Phase. Personnel augmentations to the G-2 Section prior to major maneuver activities are required either through TDY assignment, extended active duty of reserve intelligence personnel or levying the 470th CIC Detachment personnel. The following is minimum for a G-2 planning group:

- 1 Project Officer and Director Hq member
- 1 Asst Project Officer
- 1 G-2 Air Officer
- 1 Intelligence Training NCO
- 1 Intelligence Opns NCO
- 2 Clerk Typists

b. Operational Phase. Except for clerk typists which remain the same in the field, and the Project Officer who continues to function with the Director Headquarters, all personnel must be doubled in order to provide two shifts of Player Headquarters G-2 personnel during the exercise.

4. Conclusions and Recommendations.

a. Planning Phase.

(1) Distinction should be made early in the planning phase between the functions of a maneuver director headquarters and a player headquarters.

(2) USARCARIB Director headquarters must be established and begin functioning as a separate element no less than four months prior to D-Day.

(3) Publication schedules for all material should be issued by Director Headquarters by D-90 as should the basic maneuver scenario.

(4) All material utilized in the exercise should be translated for the benefit of Latin American participants.

(5) Translator-interpreter requirements should be determined not later than D-90 and screening of personnel begun at that time. Assignment of suitable bilingual personnel for translator duty with the USARCARIB AG Section should be accomplished by D-75.

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(6) In future exercises, a G-2 planning group, consisting of personnel from the G-2 Operations Division (who will act as chairman and also serve as G-2 member of the Director Headquarters), the S2 of the participating aggressor unit, and representatives of Engineer Intelligence (G-2 Air), 470th CIC Detachment (IPW, OB, CI and Special Intel Opns) and ASA, will be organized on D-90. This group will be augmented as early as funds permit by representatives of the US Army Aggressor Center, and any CONUS intelligence agencies required to operate independently of the battle group level participants.

(7) Specific training in the use of Aggressor as a training aid must be a part of pre-exercise training for all participating units. The procurement of training aids from US Army Aggressor Center and the training of bilingual interpreter teams should be accomplished not later than D-60. Training in intelligence subjects, Geneva Convention, the code of conduct and escape and evasion, etc., must begin for all player units, including Latin American participants, not later than D-30.

b. Operational Phase.

(1) Maneuver Director Headquarters should move to the field intact to function as its name implies. Reporting and responsible to that headquarters should be an Umpire Control Headquarters, a Division or "Player" Headquarters, and the Aggressor Headquarters. Primary functions of the Maneuver Director Headquarters would be insuring adherence to the scenario, conduct of briefings, and coordination of Aggressor activity, thus relieving the Umpires and Player Headquarters staff of those responsibilities.

(2) G-2 and G-3 of the Player Headquarters should be located in separate tents. Communications for G-2 should include intelligence telephone net as well as both ground-mounted and vehicle-mounted two-channel radio nets. (One intelligence channel, one command channel). G-2 Player section should consist of three shifts of two officers and three enlisted men each, although for short exercises two such shifts would suffice.

(3) Efforts should be made to eliminate the requirement for an AOC - ASOC in the Canal Zone. Failing this, provision should be made for an ARSB (Aerial Recon & Support Battalion) element to support the Player Headquarters G-2 Section.

(4) Included within Player Headquarters responsibilities should be a Division-type POW cage. Appropriate IPW activity should take place there.

ANNEX C

OPERATIONS

FINAL REPORT - EXERCISE BANYAN TREE II

1. Organization and Operations

a. Organization: The G3 project officer was also the command project officer and was responsible for coordinating the development of plans by all agencies within the command. He attended all briefings and conferences at Quarry Heights and Fort Amador and made liaison visits to Colombia, Brazil and to Fort Bragg, N.C. Other personnel of the G3 Section assisted with the preparation of plans and orders as required. During the tactical phase of the exercise three officers and four enlisted men were required in the Rio Hato maneuver area to perform G3 functions with the tactical command group on a 24-hour daily schedule while two officers and four enlisted men operated the Army Operations Center at Fort Amador in conjunction with the Air Support Operations Center. One officer was detailed as an observer escort and one officer was an umpire. Total G3 participation during the tactical phase: seven (7) officers and six (6) enlisted men.

b. Operations: Prior to the start of the tactical phase of the exercise, USARCARIB Exercise Directive Nr 1, and Operation Order T-1-60 were published. These provided guidance to participating agencies for development of their plans and outlined the tactical operations and support activities for the first day of the exercise. The Army Operations Center at Fort Amador and the advance element in the Rio Hato maneuver area became operational at 1600R, 7 March 1960 and remained in operation until all participating troops had cleared the Rio Hato area on 11 March 1960.

c. The G3 personnel in the tactical command group at Rio Hato were responsible for preparing orders and directives, maintaining a situation map and journal, briefing the CG, senior staff officers and official observers and disseminating information to the Combined Expeditionary Force in the maneuver area and the Army Operations Center at Fort Amador. All Banyan Tree II directives for the tactical forces subsequent to H-Hour were issued from the Command Group Headquarters at Rio Hato. The Army Operations Center at Fort Amador maintained a situation map and coordinated all air-lift and air support requirements with the ASOC and TCCP.

ANNEX C

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2. Major Planning and Operational Problems

a. Planning was hampered by delays in obtaining firm troop commitments from Latin American countries.

b. Liaison with participating units, particularly Latin American units, prior to the start of the exercise was very limited due to the inability to obtain firm commitments for participation.

c. The requirement for dividing the operations personnel between the Army Operations Center in the Canal Zone and the tactical command group in the Rio Hato area severely strained the limited personnel resources of this section.

d. The requirement for briefing and escorting observers in the maneuver area imposed a heavy burden on the limited personnel in the operations center. This situation was further aggravated by the lack of qualified linguists to perform briefing and escort duties for Latin American observers.

3. Lessons Learned

a. Planning Phase: (1) A lead time of 12 to 18 months is essential for planning future exercises which will include participation by Latin American forces. This is to allow for processing of invitations and acceptances through diplomatic channels.

(2) Liaison visits to participating Latin American countries must be made by planning personnel after firm troop commitments have been obtained.

(3) The command project officer should be relieved of all other duties not later than D-60 to enable him to devote full time to development of plans and directives for the exercise.

b. Operations Phase: (1) The need for an operations center at the Rio Hato maneuver area was evident throughout the exercise and should be included in the plans for future exercises in that area. The only requirement for an operations center in the Canal Zone is to provide coordination with the Air Support Operations Center. In future exercises consideration should be given to establishing the Air Support Operations Center in the Rio Hato area in conjunction with the Army Operations Center, or if this is not acceptable to the Air Force, consider furnishing only an Army Liaison officer to the Air Support Operations Center in the Canal Zone.

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(2) There is a need for a liaison or escort group in the maneuver area, composed of qualified linguists who would be available to brief and escort observers who visit the area.

4. Recommendations

a. That invitations to Latin American countries for participation in future exercises be extended sufficiently early to permit acceptance or refusal by D-180, and that this date be set as a deadline for establishing a firm troop list for the exercise.

b. That at least one liaison visit to each participating country by a selected Army planning group be programmed as soon as the final troop list is available and that at least one liaison officer from each participating country visit the Canal Zone for a conference and reconnaissance not later than D-60.

c. That the command project officer be relieved of all other duties not later than D-60.

d. That an Army Operations Center be established in the maneuver area and that the Air Support Operations Center be located adjacent thereto. If it is not feasible to locate the Air Support Operations Center in the Rio Hato area, then it is recommended that an Army liaison officer be furnished to the Air Support Operations Center rather than attempt to maintain two Army Operations Centers.

e. That a liaison group be located in the maneuver area composed of qualified linguists to perform briefing and escort for observers who visit the area.

ANNEX D

LOGISTICS

FINAL REPORT - EXERCISE BANYAN TREE II

1. Organization and Operation.

a. Personnel.

One Banyan Tree Project Officer.  
One Banyan Tree Project NCO.

b. Summary.

The project officer attended all briefings and conferences held at Quarry Heights and Fort Amador, and was the G-4 representative on liaison visits to CONARC, Fort Bragg, Colombia, and Brazil. Also, the G-4 project officer held periodic conferences with representatives from the USARCARIB technical services, the Post Headquarters concerned, and the 1st Battle Group, 20th Infantry, for the purpose of keeping all agencies informed on probable logistical requirements for the exercise.

2. Major Planning and Operational Problem.

a. Restrictions.

(1) The CONFIDENTIAL classification of the exercise for an unduly long time.

(2) The uncertainty of who and how many would participate from Latin American countries.

(3) The inability to obtain firm personnel figures (for logistical support planning) from the Air Force.

(4) Failure of CONUS supply sources to honor requisitions for 1/4-ton tactical vehicles.

(5) Administrative transportation capabilities of the command were inadequate to fully satisfy the demands made by official observers, press representatives, and other visiting personnel from Latin America.

(6) The late dates of invitations to participate and acceptance thereof prevented detailed liaison with the Latin American forces.

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b. Procedural Problems.

The limited time-frame for final publication of the Administrative-Logistical Annex to the Exercise Directive precluded distribution of a draft for review and comment by other than USARCARIB participants.

c. Adequacy of personnel, facilities, and logistical support and organization thereof for the accomplishment of tasks assigned.

(1) Personnel deficiencies were apparent in the following technical services: Engineer, Quartermaster, and Transportation.

(2) Facilities were considered adequate for the field portion of the exercise. Billeting facilities for the number of Air Force personnel sent in unannounced were barely adequate.

(3) Logistical Support.

(a) USARCARIB was unable logistically to support the billeting requirements for all observers, Air Force personnel, and visiting troops. Beds and mattresses were loaned by CAIRC to the Army Quartermaster to make up for the deficiency.

(b) To satisfy the requirements for tactical-type vehicles, all agencies of USARCARIB were virtually stripped. Umpire requirements for 35, each, 1/4-ton vehicles could not be met. Only 28 were furnished and the balance substituted with 3/4-ton vehicles. Only one 1/4-ton vehicle could be made available to each Latin American unit for command use. A minimum of one vehicle w/radio should be with each platoon, especially Latin American units, for proper control. A minimum of 12 additional 1/4-ton vehicles, w/radios, should have been available for this requirement.

d. Training Problems. None.

3. Summary of Lessons Learned.

a. Planning phase prior to exercise.

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(1) Decisions on participants must be made early, diplomatic clearances obtained, and invitations accepted in time to permit detailed discussions with participating personnel.

(2) Sufficient time must be allotted to the planning group on visits to participating countries for detailed planning.

(3) DCSLOG must be advised of equipment shortages in sufficient time to establish CONUS supply and assure arrival in Panama of equipment to support the projected exercise.

(4) Project officers from the staff agencies should have exercise planning as an "additional duty" only until D-90. From D-90 until the exercise terminates, staff project officers should be permitted to devote full time to exercise planning and execution.

(5) Realistic tactical requirements for quantities of Cl III, IV, and V supplies must be planned to eliminate the excessive turn-in of unused items.

b. Plans and operations during the maneuver.

(1) To avoid confusion for resupply of water, rations, etc., during the early hours of a future maneuver, the logistics annex should "spell out" the procedures and pinpoint locations of each supply point.

4. Conclusions and Recommendations.

a. Conclusions.

The logistical support provided by the technical services of USARCARIB for Exercise Banyan Tree II and the cooperation of all tactical units of USARCARIB in making available TOE equipment to support the exercise were outstanding.

b. Recommendations.

(1) That initial guidance for Banyan Tree III be requested from Commander in Chief, Caribbean Command, during May 1960.

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- (2) That initial USARCARIB plans for Banyan Tree III be prepared during June 1960, and concept approval obtained from CINC, Caribbean Command.
- (3) That an initial planning conference with representatives of DA, CONARC, and Caribbean Command be scheduled during July 1960 to establish the framework concept of exercise, and participants.
- (4) That participants, other than U. S., be invited through appropriate channels with an acceptance deadline of 1 October 1960.
- (5) That a target date of 1 March 1961 be set for Banyan Tree III.
- (6) That, based upon the results of conference proposed in paragraph (3), supra, a probable equipment requirements list be furnished to DA/DCSLOG, and a priority for requisitioning delivery be established.
- (7) That USARCARIB staff project officers be relieved from other duties on a D-minus date sufficiently in advance of the exercise to operate as a maneuver directors headquarters.
- (8) That liaison visits with participating units be of sufficient duration to permit resolution of problem areas.
- (9) That an endeavor be made to limit to the minimum essential the observers, press representatives, and visiting dignitaries.

ANNEX E

ADJUTANT GENERAL

FINAL REPORT - EXERCISE BANYAN TREE II

1. Resume of Organization and Operation

a. The planning and implementation of procedures for personnel administrative support was accomplished without a specific organization within this Section. Existing policies and directives are adaptable to operations of this nature except as pertains to OAS troops.

b. Since the visiting units did not have personnel administrative support accompanying the unit, it was necessary for this office to provide this support until completion of the exercise, when units were attached to Fort Kobbe or Fort Clayton.

c. One Captain was appointed as AG Project Officer to represent this office in the planning phase for the exercise. During the exercise this officer and one NCO constituted an AG element located at the Maneuver Control Headquarters at Rio Hato Base Camp.

d. During the planning phase, the operations of this office consisted of:

(1) The application of existing policies concerning personnel services and administration to US troops, and to OAS troops when possible.

(2) Implementation of training in casualty reporting and replacement processing during the exercise.

(3) Procurement of personnel for support of exercise.

e. During the exercise, operation of this office consisted of:

(1) The normal AG functions in support of both US and OAS troops. With the exception of some reproduction services at Rio Hato, all these functions were accomplished at USARCARIB headquarters at Fort Amador. The AG Forward element at Rio Hato was equipped with a portable mimeograph and furnished reproduction services at Rio Hato.

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(2) The primary mission of the AG Forward element was the supervision of simulated casualty reporting and processing of replacements (including the operation of a replacement station at Rio Hato). Statistical data for this phase of training is as follows:

(a) Simulated casualties evacuated beyond control of participating units (1st BG, 325th Inf) to Rio Hato Base Camp -- 311.

(b) Simulated casualties processed and returned to duty within control of participating unit (1st BG, 325th Inf) -- 27.

(c) Replacements (includes personnel evacuated to Base Camp, repatriated POW's, personnel hospitalized (heat cases) at Base Hospital and returned to duty) processed at Replacement Station and returned to duty -- 418.

2. Summary of Major Planning and Operational Problems

a. There were no significant restrictions curtailing operations prior to and during the exercise.

b. The procurement of personnel, particularly when foreign troops are involved, requires an early determination of requirements. While the procurement of specialists is no particular problem, the added prerequisite of bilingual capabilities is. It was only after great difficulty that trained bilingual personnel were obtained to support requirements. For example, a bilingual radio operator-driver is a hard combination to find.

c. There were no facilities to hold POW's and simulated casualties evacuated to Base Camp. The lack of facilities was not conducive to control and it was only due to the ability of the AG Forward element to return individuals to their units within a short period of time that precluded personnel straggling. (Only one of the 418 was returned to his unit as AWOL.) However, the collection of POW's reached as high as 70 in a single day, but could not be returned to their unit until after dark for tactical reasons. Messing of these transient personnel was accomplished only by the versatility of the Base Camp Mess.

d. No training problems were encountered insofar as the AG is concerned. It was noted that Combat Area Casualty Reporting as prescribed by a dormant regulation (AR 600-66) was not followed

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precisely by participating US Units. However, an acceptable reporting procedure was in effect at company level and attained the desired training value.

e. Evacuation of simulated casualties was made direct from aid station of participating units to the Replacement Station, Rio Hato Base Camp where they were processed for return to units as replacements. USARCARIB Maneuver directive contained this requirement. However, the USAF Medical element stated their plans called for the evacuation of simulated casualties to Albrook. This was not feasible since no provisions had been made for return of individuals as replacements to Rio Hato. It was necessary to effect last minute changes with the Air Force to preclude the evacuation of simulated casualties from Rio Hato. This indicated lack of coordination between participating units and the Air Force at staging areas in CONUS. The operations order of the 82d Abn Div complied with the maneuver directive of this headquarters concerning evacuation of simulated casualties. However, the operations order of the coordinate USAF element required evacuation to Albrook. (The evacuation of simulated casualties to Albrook at Exercise Banyan Tree for 1959 caused complete failure of replacement processing since no means were available to return individuals to Rio Hato except by administrative means.)

3. Summary of Lessons Learned

a. Due to the wide publicity of the exercise it was essential that the Maneuver Control Headquarters have accurate data pertaining to individuals of both US and OAS forces. During the preparation for the exercise MRU status cards and emergency data forms of US troops were obtained and in custody of the AG Forward element at Base Camp. This information made it possible for personnel status and casualty reports to be prepared expeditiously and obviated any delay caused by lack of information. The US liaison officers with OAS forces assumed the responsibility for dissemination of information concerning individuals. While this did accomplish the purpose due to the short course of the exercise, it is the opinion that in any future exercise or military operation of a prolonged period this responsibility should be assumed by the AG.

b. No internal staff distribution center was manned by the AG Forward element at Rio Hato since none was devised. It is considered that when this headquarters establishes an advance command group, the usual administrative services (including reproduction) should be available to the group.

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c. The Rio Hato Base Camp Commander assumed responsibility for message center deliveries. However, this was not determined until after the commencement of the exercise. The specific agency responsible (normally Signal) for message center delivery was not determined prior to the exercise as it should have been.

d. Teletype (ACAN) messages were either delivered by the courier flights scheduled in the SOI or in some cases relayed over the AOC station at Fort Amador to Rio Hato by tactical line. It is understood by this office that future operations will be serviced by administrative teletype relay to the Maneuver Headquarters from the Communications Center at Quarry Heights.

e. During the initial operations of the exercise, injured and sick personnel were evacuated direct to USARCARIB medical facilities. No problem existed insofar as casualty reporting was concerned in view of subparagraph a, above. However, the visiting unit (1st BG, 325th Inf) was delayed in achieving personnel accountability after the drop since they had no exact record of who had been evacuated. No difficulty encountered in supplying the information, but some confusion existed as to who would supply reports of hospitalized personnel. The responsibility of AG for reporting bona fide casualties was stated in the maneuver directive. However, information on all injured personnel (not reportable casualties) were accumulated by Chaplain, Surgeon, PIO, G-1, G-4, AG, CINCARIB, Umpire Control, etc. Consequently, there was some confusion as to just who was responsible for supplying official lists of sick and injured to authorized sources. A responsible agency (G-1 or AG) should be designated in future exercise directives.

f. No difficulty was encountered in the implementation and execution of plans for personnel administration. Since locator cards are made available by the servicing MRU in CONUS, all personal mail for members of non-resident units should, in the future, be addressed to a single concentration center, when exercises are of short duration. Experience indicates that during exercises of short duration, very little personal mail is received and does not warrant the employment of the Post Office liaison clerk at each military post. A single concentration center will provide expeditious processing and delivery of mail to unit mail clerks by AG.

4. Conclusions and Recommendations

a. The short period of the exercise precluded a full evaluation of all aspects of personnel administration and services.

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However, the training achieved by the full play of simulated casualties and replacements was excellent. The experience gained by Exercise Banyan Tree for 1959 was invaluable in improving the plans and their execution for Banyan Tree II.

b. No specific recommendations are submitted; however, the observations stated in paragraph 3, above, should be considered in the development of plans for future exercises.

ANNEX F

INFORMATION

FINAL REPORT - EXERCISE BANYAN TREE II

1. Resume of Organization and Operations

a. Organization for maneuver. An exercise information office was organized under the PIO, Caribbean Command, consisting of personnel of the PIO, Caribbean Command; Information Office, USARCARIB; Information Services Office, Caribbean Air Command; attached information personnel of the 82d Airborne Division; attached information personnel from CINFO, DA; Army Home Town News Center and attached information officers of the 19th Air Force. Army personnel attached were: from Information Office, USARCARIB, two officers and 16 enlisted men (five from CFN), and two civilians; from IAGS, one enlisted interpreter; from Technical Services Pacific, two drivers with sedans; from CINFO, DA, one officer and three EM; from Army Home Town News Center, one NCO; and from Information Office, 82d Airborne Division, three officers and five EM.

b. Operations prior to the exercise.

(1) Caribbean Command determined that the press center would be located at the Officers Club, Albrook Air Force Base, due to the proximity to the Air Field and Headquarters Caribbean Command. Caribbean Command placed site support requirements on the components. Both All-American Cables and Tropical Radio were invited to place press wire and radio telephone facilities in the press center.

(2) The Information Officer, USARCARIB, held a series of planning sessions to determine advance operations and the Army operations in the press center. Fact sheets on all participating units including the aggressor, and biographies of leading Army commanders were prepared for distribution.

(3) Special editions of the Buccaneer were published on 4 and 11 March. Distribution was made to all troop units of the daily news summary, the Chronicle.

(4) Visits to USARCARIB School and JWTC were coordinated for projected press visits during latter phase of the maneuvers.

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c. Operations during the exercise.

(1) A total of 42 US correspondents, 21 South American press correspondents, three USA or USAF escorts and the PIO of the Chilean Air Force were accommodated at the press center from 6 through 13 March. In addition, 31 representatives of the local Panama press were scheduled to Rio Hato for D-Day. A daily summary was provided to USIA, Washington, D.C. for inclusion in the radio teletype news throughout Latin America and pictures, film and news releases were sent by air express daily to CINFO, DA; Ft. Bragg, and to Brazil, Colombia, Chile and Peru.

(2) Personnel of the press center made frequent distribution of pictures during the day to correspondents in the press center. CFN broadcast and telecast daily summaries and pictures of the exercise at Rio Hato.

2. Summary of Major Planning and Operational Problems

a. Release of non-battle losses of Latin American units. There should be written instructions for the guidance of press center personnel on how casualty information is to be released in the case of Latin American personnel. The need for this information also was outlined to the representatives of the US Army Missions in Brazil and Colombia.

b. It would be more satisfactory if there could be a properly qualified liaison officer attached to the press center from each participating force.

c. During Banyan Tree II, at the request of the 82d Airborne Division, Information officers at the press center agreed that only casualties actually hospitalized in the Zone would be reported to the press and that jump casualties would be minimized.

d. Translators. The USARCARIB Information Office requested one enlisted Spanish linguist be provided to the press center. The work requirement turned out to be 16 hours daily with a need of a Portuguese linguist also.

3. Summary of Lessons Learned

a. Planning prior to exercise.

(1) Photographers should be advised in advance that they will not be permitted in the drop zone during landing of troops

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or heavy equipment by parachute so that they can plan to bring telephoto lens.

(2) Two well qualified Spanish translators and one well qualified Portuguese translator should be assigned duty at the press center.

(3) Caribbean Command should continue to billet the press together in an adequate press center, such as that established at Albrook AFB.

b. Plans and Operations during the maneuver.

(1) All information officers should ensure that their personnel understand the rules on release of casualty information.

(2) Press center should continue to arrange daily transportation to Rio Hato for correspondents who wish to witness the maneuver following D-Day.

4. Conclusions and Recommendations

a. Instructions should be provided for guidance of press center personnel on release of casualty information.

b. The press center should be provided two (2) Spanish translators and one (1) Portuguese translator for troop participation such as existed during Banyan Tree II.

c. That a round trip correspondent run be scheduled daily to Rio Hato subsequent to D-Day, leaving the Canal Zone in the morning and returning early afternoon of same day.

ANNEX G

VISITORS BUREAU

FINAL REPORT - EXERCISE BANYAN TREE II

1. Resume of Organization and Operation

a. The Visitors' Bureau is normally staffed with one officer (major) and three enlisted men (one E-6, one E-5, and one E-4). Prior to and during the Exercise, the Visitors' Bureau was staffed with two officers (one major and one first lieutenant), three SP-5's, one SP-4, and one civilian (clerk-typist).

b. Prior to the Exercise, the Visitors' Bureau coordinated with other staff sections for the establishment of the following observer facilities in the Canal Zone for official observers from CONUS and Latin America:

(1) Billets.

(2) Transportation

(3) Mess

(4) Observer and spectator facilities at Rio Hato on D-Day.

c. During the Exercise, the Visitors' Bureau monitored the activities of the official observers and assisted in administrative matters pertaining to their departure from the Canal Zone.

2. Summary of Major Planning and Operational Problems.

a. The following restrictions curtailing operations were noted:

(1) Late receipt of information concerning official observers necessitated detailed instructions and guidance to be disseminated verbally rather than by written instructions.

(2) Incomplete information on official observers caused delays in furnishing visitors complete brochures, billets, and transportation.

b. There were no apparent procedural problems. Direction was furnished by the CARIB command and implemented by coordination with the component commands.

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c. (1) The staff of Visitors' Bureau during the Exercise was adequate. The personnel of the Visitors' Bureau remained at their present location and coordinated tasks assigned in conjunction with normal day-to-day activities. It is considered that the grouping of Visitors' Bureau personnel into a central control office would provide a more efficient exchange of information between component commands.

(2) Facilities for official observers during the Exercise were adequate.

(3) Logistical support was excellent.

d. No training problems were encountered by the Visitors' Bureau.

3. Summary of Lessons Learned

a. It is necessary to limit the number of official observers which can be properly provided for within the command during major exercises. It is highly desirable to obtain complete information on those accepting the invitations as official observers in order to properly billet, transport, and provide each observer with information of a local nature which will make his stay pleasant and comfortable.

b. During the Exercise, it is necessary that official observers maintain contact with the Visitors' Bureau and provide information which will enable the Visitors' Bureau to assist them in their day-to-day needs and preparations for departure.

4. Conclusions and Recommendations

a. Conclusion: That timely and complete information concerning official observers is highly desirable in order to provide adequate accommodations and facilities.

b. Recommendations:

(1) That the number of official observers from CONUS, Latin America, and local area be limited to 400.

(2) That information concerning official observers be received in this command not later than thirty (30) days prior to the Exercise.

## ANNEX H

### SIGNAL

#### FINAL REPORT - EXERCISE BANYAN TREE II

##### 1. Resume of Organization and Operations

a. The command communications system for Banyan Tree II was installed, operated and maintained primarily by personnel assigned to the Signal Area Support Platoon organized under TOE 11-8 T ROCID with a strength of one (1) officer and thirty (30) enlisted men. The platoon was augmented by eight (8) wiremen/switchboard operators for Rio Hato Base Camp, one (1) motor messenger in the Canal Zone and one (1) field radio repairman for Base Camp. Three (3) officers from the USARCARIB Signal Office participated as follows: The Signal operations officer, who planned the command communications system, functioned during the exercise as the Maneuver Signal Officer; the assistant operations officer who maintained close liaison with the Umpire Control Group as Umpire Communications Officer and the Signal Executive Officer who acted as chief coordinator on all major communications problems arising during the exercise. Signal personnel were also provided by Post Signal Division (two (2) enlisted men) and by Pictorial Division (one (1) officer and sixteen (16) enlisted men). In addition, a Signal Corps reserve officer on two (2) week active duty participated as a Signal Observer.

b. In October 1959, after preliminary logistical planning for Banyan Tree II had been completed, Signal equipment required to support the exercise was requisitioned from CONUS. All requisitioned equipment was shipped on a priority basis and received in this command during January 1960.

c. Early in January 1960, a 12-channel (VHF) radio relay system was established between the Canal Zone and Rio Hato. Terminals were installed on Flamenco Island, Canal Zone and adjacent to the air strip at Rio Hato. This system operated continuously before and during the exercise without interruption to telephone service between tactical phones in the maneuver area and the administrative telephone system in the Canal Zone. Concurrently, one 4-channel (VHF) radio relay terminal was tested for operations with a similar (VHF) terminal to be established by the Area Communications Center Platoon, accompanying the 1st Airborne Battle Group, 325th Infantry. A second terminal was tested for utilization

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as an alternate terminal in order that continuous and reliable communications could be maintained with the 325th Infantry Main CP and their Advance CP during displacement. In February 1960, the third and fourth 4-channel terminals were installed and operated between Base Camp Rio Hato and the Aggressor CP. It was felt that a radio relay link across the maneuver area would afford more dependable communications than field wire. A total of six (6) radio relay terminals were operating during the exercise without experiencing any equipment failures.

d. All planned wire circuits were installed both in the Canal Zone and at Rio Hato approximately two (2) weeks prior to D-Day. Administrative installations at Rio Hato requested activation of the command communications approximately three (3) weeks before D-Day. A total of thirty-five (35) miles of field wire was laid by the Signal Area Support Platoon while ninety-five (95) miles of field wire was installed by the communication Platoon, 325th Infantry, during the exercise. An additional 18,000 feet of 5-pair cable was installed by the Signal Area Support personnel between the Army switchboard (CHAMPION) and control desk on the Drop Zone. These lines were used primarily for control, emergency and administrative purposes. By D/2 these circuits were inactivated.

e. Due to the number of telephones required by the Umpire Control Group, USARCARIB Advance CP and general Base Camp needs, another switchboard (SB-86) was established in Base Camp (CIDER). This switchboard was loaded to capacity, twenty-six (26) local lines and four (4) trunk circuits. The Army switchboard (CHAMPION) contained twenty (20) trunk circuits and sixteen (16) local lines in addition to the Radio/Wire Integration Station. Fifty-eight (58) tactical telephones (TA-312) were installed in the maneuver area by the Signal Area Support Platoon. Also thirteen (13) "hot-line" circuits were installed for different units at Rio Hato. Post Signal personnel installed nineteen (19) "hot-lines" and twenty-seven (27) local lines with phones for the Air Force participation in the Canal Zone.

f. One (1) teletype circuit operated between Rio Hato and a refile station on Flamenco Island. An additional teletype set at Flamenco Island was tied-in to administrative teletype system. A total of eighteen (18) messages were sent and received by the Rio Hato Station.

g. Forty-three (43) tactical radios were requisitioned and received from CONUS. During February 1960, Signal Maintenance

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Division, Madden Wye, issued and installed sixty-two (62) radios for the Umpire Control Group - 32 portables and 30 vehicular sets.

- h. No cryptographic traffic was routed during the exercise.
- i. Electronic warfare measures were effectively employed against both the Friendly and Aggressor units.
- j. The Signal Area Support Platoon field radio repair section repaired sixty-six (66) major communications items and twenty-five (25) minor items besides replacing over one hundred (100) radio tubes. All items turned in for repair were repaired and returned to appropriate units prior to their redeployment to the Canal Zone.
- k. The Air Force installed and operated a similar 12-channel (VHF) radio relay system between Rio Hato and Ancon Hill, Canal Zone. A relay station was established on Taboga Island. Four circuits were exchanged between the Army and Air Force systems. This arrangement provided each Service with an alternate means of communications in the event equipment failure occurred during the exercise. It also afforded more rapid telephone traffic between Army and Air Force units.

2. Summary of Major Planning and Operational Problems

- a. Some confusion and difficulty was experienced both in the Canal Zone as well as Rio Hato in installing wire circuits and telephones to meet Air Force tactical communication requirements. Two conditions were responsible for these difficulties; (1) 21 Air Force personnel arrived unannounced and requested immediate communications support or, (2) late arrivals lacked the knowledge concerning local plans for their operational locations. As a result, considerable overtime and last minute installations and re-locations were performed.
- b. Distribution responsibility for Signs and Counter-Signs should be placed upon G-2 instead of the Signal Section which publishes it in the SOI. If during an exercise the SOI falls into enemy hands, the Sign and Counter-Signs would be compromised. By G-2 making separate distribution, as required, issuing could be expedited to appropriate units.
- c. Messages received in the Canal Zone intended for units at Rio Hato accumulated excessive handling time during local routing due to an inadequate teletype net between the Canal Zone

ANNEX H

Final Report - Exercise Banyan Tree II

and Rio Hato. Teletype traffic received in the ACAN relay and terminal station intended for USARCARIB AG and ASOC could not be delivered as rapidly as required since no one was on duty at AG after normal duty hours, nor was there a teletype machine installed in ASOC with connection in the Administrative teletype net.

d. Some confusion was experienced by the 1st Airborne Battle Group, 325th Infantry while maintaining radio (FM) contact in their Command Net with the Latin units. Radio stations assigned to the Latin units did not consistently maintain satisfactory radio contact. Often when orders were to be issued to the Latin countries, radio contact could not be established. Radio operator liaison personnel assigned to the Latin units with radio equipment were not fully trained in radio procedure to operate tactical radios or sufficiently indoctrinated in the necessity for keeping these circuits in operation at all times.

3. Summary of Lessons Learned

a. In future communications planning for joint exercises employing CONUS and allied forces coordination should be accomplished early during the preliminary planning stages, with personnel from each participating country. Although no difficulty was experienced in developing the Army's tactical communications plan, in conjunction with the 1st Airborne Battle Group, 325th Infantry, many communications problems affecting the Latins could have been explored in greater detail, if a liaison visit had been made to each country. During Banyan Tree II, fifteen (15) radios (AN-PRC-10) were loaned to the Brazilian unit by the 325th Infantry so that the Brazilian officers and NCO's could control their units while in the attack. A vehicular radio from the 325th Infantry, with qualified operator, was also sent to the Brazilian unit in order that more dependable communications could be maintained between the commanders of each force. These radios could have been issued to the Brazilians through Signal Supply prior to D-Day.

b. More detailed coordination for future exercises must be effected between the Army and Air Force as to responsibility for providing Forward Air Controller radios. Certain radios were capable of contacting U.S. aircraft arriving from the ZI but not of contacting the Latin aircraft. Differences in equipment in aircraft and frequency coverages caused this problem.

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c. Due to Order and Shipping time for equipment required from CONUS, Umpire communications equipment planning and requisitioning had to be accomplished by the Signal Officer on an estimated basis and before assignment of Umpire spaces of personnel. This resulted in a number of last minute changes in the Umpire communications plan and equipment requirement.

4. Conclusion and Recommendations

a. All communications for Exercise Banyan Tree II as planned, installed and operated were adequate, except teletype.

b. It is recommended that:

(1) A full duplex teletype circuit be installed and operated between TAOC, Fort Amador and the Message Center at Rio Hato. Installed beside the TAOC teletype equipment should be another teletype machine operating in the command administrative teletype net.

(2) In future joint exercises Air Force should operate a teletype net between ASOC, Fort Amador and AATCC at Rio Hato.

(3) AG, USARCARIB operate on a 24-hour basis during future exercises in order to receive, distribute and dispatch exercise traffic as well as normal messages.

(4) AG representatives in Advance CP, Rio Hato be responsible for internal distribution in Base Camp. Signal to provide messengers for meeting aircraft deliveries and messenger service to subordinate units. Long haul delivery in the Canal Zone to be continued by Signal personnel during exercises.

(5) G-2 issue exercise Sign and Counter-Signs directly to participating units rather than subject the system to compromise through loss or capture of an SOI.

(6) In future communication plans, consideration be given to implementing a separate Intelligence Net between G-2 and S-2 sections.

(7) Electronic Warfare measures be continued at the present rate of employment or given such increase as may be practicable within the resources to be made available.

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(8) All officers and enlisted personnel operating voice radios in future exercises should be thoroughly trained in correct radio procedure prior to the exercise. This recommendation is particularly applicable to umpire and liaison personnel.

(9) USARCARIB Signal Officer, or representative, make at least one (1) liaison visit to each country participating in future joint exercises.

c. Communications personnel for the exercise, as provided by the Signal Area Support Platoon and augmented, were adequate for a short exercise of three (3) days. However, it must be pointed out that Signal could not adequately support from existing assigned personnel any future joint exercise where requirements increased materially from Banyan Tree II, either in extent or time of duration. Thirty (30) personnel installed and operated the command communications system for Banyan Tree II. Present assigned personnel could not maintain continuous and dependable communications during a sustained operation exceeding seven (7) days. A comparable tactical communications system would normally be operated by seventy-two (72) personnel authorized a typical Infantry Signal Battalion. In view of the recent reorganization of the Signal Area Support Platoon to the 3rd Signal Platoon (Area Support) Signal will be in a better position to support future joint exercises similar in magnitude to Banyan Tree II.

ANNEX I

1st BATTLE GROUP, 20th INFANTRY

FINAL REPORT - BANYAN TREE II - 1960

1. Resume of Organization and Operations.

a. Summary of Organization.

(1) 1st Battle Group, 20th Infantry was organized for Banyan Tree II in four groups as indicated below:

(a) Aggressor Forces: Co, Staff Representatives, Hq Co (-); Co's B, D, E; Co D, 34th Armor; Recon Platoon; Engineer Platoon; and one platoon 518th Engineer Co (-).

(b) Logistical Support - Rio Hato Base Camp: One Officer - Base Camp Commander; Supply and Maintenance Platoon (-); S-4 Base Camp; 518th Engineer Company (-); Troop Engineer Support.

(c) Logistical Support - Fort Kobbe: Staff Representatives (S-1, S-2, S-3 S-4); C/S Co (-); Hq Co (-); Battery B, 22nd Arty; JWTC (-).

(d) Umpire - Organization and functions submitted in a separate report.

(2) Company A did not participate because of an operational commitment.

(3) Missions assigned 1st Battle Group, 20th Infantry.

(a) Provide all logistical support for participating forces in the Rio Hato area.

(b) Assume administrative and logistical responsibility for the 1st Battle Group, 325th Abn Inf, 82d Airborne Division, at Fort Kobbe upon completion of the exercise until departure of that unit for its home station.

(c) Provide 1st Battle Group, 325th Abn Inf with 27 tactical vehicles, 6 administrative vehicles, 1 wrecker, 1 bulldozer, 1 lowboy and 2 water trailers.

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(d) Provide billeting and 24-hour messing facilities for USAF crews of TAC aircraft based at Howard Air Force Base during the exercise from 4-16 March 1960. (Estimated strength was 274 Officers and 415 Enlisted men.)

(e) Furnish and equip 3 Rifle Companies, Recon Platoon, two Engineer Platoons, and elements of Hqs Company to represent Aggressor Forces. One company was used for Honor Guard and retrieving parachutes prior to their participation as Aggressors.

(f) Prepare drop zone and landing zone at Rio Hato for use by Air Force and airborne elements.

(g) Provide orientation, instruction and practical work in jungle training at Fort Kobbe for 1st Battle Group, 325th Abn Inf.

(h) Provide medical support for Aggressors and assist USARCARIB medics in support of 1st Battle Group, 325th Abn Inf.

(i) Provide 32 drivers for USARCARIB.

(j) Provide logistical support to establish bleacher area at DZ-LZ for airborne drop.

(4) Organization and strength: Incl 1.

b. Summary of operations prior to and during exercise.

(1) S-1: Assisted in formulation of battle group plans for receiving, housing, subsisting and administratively supporting all elements participating in the exercise which included expansion of Officers' and NCO quarters and facilities; coordination of mail services; Special Services program.

(2) S-2: See Incl 2.

(3) S-3: Planned and coordinated activities to insure that missions outlined above were accomplished. Participated in planning conferences at USARCARIB and CINCARIB. Published training directive for Aggressor training. Acted as coordinator for planning within the battle group.

(4) S-4: Provided logistical support for participating forces at Rio Hato; provided logistical support for 1st Battle Group, 325th Abn Inf from 10-18 March 1960; provided billeting and messing

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facilities for USAR at Howard AFB 28 Feb - 18 Mar 1960; assumed logistical support for participating Latin American Forces (Panama, Brazil, Colombia) at Rio Hato. Supplies and equipment in support of Exercise Banyan Tree II were determined in advance of D-Day and were obtained from appropriate Technical Services and prepositioned at Rio Hato supply point or Fort Kobbe.

2. Summary of Major Planning and Operational Problems.

a. Restrictions curtailing operations prior to and during the exercise.

(1) Difficulty was encountered in obtaining specific requirements for the LZ-DZ area which caused this work to be accomplished at a late date.

(2) S-4: Due to enormous supply requirements in connection with Banyan Tree II, it was necessary to curtail normal Battle Group supply operations during the period 29 Feb - 18 March, except for emergency requisitioning only.

b. Procedural Problems:

(1) The use of army aircraft was not clearly defined during the operation. There seemed to be no central location where planes could be allocated or approved for use at a particular time.

(2) Certain logistical requirements for the Air Force were not made known to S-4, 1st BG, 20th Inf, prior to arrival of AF personnel, resulting in such support not being immediately available.

(3) The incoming Air Force personnel far outnumbered the original strengths made known to S-4. Daily contacts were made with Air Force operations personnel at Albrook and Howard Air Force Bases to obtain arrival times.

(4) Certain Logistical requirements for Airborne Battle Group, ie, additional transportation, wrecker, etc., were not known to S-4 until the advance party arrived.

c. Adequacy of personnel, facilities and logistical support.

(1) Number of personnel was adequate.

(2) Facilities available at Fort Kobbe were adequate.

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(3) Logistical support was adequate.

3. Summary of Lessons Learned:

a. Planning phase prior to the exercise:

(1) Detailed planning in logistics is vital. All Special project personnel should be assigned early in the planning phase.

(2) During the planning phase of the exercise the office of Base Commander should be located in the Umpire Headquarters. This would simplify some coordinating actions and would make the Base CO readily available to interested agencies.

(3) All operations in the Rio Hato area, exclusive of maneuver operations, be coordinated and supervised by the Base Commander.

(4) Aircraft for returning troops from Rio Hato were not laid on sufficiently far in advance for sound planning.

(5) Ranges around Albrook and Howard cannot be scheduled during periods when aircraft are departing.

(6) Full time project personnel are needed at the earliest possible date in order to effect the required planning and coordination.

b. Plans and operations during the exercise.

(1) Aggressor Forces: See Incl 2.

(2) Engineer Support: See Incl 3.

4. Conclusions and Recommendations.

a. Conclusions.

(1) All 1st Battle Group personnel who participated in the exercise received valuable training.

(2) The exercise area was prepared as realistically as the time allocated for preparations allowed.

(3) The presence of an advanced detail from the 325th Airborne Battle Group was invaluable in planning the missions of the 1st Battle Group, 20th Infantry.

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(4) That two day program of Jungle Training proved to be more satisfactory than the one day of training conducted in Banyan Tree I.

b. Recommendations:


(1) That the Air Force send at least one officer per tactical air wing participating in the exercise to Fort Kobbe at least ten days prior to arrival of the first elements of that wing to coordinate logistical support as required.

(2) That aircraft crews be kept to a minimum and only those personnel required to support the exercise accompany each plane, so as not to overload the limited messing and billeting facilities at Fort Kobbe.

(3) That a Jungle Navigation course be conducted in lieu of Jungle Orientation as this would provide more practical work.

3 Incls

1. Organization
2. Aggressor Report
3. Engineer Support



Incl 2 to Annex I

AGGRESSOR

FINAL REPORT - EXERCISE BANYAN TREE II

1. Resume of Organization for Maneuver.

a. Organization for maneuver: See Addendums 1 and 2

b. Summary of operations prior to and during exercise.

(1) Aggressor Headquarters was officially organized 22 Feb 1960. However, as early as November 1959 the CO of Aggressor Forces had been designated so that he could attend planning conferences at higher headquarters. During December 1959 preliminary work began on planning for the organization of the Aggressor Force.

(2) Unit commanders notified personnel within their units of their assignments within their units, conducted a training program designed to properly orient all personnel for their mission as Aggressors.

(3) On 4 March Aggressor Forces moved to Rio Hato and began preparation of the area.

(4) The S-1 Section for Aggressor handles the play of replacements into problem and supervised normal personnel matters.

(5) The S-2 Section planned the conversion of Aggressor Forces and was responsible for the following as Aggressor S-2.

(a) Received and distributed Aggressor uniforms.

(b) Briefed and organized personnel for prepared intelligence situations.

(c) Coordinated plans for operations of IPW teams.

(6) S-3 accomplished the following prior to the exercise.

(a) Published a D/F notifying units who would participate as Aggressors. This was accomplished about 1 Feb 1960.

(b) Provided for training in Aggressor doctrine history, rank and procedures, Aggressor order of battle.

Incl 2 to Annex I

After Action Report, Banyan Tree II 1960

Incl 2 to Annex I  
Aggressor

(c) Published movement order moving Aggressor Forces to maneuver area.

(7) Prior to the exercise S-4 was responsible for the following:

(a) Organization of an Aggressor S-4 Staff.

(b) Coordinated with Technical Services on equipment for the Aggressors and Aggressor Camp, ammunition, mines and wire for Aggressors.

(c) Planned for the re-supply of Aggressor Forces during the problem.

(d) Stockpiled ammunition, wire and mines at Aggressor Camp prior to the exercise.

## 2. Summary of Major Planning and Operational Problems.

a. Restrictions curtailing operations prior to and during problem.

(1) The use of smoke for umpires, Aggressors and Friendly Forces had not been allocated by colors. All three elements, by coincidence, planned to use the same color smoke. This caused a last-minute change in orders.

b. Procedural Problems.

(1) POW exchanges did not take place as planned several times.

(2) The Brazilians apparently had not been properly briefed at troop level on the proper behavior toward Aggressors. This caused the Aggressors to withdraw to avoid an incident.

(3) There was apparently no "Central Control Point" at any level for coordinating and scheduling of passengers and aircraft.

c. Adequacy of personnel, facilities and logistical support.

(1) The use of wire and pickets by personnel at Base Camp caused a shortage of these items initially.

Incl 2 to Annex I  
Aggressor

(2) Gasoline supplies could not be stockpiled in sufficient quantities since there was no road available for Aggressor re-supply.

(3) There was a definite lack of engineer work gloves for putting in wire.

(4) Since, in some cases, Aggressor Forces had to be placed in small groups over widely dispersed areas, communication facilities were strained to capacity.

d. Training problems: No training problems were encountered.

3. Summary of Lessons Learned:

a. Planning Phase Prior To Exercise.

(1) The provisions of TA 23-100 did not allocate sufficient ammunition for this type of exercise.

(2) That plans for and request to airlift Aggressor units from area to home stations should be accomplished in the initial planning conference.

(3) Prepared personnel for intelligence purposes should be briefed at least two weeks prior to the problem.

(4) That Aggressor Forces receive more realistic training in preparation of their positions by having only a limited amount of time.

b. Plans and Operations During The Maneuver.

(1) The wire communications system between Aggressor headquarters and Umpire Control headquarters was inadequate. This could have been alleviated by a "hot line" to Aggressor headquarters.

(2) That the umpire for fire control markers cannot operate effectively on the Aggressor command radio net.

(3) That the selection of an adequate Aggressor Camp, as was done, eliminated many problems for Aggressors during the exercise.

(4) That, in some cases, the "no search pocket" ruling was violated and classified documents were carried too far forward.

Incl 2 to Annex I  
Aggressor

4. Conclusions and Recommendations.

a. That provisions be made in the initial planning for adequate ammunition for both forces.

b. Planning for the air lift of personnel from the maneuver area be as early as possible.

c. The Aggressor and the umpire for fire control have separate radio nets.

d. Adequate interpreters be provided for non-US Forces at lower troop levels so that there will be no misunderstanding on rules pertaining to conduct between units.

e. That non-US citizens be indoctrinated more thoroughly on rules of Geneva Convention.

f. That all forces be better indoctrinated on security of classified documents in the field.

g. That the system of transportation for personnel arriving in the maneuver area by air be better publicized.

h. There should be a G-3 Air Representative in the maneuver area to coordinate use of Army light aircraft.

i. That Aggressor be provided with exclusive use of one H-13 and one H-19 Helicopter; the H-19 to be used for re-supply.

j. That there should be a minimum umpire representation on Aggressor side. This can best be accomplished by designating company commanders as umpires, in addition to their job as CO. CO can use his PRC 10 Radio to get the Umpire net.

ORGANIZATIONAL BREAKDOWN OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED

Headquarters Sections

OFFICERS	
1 Agg C.O.	10 EM, Hqs
S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4	3 Agg Advisors
Chaplain	(Ft Riley)
1 Pilot - H-13	Drivers
1 Agg Advisor (Ft Riley)	
Comm Officer	
MTO	

ASA	ENGR PLAT	COMM
1 Off	0 Off	1 Off
10 EM	23 EM	31 EM

518th ENGR	MEDICS
1 Off	1 Off
136 EM	12 EM

Co B	Co D	Co E
5 Off	5 Off	6 Off
125 EM	125 EM	123 EM

RECON	TK Co
1 Off	4 Off
32 EM	110 EM

AGGRESSOR ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Aggressor Unit</u>	<u>Simulated Strength</u>	<u>Actual Unit</u>	<u>Actual Strength</u>
101 Rifle Regt (Reinf)	20/100	1st BG, 20th Inf	4/8
Hq Co, 101 Rif Regt		Hq Co	1/12
Svc Co, 101 Rif Regt		Sup & Maint Plts	2/15
Sig Co, 101 Rif Regt		Commo Plat	1/31
Engr Co, 101 Rif Regt		Engr Plat	0/23
Med Co, 101 Rif Regt		Med Plat	1/12
I Rif Bn, 101 Rif Regt	39/552	Co D	5/125
II Rif Bn, 101 Rif Regt	39/552	Co B	5/125
III Rif Bn, 101 Rif Regt	39/552	Co E	7/123
1 M Tk Co, 51 M Tk & Sp Regt	5/65	Co D, 34th Armor	4/110
2 M Tk Co, 51 M Tk & Sp Regt	5/65	Co D, 34th Armor	
3 M Tk Co, 51 M Tk & Sp Regt	5/65	Co D, 34th Armor	
Rcn Co, 101 Rif Regt	4/55	Recon Plat	1/32
151 Engr Bn	30/500	Engr Plat, 518th Engr Co	1/36
	<hr/>		<hr/>
TOTAL	186/2506	TOTAL	32/677

Addendum 2 to Incl 2  
Aggressor After Action Report

518TH ENGINEER COMPANY  
Fort Kobbe, Canal Zone

AFTER ACTION REPORT - BANYAN TREE II - 1960

1. MISSION.

a. The mission of the Unit was to prepare the Rio Hato Training Area for the exercise by constructing or improving the following items.

(1) Five (5) troop type buildings, metal and steel structure, each approximately 20' x 200'.

(2) One (1) Timber Trestle water tower to support an 18,000 gallon water tank.

(3) Laying of approximately 5,900 feet of 2½" water line.

(4) Construction of a Post Exchange building of masonry construction, 20' x 72'.

(5) Construction and improvement of over 50 miles of roads and trails in the maneuver area.

(6) Preparation of a drop zone which included a temporary landing strip 200' x 3,000'.

(7) Preparation of an observer area which required erection of bleachers and latrine facilities.

(8) Improvement of the existing asphalt airfield by clearing the shoulders and neutral areas of all brush, grass and trees.

b. During the actual exercise, period 8 to 11 March 1960, the Unit provided:

(1) One full Engineer Platoon augmented with tools and equipment to the Aggressor Forces to assist in the erection of road blocks, tactical wire and laying of anti-tank and anti-personnel mine fields.

(2) Water Point for the Aggressor Camp.

(3) Work details and heavy equipment to the Airborne Forces.

c. The problems encountered during this period are as follows:

Incl 3 to ANNEX I  
Engineer Support - After Action Report Banyan Tree II - 1960

(1) Lack of complete and specific instructions for projects, by priority, to support Banyan Tree. Most of the instructions were verbal and fragmentary. Although this caused no delay, it did require relocation of the landing strip in the drop zone.

(2) The Unit was constantly furnishing transportation for visitors and VIP. This overburdened the limited transportation available for missions.

(3) Messing was very critical during the week prior to the exercise. All advance parties and transients would automatically come to the Unit mess with no prior arrangements. This caused a great ration problem. At one period the Unit fed over 250 persons.

## 2. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. That all agencies, especially the Air Force, pre-plan construction requirements, finalize and consolidate plans by work priorities, and make them available to the Unit at least three weeks prior to the actual exercise.

b. It is strongly recommended that a provisional company be established at Rio Hato at least three weeks prior to the exercise to:

- (1) Receive visitors and VIP.
- (2) Provide transportation to visitors.
- (3) Provide logistical support to advance parties.
- (4) Provide information to advance parties.
- (5) Establish a transient mess.

c. That the Engineer Company be utilized at the Rio Hato Area for construction and Engineer support to Aggressor Forces only.

ANNEX J

1st AIRBORNE BATTLE GROUP, 325th INFANTRY

FINAL REPORT -- EXERCISE BANYAN TREE II

1. Resume of organization and operation:

a. The 1st Airborne Battle Group, 325th Infantry participated with a total of 60 officers and 1,080 enlisted men for a total of 1,140 personnel. In addition there were 31 officers and 156 enlisted men from normal Battle Group attachments for a total of 187 personnel. The combined 325th Combat Team totals were 91 officers, and 1,236 enlisted men for a grand total of 1,327 participants. There were in addition: 14 officers, 3 civilians, and 1 enlisted man (observers) who did not participate in the problem. For a detailed breakdown of personnel by unit see Inclosure 1.

b. Operations prior to the exercise consisted chiefly of planning and training.

(1) Planning consisted of numerous liaison visits between this Headquarters and JSARCARIB for the purpose of resolving logistical administrative and operational problems. This Headquarters planned operations, conducted intelligence studies, logistical analyses, and published necessary information in the form of an operation order for all units of the Combined Expeditionary Force.

(2) The Battle Group conducted training in the following areas.

(a) Personal conduct and safety.

1. Personal conduct in Panama.
2. Safety during exercise.
3. Medical aspects to be considered during exercise.

(b) Area of operation study.

1. Rio Hato terrain appreciation.
2. Jungle survival.

(c) Advanced tactical training.

1. Employment of smoke.
2. Booby traps.
3. Movement in jungle and open areas.
4. Attack of fortified positions.
5. Tank-Killer Teams.
6. Breaching Obstacles.

(d) Pre-airborne operations training.

1. Loading and lashing.
2. Airborne refresher training.
3. Rehearsal of in-flight parachute rigging

techniques.

c. Operations during the exercise.

(1) D-Day activities:

- (a) Parachute assault.
- (b) Assembly.
- (c) Assumption of command of CEF by the Command-

ing Officer, 1st Airborne Battle Group, 325th Infantry.

- (d) Establishment of initial air-head defense.
- (e) Air landing of vehicles and equipment.
- (f) Repulsing enemy counter-attacks.
- (g) Long range patrolling.
- (h) Close air support and air reconnaissance.

(2) D + 1 Activities:

- (a) Executed coordinated attack with four (4)

companies:

- (b) Repelled aggressor counter-attack.
- (c) Utilized close air support extensively.
- (d) Eliminated aggressor penetration.
- (e) Dispatched long range patrols and dropped parachute dummies utilizing helicopters. (Two (2) HU LA's)
- (f) Effected night relief of two (2) companies and prepared for their redeployment to the Canal Zone area.

(3) D + 2 Activities:

- (a) Executed dawn attack with four (4) companies and achieved a penetration in which an attempt was made to exploit the success with the aid of helicopter support.
- (b) Two companies were redeployed by air to Fort Kobbe.
- (c) Attack objectives were secured after commitment of reserve forces and employment of extensive close air support.
- (d) Executed night reliefs and helicopter move of two (2) companies.
- (e) Limited night patrol actions.
- (f) Preparation of plans for continuation of attack.

(4) D + 3 Activities:

- (a) Commenced assault on final objectives at 0630.
- (b) Exercise terminated at 0635.
- (c) Redeployed CEF (-) by air and motor movement from Rio Hato to Fort Kobbe.

d. The guidance and assistance rendered by the Staffs of CARIBCOM and USARCARIB in the planning and execution phases of Banyan Tree II was of immeasurable value to the Battle Group. Their efforts greatly facilitated the task of planning and conducting the operation. The spirit of whole hearted cooperation was to a large measure responsible for the success of this maneuver.

2. Summary of major planning and operational problems.

a. Restrictions curtailed operations of the Battle Group prior to and during the operation.

(1) The major restricting factors encountered were the limited size of the maneuver area and the requirement for a three (3) day exercise. These two factors restricted the maneuver capability of the Battle Group. The shallow area of operation precluded successful utilization of Army Aviation, especially helicopters for troop movements. This is contrary to the tactics of an Airborne Battle Group, since mobility is necessary for survival in an Airhead. Enveloping tactics when attempted were not allowed by umpire decision because a rigid system of phase lines was enforced.

(2) A minor restriction on utilization of organic units was encountered. This was due to the desirability of keeping Allied Units in contact. It should be noted that all Allied Units responded very effectively and were most cooperative during the entire operation.

(3) The restrictions on night operations in the Rio Hato area with the exception of small patrols greatly hampered the tactics of the Battle Group. The cover, concealment and terrain of this area lend themselves admirably to night operations. It is realized that certain safety consideration must be taken. In spite of safety requirements it is considered however that appropriate tactics for this defoliated area, where the enemy had predominant observation continually, would have been to attack at night and defend or continue the attack during daylight hours. In addition, this would have provided for conservation of troop strength during the extreme heat of the day and capitalize upon the cooler hours of darkness.

b. Procedural problems encountered:

(1) The addition of two allied companies and another planning staff imposed certain difficulties upon the Battle Group command facilities. Communications of Allied units were inadequate to keep in contact with Battle Group. Augmentation of Allied units with Bi-lingual liaison officer from the airborne unit and communications equal to a US Rifle Company is necessary for successful operations of this type.

(2) The large number of control personnel, utilized in the form of resident umpires, visitors and observers, greatly congested the problem area. In the interest of both economy and efficiency it is felt that an area system of umpiring would be appropriate with only a minimum of resident umpires.

(3) A procedural problem occurred in the evacuation of personnel injured on the jump and personnel affected by the heat on

the first day of the exercise. An aid station additional to that of the Battle Group was established in the vicinity of the drop zone to assist in the evacuation of casualties. In the afternoon of the first day, helicopters, not under control of the Battle Group Surgeon, were utilized to evacuate heat casualties direct from the front line companies to the Evacuation Hospital without going through any of the aid stations. Many of these casualties would have been kept for 4 to 6 hours at the Battle Group Aid Station and then returned to their units. The result was that it complicated the control and accounting for personnel. A number of personnel were evacuated further than required.

(4) Air Force Air Lift support during Banyan Tree II:

(a) Deployment to Canal Zone.

28 February - one (1) C-130 (Advance Party).  
4 March - twenty five (25) C-123.  
5 March - one (1) C-130  
7 March - twenty (20) C-130 Per, three (3)

C-130 Hvy Drop.

(b) Redeployment to Fort Bragg.

16 March - one (1) C-130 twenty five (25) C-123  
17 March - two (2) C-130 (Heavy Drop)  
18 March - twenty (20) C-130 (Personnel)  
19 March - twenty five (25) C-123  
24 March - one (1) C-130 (Rear detachment)

(c) ACLs (6000# - 6300#) of C-123 aircraft were inadequate. The restricted aircraft allocation and ACLs permitted the deployment of only about one-third of Organic Vehicles. In many cases, these vehicles could not be combat loaded due to weight limitations.

(d) The three (3) C-130 aircraft utilized for heavy drop would not be adequate in actual combat operations of this type in view of initial heavy drop requirements for vehicles, equipment and supplies.

(e) The control of Peruvian and Chilean close air support aircraft was seriously hampered initially because field VHF facilities were not available until D+1. There exists a need for a pack type man transportable VHF radio to be used by Air Force forward air controllers. These should be dropped in with the parachuting FAC party.

c. Adequacy of Personnel, Facilities and Logistical support:

(1) Logistical support provided by 1st BG, 20th Infantry prior to, during and after the exercise was outstanding. No effort was spared to assist this Battle Group. Organization for this task was commendable.

(2) Logistical support and methods of implementation were adequate, installations were suitably located and adequately staffed. The allied units of the CEF were not adequately augmented with water cans prior to the operation. This caused a minor problem which was resolved by drawing additional water cans from base camp supply point. Another operational problem area was the lack of knowledge within allied units of the US type supply requisitioning systems. This should be resolved by instructing these forces in the basic supply system used by the US Army.

(3) Procedural Problems - Banyan Tree II; One problem encountered as a result of parachute assault operations on a single drop zone by forces of more than one nation is identification of air items as to ownership. US Forces experienced great difficulty in separating Brazilian air items from US air items, since many Brazilian parachutes, kit bags, etc., were not marked in such fashion as to be readily identified as to nation by whom owned.

(4) Facilities for post maneuver training were adequate.

(5) Liaison personnel as indicated in Paragraph 2b. (1) above should be provided on subsequent operations of this type. Communications facilities of the Battle Group should be augmented to allow for adequate control of attachments.

d. Training Problems:

(1) In actual operations involving long distance moves from different climatic areas, training should be conducted if possible in an area with climate similar to that found at the objective. This would allow for successful D-Day operation of the troops. It is difficult to extract strenuous combat type activities from troops not acclimatized. Serious difficulty could result from the commitment of troops accustomed to a temperate zone into a tropic summer, after a prolonged fatiguing flight.

3. Summary of lessons learned:

a. Summary of lessons learned prior to operations:

(1) Early liaison between the staff of the participating Battle Group and USARCARIB is essential. It would be highly

desirable to confirm the identity of participating countries and have staff representatives therefrom at all planning conferences. Such would be essential to successful operations involving allied troops on a scale exceeding Company size.

(2) Narrators and assistants should be joined together in the objective area early (at least two weeks prior to operation). This will allow for joint translation, timing and rehearsals. The content of the narrative should be finalized at this time. It is desirable to conduct several on the spot rehearsals with all training aids present. An additional week of rehearsals and coordination would lend polish to the presentation which is appropriate to the international aspect of the operation.

(3) Additional Naval participation should be included in the planning and execution phases of future operations of this type. If actual Naval participation is not feasible, as a minimum, Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer should be provided to allow for planning of simulated Naval support. It is unrealistic to conduct operation in beach area without planning for Naval Gunfire.

b. Summary of lessons learned during operation:

(1) Plans and operations during the tactical phases of Banyan Tree II were to some extent unrealistic. The Reinforced Battle Group was forced to operate on a limited frontage. Limitations on night operation detracted from realism. The restrictions on company size Helicopter movement was contrary to airborne training and tactics. Extending the terrain for this operation would remedy all these deficiencies. Considering the terrain limitation and extensive number of troops utilized it is felt that the operations during the exercise was successful.

(2) It is desirable to utilize an aircraft of the C-133 type to transport the HU-1A Helicopter. On this operation the C-123 and C-130 aircraft were used. This required a total of four (4) days for assembly and disassembly to accommodate the extensive dismantling required to fit the HU-1A into the C-123 and C-130 cargo compartments.

4. Conclusion:

a. The ability of a US Airborne Battle Group to operate with Allied Units after an airborne assault was proven to be successful.

b. Allied forces must be augmented with liaison personnel and adequate communications to enable effective operation in a combined command.

c. The Rio Hato Training Area is inadequate for operation of an Airborne Battle Group (reinforced).

d. The training benefits gained in operating on new unfamiliar terrain by this Battle Group was excellent.

e. Prior staging under climatic conditions approximating those of the objective area is highly desirable if not essential, for successful operation against an organized enemy force.

f. Early liaison with all units to include Allied should be established.

g. The narration party should be finalized and established two (2) weeks prior to D-Day.

5. Recommendations:

a. Early liaison with all participants, including Allied Units be established.

b. Allied Units be augmented with Bi-Lingual liaison officers from an airborne unit and be furnished with communications sufficient to allow them to operate in the battle group Command Net.

c. The maneuver area be extended in size sufficient to accommodate the tactical operations of participating units.

d. Naval participation be played, at least to the extent of Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer and simulated Naval gunfire.

e. The narrative be finalized at least two (2) weeks prior to presentation and extensive on the ground rehearsals conducted.

f. Less resident umpires be utilized and the area control system adopted.

g. One central clearing agency be established to evacuate all casualties, actual or simulated, especially on the first day of the exercise. This should be the organic aid station of the participating unit. A list of personnel evacuated through any administrative aid station should be sent on an hourly basis to the unit aid station in order to maintain an accurate account of evacuees.

h. Parachute qualified Forward Air Control Team be utilized on maneuvers involving Airborne Battle Groups.

i. VHF radio equipment, pack type transportable and capable of dropping by parachute be assigned to the TO&E of the Airborne

Battle Group. This is essential for early control of close air support in the airhead area.

j. A system of marking parachutes of Allied Units be utilized in order to insure quick and easy identification upon recovery.

T R O O P L I S T

<u>UNIT-BATTLE GROUP</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Hq & Hq Co	25	188	213
Mortar Battery	8	75	83
Co A	7	151	158
Co B	5	159	164
Co C	5	167	172
Co D	6	175	181
Co E	4	165	169
 BATTLE GROUP TOTALS:	 60	 1080	 1140
 <u>ATTACHMENTS</u>			
Btry A, 319th FA Bn	6	52	58
Sig Plat, 82d Sig Bn	1	24	25
Packing Sec, 82d QMS Co	1	3	4
Evac Sec, 82d Med Co		6	6
Engr Plat, Co A, 307th Engr Bn	3	34	37
ERP Plat, 782d Ord	1	19	20
Flt Hq, 82d Avn Co	6	4	10
MP Sqd, 82d MP Co		8	8
82d MI Det	2		2
519th MI Det	3		3
ASA Team, 319th ASA Bn	3	6	9
1st ABG, 187th Inf	3		3
Divarty	2		2
 ATTACHMENT TOTALS:	 <del>31</del>	 156	 187
 GRAND TOTALS:	 91	 1236	 1327

ANNEX K

UMPIRE

FINAL REPORT - EXERCISE BANYAN TREE II

1. Resume of Organization and Operations

a. Organization

(1) Headquarters Umpire Control Group, Exercise Banyan Tree II was established in accordance with the Exercise Directive and instructions from the Commanding General, United States Army Caribbean, effective 8 February 1960. This headquarters was activated and started its organization and planning operations with a nucleus of 2 officers and 6 enlisted men from USARCARIB. The headquarters reached a peak strength of 4 officers and 12 enlisted men by 22 February 1960. No T/D or personnel unit was officially established and strength accountability remained with each individual's parent unit. Commanding Officer, Fort Clayton, provided garrison support and transportation for personnel on duty with the Umpire Control Group prior to and during the exercise.

(2) The organization chart of the Umpire Control Group Headquarters, Exercise Banyan Tree II, is shown in Inclosure Nr 1.

b. Strength

(1) Commissioned

<u>Col</u>	<u>Maj</u>	<u>Cap</u>	<u>Lt</u>	<u>Total</u>
1	1	1	1	4

(2) Enlisted

Total - 12

c. Operation

(1) Prior to the exercise:

(a) During the period 8 February through 21 February, the Umpire Control Group Headquarters was engaged in the planning phase of the exercise. Facilities for the umpire school were acquired and tested, lesson plans were written and classes

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Final Report - Exercise Banyan Tree II

rehearsed, and Appendices 1, 3 and 5 to Annex D to Exercise Directive Nr 1, Banyan Tree II, were accomplished during this period. These Appendices comprised the following:

1. Appendix 1, (Umpire Distribution Plan) to Annex D, Exercise Directive Nr 1.

2. Appendix 3, (Individual Umpire Assignments) to Annex D, Exercise Directive Nr 1.

3. Appendix 5, (Training Schedule) to Annex D, Exercise Directive Nr 1.

(b) On 19 February 1960, the umpire packet from CONUS, consisting of 34 officers and 38 enlisted men arrived by military air at Howard Air Force Base, Fort Kobbe, Canal Zone.

(c) On 15 February, 3 officers from among the USARCARIB umpires reported for duty as instructors for the umpire school and the remainder of the USARCARIB umpires reported on 22 February 1960. The total umpire strength on 22 February 1960 was as follows:

<u>Source</u>	<u>Fld Grade</u>	<u>Officers Co Grade</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Total</u>
USCONARC	3	31	38	72
USARCARIB	$\frac{3}{6}$	$\frac{12}{43}$	$\frac{35}{73}$	$\frac{50}{122}$

(d) The umpire distribution plan, Exercise Banyan Tree II, is shown in Inclosure 2.

(e) Summary of umpire assignments is attached as Inclosure 3.

(f) Orientation of umpires began on 19 February 1960 and training began on 22 February 1960.

(2) During the Exercise:

(a) Ground operations of this tactical exercise began at 0430 hours on the morning of 8 March 1960 with an amphibious landing on the beach of Rio Hato by the Public Order Company of the Panama Guardia Nacional. This was followed some three hours later

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Final Report - Exercise Banyan Tree II

by an airborne assault led by 3d Airborne Infantry Company, Santos Dumont Battalion, Brazilian Army, in conjunction with the 1st Airborne Battle Group, 325th United States Infantry. Only the ground phase of the exercise was umpired.

(b) Unit assembly areas were obtained in advance from the Battle Group Operations Order. Umpires were placed in the immediate vicinity of these areas and joined their respective units as the assembly took place. Throughout the Exercise, the Umpires remained with these units and conducted their activities in accordance with pertinent directives.

2. Summary of Major Planning and Operational Problems

a. Restrictions curtailing umpire operations:

(1) Prior to the Exercise:

(a) The formation and operation of an umpire control headquarters at least three weeks prior to the beginning of the exercise should be provided for in the initial staff planning for the exercise. Authority to support this headquarters from existing stocks should be secured from Department of the Army well in advance of receipt of requirements from the Umpire Headquarters. By including the needs of the umpire control headquarters in early planning, and by coordinating these needs through all staff sections, a smoother, more effective school and training program can be run.

(b) Officers designated to umpire foreign troops did not have an opportunity to coordinate their activities with these troops prior to the actual assault. These umpires had many unanswered questions in mind that could not be handled by the control group. An opportunity to meet with representatives of the foreign troops or with the MAAG officers before the exercise would alleviate this situation.

(2) During the Exercise:

(a) In order for the fire markers to do their job properly; their control should be flexible and unencumbered by other umpire duties. Three separate radios must be provided to function in the umpire, aggressor and fire marker's nets. It is unsatisfactory to have the fire marker controller encumbered with other umpire duties and dependent on only one vehicular radio.

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**Final Report - Exercise Banyan Tree II**

(b) The use of identical pyrotechnic signals by different participating units to signify different things can result in considerable confusion and have disastrous consequences. The maneuver headquarters should publish its SOI well in advance, make proper distribution early, and ascertain that it is complied with.

(c) As the maneuver progressed, some discrepancies on the tactical situation, number of casualties, etc., as maintained by the umpire headquarters at Base Camp and the USARC/ARIB operations center were noted. This offered a dual picture of the situation and demonstrated lag time in the tactical reporting procedure. However, umpire communications were then used at the request of maneuver Director personnel to clarify the situation, and at times this put an unusual load on an already overcrowded radio net.

(d) Assignment of only one officer as an umpire for foreign companies was inadequate. All elements should have umpires down to and including platoon level. Even if these additional umpires are not linguists; their physical presence in the area will greatly aid the problem of control.

(e) The role of the aggressor was not understood by some of the OAS elements. This misunderstanding resulted in hand to hand combat which possibly could have been avoided had a pre-maneuver briefing and classes in the use of aggressor as a training aid been given.

b. **Procedural Problems:** Except as noted elsewhere in this report, no major procedural problems were encountered.

c. **Adequacy of personnel, facilities and logistical support and organization.**

(1) **Personnel:** Officer and enlisted personnel utilized in the Umpire Group were all of a high caliber and capable of absorbing the training given them.

(2) **Facilities:** These were satisfactory and met all of the operating requirements of the Umpire Control Group.

(3) **Logistical Support:** Commanding Officer, Fort Clayton, furnished the logistical support for the Umpire Control Group during the planning and execution of Exercise Banyan Tree II.

ANNEX K  
Final Report - Exercise Banyan Tree II

(4) Organization

(a) The initial Umpire Organization provided for two Alternate Umpires for use in the event that unforeseen umpire-type duties should arise. Both of these alternates were employed during the problem. In future maneuvers, the need for the training of at least two Alternate Umpires is apparent.

(b) The dual role of FSCC Umpire and Fire Marker Controller proved to be an unnecessary burden. The FSCC can be easily umpired by the S-3 Umpire leaving the Fire Marker Controller free for his primary job.

(c) Although no Signal or Ordnance representative was actually assigned to the umpire headquarters, the close liaison established with these groups produced an adequate repair set-up with a rapid turn around time. However, it is felt that by actually assigning a representative from each of these services, a more effective system can be developed.

(d) Training Problems: There were no major training problems encountered.

3. Summary of Lessons Learned

a. Planning phase prior to exercise:

(1) The early designation of officers and men to function as the Umpire Control Group Headquarters, at least thirty days in advance of the arrival of the CONUS Umpire Packet, would greatly facilitate the operation of the Umpire School and would enhance the umpire operations during the actual maneuver in the field.

(2) Late determination of local availability in sufficient quantities of vehicles, pyrotechnics, and some signal communications equipment during the planning stage to support umpire operations caused some delay in firming up plans and required a number of last minute changes that conflicted with previous directives.

(3) Close liaison must be established with all participating troops well in advance of field operations, to coordinate umpire and tactical SOP's. Particular attention must be placed on the use and meaning of umpire pyrotechnics, flags, signals, and obstacle markers.

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(4) Instructors for the various subjects taught during the Umpire School should be given as much time as possible to prepare and rehearse their classes.

b. Plans and Operations during the Maneuver

Umpires must have a designated area for a daily meeting to handle the numerous problems that arise during a maneuver. This area must be centrally located and should be in the rear of the maneuver area, but not in the Base Camp.

4. Conclusions and Recommendations

a. Conclusions:

(1) That the mission assigned to this headquarters as contained in Exercise Directive Nr 1, Exercise Banyan Tree II, was satisfactorily accomplished.

(2) That USARCARIB capabilities to support future exercises of this nature should be closely examined and appropriate recommendations made very early in the planning stages.

(3) That the aggressor force cooperation was excellent. During the exercise this force performed in an outstanding manner, thus contributing to the success of the maneuver.

b. Recommendations:

(1) In planning future exercises, the Chief Umpire and his assistant should be designated at the same time as the project officer. The Assistant Chief Umpire should then be included in all planning conferences.

(2) Whenever circumstances permit, dependency on USCOMARC enlisted personnel for umpire drivers and radio-operators should be curtailed.

(3) A liaison group from participating troops should meet with representatives of the Umpire Control Group as far in advance of the problem as possible in order to coordinate the myriad details that are inherent in such an exercise.

(4) The Umpire School should be cut to a maximum of one week or forty hours of classes and the umpire packet from CONUS be scheduled to arrive on D-9, begin school on D-8, and depart from the Canal Zone on D/6 following the critique.

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(5) That the fire marker controller establish a CP tent in the center of the maneuver area and that he control the fire markers from this position during the entire maneuver.


(6) That four "Scene of action umpires" be trained and attached to the aggressor forces to be in position where contact is expected. These umpires should have communication with the umpires on the opposing side.

(7) That other agencies not depend upon umpire facilities, supplies, equipment and personnel to discharge their responsibilities.


(8) That the umpire packet be allowed sufficient time to render complete, accurate reports at the termination of the problem and that the Umpire Control Headquarters be allowed to function long enough to finalize said reports.

(9) Pre-exercise training plans should emphasize the need for all personnel to understand the importance of imaginative play, simulated tactical situations and opposing strengths in the course of these maneuvers.

HEADQUARTERS UMPIRE CONTROL GROUP  
EXERCISE BANYAN TREE II  
8 - 11 March 1960



INCL 1 to ANNEX K



SUMMARY

Umpire Assignments	Officers			Source	Remarks
	Field Grade	Co Grade	EM		
Chief	1		4	USARCARIB	1 EM Qual Rad Opr-Dvr
Asst Chief	1		4	USARCARIB	1 EM Qual Rad Opr-Dvr
Airborne BG	1		1	USCONARC	EM Qual Rad Opr-Dvr
Asst Abn BG		1		USCONARC	NONE
Latin America	1	2	3	USARCARIB	Ea EM Qual Rad Opr-Dvr
Liaison Teams		2	2	USARCARIB	Ea EM Qual Rad Opr-Dvr
Alternate		2	2	USARCARIB	Ea EM Qual Rad Opr-Dvr
S1		1	1	USCONARC	EM Qual Rad Opr-Dvr
S2	1		1	USCONARC	EM Qual Rad Opr-Dvr
S3	1		1	USCONARC	EM Qual Rad Opr-Dvr
S4, Sup & Trans		1	1	USCONARC	EM Qual Rad Opr-Dvr
FSCC, Asst FSCC		2	2	USARCARIB	Ea EM Qual Rad Opr-Dvr
Hq Co		1	1	USARCARIB	EM Qual Rad Opr-Dvr
Recon Plat		1	1	USCONARC	EM Qual Rad Opr-Dvr
Assault Gun Plat		1	1	USCONARC	EM Qual Rad Opr-Dvr
Commo Plat		1	1	USCONARC	EM Qual Rad Opr-Dvr
Rifle Co		5	10	USCONARC	5 EM Qual Rad Oprs 5 EM Qual Dvrs
Rifle Platoon		20	20	USCONARC	Ea EM Qual Rad Opr
Mortar Btry, 105 How		3	3	USARCARIB	EM Qual Rad Opr-Dvr
Arty Fire M/Teams			14	USARCARIB	7 EM Qual Rad Opr-Dvr

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TOTALS	6	43	73
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RECAPITULATION:

Source	Officers			TOTAL
	Field Grade	Co Grade	EM	
USCONARC	3	31	38	72
USARCARIB	3	12	35	50
TOTALS	6	43	73	122

INCL # 3 to ANNEX K

ANNEX L

TROOP LIST

FINAL REPORT - EXERCISE BANYAN TREE II

1. <u>Organization of American States Forces:</u>	
a. Hq. USARCARIB	79
b. 1st Airborne Battle Group, 325th Inf, 82nd Abn Div.	1327
c. 3rd Airborne Infantry Company, Santos Dumont Bn, Brazil	180
d. Panama Guardia Nacional	117
e. Colombia (Advance Planning Detachment)	22
f. 45th MI Platoon	29
g. USASA	9
h. Medical Section	20
i. 1st Battle Group, 20th Inf (Simulated)	
	<hr/>
	Total 1783
2. <u>Aggressor Army Forces:</u>	
a. Hq. Section, 1st BG, 20th Inf.	42
b. Co. B, 1st BG, 20th Inf.	130
c. Co. D, 1st BG, 20th Inf.	130
d. Co. E, 1st BG, 20th Inf.	130
e. Hq. Co, 1st BG, 20th Inf.	75
f. Reconnaissance Platoon	33
g. 518th Engr Co, 20th Inf.	60

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h. Co. D, 34th Armor	114
i. Logistical Support	<u>26</u>
Total	740
3. <u>Army Support Forces:</u>	
a. 1st BG, 20th Inf. (Performed Admin and Logistical Support	99
b. Umpires	122
c. Area Signal Support Platoon (USARCARIB)	<u>64</u>
Total	285
GRAND TOTAL	2840

ANNEX M

DISTRIBUTION

FINAL REPORT - EXERCISE BANYAN TREE II

C/S	2
VB	1
G1	2
G2	5
G3	20
G4	2
AG	1
CEO	1
Chaplain	1
Chemical	1
Engineer	1
F & AO	1
IO	1
IG	1
ORD	1
PM	1
QM	1
Signal	1
Special Service	1
Surgeon	1
Transportation	1
CO 1st BG, 20th Inf	5
CO 2nd BG, 10th Inf	2
CO 1st Airborne BG, 325th Inf	5
CO 4th Gun Bn 517th Arty	2
US Army Caribbean School	2
ASA Caribbean	1
CINCARIB	10
COMCAIRC	2
COMFIFTEEN	2
COMANTDEFCON	1
GOV CANAL ZONE	1
CG Antilles Command USARCARIB	1
Chief MAAG Brazil	5
Chief MAAG Colombia	5
Chief US Army Mission Panama	3

ANNEX M  
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The Judge Advocate General	2
The Inspector General	2
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence	1
Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components	1
Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations	10
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel	1
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics	4
Chief of Research and Development	1
Comptroller of the Army	1
Chief of Finance	2
Chief of Civil Affairs	2
Chief of Military History	2
Chief, National Guard Bureau	2
Chief, US Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs	2
Chief of Information	1
The Adjutant General, Attn: AGS-E	1
The Adjutant General, Attn: AGAO-O	1
The Provost Marshal General	2
Chief of Chaplains	2
Heads of Technical Staff (Except Chief of Ordnance & Chief of Engineers)	5
Chief of Ordnance	1
Chief of Engineers	12
Commanding Generals	
US Continental Army Command	30
First US Army	1
Second US Army	1
Third US Army	25
Fourth US Army	1
Fifth US Army	1
Sixth US Army	1
US Army, Alaska	1
Ordnance Training Command	5
Quartermaster Training Command, US Army	1
US Army Air Defense Center	1
US Army Aviation Center	1
US Army Infantry Center	1
US Army Artillery and Missile Center	1
Armor Center	1
XVIII Abn Corps	5
82nd Abn Division	5
US Continental Army Command Liaison Officer, the Pentagon, Washington 25, D.C.	3

ANNEX M  
 FINAL REPORT - EXERCISE BANYAN TREE II

Commanders	
Military Air Transport Service	2
Tactical Air Command	6
2nd Weather Group, Langley AFB, Va.	1
9th Air Force	5
12th Air Force	1
19th Air Force, Shaw AFB, N. C.	5
464th Trp Carrier Wing, Pope AFB, N. C.	5
354th Tac Ftr Wing, Myrtle Beach AFB, S. C.	5
839th Air Div, Sewart AFB, Tenn	5
Commandants	
Command and General Staff College	2
The Infantry School	2
The Armor School	2
Army War College	1
US Army Aviation School	2
US Army Artillery and Missile School	2
US Army Intelligence School	2
The Engineer School	2
US Army Quartermaster School	2
Transportation School	2
Signal School	2
US Army Chemical Corps School	2
Army Medical Service School	2
USAF-Air Ground Operations School	2
US Army Aggressor Center, Ft. Riley, Kans	2
Chiefs	
US Army Security Agency	1
US Army Armor Human Research Unit	1
US Army Leadership Human Research Unit	1
US Army Infantry Human Research Unit	1
Army Advisory Group, Air University	1
Presidents	
US Army Artillery Board	1
US Army Armor Board	1
US Army Infantry Board	2
US Army Air Defense Board	1
US Army Airborne and Electronics Board	1
US Army Aviation Board	1
Directors	
Operations Research Office, 6410 Connecticut Ave, Chevy Chase, Maryland	1
Human Resources Research Office, 2013 G Street, NW, Washington, D. C.	1
Senior Army Member, Staff and Faculty, Marine Corps School	1