SUBJECT: Civil Affairs Developments

The volume of material relating to Civil Affairs that has accumulated since my letter of 23 April 1970 requires another letter in order to keep you adequately informed.

It seems appropriate that a letter should be addressed to you at this particular time, since today is the anniversary of the Civil Affairs Branch, U.S. Army, which was created on 17 August 1955. In recognition of their accomplishments during the past 15 years, the Staff and Faculty of the Civil Affairs School extend hearty congratulations to all officers commissioned in Civil Affairs, USAR, and to all ranks assigned to Civil Affairs units, active and reserve, together with best wishes for meaningful service in the years to come.

DAVID L. DAVIS
Colonel, Infantry
Commandant
1. Schedule of Resident Classes, FY 71. The schedule contained in Inclosure 1 to our 23 April 1970 "Developments" letter is firm, except for the District and Civil Affairs Advisor, Vietnam, Course. This course has been discontinued; selected officers enroute to district senior advisor posts will attend the Province and District Senior Advisor Course conducted at the Foreign Service Institute.

2. Vietnam Advisor Assignments. The views of the Department of the Army concerning the role of the province and district senior advisors in the Republic of Vietnam are stated in a recent speech by the Secretary of the Army, attached as Inclosure 1. Additional information concerning the selection of district senior advisors is contained in DA message, DCSPER, CSD, 251907Z June 1970.

3. Civil-Military Operations in Vietnam. The following excerpt from a recent letter from LTG Melvin Zais, Commanding General, XXIV Corps, to the Commandant constitutes an eye-witness account of a real-world situation of interest to us all:

"Let me add a few observations which stress the need for effective civil-military operations in connection with our current mission and the situation that exists in Vietnam today. I feel that as time goes on, we need to direct the efforts of the tactical unit towards improving the life of the people while continuing to afford them the security necessary to accomplish this goal.

Typical are the high impact-short term civic action projects conducted by tactical units in the recent refugee resettlement in Phong Dien and Quang Dien District, Thua Thien Province, along the old 'Street Without Joy.' The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) in coordination with the provincial government and advisory personnel provided untold thousands of man-hours repairing roads, constructing bridges, plowing fallow land, constructing irrigation facilities, supplying salvage lumber and materials, and providing transportation. The results have been astounding."

4. Civil Affairs in Internal Defense and Internal Development. Interested in the details of what's happening, CA-wise, in Vietnam? You (units only, please) might contact the following, and ask to be put on the mailing list for the "Link": Community Development Directorate, Civil Operations and Rural Development Support, APO San Francisco 96243.
5. **Suggestions for CA-USAR Unit Training.** Unit commanders and S3s: Have you reviewed Annex AA to CON Reg 350-1 lately, especially Appendix V? Several specific suggestions for unit training are listed at Inclosure 1 to Appendix V.

6. **Training Exercises.** The attention of readers engaged in developing and conducting exercises is invited to the restriction imposed by Department of the Army, as announced in DA Message ACSFOR-OT, DTG 052109Z Sep 69 (C), subject: Guidance for Planning and Conducting U.S. Army Exercises (U).

7. **Request for Training Information.** Receipt from each Civil Affairs USAR unit of a one-page résumé of training activities conducted and programmed would be appreciated. This material can be disseminated through subsequent issues of this letter for the enlightenment and possible use of the Civil Affairs community.

8. **Eighth Army Newsletter.** Recognition is due to the excellent Civil Affairs Newsletter published by the Eighth Army over a period of several years. One of their recent newsletters contains information on the Community Relations Advisory Council (CRAC), Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK) and the Collateral Activity Programs. Agencies desiring to get on the mailing list should write to the Commanding General, Eighth United States Army, ATTN: EAGP-CM, APO San Francisco 96301.

9. **Addresses by GEN Palmer, LTG Peers, and MG Sutton.** The complete texts of speeches given by GEN Bruce Palmer, Jr., Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; LTG William R. Peers, Chief, Office of Reserve Components; and MG W. J. Sutton, Chief of USAR, at the 23d Annual Military Government Association Conference in Chicago, 25 April, appear as Inclosures 2, 3, and 4, respectively.

10. **Changes in Marine Corps CA Structure.** The USMC Civil Affairs Branch, located at Hq, USMC, Washington, D.C., has changed its title to Counterinsurgency Branch. It will include four major sections: (1) Counterinsurgency---concerned with low-intensity conflict and conflicts short of war; (2) PSYOPS; (3) Civil Affairs; and (4) Personal Response. The first three are self-explanatory. The Personal Response Section is based on experiences of Vietnam and publication of NAVMA 2616, Unit Leaders Personal Response Handbook. It is charged with the responsibility of developing, implementing, and monitoring guidelines, training programs, and written material for instructing individual Marines in their responsibilities and attitudes toward
the civilian population world-wide. The resulting general subjects will be
used for the training of all Marines. In addition, the Personal Response
Section will have the capability to area-orient on those areas where units
will be committed.

11. Military Assistance Officer Program. The attention of officer readers
serving with the active Army is invited to the 23 April 1970 revision of
AR 614-134, Military Assistance Officer Program (MAOP). This completely
revised regulation lists 343 "Key" positions, in grades of colonel and
lieutenant colonel, and 209 "supporting" positions, in grades of lieutenant
colonel, major and captain, to be filled by MAOP members. These world-
wide positions are located in DOD; the unified and combined commands
(STRICOM, USMACV, PACOM, UNC/USF Korea, SOUTHCOM, EUCOM,
LANTCOM, SHAPE, AFSOUTH and AFCENT); MAAGs, Missions, MILGPs
and Defense Attache offices; DA; major Army headquarters and units in
CONUS and overseas; and many Army schools and colleges.

12. Letter from BG Baldwin. A recent letter from BG Clarke T. Baldwin, Jr.,
Director, International and Civil Affairs, ODCSOPS, DA, to Colonel
Lawrence B. Rohde, President of the Military Government Association,
which provides an insight into Military Assistance Officer Program (MAOP)
developments (Inclosure 5), will be of interest to all civil affairs officers,
active and USAR.

13. Area Studies. There has been some misunderstanding concerning the
availability of area studies (paragraph 13, 23 April 1970 Civil Affairs
Developments). This School does not publish or stock area studies for issue.
Our Marquat Memorial Library, however, has been designated by CONARC
as the central repository for studies produced by USAR CA units in accordance
with CON Reg 140-6; by message 62752, 6 August 1968, CONARC directed
that two copies of all area studies and related materials produced by USAR
CA units be furnished to our library, from which they could be withdrawn
on 2-week loan, by authorized borrowers, as is any other library book.
Requests for loan of area studies should be addressed to the Marquat Memorial
Library, U.S. Army Civil Affairs School, Fort Gordon, Georgia 30905.
Such requests will be honored immediately, if the requested studies are on the
shelf; if they are in the hands of previous borrowers, or if they are required
to support instruction at the moment, requests will be honored on a "waiting
list" basis as the studies are returned and become available. Unless otherwise indicated, borrowers may reproduce area studies locally, as may be required.

14. Marines Computerize Area Studies. The USMC has tested the feasibility of computerizing area studies and area surveys into a data bank that a special landing force commander can rely upon for up-to-date information on any country in the world. Such information could be requested and fed back within a few hours' notice. This could also conceivably produce CA annexes to a landing plan based on probable courses of action in a given country.

15. Scientist Suggests Army War on Hunger to Foster World Peace. Dr. Allan L. Forbes, Chief of the Scientific Analysis Branch, Life Sciences Division, OCRD, DA, has advocated a new role for the U. S. Army which will be of interest to all civil affairs personnel: The use of the Army's long-established and diversified specialized skills to wage a war against hunger and malnutrition in underdeveloped countries, as a means of alleviating conditions inimical to world peace. His interesting and thought-provoking article was first published in Military Review (USACGSC) for January 1970, and has been reprinted in the March-April 1970 issue of Army Research and Development magazine.

16. National Security Seminar Dates Announced. The Industrial College of the Armed Forces announces the following schedule for the 1970-71 academic year: Daytona Beach, Florida, 12-23 Oct; Albuquerque, New Mexico, 9-20 Nov; Jackson, Mississippi, 11-22 Jan; Yakima, Washington, 8-19 Feb; Hampton Roads, Virginia, 8-19 Mar; Manhattan, Kansas, 19-30 Apr; Youngstown, Ohio, 10-21 May. Officers wishing to attend should apply therefor, through normal channels, at least 90 days prior to the opening date of the desired session.

17. Special Studies. The following special studies, prepared by USAR Civil Affairs units, have been received by the Civil Affairs Division, USACDCISSO, in addition to those listed in paragraph 18 of our "Civil Affairs Developments" letter dated 23 April 1970. As in the case of the studies acknowledged earlier, they are currently being evaluated, and pertinent elements will be included in (or will contribute to) appropriate doctrinal publications.
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<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
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<tr>
<td>The Civil Affairs Advisory Function in Internal Defense and Internal Development Following Entry of Non-Indigenous Friendly Forces</td>
<td>300th CA Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs Requirements for Urban Conflict</td>
<td>356th CA Area Hq (B)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs Aspects of Intercultural Communications</td>
<td>352d CA Area Hq (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Functions Required of the Indigenous or Advisory Military in Insurgent Environments</td>
<td>358th CA Area Hq (B)</td>
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18. **Selective Study Program.** The U. S. Army Chaplain School has announced a new correspondence program which offers over 150 subjects in 24 areas. It is impossible to list here all of the subourses of interest to civil affairs personnel, but a sampling should give the reader an idea of the diversity of offerings: Counseling the Serviceman and his Family, Geographic Studies—Southeast Asia, Legal Aspects of Counterinsurgency, Problem Solving and Communication, Military Psychiatry, Military Leadership, The Nature of Politics, and Civilian Personnel Management. Enrollment is not restricted to chaplains. For further information, write to the Commandant, U. S. Army Chaplain School, Fort Hamilton, New York 11209.

19. **Metric System Subcourse Offered.** Confused by kilometers and millimeters? Then apply for the free one-credit-hour, one-lesson "Subcourse SIG 98, Metric System of Linear Measure." Enroll through appropriate channels to Director, Department of Nonresident Instruction, ATTN: AHDC-DNI-CSD, U. S. Army Signal Center and School, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey 07703.

20. **Clarification of CGSC Requirement.** Para 2-14a(20), AR 140-10, Army Reserve: Assignments, Attachments, and Transfers, which was added as C4, provides for the removal from active status of USAR lieutenant colonels who fail to complete CGSC prior to the third anniversary of the effective date of promotion/appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel. This change,
which will become effective on 1 July 1972, applies only to officers promoted/appointed lieutenant colonel on or after 1 July 1972.

21. Special Texts. Inclosure 6 lists Civil Affairs School special texts available to civil affairs units. Requests therefor should be forwarded to Publications Section, DNRL.

22. Improvement of Civil Affairs Capability. USAR Schools may request copies of the lesson plans and/or manuscripts listed as Inclosure 7 from the School, ATTN: ODDL&P.

23. DA Publications. Examples of DA publications which specifically affect organization, planning, training, and operations of Civil Affairs units and staff sections are indicated at Inclosure 8. This list is not intended to be all-inclusive but does indicate specific examples of DA publications for which Civil Affairs units have an immediate requirement.

24. Relationship of Publications. A portion of a recent message from CONARC, which will be of interest to many of you, is passed along: "The TOE prescribes how a unit will be organized and equipped to perform a stated mission; the ATP informs commanders what training is required to enable the unit, so organized and equipped, to perform its mission; ASubjScds provide detailed guidance to instructors for accomplishing training in accordance with the ATP; and the ATT determines whether or not the unit, so trained, can perform its mission. All mentioned publications are related to each other and must be so considered; none can be validly evaluated strictly by itself."

25. Changes in Authorized Abbreviations. Following is a short list of some authorized abbreviations from AR 310-50, Change 1, dated 25 May 70, which are pertinent to Army Reserve units and/or individuals:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>NEW</th>
<th>RESCINDED</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADT--Active duty for training</td>
<td>ACDUTRA--Active duty for training</td>
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<tr>
<td>AT--Annual training</td>
<td>AFT--Annual field training</td>
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</table>
26. Civil Defense Training. Details of the CONARC-programmed special civil defense training course for civil affairs units (active and USAR), announced in paragraph 15 of our Civil Affairs Developments letter of 23 April 1970, are contained in CON Reg 350-5, dated 10 July 1970; all civil affairs units in CONUS and Hawaii should have received that regulation prior to receipt of this letter. Attention is invited to the allocation of quotas, by dates, to all such civil affairs units, and to the requirement that all students successfully complete the OCD home study course, "Civil Defense, USA" prior to attendance. Early enrollment in the latter of quota principals and alternates is suggested.

27. Disaster Assistance in Peru. The 3d Civil Affairs Group (Airborne) from the Canal Zone recently provided a great deal of assistance to the communities devastated by the 31 May earthquake in Peru; in so doing, they provided an excellent example of (1) civil-military operations in a peacetime emergency, (2) military civic action in temporarily providing services normally within the purview of other agencies, (3) international neighborliness and assistance, and (4) a rapid response capability. An interesting news article concerning the assistance rendered is attached as Inclosure 9.

28. CA School Correspondence Courses. The Civil Affairs School offers correspondence courses of instruction to active Army officers, officers of the reserve components not on active duty, and qualified civilians to prepare them for branch command and staff duties; the School also provides special correspondence courses for familiarization purposes. The Civil Affairs
School Correspondence Course Catalog, dated 1 April 1970, which has been distributed Army-wide, provides guidance concerning enrollment. Participation in one or more of the courses offered will not only broaden the military educational standing of the participant but will also enhance his military career regarding promotions, assignments, and other military considerations. Take advantage of this opportunity. Knowledge is Power.

29. Civil Affairs MOBDES Vacancies. Lists of MOBDES vacancies in Civil Affairs Schools and in the International and Civil Affairs Directorate, ODCSOPS, Department of the Army, are attached as Inclosures 10 and 11, respectively. Applications for positions, utilizing DA Form 276, Application for Mobilization Designation Assignment, should be submitted as follows:

a. For positions in the Civil Affairs Schools (Incl 10): THRU: Commandant, U.S. Army Civil Affairs School, ATTN: DNR1, Fort Gordon, Georgia 30905, TO: Commanding Officer, U.S. Army Administration Center, 9700 Page Boulevard, St. Louis, Missouri 63132.

b. For positions in Department of the Army (Incl 11): Commanding Officer, U.S. Army Administration Center, 9700 Page Boulevard, St. Louis, Missouri 63132.

30. Retirements. Those of you who have been associated with the Civil Affairs School will be interested to learn of the retirement of LTC Charles W. Galloway on 31 May, and of COL Curtis E. Dodson and LTC Raymond J. Adamson on 30 June. They can take considerable satisfaction in the outstanding work they have done over the years for the School and the entire Civil Affairs Community.

31. Key Personalities. The Civil Affairs community at Fort Gordon includes the following key personalities:

a. U.S. Army Civil Affairs School:
   - Commandant: COL David L. Davis, IN
   - Asst Comdt/Dir of Instr: COL Kenneth B. Facey, IN
   - Secretary: LTC James F. Whitmore, IN
   - Dir of Doct Dev, Lit & Plans: LTC Charles R. Horton, FA
   - Dir of Resident Instruction: LTC Eldon R. Davis, AR
   - Dir, Civil Affairs Officer Crs: LTC Philip N. Reed, IN
Dir, Civic Action Crs
LTC Norman C. Farrar, AR
Director of Nonresident In-
struction
COL Herbert G. Parker, IN
Chief, Correspondence Courses
MAJ Jerome R. Singer, MP
Division
Chief, Reserve Components
MAJ Raymond I. Dimmick, FA
Division
b. Civil Affairs Division, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command
Institute for Strategic and Stability Operations:

Chief
LTC Thomas B. Coughlin, IN
c. 95th Civil Affairs Group:

Commanding Officer
COL William E. Webb, IN
Executive Officer
LTC Bobby L. Hardegree, IN
d. 44th Civil Affairs Company:

Commanding Officer
MAJ George P. Long, III, IN

32. Help Wanted. The School hopes that the above information has been
helpful; in turn, the staff and faculty want your help—in many different ways—
in order to disseminate all possible appropriate information to the entire
CA/CMO community. First, we need to have a complete and current mailing
list (all applicable units, headquarters, and activities, as well as individuals
MOBDES to the School and to other CA/CMO positions, and all MAO program
members); please send corrections and additions to the Director of Non-
resident Instruction. Also, we need informative, authoritative, and timely
unclassified material (or unclassified references to classified material)
of interest to the CA/CMO community, for dissemination. Finally, we
welcome your comments concerning this publication, and your questions which
appear to be suitable for answering via this medium. Information, comments,
and questions should be addressed to the Commandant, ATTN: ODDL&P.
Address by
HONORABLE STANLEY R. RESOR
Secretary of the Army
to Members of the
Province and District Senior Advisor Course
Foreign Service Institute
Washington, D. C.
8 May 1970

This speech provides information about U. S. Army officers assigned as province and district senior advisors in the Republic of Vietnam. It is published for background use in writing or discussing the Vietnamization program. It is not intended for use in recruiting personnel for the senior advisor program.

It is both a pleasure and honor to address you gentlemen who soon will be serving your country in Vietnam as province or district senior advisors.

I know of no assignment of greater importance to achieving our objectives in Vietnam.

I know of no assignment more challenging and rewarding.

I know of no assignment offering a young officer greater opportunity to exercise individual responsibility.

I know of no assignment requiring greater dedication, ingenuity and leadership.

Our Government's policy is to Vietnamize the war. Accordingly, this has become the Army's principal objective in Vietnam. Vietnamization means enabling the South Vietnamese to take over combat operations against not only the Viet Cong, but the North Vietnamese main forces as well, replacing U. S. forces. It has been reflected in a steady and continuing expansion and improvement of the Vietnamese armed forces and the popular
self-defense forces, and in a spreading area of security throughout South Vietnam.

Vietnamization is more than a military program. The military aspect merely provides a shield behind which the Vietnamese government, including local governments, must come forward with reforms. These reforms—economic, social, and political—will attract the loyalty and support of the people as a whole. Vietnamization involves helping the Vietnamese people to build their own future—to assure effective internal security forces, a stronger economy, a cohesive society and widened participation in government.

Ultimately our whole effort in Vietnam will succeed or fail depending on what the Vietnamese do—not the United States. Initially in Vietnam operations we perhaps followed too much the natural tendency of Americans to do things for ourselves. We have since learned to emphasize more those programs which increase the capability of the Vietnamese.

You who will serve in the advisory program are relatively few in number. There are only 300 province and district senior advisor positions providing management of programs at the local level for the entire nation of Vietnam. You represent the crucial leverage point on which the Vietnamization program turns. Your efforts will direct the way in which all our massive program of aid and advice is to be focused.

The Vietnamization program is reflected, of course, in other areas as well—in joint United States-Vietnamese military operations, joint training exercises, and training of individual Vietnamese soldiers. But it is only you, the advisors, who will be devoting your efforts to Vietnamization full time. It is you who will work singly-mindedly toward increasing Vietnamese capability in all fields—military, social and economic. That is why your assignment is so important.

The advisor must be not only an outstanding military leader, but also a diplomat—soldier—a person who understands and likes the Vietnamese, and who can work closely with the people he is advising. He must be familiar not just with security requirements, but also with local politics and administrative methods. He must have the tact and sensitivity to influence Vietnamese counterparts without giving offense.
In selecting you for this unique assignment, the Army applied careful standards. You are veterans of at least one tour in Vietnam with ability to speak or learn the language. In the school and command experience you already have compiled, the Army's confidence in you has been established.

As we continue to phase down United States forces, you who are to be advisors become more and more the essential ingredient of our success in Vietnam. For this reason both the Chief of Staff and I are determined to make these assignments as attractive as possible, and to be sure that those who fill them are properly recognized, rewarded and advanced in their careers. We have directed positive actions to see that this is accomplished.

First, as to attractiveness. During the years of troop buildup in Vietnam the prestige attached to command or service with United States units tended to draw many of our best people at the expense of our advisor program. We have taken steps to correct this and establish clearly the paramount importance of our advisors in the Vietnamization effort. I have directed that henceforth officers selected as advisors will be of equal quality with officers assigned as commanders of United States troop units in Vietnam.

Training programs for advisors have been expanded and career incentives broadened. The course you have just completed is an example. The training course for Province Senior Advisors began in 1967.

In January 1969, we established a similar program for training District Senior Advisors. We will also provide high quality, combat-experienced officers in other advisory positions whenever possible. Our overall objective is to see that the officers best qualified for advisory duty are selected that they receive the finest and most up-to-date training possible, and that they are utilized as intended in Vietnam.

Last month I received from the Chief of Staff further recommendations to enhance the attractiveness of the District Advisory Program. These were implemented last month. The new policy provides for a 12-month tour with special incentives, and an option for an 18-month tour coupled with a substantial increase in incentives.
Special advantages accorded to all in the regular 12-month tour include:

- A personal letter signed by the Chief of Staff attesting to the importance of the assignment, to be made a permanent part of the officer's record.
- Permission to select next assignment within practical limits.
- Every consideration within practical limits for civil schooling upon completion of the tour.
- An offer of excess family quarters at CONUS posts.

Additional incentives for those who spend an 18-month tour include:

- An offer of quarters for the family on any post of his choice in CONUS or Hawaii.
- The 30-day special leave now offered to all personnel volunteering to extend their tour 6 months.
- A 5-year exemption from additional short tours.
- Guaranteed early consideration by a promotion selection board when the officer comes into the secondary zone for lieutenant colonel.

General Westmoreland also proposed two additional incentives which I strongly endorse. First is a special responsibility pay of $50 per month for all district senior advisors. The other, for those serving an 18-month tour, is a two-week leave with family in any of the R&R sites in Hawaii or Southeast Asia, with Government transportation and per diem authorized for family members. These two incentives require approval at Defense level. I have personally discussed them with both the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and I hope for an early favorable decision.

Let me turn to the matter of career rewards. Our basic policy is that no officer's future should suffer in any way from the fact that he served as an advisor instead of in some other assignment. On the contrary, advisor duty should and will be recognized as experience equal in trust and responsibility to any type of assignment the Army offers. Our commitment is
firm and long-range. It will ensure that advisors are adequately rewarded for their efforts not only now, but over the balance of their military careers.

For example, a senior officer promotion board recently was specifically directed to equate service as an advisor with command of a United States unit in combat. Although this direction represents a change from previous years, it is one I believed was vital if we are to inspire and encourage the best of our field grade officers to seek jobs as district and province senior advisors, as advisors to Vietnamese units, or in staff positions in the CORDS organization. The importance of advisory duty will be included in the instructions to all promotion selection boards and to selection boards for service schools.

We shall hereafter designate at least one former advisor as a member of all field grade officer promotion boards. Persons preparing and reviewing officer efficiency reports have been directed to emphasize the importance of the functions performed by rated advisors.

I have tried to portray the importance of the advisor in accomplishing our objectives in Vietnam, the steps to be taken to insure that only our most qualified are assigned as advisors, the incentives offered along with the actions under way to attract our most talented personnel into this program, and the actions taken to insure proper career recognition for personnel assigned to advisory duty.

I think you will agree that the recent positive actions to enhance the advisory program should in a short period provide clear recognition and understanding by all of the importance of advisory assignments.

In the final analysis, however, the greatest satisfaction in any job comes from the feeling that one's work has been worthwhile in and of itself--important enough to justify the portion of a career spent on it. You can find this kind of satisfaction in helping another free people to help themselves. You can make it possible for them to live under a form of government which respects the dignity and worth of the individual, instead of falling victim to a system which represents the antithesis of humane values. I have seen this kind of satisfaction in speaking with present and former advisors, like Colonel Tom Bowen, who was present at the turnaround in Thua Thien province
in early 1968, and Colonel Clay Gompf, who served as province senior
advisor in Binh Dinh in 1969. They and others speak with genuine enthusiasm
of the accomplishment they felt in serving as advisors. Surely there could
be no more appealing or rewarding way to spend your time in Vietnam, or
to serve your country.

I congratulate you on your past accomplishments, and on your successful
completion of this course. I wish you success in your new assignment, and
in your Army careers.
Whoever conquers a free town and does not demolish it commits a great error, and may expect to be ruined himself; because whenever the citizens are disposed to revolt, they betake themselves of course to that blessed name of liberty, and the laws of their ancestors, which no length of time nor kind usage whatever will be able to eradicate.

I have just quoted from Niccolo Machiavelli’s book, The Prince, a passage describing a policy that is the antithesis of U.S. wartime and post-war policies towards the population of enemy countries. Nowhere is this more apparent than in our historical record in Military Government and Civil Affairs... where we have a fully matured tradition dating back to General Scott's military government in Mexico City. After the Civil War and during Reconstruction, the Army undertook military government in the South. From 1867-77 the Army was the caretaker of Alaska and as such regulated territorial affairs. Numerous other little known examples can be named. But nowhere did the Army play a greater role in military government than in Germany, Japan, and Korea during and after World War II... a period which we might call the classical era of Military Government.

Today Germany and Japan, our two major antagonists during World War II, rank among the four greatest industrial powers in the world. Had we taken Machiavelli’s advice, they would be weak and insignificant... and probably not very representative of democratic government. Today, thanks to our farsighted policies, these two countries hold the balance of power between East and West.
During this classical period we came as kind of combined conquerors and liberators, building governments almost from scratch and bringing enlightenment and education to bewildered people. In Japan and Germany, the war had brought vast destruction of the civilian economy--civil affairs filled the void.

Korea at the end of World War II in the Pacific presented a particularly interesting case. In the first place, our presence there was decided very late in the game and was almost on second thought. As a result, we were not prepared and did not have language capable and area oriented Military Government teams ready for Korea. I was Chief of Staff, 6th Infantry Division in Luzon on V-J Day--we had been planning for a final assault on the main island of Honshu when the war ended. We were then assigned an occupational sector in the South Central part of Honshu centered in the old capital of Kyoto, and we had Military Government teams, Japanese speaking and specifically trained for this part of Japan. You can imagine the consternation when we were switched to the southern part of Korea!

Secondly, Korea was not considered as a conquered country but rather a liberated one; this dictated a completely different approach and attitude. The Japanese deliberately had held back the technical and governmental advancement as well as education of the Koreans so that the governmental structure and public utilities--railroads, water works, electric power, communications, etc.--were controlled by Japanese nationals. Moreover, the schools and economy were dominated by the Japanese. And so when we removed the Japanese officials and technicians, things came to an abrupt halt. It was a most unpromising picture when Syngman Rhee returned to his country from exile in the fall of 1945. To make matters worse, Russian trained Korean communist agents, with plenty of money, abounded in the south, taking good local advantage of the vacuum created by the departing Japanese. Believe me, this was not a classical Military Government problem, and we had our work cut out. As the first Military Governor of Cholla Pukto Province, I take my hat off to the Military Government team I had. Despite all these handicaps, they were simply tremendous and we somehow made it through that first winter. As a postscript, I should add that from the very beginning of the U.S. presence in South Korea, we on the ground could clearly see the Korean War coming--it was not a question of whether, but simply when.
Beginning with the Korean War, this classic Military Government role began to change rather fundamentally. We no longer were establishing or replacing the government in a nation which had been defeated, but instead we were helping to strengthen an existing government. You know the rest of the Korean story—it is one of the most phenomenal success stories of modern time. The stability of the government, the exploding economy, the energy of the people, and the strength and competence of the armed forces are all a matter of record. Significantly, more than 90 percent of South Koreans can read and write. We can take great pride in our accomplishments in this nation.

Another step in the evolution of our Civil Affairs and Military Government role took place during the Dominican Republic affair which began on 26 April 1965. As a result of a series of rapid events, our troops ended up in a unique peacekeeping mission, initially unilaterally U. S. and later Inter-American in nature. The mission was complex and new in the annals of Civil Affairs and Military Government. It involved bringing peace to the capital city of Santo Domingo, while bringing medical aid, food and other essentials to both warring sides. It involved shoring up the existing government outside Santo Domingo to avoid the spread of violence. Finally, it meant creating a stable environment in which a temporary political settlement for a caretaking Provisional Government could be reached, followed eventually by popular elections, all under the aegis of the Organization of American States. The most significant aspect of the mission was to make possible the establishment of a democratic regime in the Dominican Republic in accordance with the desires of the majority of the people.

Thus we see in this evolution of the Army's Civil Affairs function a movement from establishing government to bolstering government. We also see a trend to consider Civil Affairs functions as an integral part of the military operations of combat-type units. Finally, we see the emerging role of Psychological Operations, likewise becoming an integral part of military operations and habitually planned as an essential part of the military mission.

In Vietnam, we have seen still further evolution of the Civil Affairs function in the U. S. Army.
In an insurgency environment, this aspect is so important that the Commander cannot afford to neglect it. Effectiveness in the Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations roles may well mean success or failure of the unit mission rather than the other way around. More importantly, these functions are at the very heart of our advisory mission which has now become predominant as we "Vietnamize" and "de-Americanize" the war.

At the individual level the advisor is vitally concerned with every aspect of Civil Affairs: medical care, public works, public health, safety, taxation, public transportation, housing, and communications in its broadest sense. The advisor is a new type individual who must not only be knowledgeable about such matters but must also be culturally attuned to the environment in which he may find himself.

Edmund Burke once said,

The use of force alone is but temporary. It may subdue for a moment; but it does not remove the necessity of subduing again: and a nation is not governed, which is perpetually to be conquered. . . .

We have kept this in mind continually in Vietnam, realizing that no stability would ever come internally if the basic needs of the South Vietnamese people were not accommodated.

Prior to May 1967, all civilian efforts to assist the South Vietnamese pacification program were directed by the U. S. Embassy--these included AID (at the time called USOM), JUSPAO (Public Affairs/PSYOPS element of USIA) and the Office of the Special Assistant. At the same time, however, these efforts were in reality autonomous in that each responded directly to its Headquarters in Washington. On the military side, MACV had its own Revolutionary Development staff element to support pacification.

In May 1967, upon the recommendation of Ambassador Bunker who had just taken over the U. S. Mission, it was decided to integrate the two efforts... civilian and military. . . under COMUSMACV, then General Westmoreland. There were several basic reasons underlying this decision. One was that the momentum of pacification depended largely on military security. Another was that this generally aligned the new U. S. Advisory organization in
parallel with the higher Vietnamese field echelons responsible for pacification. Thus U.S. advice at the crucial Corps Tactical Zone, Province and District levels was under unified direction. But the key, overriding reason was that only the Department of Defense, specifically the U.S. Army, had the personnel, materiel, and organizational resources required for this immense job.

Ambassador Bob Komer was assigned as General Westmoreland's Deputy for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development (CORDS). At Corps level, the senior advisor, a military man, was given a civilian deputy for CORDS with a separate staff to assist him.

At Province level, however, the senior advisor could be either military with a civilian deputy, or civilian with a military deputy. At District level, most of the advisors are military.

This new arrangement required the integration of some 1,200 civilians into the MACV advisory structure. By June 1968, 1,600 U.S. civilians and 6,000 military were engaged in the pacification program. This organizational technique was built partly on the experience of KCAC, the Korean Civil Assistance Command, by integrating civilian personnel into operational military staffs in the field. It was the first time, however, that we had done this on such a large scale and throughout the upper echelons of our military organization.

In this CORDS program Civil Affairs really became focused. Psychological Operations, Public Safety, Refugee Affairs, Revolutionary Development, Chieu Hoi, Education, Agriculture, Public Health, Public Works, Reduction of the Viet Cong Infrastructure, and Operations of the Vietnamese Territorial Forces, the RF&PF, are all coordinated through CORDS. In carrying out these myriad tasks, the U.S. Civil Affairs Units operating in each Corps Tactical Zone are worth their weight in gold.

The CORDS concept has worked reasonably well in Vietnam. The fact that Vietnamization is working—the fact that 150,000 more U.S. troops are coming home within a year—is proof of our confidence in the gains being made in pacification.

I do have a word of caution, however, for the future because I'm not at all certain that we should adopt the MACV-CORDS concept as permanent
policy and doctrine. My primary uneasiness with the concept is that it seems to violate our traditional subordination of the military to civilian control. I understand and recognize the reasoning leading to this policy decision. But the fact that we did it and are doing it now doesn't necessarily make it right for the future.

This subject deserves a lot of hard thought as we again may be faced with the complex problems associated with shoring up a friend. Clearly such peacekeeping will require quality people.

To meet the anticipated demands of advisory and military assistance type duty of the future, we have established a special career program in the Army. This program will identify and contribute to the development of high level advisors, key staff personnel and commanders capable of providing political-military advice -- officers who are capable of conducting military activities having social, economic, political and psychological impact -- who will have a deeper appreciation for the role of Civil Affairs and the need for trained, skilled and professional Civil Affairs units.

At the highest levels the Military Assistance Officer can be assigned to such offices as International Security Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the Department of State; Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army; in certain Joint Staff positions; as Senior Advisors in foreign countries; and in other important MAAG, Mission and Attaché assignments as well as high level PsyOps and Civil Affairs posts. He will be able to perform in all stages of military involvement -- from military assistance to conventional combat. The MAOP officer should be able to plan and develop internal defense and internal development programs in coordination with other agencies.

To help develop officers in performing these various tasks, a Military Assistance Officer Command and Staff Course has been established at the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This 19-week, graduate level course is designed to increase the individual officer's understanding of his role in the politico-military field.
While recognizing that education is not the panacea to all problems, advanced education will be a requirement for the vast majority of the more than 550 important jobs identified in the program. The fact that more than 54 percent of these positions have already been validated for advanced degrees by the Army Educational Requirements Board demonstrates that the program is being strongly supported.

Our President confirmed before the United Nations . . .

It is not my belief that the way to peace is by giving up your friends or letting down your allies.

In his State of the Union Address, he said . . .

To insist that other nations play a role is not a retreat from responsibility; it is a sharing of responsibility.

Gentlemen, the wave of the future for the Army as a part of our Armed Forces certainly does not point to a withdrawal from the Civil Affairs function. Although the Army must always be prepared to fight and carry out its basic combat mission in any kind of warfare, it must also be prepared to play a major role in the politico-military arena. Thus we visualize the continuing and growing need for skilled Civil Affairs personnel and units in the U.S. Army. The importance of our Active and Reserve Civil Affairs units was never greater than it is today. The part played by the Military Government Association in furthering our knowledge and skills in this area are well known and appreciated. But we need your help in getting better utilization of the great reservoir of talents and skills available in this area. STRICOM and other high level headquarters are exploiting such talents in certain contingency planning, but we really aren't taking maximum advantage of these valuable resources. And so we solicit your ideals and views. Your dedication and motivation in the national interest are a great credit to you individually and collectively as an organization. Keep up the fine work.
Good evening ladies and gentlemen. May I say what a privilege and a pleasure it is to be here and to participate in your annual conference. I am particularly gratified that a group of civil affairs professionals, old pros so to speak, would invite a relative novice like myself to address your group.

If I had a title for this address today, I suppose I would just call it "A Think Piece on the Role of Civil Affairs in our Changing World."

Civil Affairs and its organization for action were born out of world conflict. Our country entered World War II with no one governmental organization charged with the responsibility for handling the civil affairs functions as they relate to military operations. During the 1942 North African campaign we quickly found that some type of civil affairs support was required. The attempts to provide this support through various civilian agencies became so confused and uncoordinated that they actually detracted from military operations rather than support them. It was from these initial experiences that we developed the doctrine which states that "in addition to a commander's responsibilities for combat operations, he has an equally important responsibility for the civilians, the economy and for the governmental apparatus in his area of operations."

At the conclusion of World War II, it was clearly evident that even though the Army's civil affairs capability had been developed rapidly, it had contributed significantly to the establishment of sound government and economic development in the liberated areas.

Many changes have come about in the world since the end of that conflict. In our own adult lifetime, we have witnessed changes unequalled in the history of mankind--the jet airplane, color television, nuclear power, manned lunar landings--to name only a few. Our economists tell us that today when you walk into a department store or variety market, over 75% of the items found on the shelves did not exist 15 years ago. Our senior scholars also tell us
that scientific knowledge doubles every 15 or so years. The changes in our social and economic patterns have been so great and so rapid, that it is a challenge just to keep up with them, let alone to fully adjust to them.

As an integral part of our American society, the tempo of change has been equally pronounced in the military profession. In the relatively short time since those crisis years in the early 1940's, science and technology have given new dimensions to warfare; in the fields of strategic and tactical mobility, weaponry, communications, medicine, management, and several areas. World War II saw the tank and the airplane come to the foreground and armies were organized to take advantage of their capabilities. Mobility began to gain on firepower. Vietnam has brought about a further revolution in mobility as the helicopter has permitted infantry battalions to move long distances in a matter of minutes, and dismount in a combat posture.

Almost every aspect of our doctrine and our techniques in the application of military power has changed.

Meanwhile, during this period of dynamic change, what has happened to civil affairs? What changes have come about in doctrine, organization and the scope of operations, since World War II?

Since we first began to develop the civil affairs program, the major functional area has been involved with military government, the re-establishment of law and order and the reconstruction of economies. Our mission to Greece in 1947, while composed of military as well as civilian personnel, was chiefly concerned with improving the efficiency of the Greek government and strengthening their armed forces. The Greek experience is important because it is represented a clear-cut success by western powers in defeating a strong Communist insurgency.

Unfortunately, however, no U.S. civil affairs assets were employed and, hence, this experience developed no basic changes in civil affairs doctrine and failed to broaden the scope of civil affairs functions.

In Korea, the Commander-in-Chief was charged with the administration of all military and economic assistance provided by the United Nations. Yet the UN set up separate agencies to work in the political and economic fields. Organizational structures for civil affairs during the Korean war were complex, difficult to manage, and inefficient in their operations. No standard TOE civil affairs units were even utilized during that war. Yet the refugee
problem in Korea was tremendous. Roads and transportation facilities became clogged. The food, medical service and sanitation problems were greater than any previously experienced by the Army. It was soon learned that the proper conduct of these civil affairs functions was necessary to successful military operations. Accordingly the Army, out of necessity, turned to combat type military organizations for the solution, and another opportunity went by the boards for further development of professional civil affairs skills.

Of a more recent date, was the Dominican Republic operation in 1965. One civil affairs company was sent to the Dominican Republic with the American forces. However, its functions were restricted by the presence of various civilian agencies with similar functions. The Public Safety Team of the Agency for International Development (AID) performed many of the functions which could have and perhaps should have been performed by the civil affairs company. The functions of the CA, Displaced Persons Team were handled almost exclusively by the U.S. Embassy with the team serving in a support and assistance role. The resources of the Civil Information Team were such that they could not compete with nor effectively contribute to the efforts of the U.S. Information Services.

The after-action reports of this civil affairs company reflect time and again, the duplication of effort between civilian agencies and the Civil Affairs company.

Thus, for a third time, the opportunity to get civil affairs personnel deeply involved, working with the people of foreign countries and developing the experience and civil affairs skills, was lost.

I believe that these opportunities were lost because too many of us in the Army are still thinking of civil affairs in the image of World War II; that of following behind the armies and establishing local government and military control. We have gone through two decades of change in the world and in the organization and functioning of the Army. It would appear that it is now time for civil affairs to catch up with the rest of the Army and to begin developing the doctrine, organization, and the skills on a large scale which will be of value in the limited conflicts we are more likely to be involved in in future years.
Turning now to South Vietnam, we find some rather startling facts. The initial civil affairs efforts, in 1964-65, were made by the civil affairs unit attached to the 1st Special Forces Group in Okinawa. They rotated teams and detachments in and out of South Vietnam. Although they did some good on a local basis, they had very little impact on the overall pacification effort. In SVN the responsibility for the U.S. contribution to pacification rested with the U.S. mission. Its efforts were divided between several civilian groups; namely AID, USIA, CIA and the Public Safety Division of AID which was almost an agency within itself. Most of their actions were unilateral in nature and there was much duplication and confusion through the lack of positive direction and coordination. This was especially evident at the Province and District level.

In mid 1965, the decision was made to introduce U.S. combat forces into SVN. Shortly, thereafter, when I was serving as ADCSOPS for Special Operations, we developed a plan which we hoped to test in a few provinces of SVN. This plan would have increased the province and district advisory staffs to a total of about 80-90 people. It also envisaged the use of large numbers of U.S. Army, Civil Affairs personnel. It was a good plan and was personally approved by the Army Chief of Staff, General Harold K. Johnson and by the Dep Sec Def, Mr. Vance, but the mission in SVN thought it too revolutionary and it never got off the ground.

Meanwhile the situation in the AID managed ports was becoming chaotic and it became necessary for the Army to take them over. In the provinces the several agencies continued to add personnel but there was still little effort toward a unified action. Finally, in about mid 1967, the senior AID representative in each province was charged with coordination under a title known as "Office of Civil Operations", OCO. Later that year, the responsibility for the overall pacification program was transferred to the military. COMUSMACV, then General Westmoreland assumed command of the organization which operated under the title "Deputy for Coordination of Revolutionary Development Support", or CORDS. The Director of these activities, initially Ambassador Komer and later Ambassador Colby, was made a deputy to COMUSMACV. Over a period of time this organization has developed into a highly effective, well coordinated effort.

With respect to civil affairs, at the Division level most commands had effective civic action programs. For example, in the 4th Inf Div in the Highlands, we were devoting between 500 to 1,000 men to civic action projects
each day. These extensive projects not only aided the people but greatly strengthened the security of all of our installations. At the Division staff level these activities were planned and coordinated by the G5 through the S5's of brigades and battalions. Most of the officers occupying these positions had had but little, if any, training in civil affairs. Hence, their actions were often the result of innate intelligence or OJT. Fortunately, I had an officer completely familiar with the CA program and it paid us great dividends.

At the Corps or Field Force level, Civil Affairs worked under the DCORDS with one or two detachments assigned to each province where they worked under the PSA. In the 1st Field Force I had the 41st CA Company attached. Generally, its function was to coordinate the civic action projects and to supervise the overall effort. In all of SVN, there are now two Civil Affairs companies and four platoons, totaling about 300 personnel. Hence, in analyzing the Civil Affairs effort, it can be said that they are contributing, but personally I don't think that it is anywhere near what it should be.

What went wrong? Why wasn't the Civil Affairs effort properly applied? As I would look at it, there were many reasons, but there was no single agency or individual solely at fault. However, there were several related influences:

First, at the U.S. national level, the functions are assigned to various civilian agencies with assistance and support being provided by the military. In this role the military has little to say about the direction and control of the effort and gets but little credit for the support which it provides.

Secondly, is the reflection of this attitude or condition in SVN or in any other potential area of conflict.

Thirdly, at DOD and DA level, the effort is rather diffused and divided. There is not a single agency pulling together all of the various aspects of the program into a unified effort.

Fourthly, is the Civil Affairs organization itself. In my view, it is living in the past, it is too parochial, and it is working within antiquated doctrine, or perhaps even dogma.

Fifth and final, was our failure, on a national basis, to mobilize for the war in SVN. If our Reserve Components had been mobilized in 1965, in all
probability a large portion of the Civil Affairs assets in the Army Reserve would have been called to Active Duty. This, in itself, would have caused a critical review of the organization for pacification in SVN. But, this did not come about and a golden opportunity went by the boards.

There may be causes other than these, but basically I think they are the central ones. As a military officer, this leaves me concerned. It concerns me to have trained personnel assets that are either not used or not properly employed. With the reduction in the size of the Active Army and greater emphasis being placed upon the role of our Reserve Components, it is essential, if not imperative, that we be structured to fulfill both our world wide peacetime requirements and our commitments to meet contingency situations. If we have Civil Affairs units that are not to be deployed in emergency situations, one must logically ask, why have them? To put all of this in its proper context, we must be prepared for both general and limited war, with the probability pointing strongly toward the later. This, then, is going to require some fresh, clear thinking, abandonment of any form of parochialism, and the proper reshuffling or restructuring of the Civil Affairs resources to do the job.

You are probably thinking at this time--that is well and good but what specifically can be done. I cannot offer you any approved solutions, but I can give you some think pieces, or "food for thought", if you will.

It seems to me that the first need is to review and modify the doctrine under which DA Civil Affairs is applied. This would include an analysis of the roles and mission in general war, in limited war and in stability operations. It must also get down to the basic elements, the nitty gritty of operational techniques. But in a broader sense, it must include consideration of Army Civil Affairs at the Joint level and the role of military civil affairs within our National organization and doctrine.

Going hand in glove with the doctrine is the need to develop a sound organization. An organization with sufficient flexibility that it can serve the needs of either general or limited war. I would include several things within the organizational requirements:

a. The most obvious is the updating of TOE's based upon new mission assignments. I am told by some of the experts that some of the TOE's have
not had major surgery in the past 25 years.

b. I also see the need for a Chief of some variety at DA level, whose sole responsibility would be to plan, organize and oversee Civil Affairs throughout the entire Army--active and Reserve. Quite obviously, he should be a General Officer and he should be armed with sufficient authority to do the job--to breathe new life into an old organization.

c. New life should also be put into the CA personnel program or into a Corps that has true meaning--a program that will be able to attract people with the appropriate CA talents. Whatever it is, the organization must be attractive to the individual and, certainly, he should not be penalized for being a part of it.

As a further step to up-grade Civil Affairs and closely related to doctrine and organization is the matter of instruction. This would include not only the instruction in Civil Affairs personnel at the CA schools, but also at the several branch schools (Inf, Arty, Armd, etc.), the C&GSC and the War College. We must teach CA people how properly to do their job, and also to teach others how to employ units and personnel with such skills.

These are just a few thoughts toward improvement of CA. I am sure the specialists would have many more.

I think my message tonight is to let you know that I am vitally interested and concerned with Army Civil Affairs. I would like to see it modernized and upgraded to do its job throughout the spectrum of conflict. I would also like to see personnel in the S5 and the G5 positions fully qualified in the CA area. However, before such can be an accomplished fact, there is considerable improvement both in the organization of CA and the quality of its personnel which must take place.

It seems to me that the Military Government Association is in a position to make a most significant contribution toward the modernization of Army Civil Affairs. Each of you is a qualified, experienced expert in the discipline
of Military Government and Civil Affairs. I would feel certain that the suggestions and the counsel of this Association and that of its individual members would be gladly received by those responsible for making decisions at the DA, DOD and National levels. This Association has strong backing and it has a powerful voice, but to be heard it must speak.

In closing, I would again like to express my gratitude to you for inviting Mrs. Peers and me to your convention.
REMARKS BY
MAJOR GENERAL W. J. SUTTON
CHIEF OF USAR

Throughout the years since 1947, your Association has stood firm in its espousal of the most effective means of fulfilling the important objectives of civil affairs. Thus far, your efforts have been fruitful, and they must continue to be.

The Army's civil-military relations have never been so important as they are today. On their success depends in large measure the image of our own country that is conceived and carried by people in many foreign lands. By the complex circumstances of the international scene the Army is no longer just a last resort when diplomacy fails. The Army must practice its own form of diplomacy as a partner with agencies of our government outside the military establishment.

During the last hundred years and more the Army has been required to fashion some kind of civil affairs organization for every war the United States has fought.

Today, we are in a much better position to meet the challenging responsibilities of civil affairs wherever they emerge. And with the ever increasing likelihood that limited war and insurgency operations will continue to face us in the future, it is imperative that we be prepared well in advance to carry out an effective civil affairs effort.

We are doing just that in the U.S. Army Reserve. Our nearly 8,000 Army Reserve members in 53 civil affairs units continually carry out their training responsibilities to be ready for active duty in any emergency. You also serve daily as an integral part of our total force structure in national defense, not just for severe future emergency--but now.

As for training activities, I know that our civil affairs units in the Army Reserve undertake projects of diverse and timely application to enhance their readiness levels. Comprised of highly competent and professionally qualified individuals, Army Reserve civil affairs units provide the Army real strength in depth in this important function.
I am certain that civil affairs units of the Army Reserve will continue to play an indispensable role today and in the years ahead. As we all know, the Civil Affairs Branch of the Army Reserve has been maintained and developed so that its highly skilled personnel can serve the best interests of the United States as well as the individual members of the Army Reserve in this branch.

At the same time I see in the decade of the 70's a demand for the Active Army and the Army Reserve to broaden their scope of civil affairs expertise. Although the threat of general war still exists and we must be prepared to meet it, I believe that various types of insurgency presents our immediate real and continuing danger.

Our Army Reserve civil affairs units must be prepared to cope with the challenges presented in both forms of violence--general war and insurgency operations. Unit training must continue to be comprehensive. It takes into account those techniques involved in small civic action advisory missions, through the progressive tasks of stability operations in countering insurgency, to the support required for a general war. It requires the highest professional training if our Army Reserve units are to be truly capable of meeting the civil affairs missions peculiar to each aspect of modern warfare. That they will, I am certain.

I have complete confidence in our civil affairs units, as I have in all the 3,478 Army Reserve units of which they are a part. Why shouldn't I have when Army Reserve units perform so outstandingly as they did in the 1968-1969 mobilization period. Our 35 units deployed to Vietnam, out of the total 45 mobilized, left records of achievement which demonstrated the highest levels of readiness and training.

**General William C. Westmoreland, Chief of Staff, said to them in a welcome back address:**

"Every American can be proud of what you have done. You stepped forward when your country called; you shouldered responsibility under the most difficult conditions."
And the President of the United States proclaimed 16 December 1969 as "Reserve Recognition Day" as a tribute to them and to all returning Reservists. In citing their service to the Nation, the President reminded all Americans that "the Reserve Components are a great resource for our country and one which is necessary to our national security."

Indeed, I am proud of the dedicated service being rendered by the Army Reserve members throughout the land—in all 50 states, Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. And I am pleased that during this month of April we have been celebrating Community Month to show how proud we are to serve as citizen-soldiers. As you know, 23 April was the 62d anniversary of the U.S. Army Reserve and since 1968 we have used the entire month of April especially to carry out various community projects to bring Army Reserve members and their communities closer together. Doing this also enables us to familiarize the community with the Army Reserve mission and its diverse training activities to fulfill that mission.

In addition to working with communities on projects of mutual benefit, the purpose of Community Month is equally related to our role at home stations in keeping Americans aware of our readiness activities.

But, Community Month is only a small part of our efforts to elicit public understanding of the Army Reserve and to fulfill our objective or "Strength in Reserve" through constant and diligent training.

I am pleased to know that today has been declared "Civil Affairs Day" here in Chicago. This is a fine tribute to the Military Government Association and seems to me to be doubly significant in view of our anniversary celebration of the Army Reserve during the month of April.

I want to add my own congratulations to those of the Mayor of Chicago on this occasion of "Civil Affairs Day." The Military Government Association merits this recognition for the importance of its work in behalf of national defense. I know that all Army Reserve members join me in saluting your Association today, and in acknowledging the significant part it plays in promoting military preparedness.

I am confident this 23d annual conference will be even more successful than meetings held in the past and that all participants will derive the utmost in productive and meaningful dialogue on subject discussed. I know
you are looking forward to a number of interesting discussions pertinent to civil affairs during this conference.

I wish you every success during this annual conference and for continued Strength in Reserve.
Dear Colonel Rohde:

As we discussed, it might be beneficial for you, as President of the Military Government Association, to be given periodic updates on important actions accomplished or anticipated by the Military Assistance Officer Program (MAOP). These updates will include the program's impact and relationship with civil affairs. You may feel that all or part of this information would interest other civil affairs reserve unit personnel. With this in mind, I would have no objection to it being used in the Military Government Journal and Newsletter, realizing that it is widely reviewed by the reserve civil affairs community.

General Peers, at the 23rd Annual Military Government Association Conference, stated:

We've gone through two decades of change in the world and in the organization and functioning of the Army. It would appear that it is now time for civil affairs to catch up with the rest of the Army and to begin developing the doctrine, organization, and the skills on a large scale which will be of value in the limited conflicts we are more likely to be involved in in future years.

A partial answer to General Peers' observation is, of course, the MAOP, which incorporated the active Army's Civil Affairs Officer Program. Officers entering this program will learn their soldier-statesman role and be better
prepared to conduct operations which lead to the prevention of armed conflict. Those agencies responsible for implementing the MAOP recognize that varying relationships exist not only between civil affairs and psychological operations, but also among several other key elements. As you know, the MAOP seeks to integrate many elements, to include civil affairs and PSYOP planning and operations, where feasible. Our objective is prudently balanced to insure that the capabilities of all of these functions are applied selectively to support the Army's mission. Closely allied with this is the realization and determination that the Army must retain within its school system a capability to provide adequate support for civil affairs training. Retention of the missions and functions of the Civil Affairs School will continue to be a guiding factor in any plan to consolidate academic organizations. The pilot Military Assistance Officer Command and Staff Course graduated in December 1969. The experienced senior officers who attended that working, developmental course did much to assist in further refining the Program of Instruction. The first regular Command and Staff Course began in January of this year and graduates in June. Our intention is to teach this course two or three times a year, with a programmed input of about 60 officers per class.

Chapter 3 (Key and Supporting Position Lists) to AR 614-134 will be in the field very soon--it's now being printed. Of the 552 MAOP positions established by these lists, 300 have already been validated by the Army Educational Requirements Board for Advanced Education. Degrees will be in the social sciences; seven positions have been validated as requiring doctoral level education.

The MAOP member will be assigned to such offices as International Security Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the Department of State under the State-DOD Exchange Program; Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations on the Army Staff; in certain areas of the Joint Staff; as Province Senior Advisors in Vietnam; in important MAAG, Mission and Attaché assignments; high level PSYOP and Civil Affairs posts and as Commanders up to and including group level. They will serve in assignments dealing with the formulation of national policy and doctrine and will be prepared to perform in all stages of military involvement, from the initial provision of military assistance through high intensity conflict.
Speaking at the 23d Annual Conference, General Palmer devoted part of his remarks to an explanation of the MAOP. He cautioned that the Army must continue to recognize its politico-military functions by saying:

...the wave of the future for the Army as part of our Armed Forces certainly does not point to a withdrawal from the Civil Affairs function. Although the Army must always be prepared to fight and carry out its basic combat mission in any kind of warfare, it must also be prepared to play a major role in the politico-military arena. Thus we visualize the continuing and growing need for skilled Civil Affairs officers in the U.S. Army. The importance of our Active and Reserve Civil Affairs units was never greater than it is today. The part played by the Military Government Association in furthering our knowledge and skills in this area are well known and appreciated. Your dedication and motivation in the national interest are a great credit to you individually and collectively as an organization. Keep up the fine work.

The MAOP, using broadened civil affairs and psychological operations skills, is off to a good start. We continue to monitor the program closely in order to iron out problems as they arise--time and experience are still needed. After the Active Army effort is running smoothly, understood and successful, we will attempt to apply expertise gained to the Reserve structure. I hope this update will prove useful to you and your associates.

Sincerely,

CLARKE T. BALDWIN, JR.
Brigadier General, GS
Acting Director, International and Civil Affairs, ODCSOPS
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<td>USAID VN Assistance Program - Report to the Ambassador</td>
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<td>Counterinsurgency Revisited - The Guerrilla and His World: PSYOP Aspects of Guerrilla Warfare</td>
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<td>American Military Government Courts in Germany</td>
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### SPECIAL TEXTS (cont)

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<td>Financial Policies and Operations</td>
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<td>Press Reorientation</td>
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<td>USACAS PAM</td>
<td>CA Area Study for RVN - Prepared by CORDS</td>
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<td>550-55</td>
<td>The Viet Cong Infrastructure</td>
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**NOTE:** Unit and School addressees may order one copy each, for reference purposes, if not already on hand. Limited stocks, particularly of the older publications, preclude general availability.
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Examples of Department of the Army Publications
Directly Affecting Civil Affairs Units

PART I: Recent Publications

1. FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, October 1969.
2. FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Procedures, June 1968, w/3 Changes.
4. ATP 41-2, Civil Affairs Units, 23 July 1969.
5. TOE 29-500G, Composite Service Organization, 31 August 1967, w/5 Changes.
6. TOE 29-600G, Organizational Maintenance Teams, 17 June 1968, w/2 Changes.
7. TOE 41-2G, HHC Civil Affairs Area A or HHC Civil Affairs Area B, 30 April 1967, w/1 Change.
8. TOE 41-201G, HHC, Civil Affairs Brigade, 17 April 1969, w/1 Change.

PART II: Current Publications

1. AR 140-108, Civil Affairs Branch, 30 October 1964.
2. AR 350-25, Civil Affairs Training, 28 April 1967.
5. TOE 41-2F, HHC Area A Civil Affairs Organization or HHC Area B Civil Affairs Organization, 19 February 1965, w/4 Changes.
6. TOE 41-500D, Civil Affairs Organization, 3 October 1958, w/15 Changes.

PART III: Periodicals

1. The Army Reserve Magazine (informational, rather than directive)
DISASTER ASSISTANCE AND SURVEY TEAM IN PERU
By Sp4 James E. Kessler

Lima, June 23—Within hours after the May 31 tremors buried thousands of Peruvians in mud and rubble, and injured thousands more, the United States Southern Command Disaster Assistance and Survey Team (DAST) was alerted to the assistance of Peru. Seven and one-half hours after receiving the alert, Colonel Robert S. Beightler, who is in charge of DAST, had formulated plans and mobilized his group, and was enroute to Peru aboard three U. S. Air Force C-130 Hercules. The C-130s also carried two Huey helicopters to be used in survey and relief operations. Arriving in Peru June 2, and quickly surveying the overall damage of the earthquake, the group headed for the most devastated region of Peru, the "Vallejon de Hualas."

The nucleus of the team that set up their base camp in the valley is the United States Army Forces Southern Command's 3d Civil Affairs Group (Airborne) (3CA), from the Panama Canal Zone. With members of the 8th Special Forces Group (Airborne), and pilots and crews of the 206th Aviation Company, the team began surveying the area and administering on-the-spot medical aid to the stricken Peruvians.

The 3d CA is a small group—39 officers and 27 enlisted men—but very elite unit of specialists in many fields to include public health, veterinary medicine, civil engineering, sanitary engineering, public education, agriculture, public transportation, civilian supply, public works and utilities, and public communications. Moreover, these highly trained officers and senior noncommissioned officers are both bilingual and airborne qualified. During normal times, the unit's main function is to provide mobile training teams (MTT) and technical assistance teams (TAT) to Latin American countries which request assistance. In the past seven years, more than 100 MTT and TAT have been sent to seventeen different countries for periods ranging from one month to a year. For example, last year, an engineer TAT from the 3d CA drilled wells in the Chaco region of Paraguay, bringing water to the desolate area for the first time in its history. Another group of engineers assisted the government of Bolivia for a year in carrying out that country's national community development program. Here in Peru, 3d CA TATs have assisted the Peruvian Army in establishing and developing its highly successful vocational training program for conscripts after the completion of their term of service. When a natural disaster strikes a country, such as the May 31 Peru earthquake,
the same expertise that forms the MTTs and TATs is deployed to the striken area.

Since the arrival of DAST members in Peru, they have visited and given aid to approximately 300 mountain communities in the "Vallejon de Hualas." Using the U.S. Army's UH-1H and UH-1D model helicopters and CH-47 "Chinooks" to reach the high altitude Peruvian cities and villages, the medical teams, engineers, and others brought immediate help to the victims of the earthquake. By the evening of June 21 the DAST helicopters had made 501 sorties, carried more than 30 tons of cargo, transported 1077 passengers, evacuated 224 injured Peruvians and had flown a total of 58.45 hours. The helicopter cargo consisted of supplies and shelter items needed so desperately by the Peruvians in the valley. Passengers included medical teams of DAST, engineers and others who have been administering aid, opening roads and airstrips, and assisting the Peruvians.

This is the DAST, a specialized group of soldiers formed five years ago to assist their Latin American friends on a day-to-day basis, or to mobilize to lend assistance in time of emergency.
U.S. ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS SCHOOL MOBILIZATION DESIGNATION
POSITION VACANCIES AS OF 17 AUGUST 1970

THEATER: Training Aids Officer - CPT - 2548; Director of Admission - LTC - 8104; Personnel Officer - MAJ - 2200; Supply Officer - CPT - 4010; INSTRUCTORS: Public Finance - LTC - 86010; CA Organization - LTC - 88104; Sociology - LTC - 82701; Public Health - LTC - 83005; Public Transportation - MAJ - 80694; Arts/Monuments - MAJ - 88605.

FIRST U.S. ARMY: Director of Instruction - LTC - 2520; Training Aids Officer - CPT - 2548; INSTRUCTORS: Public Finance - MAJ - 86010; Public Communications - MAJ - 87899; Arts/Monuments - MAJ - 88605.

SECOND U.S. ARMY: Training Aids Officer - CPT - 2548; Personnel Officer - MAJ - 2200; Supply Officer - CPT - 4010; INSTRUCTORS: Public Finance - MAJ - 86010; CA Organization - LTC - 88104; Civil Information - MAJ - 85505; Public Communications - MAJ - 87899; Arts/Monuments - MAJ - 88605.

THIRD U.S. ARMY: Training Aids Officer - CPT - 2548; INSTRUCTORS: Public Communications - MAJ - 87899.

FOURTH U.S. ARMY: Training Aids Officer - CPT - 2548; Supply Officer - CPT - 4010; INSTRUCTORS: Legal - LTC - 88101; Sociology - LTC - 82701.

FIFTH U.S. ARMY: Training Aids Officer - CPT - 2548; Personnel Officer - MAJ - 2200; Supply Officer - CPT - 4010; INSTRUCTORS: Public Safety - LTC - 89000; Public Communications - MAJ - 87899; Arts/Monuments - MAJ - 88605.

SIXTH U.S. ARMY: Training Aids Officer - CPT - 2548; Supply Officer - CPT - 4010; INSTRUCTORS: Public Communications - MAJ - 87899; Arts/Monuments - MAJ - 88605.

U.S. ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS SCHOOL: Chief, Government Functions Section - LTC - 8104.
As of 4 Aug 70

**CIVIL AFFAIRS**

Mobilization Designation Position Vacancies
In Office of Director or International & Civil Affairs Portion of the ODCSOPS MOB
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