RID IETF Draft Update

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11 November 2004

This work was sponsored by the Air Force under Air Force Contract Number F19628-00-C-0002.

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| 1. REPORT DATE | 11 NOV 2004 |
| 2. REPORT TYPE |
| 3. DATES COVERED | 00-00-2004 to 00-00-2004 |
| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE | RID IETF Draft Update |
| 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER |
| 5b. GRANT NUMBER |
| 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER |
| 5d. PROJECT NUMBER |
| 5e. TASK NUMBER |
| 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER |
| 6. AUTHOR(S) |
| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) | Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Lincoln Laboratory, 244 Wood Street, Lexington, MA, 02420-9108 |
| 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER |
| 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) |
| 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) |
| 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) |
| 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT | Approved for public release; distribution unlimited |
| 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES |
| 14. ABSTRACT |
| 15. SUBJECT TERMS |
| 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: |
| a. REPORT | unclassified |
| b. ABSTRACT | unclassified |
| c. THIS PAGE | unclassified |
| 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT | Same as Report (SAR) |
| 18. NUMBER OF PAGES | 10 |
| 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON |

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prepared by ANSI Bal Z39-18
RID Updates

• Purpose
• RID and INCH
• Messaging Format for RID
• Define Extensions to IODEF Model
• New Extension for Policy and Trace Continuance
• Communication Mechanism for RID Documents
• Security Considerations
Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID)

- Trace Security Incidents to the Source
- Stop or Mitigate the Effects of an Attack or Security Incident
- Facilitate Communications between Network Providers
- Integrate with existing and future network components
  - Systems to trace traffic across a network
    - Intrusion Detection Systems
    - NetFlow, Hash Based IP Traceback, IP Marking, etc.
    - Network devices such as routers and firewalls
- Provide secure means to communicate RID messages
  - Consortiums agree upon use and abuse guidelines
  - Consortiums provide a key exchange method
    - Trusted PKI, certificate repository, cross certifications
RID and INCH

- RID is used to communicate security incident handling information between CSIRTs or Network Providers (NPs)
- RID carries much of the same data as an IODEF document
- RID requires a few additional data elements
- Communication and proper transport of messages is in the RID specification
- RID message types
  - XML IODEF document with RID extensions
  - SOAP Wrapper
    Message Type distinguished in SOAP wrapper
RID Extensions to IODEF

- AdditionalData Class from IODEF used to define Extensions
  - IPPacket Class
    - Allows hex packets to be stored in the RID message in a format that will be expected by the recipient of a RID message
    - Multiple packets may be sent in a single message
  - NPath Class
    - Purpose is to identify the path of the trace and to avoid loops
  - TraceStatus Class
    - Method for providing approval status from upstream peer after a trace request is made
  - RIDPolicy
    - Method to determine via RID messages if trace should be continued between NPs
    - Policy negotiations for RID messages
- Reliability of the trace type requested
  - Some NPs may have multiple choices for traceback
  - Method needed to decide which of several methods should be used by the percentage from the originator of request
- Level of trace required
  - RID systems need to reference the IODEF expectation class to determine how fast of a trace mechanism should be used
  - The start time and end time can be used to determine if a fast method of tracing or a slow and more detailed trace mechanism can be used
RID Policy

• RID Policy
  – Ensures policy information is transferred between participating RID peers
  – Policy information in RID to prevent policy related issues from relying on the transport mechanism for enforcement
  – Message type is specified in the RIDPolicy class

• RIDPolicy Information
  – Extension to define the type of trace
    IODEF Method and Impact class information should be considered for the type of traffic requested for trace and the success of an attack
    Explicit statement for the type of trace requested in case it does not fit into the category of attack traffic and can be linked to a CVE or other identifier
  – Identifies where the traffic may have policy issues
    Client to NP
    NP to client
    Within a consortium
    Between peers
    Between consortiums
    Across national boundaries

• Purpose is to try to prevent abuse of the system
  – Address security, confidentiality, and privacy concerns listed in the draft
  – New extension created to address issues raised at IETF-59

• Any comments on RIDPolicy?
Communicating RID Messages

- **SOAP Messaging Wrapper and XML Security**
  - Method to transport messages
  - Policy negotiated in RID message and not wrapper
  - Provide integrity, authentication, authorization
  - XML digital signature, encryption, and public key infrastructure

    Encryption of RID for privacy and security reasons should be via XML encryption and not through the security provided by a wrapper or higher level protocol

- **Public Key Infrastructure**
  - Provided by consortiums linking network providers for RID messaging

- **Message Types**
  - Trace Request
  - Trace Authorization
  - Source Found
  - Relay Request

- **Outstanding question on Source Found Message for Not Found Status**
  - Proposed change of Source Found to Result Message from MEW
  - NULL IP in source found indicates NOT found – preferred option

    Needs to be documented in draft for implementers

- **RID Systems Must Track the Requests by**
  - Incident Number
  - Packet Contents
  - Completion Status
Message Transport

• Transport via HTTPS, BEEP, or Email?
• Mailing list seems to prefer HTTPS
  – Solution is available and easy to implement
  – Provides the security mechanisms necessary to secure and authenticate the message transport
  – Protocol not designed for this purpose, but can get through firewalls
• Email
  – Some positive and negative comments
  – Has necessary security and reliability
  – May not be as fast as a direct communication protocol
• BEEP
  – May be more appropriate for RID implementation
  – Provides the security mechanisms necessary to secure and authenticate the message transport
  – Has not been implemented yet, may be a better choice at a later time
• Stunnel
• SOAP Wrapper and transport will be fully defined in a separate document
Security Considerations

• Consortiums discussed in previous draft release
  – Agreements between entities involved in RID peering
  – Provide a secure key exchange repository/system (PKI)
  – Peering agreements and policies between consortiums, across national boundaries, or jurisdictions
  – Policy enforced through RID messages by stating level and type of trace

• System use guidelines
  – Privacy considerations
  – Abuse policies
  – Use policies may vary across national, network, or consortium boundaries
    Automated method to allow enforcement of use agreements

• RID server security policies
  – Network based access controls
  – Hardened systems

• Communication security considerations for the exchange of RID messages and the underlying protocols
Summary

• Updates from the previous version
  – Extended the AdditionalData Class to accommodate the needs of RID messaging and RIDPolicy
    Extended information on system use and privacy considerations
    RID message numbers
  – PKI at the core of the security model, but provided by a consortium
  – XML Schema for RID extensions
  – Digital signature on example

• Near Future Updates will include
  – Separate document for SOAP wrapper and transport
  – Any suggested revisions or clarifications

• http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-inch-rid-01.txt