CIVILIZATION AND CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY
This report questions the validity of core assumptions of civilianization theory of military organization and outlines new approaches to civil-military relations in social theory.
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BY

S.B. FLEMMING

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ABSTRACT

This report questions the validity of core assumptions of civilianization theory of military organization and outlines new approaches to civil-military relations in social theory.

RÉSUMÉ

Ce rapport remet en question la force des hypothèses majeures de la théorie de "civilianization" des organismes militaires, et souligne les nouvelles approches aux relations civiles-militaires en sociologie.
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1. There is a consistent message in military sociology. Traditional virtues which at one time made armies strong are being lost because civilians increasingly control armed forces, and because people today care more for their civil rights and their salaries than they do for the good of the country. The result of this historical transition is that armies can no longer operate according to classic operational values. This message is the core of civilianization theory, the dominant paradigm in Western military sociology. This study rejects the basic assumptions of civilianization theory, and advocates greater attention in the field of military sociology to emerging schools of social theory in mainstream sociology.

2. The central assumptions of civilianization theory can be summarized in the following manner.

   a. Civil-military relations is a process in which the dominant institution, civil society, influences all aspects of the dependant institution, armed forces.

   b. Contemporary moral weakness in civil society and military organization contrasts poorly against the historical period of true vocational commitment to duty by military personnel.
3. These axioms are flawed, this report will argue, because they miss the tremendous impact armed forces have had and continue to have on the rise and constitution of Western societies. Further, the belief that armed forces are on the brink of a moral collapse of commitment to duty is a long standing one, and will be shown to have in fact persisted since the industrial and democratic revolutions. In the first section of this report, the major works of civilianization theory in the United States and Canada will be briefly outlined. In the second section, data and analysis from a variety of sources will be marshalled in an attempt to demonstrate that civilianization theory is based on selective images of military strength in the past and moral weakness in the present. In the final section, emerging schools of social theory offering a stronger foundation for the analysis of civil-military relations than is provided by civilianization theory will be outlined. This paper does not suggest that the Canadian Forces have not undergone changes since the Korean War. Rather, it argues that the changes which have occurred can be shown in a historical context to be of far less significance than is presently thought.
SECTION ONE: CIVILIANIZATION THEORY IN MILITARY SOCIOLOGY

United States

4. The work of Stouffer and others during the Second World War established two important benchmarks which continue to influence the practice of military sociology in the United States. Firstly, a pragmatic a-theoretical applied approach with the goal of solving specific problems which limit the effectiveness of the military (but most especially the army). Secondly, a social psychological methodological orientation with the individual service member (micro-level) as the principal unit of analysis (Kourvetaris and Dobratz, 1976). With the publication of Huntington's The Soldier and the State in 1957 and Janowitz' The Professional Soldier in 1960, the field was established in its modern form. The competing views on armed forces and society in the current literature are based on the lines drawn in these works.

5. Huntington's principle focus was the relationship of the American officer corps to the political leadership of the state. He wished to identify the degree of "objective civilian control" which would both maximize national security and satisfy the liberal democratic requirement of the subordination of armed forces to elected leadership. He argued that civil-military relations consist of "a complex equilibrium" of tenuously balanced elements, in which change in one sector of the system produces concomitant and measurable changes in others. In his view, the functional
imperative of defence accorded the military in the social system demands an institution shaped by a set of values incompatible with those adopted by other agencies in liberal democratic society. He proposed that direct control of the military by civilian masters was unnecessary. A relatively autonomous professional armed force, free of the influence of inappropriate value systems, would in his view accept and respect direction from the state. Only such a separation would avert, he argued, the growing tendency to "impose liberal solutions in military affairs" which constitutes "the gravest domestic threat to American military security" (1957:457).

6. Morris Janowitz, who continues to be the most influential of American military sociologists, advocates "a more pragmatic military professionalism" in which citizen-soldiers are subjectively controlled by the democratically elected representatives of the nation "through law, tradition and an acceptance of civil values and institutions" (Kourvetaris and Dobratz, 1976:76). While the emergence of the mass army of the eighteenth century was "an essential component in the emergence of western parliamentary institutions" (Janowitz, 1976:187) through its extention of participation in the affairs of the state to the largely disenfranchised populations of feudal Europe, there remained an "essential requirement" in the face of dramatic technical and organizational advances in the nineteenth century to maintain a "depoliticized or politically contained" national military force; "if any variant of political democracy were to be achieved and institutionalized" (Janowitz, 1976:191). It is precisely because the values of the professional
soldiers are antithetical to those of the civil milieux, Janowitz argues, that strong structural political and normative linkages must dominate the relationship between armed forces and society.

7. Huntington asserts that there have been dramatic shifts in the nature of the military profession in the modernizing and industrializing West. Janowitz accepts this premise, and attempts to identify concrete examples of internal social change in the American military since the Second World War in terms of technology, international relations, strategic doctrine, and the civil-military interface (Martin, 1984:15). In sum, Janowitz has found that the military profession in the United States "is undergoing a long-term transformation which involves increased penetration by other professions and institutions" (Janowitz, 1977:53) characterized by "a shift from authoritarian domination to greater reliance on manipulation, persuasion, and group consensus" (Janowitz, 1960:8). This has involved an "increasing concentration of technical specialists" whose "skills and orientations" are "common to civilian administrators and civilian leaders" (1960:9), a broadening and increasingly representative recruitment base among officers, a bureaucratization of career patterns, and a decline of the "traditional military self-images and concepts of honor" (1960:10-12). The history of the American military is, for both Janowitz and Huntington, a gradual process of social change in which the unique elements of the heroic warrior culture are eroded and subsumed into the pervasive managerial and materialistic ethic of Western society.
while presenting a paper at the Regional Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS) in Alabama in 1976, Charles Moskos suggested that the attitudes of American military personnel toward their service could be distinguished along "institutional" and "occupational" lines (Janowitz, 1977:51). Members with an institutional attitude see their service as a calling and recognize "a purpose transcending individual self-interest" and accept demands of "all-sacrifice and dedication," whatever the cost (Moskos, 1977:42). Those ascribing to an occupational orientation, however, put their own pecuniary interests ahead of the organization and are willing to serve only to the limits established under the legal contractual arrangement with their employer, the state. Moskos further argued that the occupational model was ascending in the American military, while those who saw their obligation to duty as something intrinsically more important than wage-labour were rapidly declining in numbers and status. While clearly a re-formulation of Janowitz heroic and managerial distinctions published some years earlier, Moskos' conceptualization attracted considerable attention. He has lately recognized that institutional attitudes persist in the American military in a manner inconsistent with his early assessments of the growing prevalence of the occupational orientation. He thus asserts now that "Both truths operate in such a way that the future of the Army enlisted man is best understood as the interplay between citizen-soldier and market place trends" (Moskos, 1986:54). Moskos' change in approach may in part be the result of the, at best, ambiguous findings generated by attempts to empirically validate his work (Segal and Yoon, 1984; Stahl, McNichols, and Marley...
1981, 1980). Moskos continues to deplore, however, the "ascendant occupational model" of service and the increasing linkages to civil society it entails.

9. David Segal argues that the Huntington-Janowitz debate is too simplistic, but does not offer significant change to the theory. He suggests that a "combination of objective and subjective models" is likely "more amenable to meeting the problems of American civil-military relations in a post-Vietnam war era of all-volunteer armed forces" (Segal, et al, 1978:424). While he believes that "there is not a crisis of transformation from service as a calling to service as a job in the U.S. Army" (Segal and Yoon, 1984:254), the American military "is losing its institutional characteristics, and military service is coming to resemble other occupations in society, in terms of nature and conditions of work, employer-employee relations, compensation, and presumably, deference, respect, and legitimacy" (Segal, 1978:444). He departs from Moskos in not accepting that the dramatic changes brought about by civilianization have resulted in a clear re-definition of what service and commitment mean to personnel. Rather, he concentrates on identifying specific institutional shifts. Some of these have been, in his view, decreasing quality of recruits, an exodus of well-educated personnel (particularly in technical trades) and an increasingly unrepresentative all-volunteer force as those who join tend to be motivated more by their own upward mobility (and are thus disproportionately from minority groups, such as blacks and hispanics) than by a sense of duty to the nation.
10. The most valuable contribution Segal has made has been to point out the various political and social dimensions on which the civilianization debate shifts. He argues, for example, that while the U.S. military is becoming an occupation in terms of actual work much like any other in civil society, the direction of change on the broader political level is toward a divergent military increasingly free of the dictates of democratic institutions. Conceptually, he wishes to show that "it is necessary to distinguish the structural convergence of civilian and military institutions from the interdependence of these institutions" (Segal, 1974:159). In other words, the reality of civil-military relations in America is far too complex and empirically eclectic to be subsumed under the simple polar extremes of the convergence-divergence debate. He does not advocate the rejection of the civilianization model, however, but works toward refinement in the spirit of the original construction.

11. Broadly speaking, there are two positions which inform the literature on civil-military relations in the United States. Some fear that increasing civilian control over the internal policy of the military will further erode the limited capacity of the armed forces to serve the nation effectively. They advocate a divergent military institution, unarticulated with civil society, relying on a heroic leadership style, a politically neutral officer corps, and a citizen force populated by personnel vocationally committed to the unlimited obligation to duty demanded by true service in the profession of arms. Others find no comfort in this description of military efficiency, arguing that only a
military organization highly articulated with civil power structures and a politically sophisticated officer corps will ensure that the armed forces are responsive to democratic leadership in this age of unimaginably destructive technical acumen. They fear the consequences of a purely military world-view, dramatically different from the values guiding the civil population and held by a professional career force with substantial autonomy from civil checks and balances. While their prospective assessments thus differ greatly, both work from the view that the history of the American military is one of gradual change in the face of erosive influences from the external social milieus leading to a weakening of the bonds of commitment required to link individuals to the armed forces.

Canada

12. Prior to the mid 70's, there was little sociology of Canadian military organisation of note, save for a number of internal studies conducted by the then Defence Research Board of the Department of National Defence. A number of scholars have subsequently, however, taken the discipline into the policy and political apparatus of the military and the state. Cotton is to Canadian military sociology as Moskos is to the American in this regard, each generating considerable debate and new audiences for the work of social scientists in the analysis of civil military relations.

13. The significance of the period during which the process of unification, integration, and the centralized
base system commenced cannot be underestimated. For many, this was the culmination of a lengthy process in which the traditions of Canadian military institutions were progressively undermined by ever stronger linkages to the state and to civil society generally. These changes represented a broad adoption of a bureaucratic non-operational administrative structure. Most contributions to the civilianization debate were made in the aftermath of this period. Specifically, the work of Crook, Pinch, and Cotton will be briefly outlined below.

14. Crook is considered to be the first to use the civilianization model in print in Canada. He examined the consequences of the "pursuit of technical rationality, so visibly successful in the realm of national science and technology" (1975:18) for the commitment of personnel to military roles in Canada. General social processes and assumptions, Crook argues, have in the advancement of industrial society produced a cash-nexus definition of value in human activity, dissolved the source of self-identity once provided by the simplicity of role differentiation inherent in the traditional extended family, and eroded the complex network of kinship ties which inculcated diffuse commitments among the members of highly bonded communities. He has an essentially Durkheimian appreciation of modern society, finding that "the capacity of symbols to mobilize sentiments and focus human motivation" is lost in the face of the "onslaught of science" which "leaves modern societies with the empty symbols of the past and without hope of the creation of new ones" (Crook, 1975:19). By replacing customs, myths, and beliefs such as the image of the "heroic
warrior" with theories and hypotheses in our understanding of nature and ourselves, western science has destroyed monuments which served as benchmarks for groups to grasp as sources of absolute truth and collective purpose. Theory, by definition never "true", is in a constant state of refinement, reformulation, and revolutionary change (see Kuhn, 1972). The twin manifestations of this fundamental shift in the nature of community in the West are, for Crook, technological advance and bureaucratic organization.

15. "The emergence of bureaucratic systems," Crook writes, to manage the anomic complexity of modern social life, "acts without doubt to increase the sense of powerlessness experienced by many" (1975:20). Without the sense of community involvement and connection to others in the social system, bureaucracy leads to a calculative career rationality, in which the goal of one's labour is upward mobility in the status hierarchy. "Consumerism and careerism come to be the only indicators of personal wealth, and commitment and loyalty become regarded as misunderstandings and rigidities of a previous era" (Crook, 1975:35). Values such as commitment to duty and service to the community cannot be readily defended empirically and are lost to the inherently individualist and instrumentalist morality of advanced industrial capitalism. The consequences for the armed forces in Canada have been, according to Crook, a blurring of the distinction between commissioned and non-commissioned ranks as technical expertise comes to be rewarded in the way that military leadership skills once were. The military becomes a complex, organically inter-dependent team in which technical and operational authority
are tenuously separated. In this system, coercive traditional measures of control are not successful, necessitating a change "in the direction of one of the alternative modes - namely renumerative or normative" (Crook, 1975:54). The modern middle class army must in Crook's view, motivate its personnel either through incentives or through convincing them that it is in their interests to support the goals of the organization through persuasion and consensus. In sum, Crook believes that military tradition and ritual provided a basis for collective identification and meaningful unit membership, which made the facing of death an honourable activity. Bureaucracy does not provide a basis for this morale and group commitment, producing rather an "instrumental or manipulative view" of service, in which "calculation replaces loyalty, progressively eroding trust and commitment" (1975:56).

16. Pinch is concerned with "the military's capacity to maintain adequate levels of manpower, of sufficient quality and at a reasonable cost, to perform its role effectively" (Pinch, 1982:575). The all-volunteer force manning model common to the American, British, and Canadian militaries is "extraordinarily sensitive to trends and perturbations within other societal institutions - for example, the education system and the civilian labor force - upon which it is most dependent for its source of personnel" (1982:575). Demographic shifts in the Canadian population, most notable among these being a substantial increase in average educational attainment and an aging labour force, have reduced the classic potential recruitment pool of unskilled young men in their late teens and early twenties (Pinch, 1976,
Evidence of the Canadian Forces' particular vulnerability to "societal shifts in age distribution, labour market and educational trends, broad value trends, and shifting career expectations" (Cotton and Pinch, 1986) may be found, in part, by the ongoing mass promotion of private soldiers to corporal in order to ensure that military salaries match the wage scales of the Public Service of Canada, the divisions of other rank compensation into pay groupings according to specialist roles within ranks, and in general the relatively high rates of pay, particularly among the other ranks (Cotton and Pinch, 1986).

17. "The military is characterized," Cotton writes, "by conflicting role orientations among its members" (1980:10). The sanguine view of the military widely held in civil society which assumes "value and attitudinal homogeneity in Canada's Army" (1980:16) is a mistaken one, Cotton argues. He used Moskos' occupational/institutional model to demonstrate structural differences in definitions of military service among Mobile Command personnel in terms of commitment. His study, conducted in the late 1970's, developed a survey measure he called the Military Ethos Scale (MES) which was intended to tap the respondents orientation toward military service. He found that "junior enlisted personnel in both combat and support segments tended to have an occupational orientation...defining their involvement in a contractually limited way," while "officers and senior enlisted ranks displayed an institutional, or vocational, orientation characterized by norms of unlimited commitment" (Cotton and Pinch, 1986:242). Further, the study identified systematic tensions along attitudinal lines both vertically
and horizontally within the army; between officers and the junior other ranks, and between combat and support personnel. These fundamental conflicts significantly undermine military effectiveness, in Cotton's view, as cohesion is the *sine qua non* of combat success and survival. Following Moskos, Cotton identifies in his use of the MES a three-way typology of "latent role types," including soldiers, "who expressed a strong institutional orientation", employees, "who expressed a strong occupational orientation", and ambivalents, "who fell between the two extremes" (Cotton and Pinch, 1986:242). In structural terms, Cotton argues, the army resembles civilian society in its degree of internal attitudinal differentiation, division of labour, and emphasis on the administrative sectors (Cotton, 198:28). In sum, military service in Canada is increasingly defined not in terms of duty or obligation to the country, but as "simply another job option and career opportunity" (Cotton, 1979:15).

18. The history of Canadian military organization is, then, according to those few sociologists who have examined civil-military relations in Canada, a progressive erosion of traditional military institutions as the diffuse, relatively autonomous authority of commanders in the pre-World War period gave way to ever stronger structural linkages to the state and to the external environment generally. Prior to the advent of the mass armies of 1914-'18 and '39-'45 and the concommitant intervention of the state into all areas of social life through national regulation in the coordination of the war effort, "the military was largely unhampered by external constraints and semi-autonomous in its control over internal matters" (Cotton, 1973:39). Personnel were
physically removed from urban Canadian society by the sheer isolation of training areas and everyday social life "revolved around military role obligations...commanders of sub units retained considerable latitude in decision making in...social action" (Cotton, 1973:39-41).

19. Prior to the diffusion of roles and structures associated with bureaucratization, Cotton argues, commanders influenced and were cognizant of all aspects of their soldiers lives in the military - officers were paymasters, administrators, counsellors, lawyers, judges, and so on. The bureaucratization of the Canadian military has tended to separate the commander from these diverse functions, creating a plethora of administrative structures, and limiting the officers' access to the primary military potential of the units they direct. Rather, the heroic or charismatic leadership style which inspires total commitment is "replaced by a technocratic method and managerial expertise" (Cotton, 1973:i). The officer as official, as "organization man," views the rank hierarchy as a vehicle for upward career mobility and adopts the "remunerative calculative rationality" of liberal democratic capitalist society as the central indicators of career success and individual achievement. The consequences of the pervasive individualism of civilianization for the military value system which demands selfless sacrifice to service, regardless of the cost, have been clear and dire (Crook, 1975:23) in the view of these theorists.
SECTION TWO:  
A CRITIQUE OF CIVILIANIZATION THEORY

20. While civilianization is formally a theory of social change, it is in essence an American policy debate built upon axiomatic assumptions about the contemporary and historical nature of military organization and civil society. Its practitioners seek to shape the direction of military planning, some arguing that the military should be highly autonomous, others supporting a position seeing the military highly integrated with civil institutions which must, in the final analysis, exercise control and supply personnel. All wish to be agents of change in moving the military toward a more effective future. What is needed is theoretical exploration which is not oriented towards influencing specific policies. In every piece of work in the civilianization literature, there is a clear agenda for change. While there may be limited patience for what many see to be aimless social science theorizing, it is only upon the results of disinterested theory that subsequent proposals for meaningful change can be built.

21. While the theoretical paucity of military sociology is its most substantial difficulty, there are further problems which limit its usefulness. Civilianization is an expressly American exercise, and we have borrowed from it heavily without paying appropriate attention to the European connections to Canadian military organization and our virtually uninterrupted reliance on volunteers in both war and peace. From the American roots of this work comes an understanding of social change which is one-dimensional and reductionist. Civilianization assumes that there was a time when military society was governed solely by pristine
military values and a collective unproblematic dedication to military service as a spiritual duty on the part of all personnel. In addition to this romantic caste of history, this perspective views civil society, both in its people and institutions, as being in a state of moral crisis, sloth, weakness, and avarice. No data of a comparative nature is ever marshalled to support these assumptions. There is excessive emphasis on attitudinal and behavioural factors among individual soldiers, while systemic factors are largely ignored. A recent volume edited by Segal and Sinaiko titled *Life In The Rank and File* (1986) purports to remedy this; the Canadian entry provided by Cotton and Pinch is merely a further restatement of the difficulties of maintaining adequate force levels. On a superstructural level, Western military organization has been in an unrelenting state of superficial change since the earliest manifestation of the modern regular army took the field in Italy in the 14th century. A valid theory of civil-military relations will not only consider change caused within the military by external forces, but will see also that this relationship is necessarily a reciprocal one and will observe the tremendous influence that armed forces have had in shaping modern western history, and will most importantly reveal those dynamics of civil-military relations which remain unchanged despite the destruction of war and the exigencies of annual budgeting in time of peace.

22. These many issues will be discussed in detail within three sub-sections. Firstly, the influence of behaviorist psychology on American civilianization theorists will be reviewed. Secondly, the plethora of images of strength in military history will be discussed, with images of weakness in civil society explored in the final sub-section.
Social Change and American Pragmatism

23. Within the broad rubric of civilianization, sociologists of military organization in the West have classified change in civil-military relations with, among others, the following conceptual models: vocational/occupational, institutional/occupational, segmented/plural, isolationist/interventionist, disarticulated/articulated, heroic/managerial, divergent/convergent, divergent/isomorphic, corporate/entrepreneurial, discontinuity/continuity, and unlimited duty/contractual obligation. As we have seen, these positions move across organizational and psychological levels, revolving around the same basic premise: civilian society has changed the military, eroding its values and institutional aspects. The notion of social change explicit in this formulation requires singular attention. Hauser, for example, argues that the crisis in the American armed forces is a consequence of "a spillover of society's social ills upon the military" (in Kourvetaris and Dobratz, 1976:84). The most extreme form of this sentiment is expressed by Gabriel and Savage, who found that in Vietnam "the record is absolutely clear on this point: the officer corps simply did not die in sufficient numbers or in the presence of their men often enough...the Army had begun to develop and adopt a new ethical code rooted in the entrepreneurial model of the modern business corporation" (1978:16-17). It is not possible that a relationship so complex as that between the armed forces and the multiplicity of agencies and institutions of civil society can be reduced to a one-directional flow from the outside into the military. The design is satisfying and engagingly direct,
but is crudely deterministic and serves to obscure the complexity of the ongoing conflict, complicity, and accident endemic to relations among institutional actors.

24. Perhaps the most telling evidence for the specifically American context of the civilianization debate regards the establishment of a formal military ethos. Among those who have concluded that many individuals view their military service as a job like any other, no longer respecting the vocational demands of true service, there is a call to establish a formal set of principles which define what real service means and require all members to acknowledge and accept these ethical norms as their own. Brown and Moskos propose, for example, that "an indoctrination program as to the why of an American military might be well considered" (1976:16). Wesbrook concurs, arguing that a formal ethos should "stress such concepts as unit loyalty, self-discipline, self-sacrifice, and obedience" (1980:186). The notion that culture can be created or altered at will through legislation is grounded in American behaviourist psychology; the values which define what being a soldier means are not created by fiat and cannot be impressed upon individuals through the act of signing a legal document. The Skinnerian faith in the power of social engineering in the manipulation of human identity for particular ends permeates American military sociology and is similarly found in Canadian work.

25. The central Canadian figures in the field conclude that a collective military ethos is necessary in the face of the "fundamental ambiguity in the national value system
regarding the balance of rights and obligations between the individual and the collectivity" (Cotton, Crook, and Pinch, 1978:369). Kasurak argues that "the statement of a positive military ethos will be an aid in the resolution of the problem" (1982:129). Most significantly, the report of the Review Group on the Report of the Task Force on Unification in the Canadian Forces (Canada, 1980) concluded that a document articulating the "core values" of military service was necessary. The underlying values which constitute military society in Canada will no more be imbued with utopian collective selflessness through legislation than a proliferation of gaudy medals will inculcate courage.

Images of Strength in History

26. Civilianization is a perspective which hinges on the belief that there has been a concrete historical passage from an era in which classic military institutional values and a supportive societal consensus generated a true profession of arms, to the contemporary world of contractually limited obligation to service among reluctant, materialistically motivated soldiers in an apathetic and anomie society. No substantial effort has been expended in actually identifying the period during which values of truth, duty, and valour were revered by all ranks and both leaders and led uncritically accepted the legitimacy of authority and discipline. Rather, the manifold problems of today are illuminated, and we must accept without substantive evidence that the present contrasts poorly with better times. This construction of history is, we are asked to believe, heuristic and ideal-typical, representing broad long-term shifts
which would be poorly served by analytic specification. Morris Janowitz attempted to identify this penultimate period in American military history as the time when the Army "was located at remote frontier posts, fighting Indians" (in Segal, 1986:369). In fact, of all men recruited into the American Regular Army between 1867 and 1891, all of whom were volunteers, one-third deserted (Rickey, 1963:143).

27. Desertion, disciplinary difficulties, high voluntary attrition, and societal ambivalence have historically been problems more or less without respite in all western armies. There is no doubt that the catalytic stress of combat has inspired tremendous unit cohesion among innumerable groups of soldiers and active support among threatened populations, but such support has not been solely the product of superior moral calibre among individuals. Taking men off their farms and out of their homes and into the barracks of the modern mass army has never occurred with the sanguine, unreflective ease portrayed by the civilianization theory, and more importantly, coordinating groups of men in the face of fire has of necessity always involved coercion and conflict in some form and measure. The relatively dispossessed men from rural areas who have populated armed forces in the past have indeed fought bravely and died in military service, but they have rarely gone with the child-like simplicity and elevated religiosity of martyrs characteristic of the portrait of spiritual commitment painted by civilianization theorists.

28. The images of strength in military history take three general forms. Units of the past are portrayed as like-minded groups of spiritually dedicated and physically robust
men for whom the military is a sanctuary and an all-encompassing way of life. Civil society in the past during time of war is portrayed as a supportive and hard-working ally in the effort, a large community characterized by a broad consensus that the fight is legitimate and victory crucial. Lastly, the internal operation of military forces in the past are portrayed as functioning according to pristine military values, unaffected by inappropriate political, economic, or other external norms. A Russian infantry major described military life in the latter part of the 19th century in a manner which illustrates the pervasiveness of the myth:

Each community has its own rules and view of life. Each is exclusive and constitutes an organic entity. In each, one withdraws up to a point from the outside world and becomes wholly absorbed in one's chosen group, which for the lonely pilgrim on this earth replaces house, friends, children, and in a way even his beloved wife. A man inclined towards contemplation chooses a monastery. More active, energetic types make their home in a regiment. (in Keep, 1985:380)

29. For each of the three forms of images, a number of incidents or events from history will be discussed which will question the appropriateness of the image. They are not necessarily events of great import, nor does this forum permit the scope of treatment which perhaps is required. However, it is hoped that enough material of significance is discussed that the point is sufficiently made. In no way does this section suggest that Canadian troops have not served bravely or honourably. The intent is only to illustrate the complexity which is missed by our unreflective vision of the past.
30. Other rank personnel on three Canadian naval vessels, the destroyers Athabaskan and Crescent, and the aircraft carrier Magnificent, mutinied during a two month period in early 1949. Mutinies had occurred earlier aboard HMCS Ontario in 1947 and HMCS Iroquois in 1943. In each case, "a number of sailors in a ship gathered together, locked themselves in a mess deck, and did not take up duties which they knew to have been assigned to them" (Audette, 1982:236). No one was punished, despite the harsh punishments provided in law. One of the three who conducted the inquiry into the events of 1949, L.C. Audette, has since observed that "The foul stench of mutiny was incapable of transforming itself into the healthy aroma of good behaviour. There was a recent history of successful and unpunished mutiny; the war had come to an end four years earlier bringing about an unpleasant metamorphosis from sparkling hero to taxpayers' burden for the uniformed serviceman" (Audette, 1982:239).

31. A morale survey of personnel at five army Advanced Training Centres in Canada (n=450) conducted in May 1943* found low moral commitment and support for the army. If given the freedom to choose any employment, only 15% would remain in the army, while 49% would return to civilian life. Almost half, 46%, believed that their families "would like it better if I were a civilian". When questioned about their enthusiasm for overseas service, 47% responded with

either no enthusiasm at all or no enthusiasm but would not object to going. A further 69% reported that they seldom or never discussed war news and the progress of the war with their officers, and 42% said Canada's main job in the war should be the production of munitions, while 45% believed our first job should be the raising of an armed force.

32. Despite the assurances of Sir Robert Borden in 1917 that "no man, whether he goes back or whether he remains in Flanders, will have just cause to reproach the Government for having broken faith with the men who won and the men who died" (in Eayrs, 1964:41), other rank Canadian soldiers who returned from Europe after the First World War turned lingering resentment into anger. Rioting at their debarkation barracks in England, they formed numerous associations upon their arrival in Canada which attempted to secure benefits for veterans beyond that preferred by the government. "From 1918 onward", Eayrs observes, "loyalty and devotion to those who had formerly been his officers were not the most clearly recognizable characteristics of the Canadian soldier" (1964:42).

33. A plethora of organizations criticized the bias thought to be shown in favour of officers in post-war government employment, "the creation of what seemed an overloaded bureaucracy to deal with veterans' affairs and discriminatory appointment of ex-officers to lucrative positions within it", the difference between officer's and men's provisions and health benefits, and so on (Eayrs, 1964:43-44). Bitterness and bloodshed among competing associations resulted in the formation of the Canadian Legion in 1925.
34. The unavoidably brutal reality of combat can neither be denied nor adequately portrayed here. The execution of twenty-five Canadian military personnel is testament to the fear and desperation engendered by the First World War. Charles Yale Harrison, who fought with the C.E.F. in Europe, wrote that the greatest enemies to face his battalion were firstly trench foot and secondly their own officers (1928). The most telling evidence of the cruel reality of combat service was the emergence of the pastoral myth in the poems, songs, and stories of soldiers, best known in the work of Siegfried Sassoon and Wilfred Owen. Martel, who has examined the origins of First World War myth and superstition, argues that the images of the pastoral setting "with its bright sunlight, its open fields, its fresh smells, and its pervasive quiet" were more than devices to escape the "desperate feeling of being caught in a situation that one is powerless to control, of being locked within a giant, horrific machine from which there is no escape" that was endemic to the conditions of trench life. The pastoral myth further served to explain to those "who had not experienced the darkness of the sunken trench, with its smell of decay and its shattering sounds, just how horrible life there had been..." (Martel, 1981:4-5). As a foil to the reality of war experiences, pastoral myths of delicate green fields have served to illuminate the misery of trench warfare in a manner no photograph or dispassionate account could accomplish.
Universal Societal Consensus and Support

35. Canadians have not been so solidly supportive of military efforts in the past as the civilianization model assumes. When the Military Service Act of 1917 was passed, effectively making every male between 20 and 45 a member of the military, 125,000 men in Ontario were initially conscripted. Of these, 118,000 (94%) attempted to acquire an exemption from service (Munro, 1979:79). While it is clear that Canada sent her share of troops, the vast majority of whom volunteered for overseas service, the effort to extract rough quotas was extremely difficult after the initial recruiting boom, and the conscription debates constituted perhaps the gravest threat to the unity of the country in its history.

36. Civilianization theorists deplore the apparently novel rise of pacifistic sentiments among current Western populations. However, active and relatively influential peace movements have regularly opposed Canadian participation in this century's wars. In Ottawa in 1946, several hundred people led by some large trucks occupied buildings of HMCS Carleton at Dow's Lake on the Rideau Canal, and "the government, the press, and the Canadian public were fully aware of the unconcealed communist influence behind it" (Audette, 1982:238). Anti-militarist views enjoyed wide currency between the wars. George Drew published an article in Macleans Magazine titled "Salesmen of Death: The Truth about War Markets", arguing in part that behind international arms competition "lies a vicious commercial competition of armament and ship building companies which seek to
promote international ill-will for the purpose of preserving a ready market for the death-dealing equipment they produce..." (In Eayrs, 1964:115). Vincent Massey, as Eayrs has noted, president of the National Liberal Federation in 1934, said in a speech that "we must put an end to the manufacture for private gain of weapons for the destruction of human beings... So long as we have scattered throughout the world great and powerful corporations whose interest is to make profit out of war, there will be irresistible forces working against those who are trying to organize peace" (1964:115). During 1934 the League of Nations Society distributed pamphlets in Toronto titled "Essentials of Disarmament", "Salesmen of Death", and "Enemies of Peace". The universities were then as now the locus of considerable anti-war activity, as Eayrs has demonstrated. He notes that debates held at McGill and the University of Toronto in 1934 concluded with motions "favouring a policy of pacifism for Canada", and further that a questionnaire with 500 student respondents from McGill at that time found only 17% willing to support the government "in any war which she may declare", let alone actually serve. A full 27%, however, asserted that they would not support the government under any circumstances in any war (Eayrs, 1964:110-111). Canadian university students declared their support for the peace movement of the 1930's and its crude version of the Marxist theory of war and capital. It is notable that students in Oxford's debating society similarly passed a resolution between the wars explicity denying their willingness to die for king and country.
37. Socknat (1984) has examined the role and influence of liberal pacifists prior to and during the First World War in Canada. The primary voice of peace groups was the Canadian Peace and Arbitration Society, counting more than a thousand members including "such prominent Canadian academics as Professor Adam Shatt of Queen's University, Professor J. McCurdy of the University of Toronto, Sir William Mullock, Chief Justice of Ontario, and Lewis E. Hornung, Professor of Classics at Victoria College" (Socknat, 1984:32). Canadians were exhorted by the Society to "resist the growing war frenzy" and to build "a new Christian spirit to supplant war" (1984:33-34). Prominent newspapers expounded liberal ideals; editorials in the Toronto Globe protested against the effects of militarism upon society, warned against building anti-German sentiment, and implored that "no Canadian cadet should be allowed to think of a German or any other man as a target for his marksmanship". In fact, J.A. MacDonald, then editor of the Globe, stated that the notion of preparation for defence in time of peace was "doomed to the rubbish heap of the world's barbarism" (Socknat, 1984:33). Eminent politicians, journalists, judges, attorneys and a plethora of radical and liberal organizations engaged in spirited debate and called for the explicit denial of service to the country on the part of individuals. When the war began, however, most abandoned the cause or were slowly denied an audience as the will of the people to fight asserted itself concretely.

38. During the initial six months of the war, two million volunteers were accepted for service in Britain. This was, in Martel's view, a remarkable achievement considering the
"contempt in which the army was held by the working class, who viewed it as a last resort because it meant exile from home, low company, drunkenness, and giving up the idea of marriages" (1981:2). Dietz and Stone similarly characterize the late 19th century British all-volunteer army as "a life of drunkenness and brutality, where only intoxication and the lash could keep order and where the prejudice of the military disciplinarians were reinforced by the degenerate nature of the shrinking number of men who were willing to endure such a system" (1975:159).

39. Western societies prior to the major wars of this century were singularly unprepared for battle and on the eve of combat were rife with internal conflict and seeming instability. English society of 1939 was, in the view of Dyson, who was an operational researcher in London during that war and is currently a noted physicist employed principally by the Department of Defense in the United States, "just as discordant and unheroic" as America is today. No one who was young in England in 1939, Dyson argues, had the slightest confidence that anything worth preserving would survive the impending war against Hitler. The folk memory of England was dominated by the barbarities of World War I, and none of us could believe that World War II would be less brutal or less demoralizing. It was frequently predicted that just as World War I had led to the collapse of society and the triumph of Bolshevism in Russia, so World War II would have the same effect in England. (Dyson, 1984:6)
Military Autonomy and Pristine Operational Values

40. The period from approximately 1960 until quite recently has been characterized as one of unusual and unacceptable civilian political interference in the internal organization of the Canadian Armed Forces. Such is believed to contrast with a time of substantial autonomy, during which commanders held broadly diffused powers in the direction of units and the norms which guided social action in the military were indigenous ones, generated by operational requirements.

41. Mackenzie King, who became Prime Minister on 29 December 1921, was "distinctly out of sympathy" with the "needs and aspirations of the postwar navy, as with those of the land and air forces of the Dominion" (Eayrs, 1964:168). From the outset, Eayrs argues, defence policy suffered under King's "marked aversion to the military life and the military mind, whose workings he failed to understand and whose virtues he ignored" (1964:168). King had never served in uniform, and "no prime minister could have been more eager to find excuses for curtailing expenditure upon defence" (1964:169). After the Washington Conference, at which major naval powers resolved to reduce armaments and tonnage of capital ships, Mackenzie cut the budget of the Royal Canadian Navy arbitrarily and, in the Minister's words, "at the stroke of a pen", from $2,500,000 to $1,500,000" (Eayrs, 1964:169). The resulting shift from a permanent force to a reserve and what Arthur Meighen called a "five-trawler navy" was a direct consequence of the exercise of civilian political power in the organization of the military.
42. The plans for aid and the actual raising of the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) in the First World War were conducted in an atmosphere of acrimony and distrust. Sam Hughes' 'egocentric ways and unorthodox methods caused a great deal of friction' (Haycock, 1981:14). Officers were chosen for the CEF by Hughes 'for reasons other than military merit, ignoring good men allegedly because they were Liberals, were from the permanent force, or were not his friends' (Harris, 1979:163). In addition to Hughes' distaste for the permanent force, however, he also managed to alienate many in the Non-Permanent Active Militia (NPAM) by denying existing regiments overt representation in the CEF order of battle, creating instead new numbered battalions. Arthur Currie, later to command the CEF and be knighted at the conclusion of hostilities, said in 1914 that "every squirt of a politician" was attempting to influence the military and further their own ends (in Harris, 1979:163).

43. The image of the mythical lost standard is perhaps more interesting in the context of American military sociology. Was there in fact "a lofty standard of quality and performance in the Old Army", asks Beaumont (1980). He observes that history has embellished the record of American forces in the world wars by losing sight of the fact that "careerism, factionalism and bureaucratic infighting... affects complex organizations of all kinds; business, ecclesiastical, bureaucratic, academic, as well as military" (1980:71). The bravura of victory has concealed the unremarkable and distinctly political struggles for power which lie behind charismatic figures of the past. We have
forgotten, for example, Beaumont argues,

the cashiering of Grant, the blatant politic­
cism of Taylor and Scott and the incredible
infighting among general officers in the Civil
War... the suppression of the armored force
which threatened Eisenhower and Patton into
silence... The rivalry of the March and
Pershing factions racked the army for years...
the command failure in Washington at the time
of Pearl Harbor... The strategic bomber offen­sive floundered along from fad to fad... A
steady struggle between Regular Army and
National Guard ensued, as well as battles
between the Marines and the Army, the Navy and
the Merchant Marine, the Navy and the Army...
(Beaumont, 1980:70-73)

44. Broadly speaking, this section has been an attempt to
apply a Kuhnian perspective to the military profession's
view of its own history. Just as Kuhn (1970) demonstrated
that the path of natural science does not advance through
placid evolutionary growth from simple to complex stages of
knowledge, but is rather punctuated by unpredictable revolu­tion­
ary changes and fraught with political and factional
conflict, so is it necessary to describe the complexity of
social factors in military history. The civilianization
literature and the writings of professional officers
portrays units of the past in a manner which elevates
ideal-typical aspects of classic operational organization
and misses the relevance of both the tawdry machinations of
institutional power and the cruel consequences often accom­
panying the existence of armed forces. It is sophomoric to
argue that war is a very bad thing, but in this context it
is necessary to do so; too often the taken-for-granted
brutality of armed conflict and the spiritual as well as
physical losses are so obvious as to be unworthy of
mention. An adequate theory of civil-military relations can neither rest on a sanguine vision of military history, nor on an uncritical appreciation of the factors which inspired willingness to endure combat in the past and actually operated among units facing fire.

45. That military sociologists have discovered only in the last thirty years that modern industrial societies and institutional groups within them have eclipsed Gemeinschaft tribal community collective identity is evidence of a continuing academic schism. Western societies are nihilistic, iconoclastic, and highly differentiated, their populations having faced a demeaning and confusing marketplace of competing values for more than the two centuries since the industrial and democratic revolutions, and such has been powerfully evoked in literature and social science. The failure of natural science and rationality to provide a clear plan of life with comforting and cognitively acceptable moral benchmarks has perpetuated the modernist conflict between freedom and meaning. Civilianization theory attacks long established windmills when it decries the unwillingness of contemporary soldiers to subsume themselves absolutely and find salvation in military service. We might more appropriately marvel at the ability of armed forces to extract such devotion as they have.

Images of Weakness in Civil Society

Just south of the United States Military Academy at West Point is the village of Highland Falls. Main Street of Highland Falls is familiar to everyone; the First National
Bank with venetian blinds, real estate and insurance offices, yellow homes with frilly Victorian porticos, barber shops and wooden churches - the tiresome monotony and incredible variety and discordancy of small town commercialism. The buildings form no part of a whole: they are simply a motley, disconnected collection of frames coincidentally joining each other, lacking common unity or purpose. On the military reservation on the other side of the South Gate, however, exists a different world. There is ordered serenity. The parts do not exist on their own, but accept their subordination to the whole. Beauty and utility are merged in gray stone. Neat lawns surround compact, trim homes, each identified by the name and rank if its occupant. The buildings stand in fixed relation to each other, part of an overall plan, their character and station symbolizing their contributions, stone and brick for the senior officers, wood for the lower ranks. The past is suffused with the rhythm and harmony which comes when collective will supplants individual whim. West Point is a community of structured purpose...West Point embodies the military ideal at its best, Highland Falls the American spirit at its most commonplace...today Americans can learn more from West Point than West Point from America. (Huntington, 1957:464-6)

46. Central also to the civilianization thesis is the belief that a trend toward convergence between civil and military institutions is a descent into chaotic sloth and avarice. Civilians, and their liberal values, are thus a dangerous pathology for armed forces analogous to the consequences for a healthy organism of contact with an insidious bacteria. The resulting disease threatens to finally collapse the fragile collective willingness of men to face death in the service of their country. For more than a century succeeding generations of military personnel and
analysts have abhorred the declining moral quality of the western nations they have served and observed, and have throughout this period predicted an imminent collapse of military values. This powerful pessimism illuminates more of what it means to be a soldier than it explains in the analysis of civil-military relations. Further, substantial evidence will be discussed which indicates both that there is greater support in the Canadian population for military service and that our workers are more committed to their work and its quality than the dark view of civilianization permits. Finally, in this section, an internal contradiction in Cotton's and Crook's construction of the civilianization thesis with respect to historical change and civilian social class and military status congruency will be examined.

The Decline of the Warrior, the Rise of the Employee

47. Currently, Segal argues, Americans "as a nation" have "lost sight of the fact that citizenship involved responsibilities as well as rights." There has been, in his view, a "redefinition, and reduction in moral valence of that responsibility" (1983:21). In modern Canada, Crook (1975) and Cotton (1980, 1973) have observed, advanced capitalism has created an anomic "mass society" lacking unifying cultural values, among these being dedication to the higher calling of military service. Dietz and Stone similarly observe that Britain since 1945 "has become more open and meritocratic," affecting attitudes toward "authority and hierarchical organisations which are seen by many young
people to be defenders of the old order and bastions of the privileged elites" (1975:177). Further, Alford argues of modern England, "the values and behaviour of society at large are totally incompatible with the traditional military virtues. Discipline and unselfishness are not two qualities most apparent in the British labor force at the present time, yet they are essential if any military organization is to respond to the challenge" (1980:254). Examples of this sentiment are legion, and are not limited to academic work. A brief review of articles published in such journals as the Canadian Defence Quarterly on officer professionalism or recruitment issues reveals an even stronger statement of the same idea. The point which is significant here is that during those very periods in military history now most revered for collective moral commitment to the exigencies of service, officers, troops, and analysts were decrying the same destructive values in civil society and among young soldiers with which today they continue to be preoccupied. The commanders who led the troops whom we now believe were heroically selfless publicly doubted the quality of their soldiers and the will of the communities which bore them with the same frustrated clarion calls of imminent disaster now to be heard in the civilianization literature.

48. Evidence of the preoccupation with the moral dedication of young Canadians among civilian and military analysts of defence issues is widely found. John Gellner asserts that "After all, any warfare short of actual defence of the homeland against invasion...will be unpopular with the majority of young people accustomed to the abundant sweetness of peace in a western democracy" (1979:55). Major
General D.C. Loomis and Lieutenant Colonel D.T. Lightburn observed recently in the Canadian Defence Quarterly that "It is clear that men in modern society will not normally be prepared to risk their lives or to die for abstractions such as ideologies, or large social groups such as nations... Terrors and brutality and the effects of injury, which used to be commonplace, are now quite foreign to modern civilization. Close quarter violence is rare in civilian life. Society isolates modern man from battle through the climate of the family, school, and cultural life. Pacifism is more fashionable than ever" (1980:17-18). In the context of an article on military professionalism in Canada, Carpenter opines that the demands of the armed forces "may be viewed as undesirable or actually repugnant by the relatively youthful segment of the population available for military service, particularly if society at large becomes increasingly 'non-violence' oriented, welfare-oriented, and permissive. At present, there is a trend away from restrictive rules and regulation in society...increasing levels of education and technical expertise will tend to increase resentment to an inflexible and rule-bound organization" (1973:32). In the same volume, Motiuk concludes that "bilingualism and biculturalism, the possible demands for some form of collective bargaining arrangements, the potential impact of the women's liberation movement, higher national education levels, population growth, and increased urbanization as well as rapidly changing technology will all have a marked effect not only on the officer corps but on the whole of the Canadian Forces" (1973:38). Lieutenant General G.G. Simonds observed in a commentary on discipline in the Canadian military in the 1970's that the young people
of Canada "are finding the 'ivory towers' of our colleges an extremely congenial atmosphere", and deplored the "soul-destroying existence" of unemployment and "academic welfare" of "prolonging formal education beyond the period of usefulness in the marketplace" (1972:276). Perhaps the most quoted of such sentiments is, however, contained in a piece by Colonel D.A. Nicholson.

What preoccupies me is the suspicion that the higher-rated officers are the earnest, colourless young men whose chief virtue is technical diligence; who never express boisterous exuberance in the mess, whose manners and social conduct are impeccable; and who always accord their seniors the proper degree of reverence. It has always seemed to me that those people with the greatest lust for life are the ones likely to attempt, in defiance of all logic, to achieve the impossible goal. I only hope that their enthusiasm, gaiety, and sheer zest for living have not...become squelched by the pervasive, bloodless 'man in the green flannel suit' syndrome... (1973:55)

49. A team of sociologists examining the process through which civilian recruits became infantry soldiers in the Canadian Army on the eve of war in Korea found that young soldiers had "extremely adhesive civilian backgrounds" which resisted the acceptance of military values. "Invariably", they observed, "recruits have not been disciplined to work habits... these young people in other words have a self-conception which is inappropriate for military life." If permitted to persist, they argue, "there is a danger that the new member's activities within the army will fail to contribute to its main objectives" (Hall, McKay, and Solomon, 1951:21). Military members evinced a similar conclusion regarding the quality and dedication of young
Canadian recruits in 1951. An NCO stated that "There was a time when you told a man that something was wrong and he took it seriously. I used to be embarrassed when they found something wrong with me. But these men just don't have any sense of personal pride. They just don't care" (1951:84). An officer observed that "Nowadays, you just can't give a man an order and expect him to carry it out. You practically have to explain all the reasons for everything to him and then ask him if he will do it" (1951:91). Other central concerns of serving members at the time were the high status accorded support specialists over operational troops in regiments, dramatic personnel turnover, and the administrative burden carried by officers which limited contact with their troops.

50. Before the Great War, Socknat (1984) observes, there was substantial fear that liberal pacifist ideas had dramatically weakened the nation. A Principal of University College in Toronto warned prior to the mobilization that "the air is so full of pacifism that it is necessary to urge upon the country the duty of national defence" (in Socknat, 1984:30). In fact, Socknat argues, some believed that pacifism was "sweeping the country", and it appeared that "pacifism had been 'pretty generally accepted, in theory, at least, by the majority of thinking persons' in Canada" (1984:30).

51. A 1981 Federal Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence concluded that "Until recent years, a militia unit was very much a part of the life of the community in which it resided...members came from all strata
of local society; retention rates were high and the officers and senior NCO's messes were centres of the social life of the community. At present, unit morale and unit esprit de corps is generally at a low ebb and the family spirit...has been seriously weakened" (Canada: 1981:15). Nearly a century earlier, in 1898, the General Officer Commanding said that the state of the Canadian militia was "unsatisfactory in the extreme...a collection of military units without cohesion, without staff and without the military departments by which an army is moved, fed, or ministered to in sickness" (in Greenhous, 1977:135).

52. During the Boer War, many questioned the apparently harsh command of the Canadian Contingent by Lt. Col. William Otter. After the return of the troops to Canada, Morton has found, "The unresolved issues remained...the problems of equipment, authority, and discipline. Were Canadians natural soldiers or did they need the austere discipline and the training that William Otter had demanded?" (Morton, 1986:45).

53. The following is a description of American society as seen by R.A. Beaumont, writing in the Military Review for today's US Army officer corps.

...a sexual revolution; growing tolerance, no, enthusiasm for vulgarity and bad manners; redefinition of several varieties of what was once seen as criminal behaviour; often uncertain criteria for upward mobility; increasing dependance on government intervention and selective taxation; Watergate, Koreagate and a plethora of smaller scandals; the erosion of standards in education increasing crime; and
pollution, politics-as-usual and massive profits wrung from a system under heavy pressure from foreign competition and a declining energy base - to cite a few. (1980:66)

54. As it became clear during the Second World War that the entrance of the United States was inevitable, Adolph Hitler was convinced on the basis of his First World War experience on the Western Front that American Forces were of such low quality that their participation would be of little consequence. "In any case" he is reported to have observed, "how could troops who had the dollar as their God be expected to fight to the utmost of their ability?" (in Herwig, 1986:94).

55. Pre-dating both Janowitz and Moskos, Stein argued that American troops in the Second World War "regarded military service as an impersonal job, not a calling" (in Segal, 1986:368). Similarly, Huntington found that American military officers in the twenties and thirties saw the United States as "a country abandoning its moral anchor... swept by 'insidious doctrines', loose living, 'sensuous publicity', crime and rackets, all resulting from carrying in an extreme the ideas of equality and democracy" (1957:310). This "hostility of liberal society" led the Army Chief of Staff to complain in 1927 that "the military spirit and its element of discipline have been neglected" (Huntington, 1957:309). Bullard saw in American soldiers of 1905 "a spirit rebellious and insubordinate to authority", a "deficient sense of the seriousness and the obligation of the enlistment oath", "intemperate criticism of superior authority," and selfishness and contempt. Broadly speaking,
Bullard observed of turn-of-the-century America that "there have come to the people through the workings of politics, unions, and societies, great taste, feeling and conceit of personal power that has turned the head of everybody" (1905:105). Prucha observed that the pre-civil war American army comprised a rather sorry lot, recruited from the dregs of American society and the newly arrived immigrants from Great Britain and Continental Europe...those native Americans who did enlist seemed to be the "scum of the population of the older states". (in Berryman, 1986:13)

Segal has also noted that evidence of concern on the part of commanders for the self-interested attitudes of American soldiers can be found as early as George Washington (1986:389).

56. Prior to the First World War, Kellett has found, British officers "feared that what they regarded as the traditional military virtues were being eroded in the population by such factors as excessive individualism, inadequate discipline, and the rise of unpatriotic working-class politics" (Kellett, 1982:76). Field Marshal Wolseley is said to have claimed that "the high status accorded ballet dancers and singers in Britain demonstrated that the nation was sick" (Kellett, 1982:76). Graves, who served in the Royal Welch Fusiliers in the First World War, argued that the traditional spelling of "Welch" with a 'c' was necessary in order to disassociate the regiment "from the modern North Wales of chapels, liberalism, the dairy and drapery business, state mines, and the tourist trade" (in Kellett, 1986:11).
57. Keegan, in his seminal *The Face of Battle*, pays particular attention to the battles of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme. Many soldiers, officers and other ranks alike, attended religious services at the Somme. Keegan argues that Wellington's troops had a "stylish indifference" to piety, and likely acquired their spiritual solace in the battle. The irreligiosity of Wellington's private soldiers was, Keegan finds, "part and parcel of an altogether rougher persona than even the most hardened old-sweat regiments of 1914 could show" (Keegan, 1976:241-242).

58. Reflecting on the Crimean War, Sir William Butler states in 1911 that "strong men were easily obtained, and no soldiers equalled ours in strength, courage, and endurance. That day is gone...the standard has to be reduced; men are now taken who would have been rejected with scorn a few years ago...I believe that a serious war tomorrow would prove to our cost that the army is not of the old stamp." (1911:41).

59. During the period of the Cardwell-Childers reforms in England during the 1870's, territorial titles replaced numbers in regimental designations. Senior officers strongly opposed the change, The Duke of Cambridge arguing that it threatened "the old Regimental system of our glorious Army". A retired officer wrote "Since time immemorial regiments have been numbered according to their precedence in the line. Nothing can alter the rightness of such a plan..." (in Kellett, 1986:10).
60. There is no pretense here to have surveyed a century of military writing. It is hoped, however, that the selected evidence demonstrates that the moral crisis has long been part of the world-view of the soldier, and that this sentiment can be found at the core of the assumptions upon which much military thinking, most notably the civilianization thesis, is built. Clausewitz, among the most influential of the philosophers of war, saw his own 19th century Prussian society in the same dim light which many see the modern West.

The mentality of the Germans seems to become more and more deplorable, one sees manifested everywhere such a lack of character, such a weakening of the spirit that it nearly brings tears to the eyes. I write this with infinite sadness; for there is no man in the world who values more than me the honour and dignity of his nation; but one cannot delude oneself about a phenomenon that no one could deny. (Carl von Clausewitz, in Aron, 1983:20)

Moral Ambiguity in Canadian Society

61. A recent analysis of public opinion conducted for DND (1986) by a private consulting firm challenges the vision of moral weakness in Canadian society assumed by civilianization theorists. The approach taken recognized that a question regarding willingness to join the CF in the event of a threat to our own borders would generate artificially high willingness results, given that Canadians are more likely to be actually called upon to serve outside the country in support of an ally. Despite this, 53% of male
respondents in the targeted 17-24 age group indicated some willingness to volunteer for service. Females in the same cohort were less willing, with 34% indicating some willingness. By region, overall willingness in the targeted age group varies from a high of 64% in the Maritimes to 41% in Ontario and the Prairies (DND, 1986:16,33). In addition, 48% of men and 32% of women in the target age cohort support a draft, with support in the larger population (17-40 years) similar at 50% of men and 33% of women in favour (DND, 1986:93,95).

62. In 1973-74, the federal department of Manpower and Immigration* examined the work ethics of a national sample of Canadians, attempting to assess the way individuals approach their work and its demands in terms of productivity, selectivity, and conscientiousness. When choosing the most important of the items listed - friends, work church, family, and union affiliation, 89% of respondents placed work in the first three, second only to family in frequency. Overall, the analysts concluded that Canadians in liberal democratic society are committed to work, not merely to collecting a wage, and obtain personal satisfaction from doing a good, meaningful job. Success was found to be not wholly a function of material wealth, and the great majority of Canadians (97%) would prefer working to collecting unemployment insurance benefits (Burstein, et al, 1975:21-25).

* Now "Employment and Immigration"
Social Class and Military Authority

63. Civilianization has, in the view of Crook (1975) and Cotton (1973, 1980) dispersed the once broad authority vested in senior ranks in the Canadian Forces. The dichotomous rank structure, now seen to lack legitimacy, "dates from a time when that structure accurately reflected status differentiation in the wider society" (Crook, 1975:75). Officers were once recruited from the "upper strata," other ranks from the lower. "Military rank," Crook argues, "was merely an expression of more general ascriptive bases of hierarchial role differentiation" (1975:75). Command was much facilitated by this congruence of social class and military status, as recruits could be expected to have accepted broad patterns of authority and submission prior to entrance, minimizing the difficulty of the transition from civilian to military life (Cotton, 1973:42). An emerging middle class, they argue, broke down this status congruence and the value consensus it supported. Class and status congruence mean fundamental structural linkages between civil and military society; classic military authority relations were thus based upon a close relationship with civil society. Civilianization assumes that such linkages are a relatively recent and very damaging phenomena, in contrast to the past, during which the military is to have been relatively autonomous. The process of civilianization, which is purported to have gradually absorbed the military into Canadian society, cannot by definition have also broken up an important and useful congruence between social class and military rank and status along the crucial dimension of authority relations between officers and other ranks. If in
the "golden age" of true military traditional organization, internal authority relations were a function of external class structure, and if current internal mechanisms are remunerative because of the anomic classlessness of external Canadian society, then no structural shift in civil-military relations of the kind suggested by civilianization can have occurred.

64. Civil-military relations are more complex than is presented by civilianization theory. Civilianization has been very useful, however, in serving as a framework in which to examine problems within the armed forces. Cotton, for example, identified unacceptably high rates of leadership turnover in combat units (1979:37-40). Pinch has illuminated socio-demographic aspects of Canadian society which have had and will have important consequences for recruiting. The value of these discrete findings does not lend integrity to the broader theory, however. Its images of weakness in civil life and strength in military history are part of the value system of military organization. Those who are set aside as the agents of violence in a society view those they protect to be weaker than themselves, perhaps in order for their unique role status to be legitimate. According to this line of reasoning, military personnel would have to believe that they are the strongest members of the society, else there is no reason that they should be set apart as the ultimate means for its perpetuation. Modern analysts in the civilianization tradition lend scientific authority to sentiments which reflect the way armed forces personnel and supportive observers see the social world and make sense of their own participation in
it. The moral crisis has lately gathered momentum as more social scientists are employed by military organizations. Civilianization in its modern incarnation in academic journals derives from an American policy debate over officer professionalism, and cannot be put to the same use in this country. Canada did not reject European influence in the shaping of its military institution, and does not have to continuously seek to generate a stable military tradition. Beneath the frequent superficial changes in uniforms, policy, and so on, are relatively unappreciated and unarticulated values which are in part revealed by the images central to civilianization theory.

65. Contemporary social theory which has yet to penetrate the relatively closed discipline of military sociology offers an alternate explanation and analysis of civil-military relations and will be outlined in the remaining section of this study. Such work is built on a view which recognizes and seeks to quantify the tremendous influence armed forces have had in the shaping of modern history in the West, and has particular emphasis on the influential European roots of the Canadian military. An historically informed model of change in the reciprocal relationship between armed forces and society will provide a stronger basis for analysis than civilianization theory in this period of uncertainty.
SECTION THREE: CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

66. The roots of an emerging paradigm of civil-military relations are to be found in modern schools of social theory. The neo-Weberian conflict theory of Anthony Giddens, the command economy model of William H. McNeill, and the post-structuralism of Michel Foucault view armed forces to be central actors in the historical emergence of Western civilization. Far from the pristine and vulnerable portrait of military institutions presented by the civilization thesis, modern social theorists see military culture to be one of the stronger forces which have shaped the genesis of Western societies. Two broad themes emerge in this implicit repudiation of civilianization. Firstly, military force has played a crucial catalytic role in galvanizing the development of capitalist economies through state-sponsored acquisition, expansion, regulation, and demands for technical innovation. Secondly, the social impact of armed forces has been remarkable and little appreciated, most importantly in the area of bureaucratic organization, which has become the dominant form of work in Western industrialized nations. The civilianization thesis assumes that bureaucracy is part of the penetration of civil society, and further that it is antithetical to military interests. This is a misleading, selective use of the theory of Max Weber, missing his appreciation for the tremendous power of bureaucratic control mechanisms and their fundamental military origin. The term "bureaucracy" has come to be a rhetorical device, meaning all that which involves lengthy staff work. It is, and has been, a crucial part of military
organization, is greatly misunderstood, and has transformed modern social life in part as a consequence of the example set by mass armies.

Armed Forces and National Economies

67. Classic liberal economics and Marxist economic theory both accept that the engine of the rise of capitalism has been the drive for capital accumulation; for profit in the market. The role of the state is accorded little attention, the former school viewing state expenditure as a hindrance to growth and the latter as a regulatory device to protect ownership classes. "The state, in short," Giddens writes, "is not conceived of as a nation-state, existing in relations of potential or actual antagonism toward other states" (1982:161). Rather, the history of capitalist development "is written almost wholly on an economic level, as if the sole significant influences in the world system were the production and exchange of goods" (1982:161). The rise of capitalism in Europe in the 16th century occurred, in Gidden's view, within a "military cockpit" with the emerging nation-state system as backcloth. Without the legal apparatus of the rational state and the technical and industrial demands of warfare, the unprecedented expansion of capitalism could not have occurred.

68. Neo-Weberian conflict theory argues, in sum, that the historical development of Western societies is over-simplified by the standard models. There is a complex of important causal factors at work which "must be assessed anew in each historical situation" (Domhoff, 1986:155). The
interaction of substantially autonomous governmental, economic, and military factors influences the social milieux. The three broad processes which have culminated in the social organisation of the modern west have thus been the evolution of the nation-state,* the world-wide dispersion of capitalism, and dramatic increase in military power. Conflict theory seeks to understand the relationships among these three hallmarks of the modern age and rejects polemics which claim that the "real" dynamics may be reduced to the primacy of class relations.

69. "The history of capitalism," Iverson observes, "has been a history of state protectionism (legal and military), financing, and participation" (1984:3). National governments underwrote the costs of the ventures which stimulated private capital and opened previously uncharted areas of the world to European merchants. By negotiating trade and tariff agreements with other governments, by "furnishing the necessary infrastructure of roads and rail lines, canals and harbour facilities" (Iverson, 1984:2), and by policing their working populations, nation-states created the financial and legal climate which has permitted the economic development of Europe and North America since the 16th century. As Polanyi notes, "the road to the free market was opened and kept open by an enormous increase in continuous, centrally organized and controlled interventionism" (in Iverson, 1984:3).

* Europe in 1500 was made up of 500 more or less autonomous monarchistic "Absolutist" states; by 1900 there were twenty-five nation-states (Giddens: 1981:187).
70. The displacement of craftwork by individual artisans with mass production by large numbers of relatively unskilled workers was initiated, McNeill argues, by the demands of military forces for increasing quantity and quality of armaments. The first extensive use of bronze and iron in production was in the casting of cannon for naval vessels, and the same needs prompted the adoption of the blast furnace in Flanders and the Rhineland around 1380 (Iverson, 1984:8). The massive infusion of capital by governments into their economies in the procurement of military material "inaugurated a new approach in world affairs" (McNeill, 1982:308), in which within each nation-state "innumerable bureaucratic structures that had previously acted more or less independently of one another in a context of market relationships coalesced into what amounted to a single national firm for waging war" (McNeill, 1982:317).

71. During the war of 1793-1815 against France, public expenditures by the British crown increased from 22 to 123 million pounds, which "enabled the nation to plunge into an unprecedented spate of production, which during the war years kept the work force fully employed, brought general prosperity, and enabled the population to surge" (Iverson, 1984:11). The demands of the navy had Great Britain smelting almost two million tons of iron a year by 1848, more than the rest of the world combined (Landes, 1969:95). Russians increased their capacity to produce shells in a little more than a year between 1915 and 1916 from 450,000 per month to 4.5 million per month. (McNeill, 1982:327-330).
survival as a sovereign state", demanded increasing and improving mass production techniques, "blazed the way" for technical innovation "from shell fuses and telephones to trench mortars and wristwatches" (McNeill, 1982:331). The GNP of the United States in fact doubled during the First World War (1982:346). The Japanese war economy "helped to sustain a five-fold increase in heavy industrial output between 1930 and 1942" (1982:347). These managed, or "command" economies, in which state participation in the market was of a scale impossible to achieve through private venture, have built the foundation on which modern capitalism rests. "In both capitalism and socialism," Iverson argues, "the industrializing process had advanced hand-in-glove with the growth of state power and the build-up of military power" (1984:20). Civilianization ignores the conjoining of the civil economy with the demands of military organization, a transformation central to an understanding of our history and crucial to the construction of an adequate theory of civil-military relations.

War and Economic Development in Canada

72. The First World War revived a depressed Canadian economy. "The volume and sophistication of the business that was done", Bliss argues, "was unprecedented in Canadian history" (1981:45). Subsequent months saw the creation of an industrial capability which served to introduce this country to the technology of the twentieth century.
73. Sam Hughes, then Minister of Militia and Defence, formed the Shell Committee of prominent Canadian manufacturers in late August 1914. Designed to be a funnel for munition orders direct from the British War Office, it became obvious that its vague organizational style and, many believed, arbitrary offering of contracts to certain select members were not working to advantage. The Imperial Munitions Board (IMB) took over from the Shell Committee on December 1, 1915 and consolidated its operation under the direction of J.W. Flavelle, a successful Toronto businessman. Consequently, as will be demonstrated in the following paragraphs, Canadian's productive capacity and contribution to the war increased dramatically.

74. Canada shipped 5,000 fifteen and eighteen-pound artillery shells overseas in 1914. In 1917, we sent 23,782,000 shells (Naylor, 1981:36), which was "between one-quarter and one-third of all the ammunition used by British artillery in France, more than half the shrapnel" (Bliss, 1981:49). By 1917 the IMB was "spending money in Canada at a rate three times that of the expenditure of the entire Canadian government apparatus" (Naylor, 1981:36). At the peak of munitions production, more than 600 factories employed a quarter of a million workers, making almost 100,000 rounds of ammunition a day. Total munitions and armaments expenditures in Canada during the war totalled one and a quarter billion dollars (Naylor, 1981:36). In a country with a total government budget of $185 million in 1913 (1981:48), Canada produced "65 million shells, 49 million cartridge cases, 30 million fuses, 35 million primers, 112 million pounds of explosives, 2,900 airplanes, 88 ships, and other assorted supplies" (Bliss, 1981:55) during the hostilities.
75. Total exports of iron and steel products "rose in value from $68.5 million in 1915 to $441.5 million in 1917", Naylor has found, while the value of non-ferrous minerals and metals went from $19.2 million in 1915 to $142 million in 1917 (Bird, 1962:39). Government budgets, aside from IMB munitions and armaments expenditure, almost tripled between 1914 and 1919 from $246 million to $740 million (Naylor, 1981:48). These figures indicate that the conjoining of state, military, and corporate actors in the war years stimulated sectors of the Canadian economy in a manner impossible to achieve through market mechanisms of peacetime competition and relative unregulation.

76. The advent of hostilities in 1939 found similar confusion in the planning of material production. It was not until April of 1940, with the abolition of the War Supply Board and the passage of the Munitions and Supply Act (conferring substantial emergency powers on the Minister of Munitions and Supply, who at that time was C.D. Howe) that effective organization and execution began. Howe told his officials that "If we lose the war nothing will matter...if we win the war the cost will still have been of no consequence and will have been forgotten" (In Bothwell, 1981:61-62. As in the Great War, prominent businessman entered the employ of the government to coordinate the awarding of Allied material contracts to Canadian manufactures. "A highly centralized structure of authority", Bothwell argues, with ultimate control by the government, "permitted a highly decentralized system of management and direction" in which needs and demands were transformed into concrete productive forces throughout the country (1981:62).
77. The expansion of aircraft production is one of the more notable achievements of the period. Between September 1939 and December 1940, 904 aircraft were produced; in 1941, 1,699 were made, and in 1942 a total of 3,781 (Bothwell, 1981:64). Munitions and Supply constructed 98 new war plants, spending $490 million, with a further $166 million provided to modernize private plants, such as a new blast furnace capable of producing 1,000 tons of steel a day built at Algoma Steel in Sault Ste. Marie (1981:65).

78. Farm income in four rural Southern Ontario townships increased from $2,300 a year in 1939 to $3,700 in 1943. In the relatively urban region of North Waterloo, 9,239 men and 4,288 women were employed in 1939. In 1943, 11,411 men and 6,824 women were working, an increase in the work force of 8,037 jobs or 52%, despite the fact that over the same period 3,198 men and 131 women from the area joined the armed forces (English, 1981:105). Further, average wages rose more than 50% as the total payroll doubled, as did aggregate and manufacturing sales (1981:106).

79. Statistics measuring economic variables during the Second World War are far more sophisticated than those available for the period prior to 1926*. As Table 1 demonstrates, the impact of war on national income and Gross National Product (GNP) was clear. The GNP proper had changed little in the decades prior the war, at $5.1

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* For a discussion of each of the concepts used, such as the meaning of the Gross National Product (GNP), see Crozier, 1983.
TABLE I

NATIONAL INCOME AND CROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, by selected components, 1929 to 1946 (in millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>4</th>
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<td>554</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>393</td>
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</table>

Components:

1. Wages, salaries, and supplementary labour income
2. Military pay and allowances
3. Corporation profits before taxes
4. Interest and miscellaneous investment income
5. Accrued net income of farm operators from farm production
6. Net national income at factor cost
7. Gross national product at market prices

Source: Crozier, 1983: Series Fl-F13
billion in 1926 and $5.7 billion in 1930, and having in fact fallen during the depression to $3.5 billion in 1933 and was at $5.3 billion on the eve of war in 1938.

80. The war was a tremendous impetus to Canadian business. Corporate profits before taxes slumped badly in the early 1930's, falling to a total of $32 million in 1932, and had stabilized at $509 million in 1938. The war saw profits more than double from $698 million in 1939 to $1.47 billion in 1946 (Table I).

81. The net income accrued by farmers nearly tripled between 1938 and 1946, from $353 million to $1.03 billion respectively. While net farm income averaged just $130 million annually from 1930 to 1935, in the post-war years it has fallen below $1 billion only three times and never lower than $826 million (Table I and see Crozier, 1983:F6).

82. Exports of Canadian goods and services were worth a total of $1.3 billion in 1938, and rose to $3.6 billion by war's end. Government expenditure on goods and services within the country averaged $452 million in the period 1926-1938, never falling below $390 million or exceeding $515 million. Through six years of war, government spending on Canadian goods and services increased 867% from $566 million in 1939 to $4.929 billion in 1945 (in Crozier, 1983:F15). When these calculations of government domestic spending on goods and services are expressed in constant 1971 dollars, the change is in fact more dramatic, rising from $2.7 billion in 1939 to $13.3 billion in 1945 (1983:F34).
TABLE II

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) AT FACTOR COST, by selected industries, 1929 to 1946 (in millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<td>39</td>
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</table>

Selected Industries:

1. Agriculture
2. Forestry
3. Fishing and Trapping
4. Mines, Quarries, and Oil Wells
5. Manufacturing
6. Construction

Source: Crozier, 1981: F56-F61
83. An examination of the influence of the war on the gross domestic product (GDP) of various industries* is instructive (Table II). The value of agricultural, manufacturing and construction industries more than doubled, fishing and trapping tripled while forestry quadrupled during the period 1938-1946.

84. No assumption is made here that military demands were the sole significant influence in the development of the Canadian economy. The goal has rather been to demonstrate that the conjoining of state, military, and economic interests into the centrally directed force W.H. McNeill calls the "command economy" in time of war has been a crucial agent of change; building an industrial infrastructure and institutionalizing the enduring role of the state in the regulation of peaceful, purposive economic competition and the maintenance of a stable working population. The foundations upon which Canadian capitalism relies could not have emerged in their present form without the tremendous modernizing impetus provided by armed forces in the conduct of war. Civilianization assumes that armed forces have had limited institutional power or independent effect on the strong currents of civil society, a view which substantially limits its theoretical utility.

*Calculated at factor cost rather than market price. GDP is effectively GNP less net income paid to non-residents.
Military Organization and the Bureaucratic-Disciplinary Society

85. With few exceptions, the socio-historical role of military organization in the rise of the West is little appreciated. The German theorist Max Weber, however, understood as Janowitz observes that "military organization was the prototype of modern organizations" (1976:188). For Weber, "The discipline of the army gives birth to all discipline" (1968:1155). The ancestor of the modern bureaucratic official is in fact the military officer of the early professional and mass armies*, and the control of troops evidenced therein the leading edge of a transformation in rational over paternal mechanisms of authority now pervasive in modern social institutions.

86. The "elective affinity" which united large-scale capitalist industrial enterprise with bureaucratic structure in the 19th century was made possible by the convincing demonstration of the human power of bureaucracy on the battlefields of Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries. Emerging nation-states monopolized the means of violence in specific territories by introducing secular, rational mechanisms of control which dispersed the broad, mystical, and paternalistic powers of feudal military commanders and centralized the "ownership" of military forces in the state (Gerth and Mills, 1958:48-50). The autonomy of individual warriors and their mercenary associations, of that time motivated primarily by prospects of materialistic plunder (see Keegan, 1976), was shattered when it became cruelly clear that independently heroic warriors, fighting on

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* Weber makes no distinction between these two types of organization, arguing that their internal authority structures were effectively the same during that period (See Gerth and Mills, 1958:260-1).
horseback with light weapons and courageous if uncoordinated initiative, could not match the violent machinations of a closely disciplined, heavily armed, and well-supported bureaucratically structured army. The Franco-Prussian war of 1877 is considered by many to be the watershed of this historical shift, in which seemingly invincible hardened French veterans, who were led by fiat by their most experienced soldiers, were crushingly defeated by the Prussians and their essentially civilian massed troops. When the Prussians lost an officer, another stepped in to perpetuate the "enduring, established, and objective conditions of a disciplined machine" (Weber, 1978:145). Without this "routinized charisma", without the highly developed division of labour and well articulated duties and responsibilities existing in the rational-legal plan, the French command structure with its reliance on charismatic and experienced leadership dissolved with the deaths of its NCO's (McNeill, 1982). It was a triumph of the plan over the hero, of rules and regulations over courage and cunning. For Max Weber, "nothing is more efficient and more precise than bureaucratic management" (Gerth and Mills, 1958:50). When a bureaucracy is firmly established, Weber argues, it "is among those social structures which are among the hardest to destroy... and where the bureaucratization of administration has been completely carried through, a form of power relation is established that is practically unshatterable. We must remember this fact...that 'democracy' as such is opposed to the 'rule' of bureaucracy" (Weber, 1968). Weber is not saying here that there are no heroes in modern combat; this point is often understood. Rather, he argues that successful armies have institutionalized or regulated
heroism by identifying technical factors that work in the command of troops and teaching officers these methods, rather than relying upon the rise of charismatic skills from the crucible of experience. The modern bureaucratic army seeks to de-mystify the hero, to make aspects of his behaviour predictable aspects of the behaviour of soldiers and most importantly their officers. This is in fact the latent intent of "leadership by example".

87. "Sins generally attributed to bureaucracy", Perrow has observed, "are not sins at all or are consequences of the failure to bureaucratize sufficiently". Those who work in the civilianization tradition relate a long litany of problems to "bureaucracy", and have served to obscure the source of these difficulties. Far from being antithetical to military organization, the classic modern military institutional form is clearly a bureaucracy. A bureaucracy is, fundamentally, an impersonal system of organization with a hierarchy of positions or offices filled by individuals who attain a higher office through the demonstration of the knowledge and skill necessary for that position. The duties of each office are recorded in widely available written documents, and the organization runs according to rules which are "more or less stable, more or less exhaustive, and which can be learned" (Gerth and Mills, 1958:198). Higher offices supervise lower, and respect for individuals in higher offices is directed to the quality of their offices rather than the persons inhabiting them. Communication flows up and down in the form of information and orders. Officials make the goals of the organization their own, and inextricably link their own careers with the survival of the
organization. Their duties demand their full working capacity. While this is a crude and brief description, it is possible to see that each of these most basic principles are central to the ideal of the classic military institution. As General Liston found upon examination of the literature of modern business management theory, the great schism thought to exist between the way the military and civilian business would like to direct and motivate their people is largely a myth (Liston, 1977). The ideal to which all large, complex organizations aspire is remarkably similar, and is based upon the triumph of scientific reasoning and logical, predictable coordination over the wasteful, disordered tyranny of individual action. When those in the civilianization tradition clamour against bureaucracy, they in fact remind us only that the ideal bureaucracy is impossible. Not all officers and soldiers will take the values of the military to their hearts, and no perfect system of administration to direct an inherently unpredictable human machine will be devised. The "problem", thus, is not bureaucracy, but the continuing inability of people to fit perfectly into seamlessly ordered systems of organization. Bureaucracies generally, and armed forces in particular, are on one level attempts to impose predictability on an inherently chaotic environment. Military organizations have maximized bureaucratic potential as no other and are the archetypal forms to which all large organizations aspire in their similar search for a system which individuals will collectively internalize and become disciplined members.
Weber's analysis of the secular advance of rationality at the expense of sacred truths concentrates on the legal and political strata of modern societies. Foucault extends this argument, as O'Neill (1986, 1986a) has argued, examining the rational bureaucratic discipline working through central institutions in the disciplinary society. Foucault attempts to identify the mechanisms of power generated within the central institutions of army, school, factory, and hospital, and relate these to the broader historical shift toward the rational society. At its most basic, Foucault's theory sees history as having replaced "overt violence by moralization" in the control of Western populations, a process most clearly seen in punishment. The gradual replacement of corporal and capital punishment with psychological incarceration, the former being a ritual "intended to restore the sanctity of the law being broken", and the latter part of a "pervasive, impersonal system of surveillance and correction...to the 'psychology' of the individual, since intention rather than transgression now becomes the central criterion of culpability" (Dews, 1984 :76) is evidence for Foucault of the growing power of scientific ideology in western institutions. This shift in the military has seen the off-noted increasing reliance on self-discipline in the socialization of recruits. The modern soldier is expected to be motivated by an internalized spirit of will, and is no longer considered to be effectively socialized when he is willing to move principally under threat of punishment. The value of Foucault's ideas for military sociology are that he points out that the disappearance of flogging and so on in peacetime have not meant that a powerful capability to control men has disappeared. It has, in the rise of
bureaucratic discipline largely precipitated by military institutions themselves, signalled the rise of a form of discipline far superior to the old, the strongest form of control yet devised to produce men who are "regimented, isolated, and self-policing subjects" (Dews, 1984:77).

The moment that saw the transition from historico-ritual mechanisms for the formation of individuality to the scientific-disciplinary mechanism, when the normal took over from the ancestral, and measurement from status, thus substituting for the individuality of the memorable man that of the calculable man, that moment when the sciences of man become possible is the moment when a new technology of power and new political anatomy of the body were implemented. (Foucault, 1979:193)

89. The disciplinary process which Foucault calls the bio-politics of a population (see O'Neill, 1986, 1986a) is in large measure an abstraction of the powerful mechanisms of the classic modern military institutional model, emphasizing the administration of techniques of corporeal, attitudinal, and behavioural discipline. Every moment of training, every aspect of the soldier's physical environment, his every action in the presence of fellows or superiors is considered and measured against standards of expected returns. It is the omniscient presence of military influence which is the basis of its effect; for Foucault it is analogous to the image of a "gaze" which is everywhere and all-seeing. The military member never escapes this gaze, and is subjectively motivated to satisfy its moral demands. He is aware of minute qualities of his dress, of his physical bearing, of his attitude toward juniors and superiors. This is above all the function of drill and "bull", and in the following section the work of William H. McNeil in this area will be discussed in some detail.
90. McNeill locates the initial phase of the bureaucratization of military discipline in 12th century Italy with the earliest successful challenges of mounted knights by organized infantry (1982:142). After spreading to French and Spanish territories in the low countries, and in the 17th century taking root in the Germanies, Sweden, England, and Russia, the dramatic advances of the Prussians signalled the primacy of the emerging military order. The Dutch "pioneered important improvements in military administration and routine...they discovered that long hours of repeated drill made armies more efficient in battle", imparting "a remarkable esprit de corps to the rank and file, even when the soldiers were recruited from the lowest ranks of society" (1982:117). These basic mechanisms of disciplining and motivating troops, which continue to be used to great advantage in armies throughout the world, merit protracted analytical attention. "Being heirs of the European past", McNeill argues, we take fundamental aspects of the reality of military life for granted "and lose the sense of wonder they properly deserve" (1982:133).

91. Drill allowed armies to become "an articulated organism with a central nervous system that allowed sensitive and more or less intelligent response to unforeseen circumstances" (1982:130). Movements and actions of large groups of men could be coordinated and predicted as never before. Repetition of weapons drills permitted a volume of fire never before achieved.
The dexterity and resolution of individual infantrymen scarcely mattered anymore. Process and personal courage all but disappeared beneath an armoured routine... troops drilled in the Maurician fashion automatically exhibited superior effectiveness in battle. As this came to be recognized, the old irregular and heroic patterns of military behaviour withered and died, even among the most recalcitrant officers and gentlemen. (McNeill, 1982:130)

92. It was the breakdown of primary communities, of shared tribal warrior identity characteristic of pre-industrial societies, conjoined with the rise of scientific method, which led to bureaucratically structured military organizations. "European drillmasters created artificial primary communities in the ranks of otherwise technically proficient armies, thanks to the remarkable way in which a few weeks of drill created sentiments of solidarity, even among previously isolated individuals" (1982:132). Bureaucratic discipline overcomes the anomic individualism of modern life through regimentation, replacing the collective consciousness of the tribe with the strident moral voice and gaze communicated by ubiquitous modern military culture, fomenting an artificial social order through omnipresent techniques of management. Every hostile engagement over these centuries both consolidated the success of bureaucratic discipline and suggested refinements. Recruits came to be separated from their homes, cut off from comfortable benchmarks which had served as their area of origin's particular source of identity, and drill "swiftly and dependably transformed obedience and deference defined by custom into obedience and deference defined by regulation" (1982:132).
93. There is no convincing social-psychological theory which explains the undeniable power of drill in turning masses of individuals into disciplined soldiers. McNeill argues that

when a group of men move their arm and by muscles in unison for prolonged periods of time, a primitive and very powerful social bond wells up among them. This probably results from the fact that movement of the big muscles in unison arouses echoes of the most primitive level of sociality known to humankind... Such rhythmic movements created an intense fellow feeling that allowed even poorly armed protohumans to attack and kill big game, outstripping far more formidable rituals through efficient cooperation. By virtue of the dance, supplemented and eventually controlled by voice signals and commands, our ancestors elevated themselves to the pinnacle of the food chain, becoming the most formidable of predators. (McNeill, 1982:131).

94. Further, McNeill suggests, the power of bureaucratic rules and their principle manifestation in drill may be explained by the fact that the "human flotsam and jetsam" populating European mass armies found "psychological satisfaction" in predictable and carefully ordered military rituals, "an honourable refuge from a world in which buying and selling had become so pervasive as to handicap severely those who lacked the necessary pecuniary self-restraint, cunning, and foresight" (1982:133). Military life offers for many a locus of identity in a world awash in competing values and truths. McNeill concludes that
Traditional methods for inculcating and sustaining military discipline remain very effective. Close order drill has lost none of its capacity to arouse elemental sociality among those who participate in it hour after hour. Its utter irrelevance in modern combat may not matter. Other rituals and routines, too, may arise and exert self-perpetuating power to channel and stabilize behaviours both within the armed services and in civil society at large. Routine and ritual constitute the standard substitute for faith of the incandescent, personal, and revolutionary kind. As such faiths - Marxist or Liberal democratic, as the case may be - fade towards mere shibboleth, ritual and routine alone remain. (1982:383)

95. This has been, at best, a limited and selective outline of the growing literature attempting to come to terms with the role armed forces have had and continue to have in Western nations, while explicitly rejecting the reductionist Marxian schools of military sociology. Further, this emerging theory avoids the assumptions which plague civilianization theory, in which the central role of armed forces in the genesis of Western society and capitalist economy is largely ignored.
CONCLUSION

96. In the period between the early 1940's and the mid 1980's, approximately 20% of all governments on earth "were installed as the direct result of the use of organized violence" (Hannewan, 1986:75). More than 40% of all governments had military personnel on their highest executive councils, and approximately one government in four was in fact headed by a military officer (Hannewan, 1986). The portrait of sanguine vulnerability and relative powerless­ness of Western armed forces fundamental to civilianization theory ignores broad historical truths, central among these being the tremendous influence military institutions have had upon civil society. Military personnel have seen, since the birth of the modern bureaucratic force, frightening moral weakness in civil societies and concommitantly escalating penetration of individualistic values into the core of the military way. In fact, no period in Western history of true military virtue, of true collective commitment, of true societal positive consensus toward the military has ever been identified. The imminent death of the military spirit prophesied by generations of officers and contemporary military sociologists is a futile rejection of transformations in social structure centuries old which broke down the linkages between individuals and societies. Bureaucratic discipline has functioned as a scientific replacement for this linkage, fostered principally through drill in military socialization, a process which has never reached fruition and will never fully artificially bond fragmented peoples to arbitrary moral prescriptions, despite the seemingly consistent and, for many, utterly fulfilling
meaning associated with military life. Ponderous modern military bureaucracy has lasted these many years in the absence of unifying cultural values, and has been considerably refined. The gradual disappearance of "traditional" methods of punishment is not evidence of increasing weakness, but quite the opposite. A more subtle, more convincing, and more effective moral spirit persuades troops that a dishonourable act is a destructive one, a spirit which no longer is crudely inculcated through coercive punishment but rather operates subjectively among individual soldiers. A number of factors discussed in this paper suggest that Canadians will answer the call in the future as they have done in the past; many unwillingly and all in fear, while the seeming discordancy and unheroic chaos of modern societies fosters the belief that a moral crisis of commitment is at hand.

97. Nothing in this paper in any way suggests that Canadians in our past do not deserve the honour and respect which they are now accorded for their bravery. This paper has tried to demonstrate only that a very selective vision of history will not suffice as a foundation for a social theory upon which to build programs for a more effective future. The core ideas guiding the most influential paradigm in military sociology are images of moral strength in military history and spiritual weakness in contemporary civil life. Emerging schools of social theory provide a superior historical grounding of civil-military relations, and avoid the brooding assertions of civilianization theory and its enduring apocalyptic vision.
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